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Dai Ha 8308c0b68f fleetd #116: recover the already-gone-worktree teardown regression test
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Ports the intent of the lost CB-576 commit c393600 (worker/cb576-01a04b-17,
never merged, package dev.ltms.bridged.*) onto main's dev.ltms.fleet.*
tree. Adds FakeWorktrees.markGone (tracks which add()'d worktree paths
still "exist", mirroring GitWorktrees.hasUncommitted's Files.exists guard
for the already-gone case) and a regression test,
releaseStillStopsPaneAndNotifiesWhenWorktreeIsGone, asserting that
SessionManager.release still fires notifyReleased, stops the pane, and
falls through to remove() when the worktree is already gone.
2026-09-03 16:11:27 +07:00
Dai Ha 3b3063eb2b #252: the route scrape counted commented-out registrations as live
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CI / contract (push) Successful in 2m21s
Follow-up to #259, found by verifying the guard rather than trusting it.

The scrape read FleetApp's raw source, so a registration disabled with `//`
still matched. Measured: commenting out `app.get("/tasks/{ticket}", ...)` left
the test GREEN, while deleting the same line was caught. Only the commented-out
shape was blind, and it is the silent direction — the inventory would keep
claiming a route the server no longer serves.

Drop whole-line comments before scraping. Only lines starting with //, * or /*
are dropped, deliberately not every // on a line: that would also cut a string
literal containing // (a URL) and could silently delete a real registration
sharing the line. The remaining gap is a trailing comment beside real code; no
registration here has that shape, and the vacuity test catches a scrape that
loses registrations wholesale.

Proof: with the fix, the comment-out mutation fails naming
"Removed ... [GET /tasks/{ticket}]"; reverted, FleetApp.java confirmed clean.
mvn clean install: 0 compile errors, 1257 tests, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-09-03 15:59:35 +07:00
Dai Ha df9086263d Merge #259: guard the REST route inventory against drift (#252) 2026-09-03 15:56:15 +07:00
Dai Ha eb568ff451 fleetd #252: guard test for the REST route inventory
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FleetApp's route list has never been checked against anything and has
already drifted once (GET /member-credentials shipped hours before the
#252 ticket and was missing from its list). Add
RestRouteInventoryTest, modelled on McpContractDocTest, which scrapes
FleetApp.java's app.<verb>("path") calls with a regex and compares
them against an explicit expected inventory, failing loudly with the
added/removed routes when they diverge.
2026-09-03 15:54:45 +07:00
Dai Ha ac790e4cce #258: stop two test fixtures writing the operator's real ~/.claude.json
CI / contract (push) Successful in 48s
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seedTrustDialog targets ~/.claude.json when a profile sets no configDir.
Two IDE-overlay fixtures built a worktree-shaped @TempDir, which opens the
#149 isProvisionedWorktree gate, and left configDir null — so every test run
added two project entries to the operator's real file. 116 had accumulated,
none of them still existing on disk, and 32 of those came from current code.

The #149 gate only closed the opposite case: a fixture with cwd unset falling
back to user.dir. A fixture that builds a worktree on purpose walks straight
through it.

- ideProfile/ideProfileModule now take configDir first and mandatory, so each
  fixture states where the trust seed goes.
- noFixtureSeededTheDefaultClaudeJson snapshots the temp-dir project keys in
  @BeforeAll and fails in @AfterAll on any key this class added. Differential,
  not absolute: an absolute check would fail on every host still carrying the
  historical entries, and such a check gets deleted rather than fixed.

Not done: a blanket -Duser.home redirect in surefire. EnvAllowListScrubTest
tests the credential scrub against the operator's real login chain and guards
with assumeTrue($HOME/.zshrc exists), so the redirect would silently skip two
security tests.

Proof: with the bug put back on one fixture the guard fails and names the path;
reverted and confirmed identical with diff -q. A full suite run under a fake
home now creates no .claude.json at all. mvn clean install: 0 compile errors,
1255 tests, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-09-03 14:01:45 +07:00
Dai Ha 6b5f3f472f Merge #111: the credential probe reads the policy instead of copying it
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scripts/probe-member-credentials.sh carried its own NAMES array of 31
names. The live policy has 34. The probe reported 26 blocked against a
policy that blocks 29, exited 0, and printed a table that looked
complete. A verification tool that under-reports is worse than none,
because its clean output stops anyone looking.

Same defect as #114, fixed the same way: DELETE the second copy rather
than correct it. The NAMES array is gone, not updated.

The daemon now serves GET /member-credentials — names and counts, never
a value; MemberCredentialPolicyView reads no environment at all, so
there is nothing to redact by construction. The probe fetches it and
refuses with a non-zero exit when the daemon is unreachable, the policy
is absent or empty, or knownCount disagrees with the length of known[].
No local fallback: a verification tool must not quietly degrade into a
weaker check.

The startup log line and the endpoint now share that one class, so the
counting exists once. That also protects a subtlety I measured before
briefing this: blocked is NOT known - allowed. Live, known=34 and
allow=7, but only 5 of those 7 appear in known, so blocked=29 and the
naive subtraction gives 27. The view reuses creds.blockedSet(), the
existing derivation, so it keeps 29.

Worker's mutation: MemberCredentialPolicyView.of(...) forced to return
ABSENT turned 4 tests red with 0 compile errors — including
MemberCredentialsGapReportTest, which proves the startup log really
does run through this path. Reverted and confirmed with diff -q.

It also caught a bug in its own first draft: jq's // operator treats
false and 0 as missing, so `.present // empty` turned a genuine
"present": false into "unknown". Fixed by reading the fields directly.

NOT yet verified: acceptance criterion 5, the live 34/29/5 run. The
route does not exist until the daemon is redeployed onto this jar, so
that check comes next and is mine, not the worker's.

Merged clean, then built on the merged tree: 1255 tests, 0 failures,
0 compile errors.
2026-09-03 13:32:16 +07:00
Dai Ha 38dec72152 Merge #155: refuse the spawn when allow-list policy cannot be enforced
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policy=allow-list is enforced by a ZDOTDIR scrub, and a non-zsh login
shell ignores ZDOTDIR entirely, so no scrub runs. The launcher already
DETECTED this and logged a WARN — then degraded to the weaker overlay
and spawned anyway. The operator asked for the blocking control and
silently got the weaker one, which is the defect the ticket is about.

Detection existed; refusal did not. Under policy=allow-list a non-zsh
shell now throws IllegalArgumentException before any ZDOTDIR or env
work, naming the actual shell and giving three ways out. Under
policy=deny-by-default nothing changes: that overlay is applied to the
pane before any shell runs, so it does not depend on the shell.

Checked against the live config myself, because this refuses spawns and
no worker can see fleetd.yaml:

  memberHerdrSocket : NOT set  -> the shell comes from fleetd's own
                                  $SHELL, not the unset memberLoginShell
  policy            : allow-list
  fleetd's $SHELL   : zsh, proven by behaviour rather than by reading
                      the process env — the daemon log shows the ZDOTDIR
                      scrub generating a directory 147 times, most
                      recently minutes ago, and that only happens when
                      isZshShell() returned true

So the new refusal cannot fire on this host. Had memberHerdrSocket been
set, the unset memberLoginShell would have read as "<unset>", non-zsh,
and refused every spawn — worth knowing before anyone sets that key.

Worker's mutation evidence, re-stated: `if (!zsh)` -> `if (false)` turned
the refusal test RED with 0 compile errors, then reverted clean.

NOT verified: a live non-zsh member spawn. Forcing it means changing the
daemon's own environment, and the value of the test does not justify
that. The unit tests drive the real launcher.spawn entry point.

Merged clean, then built on the merged tree: 1250 tests, 0 failures,
0 compile errors.
2026-09-03 13:29:53 +07:00
Dai Ha 0e8bfb74fc Merge #176 stage 2: group subscription profiles by account, not by name
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Stage 1 shipped INERT on this host and every test was green. The matcher
compared effectiveCredentialId(), which fell back to the profile's own
NAME when credentialId was unset. This host runs the lead on `opus` and
members on `sonnet`; both are subscription:true with no credentialId, so
it compared "opus" against "sonnet", never matched, and charged 0 seats.

Every stage-1 test put the lead on the SAME profile name as the target,
so the fixture encoded the one shape the live config does not have.

Stage 2 returns a "<subscription>" sentinel when credentialId is unset
and subscription is true. An explicit credentialId still wins, so an
operator with two genuinely separate Claude logins can keep them apart.

Verified by me on the live config shape, not by reasoning:

  opus.effectiveCredentialId()   = <subscription>
  sonnet.effectiveCredentialId() = <subscription>
  seats charged to sonnet = 1     (was 0 before this change)

Only opus and sonnet join the sentinel group on this host; local,
local-direct, gx, xf, sol and terra are unaffected. free is clamped
with Math.max(0, ...), so the subtraction cannot report a negative.

Second, wider consequence, flagged by the worker and confirmed here:
CompositePeerLauncher.credentialIdFor feeds enforceNotQuarantined and
enforceNotCoolingOff, so quarantining one subscription profile now also
refuses spawns on the other. That is correct — one Claude subscription
hitting a usage limit really does take out every profile on it — but it
is a behavioural change beyond fleet_list's numbers.

Checked all 5 logical callers of effectiveCredentialId(); every one
wants "this account", none wants "this exact profile".

Merged clean, then built: 1250 tests, 0 failures, 0 compile errors.
An auto-merge with no conflicts is not a compiling merge, so the build
was run on the merged tree before this landed.
2026-09-03 13:24:19 +07:00
Dai Ha 51f7b0a3ca fleetd #111: probe reads the live memberCredentials policy, no hardcoded name list
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m24s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 2m22s
scripts/probe-member-credentials.sh carried its own hand-maintained NAMES array
(31 names, recorded 2026-08-16), so a name added later to fleetd.yaml's
memberCredentials.known was never checked and the probe still exited 0 with a
clean-looking table. Same drift shape as #114's tool catalogue.

- New dev.ltms.fleet.member.MemberCredentialPolicyView: the single place that
  turns a MemberCredentials policy into names + counts (never a value). Reused
  by Fleetd.reportMemberCredentialsGap (startup log line) and by the new
  GET /member-credentials REST endpoint (FleetApp), so the two can no longer
  drift apart the way the probe and the policy did.
- FleetApp gains one route + handler + a Supplier<MemberCredentialPolicyView>
  constructor param (legacy constructors default to ::absent, so existing call
  sites are unaffected).
- probe-member-credentials.sh now fetches its name list from
  GET /member-credentials instead of carrying one. No local fallback: an
  unreachable daemon, an empty/absent policy, or a knownCount/known[] length
  mismatch all refuse with a non-zero exit rather than silently checking zero
  names. Prints "policy contains N; this run checked N" so the two numbers are
  visibly equal.
2026-09-03 13:21:35 +07:00
Dai Ha 21c539f22e #113: derive the config guard from the record tree, both directions
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The existing guard walks KNOWN_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS and anchors its regex at
column 0, so it sees only top-level keys. Every nested key was outside
its scope and nothing said so, which is the shape #113 collects: a
checker narrower than it looks, whose green run stops anyone looking.

Two derived guards replace the assumption:

  everyNestedConfigKeyIsDocumentedInTheExample
      walks FleetConfig's record components (17 records, 83 distinct
      key names) and requires each to be documented in the example.

  everyLiveKeyInTheExampleBindsToARecordComponent
      resolves every live key path in the example against the record
      tree, so a documented key that binds to nothing fails here
      instead of being silently ignored in production.

Neither carries a list, so a key added to any nested record is covered
the moment it compiles (criterion 2).

Both mutations run through the real caller, not the helper (criterion 1,
which asks for exactly that):

  removed every mention of paneProbeIntervalSeconds from the example
      -> FAILS, naming health.paneProbeIntervalSeconds
  added a live bind.totallyMadeUpKnob to the example
      -> FAILS, naming bind.totallyMadeUpKnob

0 compile errors in both; both reverted and confirmed with diff -q.
The first attempt at mutation 1 removed only the `key:` line and the
run stayed green — correctly, because the key was still documented in
prose. An incomplete mutation proves nothing, so it was redone.

Denominators (criterion 3): both guards print how many keys they
checked, and the floor for "did the walk descend?" is derived from
KNOWN_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS.size() rather than being a literal.

Scope is stated in the javadoc rather than implied: the guards do not
check a key sits at the right path, do not parse commented prose for
the reverse direction, and do not prove a parsed key is read by
anything. paneProbeIntervalSeconds is parsed and read by nothing, and
these guards pass it -- the example already says so in its own text.

everyOptionalKnobDocumentedInTheExampleBinds keeps its hand-written
list but is re-documented as a value-binding spot check, explicitly
not a coverage guard; coverage now comes from the two derived tests.

broker.uri is documented only in the example's prose convention
(`#  uri  -> ...`), never as a copy-pasteable `uri:` key, because
writing it out invites pasting a password into a file -- the thing
uriEnv exists to avoid. The matcher accepts that convention rather
than pushing the file toward doing it.

Full build: 1236 tests, 0 failures, 0 compile errors.
2026-09-03 13:18:50 +07:00
Dai Ha bd2774b5f1 fleetd #155: refuse a member spawn under memberCredentials.policy=allow-list on a non-zsh shell
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The ZDOTDIR scrub that enforces policy=allow-list only runs on zsh. The daemon
already detected a non-zsh login shell (isZshShell/warnNonZsh, from #213), but
degraded to the weaker CB-596 overlay and spawned anyway — the exact "control
silently does nothing" defect this ticket is about. Now a non-zsh shell under
policy=allow-list refuses the spawn (IllegalArgumentException, naming the
shell), surfaced by FleetMcp.spawn's existing catch(IllegalArgumentException).
policy=deny-by-default is unaffected in substance (its overlay never depended
on the shell) but now also logs a one-time WARN naming the shell, since the
stronger allow-list control is unavailable there.

The worktreeRoot/worktreeGroup-missing degrade path under memberHerdrSocket
is untouched — that gap is fleetd #213's scope, not this one.
2026-09-03 13:13:23 +07:00
Dai Ha c50f5b2d61 fleetd #176 stage 2: make effectiveCredentialId() subscription-aware
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Stage 1's lead-seat matcher (leadSeatLookup) was correct but inert on
the live host: the lead runs on profile 'opus', members on 'sonnet',
both subscription:true with no explicit credentialId. Because
effectiveCredentialId() fell back to the profile's own name, opus and
sonnet never matched even though they share one Claude login, so the
matcher charged zero seats.

FleetConfig.Profile.effectiveCredentialId() now falls back to a shared
sentinel (SUBSCRIPTION_CREDENTIAL_ID = "<subscription>") instead of the
profile name when subscription:true and credentialId is unset. An
explicit credentialId still wins, so two separate Claude logins on one
host can still be kept apart.

This is also BackendQuarantine's and BackendOutagePolicy's grouping
key and CompositePeerLauncher's spawn-time enforcement key, so the fix
also links quarantine/cool-off across subscription profiles sharing an
account -- intentional: one usage limit really does take out every
profile on that login, mirroring credentialId: openai-shared already
doing this for off-subscription profiles. Every caller was reviewed;
none wants "this exact profile" over "this account".

Tests added:
- FleetdLeadSeatLookupTest: the live shape itself (lead on a
  DIFFERENT subscription profile than the target, same account,
  neither sets credentialId) -- the case stage 1's suite never covered
- FleetMcpTest: quarantining one subscription profile's shared
  account zeroes free on another sharing it, via the same
  effectiveCredentialId()-driven wiring Fleetd.main uses

Mutation-tested: reverting the subscription branch to the old
fall-back-to-profile-name behavior sends both new tests RED with 0
compile errors; reverting the mutation restores byte-identical
(diff -q) source and green tests.

fleetd.example.yaml's fleetd #176 notes are rewritten for the sentinel
semantics and when to override it with an explicit credentialId.
2026-09-03 13:10:10 +07:00
Dai Ha 01a840cc14 #248 follow-up: drive the real backendErrorSink, not a copy of it
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BackendOutageFlowTest held a ~30-line hand-copy of the lambda in
Fleetd.main, under a comment promising it mirrored production "EXACTLY".
That promise was the defect. The test proved the copy, so any change to
the real sink left the flow test green.

#248 made Fleetd.backendErrorSink(...) public for exactly this reason.
The test now calls it.

Measured, same mutation in the real sink (an early return after
sessions.onBackendError, dropping the cool-off and the lead nudge):

  old test (hand-copy):  Tests run: 5, Failures: 0  -- blind
  new test (real sink):  Tests run: 5, Failures: 4  -- catches it

0 compile errors in both runs, so both are real results. Production
reverted and confirmed with diff -q.

Full build: 1234 tests, 0 failures, 0 compile errors.
2026-09-03 13:06:11 +07:00
Dai Ha c4deef08be fleetd #249: withhold agentSessionId when the cwd is not a provisioned worktree
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A member spawned without a worktree inherits the lead's cwd, which holds
many old opencode session rows. sessionIdForDirectory picks the most
recently updated row for that directory, so a brand-new member - which
has not written its own row yet - resolves to somebody else's session.
Measured: a row three days old, from a different profile.

The damage was at the tool surface. fleet_list told the lead that
agentSessionId is the id to pass as resumeSessionId, so acting on it
would resume a stranger's conversation, with foreign context, and
nothing to distinguish that from a correct resume.

Fixed by refusing to answer rather than by making the heuristic smarter.
#234 already established the heuristic cannot be made reliable at that
layer, and its javadoc records why, so the SQL is untouched.

agentSessionId() now returns null for a non-provisioned cwd, and
spawn() refuses a resumeSessionId request for one outright, before
anything starts. isProvisionedWorktree moved to HerdrPeerLauncher so
both adapters share it. fleet_list and fleet_spawn descriptions no
longer describe the id as always safe to resume.

Verified rather than taken on trust:
- the refusal reaches the lead as a readable message, not a stack trace
  - FleetMcp.spawn already catches IllegalArgumentException and returns
  error(e.getMessage()).
- the message tells the lead to pass fleet_spawn{worktree:<slug>}, which
  is valid: worktree is typed string, 'true' or a ticket slug.
- 13 existing tests moved off a placeholder "/work/dir" onto a real
  provisioned-worktree fixture. They cover #175/#234 model-mismatch
  machinery and would otherwise have tripped the new gate incidentally.

Worker's mutation evidence, both reverted and diff-confirmed:
- gate at OpenCodeLauncher:812 -> if(false): RED at
  OpenCodeLauncherTest:448, expected <null> but was <ses_someone_elses>.
- resume refusal at OpenCodeLauncher:683 -> 'false &&': RED at
  OpenCodeLauncherTest:379, expected IllegalArgumentException.
Both 0 compile errors.

Closes #249. PR #253.
2026-09-03 12:55:29 +07:00
Dai Ha c796eac09c fleetd #176: subtract the lead's own subscription seat from free
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m16s
maxLoad counted panes, never subscription seats: a subscription:true
profile's lead is itself a live claude session on that same account,
so free overstated capacity by the lead's own seat (measured free:1
with a real ceiling of 0, and free:3 on an idle fleet with a real
ceiling of 2).

Add FleetMcp.LeadSeatSource (same shape as QuarantineSource/
OutageSource) and Fleetd.leadSeatLookup, which derives the seat count
from fleet.leaders.<name>.profile matched against the target profile
by effectiveCredentialId() - no hardcoded "-1", and no new config key:
profile: already exists for this exact "which account does this lead
share" question. maxLoad itself is left untouched; only free (and a
new, additive-only leadSeats field) changes.

Exhaustion quarantine (cause 2 in the ticket) already forced free to 0
via the same BackendQuarantine capacityView already reads - confirmed
by reading the exhaustionSink wiring, no code change needed there.
2026-09-03 12:55:08 +07:00
Dai Ha e897e5257b fleetd #114: delete the drifted tool catalogue, keep the flows, guard the names
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docs/MCP-Contract.md was written 2026-07-14, before any MCP code existed,
and never caught up. CLAUDE.md points every session in the fleet at it.

Audited against the code today. The drift was not confined to the tool
table the ticket reported:

  section 3  still described the OLD identity rule - "any connection that
             does not map to a known worker is treated as a primary".
             That was a real privilege bug, fixed since by the ancestry
             walk in #161. The page still taught it.
  section 4  names port 8080 (the mount is 8765) and says the pom does
             not yet carry an MCP dependency.
  section 5  named fleet_read and fleet_cancel, which do not exist, and
             omitted fleet_poll, fleet_ack, fleet_profiles, fleet_whoami
             and fleet_list, which do.
  section 8  says turn_id where the code says turnId, and has no row for
             the exhausted outcome CB-578 added.
  sections
  9, 10, 11  pre-build planning: "new work" columns, open decisions long
             since decided, CB-1xx placeholders.

Every one of those is the same defect: a hand-maintained second copy of
something the code already states. So the copy is deleted rather than
corrected - correcting it just restarts the clock.

What survives is the flows and the status gating, because a flow is a
shape rather than a name, and shapes are what this page was ever good
for. They are rewritten with the names checked against the code, and
extended with what has been learned since: the ~60s cap on a blocking
send, the ~55s ask window, and the three ways the turn-done fallback
loses a report (clipped, echoed brief, slow member).

389 lines -> 188.

The names that remain are guarded. McpContractDocTest fails if the page
names a fleet_* tool FleetMcp does not register, and - because an empty
set is a subset of everything - a second test pins that both sides
actually found names, so the check cannot pass by checking nothing. A
third pins the "this is not the tool reference" sentence, which is the
fix itself: without it someone helpfully re-adds a tool table.

Mutation-tested both ways, 0 compile errors each: adding `fleet_read` to
the doc fails theDocNamesNoToolThatDoesNotExist ("names [fleet_read] ...
Checked 6 name(s)"); removing the disclaimer fails
theDocStillDisclaimsBeingTheToolReference.

All 5 mermaid diagrams render under mermaid-cli.

CLAUDE.md's pointer said "section 6 only" and now names the guard
instead. It is in the project addendum, so the canonical block is
untouched - verified still byte-identical with the wiki template.

REST is split out to #252: 14 routes, documented nowhere, and it IS a
supported operator surface - one of them drains on read.

1232 tests, 0 failures.
2026-09-03 12:52:12 +07:00
Dai Ha 2afa3652bb fleetd #249: withhold agentSessionId for a non-provisioned opencode cwd
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 54s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m52s
OpenCodeSessionDiscovery.sessionIdForDirectory keys on the worker's cwd, which
is reliable only when fleetd provisioned a unique git worktree for that
member. Without one (the default no-worktree spawn), the cwd is shared with
other sessions, and "most recently updated row for this directory" can pick a
stranger's session — fleet_list would then hand a lead an agentSessionId that
resumes someone else's conversation.

Move isProvisionedWorktree from ClaudeCodeLauncher to the shared
HerdrPeerLauncher base (both adapters need it now). OpenCodeLauncher.spawn now
refuses a resumeSessionId spawn outright when the target cwd is not a
provisioned worktree (fleetd can never verify or re-report that identity), and
SessionAwareHandle.agentSessionId() withholds the id — returns null rather
than guessing — for any member spawned without one, resumed or not. Corrected
fleet_list/fleet_spawn's tool descriptions, which previously implied
agentSessionId is always a safe resume handle.
2026-09-03 12:51:56 +07:00
Dai Ha 80092ff359 fleetd #247: stop writing a trust key Claude Code strips on every save
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seedTrustDialog wrote two keys into the shared .claude.json:
hasTrustDialogAccepted and hasCompletedProjectOnboarding. Only the first
one survives.

Measured live on 2026-09-03, minutes after a spawn seeded the file:

  hasTrustDialogAccepted:       28 of 28 project entries
  hasCompletedProjectOnboarding: 0 of 28 project entries

Our entry was written by the running jar and the key was already gone,
so it was written and then removed. It is absent from the 27 entries
Claude Code wrote for itself too, which says Claude Code normalises the
whole file when it saves and drops that key every time.

That reframes #247. I filed it as a race - a save landing between our
read and our ATOMIC_MOVE. It is not a race. The other writer removes
this key as its steady-state behaviour, with no window involved. So the
compare-and-swap retry proposed there would not have helped: it would
re-add a key that gets stripped again on the next save.

The seed's whole job is to stop the workspace-trust dialog blocking a
member (#149). The live probe reached idle with hasTrustDialogAccepted
alone, so the second key was never doing that job. Writing it only added
a contested key to a file two processes share, and made the next reader
think it mattered.

The atomic write and the lock stay. Both are still correct, both are
cheap, and hasTrustDialogAccepted is genuinely shared state.

The new assertion is assertFalse, not a deletion. Removing the old
assertion would leave nothing to stop someone re-adding the key later as
a plausible-looking completeness fix. Mutation-tested: restoring the
production line fails
seedTrustDialogWritesOnlyTheTrustFlagAndNotTheOnboardingKey:2198 with 0
compile errors.

1229 tests, 0 failures.
2026-09-03 12:41:20 +07:00
Dai Ha 9d37f3aa29 fleetd #201: the coverage line must name the key its caller actually means
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Found by reading a real boot log after the redeploy, not by a test.

coverage() is shared by two call sites — CB-578's exhaustedPattern line
and Unit 5's errorPattern line — but its 'off' branch hard-coded the
word exhaustedPattern. So this daemon printed:

  backend-exhausted classification (CB-578 stage A): partial
      (configured: [sol, terra]; not configured: [...])
  backend-error classification (fleetd #201 Unit 5): off
      (no profile has an exhaustedPattern configured; profiles: [...])

Two lines, one directly under the other, disagreeing about whether any
profile has an exhaustedPattern. Both were individually defensible and
together they were nonsense. Worse, the message sends an operator to
set the wrong key: the thing that is missing is errorPattern.

coverage now takes the key name. I changed the signature rather than
adding an overload, so the compiler found all three existing callers
instead of leaving them silently on the old path.

Every earlier coverage test passed the exhaustion case only, which is
why none of them could see this. The new test pins the errorPattern
case. Reverting the fix turns it red with 0 compile errors.

1229 tests, 0 failures, BUILD SUCCESS.

This is the second defect in two hours found only by reading the live
startup log — see #115, where the noise of a false warning had been
hiding a correct line saying a whole feature was off.
2026-09-03 12:29:27 +07:00
Dai Ha eaf89abaf6 fleetd #248: make Fleetd's CompletionResolver wiring provable
CI / contract (push) Successful in 42s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m40s
Before this, dropping either #241's worktree lookup or Unit 5's
backend-error pair at Fleetd.main's new CompletionResolver(...) call
left all 1216 tests green with 0 compile errors. Every existing test
built its own CompletionResolver, so they proved the class and never
the wiring. BackendOutageFlowTest was the sharpest case: it copies
main's sink lambda line-for-line, so it proves the copy and cannot
notice the original being deleted.

The three inline arguments are now package-private static factories on
Fleetd, following the deliverableTo pattern the file already had, each
with its own behaviour test. backendErrorSink is public so a
cross-package test can drive the real production object rather than a
hand-mirrored copy.

The test that was actually missing is a source-text assertion. That is
the honest fallback for a composition root with no seam, and it is
labelled [SOURCE TEXT] in every test name and message so it cannot be
misread as a behaviour check. It is not vacuous: two tests pin that the
variables are assigned from the factories, and two pin that those
variables reach the call site, so renaming a variable while assigning
an inert value does not slip through.

Known cost, accepted: the assertions match exact source substrings, so
reformatting that statement will break them. That is the price of
covering a main method, and a spurious failure here is loud and
obvious, which is the right direction to fail.

Verified by the lead, both mutations re-run against the merged code —
see the merge check.

PR #251
2026-09-03 12:22:32 +07:00
Dai Ha d895f02bc1 fleetd #248: prove main() wires CompletionResolver's arguments, not just the class
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 48s
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 1m40s
Fleetd.main built three of CompletionResolver's 8 constructor arguments inline
(a worktree/branch lookup lambda, and the backend-error pattern lookup + sink
locals). Dropping any of them at the call site compiled clean and left every
existing test green, because every existing test constructs its own
CompletionResolver and only ever proves the class, never main's wiring.

Extract each into a static factory on Fleetd (worktreeBranchLookup,
backendErrorPatternLookup, backendErrorSink — the same static-factory pattern
Fleetd.deliverableTo already uses), test each factory's own behaviour, and add
a source-text assertion (FleetdCompletionResolverWiringTest) proving main's
CompletionResolver call still passes all three. backendErrorSink is public so
BackendOutageFlowTest can exercise the real production sink directly instead
of the hand-mirrored copy its own class doc used to describe.

No production behaviour changes — mechanical extraction only.
2026-09-03 12:20:28 +07:00
Dai Ha 43206cac2f fleetd #148 point 2: drop .envrc from the default parity overlay
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m9s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m18s
The default is now [.env], not [.env, .envrc]. .env is data, so copying
it into a worker worktree can only move values. .envrc is executable
shell that direnv runs on every cd, so copying it moves behaviour. Those
are different risks and should not share a default.

The knob is unchanged. An operator who wants .envrc copied writes
parityOverlay: ['.env', '.envrc'] and owns that choice; a new test pins
that escape hatch, because without it this would be a removal rather
than a re-default.

Decision recorded on the ticket, with the evidence it asked for first:
this checkout has no .env and no .envrc, and direnv is not on PATH, so
there was no live exposure. Point 1 (extend the credential scrub to
direnv) is declined and the reason is on the ticket — the scrub is a
one-shot .zlogin and a direnv hook runs on every cd, so no amount of
work on the scrub can cover it. Not copying the executable file is the
smaller change and removes the need.

The worker also fixed WorktreeSessionManagerTest, which hardcoded the
same default at another layer and broke the build. Outside its named
scope, correctly flagged rather than done silently.

Verified by the lead: 1216 tests, 0 failures, 0 compile errors.

PR #250
2026-09-03 12:03:21 +07:00
Dai Ha 8bba3a8184 fleetd #148 (point 2): drop .envrc from the default parityOverlay
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m20s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m32s
.env is data; .envrc is executable shell that direnv runs on every cd, so
copying it into a worker moves behaviour, not just values. The default
parityOverlay is now [.env] only. The knob is unchanged: an operator who
wants .envrc copied can still write parityOverlay: [.env, .envrc]
explicitly.

Updates FleetConfig's default and javadoc, fleetd.example.yaml's two
mentions of the default, and the FleetConfigTest coverage: renamed the
default test, added parityOverlayExplicitEnvrcOptInStillWorks to prove
the .envrc opt-in escape hatch still works, and fixed
WorktreeSessionManagerTest#worktreeAcquireRunsParityOverlayWithProfileDefaults
which also hardcoded the old default.
2026-09-03 12:00:13 +07:00
Dai Ha 5cf3ca9a89 fleetd #241: never hand the lead back its own brief as the member's report
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m15s
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m27s
The completion fallback scrapes a member's pane when a turn ends with no
fleet_reply. If the pane still shows the brief the lead injected, the
scrape returned that brief, and the lead read its own words as the
member's answer. A silent member looked like a member that had reported.

echoesInjectedBrief now recognises that case and refuses it. Round 1 used
plain containment in both directions, which destroyed real reports: a
genuine report that quotes the brief contains it. Round 2 keeps the safe
direction unbounded (the brief contains the scrape) and bounds the other
one at MAX_ECHO_EXCESS_CHARS, so a scrape only counts as an echo when it
adds almost nothing to the brief.

Merge note — the Fleetd.java conflict:

This call site was changed by both #201/#227 Unit 5 (backendErrorPatterns
+ backendErrorSink) and by this ticket (the worktree/branch lookup). I
resolved it onto the full 8-argument constructor so neither feature is
dropped; nowNanos has to be passed explicitly to reach that overload.

Verified by the lead: 1215 tests, 0 failures, 0 compile errors.

I also measured whether the resolution itself is protected, and it is
NOT. Both mutations at this call site stay green:
  - drop the worktree lookup (pass _ -> null): 1215 tests, 0 failures
  - drop Unit 5's patterns/sink (legacy()/none()): 1215 tests, 0 failures
Nothing in the suite covers Fleetd's composition root, so either feature
could be silently unwired here and the build would still be clean. The
tests prove the seams, not the caller. Filed separately rather than
fixed in a merge commit.

PR #245, branch worker/cb241-fallback-echo-1175e9-11
2026-09-03 11:54:06 +07:00
Dai Ha ac474981e4 fleetd #201/#227 Unit 5: wire the backend-error cool-off into config, placement and the MCP surface
A profile's credential that throws two distinct backend errors inside 60
seconds now cools off for 60 seconds. Automatic placement skips it,
an explicit fleet_spawn naming it is refused before the adapter is
called, and fleet_list/fleet_profiles report it as coolingOffForSeconds
next to the separate CB-578 quarantinedForSeconds.

Verified by the lead: see the merge check below. The worker ran 7
mutations, all killed with 0 compile errors; M7 was NOT killed on the
first pass (the assertion only checked .contains("quarantined"), which
is true of both the correct message and the mutated fallback), and the
worker strengthened it to assertEquals on the exact literal and kept
that change. That is the right call and it is reported honestly.

Two deviations, both justified in the PR:
- FixedPlacementPolicy needed the same coolingOff filter because it
  filters candidates inline instead of using PlacementPolicyUtil.
- BackendOutageFlowTest sits in dev.ltms.fleet.inject because
  CompletionResolver.InFlight is package-private there.

The startup coverage log line is a code-reading claim, not a captured
line from a live daemon. The worker said so rather than overclaiming.

PR #246, branch worker/cb201-unit5-wiring-6c12e6-8
2026-09-03 11:48:42 +07:00
Dai Ha ba04b2359b fleetd #201/#227 unit 5: wire errorPattern, cool-off spawn gate, and fleet views
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 49s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m52s
Wires the already-merged units into production:
- Per-profile errorPattern config (beside exhaustedPattern), compiled once at
  startup; falls back to the legacy (?i)\bAPI Error\s*: pattern when unset.
  Startup logs configured-vs-legacy coverage, same as exhaustedPattern.
- One production BackendErrorSink in Fleetd.java: mark backend_error on the
  session, resolve the profile's credential fail-loud (never
  Optional.ifPresent), record it in BackendOutagePolicy, and push a lead
  nudge on a new incident.
- CompositePeerLauncher's explicit and automatic spawn paths both refuse a
  cooling-off credential; exhaustion quarantine wins when both are active.
  PlacementContext gets a separate coolingOff set so refusal text says
  "cooling off", never "exhausted".
- fleet_list/fleet_profiles report coolingOffForSeconds as an independent
  fact from quarantinedForSeconds; both can appear together.
- fleetd.example.yaml documents errorPattern and the 2/60/60 cool-off policy;
  CLAUDE.md tells leads how to read the two independent outage states.

Also: FixedPlacementPolicy.java, not in the original file list, needed the
same coolingOff filtering as PlacementPolicyUtil (it does its own inline
candidate filtering rather than delegating).

1190 tests, 0 failures (up from the 1163 baseline); BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-09-03 11:45:11 +07:00
Dai Ha 2e5b63f6f6 fleetd #149: seed the workspace-trust entry before a claude-code spawn
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m13s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m29s
Claude Code asks 'is this a project you trust?' the first time it starts in a directory it
has not seen. It is interactive with no timeout, and every member spawned with worktree:true
lands in a brand-new directory. The member never reaches its first turn and never replies,
while herdr reports blocked/interactive_ready — which reads as healthy.

ClaudeCodeLauncher now seeds projects.<cwd>.hasTrustDialogAccepted in the profile's
.claude.json before the process starts. This is not a new grant: the operator already
trusted the repo by configuring the profile against it, and a worktree is a checkout of it.

