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Author SHA1 Message Date
ltms d678783af7 scrub: stop export UID= aborting the allow-list scrub mid-loop
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m23s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m32s
CB-633's generated scrub.zsh blanks every non-allow-listed exported name
in one loop wrapped in `{ ... } 2>/dev/null`. In zsh, `export UID=` is
not a failed command: it is a fatal parameter error ("failed to change
user ID: operation not permitted") that aborts the whole sourced file.
The loop stops at UID, every later name is left unscrubbed, and the
report-writing block never runs -- silently, because of the 2>/dev/null.

The inversion is the severity. `env` lists inherited names first and the
names a startup file exports last, so the loop blanked the harmless
inherited half and died immediately before the operator's own exports --
exactly the credentials this policy exists to remove.

Measured on a fleet01 member pane: UID is name 42 of 57, and a decoy
exported from ~/.zshrc sat at 58, non-empty, on 8 of 8 spawns. xtrace
ends at `+scrub.zsh:28> export 'UID='` with rc=126. Reproduced
independently on macOS/zsh 5.9 (fleetd #394).

CONTAINMENT: `eval`, then VERIFY.

Neither `export "$n=" 2>/dev/null || true` nor a `${(t)n}` type guard
contains it -- both still abort, because it is an assignment error and
not a command failure. Only `eval` does. `eval` is safe at that point
because the loop above already rejected every name that is not
[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*, so nothing but a bare identifier reaches it.

Enumerating the specials (UID|EUID|GID|EGID|PPID|LINENO) also works, but
only for the names enumerated: one that turns up exported on another
host brings the abort straight back. `eval` covers all of them.

`eval` alone, though, contains the error WITHOUT blanking the value, so
the name would be reported as blanked having never been blanked --
measured: attempted=59 with UID still 1000. So each name is verified
after the attempt and only counted when it actually blanked. A name that
could not be blanked currently falls into the "allowed" count, which is
imprecise in the safe direction; the honest third count ("tried and could
not blank") needs a report-format change -- readReport treats every
non-first non-blank line as a blanked name -- and belongs with #394.

Why the suite stayed green: EnvAllowListScrubTest starts zsh from a
CLEARED parent (`pb.environment().clear()`), where UID is not an
exported name at all, so the abort cannot reproduce there. The new test
supplies the production shape -- UID present and exported -- and asserts
a report exists, which is written by the last statement in the file and
so proves the script ran to completion. Verified by mutation in both
shapes: reverting the fix fails exactly that test and no other.

Orthogonal to #388, which adds a fifth call site to a script that still
aborts at the same name.
2026-09-10 01:12:27 +00:00
Dai Ha 799014e99d Merge #388: scrub a pane shell that is neither login nor interactive
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m8s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m38s
2026-09-10 07:21:48 +07:00
Dai Ha 69e09b10fa #388: scrub a pane shell that is neither login nor interactive
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 49s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m32s
EnvAllowListScrub generated four zsh startup files but only .zshrc and
.zlogin sourced the scrub — .zshenv (the one file zsh always reads) did
not. A pane shell that is neither login nor interactive reads only
.zshenv and stops, so it was never scrubbed at all (measured on fleet01,
issue #388).

Adding an unguarded scrub to .zshenv (the ticket's own suggested fix) is
wrong: .zshenv is read by every zsh, including a short-lived `zsh -c`
a member's own tooling forks for a single command. Those children are
also neither login nor interactive, so they would scrub the environment
their parent deliberately set for them (GIT_DIR, VIRTUAL_ENV, ...), and
the rewritten scrub-report.txt would describe the last child to exit
instead of the pane.

Fix (per comment 15387, measured): keep .zshrc/.zlogin unconditional,
and add to .zshenv a pass guarded on the exact condition that defines
the gap (neither login nor interactive), plus a per-pane sentinel
(_CB633_SCRUBBED) so it runs once per pane, not once per process. The
sentinel is exported only after the scrub runs, and is folded into the
scrub's own allow-list so a later pass in the same pane cannot blank it
back to empty.

Also corrects the class javadoc's wrong premise (a bare argv[0] proves
NOT login, not "therefore interactive") and its now-stale two-file
walkthrough.

Tests: two new real-zsh tests in EnvAllowListScrubTest run actual
non-login/non-interactive zsh processes (never string-match the
generated files) to prove: a neither-shell pane is scrubbed; a child
that pane forks keeps variables the pane deliberately set for it; the
child does not re-scrub; and scrub-report.txt still describes the pane
after the child exits. Both fail without the production fix (verified
by reverting it and re-running: AssertionFailedError on the sentinel
and on the decoy secret surviving).
2026-09-10 07:21:08 +07:00
Dai Ha b9d09e044e t386: pin the per-member drift baseline the fix's own tests left open
CI / contract (push) Successful in 37s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m57s
The two tests merged with #386 both start with the member already BUSY, so a
single global drift baseline passes them. This one sleeps the host while nothing
is busy and only then starts a turn, which fails without the per-member map.
