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Author SHA1 Message Date
Dai Ha ea12107497 fleetd #345: test timeout cancellation race
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2026-09-04 16:30:46 +07:00
Dai Ha 591df91de1 Merge #337: the deferred key set proves its own reporting coverage too
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2026-09-04 16:16:20 +07:00
Dai Ha 6a814176f0 #339: the start-of-line check must skip terminal chrome
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#339 stopped a member's own prose about an error from recording a credential
outage, by requiring the pattern at the start of its matched line. A bare
lookingAt also rejected a genuine error line rendered as

    | 503 Service Unavailable: upstream credential rejected

The send still failed, but the outage was never recorded. That is the false
negative #339's own invariant 3 named as worse than the false positive it set
out to fix: an unrecorded outage leaves the fleet spawning into a dead
credential.

Measured with a throwaway probe on the raw-scrape path, whose own comment says
to expect leading chrome there: kind=FAILED, sinkNotified=0.

startsWithBackendError now skips a leading run of non-letter, non-digit
characters before the check. That keeps #339's intent: prose still does not
match, because there the pattern sits after words rather than after chrome.
The worker's own prose test still passes.

Mutation: restoring the bare lookingAt fails the new test.
2026-09-04 16:13:19 +07:00
Dai Ha d11d1d157c Merge #339: a backend-error text match must be at the start of its line before it records a credential outage 2026-09-04 16:08:46 +07:00
Dai Ha d057d56156 #341: pin the noise control, and the reverse policy order
The fix reported every distinct unprotected name, but nothing held it there.

Mutation: replacing .filter(unprotectedGapNamesWarned::add) with a filter that
adds and always returns true - so every name is logged on every spawn - left
all 1358 tests green. The Set behaved; nothing proved this class used it as a
guard rather than as a record.

Two tests added:

- theSameUnprotectedNameIsWarnedAboutOnlyOnceAcrossSpawns pins invariant 1, the
  noise control. It now fails on that mutation, showing both duplicate WARNs.
- anAllowListWarnDoesNotSuppressALaterDenyByDefaultWarnForADifferentName covers
  the reverse policy order. The defect was found going deny-by-default then
  allow-list; a guard fixed in one direction is not fixed in the other.
2026-09-04 16:07:50 +07:00
Dai Ha d703ce1313 #337: extend ConfigRefTopLevelReportingCoverageTest to DEFERRED_KEYS
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ConfigRefTopLevelReportingCoverageTest (added by #333) proved every COLD_KEYS
and SPLIT_KEYS member has a real comparison behind it, but left
DEFERRED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS unexercised. Re-measured by mutation (drop each
key's branch from changedDeferredKeys, run the suite, restore): 6 of the 11
deferred keys had no behavioural test naming them — guard, leadHeartbeat,
worktreeRoot, spawnReadyTimeoutMs, spawnReadyPollMs, quarantineCooldownSeconds
— which corrects the issue's own guessed list in two ways: lifecycle is
actually covered (ConfigRefTest.aDeferredChangeIsAppliedAndReported), and
worktreeRoot was missing from the issue's list entirely.

Promoted the test-side DEFERRED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS copy into ConfigRef.DEFERRED_KEYS
(package-private, alongside COLD_KEYS/SPLIT_KEYS) so the reflective test reads
the same set changedDeferredKeys is compared against, and made
changedDeferredKeys package-private so the test can call it directly. Every
DEFERRED_KEYS component turned out to be a scalar or a simple record, so no
exclusion set was needed.

Mutation proof: dropping guard's branch from changedDeferredKeys leaves the
whole suite green except the new
everyDeferredKeyIsActuallyReportedByChangedDeferredKeys test, which fails
naming guard exactly.
2026-09-04 16:06:09 +07:00
Dai Ha b32a30fd47 Merge #341: warn once per distinct unprotected credential name, not once per launcher 2026-09-04 16:02:51 +07:00
Dai Ha 464dbc0930 fleetd#341: a per-name guard so a later spawn's different unprotected name still warns
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unprotectedGapLogged was one AtomicBoolean guarding two WARN branches in
logCredentialGap that name different env var names (the allow-list
keptByDerivedList branch, and warnGapUnprotected's deny-by-default /
non-zsh-fallback branch). memberCredentials is a live, re-read-per-spawn
supplier, so between two spawns a policy reload can change which names are
in the gap: spawn 1 warns about name A and trips the shared flag, and
spawn 2's gap containing a different name B never gets its WARN.

Replace the AtomicBoolean with unprotectedGapNamesWarned, a
ConcurrentHashMap-backed Set<String> guard keyed per name (same shape as
OpenCodeLauncher.modelCheckSkippedWarned), so each distinct credential-shaped
name is warned about exactly once, ever, regardless of which branch or
which spawn first reports it. allowListGapLogged (the separate INFO guard,
#192) is untouched. Neither WARN's wording changed.
2026-09-04 15:59:43 +07:00
Dai Ha a8cadd9150 Merge #338: a timed-out queued send cancels its message instead of leaving it to be delivered later
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2026-09-04 15:57:39 +07:00
Dai Ha 57b8c0b56d fleetd #339: guard backend error sink
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2026-09-04 15:57:18 +07:00
Dai Ha 147f50c19e #338: cancel timed-out queued deliveries
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2026-09-04 15:56:10 +07:00
Dai Ha eee4d576a2 #333: the Cold doc bullet listed four keys, COLD_KEYS has five
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memberHerdrSocket was missing from the prose. The #333 worker spotted it and
correctly left it alone as outside its scope.

Fixed by pointing the bullet at COLD_KEYS instead of re-listing its contents,
so the prose and the set cannot drift apart a second time.
2026-09-04 15:43:39 +07:00
Dai Ha b4f9d7f53a Merge #333: fleet: is a split key, and split membership now proves a reporting branch exists 2026-09-04 15:39:02 +07:00
Dai Ha 3aca53b967 fleetd#333: fleet.leaders is split too, and split membership now proves reporting exists
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F1: fleet: was sitting in ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest's HOT_EXCLUDED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS
escape hatch, even though fleet.leaders is read only at startup (LeadTabScanner's
identity map, LeadLauncher.ensureLeads) while the rest of fleet: (role pools,
charters, tabLabel) is live. A reload changing only fleet.leaders reported a bare
"config reloaded" -- the operator edits a lead's tab: label, sees the reload
succeed, and the pane keeps resolving as a worker. Moved fleet into
ConfigRef.SPLIT_KEYS; changedSplitKeys now compares fleet.leaders specifically
(not the whole Fleet record, which would over-claim "restart" for a tabLabel-only
change) and names both halves in the message.

F2: membership in SPLIT_KEYS/COLD_KEYS never proved a matching branch existed in
changedSplitKeys/changedColdKeys -- measured by dropping the coordinator branch
while leaving "coordinator" in SPLIT_KEYS: both ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest and
the in-method "kept in step" assert stayed green. Added
ConfigRefTopLevelReportingCoverageTest, the ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest mechanism
one level up: reflection-built FleetConfig pairs that differ in exactly one
top-level component, calling the real (now package-private) changedColdKeys/
changedSplitKeys to prove each COLD_KEYS/SPLIT_KEYS member is actually reported.
Scoped to split+cold, not deferred -- see the new test's javadoc for why and what
that leaves open.

Both findings carry a behavioural test in ConfigRefTest plus a mutation proof
(revert -> real failure -> restore) recorded in the PR description.
2026-09-04 15:36:40 +07:00
Dai Ha 4aa1fae296 #329: a null task in answer() is not only "never an async ticket"
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The comment that landed with #329 said a null task means the turn was never
an async ticket. That is wrong, and it makes the guard read as complete.

A genuine async ticket also reaches answer() with task == null. ask() runs
clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, true) in its catch block, which drops the
asyncTasksByTurn entry, while rendezvous.closeAsk(turnId) runs later, in its
finally. Between the two the ask is still answerable and the map entry is
already gone, so answer()'s lookup returns null and the ticket is stranded.

Measured with a throwaway probe firing only that first half: answer() reported
REPLIED while the ticket stayed PENDING with a null reply. The probe used
forgetTurnForTest, so it omits markAskTimedOut; that cannot change the outcome,
because askTimedOut is read only by askAnsweredAsyncTasks, which reply() never
reaches while answer()'s own waiter is live.

Open as fleetd #334. The comment now says so.
2026-09-04 15:33:57 +07:00
Dai Ha 0c865032f9 Merge #329: log an exception thrown after a ticket resolves, complete the ticket from the task answer() already holds, and read orphan.turnId once 2026-09-04 15:26:45 +07:00
Dai Ha ea41bbf6b9 fleetd#329: fix silent async-ticket bugs in MessageService (F1/F2/F3)
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F2 (sendAsync executor catch): log when completeExceptionally returns
false, so an exception thrown after finishAsyncTask already completed
the ticket's future is no longer silently lost.

F1 (answer()'s stranded async ticket): reuse the Task reference answer()
already looked up before rendezvous.answerAsk(), instead of a second
asyncTasksByTurn lookup by turnId in finishAsyncTask. The second lookup
raced ask()'s unlocked timeout cleanup, which could forget turnId first
and leave the ticket stuck PENDING even though answer() itself returned
REPLIED. The #282 chained-ask guard is unaffected: it is still keyed on
result.outcome() == QUESTION, not on this lookup. Removed the now-unused
finishAsyncTask(String, Reply) overload.

F3 (reply()'s orphan recovery path): read orphan.turnId once instead of
twice, closing the same double-read shape fleetd #324 fixed in
finishAsyncTask.

Each fix has its own test plus a test-only race hook (mirroring #324's
finishAsyncTaskRaceHook) to force the exact interleaving deterministically.
Mutation-tested each fix by reverting it, confirming the real failure
(swallowed exception / PENDING ticket / NullPointerException), then
restoring it.

mvn clean install: Tests run: 1345, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0,
BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-09-04 15:19:38 +07:00
Dai Ha 7b918c51ff Merge #330: a fourth reload class for split keys, and a top-level coverage checker
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2026-09-04 15:19:14 +07:00
Dai Ha 554395b104 fleetd#330: split reload class for health/coordinator + top-level coverage
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Unit 1: ConfigRef gets a fourth reload class, `split`, for keys read both
off the startup snapshot and live off config.get() at different sites
(health:, coordinator:). A split change is accepted (Outcome.applied()
stays true) and reported by name, naming which half is live and which
needs a restart, via a new Outcome.split() field kept separate from
deferred() since the two carry different guarantees for any caller that
branches on them, not just prose in summary(). Class doc updated: four
classes now, denominator note no longer calls health/coordinator
undecided.

Unit 2: ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest enumerates FleetConfig's 22
top-level record components and requires each to sit in exactly one of
COLD_KEYS, a pinned "compared in changedDeferredKeys" set, SPLIT_KEYS, or
a pinned hot-exclusion escape hatch — printing its own denominator and
pinning the escape hatch's exact contents the way #323 asked for.

Deviates from the issue's starting values by one key: `profiles` moves
from the suggested Hot bucket into the deferred bucket, because
changedDeferredKeys demonstrably compares it (add/remove and launch
settings), and citing "read live off the config supplier" for the whole
key would be false — most Profile fields are not read live, only
weight/maxLoad/credentialId are (and those are already covered by
ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest). Cold=5, split=2, deferred=11, hot=4,
total=22 — verified against the record and against ConfigRef's code, not
copied from the issue.
2026-09-04 15:16:45 +07:00
Dai Ha 823976c1b5 #326: state primary's real consequence, and write down the denominator
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The merged javadoc said a changed primary.terminal leaves a lead 'unresolved as
primary until a restart'. That over-claims. CB-532 made the pin deprecated:
identity comes from leaders:/leadScan:, and Fleetd.java:511 warns about the pin
at startup. A changed pin still needs a restart, but for the fallback nudge
destination, the deprecated identity path, and pushReminders/pushBackoffMs -
not for a lead that uses leaders:.

Also record what I measured. FleetConfig has 22 top-level components; four are
named nowhere in ConfigRef. memberCredentials and memberLoginShell are hot and
correctly absent (both read live off config.get() at spawn). health and
coordinator are undecided, not hot. 'Absent' looks the same for both kinds, and
twice now the forgotten kind hid among the correct kind.
2026-09-04 14:58:07 +07:00
Dai Ha c8388a7f92 Merge #326: primary and configReload are deferred keys, so a reload says a restart is needed 2026-09-04 14:53:50 +07:00
Dai Ha 02e6aef98c Merge #324: read task.turnId once in finishAsyncTask, so a concurrent clear cannot make the removal key null
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2026-09-04 14:44:42 +07:00
Dai Ha 6d493bc7bb fleetd#326: classify primary and configReload as deferred top-level keys
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ConfigRef.changedDeferredKeys only classified seven top-level FleetConfig
keys (#323 fixed the profile side). Two more keys are read only off the
startup snapshot and were missing:

- primary: Fleetd.java:506/519/520 feed PrimaryRegistry and ReplyPushLoop
  at construction; neither is rebuilt on reload.
- configReload: Fleetd.java:679-680 decide once at startup whether to
  build a ConfigWatcher at all, and with what interval; the watcher that
  would apply a later change is itself built once, so it is deferred
  (not cold — no already-open resource goes inconsistent, a running
  watcher just keeps its original settings).

health and coordinator are deliberately left unclassified: both are read
both off the startup snapshot AND live off the config supplier at a
second call site, so no single bucket is correct for either — see the
PR body for the options writeup and the coordinator.uriEnv exposure
question the issue asked to be answered.

Each fix is proven with a failing-first test in ConfigRefTest and a
revert-quote-restore mutation check (see PR body for the transcripts).
2026-09-04 14:42:24 +07:00
Dai Ha e5cb51a90e #324: read task.turnId once in finishAsyncTask to stop an NPE from ask()'s unlocked forgetting
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answer() holds sessionLocks while finishAsyncTask reads the volatile Task.turnId twice — once to
check it is non-null, once as the ConcurrentHashMap.remove key. ask()'s own timeout path mutates
the same field with no lock, via clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, true). volatile makes each read fresh
but not the pair atomic, so the field can go null between the two reads and remove(null, task)
throws NullPointerException on the lead's own answer() call, even though the reply already
completed on the line above.

Capture task.turnId into a local once and use that for both the check and the removal.

Added a package-private test seam (finishAsyncTaskRaceHook + forgetTurnForTest) so a test can force
the exact interleaving deterministically, by running the identical clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, true)
cleanup ask() uses, at the point between finishAsyncTask's former two reads. Both are inert (null)
in production.
2026-09-04 14:38:52 +07:00
Dai Ha e545c08082 #323: pin the exclusion set — the coverage mechanism's own escape hatch, found by mutation
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2026-09-04 14:32:08 +07:00
Dai Ha efa0deb9b2 Merge #323: the reload classifier proves its own coverage instead of claiming it 2026-09-04 14:29:10 +07:00
Dai Ha ca47e90c01 fleetd#323: close the reload-classifier drift with a reflection coverage test
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ConfigRef.sameLaunchSettings' javadoc claimed it compares every component
the launcher reads at spawn. It missed ideProjectDir, ideOpenCommand and
autoCompactWindow, and changedDeferredKeys separately missed worktreeGroup
(baked into the same GitWorktrees as worktreeRoot, Fleetd.java:251). A
reload that changed only one of those keys reported "config reloaded" with
nothing deferred, and the running daemon kept the old value.

Fix the four instances, and add ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest: it enumerates
every FleetConfig.Profile record component by reflection, mutates each one
not in the new ConfigRef.LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED set on a base profile,
and asserts sameLaunchSettings actually notices — so a fifth missed field
fails the build by name instead of drifting silently. It also prints its
own denominator (26 components, 23 compared, 3 excluded) per the ticket's
requirement that a checker must be able to state what it checked.

Also add the `profile` field itself to the comparison (it was neither
compared nor excluded before this fix — the coverage test surfaced it).

Rewrote the sameLaunchSettings javadoc to describe what the coverage test
actually guarantees instead of repeating the unchecked claim.
2026-09-04 14:26:09 +07:00
Dai Ha fa1f49675b Merge #318: a delivery landing after release is refused, not parked in a map nobody reads
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2026-09-04 14:21:29 +07:00
Dai Ha 8426c3528f #316: pin the fail-toward-preserve rule on the late re-check, found by mutation
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2026-09-04 14:20:36 +07:00
Dai Ha 65f98ba910 Merge #316: the dirty check that authorises the worktree removal is taken after the worker stops 2026-09-04 14:17:13 +07:00
Dai Ha d05205d1eb Add a hunter skill: a sweep and a diff review are different jobs with different output contracts
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2026-09-04 14:13:08 +07:00
Dai Ha 667254df47 #316: re-check worktree dirtiness after the pane stops, before removing it
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SessionManager.releaseRemoved read hasUncommitted() once, while the worker
could still write, then used that stale boolean after launcher.stop() to
authorise `git worktree remove --force`. The same stale read also gated
trySnapshot, so a worker that wrote between the read and the stop lost its
work with neither a preserve nor a snapshot.

Add a second, best-effort hasUncommitted read immediately before the
removal, taken only on the path that is actually about to delete something
(never on a release that already decided to preserve, and never for
SHUTDOWN, which preserves unconditionally). If the tree is now dirty,
preserve it and attempt a fresh snapshot, since the original snapshot never
ran when the pre-stop read said clean. A failing re-check also preserves,
matching the existing CB-581 fail-safe rule.
2026-09-04 14:12:49 +07:00
Dai Ha 2926cd1784 #318: release() no longer strands a delivery that lands while it is running
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AmqpReplyInbox.release() used held.remove(target) then iterated the old
map. A delivery landing on the consumer work-pool thread after the
remove (basicCancel does not flush one already handed to that pool) hit
deliverCallback's computeIfAbsent, found the key gone, and created a
brand-new map release() never looks at again — delivered-but-unacked
forever, never requeued, never redelivered (#298 only closed the
"already in held when release runs" case).

Fix: release() swaps in a RELEASED tombstone via held.compute(...)
instead of held.remove(...). ConcurrentHashMap serializes compute/
computeIfAbsent calls for the same key against each other, so whichever
of release() and a concurrent deliverCallback runs first is fully
visible to the other — no gap. deliverCallback checks for the
tombstone and nacks-with-requeue instead of recreating a map; peek/ack
treat it as empty; own() clears a stale tombstone so a target is never
poisoned if its id is ever reused (the issue's own text says id reuse
doesn't happen, but the tombstone would otherwise sit in `held` forever
either way).

New test AmqpReplyInboxReleaseRaceTest forces the actual interleaving
with a latch (blocks release() inside its nack loop, which is only
reachable after the tombstone swap, then fires a concurrent delivery)
rather than a sequential call — a sequential test would not have caught
this, since #298's own contract test forces settlement before release()
runs. Mutation-tested: reverting the fix makes this test fail with
"expected: <2> but was: <1>" (m1 never nacked); restored after
confirming that failure.
2026-09-04 14:10:21 +07:00
Dai Ha c801851c66 Correct the isLoopback javadoc: after #305 narrowing this range refuses a caller, it does not promote one
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2026-09-04 14:10:10 +07:00
Dai Ha de70aa38f1 Merge #317: an unresolved caller is refused, never promoted to primary
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2026-09-04 14:03:35 +07:00
Dai Ha 53a533afb4 #317: refuse an unresolved caller instead of promoting it to primary
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ConnectionIdentity.resolve() called pids.pidForLocalPort(remotePort),
which returns -1 both on a real failure and (silently, no log line)
when lsof just finds no matching process. terminalForPid(-1) then
matches no pane, so CallerResolver's loopback-trust fallback could not
tell that caller apart from a genuine primary and handed it
Principal.primary(...) — granting SPAWN, STOP, SEND and DRAIN to a
worker whose PID lookup failed. This is the escalation PaneLocator's
own javadoc already names; CB-161's ancestry walk only helps once a
candidate pid exists, and a failed lookup has none.

Fix: ConnectionIdentity.Caller gets a resolved() predicate (pid > 0),
centralised next to the -1 sentinel it tests for the same reason
isLoopback() is centralised (fleetd #305: two independent copies of
one rule already drifted once). CallerResolver's loopback-trust
fallback now requires c.resolved() before granting PRIMARY; an
unresolved caller gets Principal.anonymous() — the same already-tested
"authenticated as nothing" outcome used everywhere else in that
method, so the refusal is a clean, named, unsurprising result rather
than something that looks like a bug.

Also logs the previously-silent "lsof ran clean, found no match" case
in LsofPeerPidLookup at DEBUG, since that (not a slow lsof — the
waitFor result was already discarded) is the likelier real trigger.

loopbackTrustTreatsANonWorkerLoopbackCallerAsThePrimary is untouched
and still green: a real pid that owns no pane (the actual primary) is
still resolved() and still PRIMARY. Token mode is unaffected — it
never consults c.pid() at all.

Mutation-tested: reverting only the CallerResolver.java guard
reproduces the escalation exactly (aFailedPeerPidLookupIsRefusedNotPromotedToPrimary
fails with "expected: <ANONYMOUS> but was: <PRIMARY>").
2026-09-04 13:58:14 +07:00
Dai Ha 77ad88631b Merge #315: the fixed placement policy honours the retry loop's unreachable set
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2026-09-04 13:57:24 +07:00
Dai Ha d88017807b #315: fix self-contradicting javadoc left by the previous commit
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FixedPlacementPolicy's class javadoc still opened with "This ignores caps
and reachability" after the previous commit added reachability as the
fourth carve-out that is explicitly NOT ignored — caught by a shape-check
survey run against this same file as part of #315's own request ("look in
placement/ ... for the same shape: a caller/comment that documents an
expectation ... where an implementation does not meet it"). Reworded the
opening sentence: fixed still ignores caps (maxLoad) by design, but
reachability is now a narrower, per-call retry exclusion, not an ignored
concern.
2026-09-04 13:55:28 +07:00
Dai Ha 2159a5a94a #315: FixedPlacementPolicy now honors the retry loop's unreachable set
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CompositePeerLauncher.spawn retries a failed candidate on the next one and
rebuilds PlacementContext "so the policy excludes this profile" (its own
comment), but FixedPlacementPolicy.select never read ctx.unreachable(). Under
the default `fixed` placement policy (used when `placement` is unset or set
to `fixed`), every retry re-picked the same dead default and a second,
healthy, configured profile was never tried. This also covers the wiring-bug
branch (a candidate profile with no owning adapter), which hit the exact same
symptom for the same reason.

Not live on this fleet: fleetd.yaml sets placement: weighted, which already
consults ctx.unreachable() via PlacementPolicyUtil.available(). This is live
only for a deployment that leaves placement unset or sets it to fixed.

Fix is in FixedPlacementPolicy: consult ctx.unreachable() in the same two
places it already consults quarantined/coolingOff (the default check and the
fallback walk over candidates()), and add a fourth reason to the "no
candidate remains" exception. Considered fixing this in
CompositePeerLauncher's retry loop instead (break when select() returns an
already-unreachable profile), but that only fails faster on the same dead
profile — it cannot make the loop advance to a different candidate, because
only the policy decides which candidate is next. The defect is that one
policy implementation does not honor the loop's stated contract, so the fix
belongs in that policy, matching how weighted/round-robin already behave.

Also fixed: the "no reachable worker profile" exception message said
"trying N candidate(s)" where N was unreachable.size(), a count of DISTINCT
profiles (a HashSet dedupes a profile added twice), under wording that reads
as a count of attempts. Reworded to "N distinct candidate(s)" so the count
matches what is measured and the profile list that follows it.

Tests: two new failover tests next to the three existing ones in
CompositePeerLauncherTest (which all use PlacementPolicies.weighted(), which
is why this had no coverage) — one pinned to PlacementPolicies.fixed() for
the unreachable-default case, one for the wiring-bug (no adapter) case.
Mutation-proofed: reverted FixedPlacementPolicy.java, both new tests failed
with the exact bug ("no reachable worker profile available after trying 1
distinct candidate(s): a" / "...c"), then restored the fix.
2026-09-04 13:52:29 +07:00
Dai Ha b9c2cf69f4 Merge #307: a worker's real reply after an ask timeout completes its ticket instead of stranding
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2026-09-04 13:31:43 +07:00
Dai Ha 8beae50fe7 Merge #308: refuse spawns once the shutdown drain has started, and sweep stragglers
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2026-09-04 13:28:09 +07:00
Dai Ha b2a58cb966 Merge #309: clean up partial worktree state when git worktree add fails 2026-09-04 13:28:04 +07:00
Dai Ha b8b25cf74c #307: an ask() timeout no longer strands the worker's real reply
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MessageService.reply()'s async-recovery path (askAnsweredAsyncTasks)
required a live Task.turnId, but ask()'s own TimeoutException handler
calls clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, true) — deliberately forgetting turnId
so hasAsyncQuestion() stops reporting the target BUSY. That made a
worker's eventual real fleet_reply, after an unanswered fleet_ask, fall
through to the inbox: fleet_poll{ticket} stayed PENDING forever and was
later force-failed with the false reason "session released before it
replied".

Fix: a new Task.askTimedOut marker is set (markAskTimedOut) right
before the turnId is forgotten, and askAnsweredAsyncTasks accepts it in
place of a live turnId. The marker never touches asyncTasksByTurn, so
the BUSY-release behaviour (invariant 1) is untouched. The existing
ambiguity guard (candidates.size() > 1 -> inbox, never guess) still
applies unchanged, but is now genuinely reachable rather than pure
defence in depth, since an ask timeout frees its target for a fresh,
independent delegation — the affected javadocs are updated to say so.

Tests: MessageServiceTest.aReplyAfterAnAskTimeoutStillCompletesTheAsyncTicket
(positive, mutation-proven) and
.twoAskTimedOutTicketsOnOneTargetFallBackToTheInboxRatherThanGuess
(negative/ambiguity). FleetMcpTest's
unansweredAsyncAskReturnsTheTicketToPending was renamed and its final
assertion updated — it had pinned the old (buggy) inbox-stranding
behaviour as expected.
2026-09-04 13:23:01 +07:00
Dai Ha f159ca7d27 #310: log when a reap is skipped because the record changed
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The compare-and-release declines silently. This race is unobservable by
construction, so a reaper that quietly stops reaping is the hardest kind of
behaviour to diagnose later. One debug line names the pane and the likely
cause.
2026-09-04 13:22:55 +07:00
Dai Ha 83f2aea60f #308: refuse a spawn once the shutdown drain has started, and sweep stragglers
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drainAll iterated a one-shot registry snapshot with nothing to refuse a new
fleet_spawn while the drain was still running (mcp.close() only runs 8 calls
after sessions.close() in the shutdown hook). A session registered in that
window was never visited by the drain loop: its pane kept running and its
worktree was never preserved, with the in-memory registry gone at exit.

Fix, both mechanisms as the issue asked for (neither alone is complete):

- SessionManager.acquire now checks a `draining` flag, flipped true at the
  very start of drainAll before the registry snapshot is even taken, and
  throws the new ShuttingDownException (invariant 3: fail loudly, say why).
  FleetMcp.spawn and FleetApp.spawnMember surface it as a clean error/503
  rather than an uncaught RuntimeException.
- The flag alone cannot close the whole race: a caller already past the
  check can still be mid-launcher.spawn() (a real herdr round trip) when
  drainAll snapshots the registry. drainAll now re-reads the registry once
  its main pass finishes and drains whatever straggler landed there too,
  bounded by the SAME whole-drain deadline (invariant 1: timeoutNanos stays
  a budget for the whole drain, never extended for a straggler).
- ReleaseCause.SHUTDOWN still preserves worktrees for both the initial pass
  and the sweep (invariant 2, unchanged release() path).

Tests (SessionManagerTest): a guard test proving acquire() throws once
drainAll has started, and a race test using a launcher double that blocks
the second spawn() and the first stop() call to force, deterministically,
the exact interleaving where a spawn passes the guard before drainAll flips
it and only registers after the initial snapshot — proving the post-loop
sweep catches it.

Shape check (SessionManager.java only, not fixed): reapIdle has the same
shape — a decision made from a roster() snapshot, then acted on via
release(s.paneId()) with no re-check of the session's current state.
2026-09-04 13:21:53 +07:00
Dai Ha 002329adb5 #309: clean partial worktrees after add failure
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2026-09-04 13:18:57 +07:00
Dai Ha a49671ceb9 #310: prevent idle reap from stopping delivered workers
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2026-09-04 13:17:51 +07:00
Dai Ha 76672ff016 #306: the post-turn phase gets the same unknown-stall escape as a turn
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Four latches gate delivery in Injector, and only awaitingCompletion had a way
out of a sustained unknown streak. CB-109 added that escape because a worker
stuck in a state herdr cannot classify never produces a working->idle
boundary. The same is true during post-turn housekeeping, but the escape was
never extended there.

awaitingPostTurnPickup and postTurnObserved are both released only on an
injectable sample, so a worker that goes unknown and stays there wedges: the
target is polled forever, every later message to it is blocked by the delivery
gate, and no onTurnFailed fires, so the session sits at DONE and looks healthy.
The counter did not even increment, since ++unknownSinceTurn sits inside the
awaitingCompletion short-circuit.

postTurnPending needs no escape; it is cleared on the line after the listener
call that sets it.

The escape does not set turnFailed. The delegated turn already completed and
its waiter already resolved — what is outstanding is the /clear. Failing the
turn would drive SessionManager.onFailed on a session that genuinely finished.

Not reachable in the live configuration: the path needs lifecycle.clearAfterTurn,
which fleetd.yaml does not set. It becomes reachable as soon as anyone turns
that supported knob on.

Fixes #306
2026-09-04 13:06:29 +07:00
Dai Ha 9379f92c23 #305: one definition of loopback, so a worker cannot become the primary
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ConnectionIdentity and CallerResolver each kept their own isLoopback. They
drifted: the identity resolver accepted only 127.0.0.1, the authorization
check accepted all of 127.0.0.0/8.

A caller from 127.0.0.2 therefore had its identity resolution skipped, so it
carried no terminal, and CallerResolver reads a missing terminal as "not a
worker" — which under loopback-trust, the default mode, is the primary. A
worker got spawn, stop, send and drain. The skip also happens before the PID
ancestry walk, so that defence is bypassed too.

Being strict in ConnectionIdentity was not the safe direction. That predicate
decides whether identity is resolved at all, and resolution is what demotes a
worker, so every address it excluded was one where a worker became the lead.

Measured, not assumed: on Linux the whole 127.0.0.0/8 is bound to lo, and
binding a source of 127.0.0.2 on the fleet host succeeds (curl rc=7, the
connect refused rather than the bind). On macOS the source bind fails (rc=45),
so this workstation was never exposed.

The shared predicate also accepts the IPv4-mapped IPv6 form, which neither
copy handled. That one failed in the safe direction: a primary on
::ffff:127.0.0.1 was refused as anonymous.

No transport-level test binds a real 127.0.0.2 source — it cannot run on
macOS. The reasoning is recorded on the issue.

Fixes #305
2026-09-04 12:58:21 +07:00
Dai Ha 21ff63b11d #304: the member routes report a herdr failure instead of a bare 500
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POST /members and DELETE /members/{paneId} were the two routes in FleetApp
with no catch (HerdrException). FleetApp has no Javalin exception mapper, so
the exception escaped as the default 500 with the body "Server Error" — no
herdr code, no herdr message. fleet_spawn and fleet_stop catch the same
exception and report a named error, so this was the same one-door-guarded
shape as #297.

Both now go through the existing herdrError mapper: 404 when herdr says the
target is gone, 502 otherwise. That is an answer the caller can act on.

stopMember matters more than spawnMember. SessionManager.release deregisters
the session, notifies the release listener and preserves a dirty worktree
before it calls launcher.stop, so a throw from that stop arrives after the
teardown the caller asked for has already happened. A bare 500 told the caller
to retry and carried nothing to explain what went wrong.

The two existing tests that asserted 500 now assert 502 and check the error
body. Neither was about the status code: one guards that a failed teardown is
not reported as a successful 204, the other that a failed spawn still closes
its tab. Both properties are unchanged.

Fixes #304
2026-09-04 12:48:21 +07:00
Dai Ha 21844b54d7 #302: fleet_reply refuses blank content too, matching fleet_send
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MessageService.reply now throws on blank content. FleetMcp.reply guarded only
against null, and its handler is a bare BiFunction with no try/catch, so a
whitespace-only fleet_reply left the handler as an uncaught
IllegalArgumentException instead of the clean tool error null already got.
fleet_send has always used isBlank here; reply now matches it.

The worker found that null/isBlank difference and reported it as a correction
to my ticket, which had quoted the guard wrongly. It was right: I grepped the
error string and assumed the condition matched its sibling.
2026-09-04 12:36:23 +07:00
Dai Ha 4769481515 Merge #302: a reply with no content is refused, not silently delivered
REST read content with .path("content").asText(""), so a body missing the key
became an empty string that resolved the lead's waiter. The turn completed and
the lead saw a member that finished and reported nothing, indistinguishable
from one that genuinely said nothing. The guard went into MessageService.reply,
which both doors call, rather than being written a second time in FleetApp.
2026-09-04 12:33:47 +07:00
Dai Ha bbbb4c1eb3 fleetd #302: require content in MessageService.reply so a REST reply with no content cannot silently resolve a waiter
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2026-09-04 12:31:09 +07:00
Dai Ha 38c248e617 Merge #298: a released reply is requeued, not dropped
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release() cancelled the consumer and dropped its local record of deliveries the
broker still held as outstanding. Cancelling a consumer does not requeue them:
they stay unacked on the still-open channel until it or the connection closes.
So a held-but-undrained reply became permanently unreachable — a worker's
report lost with no error and no log line. It now nacks with requeue, after
cancelling, so a later own() can still receive it.
2026-09-04 12:21:30 +07:00
Dai Ha 9debc0de27 #297: render both profiles doors from one body builder, not two copies
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The merged change shared the QuarantineSource and OutageSource instances
between fleet_profiles and GET /profiles, so the two doors read identical
facts. It then rendered those facts through a character-for-character copy of
the loop, in a different file. Shared inputs do not make duplicated computation
safe: a later edit to the row shape lands on one door and not the other, and
the two disagree about a live outage. That is what #284 was.

The ticket caused this. It said 'read from the same shared instances' and 'do
not change FleetMcp', and together those made copying the loop the only legal
move. Extracting FleetMcp.profilesView and calling it from both is what the
ticket should have asked for.
2026-09-04 12:19:02 +07:00
Dai Ha f34361b263 Merge #297: REST reports what MCP reports
GET /agents and GET /members now map a herdr transport failure into the same
{error, detail} envelope every other handler in FleetApp uses, instead of
letting it escape to Javalin's default handling. GET /profiles now reports the
quarantined and coolingOff states, read from the same shared sources FleetMcp
reads. REST is the door a lead falls back to when its MCP mount drops, so it
was weakest exactly when it was load-bearing.
2026-09-04 12:16:00 +07:00
Dai Ha be5ba22c75 #298: AmqpReplyInbox.release() requeues held deliveries instead of dropping them
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release(target) used to cancel the target's consumer and clear held's local
record for it. Cancelling a consumer does not requeue the broker's in-flight
deliveries — they stay unacked on the still-open channel until a real
connection drop. So a held-but-undrained reply became permanently
unreachable: never acked, never nacked, never requeued, invisible to peek.

Fix: cancel the consumer first (so it can no longer receive redeliveries),
then nack-with-requeue every held delivery for that target before dropping
the local record. Nacking before the cancel was tried first but a real
broker demonstrated a race: the still-active consumer immediately received
the requeued message back, racing held.remove and leaving peek non-empty.
Cancelling first avoids that. A failed requeue is logged at WARN and does
not abort release(), matching the best-effort teardown style #293 settled
for HerdrPeerLauncher.stop().

Extends AmqpReplyInboxContractTest.releaseCancelsConsumer... to assert the
held delivery is recoverable via a later own(), not just absent from peek.
2026-09-04 12:14:00 +07:00
Dai Ha 85c90d440a #297: map HerdrException on GET /agents and /members; GET /profiles reports quarantine + cool-off
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Two REST-only visibility gaps, both against the same shared instances FleetMcp
reads (BackendQuarantine/BackendOutagePolicy), never recomputed:

- GET /agents and GET /members let a HerdrException escape uncaught, outside
  the {error, detail} envelope every other failure path in FleetApp uses.
  Both now route through the existing herdrError() helper, matching healthz/
  sessionStatus. GET /members is the endpoint's own comment names as the
  out-of-band path a lead falls back to when its MCP mount drops.
- GET /profiles omitted the two outage states fleet_profiles already reports:
  quarantined (CB-578 stage B) and coolingOff (fleetd #201 Unit 5). FleetApp
  now takes the SAME FleetMcp.QuarantineSource/OutageSource instances Fleetd
  wires into FleetMcp (extracted to local vars in Fleetd.java so both doors
  share one object, not two independently-built copies of the same rule).

FleetMcp itself is unchanged. Item 3 of the ticket (a capacity block on
GET /members) is explicitly out of scope and was not added.
2026-09-04 12:12:35 +07:00
Dai Ha e97502d550 drainAll: record that the timeout is a whole-drain budget, not a per-session grace
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The javadoc said 'for each session that is BUSY, poll up to timeoutNanos',
which reads as a per-session grace period. The deadline is taken once, before
the loop, so the first BUSY session can spend all of it. That is deliberate and
is the safer of the two designs: the drain is one phase of a shutdown sequence
that must finish inside launchd's exit window, and a per-session grace would
overrun it and get the daemon SIGKILLed part-way through, leaving the sessions
not yet reached with no clean release, no preserved-worktree log and no
snapshot. Found by a read-only hunt that read the code correctly and drew the
opposite conclusion from the wording.
2026-09-04 12:09:44 +07:00
Dai Ha aef14ff46e Merge #296: a failed spawn no longer leaks the pane it opened
Two exits created a pane and left it running. The readiness gate propagated an
unrelated herdr error without teardown, and spawnAsPane never closed the pane it
split when the peer failed to start. Neither could be cleaned up by the caller:
SessionManager.acquire never learns the pane id, because spawn throws before it
returns one. It removed the worktree anyway, so the leak was a live backend with
a deleted cwd, invisible to fleet_list and holding a seat nothing decremented.
2026-09-04 12:08:23 +07:00
Dai Ha cba516bda4 fleetd #296: close panes on failed spawn
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2026-09-04 12:05:26 +07:00
Dai Ha ba51e0c6cc #293: catch RuntimeException on closeTab, matching its sibling guard
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No behaviour change today. HerdrCodec wraps every encode/decode failure
and UnixSocketHerdrClient wraps every IOException, so HerdrException is
all closeTab can currently throw.

But releaseZdotdir five lines below catches RuntimeException, and the
whole point of this fix is that nothing here may mask the cleanups
below. Guarding against the expected exception type and staying bare
against any other is the same asymmetry the ticket exists to remove,
one level down. This stops a later change inside
WorkspaceControl.closeTab reopening it.
2026-09-04 11:47:42 +07:00
Dai Ha 086c59848e Merge #293: a failing tab.close no longer masks the cleanups below it 2026-09-04 11:46:00 +07:00
Dai Ha 0c10079755 #293: wrap the bare tab.close in HerdrPeerLauncher.stop()
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The pane is already closed by the time spaces.closeTab runs, so a failing
tab.close is cosmetic workspace tidying, not a real teardown failure. Left
bare, it propagated out of stop() and masked releaseZdotdir (ZDOTDIR leak)
and, worse, SessionManager.release()'s worktree removal (no self-heal,
no retry — the registry entry is already gone by then).

Wrap it in a try/catch that logs a WARN naming the tab id, matching the
"must not mask a real teardown failure above" comment already on
releaseZdotdir. isAlreadyGone is untouched — this continues past *any*
tab.close failure, not just *_not_found, since the failure is cosmetic
regardless of its cause.

Adds FakeHerdr#tabCloseFailsWith/tabCloseFailsForTab (the tab.close
counterpart to #290's paneCloseFailsForPane) plus two tests: one proving
releaseZdotdir still runs (the generated ZDOTDIR is deleted) and one
proving SessionManager.release() still removes the worktree, both with a
non-not_found tab.close failure.
2026-09-04 11:41:07 +07:00
Dai Ha ece2091b53 #280: states is now touched by two scheduler tasks, so make it concurrent
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The delayed re-check reads `states` from its own scheduled task, while
`tick` writes and prunes it. Both run on the single-threaded scheduler
Fleetd passes in today, so they are serialised — but nothing in the
class enforces that, and an unsynchronised HashMap read racing a resize
can spin a CPU forever rather than fail visibly.

`priors` and `orphanStreaks` stay plain maps: `tick` is still their only
toucher. The comment says which is which, so the next person does not
have to re-derive it.
2026-09-04 11:32:56 +07:00
Dai Ha b3f917e6f5 Merge #280: one bounded delayed re-check sweeps a ticket whose ask lapsed after GONE 2026-09-04 11:31:00 +07:00
Dai Ha fa39a5f55e #280: sweep a GONE/NEVER_READY target's lapsed fleet_ask once, not just on transition
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FleetHealthMonitor's fire-once-per-transition rule (CB-580) means a target
that is genuinely mid-fleet_ask when health first classifies it GONE is
correctly skipped (sweepAsking=false). But nothing re-fires abandon() once
that ask lapses on its own 55-115s later: FleetHealth.decide keeps reporting
GONE every tick, and reportTransition's previous==next guard never lets the
sweep run again. The ticket then sat PENDING forever, the same destination
#275 fixed for an explicit teardown, reached here by a health guess instead.

SessionManager.reapIdle only reaps READY/DONE sessions (SessionManager.java:844),
and a session mid-turn (including mid-ask) stays BUSY the whole time
(onDelivered sets BUSY, nothing clears it until the turn completes) — so
SessionReaper never releases such a session and onRelease's sweepAsking=true
path is never reached.

Fix: schedule one bounded, delayed re-check per terminal transition (not a
per-tick retry — that shape was rejected by CB-580). It fires failTerminalTarget
again after a delay that exceeds the worst-case ask-lapse window, and only if
the target is still classified in the same terminal state at that time, so a
recovered or since-released target is never reached into. sweepAsking stays
false throughout, so a ticket whose ask has not yet lapsed is still never
touched — same invariant abandonDoesNotFailAnAsyncTicketWaitingForAnAnswer pins.

Proven with a mutation: neutering recheckTerminalTarget's body made
delayedRecheckSweepsATicketWhoseAskLapsedAfterGoneWasFirstObserved fail with
"expected: <FAILED> but was: <PENDING>", all 20 other FleetHealthMonitorTest
cases still green; restored and reran clean (1300 tests, 0 failures).
2026-09-04 11:28:12 +07:00
Dai Ha d5128a1d35 #290: use the imports FakeHerdr already has
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2026-09-04 11:27:51 +07:00
Dai Ha 61097e5cf0 Merge #290: restore coverage for reapIdle's per-session guard 2026-09-04 11:25:45 +07:00
Dai Ha ef507bcd12 #290: restore reapIdle's per-session guard coverage via a new launcher.stop() trigger
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#283 fixed release() to catch and log a worktree-removal failure, which closed off
reapIdleCountsAllThreeSessionsWhenOnlyItsWorktreeRemovalFails as a trigger for
reapIdle's own per-session try/catch (CB-581) — that test now proves a different,
still-real thing (a swallowed removal failure doesn't shrink the reaped count),
but the try/catch itself lost its test.

Add FakeHerdr.paneCloseFailsForPane(paneId, code) so a test can make exactly one
session's launcher.stop() fail while its siblings still tear down normally
(paneCloseFailsWith already existed but fails every pane, which cannot isolate
one session in a three-session reap). Add
reapIdleSurvivesOneSessionWhoseLauncherStopFails beside the #283 test, using
launcher.stop() as the trigger the ticket names, and prove it catches removal of
reapIdle's try/catch: deleting the guard makes the test fail with the
HerdrException propagating out of reapIdle uncaught (quoted in the PR body).
2026-09-04 11:23:52 +07:00
Dai Ha 94f50e507a #284/#285: one reclaimable rule, one group-share helper
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Two corrections on top of the merged worker branches.

#284: I told the worker to report a BACKEND_ERROR/FAILED session as
reclaimable. That half of my own ticket was wrong. Once the live count
stops counting a terminal session, its seat is already in `free`;
counting it in `reclaimable` too reports the same seat twice, and
`free + reclaimable` reads as more capacity than maxLoad allows. Worse,
only the profile-level count was widened, so the same fleet_list
response said `reclaimable: 2` while every member row said
`reclaimable: false`.

Both views now call one shared predicate, FleetMcp.reclaimable, so they
cannot drift apart. A test runs it over every MemberSession.State value,
so a state added later cannot slip through unconsidered.

#285: the new per-file chgrp+chmod helper moved from ClaudeCodeLauncher
into EnvAllowListScrub as shareFileWithGroup, next to the directory-wide
shareWithGroup it was copied from. It now reuses that class's own
setGroupAndPermissions and also catches UnsupportedOperationException,
which the copy missed — on a filesystem without POSIX group ownership
the copy threw a raw runtime exception instead of the sibling's
UncheckedIOException.
2026-09-04 11:13:01 +07:00
Dai Ha 75b15086b0 Merge #285: the workspace-trust seed refuses rather than write fleetd's own home 2026-09-04 11:08:44 +07:00
Dai Ha dab9645906 Merge #284: a BACKEND_ERROR or FAILED member no longer holds a spawn seat 2026-09-04 11:04:09 +07:00
Dai Ha e93b5f6512 #282: record that answer()'s QUESTION guard is defence in depth, not load-bearing
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Measured after merging: removing the guard alone leaves the new test green,
because ask() calls markAsyncQuestion before resolveQuestion, so the task has
already moved to the new turnId. The PR claimed each half was necessary; only
the pair is. Keeping the guard, with the ordering written down so nobody
deletes it as dead code or trusts it as the only protection.
2026-09-04 10:59:10 +07:00
Dai Ha bfabe13e8f Merge #282 (PR #289): a chained second fleet_ask no longer kills its own async ticket 2026-09-04 10:56:42 +07:00
Dai Ha 7e49c6eca2 #285: seedTrustDialog refuses under memberHerdrSocket instead of seeding fleetd's own home
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seedTrustDialog gated only on isProvisionedWorktree(cwd) and, being static, could not
see memberHerdrSocketConfigured() — unlike its sibling writeCharterFile, which already
refuses the spawn when it cannot place a file where a different-uid member can read it.
Under memberHerdrSocket + configDir unset, seedTrustDialog wrote fleetd's OWN
~/.claude.json while believing it was seeding the member's, reintroducing the fleetd
#149 failure (interactive trust dialog, no fleet_reply, silent readiness timeout) for
this one config combination.

Makes seedTrustDialog an instance method so it can see memberHerdrSocketConfigured()
and memberGroup(), and applies writeCharterFile's "refuse, don't degrade" rule: under
memberHerdrSocket it now requires both configDir and worktreeGroup before touching any
file, naming exactly which is missing, and shares the written .claude.json group-
readable (rw-r-----) via a new shareTrustJsonWithGroup so the member's OS user can
actually open it. The memberHerdrSocket-absent path (today's only live mode) is
unchanged.
2026-09-04 10:55:35 +07:00
Dai Ha 11cbfa79b4 fleetd #284: free failed-session capacity
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2026-09-04 10:55:21 +07:00
Dai Ha c2c2746922 Merge #283 (PR #288): guard release()'s worktree removal, delete the orphaned branch on spawn failure
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2026-09-04 10:54:36 +07:00
Dai Ha 0087645da4 Merge #281 (PR #286): pin the Authz.Action every handler chooses
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2026-09-04 10:50:43 +07:00
Dai Ha 19cacf5b62 #283: guard release()'s bare worktree remove; delete orphaned branch on spawn failure
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 52s
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Two teardown-cleanup leaks in SessionManager, same shape as #274.

Defect 1: release()'s last step (removing a released session's worktree)
was the one cleanup step in the method left unguarded, even though every
sibling step is wrapped because exec() can throw on a non-zero exit or its
own 30s timeout. By the time it ran, the registry entry, retained handle,
and pane were already gone, so a throw here escaped release() with no
retry path and made a fully-torn-down session look like a failed stop.
Now wrapped in try/catch with a WARN, matching the pattern already used
by every other step in this method.

Defect 2: acquireWithWorktree's catch (covering failures after add()
returns — overlayParity, shareWithGroup, launcher.spawn) removed the
worktree but left the branch it provisioned orphaned. #274 already fixed
the sibling failure inside add() itself (GitWorktrees.cleanupAfterAddFailure
deletes both). Extracted that branch-delete into a new Worktrees.deleteBranch
method, reused by both cleanupAfterAddFailure and this catch, so a routine
spawn failure (quarantined credential, backend refusal) no longer leaks a
worker/<slug>-<nonce> branch.