The write is gated on isProvisionedWorktree(cwd) — a .git that is a regular gitdir-pointer
file, never a real checkout. That gate exists because an earlier revision of this change,
run under mutation testing, wrote to the operator's real ~/.claude.json and truncated it
from 72KB to 919 bytes. Tests using a null configDir fall back to the real user.home, so
an ungated seed reaches real files.

The write is atomic (sibling temp file + ATOMIC_MOVE, never truncate-in-place) and the
whole read-modify-write is under a lock, because .claude.json is large, live, and rewritten
by Claude Code itself while fleetd runs. Two parallel spawns are normal here.

Verified by the lead: 1173 tests, 0 failures. A truncating write turns the torn-read test
red; removing the lock turns concurrentSeedsForDifferentCwdsBothSurvive red. Both with 0
compile errors. copyPosixPermissionsIfPresent is NOT covered by a test — its mutation stays
green — but createTempFile is 0600 on POSIX by default, so the not-world-readable property
holds without it; the line only preserves a non-default mode.
2026-09-03 11:44:03 +07:00
Dai Ha 3437d6313d fleetd #241: bound the echo match so a real report is never swallowed
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m9s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m25s
Round 1 used plain bidirectional containment. The direction that catches the real bug --
the pane holds the brief plus a status bar, so the scrape contains the brief -- also fires
when a member restates the whole brief and then writes a genuine report under it. That
threw the report away and told the lead nothing was produced, which is worse than the bug
being fixed: it destroys a delivery instead of merely obscuring one.

The safe direction (the scrape is a fragment of the brief) stays unbounded, because a
fragment of the brief is by definition not a report. The dangerous direction now requires
the scrape to add at most MAX_ECHO_EXCESS_CHARS beyond the brief, which is the amount of
TUI chrome a real echo carries.

Work by the cb241 worker, committed by the lead: its backend stopped answering after the
fix was written, so two turns ended with no commit and no reply. Verified by the lead:
1169 tests, 0 failures; removing the bound turns pinsTheMaximumTuiChromeExcess and
completionFallbackKeepsARealReportThatRestatesTheWholeBrief red with 0 compile errors.
2026-09-03 11:39:11 +07:00
Dai Ha 743377d6cd fleetd #149 review round 2: make the trust-dialog seed atomic and lock-protected
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m21s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m25s
Files.writeString truncates the target in place before writing, so there
was a window where .claude.json could be observed empty or half-written
- exactly the shape of the incident this ticket already hit once, but
reachable in production too: a crash/kill mid-write, or two concurrent
claude-code spawns (normal here - several run in parallel routinely)
racing a naive read-modify-write and silently discarding one spawn's
entry.

Two independent fixes, each with its own dedicated test proving it (not
the other):

- ClaudeCodeLauncher.writeAtomically: serialise to a sibling temp file in
  the same directory, then Files.move with ATOMIC_MOVE + REPLACE_EXISTING,
  preserving the target's existing POSIX permissions (.claude.json ships
  0600). A reader now only ever observes the fully-old or fully-new file,
  never a torn one. Package-visible so a test can drive it directly.
- TRUST_JSON_LOCK: a process-wide lock around seedTrustDialog's whole
  read-modify-write, so two concurrent spawns for different cwds both
  keep their entry instead of the second write discarding the first.
  Sufficient because every spawn on this daemon runs in one JVM; it does
  NOT protect against a second daemon process or the operator's own live
  Claude Code writing at the same instant - writeAtomically covers that
  case instead.

Both fail soft, same as before: any I/O failure here must never block a
spawn.

Four new tests: a large (30-project) existing file survives without
collapsing (asserted on the restored key set, not just that the result
parses); two concurrent spawns for different cwds both keep their entry
(CountDownLatch-synchronised, not a sleep); existing 0600 permissions
survive the write; and a direct test of writeAtomically with a busy-poll
reader thread proving a concurrent reader never observes a torn file.

See PR body for the full mutation-testing table, including an
honest note on which of these tests the atomicity mutation actually
caught (not the one implied by the numbering in review) and why.
2026-09-03 11:38:10 +07:00
Dai Ha 5952d559c7 fleetd #134 point 3: tell the lead which files a worktree neutralizes
CI / contract (push) Successful in 57s
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m26s
The daemon log and the worktree git config are both new in 205ad82, but neither helps a
lead who is writing a brief. This is the line that does: never brief a worker to edit
.mcp.json, opencode.json or .autoenv in its worktree, because the edit cannot be
committed and nothing will say so.

Goes in the project addendum, not the canonical block, so the byte-sync with
wiki/7-Use-Cases.md is unaffected — re-checked and still true.
2026-09-03 11:32:03 +07:00
Dai Ha 205ad823b0 fleetd #134: make tool-surface neutralization visible to the daemon and the worker
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m18s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m34s
isolateToolSurface replaces .mcp.json, opencode.json and .autoenv with stubs in every
provisioned worktree and marks them --skip-worktree. That neutralisation is correct and
is unchanged here — the committed files would mount the primary's credentials.

The problem was that it was invisible. A worker told to edit opencode.json read a 3-byte
stub and reported, truthfully and wrongly, that the mount key did not exist. A missing
file would have prompted a question; a plausible stub did not.

Two changes, both visibility only. The daemon now logs one info summary per provisioning
with the denominator, the files neutralised, and the consequence. And the list is recorded
in worktree-scoped git config (fleet.neutralizedConfig / fleet.neutralizedConfigNote) so a
worker can discover it from inside its own worktree with
'git config --worktree --get-all fleet.neutralizedConfig'.

Worktree-scoped config was chosen over a file in the working tree because it lives in
.git/worktrees/<nonce>/config.worktree and so can never appear in git status, and because
configureEnvironmentCredentialHelper already uses the same mechanism in the same add() call.

Verified by the lead: baseline 1172 tests, 0 failures. Reverting the summary to log.debug
goes red (2 tests), and recording into --local rather than --worktree — which would leak
the record into the shared repo config — goes red too. Both with 0 compile errors.
2026-09-03 11:31:24 +07:00
Dai Ha d654ccb818 fleetd #134: make tool-surface neutralization visible to the daemon and the worker
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 53s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m35s
isolateToolSurface replaced .mcp.json/opencode.json/.autoenv with neutral stubs and
marked them --skip-worktree, but said nothing anywhere. A real worker read a 3-byte
{} stub for opencode.json, where the repo's real file is 30+ lines, and truthfully
(but wrongly) reported a mount key did not exist.

Two readers, two fixes:
- the daemon operator gets one info log per provisioning, naming the denominator,
  what was neutralized, and why anything was not (same shape as overlayParity's
  fix in #148 point 3).
- the worker gets the same fact recorded in worktree-scoped git config
  (fleet.neutralizedConfig / fleet.neutralizedConfigNote), discoverable with
  `git config --worktree --get-all fleet.neutralizedConfig` from inside its own
  worktree, without asking the lead. Not a working-tree file: this repo already
  uses worktree-scoped config for the credential helper and the SSH->HTTPS
  rewrite, and it lives under .git/worktrees/<nonce>/ so it can never appear in
  `git status` for the worker to trip on or commit.

The neutralization itself (stub content, --skip-worktree marking) is unchanged.
2026-09-03 11:24:41 +07:00
Dai Ha a89dcc9b7e fleetd #149: seed the workspace-trust entry before a claude-code spawn
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 51s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m43s
A claude-code member spawned into a fresh worktree hits an interactive,
un-timed workspace-trust prompt on its first start in a directory it has
never seen. It never reaches its first turn and never mounts the bridge.

Fix: ClaudeCodeLauncher.seedTrustDialog writes
projects.<cwd>.hasTrustDialogAccepted / hasCompletedProjectOnboarding into
the profile's configDir/.claude.json (or ~/.claude.json when configDir is
unset) BEFORE the herdr spawn call, additively (existing keys/projects are
preserved). Gated to isProvisionedWorktree(cwd) - a .git that is a regular
gitdir-pointer file, never a real checkout's .git directory - the same
signal writeIdeOverlay already used, now shared between both.

That gate is a fix for a real incident hit while building this: an
earlier ungated version ran against this file's own pre-existing tests
(configDir=null, no cwd -> falls back to the real user.dir and
~/.claude.json) and corrupted the operator's actual ~/.claude.json down
to a single entry during a mutation-testing run. See PR body for the
full incident report.

FakeHerdr gained onAgentStart(Runnable) so a test can assert the seed
is on disk at the exact instant herdr's agent.start call is reached -
i.e. strictly before the peer process itself would start.
2026-09-03 11:23:06 +07:00
Dai Ha 0d7b4fb026 fleetd #134 + #148 point 3: make the parity overlay say what it did
CI / contract (push) Successful in 51s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m35s
Both defects lived in one method. overlayParity logged every step at debug, so at the
default level the copy was silent and nobody could tell which overlay files a member
actually got. It also marked a copied tracked file --skip-worktree and said nothing, so a
worker editing that file later found git ignoring the change with no error anywhere.

The summary now reports the denominator, not a bare count: 'copied 1 of 2 candidates:
.env (.envrc absent)'. A bare 'copied 1' is the same under-reporting shape as #113.
Neutralised files are named with the consequence in the message itself.

No marker file is written into the worktree: acceptance criterion 1 requires the worktree
to hold exactly the configured overlay set, so a marker would violate the fix it documents.

The copy and mark logic is unchanged — only logging is new.

Verified by the lead: baseline 1168 tests, 0 failures. Reverting either log.info to
log.debug goes red (2 reds and 1 red, 0 compile errors each), which is the regression that
matters since the whole fix is the log level.
2026-09-03 11:14:21 +07:00
Dai Ha 321d8dcbb5 fleetd #241: suppress echoed fallback briefs
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 46s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m20s
2026-09-03 11:10:48 +07:00
Dai Ha ef8c97871e fleetd #134/#148 point 3: make overlayParity's copy and skip-worktree visible
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m15s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m53s
overlayParity logged everything at debug, so at the default level nobody could
tell which overlay files a spawn actually received (#148 pt 3), and a tracked
file marked --skip-worktree gave no warning that it can no longer be edited
from that worktree (#134).

Report the outcome at info: a per-spawn summary naming the denominator (every
configured candidate), what was copied, and why anything was not — plus a
separate line naming every file marked --skip-worktree, stating plainly that
it cannot be committed from this worktree. No worktree-local marker file: the
worktree must hold exactly the configured overlay set and nothing else, so an
extra file would violate that invariant.
2026-09-03 11:09:50 +07:00
Dai Ha 26bafe824b fleetd #201/#227 unit 1: classify a backend error at the scrape
CI / contract (push) Successful in 43s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m54s
CompletionResolver already reads the pane on every turn, so the classifier lives there
rather than in a new watcher. A matched pattern resolves the waiter as a failure and
fires BackendErrorSink, always inside the resolveFailure win-gate so exactly one thread
reports one incident.

The too-fast path now takes a fresh scrape instead of reusing the pre-turn text, so a
backend that dies immediately is still classified. BackendErrorSink is a single-method
functional interface by design — see #234 for what a default overload does to a lambda.
2026-09-03 10:53:51 +07:00
Dai Ha 838a701109 fleetd #234: carry the profile hint to the exhaustion sink
An exhausted opencode member could not always be mapped back to a credential, because
the launcher knew the profile and the sink did not. The sink now takes a profile hint.

The interface is inverted on purpose: the three-argument method is the single abstract
method and the two-argument one is the default. A lambda can only implement the abstract
method, so every lambda is now forced to carry the profile. The first round of this fix
added the third argument as a default overload, and the production forwarder in Fleetd
was a two-argument lambda — so the fix compiled, passed its tests, and never ran.

Verified by the lead: deleting the forwardingTo factory's override, and rewriting the
Fleetd call site as a plain lambda, both fail to compile now rather than passing silently.
2026-09-03 10:52:01 +07:00
Dai Ha e5eb3534c7 fleetd #201/#227 unit 3: lead outage nudge
Backend incidents become a fourth source inside ReplyPushLoop, not a new scheduler — a
second injector would race the one control that already owns lead-pane delivery. One
notice per incident per affected lead (not per member), one-shot, waiting while the lead
pane is not injectable, and combined into the same nudge as any pending failed ticket.

A classified target that cannot be mapped to a credential gets its own truthful notice
and its own pending/delivered records. It previously reused the incident message, which
told the lead a credential was 'cooling for 0 remaining seconds' when nothing was cooling,
and smuggled the free-text reason into the profiles field.

Verified by the lead: 1129 tests green; routing the unmapped path back through
onBackendIncident turns unmappedBackendTargetUsesTheKnownLeadSchedule red with 0 compile
errors, and that test now asserts the whole rendered message rather than two substrings.
2026-09-03 10:49:25 +07:00
Dai Ha 959c83534f fleetd #201/#227 unit 2: credential outage policy
Adds BackendOutagePolicy — a credential-keyed state machine on an injected monotonic
clock. Two classified backend errors from two DISTINCT targets on one credential inside
60 seconds mint one incident and start a 60-second cool-off. Errors during cool-off
neither extend it nor mint another; expiry clears evidence, so two fresh errors rearm.

Correlated on credentialId, never on profile name or error text. Deliberately not
BackendQuarantine: that restarts a 1800-second cooldown per exhaustion, and its name
would make every refusal say 'backend exhausted', which is a different condition.

Threshold counts distinct targets rather than raw events (lead decision): the classifier
is a heuristic and a valid member report can quote an 'API Error:' line, so one member
repeating that line must not remove a healthy credential's capacity. A real outage hits
every member on the credential, so true detection is unaffected.

Verified by the lead: 1135 tests green; reverting evidenceCount() to reasons.size()
turns two BackendOutagePolicyTest cases red with 0 compile errors.
2026-09-03 10:49:10 +07:00
Dai Ha 31b028e860 fleetd #234 round 4: invert ExhaustionSink's abstract method so the bug class is unrepresentable
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 46s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m23s
Round 3's factory fixed the two known call sites but the underlying shape
was still there: a lambda written against ExhaustionSink binds to whichever
overload is abstract, and the 2-arg form held that position, so ANY lambda
-- a call-site forwarder, a hand-built test double, a future caller who has
never heard of fleetd #234 -- could still silently take the hint-dropping
default. Two rounds shipped exactly that mistake in two different places.

Fix: made the 3-arg onExhausted(target, reason, profile) the interface's
single abstract method; the 2-arg form is now a default that delegates with
a null profile. A lambda declared against ExhaustionSink today is forced by
the compiler to take three parameters -- there is no overload left for it to
bind to that can drop the hint. This is enforced by the type system, not by
a test that has to remember to check for it.

Knock-on changes:
- ExhaustionSink.none() -- a 3-arg lambda, still a genuine no-op, now safe
  by construction rather than by care.
- ExhaustionSink.forwardingTo(...) -- collapses to a one-line 3-arg lambda;
  kept as a named factory (round 3's lesson: a test must call the real
  object, not rebuild its shape).
- Fleetd.java's real sink and the two OpenCodeLauncherTest sinks that used
  to be anonymous classes overriding both overloads are now plain lambdas
  too -- the 2-arg override each carried was pure boilerplate once the
  interface provides it as a default.
- CompletionResolver.java itself: UNCHANGED, zero diff (confirmed via
  `git diff --stat` before staging) -- its two call sites still call the
  2-arg onExhausted(target, reason), which is now the default and behaves
  identically. CompletionResolverTest (41 tests, 0 failures) proves this;
  its five ExhaustionSink lambdas needed a mechanical third parameter added
  to keep compiling against the new abstract method, no assertion changed.

Mutation proof, re-run against the new shape: forwardingTo's body edited to
call the 2-arg default instead of passing the hint through (the equivalent
of round 3's "delete the 3-arg override" now that there is only one method
to break) -- both new tests go red with the same assertions as round 3:

  ExhaustionSinkForwardingHazardTest...: expected: <gx> but was: <null>
  OpenCodeLauncherTest...ForwardingHop:  expected: <true> but was: <false>
  Tests run: 68, Failures: 2

Restored, re-ran: green (Tests run: 109, Failures: 0, including
CompletionResolverTest).

Compiler proof (not committed -- a scratch file outside the worktree,
compiled with the real ExhaustionSink.java on the classpath, then deleted):

  ExhaustionSink forwarder = (target, reason) -> System.out.println(target + reason);

  error: incompatible types: incompatible parameter types in lambda expression

A 2-arg lambda against this interface no longer compiles at all.

mvn clean install: Tests run: 1129, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-09-03 10:46:27 +07:00
Dai Ha 7840e9adf6 CB-201: make unmapped target notice truthful
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m13s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m15s
2026-09-03 10:44:18 +07:00
Dai Ha c3672f5472 fleetd #201/#227 unit 4: durable BACKEND_ERROR member outcome
CI / contract (push) Successful in 42s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m47s
Adds MemberSession.State.BACKEND_ERROR with a nullable failureReason, surfaced in
rosterView, and SessionManager.onBackendError(target, reason). The CAS loop accepts
both sides of the completion race (BUSY and DONE); BACKEND_ERROR is terminal.

completeTurn now returns early when its CAS loses, so a stale DONE copy can no longer
release the pane or reset its context behind a member that just went BACKEND_ERROR.

Verified by the lead: 1130 tests green; mutating the completeTurn early return back to
the old fall-through turns losingCompletionDoesNotReleaseOrClearABackendErrorMember red
with 0 compile errors.
2026-09-03 10:43:58 +07:00
Dai Ha cf54aed451 CB-201 unit 2 review fix: threshold counts distinct targets, not raw events
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 58s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m46s
Two errors from the same target inside the window must never trip the
outage threshold on their own (a valid member report can legitimately
quote an "API Error:" line twice) — only two DIFFERENT targets on the
same credential do. Change evidenceCount() to targets.size() instead
of reasons.size(); reasons() still keeps every event, including
same-target repeats, so it can be longer than evidenceCount(). A real
outage still hits every target on the credential, so this loses no
true-positive coverage while cutting a real false-positive path.
2026-09-03 10:42:37 +07:00
Dai Ha bbf68f3e3c CB-201: cover losing completion CAS
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 44s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m37s
2026-09-03 10:35:36 +07:00
Dai Ha 776743cbe2 fleetd#201 Unit 1: typed backend-error classification in CompletionResolver
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m19s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m45s
Replace the hardcoded API-Error check with a target-keyed BackendErrorPatternLookup
plus a BackendErrorSink, mirroring the existing ExhaustedPatternLookup/ExhaustionSink
pair. Classifies in all three paths (normal block, #211 raw-scrape fallback, and the
fleetd#164 MIN_TURN_NANOS floor). The sink fires only after Rendezvous.resolveFailure
wins for the exact waiter. A target with no configured pattern still falls back to the
narrow (?i)\bAPI Error\s*: compatibility pattern. Existing constructors keep compiling
via BackendErrorPatternLookup.legacy() / BackendErrorSink.none() defaults.

Public send result is unchanged (still a failed send) — the typed sink event is the
internal seam Unit 5 will consume.
2026-09-03 10:33:59 +07:00
Dai Ha 826e0aeb2a CB-201 unit 2: credential-keyed backend outage policy
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m24s
Add BackendOutagePolicy: two classified backend errors on the same
credentialId within a 60s window mint one Incident and start a 60s
cool-off for that credential, one atomic ConcurrentHashMap.compute()
per credentialId so a concurrent second and third event can never
both cross the threshold. Errors during cool-off are ignored outright
(no extension, no incident); once cool-off elapses the next error
clears old evidence, requiring two fresh errors to rearm. This is a
new class, deliberately not BackendQuarantine (wrong store, wrong
1800s duration, misleading "exhausted" semantics for a 60s transient
fault). Knows nothing about panes, profiles, sessions, launchers, or
leads — takes events in, returns incidents out.
2026-09-03 10:30:40 +07:00
Dai Ha c935b181dd fleetd #234 round 3: make ExhaustionSink's forwarder a shared factory, not a rebuilt-per-caller shape
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 42s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m36s
Round 2's tests never reached Fleetd.java at all: both new tests declared
their OWN local copy of the forwarding shape instead of calling production's.
Mutating Fleetd.java's real forwarder back into the broken lambda left those
copies untouched, so the whole suite stayed green while production had
regressed to exactly the bug being fixed -- proven live by the reviewer.

Fix: extracted the forwarding shape into one named factory,
ExhaustionSink.forwardingTo(Supplier<ExhaustionSink> target), with the
"why a lambda here is wrong" explanation moved onto it (the one place the
shape is now written). Fleetd.java's forwarder collapses to one line:

    ExhaustionSink forwardingExhaustionSink = ExhaustionSink.forwardingTo(exhaustionSinkRef::get);

Both new tests now call this same factory instead of rebuilding an anonymous
class inline, so they exercise the identical object production builds:
- ExhaustionSinkForwardingHazardTest: calls ExhaustionSink.forwardingTo
  directly and asserts the hint reaches the real sink through it.
- OpenCodeLauncherTest#theSpawnTimeQuarantineSurvivesTheFleetdStyleForwardingHop:
  same factory call, inside the full Fleetd-shaped construction order
  (forwarder built first, real sink pointed at via the AtomicReference
  afterward), driven through the real SessionManager.acquire() path.

Mutation proof, this time on production code only: deleted the factory's
3-arg override (falls back to the interface default, dropping the hint) --
both new tests go red with no test file touched:

  ExhaustionSinkForwardingHazardTest...: expected: <gx> but was: <null>
  OpenCodeLauncherTest...ForwardingHop:  expected: <true> but was: <false>
  Tests run: 68, Failures: 2

Restored, re-ran: green (Tests run: 68, Failures: 0). Confirmed Fleetd.java
carries no lambda ExhaustionSink anywhere (grep). ExhaustionSink.none() stays
a lambda on purpose -- both its overloads are true no-ops regardless of
arity, so there is no hint to drop.

mvn clean install: Tests run: 1129, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-09-03 10:30:37 +07:00
Dai Ha ee932fd85b CB-201: nudge leads about backend outages
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m7s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m55s
2026-09-03 10:28:51 +07:00
Dai Ha fe2e5ede34 CB-201: retain backend failure outcome
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m23s
2026-09-03 10:26:54 +07:00
Dai Ha c325054242 fleetd #234 round 2: fix the ExhaustionSink forwarding hop Fleetd.java actually uses
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m18s
The round-1 fix was dead on the real production path. Fleetd.java:177 builds
a forwarding sink (needed because the adapters are constructed before
`sessions` exists, breaking a genuine cycle) as a LAMBDA:

    ExhaustionSink forwardingExhaustionSink =
            (target, reason) -> exhaustionSinkRef.get().onExhausted(target, reason);

A lambda can only implement the interface's one abstract method (the 2-arg
overload), so it silently inherited the 3-arg overload's default body, which
drops the profile hint and calls back into the 2-arg method. OpenCodeLauncher
is constructed with this forwarder, so the hint it supplies (its own
already-known profile name) was thrown away before it ever reached the real
sink built later in Fleetd.main -- reproducing the exact silent no-op round 1
was sent to fix. The 1127 tests from round 1 all injected a sink directly
into OpenCodeLauncher and never went through this forwarding hop, so none of
them could see it.

Fix: forwardingExhaustionSink is now an anonymous class overriding both
overloads, each delegating to whatever exhaustionSinkRef currently holds.

Audited every other ExhaustionSink value in main/: the only other one is
ExhaustionSink.none() (a lambda), which is safe regardless of arity since
both its 2-arg body and the inherited 3-arg default are true no-ops.

New tests:
- ExhaustionSinkForwardingHazardTest: isolates the hazard at the interface
  level (a lambda forwarder drops the hint; an anonymous-class forwarder
  does not), independent of Fleetd.java's specific wiring.
- OpenCodeLauncherTest#theSpawnTimeQuarantineSurvivesTheFleetdStyleForwardingHop:
  replicates Fleetd.java's actual construction order (forwarder built and
  handed to the launcher first, real sink built and pointed at via the
  AtomicReference afterward) and drives the quarantine through it via the
  real SessionManager.acquire() path.

Both proven by mutation: temporarily rewriting each fixed forwarder back
into the pre-fix lambda makes its test fail with a real assertion message
(both matched exactly: "expected: <gx> but was: <null>" for the interface
proof, "expected: <true> but was: <false>" for the composed-wiring test);
restoring makes it pass again. No reverts were committed.

mvn clean install: Tests run: 1130, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-09-03 10:22:31 +07:00
Dai Ha 7662e2d0c8 fleetd #201/#227: refine backend outage work
CI / contract (push) Successful in 53s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m49s
2026-09-03 10:21:44 +07:00
Dai Ha 4877992a70 fleetd #234: key the opencode model check on the resolved session id, and make the spawn-time quarantine actually happen
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 58s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m29s
Defect 1: OpenCodeSessionDiscovery.actualModelForDirectory queried
WHERE directory = ?, the same heuristic sessionIdForDirectory uses. Since a
default fleet_spawn (no worktree:) shares the lead's cwd with every other
worker and every past session ever run there, the model read-back could
silently compare against a DIFFERENT session's row. Renamed to
actualModelForSessionId(sessionId), keyed on the primary key id instead, and
made OpenCodeLauncher's SessionAwareHandle cache the resolved id once
non-null (AtomicReference) so a later sibling row in the same directory can
never flip which session's evidence is read. sessionIdForDirectory (#209) is
left directory-based on purpose, with a comment explaining why the heuristic
is unavoidable at that layer.

Defect 2: the ERROR log claimed "quarantining this profile's credential" but
Fleetd's ExhaustionSink lambda resolved target -> roster -> profile ->
credential, while OpenCodeLauncher's model-mismatch check fires from
agentSessionId() during SessionManager.acquire(), before the session is
registered in the roster -- the lookup found nothing and silently no-opped.
Added a default 3-arg ExhaustionSink.onExhausted(target, reason, profile)
overload (defaults to the 2-arg method, so CompletionResolver's two call
sites are unchanged); OpenCodeLauncher now passes its own already-known
profile name; Fleetd's sink became an anonymous class that tries the roster
first, falls back to the hint, and logs loudly at ERROR naming target/reason
when neither resolves, instead of silently no-oping.

Both fixes proven by mutation: reverting each independently makes its new
test fail with a real assertion message, restoring makes it pass again.

mvn clean install: Tests run: 1127, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-09-03 10:09:26 +07:00
ltms 1c051c4e47 fleetd #115: a profile that needs no token no longer warns, and no longer crashes
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m2s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m50s
tokenEnv no longer defaults to FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN. A profile that names no
tokenEnv is stating it needs none, which is different from one naming a variable
that turns out to be unset. requiredSecretEnvVars now warns only for an explicitly
declared tokenEnv, so the permanent false alarm about a token no profile needs is
gone and the real warnings beside it stay trustworthy.

Decision recorded in a code comment: an explicit tokenEnv is checked for every
kind, opencode included. opencode can use its own provider credentials, but an
explicit tokenEnv declares a required host secret for its configured provider.

Second commit fixes a crash the first one introduced. Making tokenEnv nullable
changed what every reader of that value can receive, and ClaudeCodeLauncher:261
passed it straight to env.apply — System::getenv in production, which throws on a
null name. The live profile local-direct (kind: claude-code, baseUrl set, no
tokenEnv) would have crashed on spawn. It is weight: 0 today, so the failure would
have surfaced whenever someone re-enabled it. Now uses the superclass helper
resolveEnv, which already tolerates a null name and which OpenCodeLauncher was
already using.

Reader audit, all four: ClaudeCodeLauncher fixed; OpenCodeLauncher already safe via
resolveEnv; ConfigRef uses Objects.equals; MemberEnvAllowList drops null and blank
names in addIfPresent.

Verified by the lead before merge: reverting the resolveEnv fix makes the new test
fail with a NullPointerException from the null variable name, and restoring it
passes. Independent build: 1125 tests, 0 failures, 0 errors, 0 skipped.

Not verified: the ticket's acceptance criterion 4, a real boot on this host showing
no FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN line while the WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN and AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN lines
are unchanged. A worker cannot restart the daemon it talks through. The lead checks
that at the next redeploy.
2026-09-03 05:02:27 +02:00
Dai Ha adb7a67880 CB-612: support tokenless Claude Code profiles
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m4s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m24s
2026-09-03 09:59:21 +07:00
Dai Ha 723fe494e9 CB-612: suppress unneeded token warnings
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m7s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m17s
2026-09-03 09:50:49 +07:00
ltms 0f08b93659 fleetd #176: spawn gate fails fast on a dead backend, and refines UNKNOWN safely
CI / contract (push) Successful in 52s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m47s
Two fixes to HerdrPeerLauncher.waitUntilInjectableOrThrow.

Fix 1: the status call is now guarded. A herdr *_not_found answer — what happens
when the backend process exited rather than being slow — used to escape as a raw
HerdrException, skipping stop() and leaking the pane and tab, with a message that
blamed a slow pane. It now fails immediately, runs the same teardown, and says the
process exited.

Fix 2: the gate can now resolve UNKNOWN with the same StatusRefiner the status
poller uses, behind two guards. It only runs for the claude adapter, because
StatusRefiner.classify reads a Claude Code TUI. And a refined result is accepted
only when the same agents.get sample still reports a non-null agentType. That
second guard closes a trap: a dead pane sits at a shell prompt containing the same
❯ glyph the classifier reads as idle, so refining without corroboration would turn
"the backend died" into "ready to inject".

Verified by the lead before merge: NAME_PREFIX really is "claude"/"opencode" so the
adapter split holds; AgentControl.status(t) was already get(t).status(), so moving
the loop to get() adds no herdr call; and a *_not_found already failed the spawn
before this change, so fix 1 improves an existing failure rather than creating one.
The adapter guard was mutation-tested independently (set it to `if (false)`, the new
opencode test fails with "Expected PeerUnreachableException to be thrown, but nothing
was thrown"; restored, it passes). Independent build: 1123 tests, 0 failures,
0 errors, 0 skipped.

Not fixed, and not claimed: that herdr reports a null agentType for a bare shell
pane is unverified against a live daemon. To be proved by a live spawn on both
backends after deploy. The seat-accounting suggestion in #176 was deliberately not
built — its cause was tested in that issue and not reproduced.
2026-09-03 04:20:23 +02:00
Dai Ha 432c1d92d1 fleetd #176 review: cover the namePrefix guard, the adapter-refinement corroboration that had no test
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m14s
The agentType corroboration (guard b) had positive and negative tests, but the
per-adapter namePrefix guard (guard a) had none — nothing proved that an
opencode pane can never reach StatusRefiner.classify, only that a claude pane
with a null agentType is rejected. Since a live opencode pane always reports a
non-null agentType ("opencode"), guard (b) alone cannot catch a broken guard
(a).

Added opencodePaneIsNeverRefinedEvenWhenItsContentLooksLikeAnIdleClaudePrompt
to OpenCodeLauncherTest: agentType("opencode") (non-null, satisfies guard b on
its own) + pane content containing "❯" (would classify as IDLE) + raw status
UNKNOWN throughout. Asserts the gate still times out, and that no agent.read
call used source=detection (StatusRefiner.PROBE_SOURCE) — proving the refiner
was never even reached, not just that its answer was discarded. A blanket
"agent.read is never called" does not hold here: HerdrPeerLauncher.readPaneQuietly
reads the pane tail (source=recent) for the timeout log on every timeout,
regardless of adapter, so the assertion is scoped to the refiner's own probe
source instead.

Mutation check performed and reverted before this commit: temporarily changed
`if (!"claude".equals(namePrefix))` to `if (false)` in
HerdrPeerLauncher.refinedInjectable — the new test failed
("Expected PeerUnreachableException to be thrown, but nothing was thrown"),
confirming it actually exercises the guard. Restored the guard and reran —
test passes again (1/1). No production code changed in this commit.

mvn clean install: Tests run: 1123, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0 -- BUILD SUCCESS
2026-09-03 09:17:10 +07:00
Dai Ha 60b7e67b42 fleetd #176: fail fast when the spawn gate's backend exits mid-wait, and safely refine its UNKNOWN status
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m13s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m26s
Fix 1: agents.get(paneId) inside waitUntilInjectableOrThrow was unguarded, so a
herdr *_not_found answer (the backend process exited) propagated as a raw
HerdrException instead of PeerUnreachableException, and skipped teardown
entirely, leaking the pane/tab. Now caught via isAlreadyGone(); fails
immediately (does not burn the rest of the timeout), runs the same teardown
the timeout path runs, and the exception message says the process exited
rather than that the pane was slow. Any other HerdrException still
propagates unchanged.

Fix 2: the gate now resolves a raw UNKNOWN into StatusRefiner's pane-content
classification, like StatusPoller already does mid-life. Guarded against the
trap noted in the ticket: a pane whose backend exited settles at a bare shell
prompt that can also contain the "❯" glyph classify() reads as idle. So a
refined result is accepted only when the corroborating agentType from the
SAME agent.get sample is non-null, and only for the "claude" adapter (namePrefix)
since StatusRefiner.classify is written for the Claude Code TUI only. Refine
only runs when the raw status is UNKNOWN, so a healthy spawn adds zero extra
herdr calls.

Tests added to ClaudeCodeLauncherTest (FakeHerdr gained agentType()/
agentGetFailsWithAfter() fixtures):
 - spawnFailsFastWhenBackendProcessExitsMidWaitInsteadOfBurningTheTimeout
 - spawnLetsAnUnrelatedHerdrErrorPropagateUnchanged
 - refinedIdleIsNotAcceptedWhenAgentTypeIsNull
 - refinedIdleIsAcceptedWhenAgentTypeCorroboratesLiveness
 - refinementNeverFiresWhenRawStatusIsAlreadyInjectable

mvn clean install: Tests run: 1122, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0 -- BUILD SUCCESS
2026-09-03 09:10:49 +07:00
ltms 3fbd43fe3f fleetd #175: read back the model opencode actually resolved, and quarantine a silent substitution
CI / contract (push) Successful in 44s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m29s
Verified by the lead before merge. Read the full production diff, checkModelMatch, parseModel and actualModelForDirectory. Confirmed the check runs on the real #209 late-resolve path (not at spawn, which is why #203 was closed), that unknown/incomplete evidence never quarantines, and that claude-code is structurally excluded because SessionAwareHandle is only built by OpenCodeLauncher.spawn(). Round 2 closed the one gap I found: model JSON with an id but no providerID used to read as a mismatch for a provider-prefixed profile. Independent build: BUILD SUCCESS, 1117 tests, 0 failures, 0 skipped.
2026-09-02 13:01:33 +02:00
Dai Ha 32ebf065ac fleetd #175 review: a missing providerID in opencode's model JSON is UNKNOWN, not a mismatch
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m13s
parseModel already tolerates a model JSON with an id but no providerID (a real shape
opencode can write). checkModelMatch's providerMatches check did not: a provider-
prefixed profile whose id matched but whose evidence had no providerID was reported
as a mismatch and quarantined on incomplete data, which acceptance rule 4 forbids.

Compare the provider only when BOTH the profile requested one AND the evidence has
one. A genuine id mismatch is still caught either way — narrows the check, does not
disable it.
2026-09-02 17:59:04 +07:00
Dai Ha 1178b3f684 fleetd #175: check opencode's actual model against the profile, quarantine on a real mismatch
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 42s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m49s
opencode does not fail on an unknown -m <model> flag — it silently falls back to a
default model, which can be a paid credential. Extends the existing late-resolve
path (#209's SessionManager -> handle.agentSessionId() re-poll) so that once the
opencode session row exists, OpenCodeSessionDiscovery also reads its `model` JSON
column and OpenCodeLauncher's SessionAwareHandle compares it against the profile's
configured model.