2026-09-10 06:59:42 +07:00
Dai Ha fd8650cda4 Merge #386: correct the stall check for a monotonic clock frozen by host sleep 2026-09-10 06:56:37 +07:00
Dai Ha 11050e24ed t384: fix javadoc indentation on the merged shareWithGroup lines
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m7s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m29s
2026-09-10 06:54:51 +07:00
Dai Ha 6f71f40047 Merge #384: pre-create the scrub receipt and give it group write 2026-09-10 06:49:46 +07:00
Dai Ha fb36c5238f Merge #382: SpawnRequest.withProfile() replaces the six-accessor rebuild 2026-09-10 06:49:46 +07:00
Dai Ha cc9cdc938b #384: write shared scrub receipts 2026-09-10 06:45:30 +07:00
Dai Ha 5fede82468 #382: give SpawnRequest a withProfile wither, guard it against the arity trap
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 44s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m49s
CompositePeerLauncher:372 rebuilt a routed SpawnRequest from a literal
new SpawnRequest(...) call listing six of the original request's own
accessors. That call is only correct because it happens to match the
canonical 6-arg constructor today; add a 7th component plus the
established back-compat constructor at the old (now-shorter) arity and
this call would silently rebind to it, dropping the new field on every
profile-routed spawn with no compile error — the same defect shape
already guarded on FleetConfig.withDefaults() (#357) and MemberSession
(#358).

Add SpawnRequest.withProfile(String), modeled on
MemberSession.withState/withActivity, and use it at the call site
instead. Add a guard test that resolves the true canonical constructor
by exact component types (never by argument count), gives every
component a distinctive value, and asserts every component but
profileName survives withProfile() unchanged.

Proved the guard against the real mechanism: temporarily dropped the
last (role) argument from withProfile()'s constructor call so it bound
to the 5-arg back-compat constructor — it still compiled, and the new
test failed, catching the silently-defaulted role. Restored the fix
and reconfirmed green.
2026-09-10 06:44:15 +07:00
6 changed files with 530 additions and 36 deletions
@@ -369,8 +369,7 @@ public final class CompositePeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
// CB-547a: route the chosen profile but keep the caller's session identity — dropping it
// here would silently sever the resume handle on every policy-routed spawn. CB-557: the
// role rides along for the same reason, or a routed spawn would be labelled as a dev.
SpawnRequest routedReq = new SpawnRequest(chosen.profile(), req.requestedCwd(), req.callerCwd(),
req.sessionName(), req.resumeSessionId(), req.role());
SpawnRequest routedReq = req.withProfile(chosen.profile());
try {
PeerHandle handle = d.spawn(routedReq);
spawnedBy.put(handle.id(), d);
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import java.nio.file.attribute.PosixFilePermissions;
import java.time.Duration;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.stream.Stream;
@@ -28,24 +29,46 @@ import java.util.stream.Stream;
* control lacked: herdr applies that overlay BEFORE the shell starts, so any sourced file can undo
* it — and did.
*
* <p><b>Which file is last depends on the platform, so the scrub runs from two of them.</b> zsh
* <p><b>zsh reads its four startup files under three different conditions, so no single file is
* guaranteed to run — the scrub has to cover the gap between them, not just the platforms.</b> zsh
* reads {@code .zshenv} always, {@code .zprofile} and {@code .zlogin} only for a LOGIN shell, and
* {@code .zshrc} only for an INTERACTIVE one. herdr does not open the same kind of shell
* everywhere — measured on herdr 0.8.0: macOS panes run {@code -zsh} (login, so {@code .zlogin}
* runs), Linux panes run a plain {@code /usr/bin/zsh} (interactive but NOT login, so
* {@code .zlogin} never runs at all). A scrub in {@code .zlogin} alone is therefore a control that
* silently does nothing on Linux — the exact failure this class exists to remove, one platform
* over.
* {@code .zshrc} only for an INTERACTIVE one. A pane shell that is at least one of login or
* interactive is covered by sourcing the scrub from {@code .zshrc} and {@code .zlogin} (below), but
* a pane shell that is NEITHER reads only {@code .zshenv} and stops — fleetd #388, measured: a herdr
* pane can be neither login nor interactive, and such a pane read {@code .zshenv}, never reached
* {@code scrub.zsh}, and left no report at all. A bare {@code argv[0]} of {@code /usr/bin/zsh}
* proves the shell is NOT a login shell; it says nothing about whether it is interactive, so it
* must never be read as "therefore interactive" — that wrong inference is what let #388 ship.
*
* <p>So both {@code .zshrc} and {@code .zlogin} source the same generated {@code scrub.zsh} after
* sourcing their {@code $HOME} counterpart. On Linux only the first fires; on macOS both do, and
* the second pass is deliberate rather than merely harmless — it re-scrubs anything the operator's
* own {@code ~/.zlogin} exported after {@code .zshrc} had finished. Re-running is idempotent: a
* name already blank is blanked again, and the report is rewritten with the same counts.
* <p>So {@code .zshenv} carries a THIRD pass, guarded by the exact condition that defines the gap:
* {@code [[ ! -o login && ! -o interactive ]]}. That guard is why this pass cannot double-scrub a
* pane that {@code .zshrc} or {@code .zlogin} will also cover — one of {@code -o login}/
* {@code -o interactive} is always true there, so the {@code .zshenv} pass never fires for them, and
* their own unconditional sourcing is untouched. The guard also carries a sentinel
* ({@value #SCRUB_SENTINEL}) so it fires once per PANE and not once per PROCESS: {@code .zshenv} is
* read by every zsh a member's own tooling forks (a plain {@code zsh -c '...'} for a single
* command is itself neither login nor interactive), and those children inherit variables their
* parent deliberately set for them (git hooks get {@code GIT_DIR}, a venv gets
* {@code VIRTUAL_ENV}, a build tool gets {@code NODE_OPTIONS} or {@code JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS}).