A normal release() still never deletes a branch — only the failed-provision
path does. releaseRemovesWorktreeButDoesNotDeleteBranch pins this, and
spawnFailureAfterAddDeletesTheOrphanedBranch / unchangedRegression* prove
the two paths stay apart.
2026-09-04 10:50:30 +07:00
Dai Ha 4dd12083ab fleetd #284: free backend-error capacity
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 46s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 2m42s
2026-09-04 10:47:09 +07:00
Dai Ha 30e21adec7 #281: cover registered authorization actions
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m14s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m33s
2026-09-04 10:46:26 +07:00
Dai Ha 719b79f892 wip: pin handler authorization actions
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m30s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 2m27s
2026-09-04 10:39:58 +07:00
52 changed files with 5428 additions and 326 deletions
+102
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@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
---
name: hunter
description: Defect-hunt procedure for a fleetd worker — sweep an assigned package for real bugs and report several ranked findings without fixing anything. Load this when the lead asks you to hunt or audit a scope rather than review one diff. Do NOT load `reviewer` for this; the two want different output.
---
# Hunter worker — procedure
The turn contract (one `fleet_reply`, `fleet_ask` for the lead's decisions, honest reporting,
never merge) is in **`CLAUDE.md` → Bridge communication → Worker** and already applies.
**This skill is not `reviewer`.** `reviewer` judges one diff and reports the *single* most
important issue in about 90 words. A hunt sweeps a whole package and reports *several* findings
in a long structured form. Loading both gives you two contradictory output contracts, and the
usual result is a worker that writes a good report into its terminal and ends the turn without
sending it. Load exactly one.
## 0. Read this before you read code: how the report gets home
Your terminal reaches nobody. The lead sees **only** the text inside your `fleet_reply` call.
A long report is exactly the case where this goes wrong, so plan for it:
- **Write the report into the `fleet_reply` argument itself.** Do not compose it in your terminal
and then summarise it into the call.
- If the report is long, **send it anyway** — one `fleet_reply` with everything.
- If you end the turn without replying, the bridge scrapes your pane instead. That scrape carries
at most the last 4000 characters, and on a hunt it usually captures the tail of the lead's own
brief rather than your findings. The lead then has nothing and has to ask you again.
## 1. Change nothing
A hunt is read-only. Do not edit a production file, do not "quickly fix" what you find, and do
not run a formatter. You may run the build and tests to *check* a claim, and you should say so
when you did.
## 2. Read the whole scope first
Read every file in the assigned package before you judge any of it. A defect that a caller
elsewhere in the same package makes unreachable is not a defect, and you cannot know that from
one file.
Stay inside the scope. If a defect there depends on a class outside it, read that class to
confirm — but the defect itself must live in the scope you were given.
## 3. The bar — this matters more than the count
**Name the path into the bad state.** Say which caller, in which state, reaches it. A defect on
paper is not a reachable defect. If you cannot name that path, keep the finding but mark it
`unproven` and say exactly what you could not check. Do not drop it, and do not dress it up.
**Say which direction the harm goes.** Data loss, privilege escalation and silent wrong answers
are worth reporting even when the window is narrow. A finding whose worst outcome is a worse log
line is not worth a block.
Two workers once ran the same scope: the one that applied the direction-of-harm filter found ten
real defects, the one that did not found none. Fewer findings the lead can act on beat many the
lead has to triage.
## 4. Shapes that have produced real merged fixes here
Read for these first:
1. **A one-way gate.** A guard added after an incident closes only the direction that incident
came from. Do not only ask what closes the gate — ask **which states still open it**.
2. **A value read once, then used later to authorise something destructive**, after something
else has had a chance to change it.
3. **A failure downgraded to a value that looks like a legitimate result** — `-1`, `null`, an
empty list, `false` — which a caller then trusts.
4. **A lock held for one half of a read-modify-write and not the other**, or two collections
updated under different locks.
5. **A comment or javadoc stating an invariant the code no longer keeps.** Comments are
load-bearing in this repo; a stale one has already caused a bug.
## 5. What you cannot check, and must not claim you did
- `fleetd/fleetd.yaml` is gitignored and **absent from your worktree**. You cannot read it. If a
finding depends on live configuration, name the key and say you could not check it.
- `.mcp.json`, `opencode.json` and `.autoenv` in your worktree are neutralised stubs, not the
repo's real files.
- The `wiki/` submodule pointer is months old. Do not cite it.
Reporting a fact you took from the lead's brief as something you measured yourself is a false
report, even when the fact is correct. Say where each fact came from.
## 6. The report — what goes in `fleet_reply`
One block per finding, most severe first:
```
FINDING N — <one line>
file:line
Path in: <which caller, in which state, reaches this>
Direction: <data loss | escalation | silent wrong answer | outage | ...>
Window/trigger: <when it actually happens>
Confidence: <confirmed by reading | unproven — say what you could not check>
Why nothing else catches it: <the guard or test you checked, and why it misses>
```
End with one line naming every file you read, so the lead knows the denominator.
**Nothing clears the bar?** Reply `NO FINDINGS`, name the files you read, and say what you ruled
out. A clean sweep is a valid result; an invented defect is worse than none.
+5
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@@ -10,6 +10,11 @@ never merge) is in **`CLAUDE.md` → Bridge communication → Worker** and alrea
skill is only the *review procedure*: how to work the scope, and the exact shape of what you
send back.
**Wrong skill for a sweep.** This one reviews *one* diff or scope and reports the *single* most
important issue. If the lead asked you to hunt or audit a whole package for several defects, load
`hunter` instead and ignore this file — the two want different output, and following both is how a
worker ends its turn with a good report that never gets sent.
## 1. Read the whole scope before you judge
The delegation names your scope — a file, a diff, a PR, a function. **Read all of it first.**
+7 -2
View File
@@ -200,8 +200,13 @@ must obey belongs in the charter, not here.
adapter, with a message naming the credential and the remaining seconds ("cooling off after
repeated backend errors") — distinct wording from a quarantine refusal, so don't conflate the
two when reading a spawn failure.
- **Skills available to delegate:** `implementer` (worktree → commit → push → own PR) and
`reviewer` (scoped review → one structured finding). Name one in every delegation.
- **Skills available to delegate:** `implementer` (worktree → commit → push → own PR),
`reviewer` (one diff → one structured finding) and `hunter` (sweep a package → several ranked
findings, change nothing). Name exactly one in every delegation. **`reviewer` and `hunter` are
not interchangeable** — `reviewer` caps the answer at one finding in about 90 words, so naming
it for a multi-finding sweep hands the worker two contradictory output contracts. That has
already cost three workers' turns: each wrote a good report to its terminal and ended the turn
with no `fleet_reply`, and the scrape returned the tail of the brief instead.
- **Primary-side skills** (not delegation playbooks — a worker cannot use them):
`port-to-opencode` (make an OpenCode session a participant in this workspace) and
`fleets-status` (report every fleet that shares one LavinMQ instance).
+33 -12
View File
@@ -250,9 +250,7 @@ public final class Fleetd {
boolean clearAfterTurn = cfg.lifecycle() != null && cfg.lifecycle().clearAfterTurn();
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workers, new GitWorktrees(cfg.worktreeRoot(), cfg.worktreeGroup()),
System::nanoTime, contextCap, clearAfterTurn);
liveCountRef.set(profileName -> (int) sessions.roster().stream()
.filter(s -> profileName.equals(s.profile()))
.count());
liveCountRef.set(profileName -> liveSessionCount(sessions.roster(), profileName));
// CB-303 part 1: idle-ttl reaper — only when configured, defaults to disabled.
final SessionReaper reaper;
@@ -627,6 +625,19 @@ public final class Fleetd {
log.info("auth: loopback-trust (any loopback non-worker caller is the primary)");
}
// fleetd #297: named once and reused verbatim below for FleetApp's GET /profiles, rather than
// built a second time — two independently-constructed sources reading the SAME BackendQuarantine
// / BackendOutagePolicy would still be able to drift (e.g. a future edit to the credentialIdFor
// closure in only one of the two places), exactly the shape #284 was.
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource quarantineSource = new FleetMcp.QuarantineSource(profile -> {
var configured = config.get().profiles().get(profile);
return configured == null ? null : configured.effectiveCredentialId();
}, quarantine);
FleetMcp.OutageSource outageSource = new FleetMcp.OutageSource(profile -> {
var configured = config.get().profiles().get(profile);
return configured == null ? null : configured.effectiveCredentialId();
}, outagePolicy);
FleetMcp mcp = new FleetMcp(messages, workers, sessions, identity, presence,
primaryRegistry, callers, metrics, new FleetMcp.CapacitySource(profile -> liveCountRef.get().apply(profile),
profile -> {
@@ -638,15 +649,9 @@ public final class Fleetd {
return FleetHealthMonitor.coverage(health != null && health.isEnabled(),
health != null && health.notifications() != null && health.notifications().configured());
}),
new FleetMcp.QuarantineSource(profile -> {
var configured = config.get().profiles().get(profile);
return configured == null ? null : configured.effectiveCredentialId();
}, quarantine),
quarantineSource,
leadMailbox,
new FleetMcp.OutageSource(profile -> {
var configured = config.get().profiles().get(profile);
return configured == null ? null : configured.effectiveCredentialId();
}, outagePolicy),
outageSource,
new FleetMcp.LeadSeatSource(leadSeatLookup(() -> config.get().profiles(), leaders, leads)));
// CB-637: the receive half. Only constructed when a lead mailbox actually opened — with no
@@ -717,9 +722,12 @@ public final class Fleetd {
// GET /sessions must merge across both, or a down/unpolled member daemon is invisible.
// fleetd #111: live (re-read-per-request) memberCredentials view for GET /member-credentials —
// same hot-reload shape as the memberCredentials supplier passed to ClaudeCodeLauncher above.
// fleetd #297: quarantineSource/outageSource are the SAME instances passed to FleetMcp above —
// GET /profiles must report the identical quarantine/cool-off facts as fleet_profiles.
Javalin app = new FleetApp(herdr, memberHerdr, workers, sessions, messages, presence, mcp.servlet(),
callers, metrics, deliverable,
() -> MemberCredentialPolicyView.of(config.get().memberCredentials())).build();
() -> MemberCredentialPolicyView.of(config.get().memberCredentials()),
quarantineSource, outageSource).build();
app.start(cfg.bind().host(), cfg.bind().port());
log.info("fleetd listening on {}:{}, herdr socket {}",
cfg.bind().host(), cfg.bind().port(), socket);
@@ -859,6 +867,19 @@ public final class Fleetd {
.orElse(null);
}
/**
* Count sessions that occupy a profile's spawn capacity. A {@code BACKEND_ERROR} or
* {@code FAILED} session stays in the roster so {@code fleet_list} can show its failure, but a
* member that cannot accept another delivery does not use a seat.
*/
static int liveSessionCount(List<MemberSession> roster, String profileName) {
return (int) roster.stream()
.filter(session -> profileName.equals(session.profile()))
.filter(session -> session.state() != MemberSession.State.BACKEND_ERROR)
.filter(session -> session.state() != MemberSession.State.FAILED)
.count();
}
/**
* fleetd #248 / fleetd#201 Unit 5: factory for the production {@link BackendErrorSink} — the
* collaborator {@link CompletionResolver} notifies when a pane-scrape classification actually
@@ -236,7 +236,15 @@ public final class CallerResolver {
// loopback-trust: same-host callers that are not workers are the primary. A non-loopback
// caller is anonymous even here — and startup refuses that combination anyway
// (FleetConfig.validateAuthExposure), so this is defence in depth, not the control.
return isLoopback(remoteAddr) ? Principal.primary(c.pid()) : Principal.anonymous();
//
// fleetd #317: "not a worker" must not be conflated with "identity unresolved". The real
// primary is a real process — its pid resolves (c.resolved()), it just owns no herdr pane.
// A caller whose peer-PID lookup failed (LsofPeerPidLookup's -1 sentinel — on any failure,
// silently including "lsof found no match") has no such pid, and PaneLocator's own javadoc
// already names what happens if that case is handed the primary role: a worker→primary
// escalation. So an unresolved caller is refused (ANONYMOUS — the same clean, already-tested
// "authenticated as nothing" outcome used everywhere else in this method), never promoted.
return isLoopback(remoteAddr) && c.resolved() ? Principal.primary(c.pid()) : Principal.anonymous();
}
private boolean presentedTokenMatches(String authorizationHeader) {
@@ -262,11 +270,15 @@ public final class CallerResolver {
return token.isEmpty() ? null : token;
}
/**
* fleetd #305: delegates to {@link ConnectionIdentity#isLoopback}. This used to be a second,
* independent copy of the same rule, and the two drifted: this one accepted all of
* {@code 127.0.0.0/8}, {@code ConnectionIdentity}'s accepted only {@code 127.0.0.1}. A caller
* from {@code 127.0.0.2} therefore had its identity skipped (so it had no terminal) and was
* then read as loopback here — which under loopback-trust is the primary. Sharing the inputs
* would not have prevented that; only sharing the computation does.
*/
private static boolean isLoopback(String remoteAddr) {
if (remoteAddr == null) {
return false;
}
return remoteAddr.equals("127.0.0.1") || remoteAddr.equals("::1")
|| remoteAddr.equals("0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1") || remoteAddr.startsWith("127.");
return ConnectionIdentity.isLoopback(remoteAddr);
}
}
@@ -22,46 +22,153 @@ import java.util.function.Supplier;
* choice rather than an accident of where the field was initialised.
*
* <h2>Not every key can change under a running daemon</h2>
* Keys fall into three classes, and the difference is about what already exists when the reload
* Keys fall into four classes, and the difference is about what already exists when the reload
* happens — not about how important the key is.
*
* <ul>
* <li><strong>Hot</strong> — re-read per use, so a reload takes effect on the next spawn:
* {@code fleet:} (every role pool, {@code charters}, and {@code tabLabel}),
* {@code placement:}, and an existing profile's {@code weight} / {@code maxLoad}. Those
* three are read through a supplier on {@code CompositePeerLauncher}, which is what makes
* them hot — not the fact that they are config. <strong>This does NOT include
* {@code fleet.leaders}</strong>: {@code Fleetd.main} reads {@code cfg.fleet().leaders()}
* once at startup to build the {@code LeadTabScanner} and the {@code LeadLauncher}, and
* neither is reconstructed on reload — so a lead added, removed, or re-{@code tab}'d under
* {@code fleet.leaders} needs a restart, the same as any deferred key below.</li>
* {@code placement:}, and an existing profile's {@code weight} / {@code maxLoad}. Both are
* read through a supplier on {@code CompositePeerLauncher}, which is what makes them hot —
* not the fact that they are config. Most of {@code fleet:} — every role pool
* ({@code architects}/{@code developers}/{@code reviewers}), {@code charters}, and
* {@code tabLabel} — is read the same live way, through the same supplier
* ({@code () -> config.get().fleet()}). <strong>But {@code fleet:} as a whole is NOT in this
* class</strong>: {@code fleet.leaders} inside the same key is frozen, which is exactly what
* makes {@code fleet:} split rather than hot — see below.</li>
* <li><strong>Deferred</strong> — accepted into the new snapshot, but the wiring built at startup
* keeps the old value until a restart: {@code lifecycle:}, {@code leadHeartbeat:},
* {@code spawnReadyTimeoutMs} / {@code spawnReadyPollMs}, {@code quarantineCooldownSeconds}
* (CB-578 stage B — baked once into the {@code BackendQuarantine} built at startup),
* {@code guard:}, {@code worktreeRoot:}, adding or removing a profile (a new backend needs its own launcher,
* {@code guard:}, {@code worktreeRoot:} and {@code worktreeGroup:} (both baked once into the
* {@code GitWorktrees} built at {@code Fleetd.java:251} and never rebuilt — fleetd #323
* instance 2 found {@code worktreeGroup} missing from this list and from
* {@link #changedDeferredKeys}), {@code primary:} (fleetd #326 — {@code Fleetd.java:506, 519,
* 520} read {@code cfg.primary()} only off the startup snapshot to build {@code
* PrimaryRegistry} and size {@code ReplyPushLoop}'s reminder cap/backoff, and neither is
* rebuilt on reload. Say the consequence exactly: {@code primary.terminal} is DEPRECATED
* (CB-532, and {@code Fleetd.java:511} warns about it at startup) — a lead's identity comes
* from {@code leaders:}/{@code leadScan:}, so changing this pin does not demote or promote a
* lead that uses those. What a changed pin still does not take effect on until a restart is
* the fallback nudge destination the pin remains, the deprecated identity path for an operator
* who still relies on it, and {@code pushReminders}/{@code pushBackoffMs}), {@code configReload:} (fleetd #326 — {@code
* Fleetd.java:679-680} read it only at startup to decide whether to build a {@code
* ConfigWatcher} at all and with what interval; the watcher that would apply a later change is
* itself built once, so a running watcher keeps polling on its original enabled flag and
* interval regardless of what a reload changes it to, the same shape as {@code lifecycle} —
* not cold, because no already-open resource goes inconsistent with the new value, the watcher
* (if any) simply keeps its old settings), adding or removing a profile (a new backend needs its own launcher,
* which is constructed once), <em>and an existing profile's launch settings</em> —
* {@code model}, {@code baseUrl}, {@code argv}, {@code env}, {@code mcpUrl},
* {@code exhaustedPattern} (CB-578 stage A — compiled once into {@code Fleetd.main}'s
* pattern map at startup), {@code errorPattern} (fleetd #201 Unit 5 — compiled once into
* {@code Fleetd.main}'s backend-error pattern map at startup, the same way), and the rest.
* {@code Fleetd.main}'s backend-error pattern map at startup, the same way),
* {@code ideProjectDir} / {@code ideOpenCommand} / {@code autoCompactWindow} (fleetd #323
* instance 1 — all three are read at spawn off the same frozen profile map and were missing
* from {@link #sameLaunchSettings}), and the rest of {@link #sameLaunchSettings}.
* {@code credentialId} (CB-578 stage B) is NOT on
* this list — it is read live off the config supplier at every quarantine check and
* exhaustion event, exactly like {@code weight} / {@code maxLoad}, so it is hot instead.
* {@code HerdrPeerLauncher} takes {@code Map.copyOf(profiles)} at construction and resolves
* each spawn out of that copy, so those never reach a launch until the daemon restarts. A
* reload logs these rather than pretending they applied.</li>
* <li><strong>Cold</strong> — cannot change at all under a running daemon: {@code bind:},
* {@code herdrSocket:}, {@code broker:} and {@code auth:}. The socket is bound, the broker
* <li><strong>Split</strong> (fleetd #330; extended to a third key by fleetd #333) — read
* <em>both</em> ways at different sites, so the key does not fit any class above as a whole:
* {@code health:}, {@code coordinator:} and {@code fleet:}. Each is read off the startup
* snapshot to build a long-lived object, and read live off {@link #get()} at a different,
* unrelated site — so half of a reload's effect already applies while the other half waits
* for a restart, and a bare "config reloaded" would under-claim by exactly that half.
* <ul>
* <li>{@code health:} — the monitor itself ({@code enabled}, {@code intervalSeconds},
* {@code workingSuspectAfterSeconds}) is built once at {@code Fleetd.java:556-563}
* and never rebuilt, so a changed value needs a restart to actually start, stop, or
* retime it. The coverage string {@code fleet_profiles} reports
* ({@code Fleetd.java:648-650}) is read live off {@link #get()} on every call, so it
* already reflects the new value.</li>
* <li>{@code coordinator:} — the {@code LeadMailbox} connection ({@code uri},
* {@code uriEnv}, {@code selfId}, {@code prefetch}) is opened once at
* {@code Fleetd.java:502} and never reopened, so a changed value needs a restart —
* {@code selfId} in particular names this daemon's own AMQP inbox queue, and a peer
* lead that learned the old name would not discover a new one on its own. The broker
* URI env-var <em>name</em> that {@code MemberEnvAllowList} keeps out of a member's
* environment is read live off {@link #get()} on every spawn
* ({@code HerdrPeerLauncher.java:1530}), so it already applies.</li>
* <li>{@code fleet:} (fleetd #333) — {@code fleet.leaders} is the frozen half:
* {@code Fleetd.java:281} reads {@code cfg.fleet().leaders()} off the startup snapshot
* for two long-lived objects built right after it and never rebuilt — the
* {@code LeadTabScanner}'s {@code tab label → lead name} map ({@code Fleetd.java:301},
* wired into {@code CallerResolver.withLeadsAndMembers} at {@code Fleetd.java:620/624},
* which is how a caller's pane is recognised as a lead at all) and, when herdr answered
* at startup, {@code LeadLauncher(...).ensureLeads()} ({@code Fleetd.java:315}), which
* auto-launches each declared lead up to its {@code instances} count. So a lead added,
* removed, or given a new {@code tab:} label under {@code fleet.leaders} needs a
* restart — until then it is invisible to identity resolution, and this is exactly the
* scenario fleetd #333 named: an operator edits a lead's {@code tab:} to match a
* renamed pane, sees "config reloaded", and the pane keeps resolving as a worker,
* because {@code CallerResolver} is still matching against the old label. The live
* half is the rest of {@code fleet:} — {@code architects}/{@code developers}/
* {@code reviewers}, {@code charters}, {@code tabLabel} — read live through the same
* {@code CompositePeerLauncher} supplier the Hot bullet above names, so a reload that
* only touches those already applies with nothing to report. Because the hot and frozen
* halves of {@code fleet:} are disjoint sub-fields rather than the same fields read two
* ways (contrast {@code coordinator.uriEnv} above), {@link #changedSplitKeys} compares
* {@code fleet.leaders} alone, not the whole {@code Fleet} record — comparing the whole
* record would report "split" for a {@code tabLabel}-only change that is actually fully
* hot, over-claiming in exactly the direction this class exists to avoid under-claiming
* in.</li>
* </ul>
* A split change is still accepted — {@link Outcome#applied()} stays {@code true}, the same
* as a deferred change — because the live half genuinely took effect; refusing the whole
* reload would leave the operator worse off than today. {@link Outcome#split()} names the
* key and says which half is which each time, rather than trying to score "how changed" a
* mixed key is or handle "both halves changed in one reload" as a special case.</li>
* <li><strong>Cold</strong> — cannot change at all under a running daemon. All five of
* {@link #COLD_KEYS}: {@code bind:}, {@code herdrSocket:}, {@code memberHerdrSocket:},
* {@code broker:} and {@code auth:}. The sockets are already connected, the broker
* connection is open, and the auth mode decides who may reach the port that is already
* listening.</li>
* listening. This bullet omitted {@code memberHerdrSocket:} until fleetd #333 — say "all
* five of COLD_KEYS" rather than re-listing them, so prose and set cannot drift again.</li>
* </ul>
*
* <p><strong>The denominator, measured on 2026-09-04 (fleetd #330; recounted for fleetd #333).</strong>
* {@code FleetConfig} has 22 top-level record components: 5 cold, 11 deferred, 3 split, 3
* hot-excluded. Three of them are named nowhere in this file, and the reason is the same for all
* three: {@code placement}, {@code memberCredentials} and {@code memberLoginShell} are
* <strong>hot</strong> and correctly absent — all three are read live off {@code config.get()}
* (placement through the {@code CompositePeerLauncher} supplier the Hot bullet names;
* {@code memberCredentials}/{@code memberLoginShell} at spawn time, {@code Fleetd.java:198, 205, 729}
* and {@code HerdrPeerLauncher#configuredMemberLoginShell}), so a reload takes effect on the next
* spawn with no entry needed here.
* {@code health} and {@code coordinator} used to be a third kind — <strong>undecided</strong>, not
* hot — until fleetd #330 added the <strong>split</strong> class above and gave them a home. A
* reload touching either used to report a bare "config reloaded", which under-claimed; now it names
* the key and says which half is which. {@code fleet} was the same story in reverse: fleetd #330's
* own fact-find named {@code health}/{@code coordinator} as "the complete set of split-shaped keys"
* and filed {@code fleet.leaders}'s restart requirement as a documented caveat sitting in the
* <strong>hot-excluded</strong> escape hatch instead — correctly documented, but in the one bucket
* this file's own coverage test cannot check the truth of (see that test's javadoc). fleetd #333
* moved it into <strong>split</strong>, where {@link #changedSplitKeys} actually reports it.
* <p>The point of writing the count down: "not mentioned in this file" looks identical for a key
* that is correctly hot and for a key nobody triaged. Three times now — {@code worktreeGroup} (#323),
* {@code primary}/{@code configReload} (#326), and {@code fleet.leaders} sitting in the escape hatch
* (#333) — the second kind hid among the first. A top-level coverage checker in the
* {@link ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest} shape (one level up, over {@code FleetConfig} itself rather
* than {@code FleetConfig.Profile}) proves this file's four classes exhaust the record's components
* — see {@code ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest}. That test proves the record's <em>shape</em> is fully
* triaged; it does NOT prove a {@code SPLIT_KEYS}/{@code COLD_KEYS}/{@code DEFERRED_KEYS} member has
* any reporting code behind it at all — {@code ConfigRefTopLevelReportingCoverageTest} is what
* fleetd #333 added for that, after measuring that a {@code SPLIT_KEYS} entry with its reporting
* branch deleted passes both this file's own "kept in step" assert and
* {@code ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest} unchanged. fleetd #337 extended it to {@code DEFERRED_KEYS}
* after measuring the same one-way gap there directly: dropping {@code guard}'s branch out of
* {@link #changedDeferredKeys} while {@code "guard"} stayed in the set left the whole suite green.
*
* <p><strong>A cold change refuses the whole reload.</strong> Not the hot half applied and the cold
* half warned about: that would leave the running daemon in a state matching no file on disk, which
* is the worst thing a reload can do to an operator debugging one. Refusing keeps the invariant that
* the live config is always some version of the file, and the message names the keys that must
* change through a restart.
* change through a restart. A split change does <em>not</em> refuse, for a different reason than a
* deferred change does not: its live half genuinely took effect, so refusing would throw that away
* and leave the operator worse off than the partial-but-honest report {@link Outcome#split()} gives.
*
* <p>A reload that fails to parse or fails validation is also refused, and the previous config keeps
* running. A config file being edited is normally read once mid-save; degrading a working daemon
@@ -71,10 +178,43 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<FleetConfig> {
private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(ConfigRef.class);
/** Keys that cannot change under a running daemon — see the class doc. */
private static final Set<String> COLD_KEYS =
/**
* Keys that cannot change under a running daemon — see the class doc.
*
* <p>Package-private (not {@code private}) so {@code ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest} can fold it
* into the top-level triage it checks, the same way it reads {@link #SPLIT_KEYS}.
*/
static final Set<String> COLD_KEYS =
Set.of("bind", "herdrSocket", "memberHerdrSocket", "broker", "auth");
/**
* Keys read BOTH off the startup snapshot and live off {@link #get()} at different sites, so
* neither the hot, deferred nor cold class fits them as a whole — see the class doc's Split
* bullet (fleetd #330). A changed split key is accepted ({@link Outcome#applied()} stays
* {@code true}) and reported by name, with a message naming which half is live and which needs
* a restart.
*/
static final Set<String> SPLIT_KEYS = Set.of("health", "coordinator", "fleet");
/**
* Top-level keys {@link #changedDeferredKeys} compares — see the class doc's Deferred bullet.
* Promoted here from a test-side copy in {@code ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest} by fleetd #337,
* the same reason {@link #COLD_KEYS} and {@link #SPLIT_KEYS} live here rather than in a test: a
* second, hand-maintained copy of this set is exactly the kind of thing that silently drifts
* from the method it is supposed to describe. {@code spawnReadyTimeoutMs} and
* {@code spawnReadyPollMs} are compared together in one branch and reported under the combined
* label {@code "spawnReady*"}; {@code profiles} is compared twice over (added/removed names,
* then an existing profile's launch settings) — see {@link #changedDeferredKeys}.
*
* <p>Package-private (not {@code private}) so {@code ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest} and
* {@code ConfigRefTopLevelReportingCoverageTest} can both read it, the same way they already
* read {@link #COLD_KEYS} and {@link #SPLIT_KEYS}.
*/
static final Set<String> DEFERRED_KEYS = Set.of(
"guard", "worktreeRoot", "worktreeGroup", "primary", "configReload",
"leadHeartbeat", "lifecycle", "spawnReadyTimeoutMs", "spawnReadyPollMs",
"quarantineCooldownSeconds", "profiles");
private final Path path;
private final AtomicReference<FleetConfig> current;
@@ -102,25 +242,37 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<FleetConfig> {
/**
* What a reload attempt did.
*
* <p>{@code split} is a separate field from {@code deferred} rather than a differently-worded
* entry inside it, because the two carry different guarantees for any caller that branches on
* them rather than just printing {@link #summary()}: every {@code deferred} entry means "this
* key's whole change waits for a restart", while every {@code split} entry means "part of this
* key's change already applied, and the message says which part" — collapsing them would force
* a caller to re-parse the message to tell those apart. See the class doc's Split bullet
* (fleetd #330) for why the key needs this at all.
*
* @param applied true when the new config is now live
* @param coldKeys cold keys whose value changed, which is why an unapplied reload was refused
* @param deferred keys that changed and were accepted, but whose effect waits for a restart
* @param deferred keys that changed and were accepted, but whose effect waits entirely on a
* restart
* @param split split keys that changed and were accepted, each named with which half of it
* is already live and which half waits for a restart
* @param error the parse or validation failure that refused the reload, else {@code null}
*/
public record Outcome(boolean applied, List<String> coldKeys, List<String> deferred,
String error) {
List<String> split, String error) {
public Outcome {
coldKeys = List.copyOf(coldKeys);
deferred = List.copyOf(deferred);
split = List.copyOf(split);
}
static Outcome refusedCold(List<String> keys) {
return new Outcome(false, keys, List.of(), null);
return new Outcome(false, keys, List.of(), List.of(), null);
}
static Outcome failed(String error) {
return new Outcome(false, List.of(), List.of(), error);
return new Outcome(false, List.of(), List.of(), List.of(), error);
}
/** A one-line summary for the operator — the reason, not just the verdict. */
@@ -132,11 +284,18 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<FleetConfig> {
return "config reload refused — these keys cannot change under a running daemon: "
+ String.join(", ", coldKeys) + ". Restart fleetd to apply them.";
}
if (!deferred.isEmpty()) {
return "config reloaded; these changes need a restart to take effect: "
+ String.join(", ", deferred);
if (deferred.isEmpty() && split.isEmpty()) {
return "config reloaded";
}
return "config reloaded";
StringBuilder out = new StringBuilder("config reloaded");
if (!deferred.isEmpty()) {
out.append("; these changes need a restart to take effect: ")
.append(String.join(", ", deferred));
}
if (!split.isEmpty()) {
out.append("; partially live — ").append(String.join(" | ", split));
}
return out.toString();
}
}
@@ -177,14 +336,21 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<FleetConfig> {
}
List<String> deferred = changedDeferredKeys(old, fresh);
List<String> split = changedSplitKeys(old, fresh);
current.set(fresh);
Outcome out = new Outcome(true, List.of(), deferred, null);
Outcome out = new Outcome(true, List.of(), deferred, split, null);
log.info(out.summary());
return out;
}
/** Cold keys whose value differs between the running config and the candidate. */
private static List<String> changedColdKeys(FleetConfig old, FleetConfig fresh) {
/**
* Cold keys whose value differs between the running config and the candidate.
*
* <p>Package-private (not {@code private}) so {@code ConfigRefTopLevelReportingCoverageTest}
* can call it directly with a reflection-built {@code FleetConfig} pair, the same reason
* {@link #sameLaunchSettings} is package-private — see that test's class doc (fleetd #333).
*/
static List<String> changedColdKeys(FleetConfig old, FleetConfig fresh) {
List<String> changed = new ArrayList<>();
if (!Objects.equals(old.bind(), fresh.bind())) {
changed.add("bind");
@@ -206,8 +372,16 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<FleetConfig> {
return changed;
}
/** Changed keys that were accepted but whose effect waits for a restart. */
private static List<String> changedDeferredKeys(FleetConfig old, FleetConfig fresh) {
/**
* Changed keys that were accepted but whose effect waits for a restart.
*
* <p>Package-private (not {@code private}) so {@code ConfigRefTopLevelReportingCoverageTest}
* can call it directly with a reflection-built {@code FleetConfig} pair, the same reason
* {@link #changedColdKeys} and {@link #changedSplitKeys} already are (fleetd #333, extended to
* this method by fleetd #337 — membership in {@link #DEFERRED_KEYS} proved nothing about this
* method on its own until then; see that test's class doc).
*/
static List<String> changedDeferredKeys(FleetConfig old, FleetConfig fresh) {
List<String> changed = new ArrayList<>();
if (!Objects.equals(old.lifecycle(), fresh.lifecycle())) {
changed.add("lifecycle");
@@ -221,6 +395,29 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<FleetConfig> {
if (!Objects.equals(old.worktreeRoot(), fresh.worktreeRoot())) {
changed.add("worktreeRoot");
}
// Baked into the same GitWorktrees as worktreeRoot (Fleetd.java:251) and never rebuilt
// either — see the class doc. Missing this check was fleetd #323 instance 2: a reload
// that changed only worktreeGroup reported "config reloaded" with nothing deferred, and
// newly provisioned worktrees kept the old sharing behaviour.
if (!Objects.equals(old.worktreeGroup(), fresh.worktreeGroup())) {
changed.add("worktreeGroup");
}
// fleetd #326: Fleetd.java:506, 519, 520 read cfg.primary() only off the startup snapshot
// (PrimaryRegistry's pinned terminal, ReplyPushLoop's reminder cap and backoff) — neither is
// rebuilt on reload, so a changed value needs a restart. Note what it does NOT mean:
// primary.terminal is deprecated (CB-532), identity comes from leaders:/leadScan:, so a lead
// using those is unaffected by this pin either way. See the class doc for the exact scope.
if (!Objects.equals(old.primary(), fresh.primary())) {
changed.add("primary");
}
// fleetd #326: Fleetd.java:679-680 read cfg.configReload() only at startup to decide whether
// to build a ConfigWatcher at all and with what interval — the watcher that would apply a
// later change is itself built once, so a running watcher keeps its original enabled flag and
// interval regardless of what a reload changes it to. Not cold: no already-open resource goes
// inconsistent with the new value, a watcher (if any) simply keeps polling on the old settings.
if (!Objects.equals(old.configReload(), fresh.configReload())) {
changed.add("configReload");
}
if (!Objects.equals(old.spawnReadyTimeoutMs(), fresh.spawnReadyTimeoutMs())
|| !Objects.equals(old.spawnReadyPollMs(), fresh.spawnReadyPollMs())) {
changed.add("spawnReady*");
@@ -265,14 +462,101 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<FleetConfig> {
}
/**
* Whether two versions of a profile would launch a peer identically. Compares every component
* the launcher reads at spawn; {@code weight}, {@code maxLoad} and {@code credentialId} are
* excluded because those are read live (by the placement policy and, for credentialId, by
* {@code CompositePeerLauncher}/the CB-578 stage B exhaustion sink) and really do take effect on
* the next spawn.
* Split keys whose value differs between the running config and the candidate — see the class
* doc's Split bullet (fleetd #330, extended for {@code fleet:} by fleetd #333). Unlike
* {@link #changedDeferredKeys}, this does not try to tell which sub-field moved for {@code
* health:} or {@code coordinator:}: any change to either gets the same fixed message, because
* the message already names both halves every time, so there is no "which half changed"
* question left for the caller to answer. {@code fleet:} is different on purpose — see below.
*
* <p>Package-private (not {@code private}) so {@code ConfigRefTopLevelReportingCoverageTest}
* can call it directly with a reflection-built {@code FleetConfig} pair, the same reason
* {@link #sameLaunchSettings} is package-private — see that test's class doc (fleetd #333). That
* test exists because membership in {@link #SPLIT_KEYS} proves nothing about this method on its
* own: fleetd #333 measured that dropping the {@code coordinator} branch out of this method
* while leaving {@code "coordinator"} in {@code SPLIT_KEYS} left the whole suite green except a
* hand-written {@code ConfigRefTest} case — neither {@code ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest} (it
* only reads the set) nor the "kept in step" assert below (it only checks the reported keys are
* a SUBSET of {@code SPLIT_KEYS}, never that every {@code SPLIT_KEYS} member has a branch here)
* would have caught it.
*/
private static boolean sameLaunchSettings(FleetConfig.Profile a, FleetConfig.Profile b) {
return Objects.equals(a.baseUrl(), b.baseUrl())
static List<String> changedSplitKeys(FleetConfig old, FleetConfig fresh) {
List<String> changed = new ArrayList<>();
if (!Objects.equals(old.health(), fresh.health())) {
changed.add("health: the monitor itself (enabled, interval, workingSuspectAfter) is "
+ "frozen at startup and needs a restart; the coverage status fleet_profiles "
+ "reports is read live and already applied");
}
if (!Objects.equals(old.coordinator(), fresh.coordinator())) {
changed.add("coordinator: the LeadMailbox connection (uri, uriEnv, selfId, prefetch) is "
+ "opened once and needs a restart; the broker URI env-var name kept out of a "
+ "member's environment is read live on every spawn and already applied");
}
// fleetd #333: unlike health/coordinator above, most of `fleet:` (architects, developers,
// reviewers, charters, tabLabel) is genuinely hot — ConfigRefTest.aHotChangeIsAppliedAndRead-
// ThroughGet and aCharterChangeIsHotAndReachesTheLiveConfig prove it reaches the live config
// with no restart note. Only fleet.leaders is frozen (Fleetd.java:281 reads
// cfg.fleet().leaders() off the startup snapshot to build both the LeadTabScanner's
// tab-label-to-name map, wired into CallerResolver.withLeadsAndMembers at Fleetd.java:620/624,
// and — when herdr answered — LeadLauncher(...).ensureLeads() at Fleetd.java:315, which
// auto-launches each lead up to its `instances` count; neither is rebuilt on reload). So this
// compares fleet.leaders alone, not the whole Fleet record: comparing the whole record would
// report "split" for a tabLabel-only or charters-only change that is actually fully hot,
// which is the over-claim mirror of the under-claim bug this class exists to prevent.
if (!Objects.equals(leadersOf(old), leadersOf(fresh))) {
changed.add("fleet: fleet.leaders (each lead's tab, workspace, cwd, profile and "
+ "instances count) is read once at startup to build the LeadTabScanner's "
+ "identity map and to auto-launch leads, and neither is rebuilt on reload, so a "
+ "lead added, removed, or given a new tab: label needs a restart — until then it "
+ "stays unrecognised, and a caller from its new tab resolves as a worker, not a "
+ "lead; the rest of fleet: (architects, developers, reviewers, charters, "
+ "tabLabel) is read live through the supplier on CompositePeerLauncher and "
+ "already applied");
}
// Kept in step with SPLIT_KEYS the same way changedColdKeys is kept in step with COLD_KEYS —
// every message here must be traceable to one of the split keys the class doc documents.
// NOTE what this does NOT prove, per the javadoc above: it does not catch a SPLIT_KEYS
// member with no branch above at all, only a branch whose message is mis-worded relative to
// the set. ConfigRefTopLevelReportingCoverageTest is what proves the former.
assert changed.stream().allMatch(m -> SPLIT_KEYS.stream().anyMatch(k -> m.startsWith(k + ":")))
: "a split entry was reported that does not start with a SPLIT_KEYS name: " + changed;
return changed;
}
/** {@code cfg.fleet().leaders()}, defensively, in case a caller hands in a non-defaulted config. */
private static Map<String, FleetConfig.Leader> leadersOf(FleetConfig cfg) {
return cfg.fleet() == null ? Map.of() : cfg.fleet().leaders();
}
/**
* {@link FleetConfig.Profile} record components deliberately left out of
* {@link #sameLaunchSettings} because they are read <em>live</em>, not baked in at spawn — see
* the class doc's <em>Hot</em> bullet. {@code weight} and {@code maxLoad} are read live by the
* placement policy on every spawn; {@code credentialId} is read live by
* {@code CompositePeerLauncher} and the CB-578 stage B exhaustion sink. Nothing else is
* excluded — see {@code sameLaunchSettingsComparesEveryProfileComponentOrExcludesIt} in
* {@code ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest}, which enumerates every {@code Profile} record component
* by reflection and fails the build if one is neither compared below nor named here.
*/
static final Set<String> LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED = Set.of("weight", "maxLoad", "credentialId");
/**
* Whether two versions of a profile would launch a peer identically.
*
* <p>This must compare every {@link FleetConfig.Profile} record component except the three in
* {@link #LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED}. That is not a claim this javadoc can make good on by
* itself — a javadoc saying "compares every component" is exactly what fleetd #323 found to be
* false for three fields (and a sibling method's field list, for a fourth). The actual
* guarantee comes from {@code ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest}: it enumerates every record
* component of {@code FleetConfig.Profile} by reflection, mutates each one not in
* {@code LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED} on a base profile, and asserts this method reports a
* difference — so a new component that is neither compared here nor added to
* {@code LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED} (with a reason) fails that test by name, rather than
* silently reporting "config reloaded" for a value the daemon never picked up.
*/
static boolean sameLaunchSettings(FleetConfig.Profile a, FleetConfig.Profile b) {
return Objects.equals(a.profile(), b.profile())
&& Objects.equals(a.baseUrl(), b.baseUrl())
&& Objects.equals(a.model(), b.model())
&& Objects.equals(a.configDir(), b.configDir())
&& Objects.equals(a.tokenEnv(), b.tokenEnv())
@@ -298,6 +582,16 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<FleetConfig> {
// fleetd #201 Unit 5: errorPattern is compiled once into Fleetd.main's backend-error
// pattern map at startup (see BackendErrorPatternLookup wiring), the same way
// exhaustedPattern is — a reload never re-reads it either.
&& Objects.equals(a.errorPattern(), b.errorPattern());
&& Objects.equals(a.errorPattern(), b.errorPattern())
// fleetd #323 instance 1: ideProjectDir and ideOpenCommand are read at spawn off the
// same frozen profile map as ideMcpUrl above (ClaudeCodeLauncher.java:267/269,
// OpenCodeLauncher.java:474/480/486) and were missing from this comparison.
&& Objects.equals(a.ideProjectDir(), b.ideProjectDir())
&& Objects.equals(a.ideOpenCommand(), b.ideOpenCommand())
// fleetd #323 instance 1: autoCompactWindow is read at spawn the same way
// (ClaudeCodeLauncher.java:926, OpenCodeLauncher.java:650). Comparing it here only
// makes the reload REPORT that a restart is needed — it deliberately does not make
// autoCompactWindow take effect live, which is a separate, larger change.
&& Objects.equals(a.autoCompactWindow(), b.autoCompactWindow());
}
}
@@ -322,8 +322,9 @@ public record FleetConfig(
* statement that does not stop being true just because the profile was
* named directly. A negative value has no sane meaning (there is no
* "excluded" to degrade to below zero) and is refused at config load
* instead, naming the profile and the key. Live means any session the
* registry still owns (acquired and not yet released), in any state.
* instead, naming the profile and the key. Live means a session that can
* receive another delivery. The roster keeps terminal {@code BACKEND_ERROR}
* and {@code FAILED} sessions for diagnostics, but they do not use capacity.
* @param kind which peer launcher spawns this profile: {@code "claude-code"} (default —
* the {@link dev.ltms.fleet.member.ClaudeCodeLauncher}) or {@code "opencode"}.
* The {@code CompositePeerLauncher} routes {@code spawn}/reap by this value, so
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Objects;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
import java.util.concurrent.ScheduledExecutorService;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.function.BiConsumer;
@@ -28,6 +29,14 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
static final int MAX_FAIL_TARGET_ATTEMPTS = 3;
// CB-641: Match the injector's 60s readiness gate so health allows a full first boot.
static final long READINESS_GRACE_NANOS = TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(60);
/**
* fleetd #280: how long after a terminal transition to wait before the one bounded re-check
* fires. Must exceed the worst-case reverse-rendezvous {@code fleet_ask} window (55-115s, see
* {@code FleetMcp.ASK_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS} / {@code FleetApp.MAX_ASK_TIMEOUT_MS}) so that, if the
* target was genuinely {@code ASKING} when {@code state} was first observed, its own ask has had
* time to lapse (clearing {@code Task#question} back to {@code null}) before this fires.
*/
static final long ASK_LAPSE_RECHECK_DELAY_SECONDS = 120;
private final AgentControl agents;
private final Supplier<List<MemberSession>> roster;
@@ -38,7 +47,16 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
private final long workingSuspectAfterNanos;
private final BiConsumer<String, String> failTarget;
private final Map<String, HealthPrior> priors = new HashMap<>();
private final Map<String, HealthState> states = new HashMap<>();
/**
* The live classification per member, and the only one of this class's three maps that more
* than one scheduler task touches. {@code tick} writes it (and prunes it to the roster);
* fleetd #280's delayed {@link #recheckTerminalTarget} reads it from its own separate scheduled
* task. Both run on the single-threaded scheduler {@code Fleetd} passes in today, so they are
* serialised — but nothing in this class enforces that, and an unsynchronised {@link HashMap}
* read racing a resize can spin a CPU forever rather than fail visibly. {@code priors} and
* {@code orphanStreaks} stay plain maps because {@code tick} is still their only toucher.
*/
private final Map<String, HealthState> states = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/**
* CB-643: consecutive ticks on which a target looked like an orphaned delegation. The fact
* {@link MessageService#hasOrphanedDelegation} reports is a true snapshot, but it can read true
@@ -171,6 +189,7 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
// member stayed terminal.
if (terminal(next)) {
failTerminalTarget(target, next);
scheduleTerminalRecheck(target, next);
}
}
@@ -191,6 +210,48 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
target, state, MAX_FAIL_TARGET_ATTEMPTS, last);
}
/**
* fleetd #280: schedule the one bounded, delayed follow-up for a terminal transition — never a
* per-tick retry (CB-580 rejected that shape; {@link #reportTransition} still fires
* {@link #failTerminalTarget} exactly once per transition, unconditionally on the tick loop).
* This is a single one-shot task, scheduled once per transition into GONE/NEVER_READY, so a
* member stuck terminal for the rest of its life gets exactly one extra attempt, not one per
* tick. See {@link #recheckTerminalTarget} for why the extra attempt is safe.
*/
private void scheduleTerminalRecheck(String target, HealthState state) {
if (scheduler.isShutdown()) return;
try {
scheduler.schedule(() -> recheckTerminalTarget(target, state),
ASK_LAPSE_RECHECK_DELAY_SECONDS, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.warn("fleet health: could not schedule terminal re-check for member={} state={}",
target, state, e);
}
}
/**
* fleetd #280: the delayed re-check {@link #scheduleTerminalRecheck} scheduled for one terminal
* transition. By now, a {@code fleet_ask} that was still open when {@code state} was first
* observed has had time to lapse on its own (see {@link #ASK_LAPSE_RECHECK_DELAY_SECONDS}),
* clearing {@code Task#question} back to {@code null} — which is exactly what
* {@link MessageService#abandon(String, String, boolean)}'s {@code sweepAsking=false} filter
* needs to finally match it. Calling {@link #failTerminalTarget} again is safe only because
* {@code sweepAsking} stays {@code false}: a task genuinely still {@code ASKING} is skipped
* exactly as it was on the very first attempt — this never fails a ticket whose ask has not yet
* lapsed.
*
* <p><strong>Guarded on "target is still classified {@code state}."</strong> Without this guard,
* a member that recovered (or was released and dropped from the roster) between the transition
* and this re-check would still take a blind {@code failTarget} call — reaching into whatever
* brand-new, unrelated turn it has since picked up and failing it too. {@link #states} already
* carries the live classification (updated every tick, pruned to the current roster on release),
* so a stale or recovered target simply reads as a mismatch here and this is a no-op.
*/
void recheckTerminalTarget(String target, HealthState state) {
if (states.get(target) != state) return;
failTerminalTarget(target, state);
}
private static boolean terminal(HealthState state) {
return state == HealthState.GONE || state == HealthState.NEVER_READY;
}
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.inject;
/**
* Notified when {@link CompletionResolver} actually delivers a typed backend-error classification
* to a waiting send (fleetd#201 / #227) — never on a race that lost. {@link CompletionResolver}
* calls this only after {@code Rendezvous.resolveFailure} returns {@code true} for that exact
* waiter, mirroring the win-only race rule {@link ExhaustionSink} already uses.
* Notified when {@link CompletionResolver} has a backend-error match at the start of a pane line,
* or both a match and its too-fast crash signature, for a waiting send (fleetd#201 / #227). A text
* match inside ordinary pane prose can be a member's report about an error, so it fails the send
* without notifying this sink.
* {@link CompletionResolver} calls this only after {@code Rendezvous.resolveFailure} returns
* {@code true} for that exact waiter, mirroring the win-only race rule {@link ExhaustionSink} uses.
*
* <p>The public send result is unchanged by this classification — it is still a failed send
* ({@code Rendezvous.Kind#FAILED}); this sink is the internal seam a later stage (fleetd#201 Unit
@@ -387,9 +387,10 @@ public final class CompletionResolver implements TurnListener {
// fleetd#164 (part 2) / fleetd#201: a scrape that read cleanly and produced content still
// isn't a real reply when that content is the backend's own rejection (e.g. an HTTP 400
// before the worker did any work). Classify it as a failure naming the member, rather than
// handing the caller a scrape that reads like a completed answer, and — only on the
// resolution that actually wins the race, mirroring the exhaustion sink above — notify the
// typed backend-error sink so a later stage can act on repeated failures.
// handing the caller a scrape that reads like a completed answer. A text match alone is not
// enough to notify the typed backend-error sink: this assistant block can be a member's
// normal prose about an error. A line that starts with the error match is stronger evidence;
// the too-fast path below also has its crash signature before it records a credential failure.
String backendError = firstMatchingLine(assistantBlock, backendErrorPatternOrFallback(target));
if (backendError != null) {
// Carry the whole scrape, not just the matched line. The pattern is a heuristic: a member
@@ -401,9 +402,9 @@ public final class CompletionResolver implements TurnListener {
if (rendezvous.resolveFailure(waiter, reason)) {
inFlight.remove(target, turn);
log.warn("failing send to {} via turn-stall fallback: {}", target, reason);
// fleetd#201 Unit 1: only on the resolution that actually won the race — a late
// duplicate must never double-count one backend failure.
backendErrorSink.onBackendError(target, backendError, reason);
if (startsWithBackendError(backendError, backendErrorPatternOrFallback(target))) {
backendErrorSink.onBackendError(target, backendError, reason);
}
}
return;
}
@@ -492,8 +493,9 @@ public final class CompletionResolver implements TurnListener {
if (rendezvous.resolveFailure(waiter, reason)) {
inFlight.remove(target, turn);
log.warn("failing send to {} via turn-stall fallback from the raw scrape: {}", target, reason);
// fleetd#201 Unit 1: only on the resolution that actually won the race.
backendErrorSink.onBackendError(target, backendError, reason);
if (startsWithBackendError(backendError, backendErrorPatternOrFallback(target))) {
backendErrorSink.onBackendError(target, backendError, reason);
}
}
return true;
}
@@ -540,10 +542,10 @@ public final class CompletionResolver implements TurnListener {
* {@link #MIN_TURN_NANOS} — a crash signature (e.g. a backend HTTP 400 before the worker did