Comparison rule: split the profile's model on the first '/' into provider+id. Compare
id always; compare provider only when the profile specified one. A bare model name
with no '/' matches on id alone. Absent/unparseable evidence is UNKNOWN, never a
mismatch, so a working profile is never quarantined on missing data. A real mismatch
logs an ERROR naming both models and the profile, then quarantines through the
existing ExhaustionSink path (wired via an AtomicReference forwarding sink in
Fleetd.java to break the sessions/workers/adapters construction cycle).
2026-09-02 17:53:59 +07:00
ltms 2a434ced2f fleetd #222: keep the member's charter file out of fleetd's own java.io.tmpdir
CI / contract (push) Successful in 58s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m28s
Verified by the lead before merge: read the full production diff, confirmed the memberHerdrSocket-absent branch is the literal unmodified Files.createTempFile call in its own branch, and that the refusal names the missing key. Measured behaviour recorded: claude 2.1.258 exits 1 immediately on an unreadable --append-system-prompt-file, so the pre-fix bug was the loud readiness-gate failure, not a silent charter-less member. The /tmp full-suite failure the worker reported was the two other #225 copies, fixed by #230 which is already on main; main is built and checked after this merge.
2026-09-02 02:56:36 +02:00
ltms cc919aa2b6 fleetd #226: reserve an architect slot before launch, so no member runs on a charter it will not hold
CI / contract (push) Successful in 41s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m31s
Verified by the lead before merge. Read the full production diff: locking is consistent (every MemberRegistry method uses synchronized(terminalToSlot)), and the refusal happens before the launcher starts a process. Proved the restored fallback test is real by removing the DEV fallback from SessionManager and re-running it: it failed with "expected: <DEV> but was: <ARCHITECT>", then reverted. Independent build: BUILD SUCCESS, 1092 tests, 0 failures, 0 skipped.
2026-09-02 02:54:52 +02:00
Dai Ha 6417b0edd9 fleetd#222: fix currentUserGroup() to resolve the real primary group (fleetd#225)
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 52s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m43s
The helper I copied from OpenCodeLauncherTest read the CWD's owning
group instead of the process's real primary group, so it silently
picked up whatever group owns the directory Maven was started from
(staff in a home checkout, wheel under /private/tmp on macOS) rather
than a group the operator is actually in. Replaced with the id -gn
based resolution that landed on #230 for the other two copies of this
helper, same shape and skip wording.
2026-09-02 07:54:11 +07:00
ltms 39c7ce76f3 fleetd #224 + #225: make worktreeRoot group-traversable, and stop two tests depending on the checkout location
CI / contract (push) Successful in 53s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m41s
Verified by the lead before merge: read the full production diff, confirmed `group` is normalised to null at GitWorktrees:148 so the `group == null` guard is complete, and confirmed the refusal runs before `git worktree add` so a failure leaves no half-made worktree. Independent build in the worker's worktree: BUILD SUCCESS, 1093 tests, 0 failures, 0 skipped.
2026-09-02 02:52:12 +02:00
Dai Ha b40f477210 #226 retain architect fallback coverage
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m17s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m33s
2026-09-02 07:50:34 +07:00
Dai Ha 5c56cb347f fleetd #224 / #225: share worktreeRoot with the group, and fix the group-detection test helper
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 44s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m42s
#224: GitWorktrees#add created worktreeRoot with the daemon's umask and never shared it with
worktreeGroup, even though shareWithGroup shares every child underneath it (each worktree, and
the repo's common git dir). Under memberHerdrSocket: the member pane runs as a different OS
user, which needs execute on every ancestor directory to reach anything underneath, no matter
how carefully each child is shared — so a member could not read the opencode.json #219 places
under this root, could not reach its own worktree, and could not read #213's ZDOTDIR scrub when
placed here either.

Fix: add() now calls a new shareRootWithGroup(root) right after creating the root, chgrp+chmod
g+x on the root itself (non-recursive — each child is still shared individually by its own call
site). No-op when worktreeGroup is unset, so behaviour is byte-identical in today's only live
mode. On failure (group missing, or operator not a member of it) the spawn is refused with a
WorktreeException naming the root, its current mode, and the group — mirroring shareWithGroup's
existing refusal shape — before `git worktree add` ever runs, so no partial worktree is left
behind.

Also adds the assertion the #221 reviewer flagged as missing: a test driving
EnvAllowListScrub#shareWithGroup directly against a directory holding several flat files
(opencode.json, member-charter.md, ide-rules.md, plus an unrelated one) and asserting every one
of them gets group-readable/never-group-writable permissions, not just the two files someone
happened to think of.

#225: OpenCodeLauncherTest/HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest's currentUserGroup() read the
group that owns the current working directory, not the process's own primary group, despite its
comment claiming the latter. Those coincide only by accident: a home checkout is typically owned
by a group the operator belongs to (staff), while a checkout under /private/tmp on macOS is
group wheel, which the operator is usually not a member of — so the same test fails for real
depending on where the repo happens to be checked out, and the existing assumeTrue only guarded
against "no POSIX groups at all", never "a resolvable but wrong group". Fixed by resolving the
process's REAL primary group via `id -gn` instead, with assumeTrue (skip, not fail) only when
that itself cannot be resolved on the host. The permission assertions these tests exist for are
unchanged.

Verified `mvn clean install` green from both a home checkout and a /private/tmp copy (mirroring
the exact repro in #225): 1093 tests, 0 failures, 0 errors in both locations.
2026-09-02 07:47:13 +07:00
Dai Ha e694deace3 #226 reserve architect slots before launch
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m19s
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 1m33s
2026-09-02 07:44:41 +07:00
Dai Ha 748367b7d6 fleetd#222: put the claude-code charter file where the member can read it
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 44s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m16s
ClaudeCodeLauncher#writeCharterFile used Files.createTempFile with no
directory argument, which resolves against fleetd's own java.io.tmpdir
(macOS: the per-user $TMPDIR, mode 0700). Under memberHerdrSocket: the
member pane runs as a different OS user and cannot read that directory,
and since #220 the charter file is the ONLY delivery path for
--append-system-prompt-file. Following #219's refusal decision (a
charter is the member's turn contract, not a degradable control): with
memberHerdrSocket configured, the charter now goes into a fresh
per-spawn directory under worktreeRoot, shared read-only via
EnvAllowListScrub.shareWithGroup (reusing #213/#219's mechanism); a
missing worktreeRoot/worktreeGroup refuses the spawn by name instead of
writing an unreadable file. With memberHerdrSocket absent the path is
unchanged.
2026-09-02 07:44:34 +07:00
ltms dcf5fb3be3 Merge pull request 'CB-619 / fleetd #123: refuse an architect spawn with no matching slot' (#223) from worker/cb-123-role-demotion-c600f7-2 into main
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m11s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m55s
2026-09-01 10:41:47 +02:00
ltms f9d2ee2a2b Merge pull request 'fleetd#219: fix OpenCodeLauncher config/discovery roots under memberHerdrSocket' (#221) from worker/cb-219-opencode-roots-1f677e-1 into main
CI / contract (push) Successful in 45s
CI / build (push) Successful in 2m16s
2026-09-01 10:33:04 +02:00
Dai Ha 866c7f2e9a CB-619 / fleetd #123: refuse an architect spawn with no matching slot
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m16s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m18s
An explicit-profile spawn bypasses role-pool placement (CompositePeerLauncher
only constrains an UNQUALIFIED spawn to fleet.<role>), so it was the one path
that could ask for role=architect on a profile no architect slot carries.
MemberRegistry silently held the session as a plain worker while GET /members
still reported the requested "architect" and only fleet_whoami (which reads
live bindings, not the request) told the truth.

- MemberLifecycle.requireSlotFor(role, profile): refuses the acquire before
  anything spawns when no configured architect slot carries the profile,
  naming the role, the profile, and the pools that do carry it. No-op for
  dev/reviewer, which are placement candidates only, never a live identity
  binding — refusing a profile mismatch there would break the documented
  fleet_spawn{profile:"opus"} (role defaults to dev) flow.
- MemberLifecycle.acquired(...) now returns the role the session actually
  holds, so a residual race (a slot exists but every instance is already
  bound to a different terminal) still falls back to dev honestly instead of
  lying — this case logs at WARN (was INFO), naming profile and terminal.
- SessionManager now records the role acquired() returns on MemberSession,
  never the requested role, so GET /members and fleet_list can no longer
  report a role the member does not hold; no changes needed to memberView/
  rosterView, which just read session.role().

An architect's identity IS the slot it is bound to — binding a role with no
slot to bind means inventing an identity out of nothing, which is the quiet
failure the whole role system exists to prevent.

Tests: SessionManagerTest and FleetMcpTest each drive a real spawn through
FleetMcp.spawn -> SessionManager.acquire -> the real ClaudeCodeLauncher (via
FakeHerdr), then assert on GET /members and fleet_whoami for that same
session — not on MemberRegistry.bind directly (fleetd issue #113's mistake).
2026-09-01 15:29:39 +07:00
Dai Ha d9168de43e fleetd#219: OpenCodeLauncher config/discovery roots must not assume fleetd's own filesystem
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 44s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m48s
Site 1 (config root): under memberHerdrSocket, writeConfig() now places the
ephemeral opencode.json directory under worktreeRoot and shares it read-only
with worktreeGroup, reusing EnvAllowListScrub#shareWithGroup (widened to
package-private and generalized) — the same mechanism #213 built for the
ZDOTDIR scrub, rather than a second copy. Unlike the ZDOTDIR scrub's
degrade-to-overlay fallback, a missing worktreeRoot/worktreeGroup here
REFUSES the spawn (IllegalStateException from buildLaunch): this file is the
member's only way to learn where the bridge MCP is, so writing it somewhere
unreadable would just produce an undeliverable member with no signal
pointing at the cause. memberHerdrSocket absent stays byte-identical.

Site 2 (discovery root): under memberHerdrSocket, agentSessionId() now
declares session discovery unavailable and logs one WARN per launcher
instance instead of silently scanning fleetd's own $HOME (opencode.db lives
under the MEMBER's home under this config key). Decision + reasoning for why
this is a declare-unavailable rather than a new config key is in
defaultDiscoveryRoot()'s javadoc.

Widened HerdrPeerLauncher#memberHerdrSocketConfigured/memberScrubParentDir/
memberGroup to package-private so OpenCodeLauncher reuses the exact same
config resolution rather than re-deriving it.

Same-shape finding (not fixed, out of scope): ClaudeCodeLauncher#writeCharterFile
(line ~465) writes the role-charter temp file via Files.createTempFile with no
directory argument, i.e. under java.io.tmpdir — the same site-1 shape, unfixed
for the Claude Code adapter.
2026-09-01 14:38:48 +07:00
Dai Ha c3fa1136d4 #220: keep the launch command inside the pane's 1024-byte line
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m37s
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m37s
herdr does not exec a member's launch command — it TYPES it into the pane,
and a pty line buffer holds 1024 bytes (BSD/macOS MAX_CANON). Past that the
tail is dropped and NOTHING reports it: herdr answers "agent started", the
backend exits on the mangled argument it was handed, the pane closes, and the
only symptom is the readiness gate timing out 20 seconds later with no reason.

That is what broke every claude-code spawn after #214. The reply charter rode
inline on --append-system-prompt, so the command was already 978 bytes; adding
--session-id <uuid> made it 1028, and the 4 bytes cut off the end turned
--autocompact 250000 into --autocompact 25, which claude rejects. Measured on
the live pane, the cut is at byte 1024 exactly.

- ClaudeCodeLauncher: the charter ALWAYS travels as --append-system-prompt-file.
  The file path already existed for the two-charter case; the inline form only
  ever saved a temp file, and it cost ~800 bytes of the line budget. This takes
  the prose off the command line for good.
- HerdrPeerLauncher.checkPaneCommandFits: refuse a command that cannot fit,
  naming the byte count and the longest argument, instead of spawning something
  that cannot work. The estimate is deliberately conservative — fleetd cannot
  see herdr's quoting, and an under-estimate would let the silent truncation
  back in.
- HerdrPeerLauncher.waitUntilInjectableOrThrow: log the pane tail and the last
  herdr status BEFORE stop() closes the pane. Without it the gate reports only
  that it timed out, which is true of every cause. This is what found the bug,
  and it stays.

The guard also catches a case that was already over the limit: a profile with
ideMcpUrl set assembles 1084 bytes. It is now impossible to ship that silently.

3 tests, all watched failing first: with the inline charter restored the guard
fires in the new fit test, in the pre-existing autocompact test and in the IDE
mount test. Full suite 1081 tests green. Proven live: sonnet spawns again, the
member obeys the file-delivered charter and ends its turn with fleet_reply, and
fleet_list reports the #214 agentSessionId.
2026-09-01 14:11:28 +07:00
Dai Ha cabcd87b66 #211 follow-up: the raw-scrape fallback must carry the pane, not just the matched line
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m16s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m50s
The normal backend-error path appends the pane tail to the failure reason on
purpose (fleetd#164): the BACKEND_ERROR pattern is a heuristic, and a member
that reported *about* an error while forgetting fleet_reply matches it too, so
dropping the rest of the pane destroys the report.

The new raw-scrape fallback did not do that. It matters more there, not less:
the fallback only runs when the trimmed assistant block was empty, so the raw
scrape is the ONLY copy of whatever the member managed to say. A lead read the
matched line and nothing else.

Clipped to the same cap the normal path uses, since a raw screen has no
boundary trimming to bound its size.

The assertion was watched failing without the fix:
  AssertionFailedError: fleetd#164: the failure must carry the pane, not only
  the matched line ... expected: <true> but was: <false>

mvn clean install: Tests run: 1079, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0
2026-09-01 13:26:05 +07:00
Dai Ha bf0e09b1a2 #214: mint a session id on every claude-code spawn, so every member is resumable 2026-09-01 13:23:32 +07:00
Dai Ha e1eb50ce65 #213: fix ZDOTDIR credential scrub gate + directory under memberHerdrSocket 2026-09-01 13:23:32 +07:00
Dai Ha 049e7d9d54 fleetd#211: classify BACKEND_EXHAUSTED/BACKEND_ERROR from the raw scrape as a fallback 2026-09-01 13:23:32 +07:00
Dai Ha ff3b49cd1e #214: mint a session id on every claude-code spawn, so every member is resumable
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m15s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m52s
2026-09-01 11:27:10 +07:00
Dai Ha 0373b6c41b #213: fix ZDOTDIR credential scrub gate + directory under memberHerdrSocket
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 2m17s
The memberCredentials.policy: allow-list ZDOTDIR scrub decided zsh-vs-not
using fleetd's own process $SHELL and wrote the generated scrub dir into
fleetd's own java.io.tmpdir. Under memberHerdrSocket: (member panes run as
a different OS user than fleetd's own process) this silently protects
nothing: the wrong shell decides the gate, and the directory can be
unreachable to the member.

- New FleetConfig.memberLoginShell: the member OS user's login shell,
  only ever read when memberHerdrSocket: is configured; fleetd's own
  $SHELL keeps deciding everything when memberHerdrSocket: is absent
  (byte-identical to before).
- HerdrPeerLauncher.applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy: memberHerdrSocket +
  memberLoginShell not configured/non-zsh falls back to the CB-596
  sentinel overlay (warn loudly, never refuse to spawn). memberHerdrSocket
  + zsh memberLoginShell generates the ZDOTDIR under the configured
  worktreeRoot instead of java.io.tmpdir, shared with the existing
  worktreeGroup (reused, not a new key).
- EnvAllowListScrub: new generate(parentDir, allowedNames, group) overload
  shares the generated directory via pure-Java POSIX group ownership
  (rwxr-x--- dir, rw-r----- files) — no external process spawn.
- fleetd.example.yaml documents memberLoginShell: and worktreeGroup:'s
  reuse for the scrub directory (the live fleetd.yaml is gitignored).

4 new tests in HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest cover the acceptance
criteria; 3 of the 4 were watched failing against the pre-fix code.
2026-09-01 11:07:11 +07:00
Dai Ha 445a45f6e1 fleetd#211: classify BACKEND_EXHAUSTED/BACKEND_ERROR from the raw scrape as a fallback
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 50s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m17s
CompletionResolver.resolve() returned an empty-scrape failure before the
BACKEND_EXHAUSTED / BACKEND_ERROR classification ever ran, whenever
lastAssistantBlock() found no usable text — most commonly a pane with no ⏺
marker at all, whose boundary scan starts at the top of the raw screen and
breaks immediately on the first line of TUI chrome. Since BACKEND_EXHAUSTED
is the only caller of exhaustionSink, this meant an exhausted backend was
recorded as "produced nothing" instead of being quarantined.

Fix: run the same two classifications against the raw (untrimmed) scrape as
a fallback, only inside the empty-scrape failure branch. A pane that already
yields a usable assistant block never reaches this branch, so the existing
narrow match is unchanged. lastAssistantBlock stays the sole source of the
reply text; only classification ever consults the raw scrape.
2026-09-01 10:50:10 +07:00
Dai Ha 966c58a3b8 #137: don't hand one stranded reply to every open async ticket (#215)
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m31s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m41s
abandon() drained the target's stranded reply once and then reused that same
Reply for every open task it walked past. Two open tickets on one target
therefore both came back REPLIED with the same text — one of them a reply the
worker never gave for that delegation.

One worker answer can settle at most one delegation. It now goes to the oldest
open task (lowest createdNanos) and every other open task keeps the ordinary
WORKER_FAILED path. If the chosen task turns out to be already resolved by
another path, the drained reply is published back to the inbox instead of being
dropped.

reply()'s matching side gets the same rule: more than one candidate means the
reply goes to the inbox rather than to a guess.

Reachability, checked rather than assumed:
- matching.size() >= 2 alone is reachable and was a real bug before this change.
- More than one candidate in reply() is not reachable today — hasAsyncQuestion
  matches any task with a stamped turnId, and answer()'s
  clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, false) leaves that stamp until the resumed turn
  resolves. Kept as defensive code, documented, no test seam added.
- matching.size() >= 2 together with a live strand is not reachable either:
  send() and answer() are the only two lock holders and both open a Rendezvous
  waiter inside the lock, so "lock held" and "waiter open" are one fact, and an
  acceptance always clears the strand first.

I checked the last point by building it in a scratch worktree: it can be forced
by closing an accepted send's waiter directly through Rendezvous, and it does go
red against the pre-fix loop — but that breaks the lock-and-waiter invariant
from outside the class, so no such test is added. A note in abandon()'s javadoc
says so, to save the next reader the same round trip.

Worker's REPORT-cb137.md left out of main.

mvn clean install: Tests run: 1071, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0
2026-08-31 23:23:07 +07:00
Dai Ha de026b8f8a #137 follow-up: document defect-1 and defect-2 reachability, drop unconstructible test
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 48s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m28s
Defect 1 (reply()'s askAnsweredAsyncTasks returning >1 candidate): confirmed
unreachable today. Documented why in three places — hasAsyncQuestion matches
any task with a stamped turnId (not just an open question), and answer()'s
clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, false) leaves that stamp in place until the
resumed turn's own future resolves — so a second task can never reach the
same eligible state while a first one holds it. Kept the defensive
inbox-fallback branch as defence in depth against that guarantee weakening,
per review instruction; no test seam added.

Defect 2 (abandon()'s broader `matching` filter applying a stranded reply to
more than one task): matching.size() >= 2 alone IS reachable (already
covered by abandonFailsEveryPendingAsyncTicketForTheReleasedTarget) and was
a real pre-fix bug (97f6c33's parent reused one drained reply for every
matching task). But hadStrandedReply == true together with matching.size()
>= 2, at the instant abandon() runs, is not constructible through the public
API: send() and answer() are the only two sites that ever hold a target's
session lock, and both open a Rendezvous waiter for that target as the first
thing they do while holding it — so "lock held" and "waiter open" are the
same fact throughout this class, and reply()'s fast path always resolves an
open waiter directly instead of stranding. A strand can only be created
while no task is accepted, and the moment the lock is next taken, that
acceptance clears the strand again before abandon() can observe both facts
together. Documented this in abandon()'s javadoc and removed the earlier
attempt at a deterministic test for the conjunction, whose apparent failure
was an invalid premise (the "accepted" task's own acceptance silently
cleared the strand it was meant to race against), not the fix being absent.
2026-08-31 23:17:50 +07:00
Dai Ha 97f6c33a45 #137: don't guess when a target has more than one open async task
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m4s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m17s
The CB-205-recovery fix in #205 assumed a target has at most one open
async task, with no guard. Fix three consequences:

- reply(): askAnsweredAsyncTask -> askAnsweredAsyncTasks (List). Exactly
  one candidate completes it (unchanged). Zero falls to the inbox
  (unchanged). More than one now ALSO falls to the inbox instead of
  picking an arbitrary ConcurrentHashMap iteration order, and logs a
  WARN naming the target and every candidate ticket.

- abandon(): a stranded reply now settles at most one matching task —
  the oldest by Task#createdNanos (a new field, the tiebreaker). Every
  other matching task keeps WORKER_FAILED, same as today.

- abandon(): if the chosen recovery task's complete() loses a race
  (another path resolved it first), the drained reply is republished
  to the inbox instead of being silently dropped.

Single-task behavior is unchanged; only the ambiguous case changes.
2026-08-31 22:46:23 +07:00
Dai Ha 735c837604 #209: resolve agentSessionId lazily via the retained PeerHandle
CI / contract (push) Successful in 48s
CI / build (push) Successful in 2m18s
SessionManager called handle.agentSessionId() once at spawn and froze it in the
immutable MemberSession. For opencode that value is always null - the session
row does not exist yet when the pane is created - so fleet_list never reported
an agentSessionId and fleet_spawn{resumeSessionId} was unusable for that
backend. The handle's javadoc said 'the caller re-calls later'; no caller did,
and SessionManager did not even retain the handle.

Retain the PeerHandle per pane and re-resolve while the stored id is still
null, sticky once found, CAS-swapped into the registry.

roster() stays non-resolving - it is the roster supplier for LeadHeartbeatLoop
and FleetHealthMonitor, and resolving there would open opencode's 841MB SQLite
database on every tick, for every unresolved member, forever. rosterResolved()
carries the resolve and is used only by fleet_list and the REST roster, the two
surfaces that report the id. get(paneId) and release() resolve too, both
caller-driven.

A test pins the split: the plain roster() must never call agentSessionId()
again.
2026-08-31 22:21:16 +07:00
Dai Ha 457dc0330d #185 stage 2: the credential gap detector must not report on the wrong environment
CI / contract (push) Successful in 55s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m59s
Under memberHerdrSocket: member panes run as a different OS user, so
hostEnvNames (fleetd's own environment) no longer describes what a member
inherits. logCredentialGap now reports "unknown, not clean" in that mode
instead of its usual UNBLOCKED/blanked conclusions, once per launcher, naming
the config key and scoping its count to fleetd's own process.

Byte-identical when memberHerdrSocket: is absent, pinned by a test.
2026-08-31 22:17:40 +07:00
Dai Ha a1a9015217 #199: /members returns rows under "members" 2026-08-31 22:17:35 +07:00
Dai Ha 5a811a3695 #199: GET /members returns its rows under "members", with "workers" kept as an alias
The endpoint became /members in the CB-634 rename but the body key stayed
"workers", so a caller that read "members" saw an empty fleet and reported
no members at all.

Emit the canonical "members" key. Keep "workers" as a deprecated alias so an
existing REST consumer keeps working - the out-of-band path a lead falls back
to when its MCP mount drops reads this endpoint.

The test now pins both keys and asserts they carry the same rows, so the alias
cannot silently drift. Watched failing without the fix:
"GET /members must return its rows under \"members\" ==> expected: not <null>"
2026-08-31 22:17:22 +07:00
Dai Ha 1fdaa74eb3 fleetd #209 follow-up: keep roster() off the resolve path
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m20s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m21s
roster() is the supplier for LeadHeartbeatLoop and FleetHealthMonitor
(both timer-driven) and for placement/exhaustion checks and the
metrics scrape — none of which read agentSessionId. Resolving there
meant every tick could open a lazy-resolving adapter's (opencode's)
on-disk session database once per member whose id was still unknown,
with no bound: a member whose id never appears would pay that cost for
the life of the process.

roster() goes back to its pre-#209 behavior (no resolve, no I/O). A
new rosterResolved() carries the resolve logic, and is used only by
the two surfaces that actually report agentSessionId to a caller:
fleet_list (FleetMcp.listFleet) and the REST roster
(FleetApp.listMembers). fleet_whoami's roster().stream() at
FleetMcp.java:768 does not surface the field, so it stays on the plain
roster(). get(paneId) (fleet_status) and the release() resolve are
caller-driven, not timers, and are unchanged.

Retargeted the roster-facing tests from #209 at rosterResolved(), and
added plainRosterDoesNotResolveAgentSessionId, which pins the split by
asserting the handle's agentSessionId() is not called again by
roster().
2026-08-31 22:15:16 +07:00
Dai Ha 7d4a4339c2 Merge branch 'worker/cb-137-ask-ticket-e7760c-2' of https://git.ltms.dev/fleet/fleetd into worker/cb137-ambiguous-task-4df3d8-4 2026-08-31 22:13:37 +07:00
Dai Ha 847e8bd3fa #185 stage 2: stop the credential-gap detector reporting on the wrong environment
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 54s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m39s
When memberHerdrSocket: is configured, member panes run under a different OS
user than fleetd's own process, so hostEnvNames (fleetd's own environment)
no longer describes what a member pane inherits. logCredentialGap now checks
for that config key and, when set, logs a single WARN saying the gap is
UNKNOWN (not clean) and names the key, instead of printing the "inherits
them UNBLOCKED" / "the scrub blanks them" conclusions as fact. Behaviour is
byte-identical when memberHerdrSocket is absent (the default and only mode
this host runs).
2026-08-31 22:12:56 +07:00
Dai Ha f9fb387427 fleetd #209: re-poll agentSessionId against the retained PeerHandle
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 45s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m40s
SessionManager used to call PeerHandle.agentSessionId() exactly once at
spawn and freeze the answer into the immutable MemberSession. For
opencode that call always came back null, because opencode has not
written its on-disk session row yet when the pane is created, and no
caller ever re-asked the handle — it went out of scope at the end of
the spawn method. fleet_list therefore never reported agentSessionId
for an opencode member, and resumeSessionId was unusable for it.

Retain each spawn's PeerHandle in SessionManager, keyed by paneId, and
re-resolve a still-null agentSessionId against it from roster(), get(),
and release() (so a released member's detail also carries a
late-resolved id). Resolution is bounded: only sessions with a still-
null id do any work, a resolved id is never looked up again, and a
throwing handle degrades to "unresolved" rather than breaking the
caller. MemberSession gains a withAgentSessionId wither in the same
style as withState/withActivity.
2026-08-31 22:04:20 +07:00
Dai Ha a55079afbd #185: opt-in worktreeGroup, so a member running as another OS user can write its worktree
CI / contract (push) Successful in 50s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m39s
Stage 3 of #185. A provisioned worktree and the repo's git store are made
group-writable when worktreeGroup names an OS group; absent, nothing changes.
The share pass runs after overlayParity, not inside add(), because
overlayParity copies more files in after add() returns.

This isolates credentials, not the repository: a member in the group can
still write the operator's git objects and refs.
2026-08-31 21:47:03 +07:00
Dai Ha e18ad4723b Merge remote-tracking branch 'refs/remotes/origin/cb206' 2026-08-31 21:47:03 +07:00
Dai Ha 6de8ac8972 #206: read opencode session ids from opencode.db, and pin the read-only open
opencode migrated its session store from a JSON file tree to SQLite in
January. OpenCodeSessionDiscovery still scanned the frozen tree, so it
returned null for every member: agentSessionId was never known and
resumeSessionId silently did nothing for every opencode profile, through
57 member spawns, with nothing logging that the search found nothing.
2026-08-31 21:46:32 +07:00
Dai Ha a052975420 #206: pin the read-only open with a test that actually fails without it
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m18s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m44s
setReadOnly(true) is the whole thing keeping fleetd out of the operator's
live 841MB opencode.db, and no test failed when it was removed.

The obvious test does not work. Making the database file unwritable and
checking the read still succeeds passes either way, because SQLite silently
downgrades a read-write open of an unwritable file to read-only. I wrote that
test, watched it pass with the flag removed, and threw it away.

What works: extract a package-private openReadOnly(), then ask that connection
to INSERT and require the refusal. Watched red with the flag removed, green
with it restored.

Also switches the test's INSERT helper to a PreparedStatement -- hand-escaped
SQL in a test is a pattern that gets copied into main code.
2026-08-31 21:46:07 +07:00
Dai Ha 6d82ca95a4 #185: skip absent git paths, and resolve the git dir instead of assuming .git
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 56s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m38s
Two defects in the stage-3 share pass, both of which would have failed EVERY
provisioning spawn once worktreeGroup was set, not only the two-user case.

.git/logs was handed to chgrp unguarded while packed-refs was guarded. It does
not exist with core.logAllRefUpdates=false, or before the first ref update, and
chgrp on a missing path exits non-zero -- surfacing as a WorktreeException that
blames a group which is in fact fine. Every path is now skipped when absent.

repoRoot + "/.git" was hardcoded. That is a FILE, not a directory, when the
checkout is itself a linked worktree -- the very thing this class creates for
every member. It now asks git: rev-parse --git-common-dir, resolved against
repoRoot because git answers relatively for an ordinary checkout.

Both new tests were watched failing with the fix removed before being kept.
2026-08-31 21:34:49 +07:00
Dai Ha 8067ee4ec4 fleetd #185: opt-in worktreeGroup config for group-shared worktrees
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Adds worktreeGroup (top-level FleetConfig key), Worktrees.shareWithGroup
(GitWorktrees impl: git config core.sharedRepository group + one-time
chgrp/chmod g+rwX/setgid fix-up over the worktree, .git/objects, refs,
logs, worktrees, and packed-refs when present), and wires SessionManager
to call it AFTER overlayParity so overlay files are covered too. Off by
default (byte-identical behaviour when unset). Documents the
credentials-not-repository caveat in the javadoc and example config.
2026-08-31 15:53:01 +07:00
Dai Ha 3743789e8d fleetd #206: read opencode session ids from opencode.db (SQLite), not the frozen JSON tree
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m5s
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opencode migrated its session store to SQLite in January 2026; the JSON tree under
storage/session/<projectID>/ses_*.json stopped being written, so OpenCodeSessionDiscovery
returned null for every member forever, and fleet_spawn{resumeSessionId} was unreachable.

- Add org.xerial:sqlite-jdbc 3.53.4.0, opened read-only (SQLiteConfig.setReadOnly), so it
  never disturbs a live opencode process writing the WAL-mode database.
- Rewrite sessionIdForDirectory to run a parameterized SELECT ... WHERE directory = ?
  ORDER BY time_updated DESC LIMIT 1 against the session table. Still never throws: a
  missing database, a locked/corrupt one, or no matching row all return null.
- Log the silence that let this go unnoticed: WARN once per instance when opencode.db
  itself is missing (the layout moved again), DEBUG when it exists but no row matches
  yet (the normal interim answer right after a spawn).
- Replace the JSON-fixture tests with a synthetic-SQLite-db fixture; delete the tests
  that only proved the old JSON scan worked.
2026-08-31 15:52:06 +07:00
Dai Ha 388aba7632 #137: an answered turn's reply completes its own ticket, instead of a false failure
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A wait:false delegation whose worker used fleet_ask ended with fleet_poll{ticket}
reporting 'the worker session was released before it replied' -- naming a
worktree, a branch and a snapshot commit, so it read as lost work. The worker had
in fact replied in full.

The ticket guessed the ask rendezvous detached the turn. The real cause is
narrower: answer() (behind fleet_send{turnId}) waits only for the lead's own
bounded MCP call window. A resumed turn doing real work -- edits, a build, a
push, a PR -- routinely outlives it. On timeout answer()'s finally closed the
waiter, so the worker's later fleet_reply found none and fell to the session
inbox, leaving the ticket's future unresolved until fleet_stop forced it FAILED.

reply() now looks for the async task parked on this exact answered turn and
completes it with the real reply. That is safe against completing the wrong
ticket: answer() calls clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, false), so the task keeps its
turnId and stays in asyncTasksByTurn, and hasAsyncQuestion therefore still makes
send() return BUSY for a second async send to that target. At most one candidate
task can exist per target.

abandon() keeps an independent check: if a reply was stranded, a released session
reports REPLIED with that text rather than a failure -- so the recovery hint that
implies lost work never prints once a reply exists.

Verified before merging: build green unpiped, and both new tests drive the full
delegation path (send async, ask, answer, reply, poll the ticket) rather than
handing a Reply to a sink, which is the trap this ticket called out.

Co-authored-by: fleetd worker <worker@ltms.dev>
2026-08-31 14:24:54 +07:00
Dai Ha ad587eafa3 #172: keep the broker URI, password and all, out of every member pane
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broker.uriEnv names an environment variable holding amqp://user:password@host,
and it was reaching every member. Its name is not credential-shaped -- no TOKEN,
KEY or SECRET in it -- so every name-pattern heuristic missed it, and it sat on
neither credential list.

fleetd already knows the name: the operator wrote it in broker.uriEnv. So derive
the exclusion from the config rather than hoping an operator also remembers to
deny it. coordinator.uriEnv has the same shape and is excluded too; on this host
both resolve to the same variable.

Excluded even when the operator lists the name under memberCredentials.allow:,
following the SSH_AUTH_SOCK precedent. There is no override, because a member has
no legitimate use for the broker password.

Reviewer finding, recorded rather than overstated: this is only a hard guarantee
under policy: allow-list, where the ZDOTDIR scrub runs after the pane's shell has
sourced the operator's chain. Under deny-list the name is removed from the
pre-shell env only, and a login shell re-exports it. That is deny-list's existing
weakness rather than a regression here, but the javadoc now says so plainly
instead of implying a guarantee that path cannot give.

Co-authored-by: fleetd worker <worker@ltms.dev>
2026-08-31 14:21:48 +07:00
Dai Ha 08ce9aef11 #161: resolve a pane by process ancestry, closing a worker->primary escalation
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PaneLocator's javadoc always claimed it found 'the agent pane whose process
tree contains' a pid. It did not: paneOwnsPid matched only the pane's shell_pid
and its foreground_processes. A process a member spawned -- python3, curl, any
helper opening its own connection to 127.0.0.1:8765 -- matched no pane, so
CallerResolver fell through to loopback-trust and resolved it as the PRIMARY.
A member escalated to lead by shelling out.

terminalForPid now builds the caller's ancestor set once (bounded at 32
generations, with a cycle guard) and matches any ancestor against a pane's pids.
The set is reused across both herdr clients on the CB-185 two-daemon path.

This only ever ADDS matches, which is the safe direction: the failure mode of
the fix is a member correctly restricted, while the failure mode of the bug is a
member acting as the lead. The no-match case still returns null, so the lead --
which maps to a pane named by leaders: -- still resolves as primary.

Ancestry is walked through a new ParentResolver seam so the tests drive it from
a fake pid->parent map rather than spawning real processes.

Co-authored-by: fleetd worker <worker@ltms.dev>
2026-08-31 14:15:39 +07:00
Dai Ha ee5f8b932b #137: complete an async ticket's own reply after answer() times out
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 49s
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fleet_send{turnId} (MessageService.answer) blocks the primary only for its
own bounded MCP-call window (25s default, 120s max) — far shorter than a
worker's resumed turn can genuinely take. When that window expires, answer()
closes its rendezvous waiter, so the worker's eventual fleet_reply has no
live waiter to resolve and falls back to the session inbox. The async
ticket's future was never completed by that path, so fleet_poll{ticket}
stayed PENDING until fleet_stop's abandon() forced it FAILED with a
misleading "the worker session was released before it replied" reason,
even though the reply had genuinely arrived.