* Re-scrubbing every such child would blank all of that, and would also make the pane's own
* {@code scrub-report.txt} — rewritten on every pass — describe whichever child exited last
* instead of the pane. The sentinel is exported only AFTER {@code scrub.zsh} runs, so the pass
* that sets it never sees it and cannot blank it; it must also be on the scrub's own allow-list
* (see {@link #generate(Path, Set)}) so a later pass, in the same pane, cannot blank it back to
* empty — an exported-but-empty sentinel reads as unset to the {@code -z} guard and would silently
* re-enable scrubbing for every subsequent child of that pane.
*
* <p>So all three of {@code .zshenv} (gap only, guarded), {@code .zshrc}, and {@code .zlogin}
* source the same generated {@code scrub.zsh} after sourcing their {@code $HOME} counterpart. A
* login-and-interactive pane runs the {@code .zshrc} and {@code .zlogin} passes, and the second is
* deliberate rather than merely harmless — it re-scrubs anything the operator's own
* {@code ~/.zlogin} exported after {@code .zshrc} had finished. A pane that is neither runs only the
* {@code .zshenv} pass. Re-running is idempotent: a name already blank is blanked again, and the
* report is rewritten with the same counts.
*
* <p>Each generated file sources its {@code $HOME} counterpart FIRST, so {@code PATH} and every
* toolchain binary still resolve exactly as the operator configured them; only afterwards does
* {@code .zlogin} run the scrub: every EXPORTED variable not on the derived allow-list is re-exported
* toolchain binary still resolve exactly as the operator configured them; only afterwards does the
* scrub run: every EXPORTED variable not on the derived allow-list is re-exported
* blank. Blank, not credential-shaped-pattern-filtered: a pattern list ({@code *TOKEN*}, …) is an
* enumeration and misses what it did not think of — a username is the other half of a credential and
* is shaped like none. Credential-SHAPED names among the blanked set go to the WARN log only,
@@ -63,7 +86,11 @@ public final class EnvAllowListScrub {
/** Name of the report file written into the generated directory by the scrub itself. */
static final String REPORT_FILE = "scrub-report.txt";
/** The scrub body, generated once and sourced from both {@code .zshrc} and {@code .zlogin}. */
/**
* The scrub body, generated once and sourced from {@code .zshrc} and {@code .zlogin}
* unconditionally, and from {@code .zshenv} when the pane shell is neither login nor
* interactive (fleetd #388) — see the class javadoc.
*/
static final String SCRUB_FILE = "scrub.zsh";
/** Prefix of every generated directory — also what {@link #reapOrphans} matches on. */
@@ -79,6 +106,28 @@ public final class EnvAllowListScrub {
private static final String SOURCE_SCRUB =
"source \"$ZDOTDIR/" + SCRUB_FILE + "\"\n";
/**
* fleetd #388: marks a pane, not a process, as already scrubbed. Set only by the guarded
* {@code .zshenv} pass (see {@link #NEITHER_LOGIN_NOR_INTERACTIVE_SCRUB}) after
* {@code scrub.zsh} has run, so it must also be folded into that pass's own allow-list — see
* the class javadoc's "must also be on the scrub's own allow-list" paragraph.
*/
static final String SCRUB_SENTINEL = "_CB633_SCRUBBED";
/**
* Appended to {@code .zshenv}, after its {@code $HOME} source: the third pass, guarded on the
* exact condition that defines the gap {@code .zshrc}/{@code .zlogin} do not cover — a shell
* that is neither login nor interactive. The sentinel export happens only once the scrub has
* already run, and only for as long as the current pane's environment has not been rebuilt from
* scratch (a fresh {@code env -i} child would not inherit it — that is out of scope here, since
* such a child is no longer running under the pane's own environment at all).
*/
private static final String NEITHER_LOGIN_NOR_INTERACTIVE_SCRUB =
"if [[ ! -o login && ! -o interactive && -z \"${" + SCRUB_SENTINEL + ":-}\" ]]; then\n"
+ " " + SOURCE_SCRUB
+ " export " + SCRUB_SENTINEL + "=1\n"
+ "fi\n";
private EnvAllowListScrub() {
}
@@ -105,11 +154,16 @@ public final class EnvAllowListScrub {
reapOrphans(parentDir);
Path dir = Files.createTempDirectory(parentDir, DIR_PREFIX);
dir.toFile().deleteOnExit();
// The report is written by zsh, after these hooks are registered, so register its path
// too — otherwise the directory is non-empty at JVM exit and cannot be removed at all.
dir.resolve(REPORT_FILE).toFile().deleteOnExit();
write(dir, SCRUB_FILE, scrubScript(allowedNames));
write(dir, ".zshenv", homeSourcingFile(".zshenv"));
// zsh truncates this pre-created receipt after these hooks are registered. Register its
// path too — otherwise the directory is non-empty at JVM exit and cannot be removed.
Files.createFile(dir.resolve(REPORT_FILE)).toFile().deleteOnExit();
// fleetd #388: scrub.zsh's OWN allow-list must also keep SCRUB_SENTINEL, or a later
// pass in the same pane blanks it back to empty and the .zshenv guard below thinks it
// was never scrubbed — see the class javadoc.