* anything) that a bare {@code BUSY -> DONE} transition cannot be told apart from a genuinely
* fast completion. Runs the same backend-error classification the normal and raw-scrape paths
* apply, against whatever is on screen right now: a match is a typed failure that notifies
* {@link #backendErrorSink} (only on the resolution that wins the race); a non-match stays the
* original generic too-fast failure, naming the member and both timings, with whatever the pane
* shows appended so the caller sees the cause, not just "it failed".
* apply, against whatever is on screen right now: a match together with the too-fast crash
* signature notifies {@link #backendErrorSink} (only on the resolution that wins the race). A
* non-match stays the original generic too-fast failure, naming the member and both timings,
* with whatever the pane shows appended so the caller sees the cause, not just "it failed".
*/
private void failTooFast(String target, InFlight turn, CompletableFuture<Rendezvous.Resolution> waiter,
long elapsedNanos) {
@@ -611,6 +613,28 @@ public final class CompletionResolver implements TurnListener {
return null;
}
/**
* True when the error pattern begins the matched pane line, rather than appearing in prose.
*
* <p>Leading terminal chrome is skipped first — box-drawing characters, bullets, gutter bars and
* spaces. #339 introduced this check with a bare {@code lookingAt}, and that rejected a genuine
* error line rendered as {@code "| 503 Service Unavailable: ..."}: the send still failed, but the
* credential outage was never recorded. That is the false negative #339's own invariant 3 called
* worse than the false positive it set out to fix — measured with a throwaway probe on the
* raw-scrape path, which is exactly the path whose comment says to expect leading chrome.
*
* <p>Skipping only a leading run of non-letter, non-digit characters keeps the fix's intent. A
* member's prose ({@code "I checked the retry path. An API Error: makes it back off."}) still
* does not match, because there the pattern sits after words, not after chrome.
*/
private static boolean startsWithBackendError(String line, Pattern pattern) {
int i = 0;
while (i < line.length() && !Character.isLetterOrDigit(line.charAt(i))) {
i++;
}
return pattern.matcher(line.substring(i)).lookingAt();
}
/**
* Coverage summary for the CB-578 stage A exhausted-pattern classification, logged at startup
* the way {@link dev.ltms.fleet.health.FleetHealthMonitor#coverage} is — so an operator can
@@ -145,8 +145,58 @@ public final class Injector {
return router != null ? router.agentsFor(target) : agents;
}
/** The result of trying to remove an undelivered message from the injector. */
public enum Cancellation {
CANCELLED,
DELIVERED,
NOT_DELIVERED
}
/**
* An identity handle for one queued delivery. It is the only value accepted by
* {@link #cancel(Delivery)}, so a caller cannot cancel a different message with the same target
* or text.
*/
public static final class Delivery {
private final Pending pending;
private Delivery(Pending pending) {
this.pending = pending;
}
public CompletableFuture<Void> completion() {
return pending.delivered;
}
}
/** A pending message and the future that completes when it has been delivered. */
private record Pending(String text, TurnToken token, CompletableFuture<Void> delivered) {
private static final class Pending {
enum State { QUEUED, DELIVERED, NOT_DELIVERED, CANCELLED }
final String target;
final String text;
final TurnToken token;
final CompletableFuture<Void> delivered;
volatile State state = State.QUEUED; // written under the owning Target monitor
Pending(String target, String text, TurnToken token, CompletableFuture<Void> delivered) {
this.target = target;
this.text = text;
this.token = token;
this.delivered = delivered;
}
String text() {
return text;
}
TurnToken token() {
return token;
}
CompletableFuture<Void> delivered() {
return delivered;
}
}
/** Per-worker delivery state, guarded by its own monitor (single writer per worker). */
@@ -157,6 +207,7 @@ public final class Injector {
boolean awaitingCompletion; // a delivered message's turn is not yet known-complete
boolean turnObserved; // saw a real `working` sample since that delivery (turn ran)
int unknownSinceTurn; // consecutive `unknown` samples while a delegation is outstanding (CB-109)
int unknownSincePostTurn; // the same, for the post-turn housekeeping phase (fleetd #306)
int notReadySincePoll; // consecutive injectable samples a queued message waited on the readiness gate (CB-114)
boolean postTurnPending; // completion observed; adapter housekeeping has not started yet
boolean awaitingPostTurnPickup;
@@ -176,15 +227,47 @@ public final class Injector {
* <p>Uses an atomic map update so a concurrent {@link #drop} cannot slip between "find the
* target" and "queue the message" and orphan it in a target it just removed.
*/
public CompletableFuture<Void> enqueue(String target, String text, TurnToken token) {
public Delivery enqueue(String target, String text, TurnToken token) {
CompletableFuture<Void> delivered = new CompletableFuture<>();
Pending p = new Pending(text, token, delivered);
Pending p = new Pending(target, text, token, delivered);
targets.compute(target, (_, existing) -> {
Target t = (existing != null) ? existing : new Target();
t.add(p); // synchronized on the Target monitor — atomic with a concurrent drop
return t;
});
return delivered;
return new Delivery(p);
}
/**
* Cancel this exact queued delivery. The target monitor serializes this operation with
* {@link #onStatus}: if delivery wins that race, this returns {@link Cancellation#DELIVERED}
* rather than claiming the message remained queued.
*/
public Cancellation cancel(Delivery delivery) {
Pending p = delivery.pending;
Target t = targets.get(p.target);
if (t == null) {
return cancellationOf(p);
}
synchronized (t) {
if (p.state != Pending.State.QUEUED || !t.queue.remove(p)) {
return cancellationOf(p);
}
p.state = Pending.State.CANCELLED;
if (isQuiescent(t)) {
targets.remove(p.target, t);
}
return Cancellation.CANCELLED;
}
}
private static Cancellation cancellationOf(Pending p) {
return p.state == Pending.State.DELIVERED ? Cancellation.DELIVERED : Cancellation.NOT_DELIVERED;
}
private static boolean isQuiescent(Target t) {
return t.queue.isEmpty() && !t.awaitingPickup && !t.awaitingCompletion
&& !t.postTurnPending && !t.awaitingPostTurnPickup && !t.postTurnObserved;
}
/**
@@ -217,10 +300,12 @@ public final class Injector {
t.awaitingPickup = false;
t.injectableSincePickup = 0;
t.unknownSinceTurn = 0;
t.unknownSincePostTurn = 0;
t.notReadySincePoll = 0;
if (t.awaitingCompletion) t.turnObserved = true;
} else if (status.injectable()) { // IDLE or BLOCKED
t.unknownSinceTurn = 0;
t.unknownSincePostTurn = 0;
if (t.awaitingPostTurnPickup) {
if (++t.injectableSincePostTurnPickup >= PICKUP_GRACE_POLLS) {
t.awaitingPostTurnPickup = false;
@@ -271,6 +356,7 @@ public final class Injector {
try {
agentsFor(target).send(target, p.text());
t.queue.poll();
p.state = Pending.State.DELIVERED;
t.awaitingPickup = true;
t.awaitingCompletion = true;
t.turnObserved = false;
@@ -280,6 +366,7 @@ public final class Injector {
// Delivery failed at herdr; drop the poisoned message and surface it
// rather than blocking the queue behind it.
t.queue.poll();
p.state = Pending.State.NOT_DELIVERED;
sent = p;
sendError = e;
}
@@ -290,6 +377,9 @@ public final class Injector {
// fail every queued message and release the target (CB-114) instead of
// polling it indefinitely with the caller's future never completing.
notReady = new ArrayList<>(t.queue);
for (Pending pending : notReady) {
pending.state = Pending.State.NOT_DELIVERED;
}
log.warn("readiness grace for {} expired after {} polls ({}s): target never "
+ "became deliverable, so failing {} queued message(s) that never "
+ "reached its pane",
@@ -315,12 +405,29 @@ public final class Injector {
t.unknownSinceTurn = 0;
turnFailed = true;
}
// fleetd #306: the same escape for the post-turn housekeeping phase. Four latches
// gate delivery (awaitingCompletion, postTurnPending, awaitingPostTurnPickup,
// postTurnObserved) and only the first had a way out of a sustained unknown streak —
// a gate that closed one direction only. The other two below are released here as
// well; postTurnPending needs no escape because it is cleared unconditionally on the
// line after the listener call that sets it.
//
// This does NOT set turnFailed. The delegated turn already completed and its waiter
// already resolved — what is outstanding is adapter housekeeping (the `/clear`).
// Reporting a turn failure here would drive SessionManager.onFailed on a session
// that genuinely finished its work, which is a worse lie than the wedge.
if ((t.awaitingPostTurnPickup || t.postTurnObserved)
&& ++t.unknownSincePostTurn >= TURN_STALL_GRACE_POLLS) {
t.awaitingPostTurnPickup = false;
t.postTurnObserved = false;
t.injectableSincePostTurnPickup = 0;
t.unknownSincePostTurn = 0;
}
}
// Reclaim the entry once the worker is fully quiescent (nothing queued, no pickup or
// completion awaited), so the map cannot grow without bound across short-lived workers.
if (t.queue.isEmpty() && !t.awaitingPickup && !t.awaitingCompletion
&& !t.postTurnPending && !t.awaitingPostTurnPickup && !t.postTurnObserved) {
if (isQuiescent(t)) {
targets.remove(target, t);
}
}
@@ -411,6 +518,9 @@ public final class Injector {
boolean hadDeliveredTurn;
synchronized (t) {
pending = new ArrayList<>(t.queue);
for (Pending p : pending) {
p.state = Pending.State.NOT_DELIVERED;
}
t.queue.clear();
hadDeliveredTurn = t.awaitingCompletion;
t.awaitingCompletion = false;
@@ -36,6 +36,25 @@ public final class ConnectionIdentity {
* primary / an off-host client) and its {@code pid} (or {@code -1} if not resolvable).
*/
public record Caller(String terminal, long pid) {
/**
* Whether the OS peer-PID lookup actually succeeded — {@code false} means {@code pid} is
* the {@code -1} sentinel, not a real process id, so this caller's identity could not be
* established at all. That is a different fact from a real pid that simply owns no worker
* pane (the primary's own connection): the primary is {@code resolved()} and has a
* {@code null terminal}; an unresolvable caller is {@code !resolved()} and also has a
* {@code null terminal}. The two look identical through {@link #terminal} alone, which is
* exactly how fleetd #317 happened — a failed {@code lsof} lookup and a genuine primary both
* fell through to {@code Principal.primary(...)}.
*
* <p>Centralised here, next to the sentinel it tests, for the same reason
* {@link ConnectionIdentity#isLoopback} is centralised rather than left for each caller to
* reimplement: a raw {@code pid > 0} check duplicated at every call site is precisely the
* "one rule, two copies" shape that let #305 drift.
*/
public boolean resolved() {
return pid > 0;
}
}
/** Resolve the caller's terminal and PID from one peer-PID lookup. */
@@ -60,7 +79,44 @@ public final class ConnectionIdentity {
return pid > 0 ? cwds.cwdForPid(pid) : null;
}
private static boolean isLoopback(String addr) {
return "127.0.0.1".equals(addr) || "::1".equals(addr) || "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1".equals(addr);
/**
* Whether {@code addr} is a same-host address, and therefore one whose peer PID is worth
* looking up. <strong>This is the one definition of loopback in the daemon</strong> —
* {@code CallerResolver} calls it rather than keeping its own, because the two used to differ
* and that difference was a privilege escalation (fleetd #305).
*
* <p>The whole of {@code 127.0.0.0/8} counts, not just {@code 127.0.0.1}. On Linux every
* address in that range is bound to {@code lo} by default, so a process can connect to
* {@code 127.0.0.1:8765} with a source address of {@code 127.0.0.2} — measured on the Linux
* fleet host, where binding that source succeeds.
*
* <p><strong>What excluding an address costs, stated as it is today.</strong> This paragraph
* used to say that narrowing this range turned a worker into the lead, and that widening the
* check was what closed the hole. That was true only while there were <em>two</em> definitions
* that disagreed: {@code ConnectionIdentity} skipped the identity lookup for {@code 127.0.0.2}
* while {@code CallerResolver} read the same address as loopback and granted the primary role.
* #305 removed the second copy, and with one shared definition the old sentence no longer holds.
*
* <p>Measured on 2026-09-04 by narrowing this method back to exactly {@code 127.0.0.1} and
* running {@code CallerResolverTest} and {@code ConnectionIdentityTest}: a caller from
* {@code 127.0.0.2} then resolves to {@code ANONYMOUS}, not {@code PRIMARY} — for a worker
* ({@code aWorkerOnAnyLoopbackSourceAddressIsStillAWorkerNotThePrimary}) and for a non-worker
* ({@code aNonWorkerOnAnyLoopbackSourceAddressIsStillThePrimary}) alike. Excluding an address
* now <em>refuses</em> its caller; it does not promote one.
*
* <p>So keep the whole range, but for the plain reason: a genuine worker or primary that
* connects from {@code 127.0.0.2} must be identifiable at all, and narrowing this predicate
* locks it out. That is an outage, and an outage is the direction to fail in — which is exactly
* why the range must not be narrowed casually and also why doing so is no longer a security
* hole. This predicate still does not decide whether a caller is trusted; it decides whether the
* caller's identity is <em>resolved at all</em>. What makes an unresolved caller safe is
* {@link Caller#resolved()} (#317), not this method.
*/
public static boolean isLoopback(String addr) {
if (addr == null) {
return false;
}
String a = addr.startsWith("::ffff:") ? addr.substring(7) : addr; // IPv4-mapped IPv6
return a.startsWith("127.") || "::1".equals(a) || "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1".equals(a);
}
}
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.BackendQuarantine;
import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.PlacementException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.SessionManager;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.MemberSession;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.ShuttingDownException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.WorktreeRequest;
import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.MemberRole;
import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.PeerLauncher;
@@ -257,7 +258,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
// Each handler is built once and wired to its fleet_* tool below.
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> sendHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.SEND,
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_send", req.arguments()),
str(req.arguments(), "sessionId"));
if (denied != null) return denied;
String caller = callerTerminal(exchange);
@@ -299,7 +300,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> replyHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
String self = callerTerminal(exchange);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.REPLY, self);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_reply", req.arguments()), self);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return reply(messages, self, str(req.arguments(), "content"));
};
@@ -307,13 +308,13 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> askHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
String self = callerTerminal(exchange);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.ASK, self);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_ask", req.arguments()), self);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return ask(messages, self, str(req.arguments(), "question"), timeoutMs(req.arguments()));
};
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> statusHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.READ, null);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_status", req.arguments()), null);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return status(messages, str(req.arguments(), "sessionId"));
};
@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
Map<String, Object> a = req.arguments();
String target = str(a, "target");
// The action depends on the ARGUMENTS, not on the tool name -- see pollAction.
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, pollAction(target), target);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_poll", a), target);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return poll(messages, str(a, "ticket"), target);
};
@@ -331,14 +332,14 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> ackHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
Map<String, Object> a = req.arguments();
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.DRAIN, str(a, "target"));
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_ack", a), str(a, "target"));
if (denied != null) return denied;
return ack(messages, str(a, "target"), str(a, "msgId"));
};
// Fleet management (CB-108): spawn/list/stop over ClaudeCodeLauncher.
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> spawnHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.SPAWN, null);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_spawn", req.arguments()), null);
if (denied != null) return denied;
String caller = callerTerminal(exchange);
// SPAWN is already auth-gated to PRIMARY (architects can never call it), but
@@ -355,7 +356,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
};
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> listHandler =
(exchange, _) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.READ, null);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_list", Map.of()), null);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return listFleet(workers, sessions, messages, capacity, healthCoverage, quarantine, outage,
leadSeats, callers == null ? Map.of() : callers.leads(),
@@ -365,19 +366,19 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> stopHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
String paneId = str(req.arguments(), "paneId");
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.STOP, paneId);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_stop", req.arguments()), paneId);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return stop(sessions, paneId);
};
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> profilesHandler =
(exchange, _) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.READ, null);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_profiles", Map.of()), null);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return profiles(workers, quarantine, outage);
};
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> whoamiHandler =
(exchange, _) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.READ, null);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_whoami", Map.of()), null);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return whoami(principal(exchange), sessions);
};
@@ -754,6 +755,25 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
return isBlank(target) ? Authz.Action.READ : Authz.Action.DRAIN;
}
/**
* The action a registered tool handler actually hands to the authorization gate.
* Keeping this choice beside the registered-tool inventory makes a new tool fail the coverage
* test until its action is pinned.
*/
static Authz.Action toolAction(String toolName, Map<String, Object> arguments) {
return switch (toolName) {
case "fleet_send" -> Authz.Action.SEND;
case "fleet_reply" -> Authz.Action.REPLY;
case "fleet_ask" -> Authz.Action.ASK;
case "fleet_status", "fleet_list", "fleet_profiles", "fleet_whoami" -> Authz.Action.READ;
case "fleet_poll" -> pollAction(str(arguments, "target"));
case "fleet_ack" -> Authz.Action.DRAIN;
case "fleet_spawn" -> Authz.Action.SPAWN;
case "fleet_stop" -> Authz.Action.STOP;
default -> throw new IllegalArgumentException("unregistered tool: " + toolName);
};
}
/** {@code fleet_poll}: check an async delegation by ticket, or drain a worker's inbox by target. */
static McpSchema.CallToolResult poll(MessageService messages, String ticket, String target) {
if (!isBlank(target)) {
@@ -794,7 +814,12 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
return error("fleet_reply is for workers only — could not identify the calling worker "
+ "from the connection");
}
if (content == null) {
// fleetd #302: isBlank, not == null, to match fleet_send's own guard above. MessageService
// .reply now REJECTS blank content, and this handler is a bare BiFunction with no try/catch
// around it — so a whitespace-only fleet_reply would leave here as an uncaught
// IllegalArgumentException instead of this clean tool error. Null and whitespace are the
// same mistake by the caller and must get the same answer.
if (isBlank(content)) {
return error("content is required");
}
messages.reply(callerTerminal, content);
@@ -938,6 +963,10 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
return text(json(memberView(member)));
} catch (GuardException e) {
return error("subscription boundary: " + e.getMessage());
} catch (ShuttingDownException e) {
// fleetd #308: the daemon's shutdown drain has already started — refuse loudly rather
// than register a session drainAll will never see again.
return error("shutting down: " + e.getMessage());
} catch (PlacementException e) {
// CB-599: no candidate had capacity (maxLoad, quarantine, or all-exhausted) — distinct
// from "profile does not exist" below.
@@ -996,6 +1025,25 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
* both maps at once when it is both exhaustion-quarantined AND cooling off.
*/
static McpSchema.CallToolResult profiles(PeerLauncher workers, QuarantineSource quarantine, OutageSource outage) {
return text(json(profilesView(workers, quarantine, outage)));
}
/**
* The body both front doors answer {@code profiles} with: the configured profile names, the
* default, and the two independent outage states — {@code quarantined} (the backend reported it
* out of capacity) and {@code coolingOff} (the credential threw repeated non-exhaustion backend
* errors). Each map is present only when at least one profile is in that state, and a profile
* can appear in both at once, because the two checks are separate.
*
* <p>fleetd #297: extracted so {@code fleet_profiles} and {@code GET /profiles} render from ONE
* body builder rather than two copies. Passing both doors the same {@link QuarantineSource} and
* {@link OutageSource} instances is necessary but not sufficient: with the loop written out
* twice, a later edit to the row shape — a renamed key, an added field — lands on one door and
* not the other, and the two then disagree about a live outage. That is exactly what fleetd
* #284 was, where one rule computed in two places was widened in only one and a single response
* contradicted itself. Shared inputs do not make duplicated computation safe.
*/
public static Map<String, Object> profilesView(PeerLauncher workers, QuarantineSource quarantine, OutageSource outage) {
Map<String, Object> result = new LinkedHashMap<>();
result.put("profiles", workers.profiles());
result.put("default", workers.defaultProfile() == null ? "" : workers.defaultProfile());
@@ -1027,7 +1075,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
if (!coolingOff.isEmpty()) {
result.put("coolingOff", coolingOff);
}
return text(json(result));
return result;
}
/**
@@ -1148,15 +1196,35 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
private static Map<String, Object> memberCapacityView(MemberSession session, Agent live,
MessageService messages, long nowNanos) {
Map<String, Object> row = SessionManager.rosterView(session, live);
boolean open = messages != null && messages.hasAcceptedDelivery(session.terminalId());
boolean inbox = messages != null && messages.hasInboxMessage(session.terminalId());
boolean reclaimable = (session.state() == MemberSession.State.READY || session.state() == MemberSession.State.DONE)
&& !open && !inbox;
boolean reclaimable = reclaimable(session, messages);
row.put("reclaimable", reclaimable);
row.put("idleForSeconds", reclaimable ? Math.max(0, (nowNanos - session.lastActivityAtNanos()) / 1_000_000_000L) : null);
return row;
}
/**
* The one definition of {@code reclaimable}: this member holds a spawn seat, and has no open
* bridge work, so stopping it gives the seat back. Both views in a single {@code fleet_list}
* response call it — the per-member flag in {@link #memberCapacityView} and the per-profile
* count in {@link #capacityView} — because two copies of this rule in one response is how the
* two numbers come to disagree.
*
* <p>fleetd #284: {@code BACKEND_ERROR} and {@code FAILED} are deliberately NOT reclaimable.
* The ticket asked for them to be, and that half of the ticket was wrong. Once
* {@code Fleetd.liveSessionCount} stopped counting a terminal session as live, that seat is
* ALREADY in {@code free}; counting it here too reports the same seat twice, and
* {@code free + reclaimable} then reads as more capacity than {@code maxLoad} allows. The dead
* session stays visible either way: its roster row still carries {@code state:
* "backend_error"} or {@code "failed"}, which is what tells the lead to stop it.
*/
static boolean reclaimable(MemberSession session, MessageService messages) {
boolean holdsSeat = session.state() == MemberSession.State.READY
|| session.state() == MemberSession.State.DONE;
return holdsSeat && (messages == null
|| (!messages.hasAcceptedDelivery(session.terminalId())
&& !messages.hasInboxMessage(session.terminalId())));
}
/**
* CB-583: {@code free} alone cannot tell a lead "busy, will free up" from "refusing, and
* nothing changes for N seconds" — those need different decisions. So a quarantined profile
@@ -1195,8 +1263,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
int live = liveCount.apply(profile);
int leadSeatCount = leadSeats.seatsFor().apply(profile);
int reclaimable = (int) roster.stream().filter(s -> profile.equals(s.profile()))
.filter(s -> (s.state() == MemberSession.State.READY || s.state() == MemberSession.State.DONE))
.filter(s -> messages == null || (!messages.hasAcceptedDelivery(s.terminalId()) && !messages.hasInboxMessage(s.terminalId())))
.filter(s -> reclaimable(s, messages))
.count();
Map<String, Object> row = new LinkedHashMap<>();
row.put("profile", profile); row.put("maxLoad", cap); row.put("live", live);
@@ -41,6 +41,14 @@ public final class LsofPeerPidLookup implements PeerPidLookup {
if (!p.waitFor(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS)) {
p.destroyForcibly();
}
if (found < 0) {
// fleetd #317: this is the silent path — lsof ran clean and simply reported no
// matching process (e.g. queried before the OS socket table settles). Previously
// this logged nothing at all, which is exactly why the escalation went unnoticed;
// the exception path below already logs. A caller now refused because of this is
// still refused (never promoted) — this line only makes the refusal diagnosable.
log.debug("lsof peer-pid lookup for port {} found no matching process", port);
}
return found;
} catch (Exception e) {
log.debug("lsof peer-pid lookup for port {} failed: {}", port, e.getMessage());
@@ -540,16 +540,66 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
* itself is still lost, because there is no OS-level compare-and-swap on a plain file, only this
* cooperative narrowing of the gap.
*
* <p><b>fleetd #285: refuses under {@code memberHerdrSocket} rather than writing somewhere the
* member cannot read.</b> Under {@code memberHerdrSocket:} the member pane runs as a
* <em>different OS user with its own {@code $HOME}</em> — the same reason {@link
* #writeCharterFile} routes the role/reply charter under {@code worktreeRoot} instead of
* {@code java.io.tmpdir} and refuses the spawn when it cannot. This method has no equivalent
* relocation available: unlike the charter (fleetd's own content, free to place anywhere and
* hand to the peer via an argv flag), {@code .claude.json} is a file Claude Code looks up for
* ITSELF at a fixed location — {@code CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.claude.json}, or else the member OS
* user's own {@code ~/.claude.json}, a path fleetd has no channel to learn. So when {@code
* configDir} is unset, there is no member-readable target to seed at all — writing the
* unqualified default would land in <em>fleetd's own</em> {@code ~/.claude.json} instead, the
* exact defect this fix closes, not a workable fallback. And even with {@code configDir} set,
* the file this method itself just wrote is {@code 0600} (owner-only — see {@link
* #copyPosixPermissionsIfPresent}), unreadable by a different-uid member unless shared with
* {@code worktreeGroup}, the same group {@link EnvAllowListScrub#shareWithGroup} already uses
* for the ZDOTDIR scrub (fleetd #213) and the charter file (fleetd #219/#222). So under {@code
* memberHerdrSocket} this method requires BOTH {@code configDir} and {@code worktreeGroup}
* before it ever touches a file, and refuses the spawn — naming exactly which one is missing —
* rather than silently corrupt fleetd's own home or hand the member an unreadable path. This
* mirrors {@link #writeCharterFile}'s "refuse, don't degrade" decision: a member spawned without
* a readable trust seed is not degraded, it sits on the interactive dialog forever and never
* calls {@code fleet_reply} — exactly the failure fleetd #149 exists to prevent, so trading it
* for "spawn something" is not worth it. When {@code configDir} and {@code worktreeGroup} are
* both present, the write proceeds exactly as below and the resulting file is additionally
* chgrp'd/chmod'd group-readable ({@code rw-r-----}) via {@link
* EnvAllowListScrub#shareFileWithGroup(Path, String)} so the member's OS user can actually
* open it — the
* directory itself (unlike {@code worktreeRoot} or the charter's per-spawn directory) is not
* fleetd-managed, so its own traversal permissions remain the operator's setup, same as they
* already must be for the member to read anything else fleetd points {@code CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR}
* at. With {@code memberHerdrSocket} ABSENT (today's only live mode) every branch below is
* byte-identical to before this fix.
*
* @param configDir the profile's {@code CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR} ({@code cfg.configDir()}), or
* {@code null}/blank to target the default {@code ~/.claude.json}
* {@code null}/blank to target the default {@code ~/.claude.json} — refused
* outright when {@code memberHerdrSocket} is configured, see above
* @param cwd the spawn's resolved working directory — the exact key Claude Code will look
* up for itself once it starts there
* @throws IllegalStateException when {@code memberHerdrSocket} is configured but {@code
* configDir} and/or {@code worktreeGroup} is not — the same
* refusal shape as {@link #writeCharterFile}
*/
private static void seedTrustDialog(String configDir, String cwd) {
private void seedTrustDialog(String configDir, String cwd) {
if (!isProvisionedWorktree(cwd)) {
return;
}
boolean unsetConfigDir = configDir == null || configDir.isBlank();
boolean memberHerdrSocket = memberHerdrSocketConfigured();
String group = memberHerdrSocket ? memberGroup() : null;
if (memberHerdrSocket && (unsetConfigDir || group == null)) {
throw new IllegalStateException("memberHerdrSocket is configured, so the workspace-trust "
+ "seed (.claude.json, which gates Claude Code's interactive trust dialog) must be "
+ "placed where the member's OS user can read it — configDir, shared via "
+ "worktreeGroup — but " + (unsetConfigDir ? "configDir" : "worktreeGroup")
+ " is not configured. Refusing to spawn rather than write fleetd's own default "
+ "'~/.claude.json' or hand the member a config file it cannot read: that member "
+ "would sit on the interactive trust dialog forever and never reach an "
+ "injectable state. Configure configDir on this profile and worktreeGroup on the "
+ "fleet to enable claude-code member spawns under memberHerdrSocket.");
}
Path target = unsetConfigDir
? Path.of(System.getProperty("user.home"), ".claude.json")
: Path.of(configDir, ".claude.json");
@@ -559,18 +609,20 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
// profile that simply forgot to set configDir gets no signal at all short of the
// operator noticing their own file changing. Say so loudly, every time it is about to
// happen, rather than only once ever: each occurrence is a live write to a real
// person's home config and deserves its own log line.
// person's home config and deserves its own log line. (Reached only when
// memberHerdrSocket is absent — the block above already refused otherwise.)
log.warn("seedTrustDialog: profile has no configDir set, so the workspace-trust seed "
+ "for cwd '{}' is about to write the operator's own default '{}' — set "
+ "configDir on this profile to target a per-member config file instead",
cwd, target);
}
synchronized (TRUST_JSON_LOCK) {
boolean written = false;
try {
if (target.getParent() != null) {
Files.createDirectories(target.getParent());
}
for (int attempt = 1; attempt <= MAX_TRUST_JSON_CAS_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {
for (int attempt = 1; attempt <= MAX_TRUST_JSON_CAS_ATTEMPTS && !written; attempt++) {
byte[] before = Files.isRegularFile(target) ? Files.readAllBytes(target) : null;
ObjectNode root = parseTrustJsonOrEmpty(before);
JsonNode projectsNode = root.get("projects");
@@ -611,26 +663,39 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
continue;
}
writeAtomically(target, newContent);
return;
written = true;
}
if (!written) {
// fleetd #247: deliberately do NOT write here. A member that starts without the
// seed still starts — it may hit the trust dialog fleetd #149 describes and fail
// to reach an injectable state, but that failure is visible (herdr reports it,
// the spawn-readiness gate times out) and recoverable (retry the spawn). Writing
// our stale copy over whatever the other writer left would be silent and, if that
// other writer is the operator's own live session, could destroy real
// configuration — fail toward the recoverable outcome, not the silent one.
log.warn("seedTrustDialog: gave up seeding workspace-trust for cwd '{}' into '{}' "
+ "after {} attempts — another writer (most plausibly the operator's own "
+ "live Claude Code sharing this file) kept changing it faster than we "
+ "could re-read it, so nothing was written; the member may show the "
+ "trust dialog instead", cwd, target, MAX_TRUST_JSON_CAS_ATTEMPTS);
}
// fleetd #247: deliberately do NOT write here. A member that starts without the
// seed still starts — it may hit the trust dialog fleetd #149 describes and fail to
// reach an injectable state, but that failure is visible (herdr reports it, the
// spawn-readiness gate times out) and recoverable (retry the spawn). Writing our
// stale copy over whatever the other writer left would be silent and, if that other
// writer is the operator's own live session, could destroy real configuration —
// fail toward the recoverable outcome, not the silent one.
log.warn("seedTrustDialog: gave up seeding workspace-trust for cwd '{}' into '{}' "
+ "after {} attempts — another writer (most plausibly the operator's own "
+ "live Claude Code sharing this file) kept changing it faster than we could "
+ "re-read it, so nothing was written; the member may show the trust dialog "
+ "instead", cwd, target, MAX_TRUST_JSON_CAS_ATTEMPTS);
} catch (Exception e) {
log.debug("cannot seed workspace-trust entry for cwd '{}' into '{}'", cwd, target, e);
return;
}
// fleetd #285: the write above lands as fleetd's own OS user; under memberHerdrSocket
// that is NOT the member's OS user, so without this the member still cannot read the
// file it exists to seed — a silent readiness timeout with the write looking "done".
// Deliberately OUTSIDE the swallow-all catch above: a group that fails to resolve here
// means the seed is unreadable despite a successful write, which must fail as loudly as
// writeCharterFile's own EnvAllowListScrub.shareWithGroup call already does.
if (written && memberHerdrSocket) {
EnvAllowListScrub.shareFileWithGroup(target, group);
}
}
}
/** Bound on {@link #seedTrustDialog}'s fleetd #247 compare-and-swap retry loop. */
private static final int MAX_TRUST_JSON_CAS_ATTEMPTS = 5;
@@ -385,9 +385,12 @@ public final class CompositePeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
}
}
// unreachable.size() counts DISTINCT profiles, not attempts (a HashSet dedupes a profile
// added twice) — say "distinct" so the count matches the sentence and the profile list that
// follows, rather than reading as a count of attempts made (fleetd #315).
throw new PeerUnreachableException(
"no reachable worker profile available after trying " + unreachable.size()
+ " candidate(s): " + String.join(", ", unreachable));
+ " distinct candidate(s): " + String.join(", ", unreachable));
}
/**
@@ -181,6 +181,33 @@ public final class EnvAllowListScrub {
}
}
/**
* fleetd #285: share ONE file with {@code group}, read-only ({@code rw-r-----}) — the same
* per-file mode {@link #shareWithGroup} applies to a directory's entries, and the same error
* shapes, but without touching a parent directory. Used for a file fleetd writes into a
* directory it does NOT own — {@code configDir}'s own traversal permissions stay the
* operator's setup — where the directory-wide {@link #shareWithGroup} would be wrong.
*
* @throws UncheckedIOException when {@code group} does not resolve on this host, the
* filesystem has no POSIX group ownership, or a
* group-ownership/permission call is refused
*/
static void shareFileWithGroup(Path file, String group) {
try {
GroupPrincipal principal = file.getFileSystem().getUserPrincipalLookupService()
.lookupPrincipalByGroupName(group);
setGroupAndPermissions(file, principal, "rw-r-----");
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new UncheckedIOException("cannot share generated file " + file + " with group '"
+ group + "' — the group must exist, and the fleetd operator ("
+ System.getProperty("user.name") + ") must be a member of it", e);
} catch (UnsupportedOperationException e) {
throw new UncheckedIOException("cannot share generated file " + file + " with group '"
+ group + "' — this filesystem does not support POSIX group ownership",
new IOException(e));
}
}
private static void setGroupAndPermissions(Path path, GroupPrincipal group, String perms) throws IOException {
PosixFileAttributeView view = Files.getFileAttributeView(path, PosixFileAttributeView.class);
if (view == null) {
@@ -697,7 +697,20 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
if (paneId == null) {
throw new IllegalStateException("pane.split returned no pane — cannot start a peer");
}
Agent peer = startUniquelyNamed(cfg, argv, paneId).agent();
Agent peer;
try {
peer = startUniquelyNamed(cfg, argv, paneId).agent();
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
// The peer never started — don't leave the pane we just created orphaned.
// Best-effort cleanup; never let it mask the real spawn failure.
try {
stop(paneId);
} catch (RuntimeException cleanup) {
log.warn("failed to close orphaned pane {} after spawn error: {}",
paneId, cleanup.getMessage());
}
throw e;
}
log.info("{} started pane={} terminal={}", namePrefix, peer.paneId(), peer.terminalId());
return peer;
}
@@ -913,9 +926,14 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
* {@link #reapOrphanWorkers() orphan-reap} and spawn-gate-timeout paths, plus any caller that
* passes a pane directly, keep working without an owning id.
*
* <p>Resolves the tab from the pane <em>before</em> closing it. An already-gone pane/tab
* (repeated DELETE, crashed peer) is treated as success; any other failure propagates so a
* genuinely failed teardown is not reported as done.
* <p>Resolves the tab from the pane <em>before</em> closing it. {@code agents.close} (the pane)
* is the one step whose failure means the teardown itself may not have happened: an already-gone
* pane (repeated DELETE, crashed peer) is treated as success, but any other failure propagates so
* a genuinely failed teardown is not reported as done. {@code spaces.closeTab} (fleetd #293) is
* different — by the time it runs the pane is already closed, so it is cosmetic workspace tidying
* rather than a real teardown failure, and a failure there is logged and never propagates, so it
* cannot mask the two cleanups below it ({@link #releaseZdotdir}, and the caller's worktree
* removal in {@code SessionManager.release}).
*/
@Override
public void stop(String idOrPane) {
@@ -934,7 +952,25 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
log.debug("pane.close({}) ignored — already gone: {}", paneId, e.getMessage());
}
if (loc != null && loc.tabPaneCount() == 1) {
spaces.closeTab(loc.tabId());
// fleetd #293: the pane above is already closed by this point, so a failing tab.close is
// cosmetic workspace tidying, not a real teardown failure — it must not mask the two
// cleanups below it (releaseZdotdir, and the caller's worktree removal). Unlike
// agents.close above, this is not narrowed to "already gone": any failure here, whatever
// its cause, is one we continue past, so we log it at WARN (not debug) with the tab id a
// person can go close by hand.
try {
spaces.closeTab(loc.tabId());
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
// Caught as RuntimeException, not HerdrException, to match releaseZdotdir's own
// guard five lines below. Today the two are the same set — HerdrCodec wraps every
// encode/decode failure and UnixSocketHerdrClient wraps every IOException, so
// HerdrException is all closeTab can actually throw. Narrowing to it anyway would
// leave this step guarded against the expected failure and bare against any other,
// which is the exact asymmetry fleetd #293 exists to remove. No behaviour change
// today; it stops a later change inside WorkspaceControl.closeTab reopening it.
log.warn("tab.close({}) failed — the pane is already torn down, so continuing; the "
+ "tab may need manual cleanup: {}", loc.tabId(), e.getMessage());
}
} else if (loc != null) {
log.debug("not closing tab {} — it holds {} panes (not a dedicated peer tab)",
loc.tabId(), loc.tabPaneCount());
@@ -973,7 +1009,8 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
* that gap: it stops waiting immediately (never burns the rest of the timeout), runs the same
* teardown the timeout path below runs, and throws with a message that says the backend exited
* rather than that the pane was slow. Any other {@link HerdrException} still propagates
* unchanged — this gate does not know how to recover from it.
* unchanged — this gate does not interpret or recover from it, but it still closes the pane
* it opened before handing the exception to its caller.
*/
private void waitUntilInjectableOrThrow(String paneId) {
long start = nowMillis.getAsLong();
@@ -987,7 +1024,15 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
if (isAlreadyGone(e)) {
failFastOnGoneBackend(paneId, e, nowMillis.getAsLong() - start);
}
throw e; // any other herdr failure is not ours to interpret — let it propagate
// This gate must not interpret an unrelated herdr error, but the caller does not
// receive paneId when spawn throws. Close the pane here before propagating e unchanged.
try {
stop(paneId);
} catch (RuntimeException cleanup) {
log.warn("failed to close orphaned pane {} after readiness-gate error: {}",
paneId, cleanup.getMessage());
}
throw e;
}
lastStatus = sample.status();
if (lastStatus.injectable() || refinedInjectable(paneId, sample)) {
@@ -1620,30 +1665,59 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
/**
* Guards the {@code effectiveAllowed == null} branch of {@link #logCredentialGap} — the
* genuinely-unprotected report (deny-by-default, and the allow-list non-zsh fallback) — to one
* WARN per launcher instance, not one per spawn.
* genuinely-unprotected report (deny-by-default, and the allow-list non-zsh fallback) — AND
* the {@code effectiveAllowed != null} / {@code keptByDerivedList} branch, the allow-list case
* where a name is in the gap but the derived allow-list keeps it anyway. Both branches log the
* same severity (WARN) about the same fact — a name genuinely reaching a member pane
* unprotected — so they share this one guard, keyed per NAME rather than per launcher instance:
* each credential-shaped name that is ever reported unprotected gets exactly one WARN, however
* many spawns see it and whichever of the two branches first reports it.
*
* <p>fleetd #341: {@code memberCredentials} is a live, re-read-per-spawn supplier, so the
* policy — and so the gap's actual member names — can change between two spawns on the same
* launcher. Before this fix the guard was a single {@code AtomicBoolean} tripped by either
* branch: spawn 1 could warn about name A and trip the flag, and a later spawn's gap containing
* a different name B would never be reported, even though B is just as unprotected as A was.
* {@code AtomicBoolean} could not express "once per distinct name" at all — only "once, ever,
* for whichever name got there first" — so this is a {@code Set<String>} guard instead, the
* same shape {@link OpenCodeLauncher#modelCheckSkippedWarned} already uses for its own
* once-per-distinct-thing WARN. {@link #add}'s return value (true only the first time a name is
* added) is what turns "log the whole gap" into "log only the names never warned about before".
*
* <p>Bounded by construction: every name added here first passed {@link
* #CREDENTIAL_SHAPED_NAME}'s filter over {@link #hostEnvNames}, i.e. it is an actual
* environment variable name from the daemon's own process — a small, OS-bounded set (the host
* environment has, in practice, tens to a few hundred entries), not an attacker- or
* request-controlled input. So this set cannot grow past "however many distinct credential-
* shaped names this host's environment has ever held across this launcher's lifetime," which is
* effectively fixed for the life of one daemon process — no separate cap is needed.
*
* <p>CB-633 follow-up (#192): kept SEPARATE from {@link #allowListGapLogged} on purpose.
* {@code memberCredentials} is a live, re-read-per-spawn supplier, so the policy can change
* between two spawns on the same launcher. A single shared flag would let a harmless allow-list
* INFO on spawn 1 permanently suppress the real deny-by-default WARN a later spawn deserves —
* the report that matters most getting hidden by the report that doesn't. Two flags mean each
* report kind fires exactly once, independent of what the other kind already logged.
* report kind (WARN vs. INFO) fires independently of what the other kind already logged; within
* the WARN kind itself, the set above further separates by name, for the same reason.
*/
private final AtomicBoolean unprotectedGapLogged = new AtomicBoolean();
private final Set<String> unprotectedGapNamesWarned = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet();
/**
* Guards the {@code effectiveAllowed != null} branch of {@link #logCredentialGap} — the
* allow-list-scrub-covered report — to one INFO per launcher instance. See {@link
* #unprotectedGapLogged}'s javadoc for why this is a separate flag rather than a shared one.
* #unprotectedGapNamesWarned}'s javadoc for why this is a separate flag rather than a shared
* one; unlike that guard it stays a per-instance {@code AtomicBoolean}, not a per-name set —
* fleetd #341 fixed the WARN-vs-WARN suppression, not this INFO's own one-shot shape, which was
* not reported as broken and is out of that ticket's scope.
*/
private final AtomicBoolean allowListGapLogged = new AtomicBoolean();
/**
* fleetd #185 stage 2: guards {@link #warnUnknownMemberEnvironment} to one WARN per launcher
* instance, not one per spawn — the same one-per-instance shape as {@link #unprotectedGapLogged}
* and {@link #allowListGapLogged}, kept as its own flag for the same reason those two are split:
* this mode is orthogonal to which of the other two branches would otherwise have fired.
* instance, not one per spawn — the same one-shot shape {@link #unprotectedGapNamesWarned} and
* {@link #allowListGapLogged} guard their own branches with, kept as its own flag for the same
* reason those two are split: this mode is orthogonal to which of the other two branches would
* otherwise have fired.
*/
private final AtomicBoolean unknownMemberEnvironmentWarned = new AtomicBoolean();
@@ -1771,14 +1845,21 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
List<String> blankedByScrub = gap.stream()
.filter(name -> !MemberEnvAllowList.keeps(effectiveAllowed, name))
.toList();
if (!keptByDerivedList.isEmpty() && unprotectedGapLogged.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
// fleetd #341: filter to names this guard has never warned about before — not just
// "isEmpty" on the whole branch — so a name this spawn's gap shares with an EARLIER
// spawn's (already-warned) gap does not re-print, while a name unique to THIS gap still
// does, whichever of the two WARN branches reported it first.
List<String> newlyUnprotected = keptByDerivedList.stream()
.filter(unprotectedGapNamesWarned::add)
.toList();
if (!newlyUnprotected.isEmpty()) {
log.warn("memberCredentials gap: {} credential-shaped env var name(s) are on neither "
+ "known: nor allow: — the derived allow-list keeps them anyway (a profile's "
+ "gitTokenEnv/gitHostEnv/tokenEnv/env: names one, or this spawn injects it), "
+ "so every member pane inherits them UNBLOCKED — {}. Add each to "
+ "memberCredentials.known (or .allow if a member legitimately needs it), or "
+ "remove it from whatever profile setting derives it in.",
keptByDerivedList.size(), keptByDerivedList);
newlyUnprotected.size(), newlyUnprotected);
}
if (!blankedByScrub.isEmpty() && allowListGapLogged.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
log.info("memberCredentials gap: {} credential-shaped env var name(s) are on neither "
@@ -1791,12 +1872,18 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
/** The deny-by-default (and allow-list non-zsh fallback) WARN — unchanged byte-for-byte by #192. */
private void warnGapUnprotected(List<String> gap) {
if (unprotectedGapLogged.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
// fleetd #341: same "only the names never warned before" filter as the sibling branch in
// logCredentialGap above — see unprotectedGapNamesWarned's javadoc. Both branches share
// this one guard because both report the exact same fact (a name reaching a member pane
// unprotected) at the exact same severity; keying it by name is what lets a later spawn's
// DIFFERENT name still get its own WARN after an earlier spawn's already fired.
List<String> newlyUnprotected = gap.stream().filter(unprotectedGapNamesWarned::add).toList();
if (!newlyUnprotected.isEmpty()) {
log.warn("memberCredentials gap: {} credential-shaped env var name(s) are on neither "
+ "known: nor allow: — every member pane inherits them UNBLOCKED — {}. "
+ "Add each to memberCredentials.known (blocked by default) or .allow "
+ "(if a member legitimately needs it).",
gap.size(), gap);
newlyUnprotected.size(), newlyUnprotected);
}
}
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentSkipListMap;
import java.util.concurrent.ExecutionException;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeoutException;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicReference;
/**
* AMQP-backed {@link ReplyInbox} (CB-307 Stage 2): genuine cross-restart durability behind the same
@@ -93,8 +94,23 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
private final Channel channel;
/** All channel operations (publish/declare/ack/cancel) serialize on this — a Channel is not thread-safe. */
private final Object channelLock = new Object();
/** target → (msgId → held delivery). Per-target map is guarded by synchronizing on itself. */
/**
* target → (msgId → held delivery). Per-target map is guarded by synchronizing on itself.
*
* <p><strong>CB-318 tombstone.</strong> The value {@link #RELEASED} is a reserved sentinel: it
* marks a target whose {@link #release} has already run, so {@link #deliverCallback} can tell a
* delivery landing after release() apart from a fresh target it has never seen. See both methods'
* javadoc for why a plain {@code held.remove(target)} is not enough.
*/
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, LinkedHashMap<String, Held>> held = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/**
* CB-318 sentinel stored in {@link #held} for a target whose {@link #release} has already run.
* Never mutated — every read site compares it by reference ({@code ==}) before touching it as a
* map, because it is a single object shared across every released target and calling a mutator on
* it would corrupt state for all of them.
*/
private static final LinkedHashMap<String, Held> RELEASED = new LinkedHashMap<>();
/** Targets whose queue is declared and consumer is running, mapped to their broker consumer tag. */
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, String> consumerTags = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
@@ -201,6 +217,12 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
channel.queueDeclare(queue, true, false, false, null); // durable, non-exclusive, keep on idle
String tag = channel.basicConsume(queue, false, deliverCallback(target), _ -> { });
consumerTags.put(target, tag);
// CB-318: drop a stale RELEASED tombstone from a prior ownership of this same target
// string, so a delivery under this fresh consumer is held normally instead of being
// nacked forever by deliverCallback's RELEASED check. Safe to do here, still under
// channelLock: no delivery for the consumer tag just registered above can reach
// deliverCallback before this basicConsume call returns.
held.remove(target, RELEASED);
log.debug("AMQP inbox owns queue {} for target {}", queue, target);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("cannot own queue " + queue, e);
@@ -208,18 +230,103 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
}
}
/**
* Release ownership of {@code target}: cancel its consumer, then nack-with-requeue every
* delivery still held for it instead of just dropping the local record.
*
* <p><strong>Cancelling a consumer does not requeue its in-flight deliveries.</strong> In AMQP,
* a delivery that was pushed to a consumer stays unacked, attached to the still-open
* {@link #channel}, until that channel or the connection closes — {@code basicCancel} alone does
* neither. So before this method existed with a requeue step, it dropped {@link #held}'s entries
* for {@code target} while the broker still considered them outstanding: never acked, never
* nacked, never requeued, and no longer reachable by {@link #peek} — permanently invisible. This
* is unlike {@link #handleRecovery} and {@link #close()}, whose bare {@code held.clear()} is
* correct because each has already made the broker requeue (a real connection drop, or
* {@code channel.close()} respectively) before clearing local state.
*
* <p><strong>Order: cancel first, then nack.</strong> A delivery tag stays valid for
* {@code basicNack} on this channel regardless of whether its consumer is still attached — only
* a channel/connection close invalidates it — so cancelling {@code target}'s consumer first does
* not risk the tags. Doing it the other way round does: nacking a delivery with {@code requeue}
* while its consumer is still active hands the message straight back to that <em>same</em>
* consumer the instant a prefetch slot frees up (confirmed against a real broker — see
* {@code AmqpReplyInboxContractTest.releaseCancelsConsumerAndRequeuesHeldDeliveryForRecovery}),
* which races this method's own {@code held.remove(target)}: the redelivery can land after the
* clear and leave a stale entry behind, so {@link #peek} is no longer reliably empty right after
* {@link #release}. Cancelling first closes that consumer, so the requeued message goes back to
* the queue for whichever consumer picks it up next (a later {@link #own}), not this one.
*
* <p><strong>Failure of the requeue is best-effort, not fatal.</strong> {@link #release} runs
* during teardown ({@code Fleetd} calls it right after {@code MessageService.abandon}), and a
* throw here would abort cleanups the caller depends on — the same argument fleetd #293 settled
* for {@code HerdrPeerLauncher.stop()}'s tab-close step. So a failed {@code basicNack} is logged