- MessageService.reply(): before falling to the inbox, look for the async
  task this exact turn belongs to (already answered — question cleared,
  turnId still stamped — but not yet resolved) and complete it directly
  with the real reply, so fleet_poll{ticket} returns it.
- MessageService.abandon(): defense in depth, independent of the above —
  never write a false WORKER_FAILED once a reply reached the inbox for
  this target; recover and use its real content instead.
- Two new tests drive the full delegation path (async send -> ask ->
  answer with a short timeout -> reply -> poll/abandon), not a reply sink
  directly; both fail with the fix disabled and pass with it restored.
2026-08-31 14:12:23 +07:00
Dai Ha 4ac688b6d9 #164: classify a backend-error scrape as WORKER_FAILED, carrying the whole pane
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main already shipped the core of #164 in 3bfa828: the MIN_TURN_NANOS floor and
the hard fail on an empty or unreadable scrape. This adds the one case that was
still resolving as a success -- a scrape that reads cleanly but whose content is
the backend's own rejection (e.g. "API Error: 400 invalid request body").

The BACKEND_ERROR pattern is deliberately narrow. A growing list of ad-hoc error
strings rots as backends change their wording, and broader backend-error
surfacing is #164 point 3.

Because the pattern is a heuristic, it also matches a member that forgot
fleet_reply while reporting *about* a backend error. So the failure reason
carries the whole pane tail, not just the matched line: a genuine backend error
reads as before, and a false positive keeps its report instead of losing it.

Checked before merging: 3bfa828 is an ancestor of main; the branch was current
with main; mvn clean install green unpiped (1037 tests, 0 [ERROR] lines); and
each of the 5 new tests fails with the fix commented out.

Co-authored-by: fleetd worker <worker@ltms.dev>
2026-08-31 10:56:40 +07:00
ltms a814d1ef00 #197: measure the async ticket TTL from completion, not from creation
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Lead-authored and lead-verified: full mvn clean install green at 1032 tests, and the new test proved by restoring the old comparison and watching it fail.
2026-08-31 05:10:46 +02:00
Dai Ha ea98856130 #197: measure the async ticket TTL from completion, not from creation
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 54s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m32s
pruneTerminalTickets compared the cutoff against createdNanos, so the real
window to collect a reply was "TTL minus however long the task ran". A
delegation that ran longer than the 10-minute TTL was already past the cutoff
the moment it finished, so the next prune destroyed its reply.

That is the normal case here, not an edge case. Real delegated work runs well
past ten minutes. Three workers in one session did, and two of their complete
reports were lost. The reply lives only in Task.future, so pruning it discards
the worker's whole report, and fleet_poll{target} returns [] rather than
holding it — there is no fallback.

Task now stamps completedNanos from a whenComplete hook registered in its
constructor, so every completion path stamps it (a reply, the completion
fallback, a timeout, a failure, an abandon on teardown) without each one having
to remember to. The stamp is a boxed Long, not a long with a sentinel:
System.nanoTime may return any value, so no number can mean "not stamped yet".
A task that is done but not yet stamped is left for the next sweep.

createdNanos had no other reader and is removed.

The TTL still bounds tasks — an uncollected finished ticket is still evicted
once the TTL passes since it finished. Both halves are pinned by a test, and
the first one was proved by restoring the old comparison and watching it fail.

Tests run: 1032, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0
2026-08-31 10:10:16 +07:00
ltms a49e96835a CB-189: cover every remote, both URLs, and any non-SSH scheme in the credential check
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Lead-verified: merged onto current main (which already carries #194 and #196), full `mvn clean install` green at 1030 tests. Confirmed no plain `exec` call that reads a remote URL remains.

Review round 2 closed the half-fix: execRedacted was added but applied only to the new calls, leaving the three pre-existing URL readers (lines 143, 171, 334) still copying stdout into exception messages — the exact hole CB-189 named.

Kept the check before the origin strip, on the worker's reasoning: the credential really is in the config at that moment, so WARN-found followed by INFO-fixed is the full audit trail, whereas moving it after would silence the origin case entirely.
2026-08-31 04:32:14 +02:00
ltms 63c19dcba7 CB-185: fix two blockers to switching on memberHerdrSocket
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Lead-verified: merged with #194 onto an integration branch off main, full `mvn clean install` green at 1025 tests.

Review round 2 fixed the stale ambiguous-pane message and, more importantly, a real abort: probeOwner called list() unguarded, so one unreachable daemon made panes on a different healthy daemon un-stoppable too — the same bug blocker 1 exists to fix, through a new door. Worker proved it by removing the guard and quoting the failure.
2026-08-31 04:30:57 +02:00
ltms 2823349c8e CB-192: fix false credential-gap WARN under allow-list+zsh, split its log guard
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Lead-verified: merged with #196 onto an integration branch off main, full `mvn clean install` green at 1025 tests. Deny-by-default WARN confirmed byte-identical to main.

Review round 2 fixed a defect I found in round 1: the new INFO asserted that gap names were not on the derived allow-list without ever checking, so a name derived from a profile's tokenEnv/gitTokenEnv/env: would be reported as safe while the member actually inherited it. Now split with MemberEnvAllowList.keeps — the same predicate the generated scrub evaluates.
2026-08-31 04:30:48 +02:00
Dai Ha 6fc301d62c CB-189 review fix: redact the three pre-existing URL-reading exec calls
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Review found that execRedacted was applied only to the new remote-enumeration code
and left three pre-existing calls reading remote.origin.url through the plain,
unredacted exec: removeUserInfoFromHttpsOrigin, requireCredentialFreeHttpsOrigin, and
configureHttpsUrlRewriteForSshOrigin. A non-zero exit or timeout on any of those could
still have copied the credentialed URL into a WorktreeException message. Switches all
three to execRedacted; the set-url write in removeUserInfoFromHttpsOrigin is left on
plain exec with a comment explaining why (it writes the already-stripped URL, not a
read).

Widens the shared exec(Map, boolean, String...) overload to package-private, the same
test-seam pattern already used by the afterWorktreeAdded constructor parameter, and
adds a test that drives it directly with a synthetic failing command whose stdout
carries a marker (passed via env, not argv, so the always-printed command line can't
carry it) and asserts the marker never reaches the exception message.
2026-08-31 09:29:45 +07:00
Dai Ha bc99d64786 CB-185: fix ambiguous-pane message and unreachable-daemon abort in probeOwner (review)
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Lead review of PR #196 found two issues in CompositePeerLauncher.probeOwner:

1. The "more than one daemon claims this pane" throw kept the old
   pre-fix message ("no owning herdr daemon was recorded"), which was
   only true of the code it replaced. Reworded to say what actually
   happened: N configured herdr daemons report this pane, so it is
   genuinely ambiguous. Updated the one test pinning the old string.

2. probeOwner let list() propagate straight out of the probe loop, so
   one unreachable daemon aborted the whole probe and made a pane on a
   DIFFERENT, healthy daemon un-stoppable too — resurrecting the exact
   bug blocker 1 fixes. Now catches HerdrException per daemon, logs the
   exception class only, and treats that daemon as not knowing the pane
   so probing continues. New test proves this: verified it fails with
   the try/catch removed (HerdrException propagates and the stop that
   should succeed via the healthy daemon throws instead), then restored.

Full mvn clean install: 1019 tests, 0 failures, 0 errors.
2026-08-31 09:28:29 +07:00
Dai Ha 615af4ed0a CB-192 review fix: split the allow-list gap by what the scrub actually keeps
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Lead review on PR #194 found that the allow-list INFO wording claimed the
whole gap ("credential-shaped names on neither known: nor allow:") is blanked
by the scrub, without checking that against effectiveAllowed. effectiveAllowed
is a SUPERSET of known+allow — MemberEnvAllowList.derive also unions in every
profile's gitTokenEnv/gitHostEnv/tokenEnv/env: keys, and derivedAllowedNames
further unions in the spawn's own env keys — so a gap name can still be kept
by the derived list (e.g. a profile's tokenEnv names it) and reach the member
unblocked while the INFO said "no member pane keeps them". That inversion is
exactly what #192 exists to remove.

logCredentialGap now splits the gap with MemberEnvAllowList.keeps (the same
predicate the generated scrub itself evaluates, so this cannot drift from
what the scrub does): names it keeps get a WARN, guarded by the same
unprotectedGapLogged flag as the deny-by-default case (same severity — a name
reaching a member unprotected is equally serious either way); names it
blanks keep the existing INFO, guarded by allowListGapLogged. The
deny-by-default WARN text and the non-zsh fallback are untouched.

Added allowListWarnsWhenTheDerivedAllowListKeepsAnUncoveredName and
allowListSplitsAMixedGapBetweenTheWarnAndTheInfo to ClaudeCodeLauncherTest.
2026-08-31 09:28:10 +07:00
Dai Ha 045d229728 CB-185: fix two blockers to switching on memberHerdrSocket (#185)
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1. CompositePeerLauncher.stop() was permanently un-stoppable for any
   member that survived a daemon restart, because spawnedBy is in-memory
   only. On a cache miss with more than one configured herdr daemon, probe
   each distinct daemon's agent.list() for the pane instead of refusing
   outright: exactly one owner routes and caches; zero owners is treated
   as already-stopped (a no-op, matching the tolerance HerdrPeerLauncher
   already gives an already-gone pane); more than one owner is the
   genuine per-daemon-pane-id ambiguity and still throws.

2. FleetApp#healthz always reported the LEAD daemon's herdr version/
   protocol even when a second (member) daemon was configured, so a
   member-daemon protocol mismatch was invisible behind a green
   /healthz while every spawn silently failed. Added a separate "member"
   key alongside the unchanged "herdr" key, and a "protocolMismatch"
   flag when the two differ. Verified scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh and
   scripts/rename-checkout.sh only check the HTTP status code and print
   the body verbatim — neither parses a specific field — so adding a key
   is safe.

Both fixes are covered by tests written to fail without the fix
(verified by reverting each fix and watching the new tests fail, then
restoring). Full `mvn clean install`: 1018 tests, 0 failures, 0 errors.
2026-08-31 09:20:14 +07:00
Dai Ha d1fd5700f5 CB-189: cover every remote, both URLs, and any non-SSH scheme in the credential check
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GitWorktrees only ever inspected origin's HTTPS fetch URL for embedded credentials. A
credential on any other remote, on a pushurl, or on a plain http:// URL passed through
unreported. Adds an additive, reporting-only check that enumerates every remote and both
its fetch and push URLs, flagging non-empty user-info on any non-SSH-family scheme.

The existing origin/https strip-and-refuse behaviour is untouched. The new check is
wrapped so it can never abort a provision, and on failure logs only the exception's
class, never its message, since the enumerating `git remote` call is not redacted.
Also adds execRedacted, an exec variant that never copies captured stdout into a
WorktreeException message, for commands whose stdout may itself be a credentialed URL.
2026-08-31 09:17:54 +07:00
Dai Ha 2d55b0b9a5 #168: correct the audit's MISSING claim — the feature is documented, its index row was not
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The memberHerdrSocket section exists at 11-Features.md:2174; what was absent was
its row in the index table. My omission when I added the section. Wiki fixed at
b24965c.
2026-08-31 09:17:41 +07:00
Dai Ha d89ae94a2e CB-192: fix false credential-gap WARN under allow-list+zsh, split its log guard
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logCredentialGap(creds) always emitted the WARN wording ("every member pane
inherits them UNBLOCKED"), even under memberCredentials.policy: allow-list on
a zsh login shell, where the generated ZDOTDIR scrub genuinely blanks the
name. The line reported the control working as though it were a hole.

Pass an effectiveAllowed set instead: null keeps the WARN (deny-by-default,
and the allow-list non-zsh fallback, where nothing is ever scrubbed); the
derived allow-list set (only reachable after applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy's
own zsh gate) selects a new INFO wording that says the scrub will blank the
name instead of claiming it is inherited unblocked.

Also split the single credentialGapLogged AtomicBoolean into two guards
(unprotectedGapLogged / allowListGapLogged) — one per report kind. Since
memberCredentials is a live, re-read-per-spawn supplier, a shared flag let a
harmless allow-list INFO on one spawn permanently suppress a later spawn's
real deny-by-default WARN after a policy reload.

Fixes gitea #192.
2026-08-31 09:17:20 +07:00
ltms e6193c4098 Merge pull request '#168: audit current wiki snapshot' (#193) from worker/cb-168-wiki-audit-3ef3d1-3 into main
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2026-08-31 04:17:07 +02:00
Dai Ha b66f0677ed #168: audit current wiki snapshot
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2026-08-31 09:14:22 +07:00
ltms 23ada1981e CB-185: route members to a separate herdr daemon (#186)
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2026-08-29 01:24:31 +02:00
ltms a22480c117 CB-185: route PaneLocator, StatusRefiner and FleetApp to the right herdr daemon (#188)
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2026-08-29 01:24:25 +02:00
Dai Ha 24f404f989 CB-185: fix three connection-identity/status/health gaps a second herdr daemon exposes
memberHerdrSocket splits lead operations from member operations onto two herdr
daemons. Three seams still assumed one shared daemon and broke silently when the
two clients differ (all three collapse to today's behaviour when they are the
same object):

1. ConnectionIdentity's PaneLocator was pinned to the member daemon only, so a
   lead's own MCP connection (which lives on the LEAD daemon) resolved to
   terminal == null, breaking fleet_reply/fleet_ask/fleet_whoami for a lead.
   PaneLocator now searches the lead client first, then the member client.

2. StatusPoller's StatusRefiner was pinned to the member daemon, so refining an
   UNKNOWN status for a lead target read the wrong daemon's pane content and
   never left UNKNOWN, wedging status-gated delivery to that lead forever.
   StatusRefiner gained a refine(target, raw, control) overload and the poller
   now refines through the same AgentControl the raw status was sampled from.

3. FleetApp was constructed with the raw lead-only herdr client, so /healthz
   stayed green while the member daemon was down (every spawn then fails
   invisibly) and GET /sessions silently dropped every member workspace.
   FleetApp now takes both clients: healthz requires both to answer, sessions
   merges workspaces from both.

Each fix has a test proven to fail without it (verified by reverting the
production change and re-running): FleetdConnectionIdentityConstructionTest /
FleetdFleetAppConstructionTest assert the actual Fleetd.java wiring (the same
technique as FleetdHerdrControlConstructionTest); StatusPollerRoutingTest and
the new PaneLocatorTest/FleetAppTwoDaemonTest cases exercise the real
production classes end to end rather than a hand-built object graph.
2026-08-29 06:20:32 +07:00
ltms a237fbff9d #185: refuse an unowned paneId when more than one herdr daemon could own it (#187)
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2026-08-29 01:10:21 +02:00
Dai Ha 31d5516991 #185 review: keep the stop owner on failure, key list() by daemon
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Three fixes on top of the pane-id PR, from my own read and the reviewer's:

- stop() removed the spawnedBy record BEFORE the delegate accepted the stop. A
  delegate that threw left the pane alive with its owner forgotten, so the retry
  fell into the ambiguous branch and refused the id for good. Remove after.
- list() deduplicated on the raw pane id. Pane ids are per-daemon counters, so
  two daemons can each hold w1:p1 on different panes, and one of the two real
  agents was silently dropped from fleet_list and every view built on it. The
  key is now (owning daemon, pane id). Delegates sharing one daemon still
  collapse, which is what the dedupe was for.
- The class javadoc still stated the single-herdr-connection premise as fact,
  next to the bullet this PR had just corrected for stop(). Fixed there too.

Also drops a redundantly qualified java.util.Collections.

Tests: 993 run, 0 failures, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-08-29 06:09:43 +07:00
Ha Trong Dai 17af61e8dd CB-185: route message status by target
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2026-08-28 09:45:39 +07:00
Ha Trong Dai 6af87b6ad6 CB-185: share routed herdr controls
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2026-08-28 09:42:45 +07:00
Ha Trong Dai 5ba05d0bdb #185: count herdr owners for stop fallback
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2026-08-28 09:42:24 +07:00
Ha Trong Dai fc655e78c2 CB-185: route members to separate herdr
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2026-08-28 09:37:44 +07:00
Ha Trong Dai 25726a5ae7 #185: reject ambiguous unowned pane ids 2026-08-28 09:36:39 +07:00
Dai Ha 11c3ff67b6 fleets-status: fleet01 IS ssh-reachable; correct the 'denied' claim
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The skill said SSH to fleet01 is denied, so every report wrote 'not
reachable' for that fleet's daemon facts. That is true only for the user
dai.ha. The host alias fleet01 maps to user ltms and key auth works.

Checked 2026-08-28 while measuring #185: ssh fleet01 connects, and ltms
has passwordless sudo there. So fleet01's PID, uptime, jar and /healthz
can be reported over SSH even though its REST port is unreachable.
2026-08-28 09:06:54 +07:00
Dai Ha d867c87100 #184: correct the false ssh-agent premise in the URL-rewrite javadoc
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The javadoc said a member cannot authenticate at all once memberCredentials
blocks SSH_AUTH_SOCK, "there is no private key file on this host, only an
ssh-agent socket". That is wrong, and it was written after looking only in
~/.ssh, which holds nothing but Include lines.

Measured: ssh -G git.ltms.dev resolves an IdentityFile under the shared-env
directory. That file exists, is readable by this user, and has no passphrase.
A live member with SSH_AUTH_SOCK blanked pushed to the forge over SSH.

The rewrite itself is unchanged and still worth having. Only its stated reason
was wrong: it routes a member through its own scoped token instead of the
operator's ssh identity, which is what makes a member's pushes attributable
and revocable. It is not what stands between a member and the forge.
2026-08-28 06:35:46 +07:00
Dai Ha b0c4cedfab #157: redact remote-URL user-info before it reaches a log
CI / contract (push) Successful in 41s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m25s
The four log lines added with the worktree HTTPS rewrite echoed the origin
URL verbatim, and one of them echoed the ssh:// authority, which carries
user-info. An ssh authority is normally just git@, so in practice this
changes nothing -- but a remote URL is not obviously a credential channel,
and that is precisely why one has leaked here three times (#157, #182).

Redact at the log call, not after it surprises someone.
2026-08-28 06:24:08 +07:00
ltms 85417d5215 #157: rewrite an SSH origin to HTTPS inside the provisioned worktree only
CI / contract (push) Successful in 46s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m37s
Git never consults a credential.helper for an SSH transport, so #177's helper was inert on this repo — whose origin is ssh://. Once allow-list policy blocks SSH_AUTH_SOCK, a member on an SSH origin cannot authenticate at all: there is no private key file on this host, only an agent socket.

A worktree-scoped `url.<https>.insteadOf <ssh>` gives the member HTTPS for fetch and push while the primary checkout keeps SSH untouched. Host and port are parsed from the origin, never hardcoded — a test with a synthetic host proves it. The scp-like shorthand is left alone deliberately, since its host:path split is defined by ssh_config aliases rather than URI syntax.

Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 986, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-08-28 01:22:57 +02:00
Dai Ha 4accc746bd #157: rewrite SSH origin to HTTPS in the worktree so the credential helper is reachable
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m16s
2026-08-28 06:20:10 +07:00
ltms 21c4c8cbef #157: keep the forge token out of git config, via an environment credential helper
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m4s
CI / contract (push) Successful in 47s
The member credential scrub removes environment variables. It cannot remove a token written into git config inside the repo the member works in, so `git remote -v` handed a member a credential it was deliberately not given.

Provisioning now strips HTTPS user info from the origin before `git worktree add`, refuses the worktree if user info survives, and configures a per-worktree credential helper that reads WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN at call time. Nothing is persisted.

The helper emits BOTH username and password, and resets the inherited helper list first. An earlier revision emitted only `username=`, which made git fall through to the next helper — on a Mac that is osxkeychain, so a member would have authenticated with the operator's stored credential while every test passed and `git remote -v` looked clean. See #182.

`worktreeCredentialHelperCompletesWithoutUsingAnInheritedHelper` plants a synthetic operator helper in an isolated global config and proves the worktree helper wins. The worker confirmed it fails when the reset is removed. All credential tests pin GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL and GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM so they can neither read nor write real credentials.

Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 973, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-08-28 01:10:38 +02:00
ltms 430f5b0dae #164: never resolve a send with an empty scrape or a sub-floor turn
CI / contract (push) Successful in 53s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m27s
A turn that dies on a backend error produces the same working -> idle transition as a real one, just faster and with nothing on screen. The resolver accepted that as a completed turn and handed the caller HTTP 200 with an empty reply, so a lost turn and a successful empty answer were indistinguishable.

Now: an empty or unreadable scrape fails, naming the member; and a BUSY -> DONE inside MIN_TURN_NANOS (2s) fails as a crash signature.

One existing test encoded the bug — it asserted a failed scrape resolved as a success carrying "" — and has been inverted rather than worked around.

Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 973, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-08-28 01:10:27 +02:00
ltms 42731833d0 CB-633: union memberCredentials.allow into the member env allow-list
CI / contract (push) Successful in 42s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m38s
`policy: allow-list` silently ignored every name an operator wrote under `allow:` unless a profile happened to carry it too, so turning the policy on would have blanked credentials working members depend on. Derivation now unions the operator's list.

`SSH_AUTH_SOCK` stays governed only by `sshAuthSock`, even when listed under `allow:` — it is a live handle to the operator's ssh-agent, not a value.

Adds one INFO line per allow-list spawn, `member credentials: allowed N of M`, emitted only after the shell gate so it can never report coverage on a path where the scrub does not run.

Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 976, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-08-28 01:10:18 +02:00
ltms 65acf066ad #154: pin the AMQP reply inbox prefetch bound
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m26s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m39s
No behaviour change. #154 supposed that ownership drains a whole queue into the in-memory `held` map, making `x-max-length` and per-message TTL decorative. Measurement says otherwise: `basicConsume` is manual-ack, `deliverCallback` acks only duplicates, and `basicQos` is set on the one shared channel before any consumer starts — so total `held` is bounded by the prefetch window across all targets.

Adds a fake-broker test that drives the real `own()` path and fails if receipt ever starts acking, plus a javadoc line naming the prefetch window at the point of first mention.

Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 971, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-08-28 01:06:43 +02:00
Dai Ha ee8f570fd7 #157: isolate worktree credential helpers
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m5s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 2m46s
2026-08-28 06:06:12 +07:00
Dai Ha fa3f910d44 #154: pin AMQP reply inbox prefetch
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 2m16s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 2m18s
2026-08-28 06:03:54 +07:00
Dai Ha 46ac6e4e38 #157: use environment git credential helper
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m3s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m37s
2026-08-28 06:02:09 +07:00
Dai Ha 3bfa82839b fleetd#164: an empty or suspiciously fast scrape must fail, never resolve as a success
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m3s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m20s
CompletionResolver.resolve() used to hand the caller a successful "" reply whenever a
turn's scrape came back empty (whether the read failed, or genuinely produced nothing),
making a lost turn indistinguishable from a real empty answer. It also had no way to
tell a crashed backend's near-instant BUSY -> DONE transition apart from a genuine
completion.

Add MIN_TURN_NANOS (2s), a named floor below which a completed turn is treated as a
crash signature and failed rather than resolved as a reply. Fail on any empty scrape
(read failure or a clean-but-empty read) instead of resolving with "". Both failures
name the member and carry whatever is on the pane for context.

Thread an injectable LongSupplier clock through CompletionResolver (matching the
SessionManager/MessageService nowNanos pattern) so the floor is testable without a
real sleep.
2026-08-28 06:01:00 +07:00
Dai Ha 65ccf2e4ad CB-633 follow-up: only log allowed N of M when the scrub actually runs
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 53s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m44s
The coverage line was logged before the zsh gate, so a non-zsh
spawn (where nothing is scrubbed — overlayBlockedCredentials is the
fallback instead) printed 'allowed N of M' as if the derived
allow-list scrub had run. Move the log after the gate so it only
fires on the path that actually generates the ZDOTDIR scrub; the
non-zsh fallback keeps logCredentialGap's WARN as its only signal.

Added a test proving no 'allowed N of M' line is emitted on the
non-zsh fallback, through the real HerdrPeerLauncher#spawn path.
2026-08-28 06:00:38 +07:00
ltms 7a3b27f76f #150: report lead readiness from the delivery gate
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m6s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m7s
Share one deliverability predicate between Injector and FleetApp, so the status endpoint reports the same answer the injector acts on instead of re-deriving it from one of that predicate's two inputs.

Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 971, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-08-28 00:59:44 +02:00
Dai Ha 82e7be564c CB-633 follow-up: union memberCredentials.allow into the derived env allow-list
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m7s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m16s
MemberEnvAllowList.derive only ever looked at profile fields, so
memberCredentials.allow: was silently ignored under
policy: allow-list — turning the policy on would have blanked
credentials working members already depended on.

- derive(profiles, configuredAllow) unions memberCredentials.allow
  into the derived set, with SSH_AUTH_SOCK explicitly excluded from
  that union (it stays governed only by sshAuthSock: allow).
- HerdrPeerLauncher threads MemberCredentials.allowSet() into the
  derivation instead of calling the profiles-only overload.
- Added a per-spawn INFO log 'member credentials: allowed N of M'
  (N/M from the daemon's own env, the existing hostEnvNames proxy),
  never logging a blocked name or a value.
2026-08-28 05:56:27 +07:00
Dai Ha c5e24197bf #150: report lead readiness from delivery gate
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 46s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m37s
2026-08-28 05:54:40 +07:00
Dai Ha bcb402b688 #157: convert forge worktree origins to SSH
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
2026-08-28 05:54:15 +07:00
Dai Ha 7c4170ff6d CB-643: join the message-layer evidence to the health monitor
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m8s
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m9s
CB-640 published the three message-layer facts and CB-641 wired the herdr
and time ones. This joins them, so every HealthSnapshot field now carries
real evidence and the NOT_YET_OBSERVED placeholder is gone. That constant
is what made 8 of the 9 fault states unreachable, GONE and NEVER_READY
included, which is why CB-580's failTarget never fired.

hasOrphanedDelegation is a true snapshot, but it can read true for one
tick during an ordinary race: an async ticket exists before its virtual
thread reaches rendezvous.open, so for that instant nothing is accepted or
queued behind it. decide maps the field straight to DELEGATION_ORPHANED
with no smoothing, so one racy read would log a fault that clears on the
next tick. The monitor now requires two consecutive observations. That
costs one interval on a real orphan and removes the false positive.

Two tests drive real ticks against a genuinely orphaned ticket (an
unanswered fleet_ask that lapsed back to PENDING), not the seam: one tick
reports nothing, two report once, and a single clean tick in between
resets the streak.

Also correct two config comments. paneProbeIntervalSeconds is parsed and
read by nothing, so its "minimum 60" note promised a floor that does not
exist.

970 tests green.
2026-08-27 22:15:39 +07:00
Dai Ha a6095743f0 Merge CB-641: wire herdr and time evidence into the fleet health monitor 2026-08-27 22:06:50 +07:00
Dai Ha 66e776d178 CB-641: wire herdr health evidence
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m9s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
2026-08-27 22:03:20 +07:00
Dai Ha 26f64cba45 Merge CB-640: MessageService evidence accessors for the health monitor
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m4s
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m28s
2026-08-27 22:02:36 +07:00
Dai Ha 51047848f1 CB-642: make the fleets-status redaction global — a non-global sed leaks a second URI on the same line
CI / contract (push) Successful in 41s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m29s
2026-08-27 22:01:15 +07:00
Dai Ha d8c0b657e8 Merge CB-642: /fleets-status skill — multi-fleet status over the shared LavinMQ 2026-08-27 22:00:49 +07:00
Dai Ha 312c0584ce CB-640: add MessageService message-layer health evidence accessors
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 44s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
hasQueuedDelivery/hasStrandedReply/hasOrphanedDelegation surface three of the
message-layer facts FleetHealthMonitor needs but currently hardcodes to
NOT_YET_OBSERVED. Additive only — no existing public method's signature or
behavior changes.
2026-08-27 21:58:21 +07:00
Dai Ha da2625acfb CB-642: add shared fleets status skill
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 43s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m36s
2026-08-27 21:55:27 +07:00
Dai Ha 97d9cebc59 CB-634: skip the zsh scrub-report test when /bin/zsh is absent
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m10s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m27s
scrubWritesAnAllowedNofMReport spawned /bin/zsh with no guard, so it
errored on the Gitea CI runner (Linux ARM64 container, no zsh) while
the two sibling zsh tests already skipped there via assumeTrue. Add the
same guard so CI skips instead of failing; the Mac build still runs it.
2026-08-25 04:18:45 +02:00
Dai Ha 3ce76a5d69 CB-634: finish the bridge_* -> fleet_* tool rename in docs and comments
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m5s
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m35s
The alias removal left bridge_* tool names in prose. Fix them:
- README no longer claims the old bridge_* names still answer (they were removed).
- pom + LeadTabScanner comments name fleet_* tools.
- FleetMcp comment no longer mentions the removed deprecated twin.
- docs/MCP-Contract.md and e2e swept bridge_* -> fleet_*; e2e ask files renamed.
The historical mcp__bridge__* mount-name note in CLAUDE.md is kept on purpose.
949 tests pass.
2026-08-25 04:06:43 +02:00
Dai Ha 2e138a199b CB-634: one shared "fleet" workspace + rename bridged -> fleetd cutover
Two changes ship together here.

1. One shared herdr workspace. The lead and every worker now live in one
   workspace called "fleet", so the operator sees one "session" with many
   windows, not two. Before, the lead sat in a "leads" workspace and workers
   in "bridged-workers", which read as two sessions. The lead is still told
   apart from workers by its exact tab label ("lead: <name>"), so putting them
   in one space is safe. LeadTabScanner keeps the exclude-by-label mechanism
   for split layouts; Fleetd now passes an empty exclude set.

2. Rename the daemon from "bridged" to "fleetd" (the binary, config, scripts,
   launchd/systemd units, module dir, and MCP mount).
   - Module dir bridged/ -> fleetd/; jar finalName -> fleetd.jar.
   - Log line, comments, docs, and CLAUDE.md updated to say fleetd.
   - Scripts renamed: redeploy-bridged.sh -> redeploy-fleetd.sh,
     bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh -> fleetd-launchd-wrapper.sh.
   - Deploy units renamed: dev.ltms.bridged.plist -> dev.ltms.fleetd.plist,
     bridged.service -> fleetd.service; launchd Label -> dev.ltms.fleetd.
   - Config default bridged.yaml -> fleetd.yaml; the legacy bridged.yaml is
     still read as a fallback, and still gitignored.
   - MCP: drop the deprecated bridge_* tool twins; only fleet_* remain. The
     server name is "fleet". The mount name in the local .mcp.json becomes
     "fleet" (gitignored, not in this commit).
   - Env var defaults BRIDGED_API_TOKEN -> FLEETD_API_TOKEN, fixture
     BRIDGED_WORKER_TOKEN -> FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN.

Kept on purpose: the BRIDGED_MEMBER marker. Renaming it is a coupled change to
the credential-scrub security control (an operator secrets.sh may guard on it),
so it stays until that migration is done on its own.

Metrics were already fleet_* (CB-632); MetricNamesTest still guards that no
name says bridged_.

The canonical CLAUDE.md block and the wiki template stay byte-identical
(wiki working tree edited, committed to the wiki repo separately).

949 tests pass (mvn clean install). 4 fewer than before = the 4 removed
bridge_* alias tests.
2026-08-25 04:01:08 +02:00
Dai Ha 450a5ed9c5 Merge CB-634 + CB-636 + CB-637: members-IDE overlay, per-profile auto-compact window, cross-host lead coordination
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m16s
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m30s
- CB-634: deliver IDE guidance as an on-disk CLAUDE.local.md / opencode overlay,
  pinned to the module dir, best-effort auto-open (opt-in per profile via ideMcpUrl).
- CB-636: per-profile autoCompactWindow -> --autocompact for claude-code,
  provider.<p>.models.<m>.limit.context for opencode. Range-validated [100000,1000000].
- CB-637: cross-host lead-to-lead over a shared AMQP coordination vhost
  (coordinator: block, fleet_send{coordId}, LeadMailbox + LeadCoordLoop).

952 unit tests + 5 LeadMailbox contract tests green. Live E2E verified on the Mac daemon.
2026-08-24 19:11:44 +02:00
Dai Ha edabccd885 CB-637: relabel lead-comms (was colliding CB-635) + document coordId route in the CLAUDE.md tool table
The lead-to-lead wiring shipped with CB-635 in its comments, but CB-635 is
already the broker.uriEnv / unreachable-broker work. Relabel the mailbox +
fleet_send{coordId} + receive loop to CB-637 so a ticket number names one
feature. Add the cross-host peer-lead row to the primary intent->tool table
(kept byte-identical with the wiki template).
2026-08-24 17:48:51 +02:00
Dai Ha 1dbe3a03fc Merge lead-comms-wiring: wire LeadMailbox into the daemon (fleet_send{coordId} + receive loop) 2026-08-24 17:42:11 +02:00
Dai Ha 6058b8472b lead comms: wire LeadMailbox into the daemon so lead-to-lead messages flow
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 41s
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 1m22s
The sibling ticket landed the mechanism (LeadMailbox, LeadMessage, the
coordinator: config block) but nothing opened it, nothing sent through it, and
nothing read it. This is the wiring.

- LeadChannel: a small interface LeadMailbox now implements (publish/peek/ack
  plus a selfCoordId() accessor). It exists so FleetMcp and the receive loop can
  be tested with a fake instead of a live broker. LeadMailbox's AMQP logic is
  untouched — the diff is the implements clause, four @Override marks and the
  accessor.

- Fleetd.openLeadMailbox: opens this daemon's mailbox after the reply inbox is
  selected, with the same env-injected seam selectReplyInbox uses. Every "off"
  path returns null and the daemon still starts: no coordinator block (silent),
  a uriEnv that does not resolve (INFO), a configured broker with no selfId
  (WARN — a mailbox is named after the coord-id that owns it), or a broker that
  refuses at boot (WARN, credentials stripped). Closed in the ordered shutdown
  hook, after the loop that reads it has stopped.

- fleet_send{coordId}: publishes a LeadMessage(from=selfCoordId, to=coordId) to
  the peer's mailbox and returns the broker-confirmed receipt. coordId is
  mutually exclusive with sessionId/turnId and is rejected by name rather than
  resolved by precedence. An unroutable/nacked/timed-out publish comes back as a
  tool error naming the coordId, never a crash. The worker send/reply path is
  not touched.

- LeadCoordLoop: the receive half. Each tick peeks the mailbox, resolves the
  local lead pane, and — only at a turn boundary — injects "[lead <from>] <text>"
  and acks. Anything not delivered stays unacked and is retried, so a message is
  never dropped; one message per tick, so every delivery is gated on a status
  read that already saw the previous one.

- fleet_list reports {selfId, configured} when coordination is on, so an
  operator can find the coord-id a peer must use to reach them. Omitted
  entirely when it is off.

Tests: 20 new hermetic tests (no broker) across routing, delivery and startup
selection. mvn clean install: Tests run: 944, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0
— BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-08-24 17:39:29 +02:00
Dai Ha f29968c334 Merge autocompact-window: per-profile autoCompactWindow for claude-code + opencode members 2026-08-24 17:32:53 +02:00
Dai Ha 7b98cca967 LeadMailbox: durable leader-to-leader mailbox over a shared coordination vhost
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 44s
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 1m35s
Adds the broker-side mechanism for lead-to-lead messages across daemons/hosts
(unit 1 of 2): a LeadMessage envelope carrying from/to coord-ids, an
AMQP-backed LeadMailbox modeled closely on AmqpReplyInbox (consume-and-hold,
deferred manual ack, confirm-mode publish, recovery handling), and a new
optional coordinator: config block (separate vhost from broker:, leader
traffic only). Config parsing + accessors only — FleetMcp/Fleetd/Injector/
MessageService and the send path are untouched; wiring is a separate ticket.
2026-08-24 17:23:42 +02:00
Dai Ha 2757bc7185 autoCompactWindow: per-profile bounded auto-compaction, both backends
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 41s
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 1m37s
Add opt-in Integer autoCompactWindow to FleetConfig.Profile (last field,
null/unset = today's behaviour). Validated at config load to [100000,
1000000] — the band Claude Code's own --autocompact flag accepts.