Set<String> namesForScrubScript = new HashSet<>(allowedNames);
namesForScrubScript.add(SCRUB_SENTINEL);
write(dir, SCRUB_FILE, scrubScript(namesForScrubScript));
write(dir, ".zshenv", homeSourcingFile(".zshenv") + NEITHER_LOGIN_NOR_INTERACTIVE_SCRUB);
write(dir, ".zprofile", homeSourcingFile(".zprofile"));
write(dir, ".zshrc", homeSourcingFile(".zshrc") + SOURCE_SCRUB);
write(dir, ".zlogin", homeSourcingFile(".zlogin") + SOURCE_SCRUB);
@@ -147,12 +201,11 @@ public final class EnvAllowListScrub {
* into it: owner keeps full access, {@code group} gets traverse+read on the directory ({@code
* rwxr-x---}, so a member process — a login shell reading it via {@code ZDOTDIR}, or another
* process simply opening a file under it — running under that group can find and read the
* files) and read-only on each file ({@code rw-r-----}) — deliberately no group WRITE anywhere,
* since a member never needs to add or change what fleetd generated. (For the ZDOTDIR scrub
* specifically, this also means the scrub script's own report write inside the pane fails
* closed rather than open — see {@code scrub.zsh}'s trailing {@code 2>/dev/null} — which {@link
* dev.ltms.fleet.member.HerdrPeerLauncher#releaseZdotdir} already treats as "cannot be
* confirmed to have run" rather than success.)
* files) and read-only on each file ({@code rw-r-----}), except the pre-created ZDOTDIR
* {@code scrub-report.txt}. That receipt gets group write ({@code rw-rw----}), so
* {@code scrub.zsh} can truncate and write it without granting group write on the directory.
* If its optional permission change fails, the member cannot write a receipt and the launcher
* keeps its existing WARN rather than failing the spawn.
*
* <p>Package-private and named generically on purpose: fleetd #213 built this for the ZDOTDIR
* scrub directory, and fleetd #219 reuses it verbatim for {@link
@@ -167,7 +220,15 @@ public final class EnvAllowListScrub {
setGroupAndPermissions(dir, principal, "rwxr-x---");
try (Stream<Path> entries = Files.list(dir)) {
for (Path file : entries.toList()) {
setGroupAndPermissions(file, principal, "rw-r-----");
if (REPORT_FILE.equals(file.getFileName().toString())) {
try {
setGroupAndPermissions(file, principal, "rw-rw----");
} catch (IOException | UnsupportedOperationException ignored) {
// The receipt is optional. Its absence keeps the existing WARN path.
}
} else {
setGroupAndPermissions(file, principal, "rw-r-----");
}
}
}
} catch (IOException e) {
@@ -245,11 +306,13 @@ public final class EnvAllowListScrub {
}
return """
# generated by fleetd (CB-633 memberCredentials policy=allow-list) — do not edit.
# Sourced from .zshrc and again from .zlogin, each time AFTER that file has sourced
# its $HOME counterpart — so this runs after everything the operator sourced, on a
# login shell (macOS panes) and on a plain interactive one (Linux panes) alike.
# Running twice is idempotent and deliberate: the second pass catches anything
# ~/.zlogin exported after ~/.zshrc had finished.
# Sourced unconditionally from .zshrc and again from .zlogin, each time AFTER that
# file has sourced its $HOME counterpart — so this runs after everything the
# operator sourced, on any pane that is login and/or interactive. Running twice is
# idempotent and deliberate: the second pass catches anything ~/.zlogin exported
# after ~/.zshrc had finished. Also sourced, once, from a guarded pass in .zshenv
# (fleetd #388) when the pane shell is NEITHER login nor interactive — the one gap
# those two files do not cover.
typeset -A _cb633_allowed
for _cb633_n in %s; do _cb633_allowed[$_cb633_n]=1; done
@@ -271,7 +334,30 @@ public final class EnvAllowListScrub {
_cb633_blank+=("$_cb633_n")
done
{ for _cb633_n in "${_cb633_blank[@]}"; do export "$_cb633_n="; done; } 2>/dev/null