* at WARN, naming the target and delivery tag that leaked, and release proceeds; the delivery
* stays unacked on the broker rather than being silently dropped, so it is still recoverable by a
* later connection drop even though this release did not manage to requeue it immediately. A
* failed {@code basicCancel} still throws, unchanged from before this fix — that failure means
* the consumer may still be attached, so best-effort requeue is not attempted underneath it.
*
* <p><strong>CB-318: {@code held.remove(target)} alone leaves a second window open.</strong> The
* bullet above already explains why cancelling first does not save a tag from going stale — but
* that only accounts for a delivery landing before this method starts touching {@link #held}.
* {@code basicCancel} stops <em>new</em> dispatches; it does not flush one already handed to the
* consumer work pool. So a delivery can still land on that pool's thread and reach
* {@link #deliverCallback} at any point during, or after, this method's body — and a plain
* {@code held.remove(target)} does nothing to stop it: {@code deliverCallback}'s
* {@code computeIfAbsent} finds the key gone and happily creates a brand-new map under it, which
* this method — already past its {@code remove} — never looks at again. That entry then sits
* delivered-but-unacked on {@link #channel} until the whole inbox closes: never requeued, never
* redelivered, and {@link #peek} is never called again for a target nothing owns any more.
*
* <p>The fix is {@link #held}{@code .compute(target, ...)} instead of {@code remove}: it takes
* whatever was held (to nack, same as before) and, in the same atomic step, leaves the
* {@link #RELEASED} tombstone behind instead of an absent key. {@code computeIfAbsent} and
* {@code compute} calls for the same key are mutually exclusive in {@link ConcurrentHashMap} —
* whichever of this call and a concurrent {@code deliverCallback} runs first is fully visible to
* the other, with no gap between them. So a delivery that loses the race sees a real map here and
* gets nacked by the loop below, same as always; a delivery that wins the race (runs first) is
* itself nacked by that same loop, once it settles into {@code held}. A delivery that arrives once
* this method has stored {@link #RELEASED} finds it via {@code computeIfAbsent} and refuses itself
* — see {@link #deliverCallback}. Either way nothing is silently retained forever, satisfying the
* ticket's invariant against dropping a message. This closes the window rather than merely
* narrowing it — correctness does not depend on how much time elapses between the swap and this
* method returning.
*/
@Override
public void release(String target) {
synchronized (channelLock) {
String tag = consumerTags.remove(target);
held.remove(target); // stale delivery tags must not survive release
if (tag == null) {
return;
if (tag != null) {
try {
channel.basicCancel(tag);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("cannot cancel consumer for " + target, e);
}
}
try {
channel.basicCancel(tag);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("cannot cancel consumer for " + target, e);
AtomicReference<LinkedHashMap<String, Held>> previouslyHeld = new AtomicReference<>();
held.compute(target, (_, v) -> {
previouslyHeld.set(v);
return RELEASED;
});
var perTarget = previouslyHeld.get();
if (perTarget != null && perTarget != RELEASED) {
synchronized (perTarget) {
for (Held h : perTarget.values()) {
try {
channel.basicNack(h.deliveryTag(), false, true); // requeue, don't drop
} catch (IOException | RuntimeException e) {
// Caught broadly (not just IOException) for the same reason #293 catches
// RuntimeException in HerdrPeerLauncher.stop(): best-effort teardown must
// not be guarded only against the expected failure and bare against any
// other. The message stays unacked on the broker either way — not lost,
// just not proactively requeued — until a connection drop frees it.
log.warn("release({}): could not requeue held delivery (msgId={}, tag={})"
+ " back to the broker — it stays unacked until a connection"
+ " drop frees it: {}",
target, h.message().msgId(), h.deliveryTag(), e.getMessage());
}
}
}
}
}
}
@@ -272,7 +379,7 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
@Override
public List<InboxMessage> peek(String target) {
var perTarget = held.get(target);
if (perTarget == null) {
if (perTarget == null || perTarget == RELEASED) {
return List.of();
}
synchronized (perTarget) {
@@ -283,7 +390,7 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
@Override
public void ack(String target, String msgId) {
var perTarget = held.get(target);
if (perTarget == null) {
if (perTarget == null || perTarget == RELEASED) {
return;
}
Held h;
@@ -316,6 +423,20 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
}
String content = new String(delivery.getBody(), StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
var perTarget = held.computeIfAbsent(target, _ -> new LinkedHashMap<>());
if (perTarget == RELEASED) {
// CB-318: release() already ran for this target and left the RELEASED tombstone in
// held (see release()'s javadoc) — computeIfAbsent() is guaranteed to see it rather
// than recreate a fresh map, because ConcurrentHashMap serializes compute/
// computeIfAbsent calls for the same key against each other. Refuse the delivery
// instead of holding it somewhere release() will never look at again: requeue it, the
// same way release() nacks its own held entries, so a later owner (or a connection
// drop) can still recover it. This does not need channelLock across a broker round
// trip — basicNack, like the duplicate-ack case just below, does not wait for one.
synchronized (channelLock) {
channel.basicNack(tag, false, true);
}
return;
}
boolean duplicate;
synchronized (perTarget) {
if (perTarget.containsKey(msgId)) {
@@ -187,6 +187,24 @@ public final class MessageService {
private volatile Long completedNanos;
private volatile Reply question;
private volatile String turnId;
/**
* Set when this task's {@code fleet_ask} lapsed with no answer (fleetd #307):
* {@link #clearAsyncQuestion} then forgets {@link #turnId} (nulls it and drops the task from
* {@code asyncTasksByTurn}) so {@link #hasAsyncQuestion} stops reporting the target BUSY — a
* later {@code fleet_send} to it must be accepted, not refused. But the worker's turn is
* still genuinely live: it resumed on its own and will eventually call its real
* {@code fleet_reply}. Losing {@link #turnId} loses {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks}' only
* signal that such a reply belongs to this task, so that reply used to fall straight to the
* inbox and strand — {@code fleet_poll} stayed {@code PENDING} forever, later force-failed by
* {@link #abandon} with the misleading "session released before it replied". This flag is a
* second, independent signal that survives the forgetting: {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks}
* accepts it in place of a live {@link #turnId}, without ever re-adding the task to
* {@code asyncTasksByTurn} (so the BUSY release is untouched). Cleared implicitly once
* {@link #future} resolves — every match in {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks} already requires
* {@code !future.isDone()}, so a task that recovered (or was later failed by
* {@link #abandon}) can never match again regardless of this flag's value.
*/
private volatile boolean askTimedOut;
private Task(String ticket, String target, LongSupplier nowNanos) {
this.ticket = ticket;
@@ -395,42 +413,71 @@ public final class MessageService {
* {@link Rendezvous#resolveQuestion} must keep today's {@code NO_WAITER} behaviour — questions
* are interactive and must never be queued.
*
* <p><strong>Ambiguous match also falls to the inbox.</strong> {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks}
* cannot actually return more than one entry today (see its own javadoc for why — in short,
* {@link #hasAsyncQuestion} keeps a target BUSY, so no second task can reach this state, for as
* long as an earlier one's {@code turnId} is still stamped). That is an emergent guarantee from
* two other facts, not one this method enforces, so this branch stays in as defence in depth
* rather than being removed as dead code: if it ever weakens, returning whichever candidate a
* {@code ConcurrentHashMap} iteration reaches first would let a genuine reply complete the
* <em>wrong</em> ticket — silently handing the lead something that reads like a correct answer to
* a delegation the worker never touched, which is worse than a failure because the lead acts on
* it. When more than one candidate exists, guessing is not safe: fall back to the inbox exactly
* as the zero-candidate case does, and let {@link #abandon} apply the eventual recovery
* deterministically instead.
* <p><strong>Ambiguous match also falls to the inbox.</strong> {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks} can
* return more than one entry — a reachable state, not a hypothetical one (see its own javadoc:
* an {@code fleet_ask} that lapsed with no answer, fleetd #307, frees the target for a completely fresh
* delegation, which can itself go on to ask-and-lapse before the first worker's real reply
* arrives). Returning whichever candidate a {@code ConcurrentHashMap} iteration reaches first
* would let a genuine reply complete the <em>wrong</em> ticket — silently handing the lead
* something that reads like a correct answer to a delegation the worker never touched, which is
* worse than a failure because the lead acts on it. When more than one candidate exists, guessing
* is not safe: fall back to the inbox exactly as the zero-candidate case does, and let
* {@link #abandon} apply the eventual recovery deterministically instead.
*
* <p><strong>{@code content} is required (fleetd #302).</strong> Both doors that reach this
* method must reject a missing/blank reply the same way, so the check lives here rather than in
* either caller: {@code FleetMcp.reply} already refuses a {@code null} content before it ever
* calls this method (its own required-arg guard), and no test or production call site anywhere
* in the codebase relies on replying with empty content — confirmed by searching every call site
* of this method before adding the check, not assumed. Without this guard, a REST {@code
* POST /sessions/{id}/reply} whose body omits {@code content} (or a client library that maps a
* missing field to {@code ""}) used to reach {@link Rendezvous#resolve} with an empty string,
* silently completing the lead's blocking wait with nothing — indistinguishable from a worker
* that genuinely replied with nothing, which is worse than a loud failure because it destroys the
* information that the reply never arrived.
*
* @throws IllegalArgumentException if {@code content} is {@code null} or blank — the caller must
* report this as a client error (REST: 400 {@code bad_request}) rather than resolve
* anything
* @return always {@code true} — the reply resolved a live send, completed a parked ticket, or
* was queued
*/
public boolean reply(String session, String content) {
if (content == null || content.isBlank()) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("content is required");
}
if (rendezvous.resolve(session, content)) {
count(FleetMetrics.REPLIES, "path", "rendezvous");
return true; // a live send took it — unchanged fast path
}
// #137: no live rendezvous waiter, but this may be the worker's real fleet_reply resuming a
// turn that {@link #answer} already gave up waiting on. answer()'s own bounded wait (the
// primary's fleet_send{turnId} call, capped well under a minute) can time out and close its
// waiter long before the worker — now actually resuming real work — finishes and replies. That
// reply used to have nowhere to land but the session inbox, leaving the async ticket's future
// unresolved forever: fleet_poll{ticket} stayed PENDING until fleet_stop's abandon() forced it
// FAILED with a misleading "session released before it replied" reason, even though the reply
// had, in fact, arrived. Completing the matching ticket directly here means fleet_poll{ticket}
// sees the real reply instead.
// #137/fleetd #307: no live rendezvous waiter, but this may be the worker's real fleet_reply resuming
// a turn that either answer() (#137) or ask() (fleetd #307) already gave up waiting on:
// - answer()'s own bounded wait (the primary's fleet_send{turnId} call, capped well under a
// minute) can time out and close its waiter long before the worker — now actually resuming
// real work — finishes and replies.
// - ask()'s own wait for the primary can time out first, with the worker resuming on its own
// and finishing unanswered.
// Either way that reply used to have nowhere to land but the session inbox, leaving the async
// ticket's future unresolved forever: fleet_poll{ticket} stayed PENDING until fleet_stop's
// abandon() forced it FAILED with a misleading "session released before it replied" reason,
// even though the reply had, in fact, arrived. Completing the matching ticket directly here
// means fleet_poll{ticket} sees the real reply instead.
List<Task> candidates = askAnsweredAsyncTasks(session);
if (candidates.size() == 1) {
Task orphan = candidates.get(0);
if (orphan.future.complete(new Reply(Outcome.REPLIED, content))) {
if (orphan.turnId != null) {
asyncTasksByTurn.remove(orphan.turnId, orphan);
// fleetd #329 (F3): read orphan.turnId once. It used to be read twice, under no
// lock — once for this null check, once as the removal key — the same double-read
// shape fleetd #324 fixed in finishAsyncTask. clearAsyncQuestion's unlocked
// forgetTurn=true path (ask()'s timeout cleanup) can null the field between the two
// reads; capturing it once removes the torn read here too.
String turnId = orphan.turnId;
if (turnId != null) {
if (replyOrphanTurnIdRaceHookForTest != null) {
// Test-only (fleetd #329, F3): see the field's own javadoc.
replyOrphanTurnIdRaceHookForTest.run();
}
asyncTasksByTurn.remove(turnId, orphan);
}
count(FleetMetrics.REPLIES, "path", "async-recovered");
return true; // the ticket itself took it — no inbox stranding at all
@@ -455,34 +502,42 @@ public final class MessageService {
}
/**
* Every still-open async task on {@code target} whose {@code fleet_ask} was already answered —
* its {@link Task#turnId} is stamped but its {@link Task#question} was cleared by {@link #answer}
* — yet whose future is not resolved yet (#137). Empty if no such task exists, including the
* common case where {@code target}'s worker never used {@code fleet_ask} at all (a task that was
* never asked has {@code turnId == null}, so it can never match here and only ever completes
* through the ordinary rendezvous fast path in {@link #reply}).
* Every still-open async task on {@code target} whose worker is genuinely expected to send a
* real {@code fleet_reply} next with nothing left registered to catch it: either its
* {@code fleet_ask} was already answered — {@link Task#turnId} is stamped but {@link
* Task#question} was cleared by {@link #answer} — or its {@code fleet_ask} lapsed unanswered and
* {@link Task#askTimedOut} marks that (fleetd #307; {@link Task#turnId} is {@code null} by then, forgotten
* so the target is not left BUSY — see {@link Task#askTimedOut}'s own javadoc). Either way the
* task's future is not resolved yet. Empty if no such task exists, including the common case
* where {@code target}'s worker never used {@code fleet_ask} at all (a task that was never asked
* has both {@code turnId == null} and {@code askTimedOut == false}, so it can never match here and
* only ever completes through the ordinary rendezvous fast path in {@link #reply}).
*
* <p><strong>Returns at most one entry today — verified, not assumed.</strong> {@link #send}
* refuses to open a waiter on {@code target} while {@link #hasAsyncQuestion} is true, and that
* check matches ANY task whose {@code turnId} is still stamped in {@code asyncTasksByTurn} —
* not only while its question is still open. {@link #answer} deliberately leaves that stamp in
* place ({@code clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, false)}) until the resumed turn's own future actually
* resolves, at which point {@link #finishAsyncTask} both removes the stamp AND completes that
* task's future in the same call. So a second task can never reach "{@code turnId} stamped, future
* still open" — the exact pair this method matches on — while a first one already holds it: by
* the time the stamp is gone, so is the eligibility. This is an emergent property of those two
* facts holding together, not something this method (or its callers) enforces on its own — flip
* {@code forgetTurn} to {@code true} in that one {@link #answer} call and it silently stops being
* true, with nothing left to fail loudly. The callers below still handle "more than one" as
* defence in depth against exactly that, not because they exercise it today: {@link #reply}
* treats it as unresolvable and falls back to the inbox; {@link #abandon} would pick the oldest
* deterministically (its own {@code matching} list has no such guarantee — see its javadoc).
* <p><strong>Can return more than one entry — reachable, not just defence in depth.</strong>
* {@link #send} refuses to open a waiter on {@code target} while {@link #hasAsyncQuestion} is
* true, and that check matches ANY task whose {@code turnId} is still stamped in
* {@code asyncTasksByTurn}. While a task's {@code turnId} stays stamped — {@link #answer} leaves
* it in place ({@code clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, false)}) until {@link #finishAsyncTask} removes
* the stamp and completes the future in the same call — no second task on the same target can
* reach an eligible state, because {@link #send} would refuse it as BUSY first. That single-task
* guarantee holds only for the {@code turnId}-stamped half of this method's match: an
* {@link Task#askTimedOut} task is, by construction, no longer stamped in {@code asyncTasksByTurn}
* (that is the whole point of forgetting {@code turnId} in {@link #clearAsyncQuestion}), so the
* target is free the moment one ask lapses. A fresh, independent {@code sendAsync} to the same
* target can then be dispatched, itself pause on {@code fleet_ask}, and itself time out — landing
* a second {@code askTimedOut} task on the very target the first one is still waiting to answer
* for. Two (or more) genuinely open tasks on one target is therefore a real, reachable state
* today, not a hypothetical: {@link #reply} treats it as unresolvable and falls back to the
* inbox rather than guess which task a reply belongs to (guessing wrong would hand the lead a
* plausible-looking answer to a delegation the worker never touched — worse than a failure,
* because the lead acts on it); {@link #abandon} instead picks the oldest deterministically (its
* own {@code matching} list has a different, wider match — see its javadoc).
*/
private List<Task> askAnsweredAsyncTasks(String target) {
List<Task> candidates = new ArrayList<>();
for (Task task : tasks.values()) {
if (target.equals(task.target) && task.question == null && task.turnId != null
&& !task.future.isDone()) {
if (target.equals(task.target) && task.question == null && !task.future.isDone()
&& (task.turnId != null || task.askTimedOut)) {
candidates.add(task);
}
}
@@ -808,16 +863,26 @@ public final class MessageService {
if (onAccepted != null) {
onAccepted.run();
}
CompletableFuture<Void> delivered = injector.enqueue(target, content, token);
Injector.Delivery delivery = injector.enqueue(target, content, token);
try {
Rendezvous.Resolution r = reply.get(remainingMillis(deadlineNanos), TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS);
return recorded(new Reply(outcomeOf(r.kind()), r.text(), r.turnId()));
} catch (TimeoutException e) {
boolean wasDelivered = delivered.isDone() && !delivered.isCompletedExceptionally();
boolean wasDelivered = delivery.completion().isDone()
&& !delivery.completion().isCompletedExceptionally();
if (!wasDelivered) {
if (timeoutCancellationRaceHookForTest != null) {
// Test-only (fleetd #345): see the field's own javadoc.
timeoutCancellationRaceHookForTest.run();
}
// The target monitor makes cancellation atomic with onStatus picking this
// Pending up. If pickup won, report TIMED_OUT_WORKING because the text landed.
wasDelivered = injector.cancel(delivery) == Injector.Cancellation.DELIVERED;
}
log.debug("send to {} timed out (delivered={})", target, wasDelivered);
if (!wasDelivered) {
// CB-640: still sitting in the injector's queue, waiting for the member to
// go idle — record the fact for fleet health (see queuedDeliveries).
// CB-640: record that delivery did not happen for fleet health (see
// queuedDeliveries). The exact Pending was cancelled, so it cannot arrive later.
queuedDeliveries.put(target, Boolean.TRUE);
}
return recorded(new Reply(
@@ -880,6 +945,12 @@ public final class MessageService {
return new AskResult(AskOutcome.ANSWERED, answer);
} catch (TimeoutException e) {
log.debug("fleet_ask from {} went unanswered in {}ms", workerSession, timeoutMillis);
// fleetd #307: mark the task BEFORE clearAsyncQuestion(forgetTurn=true) below drops it out of
// asyncTasksByTurn and nulls its turnId — that forgetting is deliberate and stays (it is
// what keeps the target from staying BUSY forever), but it would otherwise also erase
// askAnsweredAsyncTasks' only signal that the worker's eventual real fleet_reply still
// belongs to this task, stranding it in the inbox with a false "never replied" verdict.
markAskTimedOut(ticket.turnId());
clearAsyncQuestion(ticket.turnId(), true);
return new AskResult(AskOutcome.TIMED_OUT, null);
} catch (ExecutionException e) {
@@ -948,8 +1019,52 @@ public final class MessageService {
// the worker chained a second fleet_ask before replying. Mirror sendAsync's own guard
// (:1000) and leave the ticket open (markAsyncQuestion above already re-armed it under
// the new turnId) instead of completing it here with a QUESTION "reply".
if (result.outcome() != Outcome.QUESTION) {
finishAsyncTask(turnId, result);
// Measured when #282 was merged: this guard is DEFENCE IN DEPTH, not the thing
// that makes the chained ask work. ask() calls markAsyncQuestion (:860) before
// resolveQuestion (:861), so by the time this thread wakes, the task has already
// moved to the new turnId — this outcome check, not a Task lookup, is what tells the
// two cases apart (see fleetd #329 below). Removing this guard alone leaves the test
// green. Keep it anyway: it mirrors sendAsync's sibling guard, and that sibling's own
// comment (:1017) warns the two orderings are not something to rely on. Do NOT delete
// it as dead code without re-checking that ordering, and do not treat it as the sole
// protection either.
//
// fleetd #329 (F1): complete the SAME Task object this method already looked up at
// :991, rather than re-resolving it from turnId a second time. The old
// finishAsyncTask(turnId, result) did its own asyncTasksByTurn.get(turnId) here, and
// that second lookup races ask()'s own timeout path: ask()'s ticket.answer().get(...)
// can time out (or lose that exact race) at essentially the same instant this method's
// rendezvous.answerAsk(turnId, ...) above already succeeded, running
// markAskTimedOut + clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, true) with no lock at all — which
// forgets turnId (removes it from asyncTasksByTurn, nulls Task.turnId) before this
// thread ever gets here. The worker's real reply then arrived, this method's own wait
// woke up with it, and the by-turnId lookup found nothing: the async ticket's future
// was never completed, so fleet_poll{ticket} stayed PENDING forever even though
// answer() itself correctly returned REPLIED. Reusing the reference captured at :991
// — before that race window opens — sidesteps the second lookup entirely: it is the
// identical Task whatever asyncTasksByTurn or Task.turnId say by the time we reach
// this point, so finishAsyncTask(Task, Reply) can still complete its future and detach
// it using whatever turnId it now reads. The #282 chained-ask case is unaffected
// because it is still gated purely by result.outcome() == QUESTION above, which does
// not depend on this lookup — widening what "task" means here cannot complete a ticket
// the chained ask deliberately left open.
//
// A null task is NOT only "this was never an async ticket". That reading was in this
// comment when #329 merged and it is wrong. A genuine async ticket also lands here
// with task == null, because ask()'s timeout path runs clearAsyncQuestion(turnId,
// true) — which drops the asyncTasksByTurn entry — in its catch block, while
// rendezvous.closeAsk(turnId) runs later, in its finally. Between those two the ask
// is still answerable but the map entry is already gone, so the lookup at :991
// returns null and this ticket is never completed. Measured on 2026-09-04: a probe
// firing only that first half before answer() runs printed
// "answer=REPLIED phase=PENDING reply=null" — the same stranded ticket #329 set out
// to fix, one step earlier in the same race. The probe used forgetTurnForTest, which
// omits ask()'s markAskTimedOut; that cannot change the outcome, because askTimedOut
// is read only by askAnsweredAsyncTasks, and reply() never reaches it while this
// method's own waiter is live. So #329 narrows this window rather than closing it.
// Open as fleetd #334 — do not read this guard as complete.
if (result.outcome() != Outcome.QUESTION && task != null) {
finishAsyncTask(task, result);
}
return result;
} catch (TimeoutException e) {
@@ -1000,7 +1115,7 @@ public final class MessageService {
// this fires exactly once, from whichever path completes it: finishAsyncTask(task, result)
// below on any non-QUESTION outcome of send() — a worker's fleet_reply, the CB-106
// completion fallback, a CB-109 wedge, TIMED_OUT, BUSY, or BACKEND_EXHAUSTED — the same
// finishAsyncTask reached via answer()'s finishAsyncTask(turnId, result) once a QUESTION
// finishAsyncTask reached via answer()'s own finishAsyncTask(task, result) once a QUESTION
// is resolved, completeExceptionally(t) just below when send() itself throws, or a CB-516
// abandon() on teardown. Without this, MessageService.reply's rendezvous fast path (the
// one an async ticket always takes) never told the push loop anything happened — see the
@@ -1020,7 +1135,22 @@ public final class MessageService {
finishAsyncTask(task, result);
}
} catch (Throwable t) {
task.future.completeExceptionally(t);
// fleetd #329 (F2): finishAsyncTask above already completes task.future — on its very
// first line — before doing anything else, so anything that throws afterward (inside
// finishAsyncTask's own cleanup, or from a future addition to this try block) lands
// here with the future already resolved. completeExceptionally on an already-completed
// future is a silent no-op: it returns false and does nothing, so without the check
// below the exception simply vanished — no log, no metric, nothing. Measured (see the
// ticket): temporarily reintroducing the fleetd #324 NPE reproduced 19 real exceptions
// on the ordinary path, with 74/74 tests staying green and not one log line produced.
// Do not stop completing the future first — finishAsyncTask completing before it
// cleans up is what makes a late failure harmless to the ticket's own result — only
// add the missing visibility for the case where that step, or whatever ran after it,
// has already lost the race to report through the future.
if (!task.future.completeExceptionally(t)) {
log.error("async send {} -> {} threw after its ticket was already resolved",
ticket, target, t);
}
}
});
pruneTerminalTickets();
@@ -1136,6 +1266,23 @@ public final class MessageService {
return task;
}
/**
* Mark {@code turnId}'s task as having a {@code fleet_ask} that lapsed with no answer (fleetd #307), so
* {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks} still recognizes the worker's eventual real {@code fleet_reply}
* as belonging to it after {@link #clearAsyncQuestion}'s {@code forgetTurn=true} erases
* {@link Task#turnId} — see {@link Task#askTimedOut}. Must be called before that forgetting, while
* {@code turnId} can still resolve the task in {@code asyncTasksByTurn}; a lookup afterward would
* find nothing. Only when it matches the task's current turn — same guard as
* {@link #clearAsyncQuestion} — so a chained second {@code fleet_ask} (#282) that already moved
* the task to a fresh {@code turnId} cannot mark it for a turn that is no longer its own.
*/
private void markAskTimedOut(String turnId) {
Task task = asyncTasksByTurn.get(turnId);
if (task != null && turnId.equals(task.turnId)) {
task.askTimedOut = true;
}
}
/** Clear an answered or lapsed question, but only when it matches the ticket's current turn. */
private void clearAsyncQuestion(String turnId, boolean forgetTurn) {
// CB-582: tell the push loop first — like ticketCollected, a removal for a turnId it never
@@ -1154,20 +1301,124 @@ public final class MessageService {
}
}
/** Complete and detach an async ticket after its worker's actual terminal reply. */
/**
* Complete and detach an async ticket after its worker's actual terminal reply.
*
* <p><strong>fleetd #324.</strong> {@code task.turnId} is read into {@code turnId} exactly once.
* It used to be read twice — once for the null check, once as the removal key — and {@code
* volatile} makes each of those reads individually fresh but does not make the pair atomic.
* {@link #answer} calls this while holding {@code sessionLocks} for the target; {@link #ask}'s
* own timeout path calls {@link #clearAsyncQuestion} (which nulls {@link Task#turnId}) under no
* lock at all. When that unlocked null-out landed between the two reads here, the second read saw
* {@code null} and {@code asyncTasksByTurn.remove(null, task)} threw {@code NullPointerException}
* on the lead's own {@code answer()} call — even though {@code task.future.complete(result)} on
* the line above had already run, so the answer was in fact delivered. Capturing the field once
* removes the torn read; see the ticket for why the wider asymmetry between the locked and
* unlocked sides is not fixed by this alone.
*/
private void finishAsyncTask(Task task, Reply result) {
task.future.complete(result);
if (task.turnId != null) {
asyncTasksByTurn.remove(task.turnId, task);
if (afterFinishAsyncTaskCompleteHookForTest != null) {
// Test-only (fleetd #329, F2): see the field's own javadoc.
afterFinishAsyncTaskCompleteHookForTest.run();
}
String turnId = task.turnId;
if (turnId != null) {
if (finishAsyncTaskRaceHook != null) {
// Test-only (fleetd #324): see the field's own javadoc.
finishAsyncTaskRaceHook.run();
}
asyncTasksByTurn.remove(turnId, task);
}
}
/** Complete the async ticket correlated to a specific answered turn. */
private void finishAsyncTask(String turnId, Reply result) {
Task task = asyncTasksByTurn.get(turnId);
if (task != null) {
finishAsyncTask(task, result);
}
/**
* Null in production; test seam for fleetd #324 — invoked from {@link #finishAsyncTask(Task,
* Reply)} right after {@code task.turnId}'s null-check passes and before the (now-local) value is
* used for the removal. A test installs this to force, deterministically, the exact interleaving
* that a real race between this method and {@link #ask}'s unlocked timeout cleanup can otherwise
* only produce by chance: firing it here reproduces "the field went null between the check and the
* use" against the pre-fix code, and demonstrates the fix tolerates it (the captured local is used
* unconditionally, so a hook that nulls the field afterward cannot affect this call).
*/
private volatile Runnable finishAsyncTaskRaceHook;
/**
* Test-only (fleetd #324): install {@link #finishAsyncTaskRaceHook}. Package-private so the test,
* in the same package, can reach it without widening any production API.
*/
void setFinishAsyncTaskRaceHookForTest(Runnable hook) {
this.finishAsyncTaskRaceHook = hook;
}
/**
* Null in production; test seam for fleetd #329 (F2) — invoked from {@link #finishAsyncTask(Task,
* Reply)} unconditionally, immediately after {@code task.future.complete(result)} runs (before
* {@link Task#turnId} is even read, so it fires regardless of whether this task was ever asked).
* A test installs this to force an exception into exactly the shape fleetd #329 identified:
* something throws inside {@link #sendAsync}'s executor task after the async ticket's future is
* already resolved, so the surrounding {@code catch (Throwable t)} can only report failure through
* {@code completeExceptionally} — a silent no-op on an already-completed future. Engineering a
* real exception to land in that exact post-completion window is what the ticket itself had to do
* by temporarily deleting a production guard (fleetd #324's {@code turnId != null} check); this
* hook drives the identical shape deterministically instead.
*/
private volatile Runnable afterFinishAsyncTaskCompleteHookForTest;
/**
* Test-only (fleetd #329, F2): install {@link #afterFinishAsyncTaskCompleteHookForTest}.
* Package-private so the test, in the same package, can reach it without widening any production
* API.
*/
void setAfterFinishAsyncTaskCompleteHookForTest(Runnable hook) {
this.afterFinishAsyncTaskCompleteHookForTest = hook;
}
/**
* Null in production; test seam for fleetd #345 — invoked in {@link #send}'s timeout path after
* {@link Injector.Delivery#completion()} reports incomplete and before {@link Injector#cancel}
* takes the target monitor. A test installs this to make {@code onStatus} pick the exact queued
* delivery up in that window, so {@code cancel} returns {@link Injector.Cancellation#DELIVERED}.
* This deterministically covers the caller's need to use that result rather than relying on a
* timing-sensitive real race.
*/
private volatile Runnable timeoutCancellationRaceHookForTest;
/**
* Test-only (fleetd #345): install {@link #timeoutCancellationRaceHookForTest}. Package-private
* so the test, in the same package, can reach it without widening any production API.
*/
void setTimeoutCancellationRaceHookForTest(Runnable hook) {
this.timeoutCancellationRaceHookForTest = hook;
}
/**
* Null in production; test seam for fleetd #329 (F3) — invoked from {@link #reply} right after
* the single local read of {@code orphan.turnId} passes its null-check and before that (now-local)
* value is used as the {@code asyncTasksByTurn} removal key. Mirrors {@link
* #finishAsyncTaskRaceHook} exactly, for the structurally identical double-read fleetd #324 fixed
* in {@link #finishAsyncTask}: a test installs this to force, deterministically, {@code
* clearAsyncQuestion}'s unlocked {@code forgetTurn=true} path nulling {@link Task#turnId} in that
* exact window, and to confirm the single-read fix tolerates it (the captured local is used
* unconditionally, so a hook that nulls the field afterward cannot affect this call).
*/
private volatile Runnable replyOrphanTurnIdRaceHookForTest;
/**
* Test-only (fleetd #329, F3): install {@link #replyOrphanTurnIdRaceHookForTest}. Package-private
* so the test, in the same package, can reach it without widening any production API.
*/
void setReplyOrphanTurnIdRaceHookForTest(Runnable hook) {
this.replyOrphanTurnIdRaceHookForTest = hook;
}
/**
* Test-only (fleetd #324): run the exact production cleanup {@link #ask}'s own timeout path runs
* unlocked — {@link #clearAsyncQuestion(String, boolean)} with {@code forgetTurn=true} — so a test
* can reproduce that specific mutation instead of hand-rolling an approximation of it.
*/
void forgetTurnForTest(String turnId) {
clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, true);
}
/** A new send must not open a waiter while an async ticket owns this worker's paused turn. */
@@ -5,10 +5,14 @@ import java.util.List;
/**
* Backward-compatible placement: an unqualified spawn always resolves to the configured default
* profile, exactly as {@code CompositePeerLauncher} did before CB-518. This ignores caps and
* reachability so that a pre-existing config behaves identically after upgrade.
* profile, exactly as {@code CompositePeerLauncher} did before CB-518. This ignores caps
* ({@code maxLoad}) so that a pre-existing config behaves identically after upgrade — capacity
* gating for automatic placement is deliberately out of scope for {@code fixed}, exactly as it
* always has been. Reachability is a narrower exception (fleetd #315, below): a profile is never
* checked for reachability up front, only skipped once it has already failed in <em>this same</em>
* spawn call's retry loop — see the unreachable case below.
*
* <p>Three exceptions walk past the default instead of returning it unconditionally:
* <p>Four exceptions walk past the default instead of returning it unconditionally:
* <ul>
* <li>Quarantine (CB-578 stage B): a quarantined default is a credential that just refused on
* a usage limit, not a transient capacity or reachability concern.
@@ -16,13 +20,21 @@ import java.util.List;
* ({@code BackendOutagePolicy}) — a separate, shorter-lived source from quarantine. When a
* profile is both quarantined and cooling off, only the quarantine reason is reported
* (exhaustion takes priority), matching {@code CompositePeerLauncher}'s explicit-spawn order.
* <li>Unreachable (fleetd #315): {@code CompositePeerLauncher.spawn} retries a failed candidate
* on the next one and rebuilds the {@link PlacementContext} so {@code ctx.unreachable()}
* names every profile that already failed with {@code PeerUnreachableException} in this same
* call. Without this check {@code select} kept handing back the same dead default forever —
* the retry loop's own comment says "so the policy excludes this profile", and this is what
* makes that true for {@code fixed} too, matching {@code weighted}/{@code round-robin}
* (both filter on {@code ctx.unreachable()} via {@link PlacementPolicyUtil#available}).
* <li>Weight 0 (CB-554): {@code fixed} is still automatic selection, so a profile the operator
* marked "never auto-select me" ({@code weight <= 0}) must be skipped here exactly as
* {@code weighted}/{@code round-robin} skip it — an explicit {@code fleet_spawn} naming
* the profile is unaffected, only this automatic fallback walk.
* </ul>
* A fleet where nothing is ever quarantined, cooling off, or weight-0 never exercises any of these
* paths, so today's behaviour is unchanged.
* A fleet where nothing is ever quarantined, cooling off, unreachable, or weight-0 never exercises
* any of these paths, so today's behaviour is unchanged — in particular, the very first selection
* of a spawn call always sees an empty {@code unreachable} set, so the first choice is untouched.
*/
final class FixedPlacementPolicy implements PlacementPolicy {
@@ -30,12 +42,12 @@ final class FixedPlacementPolicy implements PlacementPolicy {
public PlacementCandidate select(PlacementContext ctx) {
String d = ctx.defaultProfile();
if (d != null && !d.isBlank() && !ctx.quarantined().contains(d) && !ctx.coolingOff().contains(d)
&& !weightExcluded(ctx, d)) {
&& !ctx.unreachable().contains(d) && !weightExcluded(ctx, d)) {
return new PlacementCandidate(d, null, 1.0f, null);
}
for (PlacementCandidate c : ctx.candidates()) {
if (!ctx.quarantined().contains(c.profile()) && !ctx.coolingOff().contains(c.profile())
&& !c.excluded()) {
&& !ctx.unreachable().contains(c.profile()) && !c.excluded()) {
return new PlacementCandidate(c.profile(), null, c.weight(), c.maxLoad());
}
}
@@ -44,8 +56,9 @@ final class FixedPlacementPolicy implements PlacementPolicy {
// Exhaustion quarantine takes priority: reported only when quarantine is absent, so the
// message never claims "cooling off" for a profile that is really backend-exhausted.
boolean dCoolingOff = !dQuarantined && ctx.coolingOff().contains(d);
boolean dUnreachable = ctx.unreachable().contains(d);
boolean dWeightExcluded = weightExcluded(ctx, d);
if (dQuarantined || dCoolingOff || dWeightExcluded) {
if (dQuarantined || dCoolingOff || dUnreachable || dWeightExcluded) {
List<String> reasons = new ArrayList<>();
if (dQuarantined) {
reasons.add("is quarantined (backend exhausted)");
@@ -53,6 +66,9 @@ final class FixedPlacementPolicy implements PlacementPolicy {
if (dCoolingOff) {
reasons.add("is cooling off after repeated backend errors");
}
if (dUnreachable) {
reasons.add("is unreachable");
}
if (dWeightExcluded) {
reasons.add("has weight 0 (excluded from automatic selection)");
}
@@ -62,7 +78,7 @@ final class FixedPlacementPolicy implements PlacementPolicy {
}
if (!ctx.candidates().isEmpty()) {
throw new PlacementException("all worker profiles are excluded from automatic "
+ "selection (quarantined, cooling off, or weight-0)");
+ "selection (quarantined, cooling off, unreachable, or weight-0)");
}
throw new PlacementException("no worker profiles configured");
}
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.Principal;
import dev.ltms.fleet.guard.GuardException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.metrics.FleetMetrics;
import dev.ltms.fleet.metrics.Metrics;
import dev.ltms.fleet.mcp.FleetMcp;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.Agent;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.HerdrClient;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.HerdrException;
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@ import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.PeerUnreachableException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.PlacementException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.msg.MessageService;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.SessionManager;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.ShuttingDownException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.MemberRole;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.MemberSession;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.WorktreeRequest;
@@ -47,6 +49,22 @@ import java.util.stream.Collectors;
*/
public final class FleetApp {
/** The authorization action the matching route handler hands to {@link #allow}. */
static Authz.Action routeAction(String route) {
return switch (route) {
case "GET /metrics" -> Authz.Action.METRICS;
case "POST /members" -> Authz.Action.SPAWN;
case "DELETE /members/{paneId}" -> Authz.Action.STOP;
case "POST /sessions/{id}/message" -> Authz.Action.SEND;
case "POST /sessions/{id}/reply" -> Authz.Action.REPLY;
case "GET /sessions/{id}/replies" -> Authz.Action.DRAIN;
case "POST /sessions/{id}/ask" -> Authz.Action.ASK;
case "GET /sessions", "GET /agents", "GET /members", "GET /profiles",
"GET /member-credentials", "GET /sessions/{id}/status", "GET /tasks/{ticket}" -> Authz.Action.READ;
default -> throw new IllegalArgumentException("route has no authorization gate: " + route);
};
}
/** Default blocking window for a message; kept under typical HTTP idle timeouts. */
private static final long DEFAULT_MESSAGE_TIMEOUT_MS = 25_000;
private static final long MAX_MESSAGE_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
@@ -70,6 +88,12 @@ public final class FleetApp {
// absent() (the honest "no policy configured" view) for every constructor that does not wire
// a real one, so existing legacy call sites keep building without knowing this field exists.
private final Supplier<MemberCredentialPolicyView> memberCredentials;
// fleetd #297: the SAME shared sources FleetMcp.profiles/fleet_profiles reads (BackendQuarantine
// and BackendOutagePolicy are each one instance for the whole daemon — see Fleetd wiring) so
// GET /profiles cannot drift from fleet_profiles about which profile is quarantined/cooling off.
// .none() (the honest "feature not wired" view) for every constructor that does not pass one.
private final FleetMcp.QuarantineSource quarantine;
private final FleetMcp.OutageSource outage;
private final ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
/**
@@ -130,6 +154,23 @@ public final class FleetApp {
MessageService messages, MemberPresence presence,
HttpServlet mcpServlet, CallerResolver auth, Metrics metrics,
Predicate<String> deliverable, Supplier<MemberCredentialPolicyView> memberCredentials) {
this(herdr, memberHerdr, workers, sessions, messages, presence, mcpServlet, auth, metrics,
deliverable, memberCredentials, FleetMcp.QuarantineSource.none(), FleetMcp.OutageSource.none());
}
/**
* @param quarantine the SAME {@link FleetMcp.QuarantineSource} instance passed to {@code
* FleetMcp} (fleetd #297), so {@code GET /profiles} reports the identical
* exhaustion-quarantine facts as {@code fleet_profiles} rather than a second,
* independently-computed copy
* @param outage the SAME {@link FleetMcp.OutageSource} instance passed to {@code FleetMcp} —
* see {@code quarantine}; a SEPARATE check from it, never merged in
*/
public FleetApp(HerdrClient herdr, HerdrClient memberHerdr, PeerLauncher workers, SessionManager sessions,
MessageService messages, MemberPresence presence,
HttpServlet mcpServlet, CallerResolver auth, Metrics metrics,
Predicate<String> deliverable, Supplier<MemberCredentialPolicyView> memberCredentials,
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource quarantine, FleetMcp.OutageSource outage) {
this.herdr = herdr;
this.memberHerdr = memberHerdr != null ? memberHerdr : herdr;
this.workers = workers;
@@ -140,6 +181,8 @@ public final class FleetApp {
this.auth = auth;
this.metrics = metrics;
this.memberCredentials = memberCredentials != null ? memberCredentials : MemberCredentialPolicyView::absent;
this.quarantine = quarantine != null ? quarantine : FleetMcp.QuarantineSource.none();
this.outage = outage != null ? outage : FleetMcp.OutageSource.none();
}
/** Wire routes onto a fresh, unstarted Javalin instance. Caller starts it. */
@@ -222,7 +265,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
/** Prometheus scrape endpoint (CB-502). */
private void metrics(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.METRICS, null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /metrics"), null)) {
return;
}
ctx.status(200).contentType("text/plain; version=0.0.4; charset=utf-8").result(metrics.render());
@@ -294,7 +337,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
* member workspace (they live on the member daemon only).
*/
private void sessions(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /sessions"), null)) {
return;
}
List<Map<String, Object>> out = new ArrayList<>();
@@ -319,52 +362,76 @@ public final class FleetApp {
/** Discovery: every agent herdr tracks, keyed by its Claude session UUID. */
private void agents(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /agents"), null)) {
return;
}
ctx.status(200).json(Map.of("agents",
workers.list().stream().map(Agent.class::cast).map(FleetApp::view).toList()));
try {
ctx.status(200).json(Map.of("agents",
workers.list().stream().map(Agent.class::cast).map(FleetApp::view).toList()));
} catch (HerdrException e) {
// fleetd #297: workers.list() reaches herdr — a transport failure must land in the same
// {error, detail} envelope every other failure path here uses, not escape as a bare
// exception and leave Javalin's default handling to respond outside the JSON contract.
herdrError(ctx, e);
}
}
/** CB-304: bridge-owned roster merged with live herdr status by paneId. */
private void listMembers(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /members"), null)) {
return;
}
// CB-519: the registry key is a host-unique id, not the pane coordinate — join on terminal.
Map<String, Agent> live = workers.list().stream()
.map(Agent.class::cast)
.filter(a -> a.terminalId() != null)
.collect(Collectors.toMap(Agent::terminalId, Function.identity(), (_, b) -> b));
// fleetd #209: this REST roster reports agentSessionId via SessionManager.rosterView, so it
// uses the resolving roster read (caller-driven, not a timer) rather than the plain one.
List<Map<String, Object>> out = sessions.rosterResolved().stream()
.map(s -> SessionManager.rosterView(s, live.get(s.terminalId())))
.toList();
Map<String, Object> body = new LinkedHashMap<>();
// fleetd #199: the endpoint became /members in the CB-634 rename but the body key stayed
// "workers", so a caller that read "members" saw an empty fleet and reported no members at
// all. "members" is the canonical key; "workers" stays as a deprecated alias so an existing
// REST consumer keeps working — the out-of-band path a lead falls back to when its MCP mount
// drops reads this endpoint. Drop the alias once nothing reads it.
body.put("members", out);
body.put("workers", out);
// CB-586: operator visibility for the refs/wip snapshot store without shelling into the
// repo — how many snapshot refs exist and roughly what they cost. Present only once a
// worktree session has established the repo, so a never-snapshotted fleet reports nothing.
sessions.wipRefs().ifPresent(st -> body.put("wipRefs",
Map.of("count", st.count(), "costBytes", st.costBytes())));
ctx.status(200).json(body);
try {
// CB-519: the registry key is a host-unique id, not the pane coordinate — join on terminal.
Map<String, Agent> live = workers.list().stream()
.map(Agent.class::cast)
.filter(a -> a.terminalId() != null)
.collect(Collectors.toMap(Agent::terminalId, Function.identity(), (_, b) -> b));
// fleetd #209: this REST roster reports agentSessionId via SessionManager.rosterView, so it
// uses the resolving roster read (caller-driven, not a timer) rather than the plain one.
List<Map<String, Object>> out = sessions.rosterResolved().stream()
.map(s -> SessionManager.rosterView(s, live.get(s.terminalId())))
.toList();
Map<String, Object> body = new LinkedHashMap<>();
// fleetd #199: the endpoint became /members in the CB-634 rename but the body key stayed
// "workers", so a caller that read "members" saw an empty fleet and reported no members at
// all. "members" is the canonical key; "workers" stays as a deprecated alias so an existing
// REST consumer keeps working — the out-of-band path a lead falls back to when its MCP mount
// drops reads this endpoint. Drop the alias once nothing reads it.
body.put("members", out);
body.put("workers", out);
// CB-586: operator visibility for the refs/wip snapshot store without shelling into the
// repo — how many snapshot refs exist and roughly what they cost. Present only once a
// worktree session has established the repo, so a never-snapshotted fleet reports nothing.
sessions.wipRefs().ifPresent(st -> body.put("wipRefs",
Map.of("count", st.count(), "costBytes", st.costBytes())));
ctx.status(200).json(body);
} catch (HerdrException e) {
// fleetd #297: same reasoning as agents() above — this is the out-of-band roster a lead
// falls back to when its MCP mount drops, so it must stay inside the JSON error contract
// exactly when herdr is briefly unreachable, not escape as a bare exception.
herdrError(ctx, e);
}
}
/** The configured worker profiles and which one a no-argument spawn uses. */
/**
* The configured worker profiles, which one a no-argument spawn uses, and (fleetd #297) the two
* outage states {@code fleet_profiles} already reports: {@code quarantined} (CB-578 stage B —
* the backend reported it out of capacity) and {@code coolingOff} (fleetd #201 Unit 5 — the
* credential threw repeated non-exhaustion backend errors). Both are read from the SAME shared
* {@link FleetMcp.QuarantineSource}/{@link FleetMcp.OutageSource} instances {@code FleetMcp}
* reads, never recomputed, so the two doors cannot disagree about which profile is down and why.
* Independent checks, so a profile can appear in both maps at once; each map is present only
* when at least one profile is in that state.
*/
private void profiles(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /profiles"), null)) {
return;
}
ctx.status(200).json(Map.of(
"profiles", workers.profiles(),
"default", workers.defaultProfile() == null ? "" : workers.defaultProfile()));
// fleetd #297: ONE body builder, shared with fleet_profiles. Handing both doors the same
// QuarantineSource/OutageSource instances stops them reading different facts; rendering
// through the same method stops them reporting those facts differently. Both are needed.
ctx.status(200).json(FleetMcp.profilesView(workers, quarantine, outage));
}
/**
@@ -376,7 +443,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
* name list, which is exactly what let the list drift silently behind the real policy.
*/
private void memberCredentials(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /member-credentials"), null)) {
return;
}
MemberCredentialPolicyView view = memberCredentials.get();
@@ -396,7 +463,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
* the subscription boundary, 400 for an unknown profile.
*/
private void spawnMember(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.SPAWN, null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("POST /members"), null)) {
return;
}
String role = ctx.queryParam("role");
@@ -435,6 +502,11 @@ public final class FleetApp {
ctx.status(201).json(view(member));
} catch (GuardException e) {
ctx.status(403).json(Map.of("error", "subscription_boundary", "detail", e.getMessage()));
} catch (ShuttingDownException e) {
// fleetd #308: the daemon's shutdown drain has already started — 503, not a bare 500,
// so this reads the same as PlacementException below: valid request, refused because
// of a transient daemon state rather than a bad argument.
ctx.status(503).json(Map.of("error", "shutting_down", "detail", e.getMessage()));
} catch (PlacementException e) {
// CB-599: no candidate had capacity (maxLoad, quarantine, or all-exhausted) — a benign,
// likely-transient refusal, distinct from "profile does not exist" below. 503: the
@@ -444,6 +516,12 @@ public final class FleetApp {
ctx.status(400).json(Map.of("error", "unknown_profile", "detail", e.getMessage()));
} catch (PeerUnreachableException e) {
ctx.status(502).json(Map.of("error", "spawn_timeout", "detail", e.getMessage()));
} catch (HerdrException e) {
// fleetd #304: not every herdr failure on the spawn path is a readiness timeout, so
// PeerUnreachableException above does not cover this. Without this catch the exception
// escapes to Javalin's default 500, while fleet_spawn reports the same failure as a
// clean named error (FleetMcp.spawn) — the #297 one-door-guarded shape.
herdrError(ctx, e);
}
}
@@ -464,13 +542,29 @@ public final class FleetApp {
return (s == null || s.isBlank()) ? null : s;
}
/** Tear a worker down by pane id. */
/**
* Tear a worker down by pane id.
*
* <p>fleetd #304: the {@code HerdrException} catch is not cosmetic. {@code release} deregisters
* the session, notifies the release listener and preserves a dirty worktree <em>before</em> it
* calls {@code launcher.stop}, so a throw from that stop arrives after the teardown the caller
* asked for has already happened. Letting it escape gave Javalin's default 500, which tells the
* caller to retry — and the retry finds nothing in the registry, reaches the same stop, and
* throws again, so it can never succeed. {@code herdrError} instead answers 404 ("the pane is
* gone, stop retrying") or 502 ("herdr is upstream and broken, a retry may help"), matching what
* {@code fleet_stop} reports for the same failure.
*/
private void stopMember(Context ctx) {
String paneId = ctx.pathParam("paneId");
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.STOP, paneId)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("DELETE /members/{paneId}"), paneId)) {
return;
}
try {
sessions.release(paneId);
} catch (HerdrException e) {
herdrError(ctx, e);
return;
}
sessions.release(paneId);
ctx.status(204);
}
@@ -482,7 +576,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
*/
private void sendMessage(Context ctx) {
String id = ctx.pathParam("id");
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.SEND, id)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/message"), id)) {
return;
}
String content;
@@ -569,7 +663,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
*/
private void askMessage(Context ctx) {
String id = ctx.pathParam("id");
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.ASK, id)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/ask"), id)) {
return;
}
String question;
@@ -608,7 +702,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
// The rule that matters: a worker may reply only as itself. Over MCP this was already true
// structurally (identity comes from the connection, never an argument); over REST the path