Claude Code: appends --autocompact <window> to argv (mirrors --model),
so it survives the ccs <profile> wrapper.

opencode: has no absolute compact-at-N knob (only compaction.auto/prune/
reserved/tail_turns/preserve_recent_tokens), so the window is applied as
the resolved model's own limit.context (+ a required limit.output:16384
default) in the generated opencode.json, merged via get-or-create nodes
so it does not clobber a custom-provider block. Only applies when model:
resolves to "provider/model"; otherwise logs a WARN naming the profile
rather than silently doing nothing.

Docs added to fleetd.example.yaml explaining the cross-backend semantics
difference (compacts AT the window vs. WITHIN it).
2026-08-24 16:54:40 +02:00
Dai Ha 7655f1b51a CB-634: pin the IDE overlay to the module dir + best-effort auto-open
The overlay pinned project_path to the worktree root. For a repo whose Maven
module is a subdir (this repo's pom is in `bridged/`, not at the root), opening
the root imports no module and every ide_* call resolves nothing. Pin and open
the module dir instead.

Two new opt-in per-Profile keys, both read only when ideMcpUrl is set:
- ideProjectDir: repo-relative module dir the IDE opens and the overlay pins;
  blank keeps the old worktree-root behaviour.
- ideOpenCommand: host command that opens that dir in the IDE at spawn, with
  {dir} substituted and run through /bin/sh -c so env (e.g. DISPLAY) can be set
  inline. Best-effort and non-fatal — a failure never fails the spawn. Blank
  keeps the manual-open behaviour. No close half yet (deferred).

Shared helpers PeerLauncher.ideProjectPath / openInIde back both launchers.
The two Profile fields ride a back-compat constructor, so every existing call
site and YAML compiles and behaves unchanged.

Tests: overlay content pins the module dir when ideProjectDir is set;
ideProjectPath resolution; openInIde no-op on a blank command. 918 tests green.
2026-08-24 06:47:37 +02:00
Dai Ha a5efb7c676 CB-634: write the overlay exclude to the common git dir, not the per-worktree gitdir
git reads info/exclude from the common dir for a linked worktree (only
info/sparse-checkout is per-worktree), so the entry written into
<common>/worktrees/<name>/info/exclude was never honoured and CLAUDE.local.md
showed as untracked -- at risk of being swept into a worker's PR. Derive the
common dir (<common>/worktrees/<name> -> <common>) and write there. Found by
dogfooding a real spawn on fleet01; the test now uses the real worktree layout
and asserts the entry lands in the common dir, not the per-worktree gitdir.
2026-08-23 20:06:36 +02:00
Dai Ha 5a8cf4cb4d Merge CB-634 overlay redesign: deliver IDE guidance as on-disk CLAUDE.local.md / opencode instructions overlay 2026-08-23 16:45:50 +02:00
Dai Ha a3fc7e4df8 CB-634: deliver IDE guidance as an on-disk overlay, not the system-prompt charter
Move the IDE guidance text to PeerLauncher.ideOverlayText (shared by both
launchers). ClaudeCodeLauncher drops it from the reply-charter file and writes
CLAUDE.local.md into a provisioned worktree instead, gated on a .git FILE
(safety: never writes into the primary's real .git-DIRECTORY checkout) and
registers it in info/exclude. OpenCodeLauncher mounts the intellij server and
adds the rules file to the instructions array.
2026-08-23 16:37:08 +02:00
Dai Ha d811b30df3 CB-634 (draft): mount the IDE Index MCP into a member, opt-in per profile
Adds `ideMcpUrl` to FleetConfig.Profile (default off). When set, the
Claude Code launcher mounts the IDE Index MCP as a second inline
--mcp-config server named `intellij`, and appends an IDE charter that
pins every ide_* call to the member's own worktree (spec.cwd()). The
charter order is role -> ide -> reply, one --append-system-prompt-file,
reply last (CB-618). The mount gate now fires on ideMcpUrl alone, not
only mcpUrl. ConfigRef treats an ideMcpUrl change as deferred, like the
other launch flags.

Never touches .mcp.json or CLAUDE.md — the mount and the rule arrive as
launch flags, so a project's own config is untouched.

Not yet done (see fleetd #162): the bridged-owned IDE lifecycle
(open on provision, close before worktree removal), and the opencode
adapter (separate ticket). fleetd.example.yaml documents ideMcpUrl and
fixes the stale parityOverlay default.

911 tests green.
2026-08-23 16:00:36 +02:00
Dai Ha 3f4ac2b24e CB-635: --check reports whether broker.uriEnv resolves in a login shell
CI / contract (push) Successful in 46s
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m30s
An empty uriEnv no longer stops the daemon (#152), so the failure is quiet: bridged
starts, falls back to the in-memory reply inbox, and held reports stop surviving a
restart. --check is the only thing that says so before the fact. The var name is read
out of bridged.yaml so a renamed key cannot make the check lie.
2026-08-23 14:03:08 +02:00
Dai Ha 4644359128 Merge CB-635: broker.uriEnv keeps the AMQP password out of the config, and an unreachable broker no longer stops the daemon (#151, #152)
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m11s
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m42s
2026-08-23 13:58:21 +02:00
Dai Ha 95a8dbcea9 broker: uriEnv config + non-fatal unreachable broker on boot
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 56s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m6s
#151: Broker gains uriEnv beside uri, taking the AMQP URI from an env var so
the password stays out of fleetd.yaml (same pattern as auth.tokenEnv). uriEnv
wins when set; isConfigured() treats a uriEnv naming an unset/blank variable
as unconfigured. A configured uriEnv is added to the startup required-secrets
report. Never logs the resolved URI (it carries the password).

#152: AmqpReplyInbox.open throwing at boot no longer stops the daemon. The
selection at the call site catches the failure and falls back to the in-memory
inbox for the process lifetime, warning loudly that durable cross-restart
delivery is off and logging the failed URI with credentials stripped.
2026-08-23 13:49:26 +02:00
ltms 83b50753fe Merge CB-633: constrain a member's environment with a derived allow-list
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m2s
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m23s
Round 2 fixes the defect that mattered: the scrub lived in .zlogin only, and a
herdr pane is a login shell on macOS but a plain interactive one on Linux. It
would have protected nothing on the vhost it was built for, in silence.

Verified by the lead: 901 tests, 0 failures, mvn clean install green. Both new
tests mutation-checked -- unwiring the control fails one, reverting the scrub to
.zlogin alone fails the other while the login-shell test still passes.

NOT yet deployed: the running daemon still holds the old jar.
2026-08-23 08:22:06 +02:00
Dai Ha 6f968d59a4 CB-633 round 2: the scrub ran on macOS and did nothing on Linux
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 1m8s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
Six review findings, from the peer lead `vms` and a reviewer worker. The first
one is a real defect that would have shipped as a dead control.

1. The scrub only ran in a login shell. It lived in the generated `.zlogin`,
   and zsh reads `.zlogin` only for a login shell. herdr does not open the same
   kind of shell everywhere: measured on herdr 0.8.0, a macOS pane runs `-zsh`
   (login) while a Linux pane runs a plain `/usr/bin/zsh`. So on the vhost this
   was being built for, `.zlogin` never ran and every member kept the whole
   secret store, in silence.

   The scrub body now lives in a generated `scrub.zsh` that BOTH `.zshrc` and
   `.zlogin` source, each after sourcing its own `$HOME` counterpart. Linux
   runs the first, macOS runs both, and the second pass is not merely harmless
   -- it re-scrubs anything the operator's `~/.zlogin` exported after `~/.zshrc`
   had finished. Re-running is idempotent.

2. `INFRASTRUCTURE_PASSTHROUGH` listed names that are not infrastructure:
   ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN, GITEA_TOKEN, GITEA_HOST, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL,
   ANTHROPIC_MODEL, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, OPENCODE_CONFIG, BRIDGED_MEMBER. I read
   each injection point and confirmed every one of them reaches `launch.env()`
   only when actually injected, so `allowed.addAll(launch.env().keySet())`
   already covers the legitimate case. As static entries they were pure leak
   surface: a host that happened to export ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN would have had
   it passed straight through.

3. A missing `scrub-report.txt` at teardown was logged at debug. The report is
   the only evidence the scrub ran at all. Its absence has an innocent reading
   and a serious one, and we cannot tell them apart from the daemon -- so it is
   now a WARN that says exactly that. Logging it at debug is how a control that
   quietly stopped working stays unnoticed.

4. Nothing tested that the control was wired in. Deleting the single
   `applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy(cfg, launch)` line left all 896 tests green
   while turning the feature completely off -- the CB-586/CB-611 shape again.
   `HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest` starts a real spawn and asserts on the
   env that reached herdr. Mutation-checked: unwiring that line fails it.

5. `EnvAllowListScrubTest` now also runs `zsh -i` with no `-l`, which is the
   Linux pane shape, so finding 1 is tested from a Mac. Mutation-checked:
   putting the scrub back in `.zlogin` alone fails that test alone, while the
   login-shell test still passes -- which is exactly the blind spot that let
   the bug through.

6. Two ZDOTDIR leaks closed. A failed spawn has no pane id, so its directory
   was never keyed for teardown; it is now removed on the way out. And
   `deleteOnExit` covers a clean shutdown and nothing else, so `generate` now
   reaps sibling directories older than 24h left by a killed daemon.

Also: `policy:` is lowercased with Locale.ROOT, and the `.zlogin`-only claim is
corrected in fleetd.example.yaml, FleetConfig and HerdrPeerLauncher.

901 tests, 0 failures, `mvn clean install` green.
2026-08-23 08:17:52 +02:00
Dai Ha d432df8e5c CB-633: memberCredentials policy=allow-list — derived ZDOTDIR env scrub
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 1m4s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m19s
Move member environment control out of the pane-creation env overlay
(defeated by any file the login shell sources) into a per-spawn ZDOTDIR
directory whose .zlogin runs LAST, after the operator's whole chain, and
blanks every exported variable not on an allow-list DERIVED from what the
launcher itself injects (profiles' tokenEnv/gitTokenEnv/gitHostEnv/env
keys + an infrastructure set) — never hand-typed.

- memberCredentials.policy: allow-list (deny-by-default/deny-list stay
  default and unchanged); known:/allow: become reporting only under it.
- memberCredentials.sshAuthSock knob, blocked by default; allowing it is
  an explicit decision (operator ssh-agent handle).
- Non-zsh login shell: loud WARN, protection off, fallback to the old
  enumerated-name overlay.
- Scrub writes an 'allowed N of M' denominator report, read at teardown;
  credential-shaped blanked names go to WARN (names only, never values).
- Equality test against a real login zsh from a clean parent: surviving
  non-empty exports EQUAL baseline ∩ derived allow-list.
2026-08-23 07:43:38 +02:00
Dai Ha 4b822731e6 CB-632: rename the member's MCP mount bridge -> fleet
CI / contract (push) Successful in 40s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m22s
Every launcher writes the bridge's MCP server into the config it hands its peer,
and it named that server "bridge". So a member addressed its tools as
mcp__bridge__fleet_send while the tools themselves are already fleet_*. The
mount is named "fleet" now, and a member's tools are mcp__fleet__*.

The name was a bare literal in three files: ClaudeCodeLauncher and LeadLauncher
build a --mcp-config JSON string, OpenCodeLauncher writes an opencode.json node.
Three hand-written copies of one name is how a rename lands in two of them, so
the name is now one constant, PeerLauncher.MCP_MOUNT_NAME.

The mount name is local to the peer — it is the label its own client puts on the
server, and nothing in the daemon reads it back. Renaming it changes no wire
call.

Tests. Each launcher's test now asserts the mount is named fleet AND that
nothing writes "bridge"; the second half is the part that would have caught a
half-done rename. LeadLauncherTest never checked the name at all, only the URL,
so it gained the assertion rather than had one updated.

CLAUDE.md's role-detection ladder quoted mcp__bridge__* as the marker of a
spawned member. It names mcp__fleet__* now, and says that a member spawned
before this change still reports the old prefix. The portable block stays
byte-identical with the wiki template (wiki 569a917).

Build: cd bridged && mvn clean install, then read target/surefire-reports/*.xml
directly — 884 tests, 0 failures, 0 errors.
2026-08-23 07:04:44 +02:00
Dai Ha e38eac1a33 CB-632: ignore fleetd.yaml too, and fix the docs that named the old example
CI / contract (push) Successful in 48s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m31s
Unit 3 renamed bridged.example.yaml to fleetd.example.yaml and taught Fleetd to
read fleetd.yaml first. Two things it left behind.

bridged/.gitignore still ignored only bridged.yaml. An operator who follows the
new comment and copies the example to fleetd.yaml gets an untracked live config
holding tokens, and git offers to commit it. Both names are ignored now, because
both names work until the cutover.

Three design docs still pointed readers at bridged.example.yaml, a file that no
longer exists under that name.
2026-08-23 07:00:30 +02:00
Dai Ha 8101290933 CB-632: rename the exported metrics bridged_* -> fleet_*
Part of #145 (CB-632). Doing this NOW, ahead of the rest of the path
renames, for one reason: the vms lead is about to wire a monitoring
dashboard to these series. Renaming a metric after a dashboard points at
it breaks continuity and silently leaves a dead panel. Renaming it before
costs nothing, so it goes first rather than at the cutover.

Nine series renamed, all declared in FleetMetrics.

Two real defects found while doing it:

  - FleetApp had "bridged_auth_failures_total" written as a LITERAL
    instead of using FleetMetrics.AUTH_FAILURES -- a second hand-written
    copy of a name, which is how these drift. It now uses the constant,
    so there is one source for that name again.
  - Nothing guarded the prefix. One test does assert a wire name
    (FleetAppAuthTest checks the real /metrics body for fleet_sessions),
    which is good, but it covers one series out of nine. The literal
    above was covered by nothing at all.

So this adds MetricNamesTest, which reads the constants reflectively
rather than listing them -- a test that lists the nine names is itself a
second hand-written copy, and would pass while a tenth went unchecked.
It asserts its own denominator too: "no name starts with bridged_" is
true of an empty set, so a sweep that found nothing would pass loudly.
Asserting the count of 9 makes a broken sweep fail instead.

Also renamed three herdr contract-test workspace labels, __bridged_* ->
__fleet_*. Those are throwaway workspaces created by ensureWorkspace, not
metrics, but they are the same word.

Verified: mvn clean install green, 52 classes, 881 tests, 0 failures.
Test count is up by 3 -- the new prefix, denominator and uniqueness
checks. No bridged_ string remains anywhere outside wiki/.
2026-08-23 06:59:37 +02:00
Dai Ha 6e7fc12f89 CB-632 unit 3: point text references at fleetd.example.yaml
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m17s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m36s
2026-08-23 06:51:48 +02:00
Dai Ha 50df14a50f CB-632 unit 3: prefer fleetd.yaml, fall back to bridged.yaml; log the chosen file 2026-08-23 06:51:35 +02:00
Dai Ha ccd882f2fc CB-632 unit 3: rename the example config file to fleetd.example.yaml 2026-08-23 06:48:16 +02:00
Dai Ha ecc590f344 CB-632 unit 5: rename the daemon and classes in the docs prose
Part of #145 (CB-632). Documentation only, plus one internal literal.

Unit 1 renamed the package and classes, which left every doc describing
classes that no longer exist. This fixes the prose across README.md,
docs/ and bridged/docs/ -- 18 files.

Renamed: dev.ltms.bridged -> dev.ltms.fleet, the five class names, and
"bridged" where it names the daemon as a product rather than a path.

Also renamed two literals, because a doc that disagrees with the code is
worse than one that is out of date:

  - bridged-local-noauth -> fleetd-local-noauth. A placeholder apiKey
    OpenCodeLauncher sends when a profile resolves no token, to a local
    endpoint that does not check it. No test asserts the old string.
  - the vnd.ltms.bridged.* media type in the M4 design doc. It appears
    in no Java file, so nothing implements it yet.

Deliberately NOT renamed, because each is still literally true today and
changes only at the cutover:

  - paths: bridged/, bridged.yaml, bridged.example.yaml, bridged.jar,
    .bridged-worktrees, deploy/dev.ltms.bridged.plist,
    scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh, bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh
  - bridged_* metric names -- renaming these after the monitoring is
    wired would break dashboard continuity, so they move before it is
  - bridge_* MCP tool names, which answer alongside fleet_* on purpose
  - BRIDGED_* environment variables, read by a file outside this repo

Method note: perl, not sed. BSD sed has no \b and no lookaround, and a
word-boundary expression there fails silently. The prose replace uses
(?<![\w./-])bridged(?![\w./-]) so it cannot touch a path or an
identifier, then every remaining hit was read by hand.

Verified: mvn clean install green, 51 classes, 878 tests, 0 failures.
2026-08-23 06:46:34 +02:00
Dai Ha 3b7cdf9365 CB-632: the addendum named a class unit 1 renamed
mcp/BridgeMcp is now mcp/FleetMcp. This line is in the project addendum,
not the canonical block, so the wiki template is untouched -- the sync
check still returns True.

Part of #145.
2026-08-23 06:39:54 +02:00
Dai Ha 9b50dd69d8 CB-632 unit 1: rename the Java package and classes to fleet
Part of #145 (CB-632), under epic #125.

The product is called fleet and the daemon is called fleetd, but the code
still said bridge everywhere. This renames the Java half:

  package dev.ltms.bridged -> dev.ltms.fleet
  Bridged        -> Fleetd          (the main class)
  BridgedConfig  -> FleetConfig
  BridgeMcp      -> FleetMcp
  BridgedApp     -> FleetApp
  BridgedMetrics -> FleetMetrics

The package root is dev.ltms.fleet, not dev.ltms.fleetd. The trailing d
means daemon, which names a process, not a namespace.

What this commit deliberately does NOT change:

  - The module directory stays bridged/, and <finalName> stays bridged.
    The installed launchd plist names bridged/target/bridged.jar and its
    KeepAlive is armed, so renaming the jar on its own strands a restart.
    Both change at the cutover, together with the plist, in one step.
  - The bridge_* MCP tool aliases. CB-622 shipped both names on purpose.
    One test names a local variable viaBridge because it holds the result
    of the deprecated call; the rename collided with it and the compiler
    caught it. That variable is back.
  - BRIDGED_* env var names, and bridged.yaml. Both are operator
    contracts and need a read-both shim, which is a later unit.

Two things a plain search-and-replace would have missed:

  - logback.xml and logback-test.xml name the package twice, once as a
    turboFilter class= attribute. The compiler never checks those.
  - BSD sed does not support \b. The word-boundary expression matched
    nothing and said nothing, while the other ten in the same command
    worked. Checked the leftovers instead of trusting the exit code.

Verified: mvn clean install green, 51 test classes, 878 tests, 0 failures
-- the same count as before the rename.
2026-08-23 06:27:43 +02:00
ltms 08f1a79800 Merge #143: scripts/rename-checkout.sh (CB-624)
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m13s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m22s
Adds the rename script for CB-624 (#128), with a read-only --check mode.

Two workers ran this ticket in parallel and were kept apart on purpose: one wrote the script, one inventoried the same rename read-only without seeing it. The inventory found three surfaces the script had missed, all verified on the live machine before being acted on: ~/.claude.json's projects key (trust state, enabledMcpjsonServers, allowedTools, lastSessionId), ~/.config/herdr/session.json, and the JetBrains recentProjects.xml / trusted-paths.xml pair in 2026.1 and 2026.2.

All three are report-only by decision, not by oversight, and the reason is written into the script header: ~/.claude.json is global config written by live sessions, herdr/session.json is live process state, and IntelliJ rewrites its own files when the project is reopened.

While adding them the author found a trap worth recording: JetBrains stores $USER_HOME$/LTMS/claude-bridge, not the absolute path, so a plain absolute-path grep reports 0 hits on files full of them. The script now counts both forms and says which form matched.

Every apply-mode branch is unexecuted. Running it moves the directory this system runs from and stops the daemon the workers talk through, so the script is well-reasoned, not proven. Its first real run is its test. Verified before merge: CI run 215 green on both jobs, bash -n passes. shellcheck is not installed on this machine, so it never ran.
2026-08-23 06:09:18 +02:00
Dai Ha 51bdec22e7 CB-624: report three more rename surfaces as report-only
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 55s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m14s
--check gains section 6 counting ~/.claude.json (the projects entry keyed
by the old absolute path), ~/.config/herdr/session.json, and JetBrains
recentProjects.xml / trusted-paths.xml across every IntelliJIdea* version.
Apply mode's closing summary lists the same three with manual follow-ups.

None of the three is rewritten automatically, on purpose: ~/.claude.json
is global live Claude Code config, herdr session.json is live process
state, and JetBrains rewrites its own files when the project is reopened
at the new path. Header comment states the reason for each so it does not
read as an oversight.

JetBrains stores these paths as its $USER_HOME$ macro rather than a
literal absolute path, so the counter matches both forms and says which
form the hits used.
2026-08-23 06:07:16 +02:00
Dai Ha d43f670285 CB-624: add scripts/rename-checkout.sh to rename the checkout safely
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 46s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m32s
Renames ~/LTMS/claude-bridge -> ~/LTMS/fleetd as one auditable command,
modeled on redeploy-bridged.sh. --check reports every surface holding the
old absolute path (checkout files, launchd plist, Claude Code project
state, worktree .git pointers, running daemon). Apply mode stops the
daemon first (launchctl-aware), moves the checkout and the Claude Code
project-state slug dir derived from both paths, repairs worktree gitdir
pointers, rewrites bridged.yaml and the installed plist if they exist,
restarts, and verifies /healthz plus a fresh 'bridged listening' line
anchored to a pre-stop marker.
2026-08-23 05:55:04 +02:00
ltms c135583402 Merge #139: drop the unused rabbitmq host port mapping
CI / contract (push) Successful in 53s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m19s
The contract job reaches the broker by network alias (AMQP_URI=amqp://guest:guest@rabbitmq:5672), so the host mapping 5672:5672 was never used. It only bound a port on the runner host, which made two concurrent runs collide and the service container fail to start.

Seen on 2026-08-22: run 209 (PR) contract=success and run 210 (the merge of that same code) contract=failure with every step, including checkout, marked cancelled. Both started at 22:08. Re-running 210 alone on the identical commit passed.

PR #139's own run 212 is green on both jobs with the mapping gone, which proves the alias path still works.

Also the worker-PR proof for CB-623 (#127): opened by the agent account against fleet/fleetd after the org transfer.
2026-08-23 05:41:26 +02:00
Dai Ha 8d2893b67e CB-ci: drop host port mapping for rabbitmq service in contract job
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 43s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m33s
2026-08-23 05:35:58 +02:00
Dai Ha 555715ced9 CB-623: point every path at fleet/fleetd after the org transfer
CI / contract (push) Successful in 44s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m29s
The repo moved lms/claude-bridge -> fleet/claude-bridge -> fleet/fleetd.
Gitea redirects hold, so most of this is not urgent, but one line was a
real break: the implementer skill posts a worker's PR to a hardcoded
repo path, so every worker PR would have gone to the old address.

  .claude/skills/implementer/SKILL.md  the worker PR endpoint (functional)
  .gitmodules                          wiki submodule URL
  CLAUDE.md + wiki/7-Use-Cases.md      the canonical block, kept byte-identical
  README.md                            clone command and wiki link
  deploy/bridged.service               Documentation=
  plugin/.claude-plugin/plugin.json    homepage + repository
  docs/*.md                            issue and wiki links

The wiki is not a separate repo. /repos/lms/claude-bridge.wiki returns 404
and lms owned no .wiki entity, so the wiki moved with the repo; both the old
and the new wiki SSH URLs resolve to the same sha. Ticket step 4 assumed a
second transfer that does not exist.
2026-08-23 05:22:04 +02:00
ltms 446a9d395c Merge CB-622: canonical block to fleet_*, charter quote fixed
CI / contract (push) Successful in 49s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m22s
2026-08-22 22:08:44 +02:00
Dai Ha 8311f2db7f CB-622: update the canonical block to fleet_*, and fix the broken charter quote
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 43s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m28s
The eleven tool names become fleet_* throughout the portable block. The
fallback ladder keeps mcp__bridge__* unchanged and that is deliberate: both
launchers still mount the server as "bridge", so a spawned member really
does see that prefix. Renaming the mount is a separate surface CB-622 did
not touch.

Separately, a pre-existing defect: the ladder quoted the reply charter as
"You are an off-subscription worker in the claude-bridge fleet", while
REPLY_CHARTER says "You are a spawned member in the claude-bridge fleet".
A member matching that quote found nothing, so the ladder's first rung
could never fire. Now quoted verbatim.

wiki/7-Use-Cases.md is advanced to the matching template commit; the sync
check prints in sync: True.
2026-08-22 22:08:12 +02:00
ltms f4570ff274 Merge CB-622 lead follow-up
CI / contract (push) Successful in 42s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m1s
2026-08-22 21:59:46 +02:00
Dai Ha 3aea4e1ec6 CB-622 lead follow-up: the three changes no worker could make
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m30s
1. opencode.json — mount key bridged -> fleetd. Unit C could not do this:
   the file is neutralized by the worktree overlay, so every worker sees a
   stub and correctly reported it held no mount key. Tracked as CB-628.

2. e2e/bridge_ask_transcript.md keeps its name. It is a dated record of a
   run on 2026-07-16 that really did call bridge_ask, and its first line
   says so. The harness now writes fleet_ask_transcript.md for new runs;
   its header already says 'Live fleet_ask', so the two now agree.

3. docs/MCP-Contract.md line 20 — the historical banner describes section
   6, and section 6 now says fleet_ask.
2026-08-22 21:59:23 +02:00
ltms 516366b796 Merge CB-622 Unit B: rename bridge_* to fleet_* in the Markdown docs
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m0s
CI / contract (push) Successful in 40s
Lead-verified: 27 .md files, 165 occurrences, no wiki/, no CLAUDE.md. The docs/MCP-Contract.md boundary held exactly — every hunk falls in 223-286, inside section 6 (210-293). The transcript rename is reverted by the lead in a follow-up: that file is a dated record of a run that really did call bridge_ask.
2026-08-22 21:58:16 +02:00
ltms d82d0157cb Merge CB-622 Unit C: rename bridge_* to fleet_* in scripts, e2e and config
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m0s
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m5s
Lead-verified: 9 files, +68/-68, nothing under wiki/, root .mcp.json untouched. The worker's opencode.json finding was correct about its worktree and led to CB-628 (#134); the tracked file is fixed separately by the lead.
2026-08-22 21:58:09 +02:00
ltms 1deb0c90d4 Merge CB-622 Unit A: dual-register the MCP tools as fleet_* and bridge_*
CI / contract (push) Successful in 37s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m30s
Lead-verified: both names reach the same handler instance; warn-once uses a per-name Set, not a numeric sentinel; Authz keys on an action enum so the deprecated names keep their authorization. 878 tests green in a local integration with #132, #133 and the lead's opencode.json fix. Live MCP verification is still outstanding and is the lead's step after redeploy.
2026-08-22 21:58:03 +02:00
Dai Ha 41a3114d03 CB-622 Unit A: register fleet_* MCP tools, keep bridge_* working
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m2s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m8s
fleet_* is now the documented tool name for all eleven MCP tools; each
bridge_* twin is registered against the exact same handler (no logic
duplication) and its description leads with a DEPRECATED notice. A
bridge_* call logs one WARN naming the old and new name, once per name
for the life of the process (a Set, not a numeric sentinel).

REPLY_CHARTER in HerdrPeerLauncher now tells a spawned member to call
fleet_reply — the one rule that must survive with no repo checkout.

All other bridge_* string literals across mcp/, Javadoc, and tests were
renamed to fleet_* for consistency with the new documented name.
2026-08-22 21:54:32 +02:00
Dai Ha 76e4b577a0 CB-622: rename bridge_* tool names to fleet_* in Markdown docs
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m6s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m6s
Rename the eleven MCP tool names (bridge_ack/ask/list/poll/profiles/reply/
send/spawn/status/stop/whoami) to their fleet_* names across the Markdown
documentation. fleet_* is written as the normal name; one deprecation note
in README.md says bridge_* still works for one release.

docs/MCP-Contract.md is renamed only inside section 6 (lines 210-293):
sections 1-5 and 7-11 are stale pre-build design text (CB-609) and are
deliberately left with old names so dead text does not look maintained.

Also renames e2e/bridge_ask_transcript.md to e2e/fleet_ask_transcript.md
to match its content. CLAUDE.md, wiki/, plugin/skills/setup/SKILL.md and
.claude/skills/port-to-opencode/SKILL.md are owned by other units and are
untouched.
2026-08-22 21:52:24 +02:00
Dai Ha 03473a286b CB-622: rename bridge_* tools to fleet_* in scripts, e2e tests and config; mount name bridged -> fleetd
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 58s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m9s
2026-08-22 21:49:15 +02:00
Dai Ha 5cabd09705 wiki: CB-618 correction to the role-agent entry
CI / contract (push) Successful in 48s
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m0s
2026-08-22 12:37:12 +02:00
Dai Ha cc47672b7c CB-618: one charter file, and agent files need a name:
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m10s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m27s
Two defects in CB-617 that only a live spawn could find. Both were shipped
green: every test passed because every test read the argv we built, and none
ran the binary that has to accept it.

1. Claude Code refuses to start when both --append-system-prompt and
   --append-system-prompt-file are on the command line:

     Error: Cannot use both --append-system-prompt and
     --append-system-prompt-file. Please use only one.

   CB-617 put the role charter on the file flag and left the reply charter on
   the inline flag, so every Claude-profile spawn with a role charter died at
   launch. The pane exited on its own and bridged reported it as
   spawn_timeout ("did not reach injectable state within 20000ms"), which
   hides the real cause.

   Both charters now go in the one file, role charter first and reply charter
   last — last is where the reply rule must sit, because it is the rule that
   must survive. A member with only a reply charter keeps the proven inline
   flag, which is also the only form that reaches a member with no repo
   checkout.

2. A Claude Code agent definition needs `name:` in its frontmatter. Ours had
   only `description:`, so the files were skipped and --agent architect failed
   with "not found. Available agents: claude, Explore, ...". Added to all
   three. The OpenCode files take their name from the filename and are
   unchanged.

Checked on this host, in this repo, with the real binary:

  claude --model claude-sonnet-5 --agent architect \
    --append-system-prompt-file /tmp/combined.md -p '...'
  -> ROLEOK, REPLYOK, yes

so the agent definition, the role charter and the reply charter all compose.

The updated test now asserts the constraint that actually binds: with a role
charter present, --append-system-prompt must be absent, and the file must open
with the role charter and end with the reply charter.

874 tests pass.
2026-08-22 12:32:44 +02:00
Dai Ha 37edd9134b Merge CB-617 Unit B (#122): role agent definitions for both backends
CI / contract (push) Successful in 56s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m16s
2026-08-22 12:23:08 +02:00
Dai Ha 80f167b1f7 Merge CB-617 Unit A (#121): role charter travels by file, not argv 2026-08-22 12:23:08 +02:00
Dai Ha bd6547fca3 CB-617: add role agent definitions
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 43s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m31s
2026-08-22 12:21:16 +02:00
Dai Ha 7e97f5bff5 CB-617 Unit A: role charter via file, not argv
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m16s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m28s
herdr refused to shell-encode a multi-line inline --append-system-prompt
argument (invalid_agent_argument), which broke any Claude Code profile with
a configured multi-line fleet.charters.<role>. Split delivery: the role
charter now writes to a temp file and mounts via
--append-system-prompt-file; the one-line REPLY_CHARTER keeps its inline
--append-system-prompt delivery, since it must reach a member with no repo
checkout. Also pass --agent <role> when a role's agent-definition file
exists under the worker's cwd (.claude/agents/<role>.md for claude-code,
.opencode/agent/<role>.md for opencode); absent either file, nothing extra
is added and the member still spawns.