# `export UID=` is not a failed command: it is a FATAL zsh parameter error
# ("failed to change user ID") that aborts this whole sourced file mid-loop,
# leaving every later name unscrubbed and the report below unwritten — silently,
# because of the 2>/dev/null. Neither `|| true` nor a `${(t)n}` type guard
# contains it; only `eval` does. `eval` is safe here precisely because the loop
# above already rejected every name that is not [A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*, so
# nothing but a bare identifier can reach it.
#
# Enumerating the special names instead (UID|EUID|GID|EGID|PPID|LINENO) also
# works, but only for the ones enumerated: a special that turns up exported on
# some other host brings the abort straight back. `eval` contains all of them.
#
# Then VERIFY. A contained failure is still a failure, so a name that did not
# actually blank must not be reported as blanked. It currently falls into the
# "allowed" count, which is imprecise in the safe direction; the honest third
# count ("tried and could not blank") needs a report-format change and belongs
# with fleetd #394, not here.
typeset -a _cb633_done
_cb633_done=()
for _cb633_n in "${_cb633_blank[@]}"; do
eval "export ${_cb633_n}=" 2>/dev/null
[[ -z "${(P)_cb633_n}" ]] && _cb633_done+=("$_cb633_n")
done
_cb633_blank=("${_cb633_done[@]}")
integer _cb633_kept=$(( _cb633_total - ${#_cb633_blank} ))
{
@@ -279,7 +365,7 @@ public final class EnvAllowListScrub {
for _cb633_n in "${_cb633_blank[@]}"; do print -r -- "$_cb633_n"; done
} > "$ZDOTDIR/%s" 2>/dev/null
unset _cb633_allowed _cb633_names _cb633_blank _cb633_n _cb633_total _cb633_kept
unset _cb633_done _cb633_allowed _cb633_names _cb633_blank _cb633_n _cb633_total _cb633_kept
""".formatted(names, MemberEnvAllowList.zshCasePattern(), REPORT_FILE);
}
@@ -29,4 +29,9 @@ public record SpawnRequest(String profileName, String requestedCwd, String calle
String sessionName, String resumeSessionId) {
this(profileName, requestedCwd, callerCwd, sessionName, resumeSessionId, null);
}
/** Return a copy of this request with {@code profileName} replaced by {@code profile}. */
public SpawnRequest withProfile(String profile) {
return new SpawnRequest(profile, requestedCwd, callerCwd, sessionName, resumeSessionId, role);
}
}
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ import java.util.concurrent.ScheduledFuture;
import java.util.concurrent.ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicReference;
import java.util.function.BiConsumer;
import java.util.function.LongSupplier;
@@ -277,6 +278,58 @@ class FleetHealthMonitorTest {
}
}
/**
* fleetd #386 follow-up, added on merge. The fix carries a PER-MEMBER drift baseline, so drift
* from a sleep that happened BEFORE a member went busy is never charged to that member. The
* two tests shipped with the fix both start with the member already BUSY, so a single global
* baseline passes them — this one fails without the per-member map.
*
* <p>Order matters: the host sleeps while nothing is busy, and only then does a member take a
* turn. Its stall clock must start at zero.
*/
@Test void driftFromASleepBeforeAMemberWentBusyIsNotChargedToThatMember() {
Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(FleetHealthMonitor.class);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.start();
logger.addAppender(appender);
try {
AtomicLong mono = new AtomicLong(0);
AtomicLong real = new AtomicLong(0);
AtomicReference<List<MemberSession>> roster = new AtomicReference<>(List.of());
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().withAgent("busy", "term_busy", "pane_busy", "tab_busy");
var scheduler = Executors.newSingleThreadScheduledExecutor();
AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = new FleetHealthMonitor(agents, roster::get,
new MessageService(agents, new Injector(agents), new Rendezvous(), new InMemoryReplyInbox()),
scheduler, mono::get, real::get, 60, 600, (_, _) -> { });
monitor.tick(); // baseline, no members yet
// The host sleeps for 700s with nobody busy: the monotonic clock stands still.
real.set(TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(700));
monitor.tick();
// Awake again. Only NOW does a member start a turn, with a fresh activity stamp taken
// from the monotonic clock. Both clocks advance together from here.
mono.set(TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(10));
real.set(TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(710));
roster.set(List.of(member("term_busy", MemberSession.State.BUSY,
0, TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(10))));
monitor.tick();
mono.set(TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(20));
real.set(TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(720));
monitor.tick();
monitor.stop();
assertEquals(0, appender.list.stream().filter(event -> event.getFormattedMessage()
.contains("member=term_busy state=STALL_SUSPECTED")).count(),
"the member has been busy for 10s, not 710s — the earlier sleep is not its stall");
} finally {
logger.detachAppender(appender);
}
}
private static FleetHealthMonitor monitorWithClocks(FakeHerdr herdr, List<MemberSession> roster,
java.util.concurrent.ScheduledExecutorService scheduler, LongSupplier clock,
LongSupplier realtimeClock, long intervalSeconds, long workingSuspectAfterSeconds,
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNotNull;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNull;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
@@ -45,6 +47,15 @@ class EnvAllowListScrubTest {
/** Env var names appearing in command output; anything else (prompts, wrapped lines) is noise. */
private static final Pattern ENV_NAME = Pattern.compile("^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)$");
/**
* fleetd #388: the sentinel name the generated {@code .zshenv} guard uses, kept here as a
* literal rather than referencing {@link EnvAllowListScrub#SCRUB_SENTINEL} — the two tests that
* use it must still compile and run against the pre-fix production class (which has no such
* constant), so the revert-and-prove-it-fails step exercises a real assertion instead of a
* compilation error.
*/
private static final String SCRUB_SENTINEL_NAME = "_CB633_SCRUBBED";
/**
* The equality test. Expected survivors = baseline exports ∩ allowed — i.e. every survivor is
* allowed AND every allowed name that existed survives. The operator's own secret-store exports
@@ -108,6 +119,68 @@ class EnvAllowListScrubTest {
"allowed N of M with N <= M — the denominator is always reported");
}
/**
* A pane inherits {@code UID}; a cleared test parent does not. The scrub must survive it.
*
* <p>Every other test here starts zsh from a CLEARED environment, so {@code UID} is never an
* exported name and never reaches the blanking loop. In a real member pane it is exported and
* it IS reached — and {@code export UID=} is a fatal zsh parameter error that aborts the whole
* sourced file, leaving every later name unscrubbed and writing no report at all. The abort is
* silent: the loop is wrapped in {@code 2>/dev/null}.
*
* <p>The assertion is deliberately "a report exists" rather than "the canary is blanked". The
* report is written by the last statement in the file, so its presence proves the script ran
* to completion; the canary alone would depend on where it happens to sit in {@code env} order.
* Both are checked, but only the first one fails deterministically without the fix.
*/
@Test
void scrubSurvivesAnInheritedUidTheWayARealPaneHasIt(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
assumeTrue(Files.isExecutable(ZSH), "/bin/zsh not present — nothing to prove here");
Set<String> allowed = MemberEnvAllowList.derive(List.of());
Path zdotdir = EnvAllowListScrub.generate(tmp, allowed);
// The production shape: UID present and exported, as every pane shell inherits it.