// id was simply trusted, so this is where the invariant actually gets enforced.
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.REPLY, id)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/reply"), id)) {
return;
}
String content;
@@ -618,7 +712,19 @@ public final class FleetApp {
ctx.status(400).json(Map.of("error", "bad_request", "detail", "body must be JSON"));
return;
}
messages.reply(id, content);
// fleetd #302: content is required. `.path("content").asText("")` above turns a missing key
// into "" rather than throwing, so without this check an empty/blank reply used to reach
// messages.reply(...) and silently resolve the lead's waiter — the same class of bug as the
// sibling "content is required" guards on sendMessage/askMessage below, except this one wrote
// a WRONG value instead of failing loudly. The check lives in MessageService.reply so both
// this door and FleetMcp.reply inherit the same rule; this catch only translates it into the
// {error, detail} envelope this file uses everywhere else.
try {
messages.reply(id, content);
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
ctx.status(400).json(Map.of("error", "bad_request", "detail", e.getMessage()));
return;
}
ctx.status(200).json(Map.of("sessionId", id, "delivered", true));
}
@@ -629,7 +735,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
*/
private void drainReplies(Context ctx) {
String id = ctx.pathParam("id");
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.DRAIN, id)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /sessions/{id}/replies"), id)) {
return;
}
var replies = messages.drainReplies(id);
@@ -647,7 +753,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
*/
private void sessionStatus(Context ctx) {
String id = ctx.pathParam("id");
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, id)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /sessions/{id}/status"), id)) {
return;
}
try {
@@ -672,7 +778,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
/** Poll an async (wait:false) delegation by ticket. 404 for an unknown/expired ticket. */
private void taskStatus(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /tasks/{ticket}"), null)) {
return;
}
MessageService.TaskView v = messages.poll(ctx.pathParam("ticket"));
@@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
/** OS group name for {@link #shareWithGroup} (fleetd #185 stage 3); {@code null} ⇒ feature off. */
private final String group;
private final Consumer<String> afterWorktreeAdded;
/** How the initial {@code git worktree add} command runs. Package-private test seam for an
* interrupted command after Git has made worktree state. */
private final Function<String[], String> worktreeAddRunner;
/** How {@link #shareWithGroup}'s processes (git config / chgrp / chmod / find) actually run.
* Defaults to the real {@link #exec(String...)}. Package-private test seam so a unit test can
* prove "no group configured ⇒ zero processes spawned" and inspect exactly what a configured
@@ -132,7 +135,13 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
/** Test seam combining a configurable {@code group} with {@link #afterWorktreeAdded}. */
GitWorktrees(String configuredRoot, String group, Consumer<String> afterWorktreeAdded) {
this(configuredRoot, group, afterWorktreeAdded, null);
this(configuredRoot, group, afterWorktreeAdded, null, null);
}
/** Test seam for changing how {@link #shareWithGroup}'s processes run. */
GitWorktrees(String configuredRoot, String group, Consumer<String> afterWorktreeAdded,
Function<String[], String> shareGroupRunner) {
this(configuredRoot, group, afterWorktreeAdded, shareGroupRunner, null);
}
/**
@@ -141,13 +150,15 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
* exactly what commands a configured group runs, without a real second OS user/group.
*
* @param shareGroupRunner {@code null} ⇒ the real {@link #exec(String...)}.
* @param worktreeAddRunner {@code null} ⇒ the real {@link #exec(String...)}.
*/
GitWorktrees(String configuredRoot, String group, Consumer<String> afterWorktreeAdded,
Function<String[], String> shareGroupRunner) {
Function<String[], String> shareGroupRunner, Function<String[], String> worktreeAddRunner) {
this.configuredRoot = configuredRoot;
this.group = (group == null || group.isBlank()) ? null : group;
this.afterWorktreeAdded = afterWorktreeAdded == null ? _ -> {} : afterWorktreeAdded;
this.shareGroupRunner = shareGroupRunner != null ? shareGroupRunner : this::exec;
this.worktreeAddRunner = worktreeAddRunner != null ? worktreeAddRunner : this::exec;
}
@Override
@@ -166,8 +177,8 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
String wt = path.toAbsolutePath().toString();
log.info("adding worktree branch={} path={} base={}", branch, wt, base);
removeUserInfoFromHttpsOrigin(repoRoot);
exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "worktree", "add", wt, "-b", branch, base);
try {
worktreeAddRunner.apply(new String[] {"git", "-C", repoRoot, "worktree", "add", wt, "-b", branch, base});
afterWorktreeAdded.accept(wt);
requireCredentialFreeHttpsOrigin(wt);
configureEnvironmentCredentialHelper(repoRoot, wt);
@@ -181,10 +192,11 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
}
/**
* {@code add()} has already created the worktree and its branch by the time any step from
* {@link #afterWorktreeAdded} through {@link #isolateToolSurface} can throw — including
* {@code git worktree add} may have created the worktree and its branch by the time it, or any
* later step through {@link #isolateToolSurface}, throws. This includes
* {@link #requireCredentialFreeHttpsOrigin}, an intended security refusal, not only an IO
* accident. Without this, {@code add()} never returns, so its caller
* accident. A Git-reported {@code worktree add} failure usually creates nothing, but an
* interrupted command can leave partial state. Without cleanup, {@code add()} never returns, so its caller
* ({@code SessionManager#acquireWithWorktree}) never receives a path to register or clean up:
* its local {@code path} stays null, the {@code if (path != null)} guard in its own catch block
* never runs, and the worktree directory and branch leak on disk forever with nothing tracking
@@ -204,6 +216,10 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
* used in {@code SessionManager#acquireWithWorktree}'s own catch block.
*/
private void cleanupAfterAddFailure(String repoRoot, String worktreePath, String branch, RuntimeException original) {
if (!Files.exists(Path.of(worktreePath))) {
log.debug("provisioning failed before worktree {} existed; nothing to clean up", worktreePath);
return;
}
log.warn("provisioning failed for branch={} path={}: {} — cleaning up before rethrowing",
branch, worktreePath, original.getMessage());
try {
@@ -213,13 +229,18 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
worktreePath, cleanup.getMessage());
}
try {
exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "branch", "-D", branch);
deleteBranch(repoRoot, branch);
} catch (RuntimeException cleanup) {
log.warn("failed to remove leaked branch {} after provisioning error: {}",
branch, cleanup.getMessage());
}
}
@Override
public void deleteBranch(String repoRoot, String branch) {
exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "branch", "-D", branch);
}
/**
* A linked worktree shares its primary checkout's git config. Remove HTTPS user info before
* adding one, so a credential accidentally embedded in that config cannot reach the member.
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import java.util.Optional;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong;
import java.util.function.Consumer;
import java.util.function.LongSupplier;
@@ -61,6 +62,8 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
private final LongSupplier nowNanos;
private final int contextCap;
private final boolean clearAfterTurn;
/** Null in production; test seam for the interval before an idle session's conditional release. */
private final Consumer<MemberSession> beforeIdleRelease;
private volatile MemberLifecycle memberLifecycle = MemberLifecycle.NONE;
/**
* CB-586: the repo root the fleet actually works in, remembered the first time a worktree
@@ -71,6 +74,16 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
*/
private volatile String fleetRepoRoot;
/**
* fleetd #308: flips true the instant {@link #drainAll} starts, before its registry snapshot
* is even taken — so a spawn already in flight sees the refusal as early as a plain flag can
* make it. This alone cannot close the race completely: a caller that read {@code false} just
* before the flip can still land in the registry after the snapshot. {@link #drainAll}'s
* post-loop sweep is what catches that straggler; the two mechanisms are deliberately paired,
* see {@link #drainAll}'s javadoc.
*/
private final AtomicBoolean draining = new AtomicBoolean(false);
/** CB-520: notified with a terminalId on every acquire; no-op until wired. */
private final List<Consumer<String>> acquireListeners = new java.util.concurrent.CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
/** CB-516: notified with a {@link ReleaseDetail} on every release; no-op until wired. */
@@ -102,13 +115,23 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
}
public SessionManager(PeerLauncher launcher, Worktrees worktrees, LongSupplier nowNanos,
int contextCap, boolean clearAfterTurn) {
int contextCap, boolean clearAfterTurn) {
this(launcher, worktrees, nowNanos, contextCap, clearAfterTurn, null);
}
/**
* Package-private constructor for a deterministic reap/delivery race test. Production callers
* use the constructor above, whose null hook adds no callback or lock to an ordinary reap.
*/
SessionManager(PeerLauncher launcher, Worktrees worktrees, LongSupplier nowNanos,
int contextCap, boolean clearAfterTurn, Consumer<MemberSession> beforeIdleRelease) {
this.launcher = launcher;
this.worktrees = worktrees;
this.presence = new PresenceFleet(this);
this.nowNanos = nowNanos;
this.contextCap = contextCap;
this.clearAfterTurn = clearAfterTurn;
this.beforeIdleRelease = beforeIdleRelease;
}
/**
@@ -181,6 +204,14 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
public MemberSession acquire(String profile, MemberRole role, String requestedCwd, String callerCwd,
String ownerTerminal, WorktreeRequest wt,
String sessionName, String resumeSessionId) {
// fleetd #308: refuse before anything else runs — no slot reservation, no launcher spawn —
// so a caller learns the daemon is going down instead of getting a session drainAll will
// never see again. Checked here because every other acquire(...) overload delegates to
// this one, so this is the single point every spawn path passes through.
if (draining.get()) {
throw new ShuttingDownException("fleetd is shutting down; refusing to spawn a session "
+ "the shutdown drain would never see");
}
MemberRole memberRole = (role == null) ? MemberRole.DEV : role;
requireResumeCapability(profile, resumeSessionId);
// CB-619 / fleetd #123: an explicit profile bypasses placement (CompositePeerLauncher only
@@ -272,10 +303,32 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
*/
private void release(String paneId, ReleaseCause cause) {
MemberSession removed = registry.remove(paneId);
releaseRemoved(paneId, removed, handles.remove(paneId), cause);
}
/**
* Tear a session down only while {@code expected} is still its registry value. A lifecycle
* transition replaces the immutable record, so this prevents a reap based on an old READY or
* DONE record from stopping a worker that delivery has made BUSY.
*/
private boolean releaseIfCurrent(MemberSession expected, ReleaseCause cause) {
if (!registry.remove(expected.paneId(), expected)) {
// A lifecycle transition replaced the record between the caller's check and this remove.
// Log it: this race is by definition unobservable otherwise, and a reaper that silently
// declines to reap is the hardest kind of behaviour to diagnose after the fact.
log.debug("skipping reap of pane={}: its registry record changed after the idle check "
+ "(most likely a delivery made it BUSY)", expected.paneId());
return false;
}
releaseRemoved(expected.paneId(), expected, handles.remove(expected.paneId()), cause);
return true;
}
private void releaseRemoved(String paneId, MemberSession removed, PeerHandle removedHandle,
ReleaseCause cause) {
// fleetd #209: remove right alongside the registry entry so a released session's handle is
// never leaked — but keep the local reference below, so the id can still be resolved for
// the ReleaseDetail this teardown notifies with.
PeerHandle removedHandle = handles.remove(paneId);
boolean preserveWorktree = cause == ReleaseCause.SHUTDOWN;
String snapshotRef = null;
if (removed != null) {
@@ -334,7 +387,63 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
// slot that no longer appears in the roster and can never be reclaimed.
launcher.stop(paneId);
if (removed != null && !preserveWorktree && removed.worktree() != null) {
worktrees.remove(worktrees.repoRoot(removed.cwd()), removed.worktree());
// fleetd #316: the `dirty` read above ran while the worker could still write to this
// worktree, so a stale `false` must not be trusted to authorise the --force removal
// below. Re-read the worktree's state one more time, right here — immediately before
// the one step that would destroy it, and only on the path that is actually about to
// do that (invariant 4: no second unconditional `git status` on a release that already
// decided to preserve). By now `launcher.stop` has returned, so this read reflects
// whatever the worker managed to write up to and including its teardown, not whatever
// it had written at release-start time.
if (dirtyImmediatelyBeforeRemoval(removed)) {
preserveWorktree = true;
// The pre-stop snapshot above never ran for this session (the pre-stop read said
// clean), so this is the only chance to get the newly-discovered work into
// refs/wip/* rather than leaving the on-disk preserve as the sole copy. Best-effort,
// like every other snapshot attempt — trySnapshot logs and swallows its own failure.
String lateSnapshotRef = trySnapshot(removed, cause);
log.warn("release {} preserves worktree {} for pane={} terminal={}: it reported "
+ "clean before the pane stopped but dirty immediately before removal — the "
+ "worker wrote to it during teardown, and --force removing it now would "
+ "have destroyed that work{}",
cause, removed.worktree(), paneId, removed.terminalId(),
lateSnapshotRef == null ? "" : " (snapshotted to refs/wip/" + removed.branch()
+ " commit=" + lateSnapshotRef + ")");
}
}
if (removed != null && !preserveWorktree && removed.worktree() != null) {
// fleetd #283: this is the one cleanup step in this method that used to be bare. By the
// time it runs, the registry entry, the retained handle, and the pane are all already
// gone — so a throw here (a stale index lock, a slow filesystem, `remove`'s own 30s exec
// timeout) must not escape release(): there is no retry path (a second stop on this
// paneId is a no-op), and the caller would otherwise see a "failed stop" for a session
// that is in fact fully torn down. Log and swallow, matching every sibling step above.
try {
worktrees.remove(worktrees.repoRoot(removed.cwd()), removed.worktree());
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.warn("failed to remove worktree {} for pane={} terminal={} after release: the "
+ "pane is already stopped and the session already deregistered, so this is "
+ "not retryable — the directory must be reclaimed manually: {}",
removed.worktree(), paneId, removed.terminalId(), e.toString());
}
}
}
/**
* fleetd #316: the read that actually authorises {@code worktrees.remove}, taken with the
* worker's pane already stopped. Fails toward preserving (returns {@code true}) on any
* exception — the same rule the pre-stop check applies (CB-581): once we can no longer tell
* whether the worktree is dirty, preserving costs disk while deleting on a guess can destroy
* work that has no other copy.
*/
private boolean dirtyImmediatelyBeforeRemoval(MemberSession removed) {
try {
return worktrees.hasUncommitted(removed.worktree());
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.warn("release could not re-check worktree {} for pane={} terminal={} immediately "
+ "before removal; preserving it rather than risk destroying unsaved work: {}",
removed.worktree(), removed.paneId(), removed.terminalId(), e.toString());
return true;
}
}
@@ -504,11 +613,26 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
log.warn("spawn failed for profile={} role={} branch={} path={}: {}",
preResolvedProfile, memberRole, branch, path, e.getMessage());
if (path != null) {
// fleetd #283: this catch covers every failure AFTER worktrees.add() returned —
// overlayParity, shareWithGroup, launcher.spawn itself — so by this point `branch`
// was actually created in git. #274 fixed the sibling failure INSIDE add() by having
// GitWorktrees.cleanupAfterAddFailure delete both the worktree and the branch it
// provisioned; this path removed only the worktree and left the branch orphaned. A
// spawn failure here is routine (a quarantined credential, a backend refusal), so
// every occurrence leaked a `worker/<slug>-<nonce>` branch nothing ever pointed at
// again. Reuse the same Worktrees.deleteBranch GitWorktrees already has, rather than
// a second copy of the git command. Best-effort and log-only, like the worktree
// removal right above it — neither cleanup step may mask the original exception.
try {
worktrees.remove(repoRoot, path);
} catch (RuntimeException cleanup) {
log.warn("failed to clean up worktree {} after spawn error: {}", path, cleanup.getMessage());
}
try {
worktrees.deleteBranch(repoRoot, branch);
} catch (RuntimeException cleanup) {
log.warn("failed to clean up branch {} after spawn error: {}", branch, cleanup.getMessage());
}
}
throw e;
}
@@ -818,14 +942,18 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
}
long idleNanos = now - s.lastActivityAtNanos();
if (idleNanos > idleTtlNanos) {
log.debug("reaping idle session terminal={} pane={}: idle {}s exceeds the {}s ttl",
s.terminalId(), s.paneId(), TimeUnit.NANOSECONDS.toSeconds(idleNanos),
TimeUnit.NANOSECONDS.toSeconds(idleTtlNanos));
// CB-581: one session that fails to release must not abort the whole reaping pass —
// match drainAll's per-session try/catch so the rest of the roster still gets reaped.
try {
release(s.paneId());
reaped++;
if (beforeIdleRelease != null) {
beforeIdleRelease.accept(s);
}
if (releaseIfCurrent(s, ReleaseCause.COMPLETED)) {
log.debug("reaping idle session terminal={} pane={}: idle {}s exceeds the {}s ttl",
s.terminalId(), s.paneId(), TimeUnit.NANOSECONDS.toSeconds(idleNanos),
TimeUnit.NANOSECONDS.toSeconds(idleTtlNanos));
reaped++;
}
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.warn("reap failed for pane={} terminal={} worktree={}; continuing with "
+ "remaining sessions", s.paneId(), s.terminalId(), s.worktree(), e);
@@ -836,20 +964,60 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
}
/**
* Gracefully drain all registered sessions on daemon shutdown. For each session that is
* {@code BUSY}, poll up to {@code timeoutNanos} for it to leave {@code BUSY}, then release it
* regardless. Non-busy sessions are released immediately. A failure releasing one session is
* logged and does not abort the rest.
* Gracefully drain all registered sessions on daemon shutdown. Non-busy sessions are released
* immediately; a {@code BUSY} one is polled until it leaves {@code BUSY}, then released
* regardless. A failure releasing one session is logged and does not abort the rest.
*
* <p>{@code timeoutNanos} is a budget for the WHOLE drain, not a grace period per session: the
* deadline is taken once, before the loop. So the first BUSY session can spend all of it, and a
* later BUSY one is then released with no wait at all. That is deliberate. This drain is only
* one phase of shutdown — {@code Fleetd} closes the message service, the push loop, the
* heartbeat, MCP and the router after it — and the whole sequence has to finish inside
* launchd's exit window. A per-session grace would let N busy members drain for N * the
* timeout, overrun that window, and get the daemon SIGKILLed part-way through; the members not
* yet reached would then get no clean release, no preserved-worktree log, and no snapshot.
* Cutting one turn short is the cheaper failure, and it is not silent: an abandoned BUSY
* session is preserved, snapshotted, and logged at WARN by {@code logPreservedForShutdown}.
*
* <p>CB-544: this is a {@link ReleaseCause#SHUTDOWN} release — the worker's pane is stopped
* (the process must end) but its worktree is preserved and its path logged. Shutdown is never
* a reason to delete a worker's only copy of its uncommitted work. A session still {@code BUSY}
* when the timeout expired is abandoned mid-turn and logged loudly so an operator can find its
* kept worktree.
*
* <p>fleetd #308: {@code roster()} is a one-shot snapshot (see its javadoc), and nothing used
* to stop a new session from registering after it was taken — {@link #acquire} stayed open for
* as long as this drain waited on a {@code BUSY} session, up to the whole {@code timeoutNanos}
* budget. Two things close that window, deliberately paired because neither alone is complete:
* {@link #draining} is flipped true before the snapshot is even taken, so {@link #acquire}
* refuses (invariant 3: loudly, via {@link ShuttingDownException}) as much of the window as a
* plain flag can close; and the sweep below re-reads the registry once the initial snapshot has
* fully drained and drains whatever a straggler — a caller that read the flag as {@code false}
* a moment before it flipped — still managed to register. The sweep shares the same
* {@code deadline} rather than getting its own: {@code timeoutNanos} is a budget for the WHOLE
* drain (see above), and a straggler must not buy the drain more time than the flag it lost the
* race against would have. In the ordinary case the sweep finds nothing and costs one empty
* {@link #roster()} call.
*/
void drainAll(long timeoutNanos) {
long deadline = System.nanoTime() + timeoutNanos;
for (MemberSession s : roster()) {
draining.set(true);
drainSnapshot(roster(), deadline);
List<MemberSession> stragglers = roster();
if (!stragglers.isEmpty()) {
log.warn("drain sweep found {} session(s) registered after the drain snapshot was "
+ "taken (raced past the shutdown guard); draining them too", stragglers.size());
drainSnapshot(stragglers, deadline);
}
}
/**
* Drain exactly the sessions in {@code snapshot}, waiting out a {@code BUSY} one against the
* shared whole-drain {@code deadline} before releasing it. Shared by {@link #drainAll}'s main
* pass and its post-loop straggler sweep (fleetd #308) so both honor the same one budget.
*/
private void drainSnapshot(List<MemberSession> snapshot, long deadline) {
for (MemberSession s : snapshot) {
try {
if (s.state() == MemberSession.State.BUSY) {
while (System.nanoTime() < deadline) {
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.session;
/**
* Thrown by {@link SessionManager#acquire} when a spawn is requested after the daemon's shutdown
* drain has already begun (fleetd #308).
*
* <p>{@link SessionManager#drainAll} snapshots the registry once and tears down exactly what is
* in that snapshot. A session registered after the snapshot is invisible to the drain loop: its
* pane is left running and its worktree is never preserved, and nothing else ever reclaims
* either — the daemon's in-memory registry dies with the process. Refusing the spawn here,
* loudly, is what stops that session from ever being created in the first place, rather than
* silently handing the caller a session the daemon can no longer manage.
*/
public final class ShuttingDownException extends RuntimeException {
public ShuttingDownException(String message) {
super(message);
}
}
@@ -11,6 +11,15 @@ public interface Worktrees {
/** git -C <repoRoot> worktree remove --force <path>. Idempotent (already-gone tolerated). */
void remove(String repoRoot, String worktreePath);
/**
* git -C {@code repoRoot} branch -D {@code branch}. Force-deletes a branch that has no other
* owner — used only on the failed-provisioning path (fleetd #274, #283), never on a normal
* release: {@link SessionManager#release} deliberately leaves a released session's branch
* behind so a lead can still recover the work, and this method must never be called from
* that path.
*/
void deleteBranch(String repoRoot, String branch);
/**
* True when the worktree holds uncommitted changes the bridge cannot see: tracked
* modifications, staged files, or untracked files. {@code git status --porcelain} is the
@@ -226,4 +226,44 @@ class FleetdBackendErrorSinkTest {
assertTrue(remaining.isPresent(), "two distinct targets must start a cool-off");
assertEquals(1, leadClient.sendCount());
}
@Test
@DisplayName("a backend-error session no longer blocks the real maxLoad spawn gate")
void backendErrorSessionDoesNotBlockFreshSpawnAtMaxLoad() {
SessionManager sessions = capacityLimitedSessions();
MemberSession failed = sessions.acquire("terra", null, null, null);
assertTrue(sessions.onBackendError(failed.terminalId(), "backend exited"));
MemberSession fresh = sessions.acquire("terra", null, null, null);
assertEquals("terra", fresh.profile(), "the real maxLoad gate grants a fresh spawn after a backend error");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("a failed session no longer blocks the real maxLoad spawn gate")
void failedSessionDoesNotBlockFreshSpawnAtMaxLoad() {
SessionManager sessions = capacityLimitedSessions();
MemberSession failed = sessions.acquire("terra", null, null, null);
sessions.onTurnFailed(failed.terminalId());
MemberSession fresh = sessions.acquire("terra", null, null, null);
assertEquals("terra", fresh.profile(), "the real maxLoad gate grants a fresh spawn after a failed turn");
}
private static SessionManager capacityLimitedSessions() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FleetConfig.Profile profile = new FleetConfig.Profile("terra", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder",
null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN", List.of("claude"), "tab", "fleetd-workers",
"w #{n}", null, null, null, null, null, null, null, 1.0f, 1);
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles = Map.of("terra", profile);
ClaudeCodeLauncher adapter = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), profiles, "terra", _ -> "tok");
AtomicReference<SessionManager> sessionsRef = new AtomicReference<>();
CompositePeerLauncher workers = new CompositePeerLauncher(List.of(adapter), "terra", profiles,
PlacementPolicies.fixed(), name -> Fleetd.liveSessionCount(sessionsRef.get().roster(), name));
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workers);
sessionsRef.set(sessions);
return sessions;
}
}
@@ -103,6 +103,54 @@ class CallerResolverTest {
assertEquals(Role.PRIMARY, p.role(), "the historical behaviour, now an explicit choice");
}
// ── fleetd #317: an unresolvable caller must never be promoted to the primary ──────────────────
// #305 closed the trigger where a resolved pid matched no pane *and* had no ancestry walk to
// save it. This is the other trigger PaneLocator's javadoc names: the pid never resolves at
// all — LsofPeerPidLookup returns -1 on any failure, including (silently) "lsof found no
// match" — so there is no candidate pid for an ancestry walk to even attempt.
/**
* The failing-without-the-fix case. Before #317's fix, {@code c.terminal() == null} was the
* only test in the loopback-trust fallback, and an unresolved pid produces exactly that same
* {@code null} terminal as a genuine primary — so this caller was handed
* {@code Principal.primary(...)}, a real worker's failed lookup becoming indistinguishable from
* the lead.
*/
@Test
void aFailedPeerPidLookupIsRefusedNotPromotedToPrimary() {
ConnectionIdentity unresolved = new ConnectionIdentity(new PaneLocator(herdr), _ -> -1);
Principal p = new CallerResolver(unresolved).resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555, null);
assertEquals(Role.ANONYMOUS, p.role(),
"an unresolvable caller must never be silently promoted to the primary");
}
/**
* The companion invariant #317 must not break: a caller whose lookup genuinely succeeded, and
* who simply owns no herdr pane — the real primary's own connection — is still the primary.
* This is {@link #loopbackTrustTreatsANonWorkerLoopbackCallerAsThePrimary} pinned again here,
* named for #317 and placed next to the test it must be distinguished from: same {@code null}
* terminal, opposite verdict, because {@code Caller.resolved()} tells them apart.
*/
@Test
void aRealPidThatOwnsNoPaneIsStillThePrimaryNotRefused() {
Principal p = new CallerResolver(nonWorkerIdentity()).resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555, null);
assertEquals(Role.PRIMARY, p.role());
}
/** #317 point 4: token mode never consults {@code c.pid()}, so a failed lookup must not change it. */
@Test
void tokenModeIsUndisturbedByAnUnresolvedLookup() {
ConnectionIdentity unresolved = new ConnectionIdentity(new PaneLocator(herdr), _ -> -1);
CallerResolver r = new CallerResolver(unresolved, true, "s3cret");
assertEquals(Role.ANONYMOUS, r.resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555, null).role(),
"no credential is still just ANONYMOUS, as before #317 — unchanged by the lookup failing");
assertEquals(Role.PRIMARY, r.resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555, "Bearer s3cret").role(),
"a valid token still authenticates the primary even though the peer-pid lookup failed");
}
@Test
void tokenModeRefusesANonWorkerCallerThatPresentsNoToken() {
Principal p = new CallerResolver(nonWorkerIdentity(), true, "s3cret")
@@ -413,4 +461,29 @@ class CallerResolverTest {
assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> new CallerResolver(id, true, null));
assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> new CallerResolver(id, true, " "));
}
@Test
void aWorkerOnAnyLoopbackSourceAddressIsStillAWorkerNotThePrimary() {
// fleetd #305: the escalation. ConnectionIdentity used to accept only 127.0.0.1, so a
// worker connecting from 127.0.0.2 resolved to no terminal, and this resolver's own
// (wider) loopback check then made it the PRIMARY — granting spawn, stop, send and drain.
// Measured on the Linux fleet host: binding a source of 127.0.0.2 succeeds there, so the
// path is real and not theoretical.
CallerResolver r = new CallerResolver(workerIdentity(), false, null);
for (String src : new String[]{"127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2", "127.1.2.3", "::ffff:127.0.0.2"}) {
Principal p = r.resolve(src, 55555, null);
assertEquals(Role.WORKER, p.role(), "a worker must stay a worker from source " + src);
assertEquals("term_a", p.terminal(), "worker terminal from source " + src);
}
}
@Test
void aNonWorkerOnAnyLoopbackSourceAddressIsStillThePrimary() {
// The other direction of the same fix: widening the identity check must not demote a
// legitimate same-host primary that happens to connect from another 127.* address.
CallerResolver r = new CallerResolver(nonWorkerIdentity(), false, null);
for (String src : new String[]{"127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2", "::ffff:127.0.0.1"}) {
assertEquals(Role.PRIMARY, r.resolve(src, 55555, null).role(), "source " + src);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.config;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.lang.reflect.RecordComponent;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.TreeSet;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* fleetd #323: {@code ConfigRef.sameLaunchSettings} javadoc used to claim it "compares every
* component the launcher reads at spawn". It did not — {@code ideProjectDir}, {@code
* ideOpenCommand} and {@code autoCompactWindow} were all baked in at daemon startup (see
* {@code ClaudeCodeLauncher}/{@code OpenCodeLauncher}) and missing from the comparison, so a reload
* that changed only one of them reported "config reloaded" and the running daemon kept the old
* value.
*
* <p>This class is the mechanism the issue asked for: it enumerates every record component of
* {@link FleetConfig.Profile} by reflection and proves — by actually mutating a base profile one
* field at a time and calling the real method — that each component is either compared by
* {@link ConfigRef#sameLaunchSettings} or named in {@link ConfigRef#LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED} with
* a reason. A new profile field that is neither fails this test by name, not a hand-maintained list
* going stale.
*/
class ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest {
private static final RecordComponent[] COMPONENTS = FleetConfig.Profile.class.getRecordComponents();
/**
* One valid, non-blank value per record component — "the a value". None of these trip any
* defaulting/normalization in {@code Profile}'s compact constructor (see {@code
* FleetConfig.java}), so what goes in is what {@code sameLaunchSettings} sees back out.
*/
private static final Map<String, Object> BASE = baseValues();
/** The same shape, each value distinct from {@link #BASE} — "the b value". */
private static final Map<String, Object> ALT = altValues();
private static Map<String, Object> baseValues() {
Map<String, Object> v = new LinkedHashMap<>();
v.put("profile", "sonnet");
v.put("baseUrl", "http://gx00.gw:8000");
v.put("model", "sonnet");
v.put("configDir", "/config/a");
v.put("tokenEnv", "TOKEN_A");
v.put("argv", List.of("claude", "--flag-a"));
v.put("placement", "tab");
v.put("workspace", "workspace-a");
v.put("tabLabel", "label-a");
v.put("mcpUrl", "http://mcp-a");
v.put("cwd", "/cwd/a");
v.put("parityOverlay", List.of(".env", ".env.a"));
v.put("gitTokenEnv", "GIT_TOKEN_A");
v.put("gitHostEnv", "GITEA_HOST_A");
v.put("kind", "claude-code");
v.put("env", Map.of("K", "A"));
v.put("weight", 1.0f);
v.put("maxLoad", 5);
v.put("subscription", Boolean.TRUE);
v.put("exhaustedPattern", "usage limit a");
v.put("credentialId", "cred-a");
v.put("ideMcpUrl", "http://ide-mcp-a");
v.put("ideProjectDir", "modules/a");
v.put("ideOpenCommand", "open-cmd-a {dir}");
v.put("autoCompactWindow", 150000);
v.put("errorPattern", "error a");
assertNamesMatchComponents(v);
return v;
}
private static Map<String, Object> altValues() {
Map<String, Object> v = new LinkedHashMap<>();
v.put("profile", "sonnet-b");
v.put("baseUrl", "http://gx01.gw:8000");
v.put("model", "haiku");
v.put("configDir", "/config/b");
v.put("tokenEnv", "TOKEN_B");
v.put("argv", List.of("claude", "--flag-b"));
v.put("placement", "weighted");
v.put("workspace", "workspace-b");
v.put("tabLabel", "label-b");
v.put("mcpUrl", "http://mcp-b");
v.put("cwd", "/cwd/b");
v.put("parityOverlay", List.of(".env", ".env.b"));
v.put("gitTokenEnv", "GIT_TOKEN_B");
v.put("gitHostEnv", "GITEA_HOST_B");
v.put("kind", "opencode");
v.put("env", Map.of("K", "B"));
v.put("weight", 2.0f);
v.put("maxLoad", 9);
v.put("subscription", Boolean.FALSE);
v.put("exhaustedPattern", "usage limit b");
v.put("credentialId", "cred-b");
v.put("ideMcpUrl", "http://ide-mcp-b");
v.put("ideProjectDir", "modules/b");
v.put("ideOpenCommand", "open-cmd-b {dir}");
v.put("autoCompactWindow", 250000);
v.put("errorPattern", "error b");
assertNamesMatchComponents(v);
return v;
}
private static void assertNamesMatchComponents(Map<String, Object> values) {
Set<String> componentNames = new TreeSet<>();
for (RecordComponent rc : COMPONENTS) {
componentNames.add(rc.getName());
}
assertEquals(componentNames, new TreeSet<>(values.keySet()),
"this test's value map has drifted from FleetConfig.Profile's actual components — "
+ "update BASE/ALT alongside the record");
}
private static FleetConfig.Profile profileOf(Map<String, Object> values) throws ReflectiveOperationException {
Class<?>[] types = Arrays.stream(COMPONENTS).map(RecordComponent::getType).toArray(Class<?>[]::new);
Object[] args = Arrays.stream(COMPONENTS)
.map(rc -> values.get(rc.getName()))
.toArray();
Constructor<FleetConfig.Profile> ctor = FleetConfig.Profile.class.getDeclaredConstructor(types);
return ctor.newInstance(args);
}
/** {@code BASE} with exactly one named component swapped for its {@code ALT} value. */
private static FleetConfig.Profile mutate(String componentName) throws ReflectiveOperationException {
Map<String, Object> values = new LinkedHashMap<>(BASE);
values.put(componentName, ALT.get(componentName));
return profileOf(values);
}
/**
* The mechanism fleetd #323 asked for: enumerate {@link FleetConfig.Profile}'s record
* components, mutate each non-excluded one, and prove {@code sameLaunchSettings} actually
* notices — not just that some hand-maintained list claims it does. Prints the denominator
* (total / compared / excluded) the issue required: a checker that cannot state its own
* denominator is the failure this repo keeps hitting.
*/
@Test
void sameLaunchSettingsComparesEveryProfileComponentOrExcludesIt() throws ReflectiveOperationException {
int total = COMPONENTS.length;
Set<String> excluded = ConfigRef.LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED;
Set<String> allNames = new TreeSet<>();
for (RecordComponent rc : COMPONENTS) {
allNames.add(rc.getName());
}
assertTrue(allNames.containsAll(excluded),
"ConfigRef.LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED names a component that does not exist on "
+ "FleetConfig.Profile — check for a typo: " + excluded);
// The exclusion set is this mechanism's own escape hatch, so it has to be pinned too.
// Found by mutation while verifying fleetd #323: moving autoCompactWindow and
// ideOpenCommand OUT of the comparison and INTO the exclusion set left the whole suite
// green — the loop below simply skips them, and the denominator assertion still balances.
// That is exactly the lazy move a failing coverage test invites, and it silently restores
// the #323 bug. Only ideProjectDir and worktreeGroup were saved by a behavioural test in
// ConfigRefTest; the other two had none. So: growing this set now requires editing this
// line as well, which is a visible, deliberate diff rather than a quiet one.
assertEquals(Set.of("weight", "maxLoad", "credentialId"), excluded,
"ConfigRef.LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED changed. A component belongs in it ONLY if it "
+ "is read live off the config supplier, not baked into a launcher at "
+ "startup. If you are adding one to silence this test, that is fleetd #323 "
+ "happening again: compare it in sameLaunchSettings instead. If it really "
+ "is read live, name where it is read and update this assertion.");
FleetConfig.Profile base = profileOf(BASE);
List<String> uncovered = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
int compared = 0;
for (RecordComponent rc : COMPONENTS) {
String name = rc.getName();
if (excluded.contains(name)) {
continue;
}
FleetConfig.Profile mutated = mutate(name);
if (ConfigRef.sameLaunchSettings(base, mutated)) {
uncovered.add(name);
} else {
compared++;
}
}
System.out.printf(
"ConfigRef.sameLaunchSettings coverage — %d Profile components total, %d compared, "
+ "%d excluded (%s)%n",
total, compared, excluded.size(), excluded);
assertEquals(List.of(), uncovered,
"these FleetConfig.Profile components changed but ConfigRef.sameLaunchSettings "
+ "reported no difference — add each one to the comparison (it is read at "
+ "spawn and baked in until a restart) or to ConfigRef.LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED "
+ "with a reason it is genuinely read live: " + uncovered);
assertEquals(total, compared + excluded.size(),
"every FleetConfig.Profile record component must be either compared or excluded — "
+ total + " components, " + compared + " compared, " + excluded.size()
+ " excluded");
}
}
@@ -434,6 +434,364 @@ class ConfigRefTest {
assertEquals("provider 5xx", ref.get().profiles().get("sonnet").errorPattern());
}
/**
* fleetd #323 instance 1: {@code ideProjectDir} is read at spawn off the frozen profile map
* (see {@code ClaudeCodeLauncher}/{@code OpenCodeLauncher}) exactly like {@code model}, but was
* missing from {@code sameLaunchSettings} — a reload changing only this field used to report a
* bare "config reloaded" and the running daemon kept launching with the old value.
*/
@Test
void changingAProfilesIdeProjectDirIsReportedAsDeferred(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 8765
herdrSocket: ~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock
profiles:
sonnet:
baseUrl: http://gx00.gw:8000
model: sonnet
ideProjectDir: fleetd
guard:
offSubscriptionHosts:
- gx00.gw
""");
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 8765
herdrSocket: ~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock
profiles:
sonnet:
baseUrl: http://gx00.gw:8000
model: sonnet
ideProjectDir: fleetd-renamed
guard:
offSubscriptionHosts:
- gx00.gw
""");
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied());
assertEquals(1, out.deferred().size(), out.deferred().toString());
assertTrue(out.deferred().getFirst().contains("sonnet"), out.deferred().toString());
assertTrue(out.deferred().getFirst().contains("launch settings"), out.deferred().toString());
// The snapshot still carries the new value — a restart is what makes it take effect.
assertEquals("fleetd-renamed", ref.get().profiles().get("sonnet").ideProjectDir());
}
/**
* fleetd #323 instance 2: {@code worktreeGroup} is baked into the same {@code GitWorktrees}
* as {@code worktreeRoot} (Fleetd.java:251) and never rebuilt, but only {@code worktreeRoot}
* was on {@code changedDeferredKeys} — a reload changing only the group reported a bare
* "config reloaded" and newly provisioned worktrees kept the old sharing behaviour.
*/
@Test
void changingWorktreeGroupIsReportedAsDeferred(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml("worktreeGroup: devgroup\n"));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
Files.writeString(f, yaml("worktreeGroup: devgroup2\n"));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied());
assertEquals(java.util.List.of("worktreeGroup"), out.deferred());
assertTrue(out.summary().contains("needs a restart") || out.summary().contains("need a restart"),
out.summary());
// The snapshot still carries the new value — a restart is what makes it take effect.
assertEquals("devgroup2", ref.get().worktreeGroup());
}
/**
* fleetd #326: {@code primary} is read only off the startup snapshot — {@code Fleetd.java:506,
* 519, 520} feed {@code PrimaryRegistry} and {@code ReplyPushLoop} at construction and neither is
* rebuilt on reload — but it was missing from {@link ConfigRef#changedDeferredKeys}, so a reload
* that only changed the pinned primary terminal reported a bare "config reloaded" while a lead
* whose tab no longer matched stayed demoted to worker.
*/
@Test
void changingPrimaryIsReportedAsDeferred(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
primary:
terminal: term-a
"""));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
primary:
terminal: term-b
"""));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied());
assertEquals(java.util.List.of("primary"), out.deferred());
assertTrue(out.summary().contains("need") && out.summary().contains("restart"), out.summary());
// The snapshot still carries the new value — a restart is what makes it take effect.
assertEquals("term-b", ref.get().primary().terminal());
}
/**
* fleetd #326: {@code configReload} itself is read only at startup ({@code Fleetd.java:679-680})
* to decide whether to build a {@code ConfigWatcher} at all, and with what interval — the watcher
* that would apply a later change is itself built once, so it is deferred rather than cold (see
* {@link ConfigRef}'s class doc: cold means an already-open resource would go inconsistent with
* the new value, and there is no such resource here — a running watcher just keeps polling on its
* original enabled/interval until a restart, exactly like {@code lifecycle} or {@code guard}).
* Before this fix, turning reload off (or changing its interval) through a reload reported a bare
* "config reloaded" — the obvious joke the issue names.
*/
@Test
void changingConfigReloadIsReportedAsDeferred(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
configReload:
enabled: true
intervalSeconds: 10
"""));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
configReload:
enabled: false
intervalSeconds: 30
"""));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied());
assertEquals(java.util.List.of("configReload"), out.deferred());
assertTrue(out.summary().contains("need") && out.summary().contains("restart"), out.summary());
// The snapshot still carries the new value — a restart is what makes it take effect.
assertFalse(ref.get().configReload().isEnabled());
assertEquals(30, ref.get().configReload().intervalSeconds());
}
/**
* fleetd #330: {@code health:} is read both ways — {@code Fleetd.java:556-563} builds the
* monitor off the startup snapshot and never rebuilds it, but {@code Fleetd.java:648-650} reads
* {@code config.get().health()} live on every {@code fleet_profiles} call. A changed value is
* neither purely hot nor purely deferred, so it gets its own {@code split} report naming both
* halves rather than a bare "config reloaded" (which would hide the frozen half) or a plain
* {@code deferred} entry (which would hide that the coverage string already applied).
*/
@Test
void changingHealthIsReportedAsSplit(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
health:
enabled: true
intervalSeconds: 30
"""));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
health:
enabled: true
intervalSeconds: 90
"""));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied());
assertTrue(out.deferred().isEmpty(), out.deferred().toString());
assertEquals(1, out.split().size(), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().getFirst().startsWith("health:"), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().getFirst().contains("restart"), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().getFirst().contains("live"), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.summary().contains("partially live"), out.summary());
// The snapshot still carries the new value — the monitor itself is what waits for a restart.
assertEquals(90, ref.get().health().intervalSeconds());
}
/**
* fleetd #330: {@code coordinator:} is the other split key — {@code Fleetd.java:502} opens the
* {@code LeadMailbox} off the startup snapshot and never reopens it, but
* {@code HerdrPeerLauncher.java:1530} reads {@code config.get().coordinator()} live on every
* spawn to keep the broker URI env-var name out of a member's environment.
*/
@Test
void changingCoordinatorIsReportedAsSplit(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
coordinator:
selfId: mac-a
"""));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
coordinator:
selfId: mac-b
"""));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied());
assertTrue(out.deferred().isEmpty(), out.deferred().toString());
assertEquals(1, out.split().size(), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().getFirst().startsWith("coordinator:"), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().getFirst().contains("restart"), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().getFirst().contains("live"), out.split().toString());
// The snapshot still carries the new value — the LeadMailbox connection is what waits for a
// restart; selfId names this daemon's own inbox queue and a peer cannot discover a rename.
assertEquals("mac-b", ref.get().coordinator().selfId());
}
/**
* fleetd #333: {@code fleet:} is split too — {@code fleet.leaders} is read only at
* {@code Fleetd.java:281} to build the {@code LeadTabScanner}'s identity map (fed into
* {@code CallerResolver}) and to auto-launch leads via {@code LeadLauncher.ensureLeads()}, and
* neither is rebuilt on reload, while the rest of {@code fleet:} (role pools, charters,
* tabLabel) is read live through the {@code CompositePeerLauncher} supplier. Before this fix
* {@code fleet} sat in the coverage checker's hot-excluded escape hatch, so a reload that
* changed only {@code fleet.leaders} reported a bare "config reloaded" — exactly the
* under-claim the split class exists to prevent for {@code health}/{@code coordinator}.
*/
@Test
void changingFleetLeadersIsReportedAsSplit(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
fleet:
leaders:
opus:
tab: "lead: opus-a"
profile: sonnet
"""));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
fleet:
leaders:
opus:
tab: "lead: opus-b"
profile: sonnet
"""));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied());
assertTrue(out.deferred().isEmpty(), out.deferred().toString());
assertEquals(1, out.split().size(), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().getFirst().startsWith("fleet:"), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().getFirst().contains("restart"), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().getFirst().contains("live"), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.summary().contains("partially live"), out.summary());
// The snapshot still carries the new value — the LeadTabScanner's identity map and
// LeadLauncher's auto-launch are what wait for a restart; a reload rebuilds neither.
assertEquals("lead: opus-b", ref.get().fleet().leaders().get("opus").tab());
}
/**
* fleetd #333: {@code fleet.leaders} is the ONLY frozen part of {@code fleet:}. A reload that
* changes {@code tabLabel} (or charters, or a role pool) without touching {@code fleet.leaders}
* must stay fully hot with nothing reported — proving {@link ConfigRef#changedSplitKeys}
* compares {@code fleet.leaders} specifically rather than the whole {@code Fleet} record, which
* would over-claim "needs a restart" for a change that is genuinely all live (the mirror
* mistake of the under-claim this class exists to prevent).
*/
@Test
void changingFleetTabLabelWithoutLeadersStaysFullyHot(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
fleet:
tabLabel: "{role}: {profile} #{n}"
"""));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
fleet:
tabLabel: "[{profile}] {role}"
"""));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied());
assertTrue(out.deferred().isEmpty(), out.deferred().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().isEmpty(), out.split().toString());
assertEquals("config reloaded", out.summary());
assertEquals("[{profile}] {role}", ref.get().fleet().tabLabel());
}
/**
* A split change must not refuse the reload (invariant 2 of fleetd #330) and
* {@code Outcome.applied()} must stay {@code true} (invariant 3) — unlike a cold change, the
* live half of a split key genuinely took effect, so refusing would throw that away.
*/
@Test
void aSplitChangeDoesNotRefuseTheReload(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml("coordinator:\n selfId: mac-a\n"));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
Files.writeString(f, yaml("coordinator:\n selfId: mac-b\n"));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied());
assertTrue(out.error() == null);
assertTrue(out.coldKeys().isEmpty());
}
/**
* Both split keys can change in one reload — the report names both, and a caller reading
* {@code split} does not have to guess which half of which key already applied.
*/
@Test
void changingBothSplitKeysReportsBoth(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
health:
enabled: true
coordinator:
selfId: mac-a
"""));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
health:
enabled: false
coordinator:
selfId: mac-b
"""));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied());
assertEquals(2, out.split().size(), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().stream().anyMatch(s -> s.startsWith("health:")), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().stream().anyMatch(s -> s.startsWith("coordinator:")), out.split().toString());
}
/**
* A split key and a deferred key changing in the same reload must both show up, each in its own
* list — proving the two fields do not step on each other and {@link ConfigRef.Outcome#summary()}
* reports both halves of the message.
*/
@Test
void aSplitChangeAndADeferredChangeCoexist(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
coordinator:
selfId: mac-a
lifecycle:
drainTimeoutSeconds: 30
"""));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
Files.writeString(f, yaml("""
coordinator:
selfId: mac-b
lifecycle:
drainTimeoutSeconds: 60
"""));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied());
assertEquals(java.util.List.of("lifecycle"), out.deferred());
assertEquals(1, out.split().size(), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.split().getFirst().startsWith("coordinator:"), out.split().toString());
assertTrue(out.summary().contains("need a restart") || out.summary().contains("needs a restart"),
out.summary());
assertTrue(out.summary().contains("partially live"), out.summary());
}
@Test
void aFixedRefHasNoFileAndRefusesToReload() {
FleetConfig cfg = new FleetConfig(null, null, null, null, null, null,
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.config;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.lang.reflect.RecordComponent;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.TreeSet;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* fleetd #330: a new top-level {@link FleetConfig} record component must be triaged into a reload
* class before it ships, or it repeats fleetd #323 ({@code worktreeGroup} missing from {@code
* ConfigRef.changedDeferredKeys}) and fleetd #326 ({@code primary}/{@code configReload} missing the
* same way) — a key silently absent from {@link ConfigRef}'s reload machinery, so a reload changing
* only that key reports a bare "config reloaded" for a change the running daemon never picked up.
*
* <p>This is the top-level counterpart of {@link ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest}: instead of
* enumerating {@link FleetConfig.Profile}'s record components, it enumerates {@link FleetConfig}'s
* own — {@code bind}, {@code health}, {@code memberCredentials}, and so on — and requires each to
* fall into exactly one of four homes: {@link ConfigRef#COLD_KEYS}, {@link #DEFERRED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS}
* (compared in {@code ConfigRef.changedDeferredKeys}), {@link ConfigRef#SPLIT_KEYS}, or
* {@link #HOT_EXCLUDED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS} (the escape hatch: read live off the config supplier, so no
* reload bookkeeping is needed for it at all).
*
* <h2>What this checker can and cannot prove</h2>
* It proves the record's <em>shape</em> is fully triaged: every one of {@code FleetConfig}'s
* components sits in exactly one of the four sets, none sits in two, and the escape hatch
* ({@link #HOT_EXCLUDED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS}) cannot silently grow without a visible diff to this file.
* That is what "a new component cannot be added without someone triaging it" means in practice.
*
* <p>It CANNOT prove that any of the citations are <em>true</em>. "Compared in {@code
* changedDeferredKeys}" and "read live off {@code config.get()}" are facts about {@code
* ConfigRef.java}, {@code Fleetd.java} and {@code HerdrPeerLauncher.java} that a reflection-only
* test over {@code FleetConfig}'s shape has no way to inspect — this test would pass identically
* whether or not the cited line still does what the comment next to it says. Trust the citation
* because a person read the source (the exact call sites are named next to each set below), not
* because this test is green. {@link ConfigRefTest} is what behaviourally proves the deferred and
* split keys it covers actually get reported; {@link ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest} does the same,
* behaviourally, for {@code FleetConfig.Profile}'s own fields.
*/
class ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest {
private static final RecordComponent[] COMPONENTS = FleetConfig.class.getRecordComponents();
/**
* Top-level components whose change {@code ConfigRef.changedDeferredKeys} reads and reports on.
* Fleetd #337 promoted this out of a hand-maintained copy here into {@link ConfigRef#DEFERRED_KEYS}
* itself, the same reason {@link ConfigRef#COLD_KEYS} and {@link ConfigRef#SPLIT_KEYS} are
* production constants rather than test-side copies: two lists that are supposed to describe the
* same method are exactly the shape that silently drifts apart. {@code spawnReadyTimeoutMs}/
