export UID= aborting the allow-list scrub mid-loop
CB-633's generated scrub.zsh blanks every non-allow-listed exported name
in one loop wrapped in `{ ... } 2>/dev/null`. In zsh, `export UID=` is
not a failed command: it is a fatal parameter error ("failed to change
user ID: operation not permitted") that aborts the whole sourced file.
The loop stops at UID, every later name is left unscrubbed, and the
report-writing block never runs -- silently, because of the 2>/dev/null.
The inversion is the severity. `env` lists inherited names first and the
names a startup file exports last, so the loop blanked the harmless
inherited half and died immediately before the operator's own exports --
exactly the credentials this policy exists to remove.
Measured on a fleet01 member pane: UID is name 42 of 57, and a decoy
exported from ~/.zshrc sat at 58, non-empty, on 8 of 8 spawns. xtrace
ends at `+scrub.zsh:28> export 'UID='` with rc=126. Reproduced
independently on macOS/zsh 5.9 (fleetd #394).
CONTAINMENT: `eval`, then VERIFY.
Neither `export "$n=" 2>/dev/null || true` nor a `${(t)n}` type guard
contains it -- both still abort, because it is an assignment error and
not a command failure. Only `eval` does. `eval` is safe at that point
because the loop above already rejected every name that is not
[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*, so nothing but a bare identifier reaches it.
Enumerating the specials (UID|EUID|GID|EGID|PPID|LINENO) also works, but
only for the names enumerated: one that turns up exported on another
host brings the abort straight back. `eval` covers all of them.
`eval` alone, though, contains the error WITHOUT blanking the value, so
the name would be reported as blanked having never been blanked --
measured: attempted=59 with UID still 1000. So each name is verified
after the attempt and only counted when it actually blanked. A name that
could not be blanked currently falls into the "allowed" count, which is
imprecise in the safe direction; the honest third count ("tried and could
not blank") needs a report-format change -- readReport treats every
non-first non-blank line as a blanked name -- and belongs with #394.
Why the suite stayed green: EnvAllowListScrubTest starts zsh from a
CLEARED parent (`pb.environment().clear()`), where UID is not an
exported name at all, so the abort cannot reproduce there. The new test
supplies the production shape -- UID present and exported -- and asserts
a report exists, which is written by the last statement in the file and
so proves the script ran to completion. Verified by mutation in both
shapes: reverting the fix fails exactly that test and no other.
Orthogonal to #388, which adds a fifth call site to a script that still
aborts at the same name.
claude-bridge
A subscription-safe bridge that lets a primary Claude Code (Opus 4.8, on Pro/Max)
session drive a secondary Claude agent running a different model via its own
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL — without ever putting a proxy on the primary session.
Sibling of crush-bridge (which drives a headless
Crush worker on GX10 DeepSeek). claude-bridge keeps the worker a real Claude Code
process, so it inherits CLAUDE.md, hooks, skills, and MCP — just pointed at a
cheaper/local model.
Leading approach — herdr-centric message server (fleetd)
A small always-on message server, fleetd, controls
herdr (an agent multiplexer) over its Unix-socket API and exposes a
clean 2-way messaging API as an MCP server that both the primary and the workers mount —
one unified Claude setup and the sole communication gateway (REST/SSE stays for non-Claude
clients; any broker is fleetd-internal, below the gateway).
herdr owns the PTYs, multiplexing, persistence, and agent-status events; fleetd owns
policy (subscription boundary, session lifecycle, status-gated delivery) and the client
contract. A Claude member launches with ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL pointed at the gateway,
https://llm.ltms.dev/anthropic, plus a bearer token; the lead stays env-clean and calls
fleetd's MCP tools. See the wiki's 13 User Guide to run it.