Map<String, String> paneLikeParent = Map.of(
"HOME", System.getProperty("user.home"),
"PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin",
"SHELL", "/bin/zsh",
"UID", "1000",
"CB633_CANARY", "must-not-survive-the-scrub");
Set<String> survivors = exportedNamesFromCleanParent(paneLikeParent, zdotdir);
EnvAllowListScrub.ScrubReport report = EnvAllowListScrub.readReport(zdotdir);
assertNotNull(report,
"an inherited UID must not abort the scrub — no report means the file died mid-loop "
+ "and every name after UID in `env` order was left unscrubbed");
assertFalse(survivors.contains("CB633_CANARY"),
"a non-allow-listed name must still be blanked when UID is in the environment");
}
/** A group-shared ZDOTDIR still lets the member truncate and write its pre-created receipt. */
@Test
void groupSharedScrubWritesAndReadsItsReport(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
assumeTrue(Files.isExecutable(ZSH), "/bin/zsh not present — nothing to prove here");
Set<String> allowed = MemberEnvAllowList.derive(List.of());
Path zdotdir = EnvAllowListScrub.generate(tmp, allowed, currentUserGroup());
Map<String, String> cleanParent = Map.of(
"HOME", System.getProperty("user.home"),
"PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin",
"SHELL", "/bin/zsh");
exportedNamesFromCleanParent(cleanParent, zdotdir);
EnvAllowListScrub.ScrubReport report = EnvAllowListScrub.readReport(zdotdir);
assertNotNull(report, "a group-shared completed login shell must leave a report behind");
assertTrue(report.allowed() >= 0 && report.total() >= report.allowed(),
"allowed N of M with N <= M — the denominator is always reported");
assertEquals("rw-rw----", java.nio.file.attribute.PosixFilePermissions.toString(
Files.getPosixFilePermissions(zdotdir.resolve(EnvAllowListScrub.REPORT_FILE))),
"the pre-created receipt must be group-writable");
assertEquals("rwxr-x---", java.nio.file.attribute.PosixFilePermissions.toString(
Files.getPosixFilePermissions(zdotdir)),
"group sharing must not make the ZDOTDIR directory group-writable");
}
/** Report parsing is lenient: absent file → null (no measurement), not an exception. */
@Test
void readReportReturnsNullForADirectoryWithoutOne(@TempDir Path dir) {
@@ -224,6 +297,140 @@ class EnvAllowListScrubTest {
+ "shell. A difference here means the scrub is dead on Linux.");
}
/**
* fleetd #388: the actual gap. zsh reads {@code .zshenv} always, {@code .zprofile}/
* {@code .zlogin} only for a LOGIN shell, and {@code .zshrc} only for an INTERACTIVE one — so a
* shell that is NEITHER (a bare {@code /bin/zsh} reading a script off a non-tty stdin, no
* {@code -l}, no {@code -i}) reads only {@code .zshenv} and stops. Before this fix, that shell
* never reached {@code scrub.zsh} at all: the decoy secret below would survive untouched. This
* test injects that decoy directly into the process environment (not via a sourced dotfile,
* since the whole point of the gap is that {@code .zshenv} is normally close to empty) so the
* test does not depend on any real {@code ~/.zshrc} content existing on the host.
*/
@Test
void scrubRunsInAShellThatIsNeitherLoginNorInteractive(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
assumeTrue(Files.isExecutable(ZSH), "/bin/zsh not present — nothing to prove here");
Set<String> allowed = MemberEnvAllowList.derive(List.of());
Path zdotdir = EnvAllowListScrub.generate(tmp, allowed);
Map<String, String> cleanParent = new HashMap<>(Map.of(
"HOME", System.getProperty("user.home"),
"PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin",
"SHELL", "/bin/zsh",
"USER", System.getProperty("user.name", "nobody"),
"TMPDIR", tmp.toString()));
cleanParent.put("FLEETD_TEST_DECOY_SECRET", "x"); // not on any allow-list; must be blanked
List<String> neither = List.of(); // no -l, no -i; stdin is a pipe (never a tty) either way
Set<String> baseline = exportedNamesFromCleanParent(cleanParent, null, neither);
Set<String> scrubbed = exportedNamesFromCleanParent(cleanParent, zdotdir, neither);
Set<String> expected = new TreeSet<>();
for (String name : baseline) {
if (MemberEnvAllowList.keeps(allowed, name)) {
expected.add(name);
}
}
assertTrue(baseline.contains("FLEETD_TEST_DECOY_SECRET"),
"sanity: the decoy must actually reach the un-scrubbed baseline, or this test proves "
+ "nothing");
expected.add("ZDOTDIR"); // the harness set it and it is infrastructure, so it must survive
expected.add(SCRUB_SENTINEL_NAME); // set by the new .zshenv guard once scrubbed
assertEquals(expected, scrubbed,
"a pane shell that is NEITHER login nor interactive must still be scrubbed — its "
+ "surviving exported names must EQUAL baseline ∩ allow-list, plus the "
+ "sentinel the guard sets once it has run. FLEETD_TEST_DECOY_SECRET surviving "
+ "here means the gap is still open.");
}
/**
* fleetd #388 invariants 3 and 4, which a name-set equality cannot show: a member's own tooling
* forks plain, non-login, non-interactive zsh processes for a single command (the same shape as
* the pane shell itself), and such a child must (a) keep whatever its parent deliberately set
* for it, never (b) re-run the scrub and blank it, and never (c) overwrite the pane's own
* {@code scrub-report.txt} with a description of itself instead of the pane. All three can only
* be shown by actually running a child process from within the scrubbed pane shell.