* {@code spawnReadyPollMs} are compared together and reported under one combined label
* ({@code "spawnReady*"}); {@code profiles} is compared twice over — once for added/removed
* profile names, once for an existing profile's launch settings — and that second comparison
* excludes {@code weight}/{@code maxLoad}/{@code credentialId} as hot sub-fields, which is what
* {@link ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest} exists to keep honest at the sub-field level. {@code
* profiles} itself still belongs here, not in the hot-exclusion set below: most of a profile's
* fields are NOT read live, so citing "read live off the config supplier" for the whole
* top-level key would be false.
*/
private static final Set<String> DEFERRED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS = ConfigRef.DEFERRED_KEYS;
/**
* The escape hatch: top-level components with no reload bookkeeping at all, because every read
* of them goes live through {@link ConfigRef#get()} rather than off a startup snapshot. A
* component belongs here ONLY if that is true — never because adding it here makes this test
* pass. fleetd #323 is the cautionary tale for exactly this pattern: the identical hatch on
* {@code ConfigRef.LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED} let two profile fields be silently re-broken with
* the whole suite green, and it was only caught by mutating the checker itself (see this class's
* own mutation test below, and {@code ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest}'s equivalent).
*
* <ul>
* <li>{@code placement} — read live by the placement policy on every spawn (class doc, Hot
* bullet; {@code ConfigRefTest.aConsumerHoldingTheRefSeesTheNewValue} proves it
* behaviourally).</li>
* <li>{@code memberCredentials} — read live at {@code Fleetd.java:198, 205, 729}.</li>
* <li>{@code memberLoginShell} — read live at
* {@code HerdrPeerLauncher#configuredMemberLoginShell}.</li>
* </ul>
*
* <p>{@code fleet} used to sit here too, on the strength of most of it (role pools, charters,
* tabLabel) being read the same live way — but {@code fleet.leaders} inside the same key is
* read only at startup and genuinely needs a restart, which is a real gap this escape hatch
* cannot represent: it excuses a whole top-level key from reload bookkeeping, and {@code fleet}
* needed exactly half of it excused. fleetd #333 moved it into {@link ConfigRef#SPLIT_KEYS}
* instead, where {@code changedSplitKeys} reports the frozen half by name. That is the
* cautionary tale this test's own javadoc already told: this checker proves the record's shape
* is triaged, never that a bucket a key sits in is the right one — a person has to read the
* source, which is exactly how fleetd #333 found {@code fleet} sitting in the wrong bucket
* while this test stayed green throughout.</p>
*/
private static final Set<String> HOT_EXCLUDED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS =
Set.of("placement", "memberCredentials", "memberLoginShell");
@Test
void everyTopLevelComponentIsAccountedForInExactlyOneClass() {
Set<String> allNames = new TreeSet<>();
for (RecordComponent rc : COMPONENTS) {
allNames.add(rc.getName());
}
Set<String> cold = ConfigRef.COLD_KEYS;
Set<String> split = ConfigRef.SPLIT_KEYS;
Set<String> deferred = DEFERRED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS;
Set<String> hot = HOT_EXCLUDED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS;
// Typo guard on each set — the same check ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest runs on
// LAUNCH_SETTINGS_EXCLUDED. A name that does not exist on FleetConfig is a silent no-op.
assertTrue(allNames.containsAll(cold),
"ConfigRef.COLD_KEYS names a component that does not exist on FleetConfig: " + cold);
assertTrue(allNames.containsAll(split),
"ConfigRef.SPLIT_KEYS names a component that does not exist on FleetConfig: " + split);
assertTrue(allNames.containsAll(deferred),
"DEFERRED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS names a component that does not exist on FleetConfig: " + deferred);
assertTrue(allNames.containsAll(hot),
"HOT_EXCLUDED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS names a component that does not exist on FleetConfig: " + hot);
// The escape hatch is pinned. Growing it requires editing this line — a visible, deliberate
// diff, not a quiet one. See the field javadoc above for what "belongs here" actually means.
assertEquals(Set.of("placement", "memberCredentials", "memberLoginShell"), hot,
"HOT_EXCLUDED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS changed. A component belongs here ONLY if it is read "
+ "live off the config supplier, never because adding it makes this test "
+ "pass. If you are adding one to silence this test, that is fleetd #323 "
+ "happening again: account for it in ConfigRef.changedDeferredKeys (or "
+ "COLD_KEYS/SPLIT_KEYS) instead. If it really is read live, name where and "
+ "update this assertion and the field javadoc together.");
// No component may sit in two buckets at once — the denominator check below could not catch
// that on its own (two buckets double-booking one key still sums to the right total if
// another key is simultaneously missing), so check every pair directly and name the culprit.
record Bucket(String name, Set<String> keys) {}
List<Bucket> buckets = List.of(
new Bucket("COLD_KEYS", cold), new Bucket("SPLIT_KEYS", split),
new Bucket("DEFERRED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS", deferred), new Bucket("HOT_EXCLUDED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS", hot));
for (int i = 0; i < buckets.size(); i++) {
for (int j = i + 1; j < buckets.size(); j++) {
Set<String> overlap = new LinkedHashSet<>(buckets.get(i).keys());
overlap.retainAll(buckets.get(j).keys());
assertEquals(Set.of(), overlap, "a component is in both " + buckets.get(i).name()
+ " and " + buckets.get(j).name() + ": " + overlap);
}
}
Set<String> union = new TreeSet<>();
union.addAll(cold);
union.addAll(split);
union.addAll(deferred);
union.addAll(hot);
System.out.printf(
"FleetConfig top-level coverage — %d components total: %d cold %s, %d deferred %s, "
+ "%d split %s, %d hot-excluded %s%n",
allNames.size(), cold.size(), cold, deferred.size(), deferred, split.size(), split,
hot.size(), hot);
Set<String> missing = new TreeSet<>(allNames);
missing.removeAll(union);
assertEquals(Set.of(), missing,
"these FleetConfig components are in none of COLD_KEYS, DEFERRED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS, "
+ "SPLIT_KEYS or HOT_EXCLUDED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS — triage each one into whichever "
+ "actually describes it: " + missing);
assertEquals(allNames.size(), cold.size() + deferred.size() + split.size() + hot.size(),
"counts don't sum to the component total even though every component was found in "
+ "the union — " + allNames.size() + " components, " + cold.size()
+ " cold + " + deferred.size() + " deferred + " + split.size() + " split + "
+ hot.size() + " hot-excluded");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.config;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.lang.reflect.RecordComponent;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.TreeSet;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
/**
* fleetd #333, finding F2: {@link ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest} proves every {@link FleetConfig}
* top-level component sits in exactly one of {@link ConfigRef#COLD_KEYS}, {@link
* ConfigRef#DEFERRED_KEYS}, {@link ConfigRef#SPLIT_KEYS} or the hot-excluded set. It does
* <strong>not</strong> prove that a key's membership in one of the first three sets corresponds to
* any actual comparison in {@link ConfigRef}: a key can sit in a set with no branch in {@code
* changedColdKeys}/{@code changedSplitKeys}/{@code changedDeferredKeys} checking it, and both
* {@link ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest} and the "kept in step" {@code assert} inside the first two
* of those methods stay green, because neither one reads the method body — the coverage test only
* reads set membership, and the assert only checks that reported entries are a SUBSET of the set,
* never that every set member produced a reported entry. {@code changedDeferredKeys} does not even
* have a "kept in step" assert of its own.
*
* <p>Measured directly, live, while fixing fleetd #333: dropping the {@code coordinator} branch out
* of {@code ConfigRef.changedSplitKeys} while leaving {@code "coordinator"} in
* {@link ConfigRef#SPLIT_KEYS} left {@link ConfigRefTopLevelCoverageTest} and the in-method assert
* both green — only a hand-written behavioural case in {@link ConfigRefTest} caught it, because it
* happened to name that exact key. This is the {@link ConfigRefProfileCoverageTest} mechanism one
* level up, generalised over every {@code COLD_KEYS}/{@code SPLIT_KEYS}/{@code DEFERRED_KEYS}
* member rather than one hand-picked field: enumerate {@link FleetConfig}'s own record components by
* reflection, build "a config where only {@code <key>} differs" for each key, and call the real
* {@link ConfigRef#changedColdKeys}/{@link ConfigRef#changedSplitKeys}/
* {@link ConfigRef#changedDeferredKeys} methods (all package-private for exactly this, the same
* reason {@link ConfigRef#sameLaunchSettings} already is) to prove each one is actually reported —
* not assumed from a set literal.
*
* <h2>fleetd #337 — DEFERRED_KEYS was the gap left open here</h2>
* This class originally covered {@code COLD_KEYS} and {@code SPLIT_KEYS} only — {@code
* DEFERRED_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS} (now {@link ConfigRef#DEFERRED_KEYS}) carried the identical one-way risk
* in principle, unexercised. fleetd #337 measured the real consequence rather than assuming it from
* the shape of the gap: dropping {@code guard}'s comparison out of {@code changedDeferredKeys} while
* {@code "guard"} stayed in the set left all 1355 tests green — the same failure mode {@code
* coordinator} demonstrated for {@code SPLIT_KEYS} in fleetd #333, now confirmed for {@code
* DEFERRED_KEYS} too. Re-deriving the full list by mutation (drop each key's branch in turn, run the
* suite, restore) found six of the eleven {@code DEFERRED_KEYS} members with no behavioural test in
* {@link ConfigRefTest} naming them: {@code guard}, {@code leadHeartbeat}, {@code worktreeRoot},
* {@code spawnReadyTimeoutMs}, {@code spawnReadyPollMs} and {@code quarantineCooldownSeconds}. That
* list corrects fleetd #333's own guess at it in two ways the mutation proved and a reading did not:
* {@code lifecycle} is NOT on it — {@code ConfigRefTest.aDeferredChangeIsAppliedAndReported} already
* names it, and dropping its branch fails that test — and {@code worktreeRoot} IS on it, which #333
* never named at all. The other five {@code DEFERRED_KEYS} members ({@code lifecycle}, {@code
* worktreeGroup}, {@code primary}, {@code configReload}, {@code profiles}) already had a hand-written
* case each. {@link #everyDeferredKeyIsActuallyReportedByChangedDeferredKeys} below now covers all
* eleven the reflective way, so the six with no hand-written test are no longer silently unpinned —
* every {@code DEFERRED_KEYS} component turned out to be a scalar or a simple record, so, unlike
* {@code fleet.leaders} in fleetd #333, none needed an exclusion set: {@link #BASE}/{@link #ALT} give
* every top-level component (not only {@code COLD_KEYS}/{@code SPLIT_KEYS}) a real, distinct value.
*/
class ConfigRefTopLevelReportingCoverageTest {
private static final RecordComponent[] COMPONENTS = FleetConfig.class.getRecordComponents();
/**
* One valid value per top-level {@link FleetConfig} component — "the a value". fleetd #337 gave
* every {@code DEFERRED_KEYS} component a real value here too (previously left {@code null} on
* both sides, which meant {@code mutate(key)} produced no actual difference for any of them);
* only {@code placement}, {@code memberCredentials} and {@code memberLoginShell} — the
* hot-excluded set, never compared by any {@code changed*Keys} method — stay {@code null}.
* {@link FleetConfig}'s compact constructor only normalizes {@code profiles}, so every other
* field accepts whatever is put here unmutated.
*/
private static final Map<String, Object> BASE = baseValues();
/** The same shape, each value distinct from {@link #BASE} — "the b value". */
private static final Map<String, Object> ALT = altValues();
private static Map<String, Object> baseValues() {
Map<String, Object> v = new LinkedHashMap<>();
v.put("bind", new FleetConfig.Bind("127.0.0.1", 8765));
v.put("herdrSocket", "~/.config/herdr/a.sock");
v.put("memberHerdrSocket", "~/.config/herdr/member-a.sock");
v.put("profiles", Map.of());
v.put("guard", new FleetConfig.Guard(List.of("host-a")));
v.put("worktreeRoot", "/wt/a");
v.put("lifecycle", new FleetConfig.Lifecycle(300, 5, 30, false));
v.put("spawnReadyTimeoutMs", 5000);
v.put("spawnReadyPollMs", 100);
v.put("broker", new FleetConfig.Broker("amqp://a", null, 1));
v.put("primary", new FleetConfig.Primary("term-a", 1, 1000));
v.put("fleet", new FleetConfig.Fleet(
Map.of("opus", new FleetConfig.Leader("sonnet", "lead: opus-a", 1, null, 10,
"claude", null, null, null)),
Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(), "{role}: {profile} #{n}"));
v.put("leadHeartbeat", new FleetConfig.LeadHeartbeat(300, 60_000L, 3));
v.put("health", new FleetConfig.Health(true, 30, 600, null, null));
v.put("placement", null);
v.put("auth", new FleetConfig.Auth("loopback-trust", null));
v.put("configReload", new FleetConfig.ConfigReload(true, 10));
v.put("quarantineCooldownSeconds", 1800);
v.put("memberCredentials", null);
v.put("coordinator", new FleetConfig.Coordinator("amqp://coord-a", null, "self-a", 1));
v.put("worktreeGroup", "group-a");
v.put("memberLoginShell", null);
assertNamesMatchComponents(v);
return v;
}
private static Map<String, Object> altValues() {
Map<String, Object> v = new LinkedHashMap<>();
v.put("bind", new FleetConfig.Bind("127.0.0.2", 8766));
v.put("herdrSocket", "~/.config/herdr/b.sock");
v.put("memberHerdrSocket", "~/.config/herdr/member-b.sock");
// A single added profile — enough to trip the "added/removed" comparison in
// ConfigRef.changedDeferredKeys, which is all this mechanism needs to prove "profiles" has
// a branch behind it; the launch-settings comparison already has its own hand-written cases
// in ConfigRefTest (changingAProfilesLaunchSettingsIsReportedAsDeferred and siblings).
v.put("profiles", Map.of("sonnet", minimalProfile("sonnet")));
v.put("guard", new FleetConfig.Guard(List.of("host-b")));
v.put("worktreeRoot", "/wt/b");
v.put("lifecycle", new FleetConfig.Lifecycle(600, 10, 60, true));
v.put("spawnReadyTimeoutMs", 10_000);
v.put("spawnReadyPollMs", 200);
v.put("broker", new FleetConfig.Broker("amqp://b", null, 2));
v.put("primary", new FleetConfig.Primary("term-b", 2, 2000));
// Differs from BASE.fleet only in fleet.leaders (a different tab for "opus") — the frozen
// sub-field ConfigRef.changedSplitKeys actually compares. A Fleet that instead differed only
// in tabLabel would correctly NOT be reported (see
// ConfigRefTest.changingFleetTabLabelWithoutLeadersStaysFullyHot) and would wrongly fail this
// test — that is by design, not a gap: this map exists to prove fleet.leaders is covered.
v.put("fleet", new FleetConfig.Fleet(
Map.of("opus", new FleetConfig.Leader("sonnet", "lead: opus-b", 1, null, 10,
"claude", null, null, null)),
Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(), "{role}: {profile} #{n}"));
v.put("leadHeartbeat", new FleetConfig.LeadHeartbeat(600, 120_000L, 5));
v.put("health", new FleetConfig.Health(false, 90, 900, null, null));
v.put("placement", null);
v.put("auth", new FleetConfig.Auth("token", "TOKEN_ENV"));
v.put("configReload", new FleetConfig.ConfigReload(false, 20));
v.put("quarantineCooldownSeconds", 3600);
v.put("memberCredentials", null);
v.put("coordinator", new FleetConfig.Coordinator("amqp://coord-b", null, "self-b", 2));
v.put("worktreeGroup", "group-b");
v.put("memberLoginShell", null);
assertNamesMatchComponents(v);
return v;
}
/** A minimal, otherwise-null {@link FleetConfig.Profile} — just enough to name one in a map. */
private static FleetConfig.Profile minimalProfile(String name) {
return new FleetConfig.Profile(name, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null,
null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null,
null, null);
}
private static void assertNamesMatchComponents(Map<String, Object> values) {
Set<String> names = new TreeSet<>();
for (RecordComponent rc : COMPONENTS) {
names.add(rc.getName());
}
assertEquals(names, new TreeSet<>(values.keySet()),
"this test's value map has drifted from FleetConfig's actual top-level components — "
+ "update BASE/ALT alongside the record");
}
private static FleetConfig configOf(Map<String, Object> values) throws ReflectiveOperationException {
Class<?>[] types = Arrays.stream(COMPONENTS).map(RecordComponent::getType).toArray(Class<?>[]::new);
Object[] args = Arrays.stream(COMPONENTS).map(rc -> values.get(rc.getName())).toArray();
Constructor<FleetConfig> ctor = FleetConfig.class.getDeclaredConstructor(types);
return ctor.newInstance(args);
}
/** {@code BASE} with exactly one named top-level component swapped for its {@code ALT} value. */
private static FleetConfig mutate(String componentName) throws ReflectiveOperationException {
Map<String, Object> values = new LinkedHashMap<>(BASE);
values.put(componentName, ALT.get(componentName));
return configOf(values);
}
/**
* The mechanism fleetd #333 F2 asked for, applied to {@link ConfigRef#COLD_KEYS}: mutate each
* cold key in isolation and prove {@code changedColdKeys} actually names it, not just that
* {@code COLD_KEYS} claims it does.
*/
@Test
void everyColdKeyIsActuallyReportedByChangedColdKeys() throws ReflectiveOperationException {
FleetConfig base = configOf(BASE);
List<String> uncovered = new ArrayList<>();
for (String key : new TreeSet<>(ConfigRef.COLD_KEYS)) {
FleetConfig mutated = mutate(key);
if (!ConfigRef.changedColdKeys(base, mutated).contains(key)) {
uncovered.add(key);
}
}
System.out.printf(
"ConfigRef.changedColdKeys reporting coverage — %d COLD_KEYS, %d verified%n",
ConfigRef.COLD_KEYS.size(), ConfigRef.COLD_KEYS.size() - uncovered.size());
assertEquals(List.of(), uncovered,
"these keys are in ConfigRef.COLD_KEYS but mutating them alone produces no matching "
+ "entry from changedColdKeys — a set entry with no comparison behind it: "
+ uncovered);
}
/**
* The same mechanism applied to {@link ConfigRef#SPLIT_KEYS}: mutate each split key in
* isolation and prove {@code changedSplitKeys} actually names it (message starting with
* {@code "<key>:"}), not just that {@code SPLIT_KEYS} claims it does. This is the exact check
* that would have failed fleetd #333's own reproduction — dropping the {@code coordinator}
* branch from {@code changedSplitKeys} while {@code "coordinator"} stayed in {@code SPLIT_KEYS}
* — see the mutation proof in the fleetd #333 PR description; the earlier checkers here (the
* shape test and the in-method assert) do not.
*/
@Test
void everySplitKeyIsActuallyReportedByChangedSplitKeys() throws ReflectiveOperationException {
FleetConfig base = configOf(BASE);
List<String> uncovered = new ArrayList<>();
for (String key : new TreeSet<>(ConfigRef.SPLIT_KEYS)) {
FleetConfig mutated = mutate(key);
List<String> split = ConfigRef.changedSplitKeys(base, mutated);
if (split.stream().noneMatch(s -> s.startsWith(key + ":"))) {
uncovered.add(key);
}
}
System.out.printf(
"ConfigRef.changedSplitKeys reporting coverage — %d SPLIT_KEYS, %d verified%n",
ConfigRef.SPLIT_KEYS.size(), ConfigRef.SPLIT_KEYS.size() - uncovered.size());
assertEquals(List.of(), uncovered,
"these keys are in ConfigRef.SPLIT_KEYS but mutating them alone produces no matching "
+ "entry from changedSplitKeys — a set entry with no comparison behind it, "
+ "exactly the fleetd #333 F2 shape: " + uncovered);
}
/**
* For most {@link ConfigRef#DEFERRED_KEYS} members, {@code changedDeferredKeys} reports the key
* name verbatim — the default this map assumes. Two entries don't: {@code spawnReadyTimeoutMs}
* and {@code spawnReadyPollMs} are compared together in one branch and reported under the
* combined label {@code "spawnReady*"} (see {@link ConfigRef#changedDeferredKeys}). {@code
* profiles} keeps the default: mutating it here only exercises the added/removed comparison
* (see {@link #altValues}), which reports {@code "profiles (added/removed: …)"} — starts with
* {@code "profiles"}, same as the default would expect.
*/
private static final Map<String, String> DEFERRED_REPORT_PREFIX = Map.of(
"spawnReadyTimeoutMs", "spawnReady*",
"spawnReadyPollMs", "spawnReady*");
/**
* fleetd #337: the same mechanism applied to {@link ConfigRef#DEFERRED_KEYS}, closing the gap
* this class's own javadoc left open since fleetd #333. Mutate each deferred key in isolation
* and prove {@code changedDeferredKeys} actually names it (message starting with the key's
* expected report prefix — see {@link #DEFERRED_REPORT_PREFIX}), not just that {@code
* DEFERRED_KEYS} claims it does. This is the exact check that fails for {@code guard} the way
* {@code coordinator} failed {@link #everySplitKeyIsActuallyReportedByChangedSplitKeys} in
* fleetd #333 — verified live: dropping {@code guard}'s branch from {@code changedDeferredKeys}
* while {@code "guard"} stayed in {@code DEFERRED_KEYS} left the whole 1355-test suite green,
* and this test is what now catches it (it fails naming {@code guard} with that mutation in
* place).
*/
@Test
void everyDeferredKeyIsActuallyReportedByChangedDeferredKeys() throws ReflectiveOperationException {
FleetConfig base = configOf(BASE);
List<String> uncovered = new ArrayList<>();
for (String key : new TreeSet<>(ConfigRef.DEFERRED_KEYS)) {
FleetConfig mutated = mutate(key);
List<String> deferred = ConfigRef.changedDeferredKeys(base, mutated);
String prefix = DEFERRED_REPORT_PREFIX.getOrDefault(key, key);
if (deferred.stream().noneMatch(s -> s.startsWith(prefix))) {
uncovered.add(key);
}
}
System.out.printf(
"ConfigRef.changedDeferredKeys reporting coverage — %d DEFERRED_KEYS, %d verified%n",
ConfigRef.DEFERRED_KEYS.size(), ConfigRef.DEFERRED_KEYS.size() - uncovered.size());
assertEquals(List.of(), uncovered,
"these keys are in ConfigRef.DEFERRED_KEYS but mutating them alone produces no "
+ "matching entry from changedDeferredKeys — a set entry with no comparison "
+ "behind it, exactly the fleetd #333 F2 shape, confirmed here for "
+ "DEFERRED_KEYS by fleetd #337: " + uncovered);
}
}
@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.CompletableFuture;
import java.util.concurrent.Executors;
import java.util.concurrent.ScheduledFuture;
import java.util.concurrent.ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong;
@@ -434,4 +436,120 @@ class FleetHealthMonitorTest {
logger.detachAppender(appender);
}
}
// --- fleetd #280: a GONE/NEVER_READY guess whose fleet_ask lapses AFTER the first sweep must
// still be swept, without ever reaching into a target that has since recovered or left the
// roster. See FleetHealthMonitor.recheckTerminalTarget's javadoc for the full reachability chain.
@Test void terminalTransitionSchedulesExactlyOneDelayedRecheck() {
ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor scheduler = new ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor(1);
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitor(new FakeHerdr(),
List.of(member("term_a", MemberSession.State.BUSY, 0, 0)), scheduler, () -> 1, 600,
(_, _) -> { });
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
// Driven via reportTransition directly (not tick()), so the queue holds only the recheck.
assertEquals(1, scheduler.getQueue().size());
ScheduledFuture<?> scheduled = (ScheduledFuture<?>) scheduler.getQueue().peek();
assertTrue(scheduled.getDelay(TimeUnit.SECONDS) > 100,
"the delay must clear the worst-case fleet_ask lapse window (up to 115s)");
// An unchanged tick must not queue a second one (CB-580's fire-once rule extends to this).
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(1, scheduler.getQueue().size());
monitor.stop();
}
@Test void recheckIsANoOpOnceTheTargetHasRecovered() {
RecordingFailTarget failTarget = new RecordingFailTarget();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitorWith(failTarget);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(1, failTarget.calls.size());
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.IDLE); // recovered before the recheck fired
monitor.recheckTerminalTarget("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(1, failTarget.calls.size(), "a recovered target must not be reached into again");
monitor.stop();
}
@Test void recheckIsANoOpForATargetItNeverObserved() {
// Mirrors "left the roster": tick() prunes states.keySet() to the current roster on release
// (see FleetHealthMonitor.tick), so a target this monitor never recorded is the same case.
RecordingFailTarget failTarget = new RecordingFailTarget();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitorWith(failTarget);
monitor.recheckTerminalTarget("term_never_seen", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(0, failTarget.calls.size(), "an untracked/released target must not be reached into");
monitor.stop();
}
/**
* The scenario from the ticket, end to end, driven through the real {@link MessageService}: a
* target's ask is still genuinely open when health first observes GONE (sweep must skip it,
* exactly as {@code abandonDoesNotFailAnAsyncTicketWaitingForAnAnswer} pins), the ask then lapses
* on its own, an unchanged tick still must not refire, and only the delayed recheck sweeps the
* now-lapsed ticket to FAILED.
*/
@Test void delayedRecheckSweepsATicketWhoseAskLapsedAfterGoneWasFirstObserved() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().withAgent("worker", "term_a", "pane-term_a", "tab_a")
.readText("$ prompt");
AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
Injector injector = new Injector(agents);
InMemoryReplyInbox inbox = new InMemoryReplyInbox();
inbox.own("term_a");
MessageService messages = new MessageService(agents, injector, rendezvous, inbox);
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = new FleetHealthMonitor(agents,
() -> List.of(member("term_a", MemberSession.State.READY, 0, 0)), messages,
new ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor(1), () -> 1, 60, 600, messages::abandon);
String ticket = messages.sendAsync("term_a", "task that asks");
long deadline = System.currentTimeMillis() + 2000;
while (!rendezvous.isWaiting("term_a") && System.currentTimeMillis() < deadline) {
Thread.sleep(5);
}
assertTrue(rendezvous.isWaiting("term_a"), "the async send should have opened its waiter");
injector.onStatus("term_a", AgentStatus.IDLE); // deliver the task
injector.onStatus("term_a", AgentStatus.WORKING); // the worker picks it up
// The worker asks, with a short timeout so its own fleet_ask lapses quickly in test time.
CompletableFuture<MessageService.AskResult> ask = CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(
() -> messages.ask("term_a", "which config?", 200));
awaitPhase(messages, ticket, MessageService.Phase.ASKING);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.ASKING, messages.poll(ticket).phase(),
"the first sweep must not fail a ticket that is still genuinely being asked");
// The worker's own fleet_ask now lapses on its own — task.question clears to null.
assertEquals(MessageService.AskOutcome.TIMED_OUT, ask.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS).outcome());
// An unchanged tick still must not refire (CB-580).
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.PENDING, messages.poll(ticket).phase());
// The delayed recheck scheduled for the original transition finally sweeps it.
monitor.recheckTerminalTarget("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.FAILED, messages.poll(ticket).phase());
monitor.stop();
}
private static MessageService.TaskView awaitPhase(MessageService messages, String ticket,
MessageService.Phase phase) throws InterruptedException {
long deadline = System.currentTimeMillis() + 2000;
MessageService.TaskView view;
do {
view = messages.poll(ticket);
if (view.phase() == phase) {
return view;
}
Thread.sleep(5);
} while (System.currentTimeMillis() < deadline);
assertEquals(phase, view.phase());
return view;
}
}
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
import java.util.concurrent.CopyOnWriteArrayList;
/**
@@ -39,8 +40,12 @@ public final class FakeHerdr implements HerdrClient {
private final Map<String, List<String>> extraTabs = new LinkedHashMap<>();
private int agentNameTakenFor = 0;
private int agentPaneBusyFor = 0;
private String agentStartErrorCode = null;
private int workerTabPaneCount = 1;
private String paneCloseErrorCode = null;
private final Map<String, String> paneCloseErrorCodeFor = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
private String tabCloseErrorCode = null;
private final Map<String, String> tabCloseErrorCodeFor = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
private String agentSendErrorCode = null;
private boolean noPanes = false;
private volatile String agentStatus = "idle"; // steady-state agent.get status
@@ -80,18 +85,56 @@ public final class FakeHerdr implements HerdrClient {
return this;
}
/** Make every {@code agent.start} call fail with this herdr error code. */
public FakeHerdr agentStartFailsWith(String code) {
this.agentStartErrorCode = code;
return this;
}
/** Make the worker tab (w9:t2) report this many panes in {@code tab.list} (default 1). */
public FakeHerdr withWorkerTabPaneCount(int n) {
this.workerTabPaneCount = n;
return this;
}
/** Make {@code pane.close} fail with this herdr error code. */
/** Make {@code pane.close} fail with this herdr error code, for every pane. */
public FakeHerdr paneCloseFailsWith(String code) {
this.paneCloseErrorCode = code;
return this;
}
/**
* Make {@code pane.close} fail with this herdr error code, but only for the given {@code
* pane_id} — every other pane's {@code pane.close} still succeeds. Unlike {@link
* #paneCloseFailsWith}, which fails every call regardless of which pane it targets, this lets a
* test reap/release several sessions at once and make exactly one of them fail to stop, so the
* others' teardown can be asserted to proceed normally (fleetd #290).
*/
public FakeHerdr paneCloseFailsForPane(String paneId, String code) {
this.paneCloseErrorCodeFor.put(paneId, code);
return this;
}
/** Make {@code tab.close} fail with this herdr error code, for every tab. */
public FakeHerdr tabCloseFailsWith(String code) {
this.tabCloseErrorCode = code;
return this;
}
/**
* Make {@code tab.close} fail with this herdr error code, but only for the given {@code
* tab_id} — every other tab's {@code tab.close} still succeeds. The {@code tab.close}
* counterpart to {@link #paneCloseFailsForPane} (fleetd #290): lets a test make exactly one
* session's tab teardown fail while proving the rest of {@code stop()} — {@code
* releaseZdotdir}, and the caller's worktree removal — still runs (fleetd #293). Named "ForTab"
* rather than "ForPane" (unlike its sibling) because {@code tab.close} keys on {@code tab_id},
* not a pane id.
*/
public FakeHerdr tabCloseFailsForTab(String tabId, String code) {
this.tabCloseErrorCodeFor.put(tabId, code);
return this;
}
/**
* Make {@code pane.list} report no panes at all — models a second herdr daemon (CB-185) that
* simply does not host the pane a {@link PaneLocator} is searching for.
@@ -275,6 +318,10 @@ public final class FakeHerdr implements HerdrClient {
+ required + "`", "invalid_request", null);
}
}
if (agentStartErrorCode != null) {
throw new HerdrException("herdr error [" + agentStartErrorCode + "]: agent.start failed",
agentStartErrorCode, null);
}
long starts = calls.stream().filter(c -> c.method().equals("agent.start")).count();
if (starts <= agentPaneBusyFor) {
throw new HerdrException(
@@ -338,7 +385,17 @@ public final class FakeHerdr implements HerdrClient {
.formatted(workerTabPaneCount,
seeded.isEmpty() ? "" : "," + String.join(",", seeded)));
}
case "tab.close" -> mapper.readTree("{\"type\":\"ok\"}");
case "tab.close" -> {
Object tabIdParam = params instanceof Map<?, ?> m ? m.get("tab_id") : null;
String perTabCode = tabIdParam == null ? null
: tabCloseErrorCodeFor.get(String.valueOf(tabIdParam));
String code = perTabCode != null ? perTabCode : tabCloseErrorCode;
if (code != null) {
throw new HerdrException("herdr error [" + code + "]: tab.close failed",
code, null);
}
yield mapper.readTree("{\"type\":\"ok\"}");
}
case "pane.get" -> mapper.readTree("""
{"type":"pane_info","pane":{"pane_id":"w9:pW","workspace_id":"w9",
"tab_id":"w9:t2","agent_status":"idle"}}""");
@@ -360,9 +417,13 @@ public final class FakeHerdr implements HerdrClient {
"foreground_processes":[]}}""");
}
case "pane.close" -> {
if (paneCloseErrorCode != null) {
throw new HerdrException("herdr error [" + paneCloseErrorCode + "]: pane.close failed",
paneCloseErrorCode, null);
Object paneIdParam = params instanceof Map<?, ?> m ? m.get("pane_id") : null;
String perPaneCode = paneIdParam == null ? null
: paneCloseErrorCodeFor.get(String.valueOf(paneIdParam));
String code = perPaneCode != null ? perPaneCode : paneCloseErrorCode;
if (code != null) {
throw new HerdrException("herdr error [" + code + "]: pane.close failed",
code, null);
}
yield mapper.readTree("{\"type\":\"ok\"}");
}
@@ -804,7 +804,28 @@ class CompletionResolverTest {
// --- fleetd#201 Unit 1: target-keyed backend-error pattern + typed sink ----------------------
@Test
void aConfiguredBackendErrorPatternClassifiesAMatchAsAFailureAndNotifiesTheSinkOnce() {
void aNormalMemberReportMentioningTheFallbackErrorPatternFailsButDoesNotNotifyTheSink() {
String block = "⏺ I checked the retry path. An API Error: makes it back off.\n❯ ";
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText(block);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
java.util.List<String> notified = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
BackendErrorSink sink = (target, matchedLine, reason) -> notified.add(target + ": " + matchedLine);
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous,
ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none(), BackendErrorPatternLookup.legacy(), sink);
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.resolve("term_a", new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null));
assertEquals(Rendezvous.Kind.FAILED, waiter.getNow(null).kind(),
"a scrape mentioning the pattern must still fail the send");
assertTrue(waiter.getNow(null).text().contains("I checked the retry path. An API Error: makes it back off."),
"the failure must keep the whole pane tail");
assertTrue(notified.isEmpty(),
"a normal report mentioning the fallback pattern must not record a credential failure");
}
@Test
void aConfiguredBackendErrorPatternAtTheStartOfALineClassifiesAMatchAndNotifiesTheSinkOnce() {
String block = "⏺ 503 Service Unavailable: upstream credential rejected\n❯ ";
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText(block);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
@@ -924,7 +945,7 @@ class CompletionResolverTest {
}
@Test
void aConfiguredPatternAlsoClassifiesTheRawScrapeFallbackAndNotifiesTheSink() {
void aConfiguredPatternAtTheStartOfALineAlsoClassifiesTheRawScrapeFallbackAndNotifiesTheSink() {
// No ⏺ marker and leading TUI chrome ⇒ lastAssistantBlock() yields "", so classification must
// fall back to the raw scrape (fleetd#211) — and it must use the configured pattern too.
String block = """
@@ -949,6 +970,40 @@ class CompletionResolverTest {
assertTrue(notified.get(0).contains("503 Service Unavailable"), notified.get(0));
}
/**
* fleetd #339 follow-up: a genuine backend error rendered behind terminal chrome must still
* record the credential outage. #339 added a start-of-line check to stop a member's own prose
* being counted as an outage, and a bare {@code lookingAt} also rejected this — the send failed
* but the sink never fired. #339's invariant 3 named that direction as the worse one: a real
* outage going unrecorded leaves the fleet spawning into a dead credential.
*
* <p>The raw-scrape path is where this matters, because its own comment says to expect leading
* TUI chrome there.
*/
@Test
void aRealErrorBehindTerminalChromeStillNotifiesTheSink() {
String block = """
╭──────────────────────────────────────╮
│ 503 Service Unavailable: upstream credential rejected
""";
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText(block);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
BackendErrorPatternLookup patterns = target -> Pattern.compile("(?i)503 Service Unavailable");
java.util.List<String> notified = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
BackendErrorSink sink = (target, matchedLine, reason) -> notified.add(target + ": " + matchedLine);
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous,
ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none(), patterns, sink);
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.resolve("term_a", new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null));
assertEquals(Rendezvous.Kind.FAILED, waiter.getNow(null).kind(),
"a real backend error must still fail the send");
assertEquals(1, notified.size(),
"a real error line behind box chrome is still a real outage — it must reach the sink, "
+ "or the fleet keeps spawning into a dead credential");
}
// --- fleetd#201 Unit 1: classification inside the fleetd#164 MIN_TURN_NANOS floor -------------
@Test
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ class InjectorTest {
@Test
void deliversWhenIdle() {
CompletableFuture<Void> f = injector.enqueue(T, "hello", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
CompletableFuture<Void> f = injector.enqueue(T, "hello", TestTurnTokens.inert(T)).completion();
assertFalse(f.isDone(), "not delivered until an injectable status arrives");
injector.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
assertTrue(f.isDone());
@@ -170,6 +170,32 @@ class InjectorTest {
assertEquals(List.of("a", "b", "c"), sent());
}
@Test
void cancellingTheMiddleDeliveryKeepsTheFollowingDeliveryReachable() {
Injector.Delivery first = injector.enqueue(T, "same text", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
Injector.Delivery cancelled = injector.enqueue(T, "same text", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
injector.enqueue(T, "after cancelled", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
assertEquals(Injector.Cancellation.CANCELLED, injector.cancel(cancelled));
injector.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
injector.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.WORKING);
injector.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
assertEquals(List.of("same text", "after cancelled"), sent(),
"cancellation must match the exact Delivery and preserve the remaining FIFO queue");
assertTrue(first.completion().isDone());
}
@Test
void cancellationReportsDeliveredWhenPickupWonTheRace() {
Injector.Delivery delivery = injector.enqueue(T, "already sent", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
injector.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
assertEquals(Injector.Cancellation.DELIVERED, injector.cancel(delivery),
"a cancellation after pickup must not claim that the text stayed queued");
assertEquals(List.of("already sent"), sent());
}
@Test
void activeWhileQueuedOrInFlightThenQuietAfterTurnCompletes() {
assertTrue(injector.activeTargets().isEmpty());
@@ -297,6 +323,68 @@ class InjectorTest {
assertTrue(inj.activeTargets().isEmpty(), "the wedged target is reclaimed, not polled forever");
}
/** A listener whose post-turn housekeeping always starts, as SessionManager's does with clearAfterTurn on. */
private static final class PostTurnListener implements TurnListener {
@Override public void onTurnComplete(String target) { }
@Override public boolean hasPostTurnAction(String target) { return true; }
@Override public boolean onTurnCompleteWithPostAction(String target) { return true; }
}
@Test
void aWorkerThatWedgesInUnknownAwaitingPostTurnPickupIsReleased() {
// fleetd #306: the post-turn phase had no way out of a sustained unknown streak, so the
// pickup latch stayed set, the target was polled forever, and every later message to it was
// blocked by the delivery gate — while the session still looked healthy.
Captor cap = new Captor();
Injector inj = new Injector(new AgentControl(herdr), new PostTurnListener());
inj.enqueue(T, "task", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE); // deliver
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.WORKING); // turn starts
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE); // turn completes; housekeeping dispatched
for (int i = 0; i < STALL_SAMPLES; i++) inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.UNKNOWN); // then wedges
assertTrue(inj.activeTargets().isEmpty(),
"a target wedged awaiting post-turn pickup must be reclaimed, not polled forever");
assertEquals(List.of(), cap.failed,
"the delegated turn already completed — a stuck /clear must not be reported as a failed turn");
}
@Test
void aWorkerThatWedgesInUnknownAfterPickingUpTheResetIsReleased() {
// The sibling latch. postTurnObserved is set when the reset is seen picked up (WORKING) and
// is cleared only on a later injectable sample, so a wedge right after pickup sticks too.
Captor cap = new Captor();
Injector inj = new Injector(new AgentControl(herdr), new PostTurnListener());
inj.enqueue(T, "task", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.WORKING);
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE); // turn complete; reset dispatched
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.WORKING); // reset picked up -> postTurnObserved
for (int i = 0; i < STALL_SAMPLES; i++) inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.UNKNOWN);
assertTrue(inj.activeTargets().isEmpty(), "a wedge after reset pickup must also be reclaimed");
assertEquals(List.of(), cap.failed, "still not a turn failure");
}
@Test
void aBriefUnknownDuringPostTurnHousekeepingDoesNotDropTheLatch() {
// The other direction: the escape must not fire on a glitch, or the queued next delegation
// would overtake housekeeping that is still running.
Injector inj = new Injector(new AgentControl(herdr), new PostTurnListener());
inj.enqueue(T, "first", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
inj.enqueue(T, "second", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.WORKING);
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE); // first completes; reset dispatched
for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++) inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.UNKNOWN); // well under the grace
assertFalse(inj.activeTargets().isEmpty(), "a brief glitch must not release the post-turn latch");
assertEquals(List.of("first"), sent(), "the queued delegation must not overtake housekeeping");
}
@Test
void aTransientUnknownGlitchNeitherFailsNorBlocksCompletion() {
Captor cap = new Captor();
@@ -316,7 +404,7 @@ class InjectorTest {
void sendFailureDropsMessageAndFailsItsFuture() {
FakeHerdr failing = new FakeHerdr().agentSendFailsWith("send_failed");
Injector inj = new Injector(new AgentControl(failing));
CompletableFuture<Void> f = inj.enqueue(T, "boom", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
CompletableFuture<Void> f = inj.enqueue(T, "boom", TestTurnTokens.inert(T)).completion();
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
assertTrue(f.isCompletedExceptionally());
@@ -325,7 +413,7 @@ class InjectorTest {
@Test
void dropFailsPendingWaiters() {
CompletableFuture<Void> f = injector.enqueue(T, "orphan", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
CompletableFuture<Void> f = injector.enqueue(T, "orphan", TestTurnTokens.inert(T)).completion();
injector.drop(T, new HerdrException("worker gone", "pane_not_found", null));
assertTrue(f.isCompletedExceptionally(), "queued waiters unblock when the worker vanishes");
}
@@ -334,8 +422,8 @@ class InjectorTest {
void dropPassesTheRealCauseForQueuedAndDeliveredWork() {
Captor cap = new Captor();
Injector inj = new Injector(new AgentControl(herdr), cap);
CompletableFuture<Void> delivered = inj.enqueue(T, "delivered", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
CompletableFuture<Void> queued = inj.enqueue(T, "queued", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
CompletableFuture<Void> delivered = inj.enqueue(T, "delivered", TestTurnTokens.inert(T)).completion();
CompletableFuture<Void> queued = inj.enqueue(T, "queued", TestTurnTokens.inert(T)).completion();
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE); // deliver the first message
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.WORKING); // its turn is now in flight; one remains queued
@@ -387,7 +475,7 @@ class InjectorTest {
Captor cap = new Captor();
List<String> forgotten = new ArrayList<>();
Injector inj = new Injector(new AgentControl(herdr), cap, _ -> false, forgotten::add);
CompletableFuture<Void> f = inj.enqueue(T, "task", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
CompletableFuture<Void> f = inj.enqueue(T, "task", TestTurnTokens.inert(T)).completion();
for (int i = 0; i < READINESS_SAMPLES; i++) inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
@@ -501,7 +589,7 @@ class InjectorTest {
StatusPoller poller = new StatusPoller(new AgentControl(idle), inj, 10);
poller.start();
try {
CompletableFuture<Void> delivered = inj.enqueue(T, "via-poller", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
CompletableFuture<Void> delivered = inj.enqueue(T, "via-poller", TestTurnTokens.inert(T)).completion();
delivered.get(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS); // completes when the poller drives the send
} finally {
poller.stop();
@@ -520,7 +608,7 @@ class InjectorTest {
void deliveredFutureCarriesSendFailure() {
FakeHerdr failing = new FakeHerdr().agentSendFailsWith("send_failed");
Injector inj = new Injector(new AgentControl(failing));
CompletableFuture<Void> f = inj.enqueue(T, "boom", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
CompletableFuture<Void> f = inj.enqueue(T, "boom", TestTurnTokens.inert(T)).completion();
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
ExecutionException ex = assertThrows(ExecutionException.class, f::get);
assertInstanceOf(HerdrException.class, ex.getCause());
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ class StatusPollerRoutingTest {
poller.start();
try {
CompletableFuture<Void> delivered =
injector.enqueue(LEAD_TARGET, "via-poller", TestTurnTokens.inert(LEAD_TARGET));
injector.enqueue(LEAD_TARGET, "via-poller", TestTurnTokens.inert(LEAD_TARGET)).completion();
// Must resolve quickly: refining against the WRONG daemon (member) never classifies
// out of UNKNOWN, so this would time out under the bug.
delivered.get(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ class StatusPollerRoutingTest {
poller.start();
try {
CompletableFuture<Void> delivered =
injector.enqueue(LEAD_TARGET, "via-poller", TestTurnTokens.inert(LEAD_TARGET));
injector.enqueue(LEAD_TARGET, "via-poller", TestTurnTokens.inert(LEAD_TARGET)).completion();
assertThrows(TimeoutException.class, () -> delivered.get(500, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS),
"a lead target must never be refined from the member daemon's pane content");
} finally {
@@ -20,6 +20,17 @@ class ConnectionIdentityTest {
assertEquals("term_a", with(_ -> FakeHerdr.WORKER_PID).callerTerminal("127.0.0.1", 55555));
}
@Test
void resolvesWorkerFromAnyLoopbackSourceAddressNotJust127001() {
// fleetd #305. On Linux the whole 127.0.0.0/8 is bound to lo, so a worker can connect with
// a source address of 127.0.0.2. If identity resolution skips that address the caller has
// no terminal, and a caller with no terminal is the primary under loopback-trust — so this
// must resolve the worker, not null.
assertEquals("term_a", with(_ -> FakeHerdr.WORKER_PID).callerTerminal("127.0.0.2", 55555));
assertEquals("term_a", with(_ -> FakeHerdr.WORKER_PID).callerTerminal("127.1.2.3", 55555));
assertEquals("term_a", with(_ -> FakeHerdr.WORKER_PID).callerTerminal("::ffff:127.0.0.2", 55555));
}
@Test
void nullForOffHostCaller() {
// A non-loopback peer can't be an on-host worker → treat as primary/unknown.
@@ -32,6 +43,22 @@ class ConnectionIdentityTest {
assertNull(with(_ -> 999_999).callerTerminal("127.0.0.1", 55555));
}
@Test
void callerIsUnresolvedWhenThePeerPidLookupFails() {
// fleetd #317: LsofPeerPidLookup returns -1 on any failure — a fork error, or (silently)
// simply no matching lsof line. Caller.resolved() is the one place that sentinel is tested.
ConnectionIdentity.Caller c = with(_ -> -1).resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555);
assertFalse(c.resolved(), "a -1 pid means the lookup failed, not that this pid owns no pane");
}
@Test
void callerIsResolvedWhenThePidIsRealEvenThoughItOwnsNoPane() {
// The primary's own connection: a real, lsof-found pid that just isn't a worker pane. This
// must read as "resolved" — the distinction #317 turns on.
ConnectionIdentity.Caller c = with(_ -> 999_999).resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555);
assertTrue(c.resolved());
}
@Test
void resolvesTheCallersPidAndCwd() {
// CB-112: the primary maps to no pane, but its PID and cwd are still readable.
@@ -24,8 +24,13 @@ import io.modelcontextprotocol.spec.McpSchema;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
@@ -44,6 +49,9 @@ import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
*/
class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
private static final Path MCP_SOURCE = Path.of("src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/mcp/FleetMcp.java");
private static final Pattern TOOL_REGISTRATION = Pattern.compile("tool\\(\\\"(fleet_[a-z_]+)\\\"");
private final FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
private final AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
private Metrics metrics;
@@ -201,6 +209,42 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
"a blank target is an absent target");
}
@Test
void everyRegisteredToolHasItsHandlerActionPinned() {
Set<String> registered = toolsTheServerRegisters();
assertTrue(registered.size() >= 10,
"scraped only " + registered.size() + " tool registrations from FleetMcp (" + registered
+ "); the server registers eleven, so the tool(\"…\") scrape has stopped matching");
registered.forEach(tool -> assertDoesNotThrow(() -> FleetMcp.toolAction(tool, Map.of()),
() -> tool + " is registered but has no pinned authorization action"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.SEND, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_send", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.REPLY, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_reply", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.ASK, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_ask", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_status", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_ack", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.SPAWN, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_spawn", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_list", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.STOP, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_stop", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_profiles", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_whoami", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_poll", Map.of("ticket", "task")));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_poll", Map.of("target", "term_b")));
}
private static Set<String> toolsTheServerRegisters() {
try {
Matcher matcher = TOOL_REGISTRATION.matcher(Files.readString(MCP_SOURCE));
Set<String> tools = new LinkedHashSet<>();
while (matcher.find()) {
tools.add(matcher.group(1));
}
return tools;
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new AssertionError("could not scrape FleetMcp tool registrations", e);
}
}
@Test
void aWorkerMayNotDrainAnotherSessionsInboxByPolling() {
FleetMcp m = mcp(true);
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.EnumSet;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.CompletableFuture;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
@@ -188,7 +189,7 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
}
@Test
void unansweredAsyncAskReturnsTheTicketToPending() throws Exception {
void unansweredAsyncAskReturnsTheTicketToPendingThenAWorkersLateReplyStillCompletesIt() throws Exception {
McpSchema.CallToolResult accepted = FleetMcp.sendAsync(messages, "term_a", "do it", null, Set.of());
String ticket = textOf(accepted).substring(textOf(accepted).indexOf("ticket=") + "ticket=".length()).trim();
@@ -202,8 +203,15 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
assertTrue(textOf(ask).contains("no answer"), textOf(ask));
assertTrue(textOf(FleetMcp.poll(messages, ticket, null)).startsWith("[pending"));
// fleetd #307: the worker resumed on its own after the primary never answered, and its real
// fleet_reply must complete its OWN async ticket — not strand in the inbox with
// fleet_poll{ticket} stuck PENDING forever and later force-failed with a false "session
// released before it replied" reason. This used to land in the inbox instead (see the old
// assertion this replaced: messages.drainReplies("term_a").getFirst()...) — that was the bug.
FleetMcp.reply(messages, "term_a", "finished after timeout");
assertEquals("finished after timeout", messages.drainReplies("term_a").getFirst().content());
assertEquals("finished after timeout", textOf(FleetMcp.poll(messages, ticket, null)));
assertTrue(messages.drainReplies("term_a").isEmpty(),
"the reply completed its own ticket directly and never touched the inbox");
}
@Test
@@ -325,6 +333,26 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
assertEquals("orphan", drained.getFirst().content());
}
@Test
void replyWithBlankContentIsACleanToolErrorNotAnUncaughtException() {
// fleetd #302: MessageService.reply now REJECTS blank content by throwing. fleet_reply's
// handler is a bare BiFunction with no try/catch around it, so if this guard only checked
// `== null` (as it did), a whitespace-only reply would leave the handler as an uncaught
// IllegalArgumentException instead of a tool error the caller can read. Null and whitespace
// are the same caller mistake and must get the same answer — the sibling fleet_send guard
// has always used isBlank for exactly this reason.
for (String blank : new String[] {null, "", " ", "\n\t"}) {
McpSchema.CallToolResult res = assertDoesNotThrow(
() -> FleetMcp.reply(messages, "term_a", blank),
"blank content must be refused as a tool error, never thrown out of the handler");
assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, res.isError(), "blank content is an error result");
assertTrue(textOf(res).contains("content is required"),
"the error names the missing argument: " + textOf(res));
}
assertEquals(0, messages.drainReplies("term_a").size(),
"a refused reply must not reach the inbox");
}
@Test
void bridgePollWithTargetDrainsReplies() {
// A reply with no open send queues it in the inbox.
@@ -604,6 +632,60 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
assertTrue(out.contains("\"reclaimable\":0"), out);
}
/**
* fleetd #284: {@code reclaimable} has exactly one definition, and this pins it over EVERY
* {@link MemberSession.State} — so a state added later cannot slip through unconsidered. Both
* views in a {@code fleet_list} response call {@link FleetMcp#reclaimable}, so they cannot
* drift apart.
*
* <p>{@code BACKEND_ERROR} and {@code FAILED} are NOT reclaimable on purpose. The ticket asked
* for them to be; that half of the ticket was wrong. Their seat is already out of
* {@code live}, so it is already in {@code free} — counting it here too would report the same
* seat twice.
*/
@Test
void onlyReadyAndDoneSessionsAreReclaimable() {
Set<MemberSession.State> expected = EnumSet.of(MemberSession.State.READY, MemberSession.State.DONE);
for (MemberSession.State state : MemberSession.State.values()) {
MemberSession session = new MemberSession("p1", "term1", "ltms-local", null,
"/tmp", null, 0L, 0L, 0, state, null, null);
assertEquals(expected.contains(state), FleetMcp.reclaimable(session, null),
"state " + state + " must " + (expected.contains(state) ? "" : "not ")
+ "count as reclaimable");
}
}
/**