The base's LaunchSpec now carries roleCharter/replyCharter/cwd alongside
the existing composed charter field, so CharterReceipt keeps fingerprinting
the same composed text it always did -- unchanged, since the digest covers
the full logical charter content regardless of how it is delivered.
2026-08-22 12:04:38 +02:00
271 changed files with 30078 additions and 9548 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "claude-bridge",
"description": "Tooling for orchestrating a fleet of delegated coding agents through the bridged MCP gateway.",
"description": "Tooling for orchestrating a fleet of delegated coding agents through the fleetd MCP gateway.",
"owner": {
"name": "LTMS"
},
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
{
"name": "claude-bridge",
"source": "./plugin",
"description": "Make a project bridge-ready: mount the bridged MCP gateway and apply standard Claude Code settings so a session can orchestrate delegated workers. Ships no credentials.",
"description": "Make a project bridge-ready: mount the fleetd MCP gateway and apply standard Claude Code settings so a session can orchestrate delegated workers. Ships no credentials.",
"version": "0.1.0",
"author": {
"name": "LTMS"
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
---
name: architect
description: Refine work into clear, independent units before implementation.
---
<!-- CB-617: The model comes from fleetd.yaml because the launch flag overrides model here on both backends. -->
You are an architect in this fleet. You refine work before anyone builds it: scope,
acceptance criteria, risks, and a unit split. You read the repo and write analysis.
You never commit production code and never open a pull request.
A design task is worked by two architects. Design alone first, then exchange and
say plainly where you disagree. Do not concede just to agree.
Do only the assigned scope. Note anything outside that scope in one line and do not
investigate it further. Use `fleet_ask{question}` only when a decision belongs to
the lead, such as an unclear requirement or two defensible fixes. Do not ask about
something you can decide by reading more code.
Report only work you actually did and the real output of checks you ran. Do not
claim a result from a tool you could not use. The primary's IDE tools are not yours.
A mounted forge tool may use a blocked credential and fail by design.
The launcher provides the required bridge reply instructions for every member.
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
---
name: dev
description: Implement one assigned unit, test it, and open a pull request.
---
<!-- CB-617: The model comes from fleetd.yaml because the launch flag overrides model here on both backends. -->
You implement the one unit you were given and nothing else. Work in your assigned
git worktree and branch. Never check out, rebase onto, or push to `main`. Confirm
the worktree root and branch before you edit. Use only paths under that root.
Do only the assigned scope. Note anything outside that scope in one line and do not
investigate it further. Use `fleet_ask{question}` only when a decision belongs to
the lead, such as an unclear requirement or two defensible fixes. Do not ask about
something you can decide by reading more code.
Implement the change and run the full required build in your worktree. Read the
complete output and report its real result. Do not hide failures with a pipe. State
only checks you actually ran. The primary's IDE tools are not yours. A mounted forge
tool may use a blocked credential and fail by design.
Stage only files you changed. Never use `git add -A` or `git add .`. Never commit
`.mcp.json` or `wiki/`. Commit with a clear message, push your branch, and open your
own pull request against `main`. Never merge.
Your handoff must name the pull request or why it was not created, the branch, the
files changed, the build result, and any caveat for review.
The launcher provides the required bridge reply instructions for every member.
+34
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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
---
name: reviewer
description: Review one assigned scope and report the most important real issue.
---
<!-- CB-617: The model comes from fleetd.yaml because the launch flag overrides model here on both backends. -->
You review the diff you were given. Report bugs, risks, and missing tests. You do
not change code.
Read the whole assigned scope before judging it. Review only that scope. If you see
something outside it, note it in one line and do not investigate it further. Do not
run the build. The owner makes changes and runs checks.
Use `fleet_ask{question}` only when a decision belongs to the lead, such as an
unclear requirement or two defensible fixes. Do not ask about something you can
decide by reading more code.
Report the single most important real issue in this form:
```
1. <path>:<line>
2. issue: <one sentence: what is wrong and why it matters>
3. fix: <one line: the concrete change>
4. severity: high | medium | low
```
If there is no real issue, report `NO ISSUE` and one line saying why. A clean review
is valid. Do not invent an issue. Use high for a wrong result, data loss, security,
or a hang or crash on a real path. Use medium for an edge-path bug or a correctness
risk under load or concurrency. Use low for clarity, a latent foot-gun, or a smell
with no current failure.
The launcher provides the required bridge reply instructions for every member.
+274
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
---
name: fleets-status
description: Report the status of every fleet that shares one LavinMQ instance. Use for local daemon health, broker-wide fleet presence, and cross-host lead coordination checks.
---
# Status of every fleet on the shared LavinMQ instance
**The headline: always report what is missing.** This skill starts with the local fleet, then adds
broker-wide facts when its read-only credential exists. A missing fleet must appear as `unknown` or
`not reachable`, with the reason and the fix. Never leave it out.
The known topology has one LavinMQ instance on `10.10.20.13` (`fleet01`). AMQP uses port `5672`,
and the management API uses port `15672`. The Mac fleet owns vhost `/mac`. The fleet01 fleet owns
vhost `/fleet01`.
## 1. Protect credentials before any probe
**Hard rule — never print `LAVINMQ_URI`.** It is an AMQP URI with its password inline. It only
resolves in a login shell because `${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh` supplies it. A non-login shell
can make every broker probe look empty.
- Never run `echo "$LAVINMQ_URI"`.
- Never put `${LAVINMQ_URI:-something}` in output. That form expands to the secret value when set.
- Parse the user, host, and password into shell or Python variables. Use them without printing them.
- Prefer `resolves` or `does not resolve` over any part of the value.
- Every command that can read `LAVINMQ_URI` must send all output through this redaction before it
reaches the report:
```bash
sed -E 's#://[^@]*@#://<redacted>@#g'
```
**The `g` flag is not optional.** Without it `sed` replaces only the first match on each line, so a
line carrying two URIs leaks the second one. `scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh --check` prints lines like
that. Checked on 2026-08-27: without `g`, `amqp://u1:p1@h1/mac and http://u2:p2@h2:15672/api`
redacts the first pair and prints `u2:p2` in the clear.
Keep `pipefail` on when applying that filter. Otherwise the filter can hide a failed probe. Apply
the same no-print rule to the management password below, even though it is not in an AMQP URI.
## 2. Tier 1 — this fleet (always run)
Start here even when the broker tier is blocked. Work from the local fleetd checkout.
First run the read-only deployment check. It already checks the daemon process, deployed jar versus
the checkout `HEAD`, launchd state, and whether each configured token resolves in a login shell.
Do not copy those checks into new shell code. The script reads `LAVINMQ_URI`, so redact all output:
```bash
set -o pipefail
scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh --check 2>&1 \
| sed -E 's#://[^@]*@#://<redacted>@#g'
git rev-parse HEAD
```
Treat jar drift as a top-level warning. A merge is not a deployment. State the running jar result
as `matches HEAD`, `drift`, or `unknown`; do not turn an unclear timestamp into a match.
Report the process identifier (PID) and uptime too:
```bash
PIDS="$(pgrep -f 'target/fleetd.jar' || true)"
if [ -z "$PIDS" ]; then
printf '%s\n' 'fleetd: not running'
else
for PID in $PIDS; do
ps -p "$PID" -o pid=,etime=,lstart=,command=
done
fi
```
Read the full health response. Keep the HTTP status because `503` means fleetd is running but herdr
is not reachable. Report both `herdr.version` and `herdr.protocol` when present:
```bash
curl -sS --max-time 5 -w '\nHTTP %{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:8765/healthz
```
Call `fleet_whoami`, then call `fleet_list`. Preserve its sections in the report:
- `leads`, including which row is this lead;
- `members`, including state, role, profile, branch, and worktree when present;
- every per-profile `capacity` row, including `maxLoad`, `live`, `free`, and quarantine facts;
- the exact `healthCoverage` value.
Do not describe an empty `members` list as an empty fleet. It says only that no members are spawned.
Also do not hide a profile with `free: 0`; say whether load or credential quarantine caused it.
Show only WARN, ERROR, and SEVERE lines after the last `fleetd listening` line. This anchor stops an
old incident from looking current:
```bash
python3 - <<'PY'
from pathlib import Path
import re
path = Path("fleetd/fleetd.out")
if not path.exists():
print("cannot check current WARN/ERROR: fleetd/fleetd.out does not exist")
else:
lines = path.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines()
starts = [i for i, line in enumerate(lines) if "fleetd listening" in line]
if not starts:
print("cannot anchor WARN/ERROR: no 'fleetd listening' line exists")
else:
current = lines[starts[-1]:]
alerts = [line for line in current if re.search(r"\b(?:WARN|ERROR|SEVERE)\b", line)]
print(f"current WARN/ERROR/SEVERE count: {len(alerts)}")
for line in alerts[-50:]:
print(line)
PY
```
**What this tier cannot see:** it proves facts only about the Mac daemon at `127.0.0.1:8765`.
It cannot show the fleet01 daemon, broker queue depth, or broker consumers. The fleet01 REST service
at `10.10.20.13:8765` is not reachable from the Mac. Say this in the report rather than omitting
fleet01.
**But fleet01 IS reachable over SSH — checked 2026-08-28.** An older version of this line said SSH
was denied. That is true only for the user `dai.ha`. The host alias `fleet01` maps to user `ltms`,
and `ssh fleet01` works with key auth:
```bash
ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=6 fleet01 'echo $(id -un)@$(hostname)'
```
So fleet01's daemon PID, uptime, jar and `/healthz` **can** be reported — over SSH, not over REST.
Do that rather than writing `not reachable`. `ltms` also has passwordless sudo there.
## 3. Tier 2 — the shared broker (run when management access exists)
**This tier is blocked today.** The AMQP user in `LAVINMQ_URI` can connect on port `5672`, but gets
HTTP `401` from the management API on port `15672`. An AMQP connection does not grant monitoring
access.
The operator must create a separate, read-only LavinMQ management user with the `monitoring` tag.
It needs access to inspect both `/mac` and `/fleet01`. Store its values as
`LAVINMQ_MANAGEMENT_USER` and `LAVINMQ_MANAGEMENT_PASSWORD` in
`${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh`. Do not reuse or print the AMQP URI. Full multi-fleet status stays
blocked until this user exists.
When both variables resolve, run this from a login shell. It calls `GET /api/overview`,
`GET /api/vhosts`, `GET /api/queues`, and `GET /api/connections`. It prints selected status fields,
but never the user, password, Authorization header, or AMQP URI:
```bash
zsh -lc 'python3 - "$@"' -- <<'PY'
import base64
import json
import os
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
base = "http://10.10.20.13:15672"
user = os.environ.get("LAVINMQ_MANAGEMENT_USER", "")
password = os.environ.get("LAVINMQ_MANAGEMENT_PASSWORD", "")
if not user or not password:
print("broker tier: BLOCKED — management credential does not resolve in a login shell")
sys.exit(0)
token = base64.b64encode(f"{user}:{password}".encode()).decode()
def get(path):
request = urllib.request.Request(
base + path,
headers={"Authorization": "Basic " + token, "Accept": "application/json"},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=5) as response:
return json.load(response)
try:
overview = get("/api/overview")
vhosts = get("/api/vhosts")
queues = get("/api/queues")
connections = get("/api/connections")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
print(f"broker tier: BLOCKED — management API returned HTTP {error.code}")
sys.exit(0)
except Exception as error:
print(f"broker tier: BLOCKED — management API is not reachable: {type(error).__name__}")
sys.exit(0)
fleet_names = {"/mac": "Mac fleet", "/fleet01": "fleet01 fleet"}
print(json.dumps({
"overview": {
"lavinmq_version": overview.get("lavinmq_version"),
"rabbitmq_version": overview.get("rabbitmq_version"),
"queue_totals": overview.get("queue_totals", {}),
"object_totals": overview.get("object_totals", {}),
},
"fleets": [
{
"fleet": fleet_names.get(vhost.get("name"), "UNKNOWN FLEET"),
"vhost": vhost.get("name"),
"queues": [
{
"name": queue.get("name"),
"messages": queue.get("messages", 0),
"messages_ready": queue.get("messages_ready", 0),
"messages_unacknowledged": queue.get("messages_unacknowledged", 0),
"consumers": queue.get("consumers", 0),
}
for queue in queues if queue.get("vhost") == vhost.get("name")
],
"connections": [
{
"name": connection.get("name"),
"peer_host": connection.get("peer_host"),
"state": connection.get("state"),
}
for connection in connections if connection.get("vhost") == vhost.get("name")
],
}
for vhost in vhosts
],
}, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
PY
```
Map `/mac` to the Mac fleet and `/fleet01` to the fleet01 fleet. Keep any other vhost in the
report as `UNKNOWN FLEET`; do not drop it. For each vhost, total the ready, unacknowledged, and all
messages. Report every queue's consumer count and each live connection.
**A vhost with queues but zero consumers means that fleet's daemon is down while its durable state
survives. Call this out as a top-level warning.** This is the main reason to use the management API
instead of calling each remote daemon.
**What this tier cannot see:** without the new `monitoring` credential it cannot enumerate any
vhost, queue, depth, consumer, or connection. With the credential it still cannot report fleet01's
daemon PID, uptime, jar revision, `/healthz`, herdr version, or member capacity. Those need reachable
fleet01 REST or SSH access, which the Mac does not have today.
## 4. Tier 3 — cross-fleet lead coordination
Use the queue data from Tier 2. Select queues whose names match `lead.<coordId>.inbox`. Report each
queue's vhost, depth, consumer count, and the `coordId` between the prefix and suffix.
- A lead inbox with a consumer shows that a lead mailbox is live on that vhost.
- A durable lead inbox with zero consumers shows saved coordination state, but no live receiver.
- No lead inbox is not proof that coordination is disabled. The daemon may be down before declaring
its queue, or this account may not be allowed to see the vhost.
This Mac fleet currently sets both `broker.uriEnv` and `coordinator.uriEnv` to the same variable,
`LAVINMQ_URI`. Therefore its coordinator connects to `/mac`. Cross-host `fleet_send{coordId}` routes
only when both leads share the same coordinator vhost. If the fleet01 lead uses `/fleet01` for its
coordinator, the leads cannot see each other and the send will not route.
**Open question:** the fleet01 coordinator vhost has not been checked. Surface this question in
every report until a live `lead.<coordId>.inbox` consumer or fleet01's config proves the answer. Do
not claim that fleet01 uses `/fleet01` just because its member queues do.
Also compare these broker facts with the `leads` rows from local `fleet_list`. A missing remote lead
is `not visible from this coordinator`, not `down`, unless the broker consumer facts prove it.
**What this tier cannot see:** without Tier 2 management access it cannot list lead inboxes or their
consumers. Even with that access, a stopped fleet01 daemon leaves only durable queue history. That
history cannot prove which coordinator URI its current config would use after restart.
## 5. Report all fleets
Use one row per known or discovered fleet. Include blocked rows.
| Fleet | Daemon | Deployment | Herdr | Members/capacity | Queues/consumers | Lead coordination | Cannot check |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mac (`/mac`) | PID + uptime | jar vs `HEAD` | health + version + protocol | `fleet_list` + `healthCoverage` | facts or blocked reason | inbox facts or open question | exact missing facts |
| fleet01 (`/fleet01`) | reachable/down/unknown | value or `not reachable` | value or `not reachable` | value or `not reachable` | facts or blocked reason | inbox facts plus coordinator-vhost question | exact missing facts and fix |
Add rows for unknown vhosts. End with three short sections: `Current warnings`, `Checks that were
blocked`, and `Operator action`. Until the management user exists, `Operator action` must say:
> Create a read-only LavinMQ management user with the `monitoring` tag and access to `/mac` and
> `/fleet01`. Put its user and password in `${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh` as
> `LAVINMQ_MANAGEMENT_USER` and `LAVINMQ_MANAGEMENT_PASSWORD`.
+6 -6
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
---
name: implementer
description: Implementer-role procedure for a bridged worker — verify your worktree, implement the scope, commit, push, open your own PR, and hand off the PR URL. Load this when the lead delegates you an implementation task over bridged.
description: Implementer-role procedure for a fleetd worker — verify your worktree, implement the scope, commit, push, open your own PR, and hand off the PR URL. Load this when the lead delegates you an implementation task over fleetd.
---
# Implementer worker — procedure
The turn contract (one `bridge_reply`, `bridge_ask` for the lead's decisions, honest reporting,
The turn contract (one `fleet_reply`, `fleet_ask` for the lead's decisions, honest reporting,
never merge, never commit `.mcp.json` or `wiki/`) is in **`CLAUDE.md` → Bridge communication →
Worker** and already applies. This skill is only the *implement-and-hand-off procedure*.
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ test "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)" = "$PWD" || cd "$(git rev-parse --show-t
your worktree*:
```bash
cd "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)/bridged" && mvn clean install
cd "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)/fleetd" && mvn clean install
echo "exit=$?"
```
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ host (`GITEA_HOST`) into your env for exactly this — the token can create a PR
merge**.
```bash
API="${GITEA_HOST%/}/api/v1/repos/lms/claude-bridge/pulls"
API="${GITEA_HOST%/}/api/v1/repos/fleet/fleetd/pulls"
BRANCH="$(git branch --show-current)"
curl -sS -X POST "$API" \
-H "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}" \
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ fix it if the cause is yours (e.g. branch not pushed yet), and report the failur
inventing a URL. If `GITEA_TOKEN` is unset your profile was not granted PR-create: push the branch
and report its name so the lead opens the PR.
## 6. Hand off — what goes in `bridge_reply`
## 6. Hand off — what goes in `fleet_reply`
The reply is the entire handoff; the lead cannot see your terminal.
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
I->>G: git push -u origin HEAD
I->>G: POST /pulls (GITEA_TOKEN) — open PR to main
G-->>I: html_url
I->>L: bridge_reply(PR url, branch, files, tests)
I->>L: fleet_reply(PR url, branch, files, tests)
Note over L,G: the lead reviews the PR and merges on green — you never merge
```
+1 -1
View File
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Map each entry from `.mcp.json`:
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"instructions": ["CLAUDE.md"],
"mcp": {
"bridged": { "type": "remote", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp", "enabled": true },
"fleetd": { "type": "remote", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp", "enabled": true },
"context7": { "type": "remote", "url": "https://example.dev/mcp", "enabled": true,
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer {env:CONTEXT7_TOKEN}" } },
"gitea": { "type": "local", "command": ["gitea-mcp", "-t", "stdio"], "enabled": true,
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
---
name: reviewer
description: Reviewer-role procedure for a bridged worker — how to work a review scope and the exact shape of the finding to report. Load this when the lead delegates you a code review over bridged.
description: Reviewer-role procedure for a fleetd worker — how to work a review scope and the exact shape of the finding to report. Load this when the lead delegates you a code review over fleetd.
---
# Reviewer worker — procedure
The turn contract (one `bridge_reply`, `bridge_ask` for the lead's decisions, honest reporting,
The turn contract (one `fleet_reply`, `fleet_ask` for the lead's decisions, honest reporting,
never merge) is in **`CLAUDE.md` → Bridge communication → Worker** and already applies. This
skill is only the *review procedure*: how to work the scope, and the exact shape of what you
send back.
@@ -24,13 +24,13 @@ wrong.
covers what it was given.
- Do **not** edit files or run the build. You review; the owner acts.
## 3. Reach for `bridge_ask` only for a genuine fork
## 3. Reach for `fleet_ask` only for a genuine fork
Ambiguous requirement, a missing acceptance criterion, "intended or a bug?", or two defensible
fixes with different consequences — those are the lead's call, and guessing produces a
confident-but-wrong finding. Anything you could settle by reading more code is yours to settle.
## 4. The finding — what goes in `bridge_reply`
## 4. The finding — what goes in `fleet_reply`
Report the **single most important** real issue in the scope, in these four lines, under
~90 words:
+6 -8
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ jobs:
# does not depend on the wiki repo being reachable.
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
# The runner image ships an older default-jdk; bridged sets maven.compiler.release=25, so
# The runner image ships an older default-jdk; fleetd sets maven.compiler.release=25, so
# provision the JDK explicitly rather than apt-installing whatever "default" means today.
- name: Set up JDK 25
uses: actions/setup-java@v4
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:
mvn -version
- name: Build and test
working-directory: bridged
working-directory: fleetd
# This IS the mock-socket surface CB-503 asks for: the pom's `default-excludes` profile
# already sets excludedGroups=contract, so the @Tag("contract") tests — which need a live
# herdr socket and a RabbitMQ container — are excluded without any flag here. Everything
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ jobs:
# the log instead, where they are actually readable.
- name: Failing test output
if: failure()
working-directory: bridged
working-directory: fleetd
run: |
for f in target/surefire-reports/*.txt; do
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ jobs:
# AmqpReplyInboxContractTest reads AMQP_URI (set below to the service's network alias) and binds
# straight to it — no Docker, no skipped tests. This separation (build job hermetic and
# Docker-free; contract job broker-provided) is deliberate — see the default-excludes/contract
# profiles in bridged/pom.xml. `setup-java` provides the JDK only; Maven is installed separately,
# profiles in fleetd/pom.xml. `setup-java` provides the JDK only; Maven is installed separately,
# exactly as in the build job above.
contract:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -69,8 +69,6 @@ jobs:
env:
RABBITMQ_DEFAULT_USER: guest
RABBITMQ_DEFAULT_PASS: guest
ports:
- 5672:5672
env:
# Service containers are reachable from the job by their network alias on their internal port.
AMQP_URI: amqp://guest:guest@rabbitmq:5672
@@ -93,12 +91,12 @@ jobs:
# runs against the RabbitMQ service container (AMQP_URI). Pinned to the one contract test to
# avoid re-running the unit suite already covered by the `build` job.
- name: Contract tests
working-directory: bridged
working-directory: fleetd
run: mvn -B -Pcontract test -Dtest=AmqpReplyInboxContractTest
- name: Failing test output
if: failure()
working-directory: bridged
working-directory: fleetd
run: |
for f in target/surefire-reports/*.txt; do
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
+4 -4
View File
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
.env
.envrc
# Daemon runtime artefacts. bridged appends its log wherever it is launched from, so both the
# repo root and bridged/ collect one; neither belongs in git.
bridged.out
bridged/bridged.out
# Daemon runtime artefacts. fleetd appends its log wherever it is launched from, so both the
# repo root and fleetd/ collect one; neither belongs in git.
fleetd.out
fleetd/fleetd.out
logs/
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
[submodule "wiki"]
path = wiki
url = ssh://git@git.ltms.dev:2224/lms/claude-bridge.wiki.git
url = ssh://git@git.ltms.dev:2224/fleet/fleetd.wiki.git
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
---
description: Refine work into clear, independent units before implementation.
mode: primary
---
<!-- CB-617: The model comes from fleetd.yaml because the launch flag overrides model here on both backends. -->
You are an architect in this fleet. You refine work before anyone builds it: scope,
acceptance criteria, risks, and a unit split. You read the repo and write analysis.
You never commit production code and never open a pull request.
A design task is worked by two architects. Design alone first, then exchange and
say plainly where you disagree. Do not concede just to agree.
Do only the assigned scope. Note anything outside that scope in one line and do not
investigate it further. Use `fleet_ask{question}` only when a decision belongs to
the lead, such as an unclear requirement or two defensible fixes. Do not ask about
something you can decide by reading more code.
Report only work you actually did and the real output of checks you ran. Do not
claim a result from a tool you could not use. The primary's IDE tools are not yours.
A mounted forge tool may use a blocked credential and fail by design.
The launcher provides the required bridge reply instructions for every member.
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
---
description: Implement one assigned unit, test it, and open a pull request.
mode: primary
---
<!-- CB-617: The model comes from fleetd.yaml because the launch flag overrides model here on both backends. -->
You implement the one unit you were given and nothing else. Work in your assigned
git worktree and branch. Never check out, rebase onto, or push to `main`. Confirm
the worktree root and branch before you edit. Use only paths under that root.
Do only the assigned scope. Note anything outside that scope in one line and do not
investigate it further. Use `fleet_ask{question}` only when a decision belongs to
the lead, such as an unclear requirement or two defensible fixes. Do not ask about
something you can decide by reading more code.
Implement the change and run the full required build in your worktree. Read the
complete output and report its real result. Do not hide failures with a pipe. State
only checks you actually ran. The primary's IDE tools are not yours. A mounted forge
tool may use a blocked credential and fail by design.
Stage only files you changed. Never use `git add -A` or `git add .`. Never commit
`.mcp.json` or `wiki/`. Commit with a clear message, push your branch, and open your
own pull request against `main`. Never merge.
Your handoff must name the pull request or why it was not created, the branch, the
files changed, the build result, and any caveat for review.
The launcher provides the required bridge reply instructions for every member.
+34
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
---
description: Review one assigned scope and report the most important real issue.
mode: primary
---
<!-- CB-617: The model comes from fleetd.yaml because the launch flag overrides model here on both backends. -->
You review the diff you were given. Report bugs, risks, and missing tests. You do
not change code.
Read the whole assigned scope before judging it. Review only that scope. If you see
something outside it, note it in one line and do not investigate it further. Do not
run the build. The owner makes changes and runs checks.
Use `fleet_ask{question}` only when a decision belongs to the lead, such as an
unclear requirement or two defensible fixes. Do not ask about something you can
decide by reading more code.
Report the single most important real issue in this form:
```
1. <path>:<line>
2. issue: <one sentence: what is wrong and why it matters>
3. fix: <one line: the concrete change>
4. severity: high | medium | low
```
If there is no real issue, report `NO ISSUE` and one line saying why. A clean review
is valid. Do not invent an issue. Use high for a wrong result, data loss, security,
or a hang or crash on a real path. Use medium for an edge-path bug or a correctness
risk under load or concurrency. Use low for clarity, a latent foot-gun, or a smell
with no current failure.
The launcher provides the required bridge reply instructions for every member.
+94 -67
View File
@@ -4,35 +4,35 @@
> **Canonical block.** Everything down to §Layering is the portable bridge charter, copied verbatim
> into every project that mounts the bridge MCP. Keep it byte-identical with the template in the
> wiki ([Use Cases](https://git.ltms.dev/lms/claude-bridge/wiki/7-Use-Cases) → *The portable
> wiki ([Use Cases](https://git.ltms.dev/fleet/fleetd/wiki/7-Use-Cases) → *The portable
> CLAUDE.md block*); improvements go to the template first, then out to each project. Anything
> specific to *this* repo lives under §Project addendum below, never inline above it.
If no `bridge_*` MCP tools are mounted in this session, this section does not apply — skip it.
If no `fleet_*` MCP tools are mounted in this session, this section does not apply — skip it.
`bridged` is the **sole communication gateway** between agents here. The orchestrating session (the
`fleetd` is the **sole communication gateway** between agents here. The orchestrating session (the
**primary**) and every delegated peer (a **member**) mount the *same* MCP server and talk only
through its `bridge_*` tools. No session addresses a peer, a broker, or the network directly.
through its `fleet_*` tools. No session addresses a peer, a broker, or the network directly.
### Which role am I? — settle this before acting
**Every role reads this file.** A member runs in a git worktree of this same repo, so it inherits
this `CLAUDE.md` verbatim, and every rule below is role-conditional.
**Call `bridge_whoami`.** It returns `primary`, `worker`, or `architect`, resolved by the daemon from
**Call `fleet_whoami`.** It returns `primary`, `worker`, or `architect`, resolved by the daemon from
your connection — unforgeable, and the same resolution its authorization gate uses. A worker also
carries its `sessionId`, `profile`, `worktree` and `branch`; an architect carries the slot name it
was bound to. Don't infer what you can ask.
Only if that call is unavailable, fall back to these — each is one-way, so keep reading until one
fires: the reply charter in your system prompt (*"You are an off-subscription worker in the
claude-bridge fleet"*) ⇒ **spawned member**; bridge tools prefixed `mcp__bridge__*` ⇒ **spawned
fires: the reply charter in your system prompt (*"You are a spawned member in the
claude-bridge fleet"*) ⇒ **spawned member**; fleet tools prefixed `mcp__fleet__*` ⇒ **spawned
member** (the launcher fixes that mount name; a primary's mount is named by whoever wrote its
`.mcp.json`, so it varies); `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` set ⇒ **spawned member** (Claude-model members run
`.mcp.json`, so it varies — and a member spawned before CB-632 still says `mcp__bridge__*`); `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` set ⇒ **spawned member** (Claude-model members run
on a clean env, so its *absence* proves nothing). None of these separate a worker from an architect —
only `bridge_whoami` does. **Still unsure ⇒ act as a worker**, the most restricted member role. The
only `fleet_whoami` does. **Still unsure ⇒ act as a worker**, the most restricted member role. The
two mistakes are not symmetric: a primary acting as a worker is refused by the authorization gate —
loud and self-correcting — while a member acting as the primary ends its turn with no `bridge_reply`,
loud and self-correcting — while a member acting as the primary ends its turn with no `fleet_reply`,
and the sender silently receives nothing. Fail toward the recoverable error.
### Invariants — both roles, no exceptions
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ and the sender silently receives nothing. Fail toward the recoverable error.
stays on subscription; only the bridge puts a member off it, at spawn. Mounting the bridge must
never move a session across that boundary.
2. **The bridge is the only channel.** Text you print in your terminal reaches nobody — the other
side cannot see your screen. An answer that isn't in a `bridge_*` call is silently discarded.
side cannot see your screen. An answer that isn't in a `fleet_*` call is silently discarded.
3. **Identity comes from the connection, never an argument.** Workers never pass a target; you
cannot act as another session. Spawn/stop/drain are lead-only; **send is lead or architect**;
reply/ask are only-as-itself — any peer may answer for its own pane, and for no other. A call
@@ -57,10 +57,10 @@ and the sender silently receives nothing. Fail toward the recoverable error.
**Delegate by default — that is the job.** With the bridge mounted you are an orchestrator on a
metered subscription, and workers are cheap, parallel, and disposable. The default answer to "who
does this?" is **a worker**, not you. Reach for `bridge_send` before you reach for `Edit`. The steps
does this?" is **a worker**, not you. Reach for `fleet_send` before you reach for `Edit`. The steps
below are the procedure — run them in order, every task, not only the big ones.
0. **Know your role** — `bridge_whoami`, once per session, before anything else.
0. **Know your role** — `fleet_whoami`, once per session, before anything else.
1. **Split.** Write the unit list. Every unit carries: scope · the files or PR in question ·
acceptance criteria · exactly what to report back. A unit with no acceptance criteria is not
ready to delegate — refine it or keep it.
@@ -70,17 +70,17 @@ below are the procedure — run them in order, every task, not only the big ones
delegate. The keep-list is closed: the conversation with the user, decomposition and planning,
the final judgment call, verification, merges, and anything that depends on context only you
hold. Nothing else is yours by default.
3. **Spawn every delegated unit first** — `bridge_spawn{profile, worktree:true, ticket}`, one per
3. **Spawn every delegated unit first** — `fleet_spawn{profile, worktree:true, ticket}`, one per
unit, *before* sending any. Pass `profile` explicitly: profiles differ in model and cost, not in
tier, so the default is rarely what you want.
4. **Then send them all** — `bridge_send{sessionId, content, wait:false}`. Line 1 of every brief is
4. **Then send them all** — `fleet_send{sessionId, content, wait:false}`. Line 1 of every brief is
`Load the <name> skill.` naming the worker's playbook; those skills are opt-in and that line is
what makes them reliable. Where the project ships no such skill, spell the procedure out in the
brief instead. The brief is self-contained — the worker sees your message and the repo, nothing
of your context, your plan, or your screen.
5. **Collect** — `bridge_poll{ticket}` → `bridge_ack{target, msgId}`. Answer a worker's `bridge_ask`
with `bridge_send{turnId, content}` — **not** `sessionId`. A worker gone quiet is diagnosed with
`bridge_status`, never by reading its terminal; it also reports an open question and the `turnId`
5. **Collect** — `fleet_poll{ticket}` → `fleet_ack{target, msgId}`. Answer a worker's `fleet_ask`
with `fleet_send{turnId, content}` — **not** `sessionId`. A worker gone quiet is diagnosed with
`fleet_status`, never by reading its terminal; it also reports an open question and the `turnId`
that answers it. **A worker's ask waits ~55 seconds, and no nudge makes that longer** — so never
brief a worker to "ask me". Decide before you delegate, or give it an explicit default.
6. **Verify yourself.** Re-run the build and the checks. A worker cannot run your IDE tooling, any
@@ -93,11 +93,11 @@ below are the procedure — run them in order, every task, not only the big ones
read it yourself.
8. **Adjudicate, merge, tear down — yours alone.** Read the diff yourself: fully if it is small,
targeted at the reported findings and the risky paths if it is large. Reviewer findings direct
your attention; they never substitute for it. Then merge, then `bridge_stop{paneId}`.
your attention; they never substitute for it. Then merge, then `fleet_stop{paneId}`.
**Steps 3 and 4 are separate on purpose** — spawning and sending in one loop is how parallel work
silently becomes serial, and it is the most common way this layer is wasted. For the same reason,
prefer `wait:false` + `bridge_poll` for anything non-trivial: a blocking `bridge_send` is capped by
prefer `wait:false` + `fleet_poll` for anything non-trivial: a blocking `fleet_send` is capped by
*your own* MCP client call timeout (~60s), well below the task's real runtime.
**Delegating does not delegate responsibility.** Workers open PRs; you are the gate. Never delegate
@@ -105,21 +105,22 @@ the merge — and merging on a reviewer's word is delegating it by proxy.
| Intent | Tool |
|---|---|
| Confirm your own role | `bridge_whoami` |
| See backends available | `bridge_profiles` |
| Start a member | `bridge_spawn{role?, profile?, cwd?, worktree?, ticket?, sessionName?, resumeSessionId?}` → `sessionId` + `paneId` |
| See the fleet | `bridge_list` → `leads` (your peers) + `members` (each carries `agentSessionId` when its backend knows one) · one peer's state: `bridge_status{sessionId}` |
| Delegate (blocking) | `bridge_send{sessionId, content}` |
| Delegate (long task) | `bridge_send{sessionId, content, wait:false}` → ticket → `bridge_poll{ticket}` |
| Answer a member's `bridge_ask` | `bridge_send{turnId, content}` — **not** `sessionId` |
| Message a **peer lead** | `bridge_send{sessionId: <their terminal>, content}` — `bridge_list` → `leads` reports it. Coordination only, **never** a task |
| Answer a peer lead that messaged you | `bridge_reply{content}` — the one case a lead replies |
| Collect a held reply | `bridge_poll{target}` · then `bridge_ack{target, msgId}` |
| Tear down a member | `bridge_stop{paneId}` |
| Confirm your own role | `fleet_whoami` |
| See backends available | `fleet_profiles` |
| Start a member | `fleet_spawn{role?, profile?, cwd?, worktree?, ticket?, sessionName?, resumeSessionId?}` → `sessionId` + `paneId` |
| See the fleet | `fleet_list` → `leads` (your peers) + `members` (each carries `agentSessionId` when its backend knows one) · one peer's state: `fleet_status{sessionId}` |
| Delegate (blocking) | `fleet_send{sessionId, content}` |
| Delegate (long task) | `fleet_send{sessionId, content, wait:false}` → ticket → `fleet_poll{ticket}` |