*
* <p>The pane and the child both report presence via {@code ${NAME:+present}} — empty when a
* name is unset OR blanked (exported empty), {@code present} when it is set and non-empty. No
* value is ever printed, only these two shapes and the literal word {@code set}/{@code unset}
* for the sentinel.
*/
@Test
void neitherShellChildKeepsParentVariablesAndReceiptStillDescribesThePane(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
assumeTrue(Files.isExecutable(ZSH), "/bin/zsh not present — nothing to prove here");
Set<String> allowed = MemberEnvAllowList.derive(List.of());
Path zdotdir = EnvAllowListScrub.generate(tmp, allowed);
Map<String, String> paneEnv = new HashMap<>(Map.of(
"HOME", System.getProperty("user.home"),
"PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin",
"SHELL", "/bin/zsh",
"USER", System.getProperty("user.name", "nobody"),
"TMPDIR", tmp.toString()));
paneEnv.put("FLEETD_TEST_DECOY_SECRET", "x"); // not allow-listed; the pane must blank it
paneEnv.put("ZDOTDIR", zdotdir.toAbsolutePath().toString());
// The pane's own script reports what IT sees, then forks a plain non-login, non-interactive
// child — the shape a member's own tooling uses — carrying a variable the "parent" (this
// pane) deliberately set for it, the way git sets GIT_DIR for a hook.
String outerScript = """
print -r -- "PANE_SENTINEL=${%1$s:+set}"
print -r -- "PANE_DECOY=${FLEETD_TEST_DECOY_SECRET:+present}"
FLEETD_TEST_TOOL_VAR=keep /bin/zsh <<'CHILD'
print -r -- "CHILD_LOGIN=$([[ -o login ]] && echo yes || echo no)"
print -r -- "CHILD_INTERACTIVE=$([[ -o interactive ]] && echo yes || echo no)"
print -r -- "CHILD_TOOL_VAR=${FLEETD_TEST_TOOL_VAR:+present}"
print -r -- "CHILD_DECOY=${FLEETD_TEST_DECOY_SECRET:+present}"
print -r -- "CHILD_SENTINEL=${%1$s:+set}"
CHILD
exit
""".formatted(SCRUB_SENTINEL_NAME);
ProcessBuilder pb = new ProcessBuilder("/bin/zsh"); // no -l, no -i: the pane's own shape
pb.environment().clear();
pb.environment().putAll(paneEnv);
pb.redirectError(ProcessBuilder.Redirect.DISCARD);
Process zsh = pb.start();
zsh.getOutputStream().write(outerScript.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
zsh.getOutputStream().flush();
zsh.getOutputStream().close();
String stdout = new String(zsh.getInputStream().readAllBytes(), StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
assertTrue(zsh.waitFor(60, java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit.SECONDS),
"the pane+child probe did not exit within 60s");
assertTrue(zsh.exitValue() == 0, "probe zsh exited non-zero: " + stdout);
Map<String, String> reported = new HashMap<>();
for (String line : stdout.split("\n")) {
int eq = line.indexOf('=');
if (eq > 0) {
reported.put(line.substring(0, eq).trim(), line.substring(eq + 1).trim());
}
}
assertEquals("set", reported.get("PANE_SENTINEL"),
"the pane itself is neither login nor interactive, so the .zshenv guard must have "
+ "run the scrub and exported the sentinel");
assertEquals("", reported.get("PANE_DECOY"),
"the pane must blank a non-allow-listed name — invariant 1");
assertEquals("no", reported.get("CHILD_LOGIN"), "sanity: the child must also be non-login");
assertEquals("no", reported.get("CHILD_INTERACTIVE"), "sanity: the child must also be non-interactive");
assertEquals("present", reported.get("CHILD_TOOL_VAR"),
"invariant 3: a variable the pane deliberately set for its child must survive — a "
+ "child that re-ran the scrub would have blanked it");
assertEquals("", reported.get("CHILD_DECOY"),
"a name already blanked by the pane must stay blanked in the child, never resurrected");
assertEquals("set", reported.get("CHILD_SENTINEL"),
"the child must inherit the sentinel from the pane's environment, or it would re-scrub");
EnvAllowListScrub.ScrubReport report = EnvAllowListScrub.readReport(zdotdir);
assertNotNull(report, "the pane's own scrub pass must leave a report behind");
assertTrue(report.blanked().stream().noneMatch(n -> n.startsWith("FLEETD_TEST_TOOL_VAR")),
"invariant 4: the receipt must still describe the PANE, not the child — a child that "
+ "re-ran the scrub would have rewritten this file to list its own "
+ "FLEETD_TEST_TOOL_VAR as blanked");
}
/**
* Run {@code /bin/zsh -l -i} from a clean parent and return the NAMES it has exported by prompt
* time. With {@code zdotdir} non-null, {@code ZDOTDIR} points at a generated scrub directory, so
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.peer;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.lang.reflect.RecordComponent;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Locale;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Objects;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.TreeSet;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
/**
* Fleetd #382, the same "defect factory" #357 and #358 guarded on {@code FleetConfig.withDefaults()}
* and {@link dev.ltms.fleet.session.MemberSession}'s rebuild sites — reproduced here on
* {@link SpawnRequest#withProfile(String)}.
*
* <p>{@code SpawnRequest} has back-compat constructors at arity 3 and 5 alongside its canonical
* arity-6 constructor. Before this ticket, {@code CompositePeerLauncher} routed a profile by
* building a fresh {@code SpawnRequest} from a literal {@code new SpawnRequest(...)} call listing
* six of the original request's own accessors. That call is only correct because it happens to
* name exactly six arguments today — add a 7th component and the established back-compat pattern
* (a new constructor at the old, now-shorter arity) and a call one argument short of the new
* canonical arity would silently rebind to that back-compat constructor, dropping the new
* component on every profile-routed spawn without any compile error. {@link #withProfile} replaces
* that literal call, so this test guards the ONE rebuild site instead of a call site scattered
* through a launcher.