* fleetd #284, the operator-visible half. {@code liveCount} here is the value the real counter
* ({@code Fleetd.liveSessionCount}, proven against the actual spawn gate in
* {@code FleetdBackendErrorSinkTest}) produces for this roster: 0, because both sessions are
* terminal. What this test pins is what {@code fleet_list} says around it — the two seats show
* up once, in {@code free}, and are NOT counted a second time as {@code reclaimable}; neither
* is any member row; and both dead sessions are still listed so the lead can see why.
*/
@Test
void terminalFailureSessionsFreeTheirSeatWithoutBeingCountedReclaimable() {
FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workerService(h, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw")));
MemberSession backendError = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, null, null);
MemberSession failed = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, null, null);
assertTrue(sessions.onBackendError(backendError.terminalId(), "backend exited"));
sessions.onTurnFailed(failed.terminalId());
String out = textOf(FleetMcp.listFleet(workerService(h, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw")),
sessions, null, new FleetMcp.CapacitySource(profile -> 0, profile -> 2,
() -> Set.of("ltms-local"), () -> 0), new FleetMcp.HealthCoverageSource(() -> "off"),
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource.none(), Map.of(), ""));
assertTrue(out.contains("\"free\":2"), "both seats are back: " + out);
assertTrue(out.contains("\"reclaimable\":0"),
"the freed seats must not be counted a second time as reclaimable: " + out);
assertFalse(out.contains("\"reclaimable\":true"),
"no member row may claim a seat the profile count says is not held: " + out);
assertTrue(out.contains("\"state\":\"backend_error\""), "the dead session stays visible: " + out);
assertTrue(out.contains("\"state\":\"failed\""), "the failed session stays visible: " + out);
}
@Test
void inertCapacitySourceOmitsCapacityBlock() {
FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -925,6 +925,71 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
assertTrue(herdr.called("pane.close"), "stop via handle.id() must close the pane");
}
/** A tab-placement launcher with {@code memberCredentials policy=allow-list} under a zsh shell — the
* combination that makes {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#spawn} generate a real ZDOTDIR, so {@code
* releaseZdotdir}'s effect (the directory's deletion) is observable from a test. */
private ClaudeCodeLauncher serviceWithAllowList(FakeHerdr herdr) {
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
List.of("ccs", "ltms-local"), "tab", "fleetd-workers",
"worker: {profile} #{n}", null, null, null);
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> creds = () -> new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(
FleetConfig.MemberCredentials.POLICY_ALLOW_LIST, List.of(), List.of(), null);
Function<String, String> env = name -> "SHELL".equals(name) ? "/bin/zsh" : null;
return new ClaudeCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(),
env, 0, System::currentTimeMillis, () -> { }, null, creds);
}
/**
* fleetd #293: {@code stop()} used to run {@code spaces.closeTab} bare — any non-{@code
* *_not_found} herdr error propagated straight out of {@code stop()}, skipping {@code
* releaseZdotdir} entirely (the pane was already closed by that point, so the tab-close failure
* is cosmetic, not a real teardown failure). Proves both halves of the fix: {@code stop()} no
* longer throws for this failure, and {@code releaseZdotdir} still runs — observed here by the
* generated ZDOTDIR actually being deleted, since {@code releaseZdotdir}'s last line is {@code
* EnvAllowListScrub.deleteRecursively(dir)}.
*/
@Test
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
void stopStillReleasesZdotdirWhenCloseTabFailsWithANonNotFoundCode() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
ClaudeCodeLauncher svc = serviceWithAllowList(herdr);
PeerHandle handle = svc.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null));
Map<String, Object> tabCreateParams = (Map<String, Object>) herdr.lastCall("tab.create").params();
Map<String, String> tabEnv = (Map<String, String>) tabCreateParams.get("env");
String zdotdir = tabEnv.get("ZDOTDIR");
assertNotNull(zdotdir, "policy=allow-list under a zsh shell must have generated a ZDOTDIR: " + tabEnv);
Path dir = Path.of(zdotdir);
assertTrue(Files.isDirectory(dir), "the generated ZDOTDIR must exist before stop(): " + dir);
herdr.tabCloseFailsForTab("w9:t2", "internal_error");
Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(HerdrPeerLauncher.class);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.start();
logger.addAppender(appender);
try {
assertDoesNotThrow(() -> svc.stop(handle.id()),
"fleetd #293: a failing tab.close is cosmetic — it must not propagate out of stop()");
} finally {
logger.detachAppender(appender);
}
assertTrue(herdr.called("tab.close"), "tab.close was still attempted");
assertFalse(Files.exists(dir),
"releaseZdotdir must still run and delete the generated ZDOTDIR despite the tab.close "
+ "failure: " + dir);
String warn = appender.list.stream()
.filter(e -> e.getLevel().equals(Level.WARN))
.map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage)
.filter(m -> m.contains("tab.close") && m.contains("w9:t2"))
.findFirst()
.orElse(null);
assertNotNull(warn, "the failing tab.close must be logged at WARN naming the tab id — a "
+ "silently swallowed failure with no message is not an improvement. Log lines: "
+ appender.list.stream().map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage).toList());
}
// --- CB-519: host-unique id, decoupled from the pane coordinate ------------------------------
@Test
@@ -1100,7 +1165,8 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void spawnLetsAnUnrelatedHerdrErrorPropagateUnchanged() {
// Fix 1 must only special-case a "*_not_found" answer. Any other herdr failure keeps
// propagating as-is — this gate does not know how to recover from it.
// propagating as-is — this gate does not know how to recover from it. The pane still needs
// closing because spawn throws before it can return the pane id to a caller that could stop it.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
herdr.agentStatus("unknown");
herdr.agentGetFailsWithAfter(0, "internal_error");
@@ -1117,8 +1183,27 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
() -> svc.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null)));
assertEquals("internal_error", ex.code());
assertEquals(0, paneCloseCount(herdr, "w9:pRoot_1"),
"an error this gate does not recognize is not this gate's teardown to run");
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCount(herdr, "w9:pRoot_1"),
"the unchanged error leaves spawn without a pane id, so this gate closes its orphaned pane");
}
@Test
void panePlacementClosesTheSplitPaneWhenAgentStartFails() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().agentStartFailsWith("internal_error");
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
List.of("claude"), "pane", "fleetd-workers", "w #{n}", null, null, null);
ClaudeCodeLauncher svc = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(
new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(), _ -> null);
dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.HerdrException ex = assertThrows(
dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.HerdrException.class,
() -> svc.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null)));
assertEquals("internal_error", ex.code(), "agent.start failure propagates unchanged");
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCount(herdr, "w1:pSplit"),
"the pane split for a peer that never starts is closed instead of left orphaned");
}
// --- fleetd #176 fix 2: corroborated UNKNOWN refinement --------------------------------------
@@ -2742,4 +2827,126 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
"a WARN naming the cwd must fire when the profile sets no configDir: "
+ appender.list.stream().map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage).toList());
}
// --- fleetd #285: seedTrustDialog under memberHerdrSocket --------------------------------------
//
// seedTrustDialog gated only on isProvisionedWorktree(cwd) and, being static, could not see
// memberHerdrSocketConfigured() at all — unlike its sibling writeCharterFile one method below,
// which already refuses the spawn when it cannot place the charter where a different-uid member
// can read it. Under memberHerdrSocket + configDir unset, seedTrustDialog wrote fleetd's OWN
// ~/.claude.json (the operator's real file) while believing it was seeding the member's. The fix
// makes the method an instance method so it can see memberHerdrSocketConfigured(), and applies
// the same "refuse, don't silently write somewhere wrong" rule writeCharterFile already uses.
@Test
void seedTrustDialogUnderMemberHerdrSocketSharesTheFileWithTheConfiguredGroup(
@TempDir Path configDir, @TempDir Path worktree, @TempDir Path worktreeRoot) throws Exception {
markAsProvisionedWorktree(worktree);
String group = currentUserGroup();
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
// trustProfile always sets a bridge mcpUrl, so a reply charter is generated too, which
// means writeCharterFile ALSO runs under memberHerdrSocket and needs its own worktreeRoot —
// pass one so this test isolates the trust-seed behaviour instead of tripping that refusal.
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = trustProfile(configDir.toString(), worktree.toString());
serviceWithConfig(herdr, cfg, () -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket(worktreeRoot.toString(), group)).spawn();
Path claudeJson = configDir.resolve(".claude.json");
assertTrue(Files.exists(claudeJson), "still seeded into <configDir>/.claude.json under memberHerdrSocket");
JsonNode project = new ObjectMapper().readTree(claudeJson.toFile())
.path("projects").path(worktree.toString());
assertTrue(project.path("hasTrustDialogAccepted").asBoolean(false));
assertEquals("rw-r-----", PosixFilePermissions.toString(Files.getPosixFilePermissions(claudeJson)),
"under memberHerdrSocket the file must be shared group-readable, mirroring the "
+ "charter file's own per-file mode (fleetd #222) — a 0600 file (Claude "
+ "Code's own default) is unreadable by the member's different OS user");
String actualGroup = Files.getFileAttributeView(claudeJson, PosixFileAttributeView.class)
.readAttributes().group().getName();
assertEquals(group, actualGroup, "the file must be chgrp'd to the configured worktreeGroup");
}
/**
* The bug itself: {@code memberHerdrSocket} configured, {@code configDir} unset. Before the fix
* this wrote fleetd's own default {@code ~/.claude.json} (here redirected to {@code fakeHome} so
* a reintroduced bug still cannot touch the real operator file); after the fix it must refuse the
* spawn instead, naming {@code configDir} as the missing key, before the member is ever started.
*/
@Test
void seedTrustDialogUnderMemberHerdrSocketRefusesWhenConfigDirUnset(
@TempDir Path fakeHome, @TempDir Path worktree) throws Exception {
markAsProvisionedWorktree(worktree);
String originalHome = System.getProperty("user.home");
System.setProperty("user.home", fakeHome.toString());
try {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = trustProfile(null, worktree.toString());
ClaudeCodeLauncher launcher = serviceWithConfig(herdr, cfg,
() -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket(null, "some-group"));
IllegalStateException ex = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, launcher::spawn,
"memberHerdrSocket + no configDir must refuse the spawn, not write fleetd's own "
+ "default ~/.claude.json");
assertTrue(ex.getMessage().contains("configDir"),
"the refusal must name the missing config key — got: " + ex.getMessage());
assertFalse(Files.exists(fakeHome.resolve(".claude.json")),
"nothing may be written to fleetd's own default home — this is the exact fleetd "
+ "#285 defect: writing the operator's own home instead of the member's");
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.start"),
"the spawn must be refused BEFORE the member is ever started — got calls: " + herdr.calls);
} finally {
System.setProperty("user.home", originalHome);
}
}
/**
* {@code configDir} alone is not enough — without {@code worktreeGroup} the file fleetd writes
* stays {@code 0600} and the member's different OS user still cannot read it, so this must also
* refuse, naming {@code worktreeGroup} this time.
*/
@Test
void seedTrustDialogUnderMemberHerdrSocketRefusesWhenWorktreeGroupUnset(
@TempDir Path configDir, @TempDir Path worktree) throws Exception {
markAsProvisionedWorktree(worktree);
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = trustProfile(configDir.toString(), worktree.toString());
ClaudeCodeLauncher launcher = serviceWithConfig(herdr, cfg,
() -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket(null, null));
IllegalStateException ex = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, launcher::spawn,
"memberHerdrSocket + no worktreeGroup must refuse the spawn, not write an unreadable file");
assertTrue(ex.getMessage().contains("worktreeGroup"),
"configDir alone is not enough — got: " + ex.getMessage());
assertFalse(Files.exists(configDir.resolve(".claude.json")),
"nothing may be written when the file cannot be shared with the member's group");
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.start"),
"the spawn must be refused BEFORE the member is ever started");
}
/**
* Regression proof: with {@code memberHerdrSocket} ABSENT — even given a LIVE, non-null {@code
* config} supplier (not merely {@code config == null}, which every other seedTrustDialog test in
* this file already exercises) — the write must stay byte-identical to before this fix: existing
* {@code 0600} permissions preserved, no chgrp/chmod attempted. This is the proof the ticket asks
* for: the path the whole live fleet uses today is unchanged by this fix.
*/
@Test
void seedTrustDialogPreservesExisting0600PermissionsWhenMemberHerdrSocketAbsentEvenWithALiveConfigSupplier(
@TempDir Path configDir, @TempDir Path worktree) throws Exception {
markAsProvisionedWorktree(worktree);
Path claudeJson = configDir.resolve(".claude.json");
Files.writeString(claudeJson, "{}");
assumeTrue(Files.getFileAttributeView(claudeJson, PosixFileAttributeView.class) != null,
"no POSIX permissions on this filesystem — skipping rather than failing");
Files.setPosixFilePermissions(claudeJson, PosixFilePermissions.fromString("rw-------"));
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = trustProfile(configDir.toString(), worktree.toString());
FleetConfig config = new FleetConfig(null, null, null, Map.of(), null, null, null, null, null,
null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null).withDefaults();
serviceWithConfig(herdr, cfg, () -> config).spawn();
assertEquals("rw-------", PosixFilePermissions.toString(Files.getPosixFilePermissions(claudeJson)),
"with memberHerdrSocket absent — even given a live config supplier — the seed must "
+ "stay byte-identical to before this fix: no chgrp/chmod attempted");
}
}
@@ -615,6 +615,67 @@ class CompositePeerLauncherTest {
assertEquals(1, adapter.spawnCount("b"));
}
/**
* fleetd #315: {@code CompositePeerLauncher.spawn} rebuilds the {@link PlacementContext} after
* every failed attempt "so the policy excludes this profile" (see the comment at the retry call
* site) — but {@code FixedPlacementPolicy} never read {@code ctx.unreachable()}, so under the
* default {@code fixed} placement every retry re-picked the same dead default and a second,
* healthy, configured profile was never tried. This is the same scenario as
* {@link #failoverRetriesNextCandidateWhenProfileIsUnreachable}, but pinned to {@code fixed()}
* instead of {@code weighted()} — the three existing failover tests all use {@code weighted()},
* which is exactly why nobody caught this: the retry loop's contract has no coverage under its
* own default policy.
*/
@Test
void failoverRetriesNextCandidateUnderFixedPlacementWhenProfileIsUnreachable() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles = ordered(
"a", stubWorker("a"),
"b", stubWorker("b"));
StubLauncher adapter = new StubLauncher("claude", herdr, profiles, "a", Set.of("a"));
CompositePeerLauncher composite = new CompositePeerLauncher(
List.of(adapter), "a", profiles, PlacementPolicies.fixed(), _ -> 0);
PeerHandle h = composite.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null));
assertEquals("b", h.profile(),
"fixed placement must fail over from the unreachable default a to the healthy b");
assertEquals(1, adapter.spawnCount("a"), "a was tried once and failed");
assertEquals(1, adapter.spawnCount("b"), "b was tried once and succeeded");
}
/**
* fleetd #315: the same fix — {@code FixedPlacementPolicy} consulting {@code ctx.unreachable()}
* — also covers the wiring-bug branch in {@code CompositePeerLauncher.spawn}: a profile that
* placement is allowed to choose (it is in the configured candidate list) but that no delegate
* declares ({@code byProfile.get(chosen.profile()) == null}). That branch adds the profile to
* {@code unreachable} and {@code continue}s without ever calling a launcher, so before this fix
* {@code fixed} handed back the same adapterless profile on every remaining attempt too.
*/
@Test
void failoverSkipsAConfiguredProfileNoAdapterDeclaresUnderFixedPlacement() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
// Placement's candidate list has three profiles, in this order (LinkedHashMap preserves it,
// and the fixed default resolves to the first — see the `ordered` helper's own javadoc).
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles = new LinkedHashMap<>();
profiles.put("c", stubWorker("c"));
profiles.put("a", stubWorker("a"));
profiles.put("b", stubWorker("b"));
// The adapter only declares a and b — c is a configured profile with no owning adapter,
// the "wiring bug" the comment in CompositePeerLauncher.spawn calls out.
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> adapterProfiles = new LinkedHashMap<>();
adapterProfiles.put("a", stubWorker("a"));
adapterProfiles.put("b", stubWorker("b"));
StubLauncher adapter = new StubLauncher("claude", herdr, adapterProfiles, "a", Set.of());
CompositePeerLauncher composite = new CompositePeerLauncher(
List.of(adapter), "a", profiles, PlacementPolicies.fixed(), _ -> 0);
PeerHandle h = composite.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null));
assertEquals("a", h.profile(),
"c has no adapter, so fixed placement must skip it and land on the next candidate, a");
assertEquals(0, adapter.spawnCount("c"), "c is never spawned — no adapter owns it");
assertEquals(1, adapter.spawnCount("a"));
}
@Test
void explicitSpawnAtMaxLoadThrowsPlacementExceptionNamingProfileLiveAndCap() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicReference;
import java.util.function.Function;
import java.util.function.Supplier;
@@ -370,6 +371,161 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
"expected the pre-existing 'scrub blanks them' INFO unchanged, got: " + messages);
}
/**
* fleetd #341: {@code unprotectedGapLogged} guarded TWO WARN branches that name DIFFERENT env
* var names — the allow-list branch ({@code keptByDerivedList}, below) and the deny-by-default
* / non-zsh-fallback branch ({@link HerdrPeerLauncher#warnGapUnprotected}). {@code
* memberCredentials} is a live, re-read-per-spawn supplier, so the policy can change between
* two spawns on the same launcher instance — a config reload needs no restart. Spawn 1 runs
* under {@code deny-by-default} with a gap of {@code SPAWN_ONE_UNCOVERED_TOKEN}, which trips
* the (before this fix) SHARED one-shot flag. The policy is then reloaded to {@code
* allow-list}; spawn 2's gap is {@code FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN} instead — the test profile's own
* {@code tokenEnv}, which the derived allow-list keeps even though it is on neither {@code
* known:} nor {@code allow:}, so it is genuinely unprotected and deserves its own WARN. Before
* this fix that WARN never fires, because the shared flag was already {@code true} — the
* operator is never told {@code FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN} reaches every member pane unblocked. Real
* path: two real {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#spawn} calls on ONE launcher instance, with mutable
* {@code memberCredentials}/host-env suppliers standing in for a live config reload between
* spawns.
*/
@Test
void aDifferentUnprotectedGapOnALaterSpawnIsNotSuppressedByAnEarlierSpawnsWarn() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
AtomicReference<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> credsState = new AtomicReference<>(
new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(null, List.of(), List.of(), null)); // deny-by-default
AtomicReference<Set<String>> hostEnvState =
new AtomicReference<>(Set.of("SPAWN_ONE_UNCOVERED_TOKEN"));
WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, credsState::get, "/bin/zsh", hostEnvState::get);
Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(HerdrPeerLauncher.class);
Level original = logger.getLevel();
logger.setLevel(Level.WARN);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.start();
logger.addAppender(appender);
try {
// Spawn 1: deny-by-default, gap = {SPAWN_ONE_UNCOVERED_TOKEN} — the effectiveAllowed ==
// null branch, via warnGapUnprotected.
launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
// Live policy reload to allow-list, with a DIFFERENT gap name.
credsState.set(new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(
FleetConfig.MemberCredentials.POLICY_ALLOW_LIST, List.of(), List.of(), null));
hostEnvState.set(Set.of("FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN"));
// Spawn 2: allow-list, gap = {FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN} — kept by the derived allow-list
// (the profile's own tokenEnv), so it is the effectiveAllowed != null / keptByDerivedList
// branch, at the SAME log line HerdrPeerLauncher:1819 guards with the shared flag.
launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
} finally {
logger.detachAppender(appender);
logger.setLevel(original);
}
List<String> messages = appender.list.stream().map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage).toList();
assertTrue(messages.stream().anyMatch(
m -> m.contains("UNBLOCKED") && m.contains("SPAWN_ONE_UNCOVERED_TOKEN")),
"spawn 1's deny-by-default gap must still warn — got: " + messages);
assertTrue(messages.stream().anyMatch(
m -> m.contains("UNBLOCKED") && m.contains("FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN")),
"spawn 2's gap names a DIFFERENT env var than spawn 1 (FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN, not "
+ "SPAWN_ONE_UNCOVERED_TOKEN) — it must still be warned about even though a "
+ "flag already fired once for spawn 1's unrelated name. Before fleetd #341's "
+ "fix this WARN never fires because unprotectedGapLogged was already true. "
+ "Got: " + messages);
}
/**
* fleetd #341 follow-up: the OTHER half of the guard's contract. The set exists to report every
* distinct name, but it must still report each one only ONCE — the noise control is the reason
* a guard is here at all, and the ticket named it as invariant 1. Two spawns, same policy, same
* gap name: exactly one WARN mentioning it.
*
* <p>Measured before this test existed: replacing {@code .filter(unprotectedGapNamesWarned::add)}
* with a filter that adds and always returns {@code true} — so every name is logged on every
* spawn — left all 1358 tests green. The fix was correct and nothing held it there. That is the
* "a test on the seam does not prove the caller" shape: the {@code Set} behaves, and nothing
* proved this class used it as a guard rather than as a record.
*/
@Test
void theSameUnprotectedNameIsWarnedAboutOnlyOnceAcrossSpawns() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
AtomicReference<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> credsState = new AtomicReference<>(
new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(null, List.of(), List.of(), null)); // deny-by-default
AtomicReference<Set<String>> hostEnvState =
new AtomicReference<>(Set.of("REPEATED_UNCOVERED_TOKEN"));
WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, credsState::get, "/bin/zsh", hostEnvState::get);
Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(HerdrPeerLauncher.class);
Level original = logger.getLevel();
logger.setLevel(Level.WARN);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.start();
logger.addAppender(appender);
try {
launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
// Same policy, same gap, second spawn. Nothing new to tell the operator.
launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
} finally {
logger.detachAppender(appender);
logger.setLevel(original);
}
List<String> messages = appender.list.stream().map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage).toList();
long mentioning = messages.stream()
.filter(m -> m.contains("REPEATED_UNCOVERED_TOKEN"))
.count();
assertEquals(1, mentioning,
"one unchanged unprotected name across two spawns must produce exactly one WARN — "
+ "the set is a guard, not just a record. Got: " + messages);
}
/**
* fleetd #341 follow-up: the reverse policy order. The original defect was found going
* deny-by-default then allow-list, and a guard that is fixed in one direction is not
* necessarily fixed in the other — "ask which states still OPEN the gate". Here spawn 1 runs
* under {@code allow-list} (the {@code keptByDerivedList} branch) and spawn 2 under
* {@code deny-by-default} ({@link HerdrPeerLauncher#warnGapUnprotected}), with a different name
* each time. Both must be reported.
*/
@Test
void anAllowListWarnDoesNotSuppressALaterDenyByDefaultWarnForADifferentName() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
AtomicReference<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> credsState = new AtomicReference<>(
new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(
FleetConfig.MemberCredentials.POLICY_ALLOW_LIST, List.of(), List.of(), null));
AtomicReference<Set<String>> hostEnvState =
new AtomicReference<>(Set.of("FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN"));
WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, credsState::get, "/bin/zsh", hostEnvState::get);
Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(HerdrPeerLauncher.class);
Level original = logger.getLevel();
logger.setLevel(Level.WARN);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.start();
logger.addAppender(appender);
try {
// Spawn 1: allow-list, gap kept by the derived list — the keptByDerivedList WARN.
launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
// Live reload the OTHER way: back to deny-by-default, with a different name.
credsState.set(new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(null, List.of(), List.of(), null));
hostEnvState.set(Set.of("LATER_UNCOVERED_TOKEN"));
launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
} finally {
logger.detachAppender(appender);
logger.setLevel(original);
}
List<String> messages = appender.list.stream().map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage).toList();
assertTrue(messages.stream().anyMatch(
m -> m.contains("UNBLOCKED") && m.contains("FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN")),
"spawn 1's allow-list gap must warn — got: " + messages);
assertTrue(messages.stream().anyMatch(
m -> m.contains("UNBLOCKED") && m.contains("LATER_UNCOVERED_TOKEN")),
"spawn 2's deny-by-default gap names a different variable and must still be warned "
+ "about, even though an allow-list WARN already fired. Got: " + messages);
}
/**
* fleetd #185 stage 2: with {@code memberHerdrSocket:} configured, member panes run under a
* different OS user — {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#hostEnvNames} describes fleetd's own process, not
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ class AmqpReplyInboxContractTest {
}
@Test
void releaseCancelsConsumerAndClearsHeld() throws Exception {
void releaseCancelsConsumerAndRequeuesHeldDeliveryForRecovery() throws Exception {
String target = "worker-release-" + System.nanoTime();
try (AmqpReplyInbox inbox = AmqpReplyInbox.open(uri())) {
inbox.own(target);
@@ -164,6 +164,22 @@ class AmqpReplyInboxContractTest {
inbox.release(target);
assertTrue(inbox.peek(target).isEmpty(),
"release clears the local held snapshot");
// fleetd #298: release() must not just drop the local record — the broker delivery was
// never acked, so cancelling the consumer alone leaves it unacked-but-orphaned on the
// still-open channel unless release() nacks it back with requeue=true. Prove the message
// is genuinely recoverable, not merely absent from peek: re-own the same target and
// confirm the broker redelivers it to the fresh consumer.
inbox.own(target);
List<ReplyInbox.InboxMessage> recovered = awaitPeek(inbox, target);
assertEquals(1, recovered.size(),
"a reply held (but undrained) at release() time must still be recoverable — "
+ "release() must requeue it, not silently drop it while the broker still "
+ "considers it outstanding");
assertEquals("m1", recovered.getFirst().msgId());
assertEquals("release me", recovered.getFirst().content());
inbox.ack(target, "m1");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.msg;
import com.rabbitmq.client.AMQP;
import com.rabbitmq.client.Channel;
import com.rabbitmq.client.Connection;
import com.rabbitmq.client.DeliverCallback;
import com.rabbitmq.client.Delivery;
import com.rabbitmq.client.Envelope;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Timeout;
import java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler;
import java.lang.reflect.Proxy;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.time.Duration;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.concurrent.CopyOnWriteArrayList;
import java.util.concurrent.CountDownLatch;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicReference;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNull;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* CB-318: a delivery landing on the consumer work-pool thread <em>after</em>
* {@link AmqpReplyInbox#release} has already swapped the target's {@code held} entry for its
* tombstone, but <em>before</em> {@code release()} itself returns, must be nacked-with-requeue —
* never silently retained in a fresh map {@code release()} has already stopped looking at.
*
* <p><strong>This forces the actual interleaving, not a sequence of calls.</strong> {@code release()}
* runs on its own thread and is made to block <em>inside</em> its nack loop, via a fake
* {@link Channel} whose {@code basicNack} blocks on its first invocation. That block is only
* reachable after {@code release()}'s {@code held.compute(...)} has already swapped in the
* {@code RELEASED} tombstone (the compute call happens strictly before the loop that calls
* {@code basicNack}), so observing it is direct, ordering-guaranteed proof that the tombstone is in
* place and {@code release()} has not yet returned — still holding {@code channelLock} — when a
* second thread fires {@code own()}'s captured {@link DeliverCallback} for a brand-new message on the
* same target. No mocking library is on the classpath, so the fake broker is a {@link Proxy}, the
* same pattern {@code AmqpReplyInboxRecoveryRaceTest} already uses.
*
* <p><strong>What this does and does not prove.</strong> It proves that a delivery whose
* {@code computeIfAbsent} call is ordered strictly after {@code release()}'s tombstone swap — while
* {@code release()} is still running — is nacked-with-requeue rather than silently parked forever.
* It does not drive a real broker: {@code basicNack} here is a recorded call on a fake channel, not a
* verified requeue-and-redeliver. That half of the contract (a nacked-with-requeue delivery really
* does come back to a later owner) is already covered against a real broker by
* {@code AmqpReplyInboxContractTest.releaseCancelsConsumerAndRequeuesHeldDeliveryForRecovery}, which
* this test does not duplicate.
*/
class AmqpReplyInboxReleaseRaceTest {
@Test
@Timeout(15)
void deliveryArrivingWhileReleaseIsStillRunningIsNackedNotStranded() throws Exception {
String target = "worker-release-race";
List<long[]> nacks = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>(); // {deliveryTag, requeue(1/0)}
List<Long> acks = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
AtomicReference<DeliverCallback> deliverCallback = new AtomicReference<>();
CountDownLatch nackStarted = new CountDownLatch(1);
CountDownLatch releaseMayFinishNack = new CountDownLatch(1);
AtomicInteger nackCallCount = new AtomicInteger();
Channel consumeChannel = fakeConsumeChannel(deliverCallback, nacks, acks, nackCallCount,
nackStarted, releaseMayFinishNack);
Channel publishChannel = fakeInertChannel();
Connection connection = fakeConnection(consumeChannel, publishChannel);
AmqpReplyInbox inbox = new AmqpReplyInbox(connection, AmqpReplyInbox.DEFAULT_PREFETCH);
inbox.own(target);
assertTrue(deliverCallback.get() != null, "own() must have registered a DeliverCallback");
// Seed one already-held delivery (m0) so release()'s nack loop has something to iterate, and
// therefore somewhere to block, before it can return.
deliverCallback.get().handle("ctag", delivery(1L, "m0", "first"));
AtomicReference<Throwable> releaseError = new AtomicReference<>();
Thread releaseThread = new Thread(() -> {
try {
inbox.release(target);
} catch (Throwable t) {
releaseError.set(t);
}
}, "release-under-test");
releaseThread.start();
// This latch only fires from inside the fake channel's basicNack — i.e. from inside
// release()'s nack loop, which release()'s code only reaches AFTER held.compute(...) has
// already swapped in RELEASED. Waiting for it is direct proof the swap has happened and
// release() has not yet returned (it is stuck mid-loop, still holding channelLock).
assertTrue(nackStarted.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS),
"release() never reached its nack loop — it may not have started");
// The exact interleaving CB-318 describes: a delivery for a NEW message on the same target
// lands on the "consumer work-pool thread" (this second thread) while release() is still
// running. With the pre-fix code (a bare held.remove(target)) this created a brand-new map
// under computeIfAbsent that release() — already past its remove — never looks at again.
AtomicReference<Throwable> deliveryError = new AtomicReference<>();
Thread deliveryThread = new Thread(() -> {
try {
deliverCallback.get().handle("ctag", delivery(2L, "m1", "second"));
} catch (Throwable t) {
deliveryError.set(t);
}
}, "concurrent-delivery");
deliveryThread.start();
// Head start for the delivery thread to reach (and, on the fixed code, block on)
// channelLock — release() still holds it at this point, so a correct fix cannot have
// resolved m1's nack yet. Purely in-memory work (computeIfAbsent, a reference compare)
// separates deliveryThread.start() from that block point, so 300ms is a large margin, not a
// tight timing assumption.
Thread.sleep(300);
assertEquals(1, nackCallCount.get(),
"the concurrent delivery must not resolve its nack before release() gives up "
+ "channelLock — if this is 2 already, the interleaving below is not being "
+ "tested, only a sequential call");
releaseMayFinishNack.countDown(); // let release() finish nacking m0 and return
assertTrue(releaseThread.join(Duration.ofSeconds(10)), "release() did not finish");
assertTrue(deliveryThread.join(Duration.ofSeconds(10)), "the concurrent delivery did not finish");
assertNull(releaseError.get(), "release() threw: " + releaseError.get());
assertNull(deliveryError.get(), "the concurrent delivery threw: " + deliveryError.get());
assertEquals(2, nacks.size(),
"both the pre-held m0 and the concurrently-arriving m1 must be nacked, got: "
+ nacks.stream().map(n -> "[tag=" + n[0] + " requeue=" + n[1] + "]").toList());
assertTrue(nacks.stream().allMatch(n -> n[1] == 1L),
"invariant 1 (never drop): every nack must set requeue=true");
assertTrue(nacks.stream().anyMatch(n -> n[0] == 1L), "m0's delivery tag must be nacked");
assertTrue(nacks.stream().anyMatch(n -> n[0] == 2L),
"m1 — delivered while release() was still running, after the tombstone swap — must be "
+ "nacked, not silently retained in a map release() will never look at again");
assertTrue(acks.isEmpty(), "invariant 1 (never drop): a held reply must never be basicAck'd");
}
private static Delivery delivery(long tag, String msgId, String body) {
Envelope envelope = new Envelope(tag, false, "", "irrelevant");
AMQP.BasicProperties props = new AMQP.BasicProperties.Builder().messageId(msgId).build();
return new Delivery(envelope, props, body.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
}
/** A {@link Proxy}-backed consume {@link Channel}: blocks the FIRST {@code basicNack} call on
* {@code releaseMayFinishNack}, after signalling {@code nackStarted} — everything else records
* the call and returns a harmless default, matching the style already used by
* {@code AmqpReplyInboxRecoveryRaceTest}. */
private static Channel fakeConsumeChannel(AtomicReference<DeliverCallback> deliverCallback,
List<long[]> nacks, List<Long> acks,
AtomicInteger nackCallCount,
CountDownLatch nackStarted,
CountDownLatch releaseMayFinishNack) {
InvocationHandler handler = (proxy, method, args) -> {
String name = method.getName();
if (name.equals("basicConsume")) {
deliverCallback.set((DeliverCallback) args[2]);
return "ctag";
}
if (name.equals("basicNack")) {
long tag = (long) args[0];
boolean requeue = (boolean) args[2];
if (nackCallCount.incrementAndGet() == 1) {
nackStarted.countDown();
if (!releaseMayFinishNack.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS)) {
throw new IllegalStateException("test never released the nack latch");
}
}
nacks.add(new long[] {tag, requeue ? 1L : 0L});
return null;
}
if (name.equals("basicAck")) {
acks.add((long) args[0]);
return null;
}
if (name.equals("equals")) {
return proxy == args[0];
}
if (name.equals("hashCode")) {
return System.identityHashCode(proxy);
}
if (name.equals("toString")) {
return "FakeConsumeChannel";
}
return defaultValue(method.getReturnType());
};
return (Channel) Proxy.newProxyInstance(AmqpReplyInboxReleaseRaceTest.class.getClassLoader(),
new Class<?>[] {Channel.class}, handler);
}
/** A {@link Proxy}-backed {@link Channel} that answers every call with a harmless default — used
* as the publish channel, which this test never actually publishes on. */
private static Channel fakeInertChannel() {
InvocationHandler handler = (proxy, method, args) -> {
String name = method.getName();
if (name.equals("equals")) {
return proxy == args[0];
}
if (name.equals("hashCode")) {
return System.identityHashCode(proxy);
}
if (name.equals("toString")) {
return "FakeInertChannel";
}
return defaultValue(method.getReturnType());
};
return (Channel) Proxy.newProxyInstance(AmqpReplyInboxReleaseRaceTest.class.getClassLoader(),
new Class<?>[] {Channel.class}, handler);
}
/** A {@link Proxy}-backed {@link Connection} handing out {@code first} then {@code second} from
* successive {@code createChannel()} calls, matching {@link AmqpReplyInbox}'s constructor. */
private static Connection fakeConnection(Channel first, Channel second) {
AtomicInteger calls = new AtomicInteger();
InvocationHandler handler = (proxy, method, args) -> {
String name = method.getName();
if (name.equals("createChannel") && (args == null || args.length == 0)) {
return calls.getAndIncrement() == 0 ? first : second;
}
if (name.equals("equals")) {
return proxy == args[0];
}
if (name.equals("hashCode")) {
return System.identityHashCode(proxy);
}
if (name.equals("toString")) {
return "FakeConnection";
}
return defaultValue(method.getReturnType());
};
return (Connection) Proxy.newProxyInstance(AmqpReplyInboxReleaseRaceTest.class.getClassLoader(),
new Class<?>[] {Connection.class}, handler);
}
private static Object defaultValue(Class<?> type) {
if (!type.isPrimitive() || type == void.class) {
return null;
}
if (type == boolean.class) {
return Boolean.FALSE;
}
if (type == long.class) {
return 0L;
}
if (type == short.class) {
return (short) 0;
}
if (type == byte.class) {
return (byte) 0;
}
if (type == char.class) {
return (char) 0;
}
if (type == double.class) {
return 0.0d;
}
if (type == float.class) {
return 0.0f;
}
return 0;
}
}
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.msg;
import ch.qos.logback.classic.Level;
import ch.qos.logback.classic.Logger;
import ch.qos.logback.classic.spi.ILoggingEvent;
import ch.qos.logback.core.read.ListAppender;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.AgentControl;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.AgentStatus;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.FakeHerdr;
@@ -11,6 +15,7 @@ import dev.ltms.fleet.mcp.PrimaryRegistry;
import dev.ltms.fleet.inject.Injector;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.util.concurrent.CompletableFuture;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
@@ -253,7 +258,7 @@ class MessageServiceTest {
injector.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE); // first delivery
injector.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.WORKING); // first turn in flight
CompletableFuture<Void> queued = injector.enqueue(T, "second task", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
CompletableFuture<Void> queued = injector.enqueue(T, "second task", TestTurnTokens.inert(T)).completion();
CompletableFuture<Rendezvous.Resolution> waiter = rendezvous.currentWaiter(T);
injector.drop(T, new HerdrException("agent target sol not found", "agent_not_found", null));
@@ -405,6 +410,29 @@ class MessageServiceTest {
"a delivered send whose worker never replies times out as still working");
}
/**
* fleetd #345. This forces the injector to pick up the exact pending delivery after {@code send}
* first observes its completion as incomplete, but before {@code cancel} takes the target monitor.
* The timeout must use {@link Injector.Cancellation#DELIVERED} from {@code cancel} and report
* {@link MessageService.Outcome#TIMED_OUT_WORKING}, because the text landed.
*
* <p>What this does not prove: that this precise interleaving happens by itself under production
* timing. The test forces it through a test-only hook; it proves the timeout caller handles the
* injector result when the interleaving occurs.
*/
@Test
void sendTimeoutUsesCancellationDeliveredWhenPickupWinsTheRace() {
messages.setTimeoutCancellationRaceHookForTest(() -> injector.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE));
try {
MessageService.Reply reply = messages.send(T, "race delivery", 50);
assertEquals(MessageService.Outcome.TIMED_OUT_WORKING, reply.outcome(),
"cancel reporting DELIVERED means the worker received the timed-out message");
} finally {
messages.setTimeoutCancellationRaceHookForTest(null);
}
}
@Test
void answerTimesOutWhenTheResumedWorkerNeverReplies() throws Exception {
CompletableFuture<MessageService.Reply> send = sendAsync();
@@ -940,6 +968,54 @@ class MessageServiceTest {
assertEquals("PR opened: https://example/pulls/42", view.reply());
}
/**
* fleetd #324: {@code answer()} holds {@code sessionLocks} for the target and, once the worker's
* real terminal reply arrives, calls {@code finishAsyncTask}, which used to read the volatile
* {@code task.turnId} twice — once to check it is non-null, once as the key for
* {@code asyncTasksByTurn.remove}. {@code ask()}'s own timeout path mutates the same field with no
* lock at all. This test does not wait for a real race to land in that narrow window between the
* two reads — instead it drives the exact sequence the ticket describes (worker asks, primary
* answers, worker's real reply arrives) and, via a package-private test hook wired to fire at
* precisely that point, runs the identical production cleanup {@code ask()}'s timeout catch block
* runs ({@code clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, true)}) so the field goes {@code null} between the two
* reads deterministically rather than by chance.
*
* <p>What this proves: given that exact interleaving, {@code answer()} must not throw and the
* ticket must still resolve to the worker's real reply. What it does not prove: that the
* interleaving itself is reachable in production — that is established by reading the code (see
* the ticket), not by this test, since forcing it via a hook is not the same as two independent
* threads racing on their own schedules.
*/
@Test
void finishAsyncTaskSurvivesTurnIdGoingNullBetweenItsTwoReads() throws Exception {
String ticket = messages.sendAsync(T, "task that asks");
awaitWaiting();
injectDelivery();
CompletableFuture<MessageService.AskResult> ask =
CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(() -> messages.ask(T, "which config?", 5000));
MessageService.TaskView asking = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.ASKING);
String turnId = asking.turnId();
// Fire ask()'s own unlocked timeout cleanup at the moment finishAsyncTask has already checked
// task.turnId is non-null but has not yet used it — the exact torn-read window fleetd #324
// describes.
messages.setFinishAsyncTaskRaceHookForTest(() -> messages.forgetTurnForTest(turnId));
CompletableFuture<MessageService.Reply> answer =
CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(() -> messages.answer(turnId, "config.yaml", 5000));
assertEquals("config.yaml", ask.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS).answer());
awaitWaiting(); // answer() opened its own forward waiter for the resumed worker turn
assertTrue(messages.reply(T, "PR opened: https://example/pulls/42"));
assertEquals(MessageService.Outcome.REPLIED, answer.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS).outcome(),
"the lead's own answer() call must not throw because ask()'s timeout cleanup raced it");
MessageService.TaskView done = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.DONE);
assertEquals("PR opened: https://example/pulls/42", done.reply(),
"the ticket must still resolve to the worker's real reply despite the forced race");
}
@Test
void unansweredAsyncQuestionReturnsTheTicketToPendingAndReleasesItsTarget() throws Exception {
String ticket = messages.sendAsync(T, "task that asks");
@@ -957,6 +1033,175 @@ class MessageServiceTest {
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.DONE, awaitTicketPhase(next, MessageService.Phase.DONE).phase());
}
/**
* fleetd #307: a worker's {@code fleet_ask} can time out because the primary never answers —
* distinct from {@link #aReplyAfterAnswerTimesOutStillCompletesTheAsyncTicket}, where the
* primary DID answer and only its own bounded wait for the resumed turn expired.
* {@code ask()}'s timeout path deliberately forgets the task's {@code turnId} (so
* {@code hasAsyncQuestion} stops reporting the target BUSY — see
* {@code unansweredAsyncQuestionReturnsTheTicketToPendingAndReleasesItsTarget} above), which used
* to also erase the one signal {@code askAnsweredAsyncTasks} needed to recognize the worker's
* eventual real {@code fleet_reply}. That reply then had nowhere to land but the inbox, and
* {@code fleet_poll{ticket}} stayed PENDING forever — later force-failed with the false reason
* "session released before it replied", even though the worker had, in fact, replied.
*/
@Test
void aReplyAfterAnAskTimeoutStillCompletesTheAsyncTicket() throws Exception {
String ticket = messages.sendAsync(T, "task that asks then finishes alone");
awaitWaiting();
injectDelivery();
assertEquals(MessageService.AskOutcome.TIMED_OUT,
messages.ask(T, "which config?", 200).outcome());
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.PENDING, messages.poll(ticket).phase(),
"only the question wait ended; the delegated turn may still finish");
// The worker keeps working past the timeout and only now calls fleet_reply — with no live
// rendezvous waiter open (ask()'s timeout already closed it) and no new send() having
// reopened one for this target.
assertTrue(messages.reply(T, "PR opened: https://example/pulls/42"));
MessageService.TaskView done = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.DONE);
assertEquals("PR opened: https://example/pulls/42", done.reply(),
"fleet_poll{ticket} must return the worker's real reply, not stay pending forever");
assertEquals("reply", done.replySource());
assertFalse(messages.hasStrandedReply(T),
"the reply completed its own ticket directly and never touched the inbox");
}
/**
* fleetd #329 (F1). {@code answer()} completes the async ticket by looking {@code turnId} up in
* {@code asyncTasksByTurn} a SECOND time (the first is at :991, purely to re-register the
* {@code asyncTasksByWaiter} entry for #282's chained-ask case). That second lookup races
* {@code ask()}'s own unlocked timeout cleanup ({@code clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, true)}, run from
* {@code markAskTimedOut} + forgetting): {@code ask()}'s {@code ticket.answer().get(timeoutMillis)}
* can time out at essentially the same instant {@code answer()}'s {@code rendezvous.answerAsk}
* call above already succeeded and unblocked the worker. fleetd #324's single-read fix does not
* help here — that fixed a torn read of one already-held {@link MessageService} internal
* {@code Task}; this is a second, independent map lookup by a caller that no longer holds the
* {@code Task} it already found once.
*
* <p>This test does not wait for that real race to land on its own schedule — it drives the exact
* sequence the ticket describes (worker asks, primary answers, worker's real reply arrives) and
* fires the identical production cleanup {@code ask()}'s timeout path runs
* ({@code clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, true)}, via the {@code forgetTurnForTest} seam fleetd #324
* already merged) at the point between "the worker's own {@code ask()} call has unblocked" and
* "the worker's real {@code fleet_reply} arrives" — the exact window fleetd #329 names.
*
* <p>What this proves: given that exact interleaving, the async ticket must still resolve to the
* worker's real reply, not stay stuck {@link MessageService.Phase#PENDING} forever. What it does
* not prove: that the interleaving itself is reachable in production on its own timing — that is
* established by reading the code (see the ticket's "path in"), not by this test, for the same
* reason fleetd #324's own race test says so.
*/
@Test
void aReplyRacingAsksTimeoutCleanupStillCompletesTheAsyncTicket() throws Exception {
String ticket = messages.sendAsync(T, "task that asks");
awaitWaiting();
injectDelivery();
CompletableFuture<MessageService.AskResult> ask =
CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(() -> messages.ask(T, "which config?", 5000));
MessageService.TaskView asking = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.ASKING);
String turnId = asking.turnId();
CompletableFuture<MessageService.Reply> answer =
CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(() -> messages.answer(turnId, "config.yaml", 5000));
assertEquals("config.yaml", ask.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS).answer(),
"the worker's own ask() call must have already unblocked with the primary's answer "
+ "before we force the race below");
// ask()'s own unlocked timeout cleanup can forget this exact turnId at essentially the same
// instant answer() has already unblocked the worker and is now waiting on the resumed turn's
// real reply — reproduce that interleaving directly instead of trying to win a real race.
messages.forgetTurnForTest(turnId);
assertTrue(messages.reply(T, "PR opened: https://example/pulls/42"));
assertEquals(MessageService.Outcome.REPLIED, answer.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS).outcome(),
"the primary's own answer() call must still see the worker's real reply");
MessageService.TaskView done = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.DONE);
assertEquals("PR opened: https://example/pulls/42", done.reply(),
"fleet_poll{ticket} must return the worker's real reply, not stay PENDING forever "
+ "just because ask()'s timeout cleanup forgot this turnId first");
}
/**
* fleetd #329 (F3). {@link MessageService#reply} reads the same orphan {@code Task}'s {@code
* turnId} twice on this path (once to check it is non-null, once as the {@code
* asyncTasksByTurn.remove} key) — the exact double-read shape fleetd #324 fixed in {@code
* finishAsyncTask}. This test drives the same real sequence as {@code
* aReplyAfterAnswerTimesOutStillCompletesTheAsyncTicket} (worker asks, primary answers, the
* primary's own bounded wait for the resumed turn expires) to reach a task with {@code turnId}
* genuinely stamped and no live rendezvous waiter open — the state {@code askAnsweredAsyncTasks}
* matches here — then fires the identical production cleanup {@code ask()}'s own timeout path
* runs ({@code clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, true)}, via the {@code forgetTurnForTest} seam fleetd
* #324 merged) at the point between the check and the removal use, via a dedicated test hook
* mirroring {@code finishAsyncTaskRaceHook}.
*/
@Test
void replyToAnOrphanedTaskSurvivesTurnIdGoingNullBetweenItsTwoReads() throws Exception {
String ticket = messages.sendAsync(T, "task that asks");
awaitWaiting();
injectDelivery();
CompletableFuture<MessageService.AskResult> ask =
CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(() -> messages.ask(T, "which config?", 5000));
MessageService.TaskView asking = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.ASKING);
String turnId = asking.turnId();
MessageService.Reply answerReply = messages.answer(turnId, "config.yaml", 150);
assertEquals("config.yaml", ask.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS).answer());
assertEquals(MessageService.Outcome.TIMED_OUT_WORKING, answerReply.outcome(),
"the primary's own bounded wait must give up first, leaving turnId stamped with no "
+ "live waiter — the state reply()'s F3 code path matches");
messages.setReplyOrphanTurnIdRaceHookForTest(() -> messages.forgetTurnForTest(turnId));
try {
assertTrue(messages.reply(T, "PR opened: https://example/pulls/42"));
MessageService.TaskView done = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.DONE);
assertEquals("PR opened: https://example/pulls/42", done.reply(),
"the ticket must still resolve to the worker's real reply despite the forced race");
} finally {
messages.setReplyOrphanTurnIdRaceHookForTest(null);
}
}
/**
* fleetd #307's ambiguity guard: an ask timeout frees its target ({@code hasAsyncQuestion}
* becomes false the instant it lapses — proven above), so a second, independent delegation can
* be dispatched to the same target and itself go on to ask-and-lapse before the first worker's
* real reply ever arrives. Two open tasks are then both eligible candidates on one target with
* no live waiter to disambiguate them. A reply arriving now must not guess which one it answers
* — guessing wrong would hand the lead a plausible-looking answer to a delegation the worker
* never touched, worse than a failure because the lead acts on it — so it must fall back to the
* inbox exactly as the zero-candidate case does.
*/
@Test
void twoAskTimedOutTicketsOnOneTargetFallBackToTheInboxRatherThanGuess() throws Exception {
String ticket1 = messages.sendAsync(T, "first task that asks");
awaitWaiting();
injectDelivery();
assertEquals(MessageService.AskOutcome.TIMED_OUT, messages.ask(T, "Q1?", 200).outcome());
String ticket2 = messages.sendAsync(T, "second task that asks");
awaitWaiting();
injectDelivery();
assertEquals(MessageService.AskOutcome.TIMED_OUT, messages.ask(T, "Q2?", 200).outcome());
assertTrue(messages.reply(T, "which task does this answer?"));
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.PENDING, messages.poll(ticket1).phase(),
"an ambiguous reply must not guess ticket1");
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.PENDING, messages.poll(ticket2).phase(),
"an ambiguous reply must not guess ticket2");
assertTrue(messages.hasStrandedReply(T));
var drained = messages.drainReplies(T);
assertEquals(1, drained.size());
assertEquals("which task does this answer?", drained.get(0).content());
}
@Test
void asyncQuestionBelongsToTheTaskThatOwnsItsForwardWaiter() throws Exception {
String first = messages.sendAsync(T, "first task");
@@ -1033,6 +1278,63 @@ class MessageServiceTest {