| Answer a member's `fleet_ask` | `fleet_send{turnId, content}` — **not** `sessionId` |
| Message a **peer lead** on this host | `fleet_send{sessionId: <their terminal>, content}` — `fleet_list` → `leads` reports it. Coordination only, **never** a task |
| Message a **peer lead** on another daemon or host | `fleet_send{coordId: <their coord-id>, content}` — needs a `coordinator:` block; your own coord-id is in `fleet_list`. Coordination only, **never** a task |
| Answer a peer lead that messaged you | `fleet_reply{content}` — the one case a lead replies |
| Collect a held reply | `fleet_poll{target}` · then `fleet_ack{target, msgId}` |
| Tear down a member | `fleet_stop{paneId}` |
### Lead ↔ lead — coordinate, never delegate
`bridge_list` returns `leads` alongside `members`; your own row carries `self: true`. Every other row
`fleet_list` returns `leads` alongside `members`; your own row carries `self: true`. Every other row
is a peer — an orchestrator with its own context, its own members, and its own judgment. An empty
`members` array means no members are spawned; it says nothing about peers.
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ The traffic between leads is coordination and nothing else:
against the code, and re-run the build. A peer's correction gets the same treatment — right or
wrong on the evidence, not on who said it. Neither of you merges the other's work unreviewed.
Being messaged by a peer does not make you its worker: answer with `bridge_reply`, and push back on
Being messaged by a peer does not make you its worker: answer with `fleet_reply`, and push back on
the substance if it is wrong. A peer that simply complies has thrown away the reason there are two of
you.
@@ -148,11 +149,11 @@ you.
1. **Load the playbook skill the lead named** before doing anything else.
2. **Do the assigned scope only.** Note anything you spot outside it in one line; don't go hunt it.
3. **`bridge_ask{question}`** when a decision is genuinely the lead's (ambiguous requirement, two
3. **`fleet_ask{question}`** when a decision is genuinely the lead's (ambiguous requirement, two
defensible fixes, "bug or intended?"). It blocks and you resume the *same* turn with the answer.
Don't ask what you could decide yourself.
4. **End the turn with exactly one `bridge_reply{content}`**, carrying your complete answer. This is
the whole handoff. No `bridge_reply` ⇒ the sender gets nothing and the exchange stalls.
4. **End the turn with exactly one `fleet_reply{content}`**, carrying your complete answer. This is
the whole handoff. No `fleet_reply` ⇒ the sender gets nothing and the exchange stalls.
Do **not** lean on the completion fallback to carry your answer for you: when you end a turn
without replying, the bridge scrapes your pane, and it can return only the last 4000 characters.
A clipped scrape is marked as partial, but the missing text is gone — your report reaches the
@@ -171,35 +172,61 @@ you.
| Layer | Scope | Reaches |
|---|---|---|
| the launcher's reply charter | the one rule that must survive with no repo: *end every turn with `bridge_reply`* | every spawned member, at launch, every peer kind — never a lead |
| the launcher's reply charter | the one rule that must survive with no repo: *end every turn with `fleet_reply`* | every spawned member, at launch, every peer kind — never a lead |
| **this section** | protocol + orchestration policy | primary **and** every member that reads the repo — tracked in git, so worktrees inherit it |
| role agent definition files | role contract and per-job procedure | a member whose launcher binds its role to the matching file in its worktree |
| role playbook skills | per-job procedure (commit/PR recipe, finding format) | a member told to load one |
| the bridge's own docs | design detail, flows, error model | on demand |
A rule belongs in **exactly one** layer — the outermost one that must obey it. Peers that don't read
`CLAUDE.md` (non-Claude adapters) get the charter only, so any rule *they* must obey belongs in the
charter, not here.
A rule belongs in **exactly one** layer — the outermost one that must obey it. A member without a
repo checkout still gets the launcher's reply charter, which is why that one rule stays there.
Peers that don't read `CLAUDE.md` (non-Claude adapters) get the charter only, so any rule *they*
must obey belongs in the charter, not here.
## Project addendum — claude-bridge (not part of the canonical block)
- **This repo is the bridge.** The daemon is `bridged`, its MCP mount is `http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp`,
and the code behind the rules above is `mcp/BridgeMcp` (tools), `auth/Authz` (the role table),
- **This repo is the bridge.** The daemon is `fleetd`, its MCP mount is `http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp`,
and the code behind the rules above is `mcp/FleetMcp` (tools), `auth/Authz` (the role table),
`mcp/ConnectionIdentity` (connection→role), and `worker/*Launcher` (`REPLY_CHARTER`).
- **`fleet_profiles`/`fleet_list` report two separate outage states, and they are not the same
thing.** *Quarantined* (CB-578) means the backend told us it is out of capacity — a long,
1800s-default cooldown. *Cooling off* (fleetd #201/#227) means a profile's credential threw two
distinct backend errors (a non-exhaustion failure such as an HTTP 5xx) within 60 seconds — a
short, fixed 60s cooldown, not configurable per profile. Each check runs independently, so a
profile can show both at once. In the JSON: a cooling profile carries `credentialId` and
`coolingOffForSeconds`; a quarantined profile carries `quarantinedForSeconds`; a profile hit by
both carries all three fields, and either state alone already sets that profile's `free` to `0`.
A `fleet_spawn` naming a cooling-off profile is refused before it ever reaches the backend
adapter, with a message naming the credential and the remaining seconds ("cooling off after
repeated backend errors") — distinct wording from a quarantine refusal, so don't conflate the
two when reading a spawn failure.
- **Skills available to delegate:** `implementer` (worktree → commit → push → own PR) and
`reviewer` (scoped review → one structured finding). Name one in every delegation.
- **Primary-side skills** (not delegation playbooks — a worker cannot use them):
`port-to-opencode` (make an OpenCode session a participant in this workspace).
`port-to-opencode` (make an OpenCode session a participant in this workspace) and
`fleets-status` (report every fleet that shares one LavinMQ instance).
- **Never commit** `.mcp.json` (the primary's local copy, flagged `--skip-worktree`) or `wiki/`
(a submodule with its own remote).
- **Flows and the error model** — rendezvous, `bridge_ask`, detached delivery, turn-done fallback —
are diagrammed in `docs/MCP-Contract.md` **§6 only**. The rest of that page is a pre-build design
doc whose tool names, parameter names and REST paths never caught up with the code, so do not use
it as the tool reference (CB-609). Section 6 is kept out of this file because this file loads into
every session's context.
- **A provisioned worktree neutralizes `.mcp.json`, `opencode.json` and `.autoenv`** — the repo's
committed copies would otherwise mount the primary's IDE and forge servers (fleetd #134). The
worktree's copy of each is a stub, **not** the repo's real file, so a worker that reads one and
reports what it found is reporting on the stub. The daemon logs a per-spawn summary, but the
worker cannot see that log. From inside its own worktree a worker — or a lead debugging one —
reads the list with `git config --worktree --get-all fleet.neutralizedConfig`, and the
consequence with `git config --worktree --get fleet.neutralizedConfigNote`. Never brief a worker
to edit one of these files: the edit cannot be committed, and it will not tell you so.
- **Flows and the error model** — rendezvous, `fleet_ask`, detached delivery, the turn-done
fallback and status gating — are diagrammed in `docs/MCP-Contract.md`. That page is now flows
only: its pre-build tool catalogue, parameter tables and REST paths were deleted rather than
corrected, because a hand-maintained second copy of the tool surface is what drifted for a month
while this line pointed every session at it (CB-609 / #114). **The live MCP schema is the tool
reference**, with the intent→tool table above as the short form. `McpContractDocTest` fails if
that page names a `fleet_*` tool the server does not register. The flows are kept out of this
file because this file loads into every session's context.
### Redeploying the daemon — the lead may do this (primary only)
**A merge is not a deployment.** The running `bridged` holds the jar it was started with, so a
**A merge is not a deployment.** The running `fleetd` holds the jar it was started with, so a
feature merged to `main` does nothing until the daemon is rebuilt and restarted. Saying "shipped"
about code the live daemon has never loaded is a false report. The lead **may and should** redeploy
rather than hand the job back to the operator.
@@ -210,9 +237,9 @@ and stopping it kills the worker's own channel mid-turn.
**Use the script — do not hand-roll the steps.**
```bash
scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh --check # report state, change nothing
scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh # build, confirm drain, restart, verify
scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh --yes # skip the drain prompt (fleet already checked)
scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh --check # report state, change nothing
scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh # build, confirm drain, restart, verify
scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh --yes # skip the drain prompt (fleet already checked)
```
It builds before it stops anything, so a failed build never leaves the fleet down; it waits for the
@@ -229,17 +256,17 @@ if the script is unavailable or a step fails, this is what it was protecting you
daemon starts fine, and the failure appears much later as workers that cannot open a PR. Nothing
logs this at startup — the script's `--check` is the only thing that reports it, and it checks
whether the name resolves without ever printing the value.
2. **Drain live members first.** `bridge_list`, then `bridge_stop` each member, and collect anything
you still want with `bridge_poll` before you kill anything. A restart drops in-flight tickets and
2. **Drain live members first.** `fleet_list`, then `fleet_stop` each member, and collect anything
you still want with `fleet_poll` before you kill anything. A restart drops in-flight tickets and
rendezvous, and a member's report is not recoverable once its ticket is gone.
3. **A restart is the only way deferred config keys take effect.** That is usually the reason to do
it. The startup log names which keys it accepted and which it deferred — read those lines rather
than assuming.
4. **Re-check identity afterwards.** Call `bridge_whoami` and confirm it still answers `primary`. The
4. **Re-check identity afterwards.** Call `fleet_whoami` and confirm it still answers `primary`. The
lead is found by its tab label (`fleet.leaders.*.tab`), and a lead whose tab no longer matches is
demoted to worker, which refuses every orchestration call.
5. **Prove the new jar is the one running.** Confirm a *fresh* `bridged listening` line at the end of
`bridged/bridged.out`, dated after the restart. An old daemon that never died looks identical from
5. **Prove the new jar is the one running.** Confirm a *fresh* `fleetd listening` line at the end of
`fleetd/fleetd.out`, dated after the restart. An old daemon that never died looks identical from
the outside.
**Permission.** A `CLAUDE.md` rule grants intent, not tool permission — the command classifier
@@ -248,7 +275,7 @@ it is one auditable command, so the operator allow-lists it once instead of appr
start every time. The rule lives in the operator's Claude Code settings:
```json
{ "permissions": { "allow": ["Bash(scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh:*)"] } }
{ "permissions": { "allow": ["Bash(scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh:*)"] } }
```
Granted by the operator on 2026-08-15. If a call is still refused, do **not** route around it by
@@ -266,15 +293,15 @@ Before you call any work done, check the row that matches what you touched:
| You changed… | Re-read and update… |
|---|---|
| a `bridge_*` tool — added, removed, renamed, or its params/semantics | the primary's intent→tool table; any rule that names that tool |
| a `fleet_*` tool — added, removed, renamed, or its params/semantics | the primary's intent→tool table; any rule that names that tool |
| `Authz` / the role table | invariant 3, and the primary-only vs worker-only claims |
| `ConnectionIdentity` / how a caller is resolved | the `bridge_whoami` paragraph and the fallback ladder |
| `REPLY_CHARTER`, or a launcher's mount/flags | the fallback ladder (`mcp__bridge__*`), and the layering table's top row |
| `ConnectionIdentity` / how a caller is resolved | the `fleet_whoami` paragraph and the fallback ladder |
| `REPLY_CHARTER`, or a launcher's mount/flags | the fallback ladder (`mcp__fleet__*`), and the layering table's top row |
| the injector / status gating | invariant 4 |
| worktree provisioning or the parity overlay | the "both roles read this file" premise — it rests on the worker's worktree being a checkout of this repo |
| `.claude/skills/**` | the addendum's skill list, and the "name the playbook" rule |
| a new peer kind (non-Claude adapter) | what that peer can read — anything it must obey belongs in its charter, not in the block |
| **anything an operator can use, configure, or observe** — an MCP tool, a `bridged.yaml` knob, an endpoint, a visible behaviour | **[Features](wiki/11-Features.md)** — one entry: what it does · the knob that turns it on · **why it exists** · the gotcha |
| **anything an operator can use, configure, or observe** — an MCP tool, a `fleetd.yaml` knob, an endpoint, a visible behaviour | **[Features](wiki/11-Features.md)** — one entry: what it does · the knob that turns it on · **why it exists** · the gotcha |
That last row is not bookkeeping. Chapters 1–10 answer *how is this built* and *why this way*;
none of them has a home for *what can it do and how do I turn it on*, so for twenty tickets a
@@ -285,7 +312,7 @@ is a Roadmap line. A change that touches none of the three earns no entry, and t
outcome rather than an omission.
Then **propagate**: the block in this file and the template in the wiki
([Use Cases](https://git.ltms.dev/lms/claude-bridge/wiki/7-Use-Cases) → *The portable `CLAUDE.md`
([Use Cases](https://git.ltms.dev/fleet/fleetd/wiki/7-Use-Cases) → *The portable `CLAUDE.md`
block*) must stay byte-identical, and other projects carrying the block need the same edit. Verify
rather than trust:
@@ -308,10 +335,10 @@ PY
Two IDE MCP servers are connected: **intellij-index** (semantic code intelligence) and
**jetbrains** (file problems, reformat, debugger). IntelliJ has multiple projects open; our
module is **`bridged`**. Always pass these to IDE MCP tools:
module is **`fleetd`**. Always pass these to IDE MCP tools:
- `project_path` = `/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/bridged`
- IDE paths are relative to `bridged/` (e.g. `src/main/java/dev/ltms/bridged/...`)
- `project_path` = `/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/fleetd`
- IDE paths are relative to `fleetd/` (e.g. `src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/...`)
### After editing any file — mandatory
@@ -325,7 +352,7 @@ module is **`bridged`**. Always pass these to IDE MCP tools:
whole-project gate before declaring work done or committing.
**Whenever dependencies change (or a `pom.xml` edit), validate CVEs with
`jetbrains get_file_problems{filePath: "bridged/pom.xml"}`** — its Mend.io check reflects the
`jetbrains get_file_problems{filePath: "fleetd/pom.xml"}`** — its Mend.io check reflects the
dependencies on disk. (Note: `ide_diagnostics` / intellij-index does NOT re-resolve dependencies
after a pom edit without a full Maven reimport, so it reports stale CVE results — don't trust it
for this.) Treat a CVE warning like any other: bump to a patched version and confirm
+29 -27
View File
@@ -9,23 +9,23 @@ Sibling of [`crush-bridge`](https://git.ltms.dev/systems/vms) (which drives a he
process*, so it inherits `CLAUDE.md`, hooks, skills, and MCP — just pointed at a
cheaper/local model.
## Leading approach — herdr-centric message server (`bridged`)
## Leading approach — herdr-centric message server (`fleetd`)
A small always-on message server, **`bridged`**, controls
A small always-on message server, **`fleetd`**, controls
[herdr](https://herdr.dev) (an agent multiplexer) over its Unix-socket API and exposes a
clean 2-way messaging API as an **MCP server that both the primary and the workers mount** —
one unified Claude setup and the **sole communication gateway** (REST/SSE stays for non-Claude
clients; any broker is `bridged`-internal, below the gateway).
herdr owns the PTYs, multiplexing, persistence, and **agent-status events**; `bridged` owns
clients; any broker is `fleetd`-internal, below the gateway).
herdr owns the PTYs, multiplexing, persistence, and **agent-status events**; `fleetd` owns
policy (subscription boundary, session lifecycle, status-gated delivery) and the client
contract. A Claude member launches with `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` pointed at the gateway,
`https://llm.ltms.dev/anthropic`, plus a bearer token; the lead stays env-clean and calls
`bridged`'s MCP tools. See the wiki's **[13 User Guide](wiki/13-User-Guide.md)** to run it.
`fleetd`'s MCP tools. See the wiki's **[13 User Guide](wiki/13-User-Guide.md)** to run it.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
OPUS["Opus — primary<br/>(Claude Code, env CLEAN)<br/>MCP client"]
subgraph BD["bridged — standalone daemon (not a claude process)"]
subgraph BD["fleetd — standalone daemon (not a claude process)"]
SRV["SERVER face<br/>MCP · REST/SSE · policy"]
CLI["CLIENT face<br/>status-gated injector · herdr socket"]
SRV --> CLI
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ flowchart LR
W["worker claude pane<br/>ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL set<br/>MCP client"]
M["llm.ltms.dev<br/>(the one gateway)"]
OPUS -->|"MCP bridge_send (blocks)"| SRV
W -.->|"MCP bridge_reply"| SRV
OPUS -->|"MCP fleet_send (blocks)"| SRV
W -.->|"MCP fleet_reply"| SRV
CLI -->|"Unix socket<br/>send_text · events.subscribe"| HERDR
HERDR -->|"drives PTY"| W
W -->|"inference"| M
@@ -47,24 +47,26 @@ flowchart LR
```
- **Subscription boundary:** the *primary* never sets `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` (stays on
Pro/Max). Only the *secondary* process is off-subscription — and `bridged` itself is a
Pro/Max). Only the *secondary* process is off-subscription — and `fleetd` itself is a
plain daemon (no Anthropic quota), so it may poll/subscribe freely.
- **One gateway (unified MCP setup):** `bridged` is the **sole communication path** for every
- **One gateway (unified MCP setup):** `fleetd` is the **sole communication path** for every
Claude session. Primary and workers each mount it as an MCP server (one `claude mcp add`
line, same on both) and talk over MCP tools — `bridge_send` / `bridge_reply` /
`bridge_status` (with `bridge_ask` planned for the blocked-worker path). **No Claude session
ever addresses a broker, a peer, or the network
directly**; any queue is `bridged`-internal. MCP tool I/O never sets `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`, so
mounting the bridge is subscription-safe by construction.
- **How the primary consumes a reply:** a single **blocking MCP call** (`bridge_send`);
`bridged` holds it open until the worker calls `bridge_reply` or its turn hits
line, same on both) and talk over MCP tools — `fleet_send` / `fleet_reply` /
`fleet_status` (with `fleet_ask` planned for the blocked-worker path). **No Claude session
ever addresses a broker, a peer, or the network
directly**; any queue is `fleetd`-internal. MCP tool I/O never sets `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`, so
mounting the bridge is subscription-safe by construction.
**Tool naming:** the tools are `fleet_*` (renamed from `bridge_*` in CB-622). The old
`bridge_*` names were removed in CB-634 — only `fleet_*` answers now.
- **How the primary consumes a reply:** a single **blocking MCP call** (`fleet_send`);
`fleetd` holds it open until the worker calls `fleet_reply` or its turn hits
`agent_status=done`, then returns the reply as the tool result. No cross-turn busy-poll, so
no quota burn. SSE is an optional side-channel for humans/dashboards watching status.
- **Worker → primary** rides `bridged`'s **MCP rendezvous** — the reply resolves the primary's
blocking call (or, for detached work, `bridged` **injects the primary's idle pane** when it's
- **Worker → primary** rides `fleetd`'s **MCP rendezvous** — the reply resolves the primary's
blocking call (or, for detached work, `fleetd` **injects the primary's idle pane** when it's
ready), so *no keystroke-into-primary and no broker are involved, even single-host*. The one
exception: a split-host primary that isn't a herdr pane wakes via its own `Stop`-hook, which
polls **`bridged`** (never a broker). See the wiki for the two topologies.
polls **`fleetd`** (never a broker). See the wiki for the two topologies.
- **Different model per process** sidesteps Claude Code's lack of per-subagent provider
routing — the worker isn't a subagent, it's its own configured process.
- **AgentAPI** ([`coder/agentapi`](https://github.com/coder/agentapi)) is retained only as a
@@ -73,11 +75,11 @@ flowchart LR
## Docs
Full design, setup, and operations live in the **[wiki](https://git.ltms.dev/lms/claude-bridge/wiki)**,
Full design, setup, and operations live in the **[wiki](https://git.ltms.dev/fleet/fleetd/wiki)**,
vendored here as a submodule under [`wiki/`](./wiki):
```bash
git clone --recurse-submodules ssh://git@git.ltms.dev:2224/lms/claude-bridge.git
git clone --recurse-submodules ssh://git@git.ltms.dev:2224/fleet/fleetd.git
# or, after a plain clone:
git submodule update --init
```
@@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ Gitea wiki.
## Status
🟢 **Implemented & dogfooded** — the herdr-centric **`bridged`** message server is built and in
🟢 **Implemented & dogfooded** — the herdr-centric **`fleetd`** message server is built and in
real use: an Opus primary delegates tasks to off-subscription workers that reply through the
bridge (code reviews delegated this way have produced committed bug fixes). Selected as the
primary approach 2026-07-11, superseding the AgentAPI plan (2026-07-08); AgentAPI retained as a
@@ -98,9 +100,9 @@ tests run separately via `mvn test -Pcontract`):
- **Core gateway** — herdr socket client (contract-tested vs live 0.7.0); guard-checked worker
spawn with `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` injected only into the worker's env; status-gated injector;
blocking `bridge_send` with reply rendezvous; MCP server as a thin adapter over the REST core.
- **MCP tools** — `bridge_send` / `bridge_reply` / `bridge_status` (messaging) and `bridge_spawn`
/ `bridge_list` / `bridge_stop` / `bridge_profiles` / `bridge_poll` (fleet). Caller identity is
blocking `fleet_send` with reply rendezvous; MCP server as a thin adapter over the REST core.
- **MCP tools** — `fleet_send` / `fleet_reply` / `fleet_status` (messaging) and `fleet_spawn`
/ `fleet_list` / `fleet_stop` / `fleet_profiles` / `fleet_poll` (fleet). Caller identity is
connection-based (loopback peer PID → herdr pane), so the same mount serves primary and workers.
- **Delivery reliability** — completion fallback (a confirmed `working→idle` turn resolves a
send); async fire-and-poll (beats the caller's MCP call timeout for long tasks); and failure
@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ tests run separately via `mvn test -Pcontract`):
- **Fleet** — multiple worker profiles, each with an independent base_url guard check; workers
inherit the primary's working directory (never `$HOME`); a readiness gate holds delivery until
a worker's Claude has connected the bridge MCP (no paste lost into its boot window).
- **Blocked-worker path** — `bridge_ask` reverse rendezvous: a worker pauses its delegated turn to
- **Blocked-worker path** — `fleet_ask` reverse rendezvous: a worker pauses its delegated turn to
ask the primary and resumes the *same* turn with the answer (CB-205).
- **Session lifecycle** — session manager with spawn/reuse/recycle, `idle_ttl` reaper, `context_cap`,
and graceful drain on shutdown (CB-301/CB-303); per-worker git worktrees on their own branch with
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
# Build output
target/
dependency-reduced-pom.xml
# Local runtime config (copy from bridged.example.yaml)
bridged.yaml
# CB-505 audit trail + daemon stdout/stderr — runtime records, never source
logs/
# Editor / OS
*.iml
.idea/
.DS_Store
@@ -1,683 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged;
import dev.ltms.bridged.config.BridgedConfig;
import dev.ltms.bridged.config.ConfigRef;
import dev.ltms.bridged.config.ConfigWatcher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.guard.SubscriptionGuard;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.HerdrClient;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.HerdrException;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.LeadTabScanner;
import dev.ltms.bridged.lead.LeadLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.PaneLocator;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.UnixSocketHerdrClient;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.WorkspaceControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.inject.CompletionResolver;
import dev.ltms.bridged.inject.ExhaustedPatternLookup;
import dev.ltms.bridged.inject.ExhaustionSink;
import dev.ltms.bridged.inject.Injector;
import dev.ltms.bridged.inject.StatusPoller;
import dev.ltms.bridged.inject.TurnListener;
import dev.ltms.bridged.inject.MemberPresence;
import dev.ltms.bridged.auth.MemberRegistry;
import dev.ltms.bridged.auth.CallerResolver;
import dev.ltms.bridged.mcp.BridgeMcp;
import dev.ltms.bridged.mcp.ConnectionIdentity;
import dev.ltms.bridged.metrics.BridgedMetrics;
import dev.ltms.bridged.metrics.Metrics;
import dev.ltms.bridged.health.FleetHealthMonitor;
import dev.ltms.bridged.mcp.PrimaryRegistry;
import dev.ltms.bridged.mcp.LsofPeerPidLookup;
import dev.ltms.bridged.mcp.LsofProcessCwdLookup;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.AmqpReplyInbox;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.InMemoryReplyInbox;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.MessageService;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.Rendezvous;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.ReplyInbox;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.LeadHeartbeatLoop;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.ReplyPushLoop;
import dev.ltms.bridged.rest.BridgedApp;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.GitWorktrees;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.MemberSession;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.SessionManager;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.PeerLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.SessionReaper;
import dev.ltms.bridged.member.ClaudeCodeLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.member.CompositePeerLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.member.HerdrPeerLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.member.OpenCodeLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.placement.BackendQuarantine;
import io.javalin.Javalin;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Objects;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.Executors;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicReference;
import java.util.function.Function;
import java.util.function.Predicate;
import java.util.function.Supplier;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import java.util.stream.Collectors;
/**
* {@code bridged} entry point. Wires the real herdr socket client to the REST app and
* starts listening. Before anything else it asserts its own environment is clean —
* {@code bridged} is not a Claude process and must never carry a base_url.
*/
public final class Bridged {
private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(Bridged.class);
/** CB-504: how long to wait at startup for herdr's socket before serving degraded. */
private static final long HERDR_WAIT_SECONDS = 30;
private static final long HERDR_WAIT_POLL_MILLIS = 500;
static void main(String[] args) {
Path configPath = Path.of(args.length > 0 ? args[0] : "bridged.yaml");
BridgedConfig cfg = BridgedConfig.load(configPath);
// CB-594: report which secret env vars the config actually needs, by name, before anything
// else can fail on a silently-empty one. A daemon started without a login shell (launchd)
// boots fine either way — this is the only thing that says so out loud.
reportRequiredSecrets(cfg);
// CB-596: an absent (or empty) memberCredentials: block blocks NOTHING — no credential
// name is hardcoded any more to fall back on. Say so loudly, the same way a missing
// secret is reported above, so upgrading past this commit never silently drops CB-592's
// protection.
reportMemberCredentialsGap(cfg);
// CB-559: `cfg` stays the startup snapshot — every validation and every piece of one-time
// wiring below reads it, and must, because those decisions cannot be unmade. `config` is the
// live reference the hot paths read per use. Which keys can actually move is ConfigRef's
// contract; adding a reader here does not make a key reloadable by itself.
ConfigRef config = new ConfigRef(configPath, cfg);
// The primary/host env that launched bridged must not be tainted.
SubscriptionGuard guard = new SubscriptionGuard(cfg.guard().hostSet());
guard.assertPrimaryClean(System.getenv());
// CB-501: refuse to start if the bind is wider than the auth mode can defend. Under
// loopback-trust, "not a known worker" means "the primary" — sound only because the OS
// refuses remote connections to a loopback socket. This throws rather than warns so the
// dangerous configuration cannot be reached by ignoring a log line.
cfg.validateAuthExposure();
cfg.validateLeadTabPrefixes();
// CB-542: a subscription:true profile whose env: reseats ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL/AUTH_TOKEN would
// reach an unguarded endpoint (the launcher skips SubscriptionGuard for it). Refuse at load.
cfg.validateSubscriptionProfiles();
cfg.validateCharters();
// CB-548: every architect slot must name a configured workers: profile — the strong-model
// backend the future spawn lifecycle would read. A stale reference dies here, not later.
cfg.validateMembers();
Path socket = cfg.herdrSocket() != null && !cfg.herdrSocket().isBlank()
? Path.of(cfg.herdrSocket())
: UnixSocketHerdrClient.defaultSocketPath();
UnixSocketHerdrClient herdr = UnixSocketHerdrClient.connect(socket, new com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper());
AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
WorkspaceControl spaces = new WorkspaceControl(herdr);
// CB-402: one adapter per configured peer kind, fronted by a composite router. A profile's
// `kind:` selects its adapter — claude-code (the default) and opencode partition the profile
// set — and the composite dispatches each SPI call to the adapter that owns the profile/pane.
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> claudeProfiles = new LinkedHashMap<>();
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> opencodeProfiles = new LinkedHashMap<>();
cfg.profiles().forEach((name, w) -> {
if (w.isOpenCode()) {
opencodeProfiles.put(name, w);
} else {
claudeProfiles.put(name, w);
}
});
List<HerdrPeerLauncher> adapters = new ArrayList<>();
// The claude-code adapter is the always-present default; keep it even with no profiles (so a
// bridge configured with no workers, or opencode-only, still has a well-defined base adapter)
// unless opencode is the only kind configured.
if (!claudeProfiles.isEmpty() || opencodeProfiles.isEmpty()) {
adapters.add(new ClaudeCodeLauncher(agents, spaces, guard,
claudeProfiles, cfg.effectiveDefaultProfile(), System::getenv,
cfg.spawnReadyTimeoutMs(), cfg.spawnReadyPollMs(),
() -> config.get().fleet(),
() -> config.get().memberCredentials()));
}
if (!opencodeProfiles.isEmpty()) {
adapters.add(new OpenCodeLauncher(agents, spaces,
opencodeProfiles, cfg.effectiveDefaultProfile(), System::getenv,
cfg.spawnReadyTimeoutMs(), cfg.spawnReadyPollMs(),
() -> config.get().fleet(),
() -> config.get().memberCredentials()));
}
AtomicReference<Function<String, Integer>> liveCountRef = new AtomicReference<>(_ -> 0);
// CB-578 stage B: one quarantine tracker for the whole daemon, shared between the launcher
// (checked at spawn) and the exhaustion sink wired in below (written on BACKEND_EXHAUSTED).
// The cooldown is deferred (see BridgedConfig#quarantineCooldownSeconds): it is read once
// here, at startup, and a config reload only changes it for a daemon restart.
BackendQuarantine quarantine = new BackendQuarantine(System::nanoTime,
TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(cfg.quarantineCooldownSeconds()));
PeerLauncher workers = new CompositePeerLauncher(
adapters,
cfg.effectiveDefaultProfile(),
config,
profileName -> liveCountRef.get().apply(profileName),
quarantine);
// CB-504: under supervision (launchd/systemd) bridged can start before herdr's socket
// exists. The client itself is lazy — it connects per call — but the orphan reap below is
// the first thing that actually talks to herdr, so without this wait a boot-order race
// would crash the daemon into a restart loop. Wait, then degrade rather than die: serving
// with /healthz reporting "degraded" is strictly more useful than exiting.
boolean herdrUp = awaitHerdr(herdr);
if (herdrUp) {
// CB-117: herdr keeps worker panes alive across a daemon restart, and their ids died
// with the previous process — reap those leaked orphans now, before we start serving.
workers.reapOrphanWorkers();
} else {
log.warn("herdr did not answer within {}s — starting anyway; /healthz will report "
+ "degraded until it comes up. Orphaned worker panes (if any) were NOT reaped.",
HERDR_WAIT_SECONDS);
}
// CB-301: authoritative session registry + lifecycle FSM on top of ClaudeCodeLauncher.
// CB-301-ext: worktree provisioning seam, optionally rooted at a configured directory.
// CB-303 part 2: context cap is opt-in and disabled (0) when absent/null.
int contextCap = 0;
if (cfg.lifecycle() != null && cfg.lifecycle().contextCap() != null
&& cfg.lifecycle().contextCap() > 0) {
contextCap = cfg.lifecycle().contextCap();
}
boolean clearAfterTurn = cfg.lifecycle() != null && cfg.lifecycle().clearAfterTurn();
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workers, new GitWorktrees(cfg.worktreeRoot()),
System::nanoTime, contextCap, clearAfterTurn);
liveCountRef.set(profileName -> (int) sessions.roster().stream()
.filter(s -> profileName.equals(s.profile()))
.count());
// CB-303 part 1: idle-ttl reaper — only when configured, defaults to disabled.
final SessionReaper reaper;
if (cfg.lifecycle() != null
&& cfg.lifecycle().idleTtlSeconds() != null
&& cfg.lifecycle().idleTtlSeconds() > 0) {
reaper = new SessionReaper(sessions, cfg.lifecycle().idleTtlSeconds());
reaper.start();
} else {
reaper = null;
}
// CB-530: every pane the config names as a lead, merged from `leaders:` and the legacy
// singular pin. PrimaryRegistry below still tracks ONE terminal — it addresses the push
// loop's nudges, which need a single destination — so it keeps the legacy pin.
Map<String, String> leadTerminals = cfg.leaderTerminals();
if (leadTerminals.size() > 1) {
log.info("leads: {} panes recognised {}", leadTerminals.size(), leadTerminals.values());
}
// CB-531: on top of the legacy primary.terminal pin, discover leads by the tab labels the
// operator writes. CB-557 moved the settings onto the lead they describe, so scanning is on
// whenever a `fleet.leaders:` entry exists — with no leads configured the supplier is a
// constant and never touches herdr, exactly as a missing `leadScan:` block used to behave.
// CB-579: each lead now names its own exact `tab:` label, so one scanner discovers every
// configured lead regardless of how differently their tabs are labelled — the old
// single-shared-tabPrefix limitation (and its warning) is gone.
final Supplier<Map<String, String>> leads;
var leaders = cfg.fleet().leaders();
if (!leaders.isEmpty()) {
Set<String> memberSpaces = cfg.profiles().values().stream()
.map(BridgedConfig.Profile::workspace)
.filter(Objects::nonNull)
.collect(Collectors.toSet());
Map<String, String> tabToName = new LinkedHashMap<>();
leaders.forEach((name, leader) -> {
if (leader != null && leader.tab() != null && !leader.tab().isBlank()) {
tabToName.put(leader.tab(), name);
}
});
// One shared rescan cadence: still taken from the first entry, as before — it is an
// operational cadence, not identity, so there is no correctness reason to give every
// lead its own scanner.
int scanIntervalSeconds = leaders.values().iterator().next().scanIntervalSeconds();
leads = new LeadTabScanner(herdr, tabToName, memberSpaces,
TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(scanIntervalSeconds), System::nanoTime);
log.info("lead scan: tabs {} host a lead (rescan every {}s, member spaces {} excluded)",
tabToName.keySet(), scanIntervalSeconds, memberSpaces);
} else {
leads = () -> leadTerminals;
}
// CB-558: start any declared lead that is not already running. After the scanner is built,
// because both read the same tab labels and the ordering makes that dependency visible; and
// only when herdr answered, because the launcher's whole safety property is that it can
// count live leads first — it must never guess and risk a second orchestrator.
if (herdrUp && !leaders.isEmpty()) {
int launched = new LeadLauncher(agents, spaces, cfg).ensureLeads();
if (launched > 0) {
log.info("lead auto-launch: {} lead(s) started", launched);
}
}
// CB-548: config-declared architect slots. Config supplies only the stable name → profile
// map; the terminal → slot binding is owned by the registry and is empty at startup, so no
// pane resolves to an architect until the later spawn lifecycle binds one. The registry is
// what CallerResolver resolves against and what that lifecycle will read profiles from;
// nothing here spawns a slot.
MemberRegistry members = new MemberRegistry(cfg.fleet());
sessions.setMemberLifecycle(members);
if (!members.slots().isEmpty()) {
log.info("member slots: {} configured {} — none bound yet (a slot is idle until the "
+ "spawn lifecycle binds a live terminal to it)",
members.slots().size(), members.slots().keySet());
}
// Status-gated injector (CB-103): the single writer into workers, fed by a poller.
// The blocking message endpoint (CB-104) is the producer; the poller is inert until then.
// CB-106: a confirmed turn completion resolves a blocked send whose worker never replied.
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
// CB-578 stage A: classify a completion-fallback scrape that matches a profile's configured
// usage-limit refusal as BACKEND_EXHAUSTED rather than handing it back as a real answer.
// Compiled once at startup, keyed by profile name; a profile with no exhaustedPattern is
// simply absent here, so its workers keep today's completion-fallback behaviour unchanged.
Map<String, Pattern> exhaustedPatternsByProfile = new LinkedHashMap<>();
cfg.profiles().forEach((name, profile) -> {
if (profile.hasExhaustedPattern()) {
exhaustedPatternsByProfile.put(name, Pattern.compile(profile.exhaustedPattern()));
}
});
ExhaustedPatternLookup exhaustedPatterns = target -> sessions.roster().stream()
.filter(session -> target.equals(session.terminalId()))
.findFirst()
.map(session -> exhaustedPatternsByProfile.get(session.profile()))