*
* <p>The check below builds a {@link SpawnRequest} through the TRUE canonical constructor —
* resolved by the record's own component types via {@code getDeclaredConstructor}, never by
* argument count, so it can never itself land on a back-compat overload — with a real, distinctive,
* non-null value in every component, calls {@link SpawnRequest#withProfile(String)}, and asserts
* every component the method is not documented to change survives unchanged, while {@code
* profileName} comes back as the new value it was given. A component that comes back anything else
* was silently dropped — the shape of the defect this test exists to catch.
*
* <p>{@link #EXCLUDED_FROM_SURVIVAL_CHECK} is kept deliberately empty and size-pinned by
* {@link #exclusionListSizeIsPinned()}, for the same reason the other two guards pin theirs at
* zero: a checker whose escape hatch can grow to silence a failure is not a checker. Every one of
* {@link SpawnRequest}'s 6 current components has a real, non-null value here and none is excluded.
*/
class SpawnRequestWithProfilePreservesEveryComponentTest {
private static final RecordComponent[] COMPONENTS = SpawnRequest.class.getRecordComponents();
/** Deliberately empty today; grow it only with a matching justification, and re-pin the size. */
private static final Set<String> EXCLUDED_FROM_SURVIVAL_CHECK = Set.of();
/** One real, distinctive, non-null value per component — none of the 6 is excluded. */
private static Map<String, Object> baseValues() {
Map<String, Object> v = new LinkedHashMap<>();
v.put("profileName", "profile-guard");
v.put("requestedCwd", "/wt/requested-guard");
v.put("callerCwd", "/wt/caller-guard");
v.put("sessionName", "session-guard");
v.put("resumeSessionId", "resume-guard");
v.put("role", MemberRole.REVIEWER);
assertNamesMatchComponents(v);
return v;
}
/**
* Guards {@link #baseValues()} itself against drifting from the record's real shape — forgetting
* to add a new component here fails this assertion by name, rather than silently checking one
* component fewer than the record has.
*/
private static void assertNamesMatchComponents(Map<String, Object> values) {
Set<String> names = new TreeSet<>();
for (RecordComponent rc : COMPONENTS) {
names.add(rc.getName());
}
assertEquals(names, new TreeSet<>(values.keySet()),
"this test's value map has drifted from SpawnRequest's actual components — "
+ "update baseValues() alongside the record");
}
/**
* Builds a {@link SpawnRequest} through the TRUE canonical constructor — resolved by the
* record's own component types, not by argument count — so this never accidentally exercises a
* back-compat overload the way a literal {@code new SpawnRequest(...)} call risks doing.
*/
private static SpawnRequest requestOf(Map<String, Object> values) throws ReflectiveOperationException {
Class<?>[] types = Arrays.stream(COMPONENTS).map(RecordComponent::getType).toArray(Class<?>[]::new);
Object[] args = Arrays.stream(COMPONENTS).map(rc -> values.get(rc.getName())).toArray();
Constructor<SpawnRequest> ctor = SpawnRequest.class.getDeclaredConstructor(types);
return ctor.newInstance(args);
}
@Test
void exclusionListSizeIsPinned() {
assertEquals(0, EXCLUDED_FROM_SURVIVAL_CHECK.size(),
"EXCLUDED_FROM_SURVIVAL_CHECK grew from 0 — every entry needs a justification in "
+ "this test class's javadoc AND this assertion re-pinned to the new size; a "
+ "growing exclusion list that silences failures on its own is not a guard");
}
@Test
void withProfilePreservesEveryOtherComponent() throws ReflectiveOperationException {
Map<String, Object> base = baseValues();
SpawnRequest request = requestOf(base);
SpawnRequest result = request.withProfile("profile-updated");
Map<String, Object> expectedOverrides = Map.of("profileName", "profile-updated");
List<String> dropped = new ArrayList<>();
int checked = 0;
for (RecordComponent rc : COMPONENTS) {
String name = rc.getName();
if (EXCLUDED_FROM_SURVIVAL_CHECK.contains(name)) {
continue;
}
checked++;
Object expected = expectedOverrides.containsKey(name) ? expectedOverrides.get(name) : base.get(name);
Object actual;
try {
actual = rc.getAccessor().invoke(result);
} catch (ReflectiveOperationException e) {
throw new RuntimeException("failed to read SpawnRequest." + name + "()", e);
}
if (!Objects.equals(expected, actual)) {
dropped.add(String.format(Locale.ROOT,
"%s: withProfile() was expected to carry (%s) for '%s' but returned %s — a "
+ "component silently dropped by withProfile(), the shape of the defect "
+ "this test exists to catch (its final \"return new SpawnRequest(...)\" "
+ "call binding to a back-compat constructor instead of the true "
+ "canonical one)",
name, expected, name, actual));
}
}
System.out.printf(Locale.ROOT,
"SpawnRequest.withProfile() component-survival coverage — %d components, %d checked, "
+ "%d excluded, %d survived%n",
COMPONENTS.length, checked, EXCLUDED_FROM_SURVIVAL_CHECK.size(), checked - dropped.size());
assertEquals(List.of(), dropped,
"withProfile() silently dropped these components: " + dropped);
}
}