assertEquals("done", done.reply());
}
// --- fleetd #329 (F2): an exception after the ticket's future completes must reach a log -----
//
// sendAsync's own executor task ends with catch (Throwable t) { task.future.completeExceptionally(t); }
// — but finishAsyncTask completes that same future on its first line, so anything that throws
// afterward hits an already-completed future: completeExceptionally returns false and does
// nothing, and (before this fix) nothing logged it either. Measured on the ticket: temporarily
// reintroducing the fleetd #324 NPE reproduced 19 real exceptions on the ordinary path with
// 74/74 tests staying green and zero log lines. There is no reachable production call site where
// finishAsyncTask throws after completing the future (fleetd #324 already closed the one that
// used to), so this test drives the shape directly via a dedicated test-only hook
// (afterFinishAsyncTaskCompleteHookForTest) rather than trying to engineer a real exception into
// that narrow window — the same technique fleetd #324's own race test and this ticket's F1/F3
// tests use for their own races.
private static ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> attachMessageServiceLog() {
Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(MessageService.class);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.start();
logger.addAppender(appender);
return appender;
}
private static void detachMessageServiceLog(ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender) {
((Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(MessageService.class)).detachAppender(appender);
}
@Test
void anExceptionAfterTheTicketFutureCompletesStillReachesTheLog() throws Exception {
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = attachMessageServiceLog();
try {
messages.setAfterFinishAsyncTaskCompleteHookForTest(() -> {
throw new RuntimeException("PROBE-329-F2");
});
String ticket = messages.sendAsync(T, "do the task");
awaitWaiting();
assertTrue(rendezvous.resolve(T, "done"));
// finishAsyncTask's own first line already completed the future with the real result
// BEFORE the hook threw — F2 is a visibility gap, not a correctness gap for the ticket
// itself, so the ticket's own outcome must be unaffected by the swallowed exception.
MessageService.TaskView done = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.DONE);
assertEquals("done", done.reply());
assertTrue(appender.list.stream().anyMatch(e ->
e.getLevel() == Level.ERROR
&& e.getFormattedMessage().contains(ticket)
&& e.getThrowableProxy() != null
&& "PROBE-329-F2".equals(e.getThrowableProxy().getMessage())),
"an exception thrown after the ticket's future already completed must still "
+ "reach the log, not vanish silently");
} finally {
messages.setAfterFinishAsyncTaskCompleteHookForTest(null);
detachMessageServiceLog(appender);
}
}
// --- CB-582: fleet_status pendingAsk() ------------------------------------------------------
@Test
@@ -1489,7 +1791,10 @@ class MessageServiceTest {
assertEquals(MessageService.Outcome.TIMED_OUT_QUEUED, r.outcome());
assertTrue(messages.hasQueuedDelivery(T),
"a TIMED_OUT_QUEUED send leaves the message still queued in the injector");
"a TIMED_OUT_QUEUED send still records the undelivered delivery for fleet health");
injector.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
assertTrue(herdr.calls.stream().noneMatch(c -> c.method().equals("agent.prompt")),
"a TIMED_OUT_QUEUED send must be cancelled, not delivered when the worker later goes idle");
}
@Test
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.rest;
import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.CallerResolver;
import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.Authz;
import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.MemberRegistry;
import dev.ltms.fleet.config.FleetConfig;
import dev.ltms.fleet.guard.SubscriptionGuard;
@@ -25,8 +26,15 @@ import java.net.URI;
import java.net.http.HttpClient;
import java.net.http.HttpRequest;
import java.net.http.HttpResponse;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.Locale;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import java.util.stream.Collectors;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
@@ -36,6 +44,10 @@ import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
*/
class FleetAppAuthTest {
private static final Path REST_SOURCE = Path.of("src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/rest/FleetApp.java");
private static final Pattern ROUTE_REGISTRATION =
Pattern.compile("app\\.(get|post|delete|put|patch)\\(\\s*\"([^\"]+)\"");
private final HttpClient http = HttpClient.newHttpClient();
private Javalin app;
private Metrics metrics;
@@ -92,6 +104,49 @@ class FleetAppAuthTest {
return http.send(b.build(), HttpResponse.BodyHandlers.ofString());
}
@Test
void everyRegisteredRouteHasItsHandlerActionPinned() {
Set<String> registered = routesTheServerRegisters();
assertTrue(registered.size() >= 15,
"scraped only " + registered.size() + " route registrations from FleetApp (" + registered
+ "); the app.<verb>(\"…\") scrape has stopped matching");
// Liveness must work before credentials can be checked, so this route is deliberately open.
assertTrue(registered.remove("GET /healthz"), "GET /healthz must stay an explicit ungated exception");
registered.forEach(route -> assertDoesNotThrow(() -> FleetApp.routeAction(route),
() -> route + " is registered but has no pinned authorization action"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.METRICS, FleetApp.routeAction("GET /metrics"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.SPAWN, FleetApp.routeAction("POST /members"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.STOP, FleetApp.routeAction("DELETE /members/{paneId}"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.SEND, FleetApp.routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/message"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.REPLY, FleetApp.routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/reply"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetApp.routeAction("GET /sessions/{id}/replies"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.ASK, FleetApp.routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/ask"));
for (String route : Set.of("GET /sessions", "GET /agents", "GET /members", "GET /profiles",
"GET /member-credentials", "GET /sessions/{id}/status", "GET /tasks/{ticket}")) {
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetApp.routeAction(route), route);
}
assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> FleetApp.routeAction("GET /healthz"));
}
private static Set<String> routesTheServerRegisters() {
try {
String source = Files.readString(REST_SOURCE).lines()
.filter(line -> {
String stripped = line.stripLeading();
return !(stripped.startsWith("//") || stripped.startsWith("*") || stripped.startsWith("/*"));
})
.collect(Collectors.joining("\n"));
Matcher matcher = ROUTE_REGISTRATION.matcher(source);
Set<String> routes = new LinkedHashSet<>();
while (matcher.find()) {
routes.add(matcher.group(1).toUpperCase(Locale.ROOT) + " " + matcher.group(2));
}
return routes;
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new AssertionError("could not scrape FleetApp route registrations", e);
}
}
// --- loopback-trust: the caller is the primary -------------------------------------------
@Test
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ import dev.ltms.fleet.session.SessionManager;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.Worktrees;
import dev.ltms.fleet.member.ClaudeCodeLauncher;
import dev.ltms.fleet.member.CompositePeerLauncher;
import dev.ltms.fleet.member.MemberCredentialPolicyView;
import dev.ltms.fleet.mcp.FleetMcp;
import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.BackendOutagePolicy;
import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.BackendQuarantine;
import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.PlacementPolicies;
import io.javalin.Javalin;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
@@ -32,6 +36,7 @@ import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.UUID;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.function.Predicate;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
@@ -70,6 +75,19 @@ class FleetAppTest {
private int start(FakeHerdr herdr, String workerBaseUrl, Set<String> allow, String placement,
Worktrees worktrees, Predicate<String> deliverable) {
return start(herdr, workerBaseUrl, allow, placement, worktrees, deliverable,
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource.none(), FleetMcp.OutageSource.none());
}
/**
* fleetd #297: same wiring as above, plus the two SAME shared sources {@code GET /profiles}
* must read — lets a test prove the quarantined/coolingOff facts it reports come from a real
* {@link dev.ltms.fleet.placement.BackendQuarantine}/{@link
* dev.ltms.fleet.placement.BackendOutagePolicy}, exactly like {@code fleet_profiles}'s own tests.
*/
private int start(FakeHerdr herdr, String workerBaseUrl, Set<String> allow, String placement,
Worktrees worktrees, Predicate<String> deliverable,
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource quarantine, FleetMcp.OutageSource outage) {
FleetConfig.Profile wcfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", workerBaseUrl, "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN", null,
placement, "fleet", "worker: {profile} #{n}", null, null, null);
@@ -90,8 +108,9 @@ class FleetAppTest {
// it directly so the inbox contract holds for those endpoints.
inbox.own("term_a");
MessageService messages = new MessageService(agents, injector, rendezvous, inbox);
app = new FleetApp(herdr, workers, sessions, messages, this.presence, null,
null, null, id -> this.presence.isPresent(id) || deliverable.test(id))
app = new FleetApp(herdr, herdr, workers, sessions, messages, this.presence, null,
null, null, id -> this.presence.isPresent(id) || deliverable.test(id),
MemberCredentialPolicyView::absent, quarantine, outage)
.build().start("127.0.0.1", 0);
return app.port();
}
@@ -164,6 +183,22 @@ class FleetAppTest {
assertEquals("idle", agents.get(0).get("status").asText());
}
/**
* fleetd #297 gap 1: {@code workers.list()} reaches herdr, and a transport failure there must
* land in the same {@code {error, detail}} envelope every other failure path in this file uses
* (see {@code herdrError}), not escape as a bare exception outside the JSON contract.
*/
@Test
void agentsMapsAHerdrFailureToTheJsonErrorEnvelope() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr down = new FakeHerdr().healthy(false);
int port = start(down, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"));
HttpResponse<String> res = req(port, "GET", "/agents");
assertEquals(502, res.statusCode(), res.body());
JsonNode body = mapper.readTree(res.body());
assertEquals("herdr_error", body.get("error").asText());
assertTrue(body.has("detail"), res.body());
}
@Test
void spawnWorkerLandsInOwnTabInWorkerSpaceAndInjectsBaseUrl() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -203,6 +238,42 @@ class FleetAppTest {
JsonNode body = mapper.readTree(req(port, "GET", "/profiles").body());
assertEquals("ltms-local", body.get("default").asText());
assertEquals("ltms-local", body.get("profiles").get(0).asText());
assertFalse(body.has("quarantined"), "nothing is quarantined, so the key is omitted: " + body);
assertFalse(body.has("coolingOff"), "nothing is cooling off, so the key is omitted: " + body);
}
/**
* fleetd #297 gap 2: {@code GET /profiles} must report the same two outage states {@code
* fleet_profiles} does — CB-578 stage B exhaustion quarantine and fleetd #201 Unit 5 cool-off —
* reading the SAME shared {@link BackendQuarantine}/{@link BackendOutagePolicy} instances rather
* than recomputing them. The two checks are independent, and this profile is deliberately put in
* both states at once, matching {@code FleetMcpTest}'s own coverage of that overlap.
*/
@Test
void profilesReportsQuarantineAndCoolingOffFromTheSameSharedSources() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
BackendQuarantine quarantine = new BackendQuarantine(() -> 0L, TimeUnit.MINUTES.toNanos(30));
quarantine.quarantine("shared-openai");
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource quarantineSource = new FleetMcp.QuarantineSource(
profile -> "ltms-local".equals(profile) ? "shared-openai" : null, quarantine);
BackendOutagePolicy outagePolicy = new BackendOutagePolicy(() -> 0L);
outagePolicy.record("shared-openai", "t1", "API Error: rate limited");
outagePolicy.record("shared-openai", "t2", "API Error: rate limited"); // 2nd distinct target starts the incident
FleetMcp.OutageSource outageSource = new FleetMcp.OutageSource(
profile -> "ltms-local".equals(profile) ? "shared-openai" : null, outagePolicy);
int port = start(herdr, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"), "tab", new GitWorktrees(),
ignored -> false, quarantineSource, outageSource);
JsonNode body = mapper.readTree(req(port, "GET", "/profiles").body());
assertTrue(body.has("quarantined"), body.toString());
assertEquals("shared-openai",
body.get("quarantined").get("ltms-local").get("credentialId").asText());
assertEquals(1800,
body.get("quarantined").get("ltms-local").get("quarantinedForSeconds").asLong());
assertTrue(body.has("coolingOff"), body.toString());
assertEquals("shared-openai",
body.get("coolingOff").get("ltms-local").get("credentialId").asText());
assertEquals(60, body.get("coolingOff").get("ltms-local").get("coolingOffForSeconds").asLong());
}
@Test
@@ -239,6 +310,23 @@ class FleetAppTest {
"liveStatus is unknown when herdr has no matching pane");
}
/**
* fleetd #297 gap 1: same reasoning as {@code agentsMapsAHerdrFailureToTheJsonErrorEnvelope} —
* {@code GET /members} is the endpoint's own comment names as "the out-of-band path a lead falls
* back to when its MCP mount drops", so it must stay inside the {@code {error, detail}} envelope
* exactly when herdr is briefly unreachable.
*/
@Test
void membersMapsAHerdrFailureToTheJsonErrorEnvelope() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr down = new FakeHerdr().healthy(false);
int port = start(down, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"));
HttpResponse<String> res = req(port, "GET", "/members");
assertEquals(502, res.statusCode(), res.body());
JsonNode body = mapper.readTree(res.body());
assertEquals("herdr_error", body.get("error").asText());
assertTrue(body.has("detail"), res.body());
}
@Test
void spawnWithACwdParamRootsTheWorkerThere() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -327,7 +415,11 @@ class FleetAppTest {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().agentNameTakenTimes(99);
int port = start(herdr, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"));
assertEquals(500, req(port, "POST", "/members").statusCode());
// fleetd #304: 502, not Javalin's default 500 — the herdr failure is named, and the body
// carries herdr's own message, matching what fleet_spawn reports for the same failure.
HttpResponse<String> res = req(port, "POST", "/members");
assertEquals(502, res.statusCode());
assertEquals("herdr_error", mapper.readTree(res.body()).get("error").asText());
assertTrue(herdr.called("tab.create"), "a tab was created before the failed start");
assertEquals("w9:t2", params(herdr, "tab.close").get("tab_id"), "orphaned tab must be closed");
}
@@ -444,6 +536,53 @@ class FleetAppTest {
assertEquals("orphan", body.get("replies").get(0).get("content").asText());
}
@Test
void replyWithMissingContentIsRejectedAndDoesNotResolveTheWaiter() throws Exception {
// fleetd #302: `.path("content").asText("")` used to turn a missing "content" key into an
// empty string that reached rendezvous.resolve, silently completing the lead's blocking wait
// with nothing. Prove the fix two ways: the bad call is rejected with 400, AND the real send
// it would have wrongly resolved is still open afterwards — a real reply completes it.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().agentStatus("idle");
int port = start(herdr, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"));
var send = java.util.concurrent.CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(() -> {
try { return postMessage(port, "{\"content\":\"review this\",\"timeoutMs\":4000}"); }
catch (Exception e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); }
});
Thread.sleep(200); // let the background send open its rendezvous waiter
HttpResponse<String> badReply = postJson(port, "/sessions/term_a/reply", "{}");
assertEquals(400, badReply.statusCode());
JsonNode err = mapper.readTree(badReply.body());
assertEquals("bad_request", err.get("error").asText());
assertTrue(err.has("detail"));
// The waiter must still be open — a real reply now completes the ORIGINAL send.
HttpResponse<String> goodReply = postJson(port, "/sessions/term_a/reply", "{\"content\":\"LGTM ship it\"}");
assertEquals(200, goodReply.statusCode());
HttpResponse<String> res = send.get(6, java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit.SECONDS);
assertEquals(200, res.statusCode());
assertEquals("LGTM ship it", mapper.readTree(res.body()).get("reply").asText());
}
@Test
void replyWithEmptyOrWhitespaceContentIsRejectedSameAsMissing() throws Exception {
// fleetd #302 sibling case: present-but-blank content is treated the same as a missing key —
// FleetMcp's own required-content guard (fleet_reply's "content is required") makes no
// distinction between the two either, so diverging here would be a new asymmetry.
int port = startHealthy();
HttpResponse<String> empty = postJson(port, "/sessions/term_a/reply", "{\"content\":\"\"}");
assertEquals(400, empty.statusCode());
assertEquals("bad_request", mapper.readTree(empty.body()).get("error").asText());
HttpResponse<String> whitespace = postJson(port, "/sessions/term_a/reply", "{\"content\":\" \"}");
assertEquals(400, whitespace.statusCode());
assertEquals("bad_request", mapper.readTree(whitespace.body()).get("error").asText());
}
@Test
void drainRepliesReturnsEmptyForNoReplies() throws Exception {
int port = startHealthy();
@@ -598,7 +737,12 @@ class FleetAppTest {
int port = start(herdr, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"));
// A genuine teardown failure must surface, not be reported as a successful 204.
assertEquals(500, req(port, "DELETE", "/members/w9:pW").statusCode());
// fleetd #304: it surfaces as a named 502 rather than Javalin's default 500. The property
// this test guards is "not 204" and the herdr detail reaching the caller — a bare 500 gave
// the body "Server Error" and said nothing about herdr.
HttpResponse<String> res = req(port, "DELETE", "/members/w9:pW");
assertEquals(502, res.statusCode());
assertEquals("herdr_error", mapper.readTree(res.body()).get("error").asText());
assertFalse(herdr.called("tab.close"), "tab is not removed when the pane close failed");
}
@@ -611,4 +755,5 @@ class FleetAppTest {
assertEquals(204, req(port, "DELETE", "/members/w9:pW").statusCode());
assertTrue(herdr.called("tab.close"));
}
}
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
public record RemoveCall(String repoRoot, String worktreePath) {
}
public record DeleteBranchCall(String repoRoot, String branch) {
}
public record OverlayCall(String repoRoot, String worktreePath,
List<String> requested, List<String> copied, List<String> skipWorktree) {
}
@@ -35,6 +38,7 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
private final List<AddCall> addCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private final List<RemoveCall> removeCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private final List<DeleteBranchCall> deleteBranchCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private final List<OverlayCall> overlayCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private final List<RepoRootCall> repoRootCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private final List<SnapshotCall> snapshotCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
@@ -51,6 +55,8 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
private final AtomicLong snapshotSeq = new AtomicLong();
private volatile RuntimeException addFailure;
private volatile RuntimeException snapshotFailure;
private volatile RuntimeException removeFailure;
private volatile RuntimeException overlayFailure;
private volatile boolean dirty = false;
private volatile String repoRoot = "/repo";
private volatile String prefix = "/worktrees";
@@ -98,6 +104,21 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
return this;
}
/** Make subsequent {@link #remove} calls throw (fleetd #283: a stale index lock, a slow
* filesystem, or {@code remove}'s own 30s exec timeout escaping the last, previously bare,
* step of {@link SessionManager#release}). */
public FakeWorktrees failRemove(String message) {
this.removeFailure = new WorktreeException(message);
return this;
}
/** Make subsequent {@link #overlayParity} calls throw (simulates a post-{@code add()} spawn
* failure — fleetd #283 defect 2 — so the {@code acquireWithWorktree} catch runs). */
public FakeWorktrees failOverlay(String message) {
this.overlayFailure = new WorktreeException(message);
return this;
}
/** Configure the value returned by {@link #wipRefs}. */
public FakeWorktrees withWipRefs(WipRefStats stats) {
this.wipRefs = stats;
@@ -132,6 +153,14 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
@Override
public void remove(String repoRoot, String worktreePath) {
removeCalls.add(new RemoveCall(repoRoot, worktreePath));
if (removeFailure != null) {
throw removeFailure;
}
}
@Override
public void deleteBranch(String repoRoot, String branch) {
deleteBranchCalls.add(new DeleteBranchCall(repoRoot, branch));
}
@Override
@@ -146,6 +175,9 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
@Override
public void overlayParity(String repoRoot, String worktreePath, List<String> overlay) {
if (overlayFailure != null) {
throw overlayFailure;
}
List<String> copied = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
List<String> skipped = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
for (String rel : overlay) {
@@ -218,6 +250,14 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
return removeCalls.isEmpty() ? null : removeCalls.getLast();
}
public List<DeleteBranchCall> deleteBranchCalls() {
return List.copyOf(deleteBranchCalls);
}
public DeleteBranchCall lastDeleteBranch() {
return deleteBranchCalls.isEmpty() ? null : deleteBranchCalls.getLast();
}
public OverlayCall lastOverlay() {
return overlayCalls.isEmpty() ? null : overlayCalls.getLast();
}
@@ -403,6 +403,52 @@ class GitWorktreesTest {
assertTrue(heads.isBlank(), "the branch leaked after a post-creation step threw:\n" + heads);
}
/**
* fleetd #309. The add runner is a narrow seam for the case where Git has created state but
* the caller then kills the process. The runner first performs the real add in this throwaway
* repo, then throws the same kind of exception that {@link GitWorktrees#exec} uses for a timeout.
* This proves the failure path cleans both real Git objects without waiting for a slow checkout.
*/
@Test
void addCleansUpWhenTheWorktreeAddRunnerFailsAfterCreatingState(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
String branch = "cb-309-timeout";
WorktreeException timeout = new WorktreeException("command timed out: synthetic git worktree add");
AtomicReference<String> createdPath = new AtomicReference<>();
GitWorktrees worktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString(), null, null, null, command -> {
createdPath.set(command[5]);
try {
git(repo, "worktree", "add", command[5], "-b", command[7], command[8]);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new AssertionError("test setup could not create the worktree", e);
}
throw timeout;
});
WorktreeException thrown = assertThrows(WorktreeException.class,
() -> worktrees.add(repo.toString(), branch, "HEAD"));
assertSame(timeout, thrown, "cleanup must not replace the add failure");
assertNotNull(createdPath.get(), "the add runner must receive the worktree path");
assertFalse(Files.exists(Path.of(createdPath.get())),
"the worktree directory leaked after the add runner failed");
assertFalse(refExists(repo, "refs/heads/" + branch), "the branch leaked after the add runner failed");
}
/** An ordinary Git refusal must not delete the existing branch or log a cleanup warning. */
@Test
void addFailureBeforeCreatingAWorktreeIsQuiet(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
String branch = "already-exists";
git(repo, "branch", branch);
assertThrows(WorktreeException.class, () -> new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString())
.add(repo.toString(), branch, "HEAD"));
assertTrue(refExists(repo, "refs/heads/" + branch), "the existing branch must remain");
assertTrue(capturedMessages().isEmpty(), "an ordinary Git refusal logged a warning: " + capturedMessages());
}
// ---- CB-189: broader remote-URL coverage — every remote, both fetch and push URLs, any
// non-SSH scheme. Reporting only, additive to the origin/https strip-and-refuse tests above. ----
@@ -26,7 +26,12 @@ import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.CountDownLatch;
import java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService;
import java.util.concurrent.Executors;
import java.util.concurrent.Future;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger;
import java.util.function.LongSupplier;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
@@ -74,23 +79,57 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
*/
private static final class RecordingWorktrees implements Worktrees {
private final List<String> removeCalls = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
private final List<String> deleteBranchCalls = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
private final List<String> snapshotCalls = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
private final java.util.Set<String> failRemoveFor = new java.util.HashSet<>();
private volatile boolean dirty = false;
private volatile RuntimeException hasUncommittedFailure;
private volatile RuntimeException snapshotFailure;
private final java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong snapshotSeq = new java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong();
/** fleetd #316: successive {@code hasUncommitted} answers, one per call, last one sticky
* once exhausted — models a worktree whose state changes between reads. Empty (the
* default) falls back to the plain {@link #dirty} flag, so every existing test using this
* fake keeps returning one fixed answer. */
private final List<Boolean> dirtySequence = new java.util.concurrent.CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private int failHasUncommittedOnCall = -1;
private RuntimeException hasUncommittedCallFailure;
private final java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger hasUncommittedCalls =
new java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger();
RecordingWorktrees dirty(boolean dirty) {
this.dirty = dirty;
return this;
}
/** fleetd #316: return {@code answers[0]} on the first {@code hasUncommitted} call,
* {@code answers[1]} on the second, and so on; the last element repeats after that. */
RecordingWorktrees dirtySequence(boolean... answers) {
for (boolean a : answers) {
dirtySequence.add(a);
}
return this;
}
int hasUncommittedCallCount() {
return hasUncommittedCalls.get();
}
RecordingWorktrees failHasUncommittedWith(RuntimeException e) {
this.hasUncommittedFailure = e;
return this;
}
/**
* Throw from {@code hasUncommitted} on one specific call only, counting from 0. The
* whole-double {@link #failHasUncommittedWith} cannot express fleetd #316's fail-safe
* case, which needs the pre-stop read to succeed and only the late read to fail.
*/
RecordingWorktrees failHasUncommittedOnCall(int call, RuntimeException e) {
this.failHasUncommittedOnCall = call;
this.hasUncommittedCallFailure = e;
return this;
}
RecordingWorktrees failRemoveFor(String worktreePath) {
failRemoveFor.add(worktreePath);
return this;
@@ -114,11 +153,23 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
removeCalls.add(worktreePath);
}
@Override
public void deleteBranch(String repoRoot, String branch) {
deleteBranchCalls.add(branch);
}
@Override
public boolean hasUncommitted(String worktreePath) {
int call = hasUncommittedCalls.getAndIncrement();
if (hasUncommittedFailure != null) {
throw hasUncommittedFailure;
}
if (call == failHasUncommittedOnCall) {
throw hasUncommittedCallFailure;
}
if (!dirtySequence.isEmpty()) {
return dirtySequence.get(Math.min(call, dirtySequence.size() - 1));
}
return dirty;
}
@@ -158,6 +209,10 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
return List.copyOf(removeCalls);
}
List<String> deleteBranchCalls() {
return List.copyOf(deleteBranchCalls);
}
List<String> snapshotCalls() {
return List.copyOf(snapshotCalls);
}
@@ -168,14 +223,19 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
}
private SessionManager sessionManager(FakeHerdr herdr, LongSupplier clock, int contextCap,
boolean clearAfterTurn) {
boolean clearAfterTurn) {
return sessionManager(herdr, clock, contextCap, clearAfterTurn, null);
}
private SessionManager sessionManager(FakeHerdr herdr, LongSupplier clock, int contextCap,
boolean clearAfterTurn, java.util.function.Consumer<MemberSession> hook) {
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
List.of("ccs", "ltms-local"), "tab", "fleetd-workers",
"worker: {profile} #{n}", null, null, null);
ClaudeCodeLauncher workers = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(), _ -> null);
return new SessionManager(workers, new GitWorktrees(), clock, contextCap, clearAfterTurn);
return new SessionManager(workers, new GitWorktrees(), clock, contextCap, clearAfterTurn, hook);
}
@Test
@@ -660,6 +720,24 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
"BUSY session remains");
}
@Test
void reapIdleDoesNotReleaseSessionDeliveredAfterItsEligibilityCheck() {
long[] clock = {0};
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
SessionManager[] manager = new SessionManager[1];
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr, () -> clock[0], 0, false,
session -> manager[0].onDelivered(session.terminalId(), TestTurnTokens.inert(session.terminalId())));
manager[0] = sessions;
MemberSession session = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller", "term_primary");
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(session.terminalId());
clock[0] = 11;
assertEquals(0, sessions.reapIdle(10), "delivery replaces the idle snapshot before release");
assertEquals(MemberSession.State.BUSY, sessions.get(session.paneId()).orElseThrow().state(),
"a just-delivered session stays registered and busy");
assertFalse(herdr.called("pane.close"), "the busy session pane is not stopped");
}
@Test
void doneSessionPastIdleTtlIsReaped() {
long[] clock = {0};
@@ -814,6 +892,186 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
.count();
}
// --- fleetd #308: a spawn accepted while the shutdown drain is running must not orphan ---
@Test
void acquireRefusesANewSpawnOnceDrainAllHasStarted() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr);
sessions.drainAll(TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS.toNanos(50)); // empty roster — returns immediately,
// but the shutdown guard it flips must stay tripped for the life of the process.
ShuttingDownException e = assertThrows(ShuttingDownException.class,
() -> sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller", "term_primary"),
"a spawn requested after the drain has begun must be refused loudly (invariant 3), "
+ "not silently registered into a registry the drain will never revisit");
assertNotNull(e.getMessage());
assertFalse(e.getMessage().isBlank(), "the refusal must say why, not just that it failed");
assertTrue(sessions.roster().isEmpty(), "the refused spawn must never reach the registry");
}
/**
* fleetd #308: the guard above closes most of the shutdown-race window, but it cannot close
* all of it — a caller that already passed the {@code draining} check before {@code drainAll}
* flips it can still be mid-{@code launcher.spawn()} (a real herdr round trip, not
* instantaneous) when {@code drainAll} takes its registry snapshot. This test forces exactly
* that interleaving with a launcher double that blocks the second {@code spawn()} call and the
* first {@code stop()} call until released, then proves the post-loop sweep in {@code
* drainAll} still finds and tears down the straggler that lands in the registry afterward.
*/
@Test
void drainAllSweepsAStragglerThatRegisteredAfterTheInitialSnapshot() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
List.of("ccs", "ltms-local"), "tab", "fleetd-workers",
"worker: {profile} #{n}", null, null, null);
ClaudeCodeLauncher delegate = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(), _ -> null);
RaceLauncher race = new RaceLauncher(delegate);
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(race);
// Registered normally, before the drain starts — the first spawn call, never blocked.
MemberSession ready = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", "/ready", "/caller", "ownerR");
ExecutorService exec = Executors.newFixedThreadPool(2);
try {
// The straggler's acquire() reads `draining == false` (checked before this call ever
// touches the launcher) and then blocks inside its own spawn() — the second spawn call.
Future<MemberSession> straggler = exec.submit(() ->
sessions.acquire("ltms-local", "/late", "/caller", "ownerLate"));
assertTrue(race.enteredSecondSpawn.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS),
"the straggler must have passed the shutdown guard and reached spawn() before "
+ "drainAll ever runs");
assertEquals(1, sessions.roster().size(),
"the straggler is still inside spawn() — not registered yet");
// drainAll flips `draining`, snapshots the registry (only `ready` is in it), and starts
// releasing that snapshot — its first release() call stops `ready`'s pane, which this
// launcher double blocks on so the interleaving below is deterministic, not a timing bet.
Future<?> drain = exec.submit(() -> sessions.drainAll(TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(5)));
assertTrue(race.enteredFirstStop.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS),
"drainAll must be stopping the ready session's pane — proof its initial "
+ "registry snapshot has already been taken");
// Only now does the straggler's spawn complete and register — strictly after the
// snapshot drainAll's main pass is working from.
race.releaseSecondSpawn.countDown();
MemberSession registered = straggler.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
// Let drainAll finish releasing `ready`; it then re-checks the registry and must find
// (and drain) the straggler that just landed in it.
race.releaseFirstStop.countDown();
drain.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
assertTrue(sessions.roster().isEmpty(),
"the post-loop sweep must drain the straggler too, not just the initial snapshot");
assertNotNull(registered.paneId());
long paneCloseCalls = herdr.calls.stream().filter(c -> "pane.close".equals(c.method())).count();
assertEquals(2, paneCloseCalls,
"both ready's pane AND the straggler's pane must actually be stopped — a pane "
+ "left running is exactly the orphan this ticket is about");
} finally {
exec.shutdownNow();
}
}
/**
* Delegates every call while blocking the SECOND {@code spawn()} call and the FIRST
* {@code stop()} call until the test releases them — used to force the fleetd #308 race
* deterministically instead of betting on real thread-scheduling timing.
*/
private static final class RaceLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
private final PeerLauncher delegate;
private final AtomicInteger spawnCalls = new AtomicInteger();
private final AtomicInteger stopCalls = new AtomicInteger();
final CountDownLatch enteredSecondSpawn = new CountDownLatch(1);
final CountDownLatch releaseSecondSpawn = new CountDownLatch(1);
final CountDownLatch enteredFirstStop = new CountDownLatch(1);
final CountDownLatch releaseFirstStop = new CountDownLatch(1);
RaceLauncher(PeerLauncher delegate) {
this.delegate = delegate;
}
private static void awaitOrFail(CountDownLatch latch) {
try {
if (!latch.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS)) {
throw new AssertionError("RaceLauncher latch timed out");
}
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
throw new AssertionError("RaceLauncher latch interrupted", e);
}
}
@Override
public Set<Capability> capabilities() {
return delegate.capabilities();
}
@Override
public Set<Capability> capabilitiesFor(String profileName) {
return delegate.capabilitiesFor(profileName);
}
@Override
public PeerHandle spawn(SpawnRequest req) {
if (spawnCalls.incrementAndGet() == 2) {
enteredSecondSpawn.countDown();
awaitOrFail(releaseSecondSpawn);
}
return delegate.spawn(req);
}
@Override
public Set<String> profiles() {
return delegate.profiles();
}
@Override
public String defaultProfile() {
return delegate.defaultProfile();
}
@Override
public String effectiveCwd(SpawnRequest req) {
return delegate.effectiveCwd(req);
}
@Override
public List<String> parityOverlay(String profileName) {
return delegate.parityOverlay(profileName);
}
@Override
public List<?> list() {
return delegate.list();
}
@Override
public int reapOrphanWorkers() {
return delegate.reapOrphanWorkers();
}
@Override
public void stop(String id) {
if (stopCalls.incrementAndGet() == 1) {
enteredFirstStop.countDown();
awaitOrFail(releaseFirstStop);
}
delegate.stop(id);
}
@Override
public boolean clearContext(String id) {
return delegate.clearContext(id);
}
}
private static List<String> promptTexts(FakeHerdr herdr) {
return herdr.calls.stream()
.filter(c -> "agent.prompt".equals(c.method()))
@@ -989,8 +1247,119 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
+ "dirty check threw");
}
// --- fleetd #316: the dirty check must be re-taken after the worker is stopped, not trusted
// stale from before it ------------------------------------------------------------------------
@Test
void reapIdleSurvivesOneSessionThatFailsToRelease() {
void releaseDoesNotRemoveAWorktreeThatBecameDirtyBetweenTheFirstCheckAndRemoval() {
// Models the exact race #316 reports: hasUncommitted answers clean while the worker is
// still running (call 1), the worker then writes new work, and by the time release is
// about to force-remove the worktree a second read (call 2) would see it as dirty. Without
// the fix this test fails: release() never re-reads and force-removes the worktree anyway.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
RecordingWorktrees worktrees = new RecordingWorktrees().dirtySequence(false, true);
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr, worktrees);
MemberSession s = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-316a", null));
sessions.release(s.paneId());
assertTrue(worktrees.removeCalls().isEmpty(),
"a worktree that turned dirty between the pre-stop read and removal must be preserved");
assertEquals(2, worktrees.hasUncommittedCallCount(),
"the fix re-reads hasUncommitted exactly once more, immediately before removal");
}
@Test
void releasePreservesAWorktreeWhoseLateRecheckCannotBeRead() {
// fleetd #316 invariant 1, which no test pinned when the fix landed: the late re-check
// fails toward PRESERVING. Found by mutation — flipping dirtyImmediatelyBeforeRemoval's
// catch from `return true` to `return false` turned the guard into a cause of the very
// data loss it was added to stop, and the whole suite stayed green. The pre-stop read
// succeeds and says clean (call 0); the read that authorises the removal throws (call 1).
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
RecordingWorktrees worktrees = new RecordingWorktrees()
.dirtySequence(false)
.failHasUncommittedOnCall(1, new WorktreeException("git status exited 128"));
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr, worktrees);
MemberSession s = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-316c", null));
sessions.release(s.paneId());
assertTrue(worktrees.removeCalls().isEmpty(),
"a worktree whose state cannot be read immediately before removal must be kept: "
+ "preserving costs disk, deleting on a guess destroys work with no other copy");
assertEquals(2, worktrees.hasUncommittedCallCount(),
"the late re-check still runs — it is the throwing call, not a skipped one");
}
@Test
void releaseSnapshotsWorkFoundOnlyByTheLateRecheck() {
// #316's second half: the pre-stop dirty=false means trySnapshot never ran for this
// session, so the late-discovered work would otherwise have no refs/wip/* copy at all —
// only the on-disk preserve. The re-check path must snapshot it too.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
RecordingWorktrees worktrees = new RecordingWorktrees().dirtySequence(false, true);
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr, worktrees);
MemberSession s = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-316b", null));
sessions.release(s.paneId());
assertEquals(java.util.List.of(s.worktree()), worktrees.snapshotCalls(),
"the newly-dirty worktree is snapshotted even though the pre-stop check saw it clean");
}
@Test
void releaseStillRemovesAWorktreeThatStaysCleanOnTheLateRecheck() {
// The ordinary, non-racing case: nothing else changes behaviour when the second read
// agrees with the first.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
RecordingWorktrees worktrees = new RecordingWorktrees().dirty(false);
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr, worktrees);
MemberSession s = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-316c", null));
sessions.release(s.paneId());
assertEquals(java.util.List.of(s.worktree()), worktrees.removeCalls(),
"a worktree that is still clean on the late recheck is removed as before");
}
@Test
void releaseNeverReChecksAWorktreeAlreadyPreservedByTheFirstDirtyCheck() {
// Invariant 4 from #316: no second unconditional git status. A release that already
// decided to preserve (the ordinary CB-576 dirty path) must not pay for a second read.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
RecordingWorktrees worktrees = new RecordingWorktrees().dirty(true);
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr, worktrees);
MemberSession s = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-316d", null));
sessions.release(s.paneId());
assertEquals(1, worktrees.hasUncommittedCallCount(),
"a release that already preserves on the first read must not re-check before "
+ "skipping the removal it was never going to do");
assertTrue(worktrees.removeCalls().isEmpty());
}
/**
* fleetd #283 defect 1 changed this test's own premise, so its assertions are updated along
* with the production fix. Before #283, the middle session's worktree-removal failure escaped
* {@code release()} uncaught, and this test proved {@code reapIdle}'s own per-session try/catch
* (CB-581) kept the rest of the pass going regardless. Now that {@code release()} itself catches
* a worktree-removal failure (matching every sibling cleanup step in that method) and only logs
* a WARN, {@code release()} no longer throws for this reason — so all three idle sessions are
* released and counted, and the middle one's removal failure is now visible only as the WARN
* {@code release()} itself logs, not as a reap-loop catch. {@code reapIdle}'s own guard (for a
* failure {@code release()} still cannot swallow, e.g. from {@code launcher.stop}) is untouched
* by this ticket. This test no longer exercises that guard — reaching it now needs a failure
* that #283 does not catch inside {@code release()} itself.
*/
@Test
void reapIdleCountsAllThreeSessionsWhenOnlyItsWorktreeRemovalFails() {
long[] clock = {0};
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
RecordingWorktrees worktrees = new RecordingWorktrees();
@@ -1004,8 +1373,8 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(a.terminalId());
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(b.terminalId());
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(c.terminalId());
// The middle session's worktree removal fails — release() propagates that, so this is the
// one call reapIdle's per-session guard must survive without skipping the rest of the pass.
// The middle session's worktree removal fails — fleetd #283 makes release() catch and log
// this itself, so it no longer propagates out of release() at all.
worktrees.failRemoveFor(b.worktree());
LoggerContext ctx = (LoggerContext) LoggerFactory.getILoggerFactory();
@@ -1026,14 +1395,16 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
.map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage)
.filter(m -> m.contains(b.paneId()))
.findFirst()
.orElse("no reap-failure WARN logged");
.orElse("no worktree-removal-failure WARN logged");
assertTrue(warn.contains(b.terminalId()), "the WARN names the failed session's terminal: " + warn);
assertTrue(warn.contains(b.worktree()), "the WARN names the failed session's worktree: " + warn);
} finally {
sessionLog.detachAppender(appender);
}
assertEquals(2, reaped, "the middle session's failure is logged, not counted as reaped");
assertEquals(3, reaped,
"fleetd #283: release() no longer throws for a worktree-removal failure, so reapIdle "
+ "counts all three idle sessions as reaped");
assertTrue(sessions.get(a.paneId()).isEmpty(), "the first session is still released");
assertTrue(sessions.get(c.paneId()).isEmpty(), "the third session is still released");
assertTrue(sessions.get(b.paneId()).isEmpty(),
@@ -1044,6 +1415,79 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCallsFor(herdr, "w9:pRoot_3"), "the third pane is stopped");
}
/**
* fleetd #290: the #283 fix above closed the one trigger this suite used for {@code
* reapIdle}'s own per-session try/catch (CB-581) — a worktree-removal failure is now caught
* and logged inside {@code release()} itself, so it never reaches {@code reapIdle}'s guard at
* all. This test restores coverage of that guard using the trigger the ticket names: {@code
* release()} calls {@code launcher.stop(paneId)} with no try/catch around it, so a failing
* {@code pane.close} propagates straight out of {@code release()} uncaught. {@link
* FakeHerdr#paneCloseFailsForPane} (added for this ticket) makes exactly the middle session's
* stop fail, while the other two still succeed, so this proves {@code reapIdle} keeps reaping
* the rest of the roster rather than aborting the whole pass.
*/
@Test
void reapIdleSurvivesOneSessionWhoseLauncherStopFails() {
long[] clock = {0};
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
RecordingWorktrees worktrees = new RecordingWorktrees();
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr, worktrees, () -> clock[0]);
MemberSession a = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-290a", null));
MemberSession b = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-290b", null));
MemberSession c = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-290c", null));
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(a.terminalId());
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(b.terminalId());
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(c.terminalId());
// Only the middle session's herdr pane fails to close — a and c stop normally. This is the
// trigger reapIdle's own guard is for, now that #283 closed the worktree-removal trigger.
herdr.paneCloseFailsForPane("w9:pRoot_2", "internal_error");
LoggerContext ctx = (LoggerContext) LoggerFactory.getILoggerFactory();
ch.qos.logback.classic.Logger sessionLog =
(ch.qos.logback.classic.Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(SessionManager.class);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.setContext(ctx);
appender.start();
sessionLog.addAppender(appender);
sessionLog.setLevel(Level.WARN);
int reaped;
try {
clock[0] = 100;
reaped = sessions.reapIdle(10);
String warn = appender.list.stream()
.filter(e -> e.getLevel().equals(Level.WARN))
.map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage)
.filter(m -> m.contains("reap failed") && m.contains(b.paneId()))
.findFirst()
.orElse("no reap-failed WARN logged for the failing session");
assertTrue(warn.contains(b.terminalId()), "the WARN names the failed session's terminal: " + warn);
} finally {
sessionLog.detachAppender(appender);
}
assertEquals(2, reaped,
"the middle session's launcher.stop failure is not counted as reaped, but must not "
+ "abort reaping the other two");
assertTrue(sessions.get(a.paneId()).isEmpty(), "the first session is still released");
assertTrue(sessions.get(c.paneId()).isEmpty(),
"the third session is still reached and released — proves the pass did not abort "
+ "when the middle session's release() threw");
assertTrue(sessions.get(b.paneId()).isEmpty(),
"the middle session is still deregistered — release() removes it from the registry "
+ "before launcher.stop() runs, regardless of whether stop() then throws");
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCallsFor(herdr, "w9:pRoot_1"), "the first pane is stopped");
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCallsFor(herdr, "w9:pRoot_2"),
"the middle pane's stop was attempted, even though it failed");
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCallsFor(herdr, "w9:pRoot_3"), "the third pane is stopped");
assertEquals(List.of(a.worktree(), c.worktree()), worktrees.removeCalls().stream().sorted().toList(),
"the middle session's worktree removal never runs — release() throws before reaching "
+ "it — while the other two, unaffected, still have theirs removed");
}
@Test
void unchangedRegressionCleanCompletedReleaseStillRemovesTheWorktree() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -1058,6 +1502,41 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
"COMPLETED release of a clean worktree still removes it");
}
/**
* fleetd #293: {@code HerdrPeerLauncher.stop()} used to run {@code spaces.closeTab} bare — a
* failing {@code tab.close} (any code other than {@code *_not_found}) propagated straight out
* of {@code stop()}. {@code SessionManager.release} calls {@code launcher.stop(paneId)} with
* no try/catch (fleetd #283 wrapped the WORKTREE-removal step further down, not this one), so
* the throw happened <em>before</em> that worktree-removal step ever ran — and by then {@code
* registry.remove(paneId)} had already run, so a second {@code stop} is a no-op: the worktree
* leaked with no retry path. The pane itself is already closed by the time {@code tab.close}
* runs, so its failure is cosmetic workspace tidying, not a real teardown failure. The fix
* wraps {@code closeTab} inside {@code stop()} so it no longer throws for this reason; this
* test proves both halves at once: {@code release()} does not throw, and it still removes the
* worktree.
*/
@Test
void releaseStillRemovesTheWorktreeWhenCloseTabFails() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
RecordingWorktrees worktrees = new RecordingWorktrees();
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr, worktrees);
MemberSession s = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-293a", null));
// FakeHerdr's pane.get always answers with tab_id "w9:t2" for a tab-placement spawn.
herdr.tabCloseFailsForTab("w9:t2", "internal_error");
assertDoesNotThrow(() -> sessions.release(s.paneId()),
"a failing tab.close is cosmetic (the pane is already closed by then) — it must not "
+ "propagate out of release()");
assertTrue(herdr.called("tab.close"), "tab.close was still attempted");
assertEquals(List.of(s.worktree()), worktrees.removeCalls(),
"release() must still remove the worktree even though tab.close failed — this is "
+ "the leak fleetd #293 reports: before the fix, release() never reached this "
+ "step at all");
assertTrue(sessions.get(s.paneId()).isEmpty(), "the session is still deregistered");
}
@Test
void unchangedRegressionDirtyCompletedReleaseStillPreservesTheWorktree() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -212,9 +212,41 @@ class WorktreeSessionManagerTest {
assertEquals("/repo", remove.repoRoot());
assertEquals(s.worktree(), remove.worktreePath());
// The fake records no branch-delete calls because Worktrees.remove only removes the checkout.
assertTrue(worktrees.deleteBranchCalls().isEmpty(),
"a normal release must NEVER delete the branch — it is the worker's only recoverable "
+ "copy of committed work, and only the failed-provisioning path may remove it");
assertTrue(sessions.get(paneId).isEmpty(), "released session is no longer retrievable");
}
/**
* fleetd #283 defect 1. Every other cleanup step in {@code release()} is wrapped in try/catch,
* because {@code exec()} can throw on a non-zero exit or its own 30s timeout — this was the one
* step left bare. By the time it runs, the registry entry, the retained handle, and the pane are
* all already gone, so a throw here used to escape {@code release()} after the session was
* already fully torn down: a second stop on the same paneId is a no-op (nothing left to find),
* so there was no retry path, and the caller saw a failed stop for a session that was in fact
* gone. This test makes the worktree removal throw and asserts release() still completes with
* the pane stopped and the registry clean.
*/
@Test
void releaseCompletesAndStopsPaneEvenWhenWorktreeRemovalThrows() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FakeWorktrees worktrees = new FakeWorktrees().withRepoRoot("/repo").withPrefix("/wt")
.failRemove("stale index lock");
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workerService(herdr), worktrees);
MemberSession s = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-283-1", null));
String paneId = s.paneId();
sessions.release(paneId); // must not throw
assertTrue(herdr.called("pane.close"), "the pane is still stopped despite the removal failure");
assertEquals(1, worktrees.removeCalls().size(), "worktree removal was still attempted");
assertTrue(sessions.get(paneId).isEmpty(),
"the session is deregistered regardless of the removal failure");
assertEquals(0, sessions.size(), "the registry is left clean");
}
/**
* CB-576. A normal {@code COMPLETED} release whose worktree holds uncommitted work must NOT
* remove it — {@code --force} would destroy the worker's only copy. The bridge cannot see
@@ -352,6 +384,39 @@ class WorktreeSessionManagerTest {
assertEquals(0, sessions.size(), "failed acquire leaves no registry entry");
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.start"), "spawn is never reached when add fails");
assertTrue(worktrees.removeCalls().isEmpty(), "no worktree was added, so none is removed");
assertTrue(worktrees.deleteBranchCalls().isEmpty(),
"add() itself never created the branch in git, so there is nothing to delete");
}
/**
* fleetd #283 defect 2. {@code acquireWithWorktree}'s catch covers every failure AFTER
* {@code worktrees.add()} returns — {@code overlayParity}, {@code shareWithGroup},
* {@code launcher.spawn} itself — so by the time it runs, {@code branch} was actually created in
* git. It removed only the worktree and forgot the branch, leaking a {@code worker/<slug>-<nonce>}
* branch on every routine spawn failure (a quarantined credential, a backend refusal). This test
* makes {@code overlayParity} (a post-add() step) throw and asserts the branch is deleted, the
* same way #274 already does for the sibling failure inside {@code add()} itself.
*/
@Test
void spawnFailureAfterAddDeletesTheOrphanedBranch() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FakeWorktrees worktrees = new FakeWorktrees().withRepoRoot("/repo").withPrefix("/wt")
.failOverlay("overlayParity failed");
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workerService(herdr), worktrees);
assertThrows(WorktreeException.class, () ->
sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-283-2", null)));
assertEquals(0, sessions.size(), "failed acquire leaves no registry entry");
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.start"), "spawn is never reached when overlayParity fails");
assertEquals(1, worktrees.removeCalls().size(), "the worktree checkout is still removed");
assertEquals(1, worktrees.deleteBranchCalls().size(),
"the orphaned branch that add() actually created must also be deleted");
FakeWorktrees.DeleteBranchCall del = worktrees.lastDeleteBranch();
assertEquals("/repo", del.repoRoot());
FakeWorktrees.AddCall add = worktrees.lastAdd();
assertEquals(add.branch(), del.branch(), "the branch deleted is the exact one add() created");
}
@Test