flowchart LR
OPUS["Opus — primary<br/>(Claude Code, env CLEAN)<br/>MCP client"]
subgraph BD["fleetd — standalone daemon (not a claude process)"]
SRV["SERVER face<br/>MCP · REST/SSE · policy"]
CLI["CLIENT face<br/>status-gated injector · herdr socket"]
SRV --> CLI
end
HERDR["herdr<br/>panes · agent-status"]
W["worker claude pane<br/>ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL set<br/>MCP client"]
M["llm.ltms.dev<br/>(the one gateway)"]
OPUS -->|"MCP fleet_send (blocks)"| SRV
W -.->|"MCP fleet_reply"| SRV
CLI -->|"Unix socket<br/>send_text · events.subscribe"| HERDR
HERDR -->|"drives PTY"| W
W -->|"inference"| M
classDef ext fill:#2b6cb0,stroke:#1a365d,color:#ffffff;
classDef core fill:#2f855a,stroke:#22543d,color:#ffffff;
class OPUS ext
class SRV,CLI,HERDR core
- Subscription boundary: the primary never sets
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL(stays on Pro/Max). Only the secondary process is off-subscription — andfleetditself is a plain daemon (no Anthropic quota), so it may poll/subscribe freely. - One gateway (unified MCP setup):
fleetdis the sole communication path for every Claude session. Primary and workers each mount it as an MCP server (oneclaude mcp addline, same on both) and talk over MCP tools —fleet_send/fleet_reply/fleet_status(withfleet_askplanned for the blocked-worker path). No Claude session ever addresses a broker, a peer, or the network directly; any queue isfleetd-internal. MCP tool I/O never setsANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, so mounting the bridge is subscription-safe by construction. Tool naming: the tools arefleet_*(renamed frombridge_*in CB-622). The oldbridge_*names were removed in CB-634 — onlyfleet_*answers now. - How the primary consumes a reply: a single blocking MCP call (
fleet_send);fleetdholds it open until the worker callsfleet_replyor its turn hitsagent_status=done, then returns the reply as the tool result. No cross-turn busy-poll, so no quota burn. SSE is an optional side-channel for humans/dashboards watching status. - Worker → primary rides
fleetd's MCP rendezvous — the reply resolves the primary's blocking call (or, for detached work,fleetdinjects the primary's idle pane when it's ready), so no keystroke-into-primary and no broker are involved, even single-host. The one exception: a split-host primary that isn't a herdr pane wakes via its ownStop-hook, which pollsfleetd(never a broker). See the wiki for the two topologies. - Different model per process sidesteps Claude Code's lack of per-subagent provider routing — the worker isn't a subagent, it's its own configured process.
- AgentAPI (
coder/agentapi) is retained only as a swappable fallback injector behind the same interface. See the wiki for the full design, comparison, and rationale.
Docs
Full design, setup, and operations live in the wiki,
vendored here as a submodule under wiki/:
git clone --recurse-submodules ssh://git@git.ltms.dev:2224/fleet/fleetd.git
# or, after a plain clone:
git submodule update --init
Edit docs in wiki/, then cd wiki && git commit && git push to publish them to the
Gitea wiki.
Status
🟢 Implemented & dogfooded — the herdr-centric fleetd message server is built and in
real use: an Opus primary delegates tasks to off-subscription workers that reply through the
bridge (code reviews delegated this way have produced committed bug fixes). Selected as the
primary approach 2026-07-11, superseding the AgentAPI plan (2026-07-08); AgentAPI retained as a
fallback injector.
Shipped (Java 25 · Maven · 266 unit/acceptance tests green; the live-herdr and broker contract
tests run separately via mvn test -Pcontract):
- Core gateway — herdr socket client (contract-tested vs live 0.7.0); guard-checked worker
spawn with
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URLinjected only into the worker's env; status-gated injector; blockingfleet_sendwith reply rendezvous; MCP server as a thin adapter over the REST core. - MCP tools —
fleet_send/fleet_reply/fleet_status(messaging) andfleet_spawn/fleet_list/fleet_stop/fleet_profiles/fleet_poll(fleet). Caller identity is connection-based (loopback peer PID → herdr pane), so the same mount serves primary and workers. - Delivery reliability — completion fallback (a confirmed
working→idleturn resolves a send); async fire-and-poll (beats the caller's MCP call timeout for long tasks); and failure detection for wedged (unknown), vanished, and never-ready workers so a send never hangs. - Fleet — multiple worker profiles, each with an independent base_url guard check; workers
inherit the primary's working directory (never
$HOME); a readiness gate holds delivery until a worker's Claude has connected the bridge MCP (no paste lost into its boot window). - Blocked-worker path —
fleet_askreverse rendezvous: a worker pauses its delegated turn to ask the primary and resumes the same turn with the answer (CB-205). - Session lifecycle — session manager with spawn/reuse/recycle,
idle_ttlreaper,context_cap, and graceful drain on shutdown (CB-301/CB-303); per-worker git worktrees on their own branch with a config-parity overlay, so parallel implementers never stomp each other (CB-301-ext). - Reliable worker→primary delivery — a durable
ReplyInbox(in-memory by default, AMQP/LavinMQ for cross-restart durability) holds a reply that arrives with no open send, and an active status-gated push loop nudges the primary to drain it (CB-307). - Pluggable peers — a
PeerLauncherSPI with two in-tree adapters,claude-codeandopencode, routed by akind:discriminator (CB-401/CB-402).
Next (see the roadmap) — Stage 5 hardening (auth/TLS, /metrics, CI,
service supervision, per-session authz + audit), then cross-host: CB-308 multi-host federation and
CB-500 multi-tier coordination.