.orElse(null);
log.info("backend-exhausted classification (CB-578 stage A): {}",
CompletionResolver.coverage(cfg.profiles().keySet(), exhaustedPatternsByProfile.keySet()));
// CB-578 stage B: on a classification that actually wins, quarantine the exhausted profile's
// CREDENTIAL — not the profile name — so a profile sharing that credential (e.g. two models
// on one OpenAI account) is refused too, not just the one that happened to report it. Reads
// the profile config live off `config`, so a credentialId edit is hot: no restart needed.
ExhaustionSink exhaustionSink = (target, reason) -> sessions.roster().stream()
.filter(session -> target.equals(session.terminalId()))
.findFirst()
.map(MemberSession::profile)
.map(profileName -> config.get().profiles().get(profileName))
.ifPresent(profile -> {
String credentialId = profile.effectiveCredentialId();
quarantine.quarantine(credentialId);
log.warn("credential '{}' quarantined for {}s (profile '{}' classified "
+ "BACKEND_EXHAUSTED): {}", credentialId,
cfg.quarantineCooldownSeconds(), profile.profile(), reason);
});
CompletionResolver completion = new CompletionResolver(agents, rendezvous, exhaustedPatterns, exhaustionSink);
// CB-113: deliver only to an available worker (its MCP is connected), never its boot window.
// CB-301: the manager's presence bridge records availability and drives SPAWNING → READY.
MemberPresence presence = sessions.asPresence();
TurnListener turnListener = new TurnListener() {
@Override
public void onTurnComplete(String target) {
completion.onTurnComplete(target);
sessions.onTurnComplete(target);
}
@Override
public boolean hasPostTurnAction(String target) {
return sessions.hasPostTurnAction(target);
}
@Override
public boolean onTurnCompleteWithPostAction(String target) {
completion.resolveBeforePostAction(target);
return sessions.onTurnCompleteWithPostAction(target);
}
@Override
public void onDelivered(String target, dev.ltms.bridged.msg.TurnToken token) {
completion.onDelivered(target, token);
sessions.onDelivered(target, token);
}
@Override
public void onTurnFailed(String target) {
completion.onTurnFailed(target);
sessions.onTurnFailed(target);
}
@Override
public void onTurnFailed(String target, String reason) {
completion.onTurnFailed(target, reason);
sessions.onTurnFailed(target);
}
};
Injector injector = new Injector(agents, turnListener, deliverableTo(presence, leads),
presence::forget);
StatusPoller poller = new StatusPoller(agents, injector, Injector.POLL_INTERVAL_MILLIS);
poller.start();
// CB-307: reply inbox. A broker: block (with a uri) selects the AMQP-backed durable adapter;
// absent, bridged stays soft-state on the in-memory inbox. The AMQP inbox owns a broker
// connection, so keep the reference to close it in the ordered shutdown hook.
final ReplyInbox replyInbox;
if (cfg.broker() != null && cfg.broker().isConfigured()) {
replyInbox = AmqpReplyInbox.open(cfg.broker().uri(), cfg.broker().prefetchOrDefault());
log.info("reply inbox: AMQP broker (durable) at {} (prefetch={})",
cfg.broker().uri(), cfg.broker().prefetchOrDefault());
} else {
replyInbox = new InMemoryReplyInbox();
log.info("reply inbox: in-memory (soft-state)");
}
// CB-307: learn the primary's terminal from orchestration tool calls (or pin from config).
// The pin also feeds CallerResolver below: a primary running inside a herdr pane would
// otherwise resolve as a worker and be refused every orchestration tool.
String pinnedPrimaryTerminal = cfg.primary() != null ? cfg.primary().terminal() : null;
PrimaryRegistry primaryRegistry = new PrimaryRegistry(pinnedPrimaryTerminal);
// CB-532: `primary.terminal` is superseded and no longer needed for either of its jobs —
// identity comes from `leaders:`/`leadScan:`, and reply nudges now follow the delegating
// lead. Say so once at startup rather than leaving a redundant pin to look load-bearing.
if (pinnedPrimaryTerminal != null && !pinnedPrimaryTerminal.isBlank()) {
log.warn("primary.terminal is DEPRECATED (CB-532) and can be deleted: identity now comes "
+ "from leaders:/leadScan:, and reply nudges follow the lead that delegated. "
+ "It still works, and is still the fallback nudge destination when a restart "
+ "has lost the delegation map. Its pushReminders/pushBackoffMs stay valid.");
}
// CB-307: active push-to-primary loop — nudge the primary when replies land without an
// open bridge_send. Uses its own lightweight scheduled executor, separate from the injector.
int maxReminders = cfg.primary() != null ? cfg.primary().remindersOrDefault() : 5;
long backoffMs = cfg.primary() != null ? cfg.primary().backoffMsOrDefault() : 15_000L;
var pushScheduler = Executors.newSingleThreadScheduledExecutor(r ->
Thread.ofVirtual().name("bridge-push-").unstarted(r));
// CB-502: the registry is built before the service and the push loop so send/reply outcomes
// are counted at their single funnel rather than at each of the two caller-facing surfaces.
// CB-512: the push loop takes it too, so nudge outcomes (delivered|exhausted) are counted.
Metrics metrics = BridgedMetrics.create(sessions, replyInbox);
var pushLoop = new ReplyPushLoop(primaryRegistry, agents, replyInbox,
pushScheduler, maxReminders, backoffMs, metrics);
// CB-551: idle-lead heartbeat. Opt-in; absent `leadHeartbeat:` this is never constructed, so
// an upgraded daemon cannot silently start spending subscription on nudging an idle lead.
// It has its own single-thread scheduler and holds its own scheduler shutdown via close().
final LeadHeartbeatLoop heartbeat;
var heartbeatScheduler = Executors.newSingleThreadScheduledExecutor(r ->
Thread.ofVirtual().name("bridge-heartbeat-").unstarted(r));
if (cfg.leadHeartbeat() != null) {
var hb = cfg.leadHeartbeat();
heartbeat = new LeadHeartbeatLoop(primaryRegistry, agents, replyInbox, sessions::roster,
pushLoop, heartbeatScheduler, System::nanoTime,
TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(hb.idleAfterSeconds()), hb.backoffMs(), hb.quietNudgeCap(),
metrics);
heartbeat.start();
} else {
heartbeat = null;
heartbeatScheduler.shutdownNow();
}
MessageService messages = new MessageService(agents, injector, rendezvous, replyInbox,
pushLoop, metrics);
// Health is a slow whole-fleet observer. Keep it separate from the 250ms delivery poller.
final FleetHealthMonitor healthMonitor;
var healthScheduler = Executors.newSingleThreadScheduledExecutor(r ->
Thread.ofVirtual().name("bridge-health-").unstarted(r));
if (cfg.health() != null && cfg.health().isEnabled()) {
// CB-580: a member found GONE/NEVER_READY must fail whatever ticket is waiting on it,
// through the same idempotent target-wide operation CB-516 already uses on release.
healthMonitor = new FleetHealthMonitor(agents, sessions::roster, messages, healthScheduler,
System::nanoTime, cfg.health().intervalOrDefault(), messages::abandon);
String coverage = FleetHealthMonitor.coverage(true,
cfg.health().notifications() != null && cfg.health().notifications().configured());
if ("detection-only".equals(coverage)) {
log.warn("fleet health: {} (no notification sink configured)", coverage);
} else {
log.info("fleet health: {}", coverage);
}
healthMonitor.start();
} else {
healthMonitor = null;
healthScheduler.shutdownNow();
}
// CB-520: the reply inbox only consumes for agents this gateway owns. own on acquire,
// release on teardown. Do this before CB-516 so the inbox is owned before any reply can land.
sessions.onAcquire(replyInbox::own);
// CB-516: releasing a worker must fail whatever send was waiting on it. Without this a
// torn-down delegation kept reporting PENDING until the 30-minute async timeout, and never
// reached /metrics — the delegation was unresolvable and nothing said so.
sessions.onRelease(detail -> {
// CB-578 stage C, acceptance criterion 10: a failed ticket's detail should tell a lead
// where to re-dispatch onto the same tree, not just that the worker vanished.
String reason = "the worker session was released before it replied";
if (detail.worktreePath() != null) {
reason += "; worktree=" + detail.worktreePath() + " branch=" + detail.branch()
+ " snapshot=" + (detail.snapshotRef() != null ? detail.snapshotRef() : "none");
}
// CB-584 (issue #65 criterion 5): also name the agent session, so a lead can resume the
// member's conversation instead of only re-dispatching a fresh one onto the same files.
if (detail.agentSessionId() != null) {
reason += " agentSessionId=" + detail.agentSessionId();
}
messages.abandon(detail.terminalId(), reason);
replyInbox.release(detail.terminalId());
primaryRegistry.forgetDelegation(detail.terminalId()); // CB-532: don't leak the lead binding
});
// MCP server face (CB-105): bridge_send/bridge_reply/bridge_status, mounted at /mcp.
// Caller identity is resolved from the connection (peer PID → herdr pane), not arguments.
ConnectionIdentity identity = new ConnectionIdentity(
new PaneLocator(herdr), new LsofPeerPidLookup(), new LsofProcessCwdLookup());
// CB-501: one resolver behind both entry paths. Worker identity still comes from the
// connection and is never token-gated, so enabling token mode cannot lock the fleet out.
final CallerResolver callers;
if (cfg.auth().tokenMode()) {
String token = System.getenv(cfg.auth().tokenEnv());
if (token == null || token.isBlank()) {
throw new IllegalStateException("auth.mode=token but env var " + cfg.auth().tokenEnv()
+ " is unset or empty — export it before starting bridged");
}
callers = CallerResolver.withLeadsAndMembers(identity, true, token, leads, members);
log.info("auth: token mode (bearer required for non-worker callers, env {})",
cfg.auth().tokenEnv());
} else {
callers = CallerResolver.withLeadsAndMembers(identity, false, null, leads, members);
log.info("auth: loopback-trust (any loopback non-worker caller is the primary)");
}
BridgeMcp mcp = new BridgeMcp(messages, workers, sessions, identity, presence,
primaryRegistry, callers, metrics, new BridgeMcp.CapacitySource(profile -> liveCountRef.get().apply(profile),
profile -> {
var configured = config.get().profiles().get(profile);
return configured == null ? null : configured.maxLoad();
}, () -> config.get().profiles().keySet(), System::nanoTime),
new BridgeMcp.HealthCoverageSource(() -> {
var health = config.get().health();
return FleetHealthMonitor.coverage(health != null && health.isEnabled(),
health != null && health.notifications() != null && health.notifications().configured());
}),
new BridgeMcp.QuarantineSource(profile -> {
var configured = config.get().profiles().get(profile);
return configured == null ? null : configured.effectiveCredentialId();
}, quarantine));
// CB-559: opt-in config reload. With no `configReload:` block nothing is constructed, so an
// upgraded daemon behaves exactly as before — the file is read once at boot and never again.
final ConfigWatcher configWatcher;
if (cfg.configReload() != null && cfg.configReload().isEnabled()) {
configWatcher = new ConfigWatcher(config, cfg.configReload().intervalSeconds());
configWatcher.start();
} else {
configWatcher = null;
}
// CB-303 part 3: single ordered shutdown hook. Drain sessions first while herdr is still
// open (so releases reach the daemon), then stop poller/message/mcp/reaper, and close herdr
// last. This replaces the earlier independent hooks that could race and close herdr early.
Runtime.getRuntime().addShutdownHook(new Thread(() -> {
sessions.close(cfg.lifecycle() != null ? cfg.lifecycle().drainTimeoutSeconds() : null);
poller.stop();
messages.close();
pushLoop.close();
if (heartbeat != null) heartbeat.close(); // CB-551: stop the idle-lead heartbeat scheduler
if (healthMonitor != null) healthMonitor.stop();
if (configWatcher != null) configWatcher.stop(); // CB-559: stop polling the config file
mcp.close();
if (reaper != null) reaper.stop();
// Release the broker connection last among message resources (no-op for the in-memory inbox).
if (replyInbox instanceof AutoCloseable closeable) {
try {
closeable.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
log.debug("reply inbox close: {}", e.toString());
}
}
herdr.close();
}));
Javalin app = new BridgedApp(herdr, workers, sessions, messages, presence, mcp.servlet(),
callers, metrics).build();
app.start(cfg.bind().host(), cfg.bind().port());
log.info("bridged listening on {}:{}, herdr socket {}",
cfg.bind().host(), cfg.bind().port(), socket);
}
/**
* The {@link Injector}'s readiness gate (CB-534): a target is deliverable if it is a spawned
* member whose agent has connected the bridge MCP, <em>or</em> a lead.
*
* <p>The gate exists for one reason — to hold a delivery out of a <em>spawned</em> member's boot
* window, where herdr already reports {@code idle} but the TUI would drop an injected paste. That
* hazard is a property of spawning. A lead is never spawned: the operator started it and named it
* (or labelled its tab) only once it was up, so there is no boot window to guard.
*
* <p>A lead is also never enrolled in {@link MemberPresence} — {@code BridgeMcp} marks presence
* for every spawned member (worker and architect), deliberately, since that map doubles as the
* member roster's availability signal and a lead counted there would show up as an available
* member. So without the second disjunct a lead is permanently un-deliverable: every
* lead→lead send sat on the gate for {@code READINESS_GRACE_POLLS} (~60s) and then failed
* having never been typed into the pane.
*
* <p>The lead set is read through the supplier on each call rather than snapshotted, so a lead
* discovered by {@code leadScan} after startup becomes deliverable without a restart.
*/
static Predicate<String> deliverableTo(MemberPresence presence, Supplier<Map<String, String>> leads) {
return target -> presence.isPresent(target) || leads.get().containsKey(target);
}
/**
* CB-594: which env vars the loaded config actually needs, and why — every non-{@code
* subscription} profile's {@code tokenEnv} (a subscription profile never reads one, see
* {@link BridgedConfig.Profile#isSubscription()}), plus every profile's {@code gitTokenEnv}
* where set (opt-in). Derived from the config, not hard-coded, so a new profile is covered for
* free. A var required by more than one profile is one entry naming every profile that needs
* it. Deliberately excludes {@code auth.tokenEnv}: that one is already enforced loudly, by a
* startup throw in {@code main()} — about 370 lines <em>below</em> this method's call site
* ({@link #reportRequiredSecrets(BridgedConfig)}), not a few lines above it. That throw only
* fires when {@code auth.mode: token} is configured; under the default loopback-trust mode it
* never runs, and {@code auth.tokenEnv} is simply not required.
*
* <p>Package-private and pure (no I/O, no logging) so the derivation is unit-testable without
* capturing log output; {@link #reportRequiredSecrets(BridgedConfig)} is the logging caller.
*/
static Map<String, List<String>> requiredSecretEnvVars(BridgedConfig cfg) {
Map<String, List<String>> requiredBy = new LinkedHashMap<>();
cfg.profiles().forEach((name, profile) -> {
if (!profile.isSubscription()) {
requiredBy.computeIfAbsent(profile.tokenEnv(), _ -> new ArrayList<>())
.add("profile '" + name + "' tokenEnv");
}
if (profile.hasGitToken()) {
requiredBy.computeIfAbsent(profile.gitTokenEnv(), _ -> new ArrayList<>())
.add("profile '" + name + "' gitTokenEnv");
}
});
return requiredBy;
}
/**
* CB-594: log, by name only, which required env vars (see {@link #requiredSecretEnvVars}) are
* set in the daemon's own process environment — the environment every profile's {@code
* tokenEnv}/{@code gitTokenEnv} is read from at spawn time (see
* {@code HerdrPeerLauncher.resolveEnv}). Never logs a value, a prefix, or a length.
*
* <p>A missing entry only warns — it must never refuse to start. A daemon that boots and says
* what is wrong is strictly more useful than one that will not boot at all.
*/
private static void reportRequiredSecrets(BridgedConfig cfg) {
Map<String, List<String>> requiredBy = requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg);
if (requiredBy.isEmpty()) {
log.info("startup secrets: no profile references a token env var — nothing to check");
return;
}
Map<String, String> env = System.getenv();
requiredBy.forEach((varName, sources) -> {
String value = env.get(varName);
if (value != null && !value.isBlank()) {
log.info("startup secret {}: set ({})", varName, String.join(", ", sources));
} else {
log.warn("startup secret {}: MISSING ({}) — the daemon will start anyway, and this "
+ "failure stays invisible until a worker actually needs it. Fix "
+ "${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh and restart bridged from a LOGIN "
+ "shell (see scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh).",
varName, String.join(", ", sources));
}
});
}
/**
* CB-596: {@code known:} empty (block absent entirely, or present but empty) means {@link
* BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials#blockedSet()} is empty too — every member pane inherits the
* operator's whole secret store, unblocked, exactly the defect this ticket fixes. Unlike a
* missing token ({@link #reportRequiredSecrets}), there is no name to point at: the point is
* that the block itself is missing. Warn once at startup and say what to add; never refuse to
* start over it — see {@link #reportRequiredSecrets} for why a daemon that boots and says
* what is wrong beats one that will not boot at all.
*
* <p>Package-private so the test can capture the log directly, the same way {@link
* #requiredSecretEnvVars} is exposed for {@link #reportRequiredSecrets}'s own test.
*/
static void reportMemberCredentialsGap(BridgedConfig cfg) {
BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials creds = cfg.memberCredentials();
if (creds != null && !creds.known().isEmpty()) {
log.info("memberCredentials: {} known name(s), {} allowed — blocking {} on every spawn",
creds.known().size(), creds.allow().size(), creds.blockedSet().size());
return;
}
log.warn("memberCredentials: absent or empty — the daemon will start anyway, and every "
+ "member pane inherits the operator's WHOLE secret store, unblocked (CB-592's "
+ "protection is lost). Add a memberCredentials: block (policy/allow/known) to "
+ "bridged.yaml — see bridged.example.yaml — and restart.");
}
/**
* Poll herdr's {@code ping} until it answers or {@link #HERDR_WAIT_SECONDS} elapses (CB-504).
*
* @return true if herdr answered, false if it never did
*/
private static boolean awaitHerdr(HerdrClient herdr) {
long deadline = System.nanoTime() + HERDR_WAIT_SECONDS * 1_000_000_000L;
boolean waited = false;
while (true) {
try {
herdr.call("ping");
if (waited) {
log.info("herdr is up");
}
return true;
} catch (HerdrException e) {
if (System.nanoTime() >= deadline) {
return false;
}
if (!waited) {
log.info("waiting up to {}s for the herdr socket…", HERDR_WAIT_SECONDS);
waited = true;
}
try {
Thread.sleep(HERDR_WAIT_POLL_MILLIS);
} catch (InterruptedException ie) {
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
return false;
}
}
}
}
private Bridged() {
}
}
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.auth;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.MemberRole;
/** Optional session lifecycle hook for live member-slot bindings. */
public interface MemberLifecycle {
MemberLifecycle NONE = new MemberLifecycle() {
@Override
public void acquired(MemberRole role, String profile, String terminal) {
}
@Override
public void released(String terminal) {
}
};
void acquired(MemberRole role, String profile, String terminal);
void released(String terminal);
}
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.herdr;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import java.util.Map;
/**
* Resolves which herdr pane a process belongs to — the herdr half of connection-based MCP
* identity (CB-105). Given the PID that opened an MCP connection, {@link #terminalForPid} finds
* the agent pane whose process tree contains it, so {@code bridged} can tell <em>which worker</em>
* is calling without the worker sending anything spoofable.
*
* <p>herdr owns the PID→pane truth: {@code pane.process_info} reports each pane's {@code shell_pid}
* and foreground process PIDs. This scans agent panes; a spawn-time {@code pid→terminal} cache is
* the obvious optimization once wired into {@code ClaudeCodeLauncher}.
*/
public final class PaneLocator {
private final HerdrClient herdr;
public PaneLocator(HerdrClient herdr) {
this.herdr = herdr;
}
/**
* The {@code terminal_id} of the agent pane whose process tree contains {@code pid}, or
* {@code null} if no agent pane owns it (e.g. the caller is the primary, or off-host).
*/
public String terminalForPid(long pid) {
if (pid <= 0) {
return null;
}
for (JsonNode pane : herdr.call("pane.list", Map.of()).path("panes")) {
String paneId = pane.path("pane_id").asText(null);
if (paneId != null && paneOwnsPid(paneId, pid)) {
return pane.path("terminal_id").asText(null);
}
}
return null;
}
private boolean paneOwnsPid(String paneId, long pid) {
JsonNode info;
try {
info = herdr.call("pane.process_info", Map.of("pane_id", paneId)).path("process_info");
} catch (HerdrException e) {
return false; // pane vanished mid-scan — just skip it
}
if (info.path("shell_pid").asLong(-1) == pid) {
return true;
}
for (JsonNode p : info.path("foreground_processes")) {
if (p.path("pid").asLong(-1) == pid) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
}
@@ -1,372 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.inject;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.Rendezvous;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.TurnToken;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Objects;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.TreeSet;
import java.util.concurrent.CompletableFuture;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
/**
* The CB-106 completion fallback: bridges the {@link Injector}'s turn-completion signal to the
* {@link Rendezvous} so a blocking {@code bridge_send} resolves even when the worker finishes its
* task without ever calling {@code bridge_reply} — the common case for a real delegated coding task.
*
* <p>On a confirmed {@code working → idle} boundary it scrapes the worker's recent transcript and
* resolves the awaiting send with that tail (a {@link Rendezvous.Kind#COMPLETION} resolution, so the
* caller can tell a scrape from a structured reply). It scrapes only when a send is actually waiting
* — a fleet worker's own turns, or a send that already timed out, cost no herdr traffic. An explicit
* {@code bridge_reply} that raced in first wins; {@link Rendezvous#resolveCompletion} is then a no-op.
*
* <p>It also handles the CB-109 stall signal ({@link #onTurnFailed}): a worker that ran a turn then
* wedged in an {@code unknown} state resolves the send as a failure (with the error screen as
* context) rather than leaving it to time out.
*
* <p>The scrape is cleaned to the last {@code ⏺} assistant block (stripping TUI chrome) and guarded
* against misattribution (CB-115): the pane content is baselined on delivery ({@link #onDelivered}),
* and a completion whose scrape is unchanged from that baseline — the previous turn's wind-down
* sampled as this turn's boundary on a rapid back-to-back send — is suppressed rather than resolving
* the send with a stale answer.
*
* <p><strong>Waiter-specific resolution (CB-116).</strong> On delivery we also capture the exact
* {@link Rendezvous} waiter this turn belongs to, and the completion/failure fallbacks resolve
* <em>that</em> waiter — never "whatever send is waiting now". A completion fallback runs on a virtual
* thread and can land after the worker's {@code bridge_reply} already resolved the turn and the
* <em>next</em> send opened its own waiter on the same session; resolving the current waiter would
* then deliver turn N's stale scrape as turn N+1's answer. Targeting the captured waiter makes a late
* completion a harmless no-op (its waiter is already done) instead of a cross-turn stale reply.
*
* <p>Wired as the {@link Injector}'s {@link TurnListener}; the handlers hand off to a virtual thread
* so the scrape's herdr round-trip never stalls the status poller. The captured waiter is read on the
* poller thread (before any next-turn delivery can overwrite it) and passed into the virtual thread.
*/
public final class CompletionResolver implements TurnListener {
private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(CompletionResolver.class);
/**
* herdr {@code agent.read} source for the completion scrape. {@code recent} returns the tail of
* the transcript (the worker's last output), which is what a delegator wants when the worker
* didn't structure a reply.
*/
static final String SCRAPE_SOURCE = "recent";
/** Cap the scraped tail so a long transcript can't return an unbounded blob. */
static final int MAX_SCRAPE_CHARS = 4000;
private static final String CLIPPED_PANE_TAIL_MARKER =
"[Pane tail clipped: member did not call bridge_reply.]";
private final AgentControl agents;
private final Rendezvous rendezvous;
private final ExhaustedPatternLookup exhaustedPatterns;
private final ExhaustionSink exhaustionSink;
/**
* Per-target record of the turn currently in flight: the exact {@link Rendezvous} waiter its
* delivering send opened, plus the assistant block present when it was delivered.
*
* <p>The {@code waiter} is what makes a late fallback safe (CB-116): we resolve it, not "whoever
* is waiting now", so a completion that fires after the next send has opened its own waiter is a
* no-op rather than a cross-turn stale reply. The {@code baseline} is the CB-115 staleness
* reference: a completion scrape equal to it means the worker produced no new output (the previous
* turn's wind-down sampled as this boundary), so it is suppressed. Overwritten on each delivery;
* cleared when the turn resolves. Package-private so tests can capture and replay a specific turn.
*/
record InFlight(CompletableFuture<Rendezvous.Resolution> waiter, String baseline) {
}
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, InFlight> inFlight = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/**
* @param exhaustedPatterns CB-578 stage A: per-target lookup for a profile's configured
* usage-limit refusal pattern. Required — there is deliberately no
* defaulting overload; a caller that does not want the classification
* must pass an explicit inert value ({@link ExhaustedPatternLookup#none()}).
* @param exhaustionSink CB-578 stage B: notified when a {@code BACKEND_EXHAUSTED}
* classification actually resolves a waiter. Required for the same
* reason as {@code exhaustedPatterns} — pass {@link ExhaustionSink#none()}
* to opt out.
*/
public CompletionResolver(AgentControl agents, Rendezvous rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup exhaustedPatterns,
ExhaustionSink exhaustionSink) {
this.agents = agents;
this.rendezvous = rendezvous;
this.exhaustedPatterns = Objects.requireNonNull(exhaustedPatterns, "exhaustedPatterns");
this.exhaustionSink = Objects.requireNonNull(exhaustionSink, "exhaustionSink");
}
@Override
public void onDelivered(String target, TurnToken token) {
// Capture the exact waiter this turn belongs to (CB-116) and snapshot the pane's pre-turn
// content — what it shows *before* the just-delivered turn produces output — as the staleness
// reference (CB-115). Done synchronously (like the delivering send itself) so both are in
// place before this turn's completion can fire.
captureBaseline(target, token);
}
/** Capture the in-flight turn: its waiter and pre-turn baseline (the testable core of {@link #onDelivered}). */
void captureBaseline(String target, TurnToken token) {
CompletableFuture<Rendezvous.Resolution> waiter = token.waiter();
if (waiter == null) {
inFlight.remove(target); // no send is waiting on this delivery — nothing to resolve later
return;
}
String baseline;
try {
// Clip to the same cap resolve() applies to the tail (line ~134): the CB-115 misattribution
// guard compares baseline.equals(tail), so both sides must be the same capped representation.
// An unclipped baseline vs a clipped tail would never match for a >MAX_SCRAPE_CHARS block,
// defeating the guard and letting a stale completion resolve the send.
baseline = clip(lastAssistantBlock(agents.read(target, SCRAPE_SOURCE)));
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
baseline = null; // fail open: no baseline ⇒ no suppression
log.debug("delivery baseline for {} failed: {}", target, e.getMessage());
}
inFlight.put(target, new InFlight(waiter, baseline));
}
/** The turn currently baselined for {@code target}, or {@code null} — a test hook for the captureBaseline path. */
InFlight inFlight(String target) {
return inFlight.get(target);
}
@Override
public void onTurnComplete(String target) {
// Read the in-flight turn on the poller thread — before any next-turn delivery can overwrite
// it — then off-load the scrape (a herdr round-trip we must not block polling on) to a vthread.
InFlight turn = inFlight.get(target);
Thread.ofVirtual().name("completion-" + target).start(() -> resolve(target, turn));
}
/**
* Resolve the completed turn before adapter housekeeping can erase its rendered output. This is
* intentionally synchronous and used only when a post-turn context reset is enabled; the normal
* path remains off-loaded so polling is not blocked by a scrape.
*/
public void resolveBeforePostAction(String target) {
resolve(target, inFlight.get(target));
}
@Override
public void onTurnFailed(String target) {
InFlight turn = inFlight.get(target);
Thread.ofVirtual().name("turn-failed-" + target).start(() -> fail(target, turn, null));
}
@Override
public void onTurnFailed(String target, String reason) {
InFlight turn = inFlight.get(target);
Thread.ofVirtual().name("turn-failed-" + target).start(() -> fail(target, turn, reason));
}
/** Synchronous resolve (the unit-testable core of {@link #onTurnComplete}). */
void resolve(String target, InFlight turn) {
CompletableFuture<Rendezvous.Resolution> waiter = turn == null ? null : turn.waiter();
if (waiter == null || waiter.isDone()) {
// Nobody is blocked on THIS turn (it had no send, or its bridge_reply already won). Skip
// the scrape; resolving the current waiter here would be the CB-116 cross-turn stale reply.
inFlight.remove(target, turn);
return;
}
String tail;
String assistantBlock = null;
int originalLength = 0;
boolean clipped = false;
boolean scrapeFailed = false;
try {
assistantBlock = lastAssistantBlock(agents.read(target, SCRAPE_SOURCE));
originalLength = assistantBlock.strip().length();
clipped = originalLength > MAX_SCRAPE_CHARS;
tail = clip(assistantBlock);
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
// The worker finished but we couldn't read its screen — still resolve the send so the
// caller unblocks; an empty tail beats hanging until the caller's timeout.
log.warn("completion scrape for {} failed; resolving with an empty tail: {}",
target, e.getMessage());
tail = "";
scrapeFailed = true;
}
// Misattribution guard (CB-115): if the scrape is byte-identical to the pane content at
// delivery, this turn produced no new output — the boundary belongs to the previous turn's
// wind-down (common on rapid back-to-back sends). Suppress rather than resolve the send with
// a stale answer; the real bridge_reply (or a later genuine completion) resolves it instead.
// A scrape that failed to read is exempt — an empty tail there is "couldn't see", not "no change".
String baseline = turn.baseline();
if (!scrapeFailed && baseline != null && baseline.equals(tail)) {
log.debug("suppressing misattributed completion for {} (no output change since delivery)",
target);
return; // keep the in-flight record: a later genuine completion still needs it
}
// CB-578 stage A: a turn that ended with no bridge_reply AND whose scrape matches the
// backend's configured usage-limit pattern is a refusal, not an answer. Classify it as
// BACKEND_EXHAUSTED rather than handing the caller a scrape that reads like a real reply.
if (!scrapeFailed) {
Pattern exhausted = exhaustedPatterns.patternFor(target);
String matchedLine = exhausted == null ? null : firstMatchingLine(assistantBlock, exhausted);
if (matchedLine != null) {
String reason = "backend exhausted (usage limit): " + matchedLine;
if (rendezvous.resolveExhausted(waiter, reason)) {
inFlight.remove(target, turn);
log.warn("completion for {} classified BACKEND_EXHAUSTED (no bridge_reply; scrape "
+ "matched the profile's exhausted pattern): {}", target, reason);
// CB-578 stage B: only on the resolution that actually won the race — a late
// duplicate must never quarantine a credential twice for one refusal.
exhaustionSink.onExhausted(target, reason);
}
return;
}
}
String completion = clipped ? tail + "\n" + CLIPPED_PANE_TAIL_MARKER : tail;
if (rendezvous.resolveCompletion(waiter, completion)) {
inFlight.remove(target, turn);
if (clipped) {
log.warn("completion scrape for {} clipped from {} chars to the {} char cap; "
+ "member did not call bridge_reply, so the pane tail is partial",
target, originalLength, MAX_SCRAPE_CHARS);
}
log.debug("resolved send to {} via turn-completion fallback ({} chars scraped)",
target, tail.length());
}
}
/** Synchronous fail (the unit-testable core of {@link #onTurnFailed}). */
void fail(String target, InFlight turn) {
fail(target, turn, null);
}
/** Synchronous fail with an optional reason supplied by a dropped worker queue. */
void fail(String target, InFlight turn, String explicitReason) {
// A never-delivered readiness failure has no in-flight record but still has a blocked send;
// fall back to the currently-registered waiter (unambiguous — that send never completed, so
// no next turn exists to confuse it with).
CompletableFuture<Rendezvous.Resolution> waiter =
turn != null ? turn.waiter() : rendezvous.currentWaiter(target);
if (waiter == null || waiter.isDone()) {
inFlight.remove(target, turn); // nobody blocked on this worker — nothing to fail
return;
}
String reason = explicitReason;
if (reason == null || reason.isBlank()) {
try {
reason = clip(agents.read(target, SCRAPE_SOURCE));
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
reason = "";
}
if (reason.isBlank()) {
// No screen to scrape — either the worker is stuck (CB-109) or gone (CB-110).
reason = "worker did not reply; its turn ended in an unrecoverable state "
+ "(worker unreachable or stuck)";
}
}
if (rendezvous.resolveFailure(waiter, reason)) {
inFlight.remove(target, turn);
log.warn("failing send to {} via turn-stall fallback: {}", target, reason);
}
}
/**
* The first line of {@code text} matching {@code pattern}, stripped — the CB-578 stage A
* evidence carried in a {@code BACKEND_EXHAUSTED} reason so the operator sees the real refusal
* text, never a generic label. {@code null} if no line matches.
*/
static String firstMatchingLine(String text, Pattern pattern) {
if (text == null || text.isEmpty()) return null;
for (String line : text.split("\n", -1)) {
if (pattern.matcher(line).find()) {
return line.strip();
}
}
return null;
}
/**
* Coverage summary for the CB-578 stage A exhausted-pattern classification, logged at startup
* the way {@link dev.ltms.bridged.health.FleetHealthMonitor#coverage} is — so an operator can
* see whether the classification is on, and for which profiles, without reading every
* profile's config by hand.
*
* @param allProfiles every configured profile name
* @param configuredProfiles the subset of {@code allProfiles} that carry an exhausted pattern
*/
public static String coverage(Set<String> allProfiles, Set<String> configuredProfiles) {
if (configuredProfiles.isEmpty()) {
return "off (no profile has an exhaustedPattern configured; profiles: " + sorted(allProfiles) + ")";
}
Set<String> unconfigured = new TreeSet<>(allProfiles);
unconfigured.removeAll(configuredProfiles);
return unconfigured.isEmpty()
? "full (all profiles configured: " + sorted(allProfiles) + ")"
: "partial (configured: " + sorted(configuredProfiles) + "; not configured: " + sorted(unconfigured) + ")";
}
private static List<String> sorted(Set<String> names) {
return names.stream().sorted().toList();
}
private static String clip(String s) {
if (s == null) return "";
String trimmed = s.strip();
return trimmed.length() <= MAX_SCRAPE_CHARS
? trimmed
: trimmed.substring(trimmed.length() - MAX_SCRAPE_CHARS);
}
/**
* Extract the last assistant message from a raw Claude Code pane scrape (CB-115). Claude Code
* prefixes each assistant turn with {@code ⏺}; the delegator wants that answer, not the TUI
* chrome around it. Take everything from the final {@code ⏺} onward and stop at the <em>first</em>
* hard interface boundary below it — the spinner/status line, input box, {@code ❯} prompt (which
* may echo the <em>next</em> turn's text), footer, or tips/warnings. Stopping at the first
* boundary (rather than trimming only trailing chrome) is what keeps a following turn's echoed
* prompt out of this reply. Blank lines are not boundaries, so a multi-paragraph answer survives;
* trailing blanks are trimmed at the end. With no {@code ⏺} marker (an unusual render) the whole
* text is scanned the same way, so we never lose the reply.
*
* <p>Package-private and pure so it is unit-testable without herdr.
*/
static String lastAssistantBlock(String raw) {
if (raw == null || raw.isBlank()) return "";
int marker = raw.lastIndexOf('⏺');
String block = marker >= 0 ? raw.substring(marker + 1) : raw;
StringBuilder out = new StringBuilder();
int kept = 0;
for (String line : block.split("\n", -1)) {
if (isBoundary(line)) break; // first TUI boundary ends the assistant message
if (kept++ > 0) out.append('\n');
out.append(line);
}
return out.toString().strip();
}
/**
* A hard TUI boundary line that marks the end of an assistant message and the start of interface
* chrome (input box, prompt, spinner, footer, tips/warnings). Blank lines are <em>not</em>
* boundaries — an answer may contain them — so they are kept and trimmed only if trailing.
*/
private static boolean isBoundary(String line) {
String t = line.strip();
if (t.isEmpty()) return false;
// A horizontal rule / all box-drawing separators (e.g. "──────").
if (t.chars().allMatch(c -> c == '─' || c == '—' || c == '━' || c == '═' || c == '-')) {
return true;
}
String lower = t.toLowerCase();
return t.startsWith("╭") || t.startsWith("│") || t.startsWith("╰") || t.startsWith("┌")
|| t.startsWith("└") || t.startsWith("❯") || t.startsWith("⏵")
|| t.startsWith("⎿") || t.startsWith("⚠")
// Status/spinner lines Claude Code renders below a settled or in-flight turn,
// e.g. "✻ Baked for 21s", "✶ Forming…".
|| t.startsWith("✻") || t.startsWith("✳") || t.startsWith("✽") || t.startsWith("·")
|| t.startsWith("●") || t.startsWith("◐") || t.startsWith("✢") || t.startsWith("✶")
|| lower.contains("auto mode") || lower.contains("for shortcuts")
|| lower.contains("esc to interrupt") || lower.contains("bypass permissions");
}
}
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.inject;
/**
* Notified when {@link CompletionResolver} actually delivers a {@code BACKEND_EXHAUSTED}
* classification to a waiting send (CB-578 stage B) — never on a race that lost (see
* {@link CompletionResolver#resolve}, which only calls this after
* {@code Rendezvous.resolveExhausted} returns {@code true}).
*
* <p>{@link CompletionResolver} knows only {@code target} (a herdr terminal id); it has no notion of
* profiles or credentials, so mapping {@code target} to whatever should be quarantined is entirely
* the sink's job — see {@code Bridged.main}'s wiring, which resolves target → session → profile →
* {@code effectiveCredentialId()} and calls {@code BackendQuarantine.quarantine} on it.
*/
@FunctionalInterface
public interface ExhaustionSink {
/**
* @param target the herdr terminal id whose turn was classified {@code BACKEND_EXHAUSTED}
* @param reason the matched-line reason carried by the classification
*/
void onExhausted(String target, String reason);
/**
* Inert sink — nothing happens on exhaustion. The explicit stand-in a caller (or a test not
* exercising this feature) passes instead of a defaulting overload, exactly like
* {@link ExhaustedPatternLookup#none()}.
*/
static ExhaustionSink none() {
return (target, reason) -> { };
}
}
@@ -1,373 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.member;
import dev.ltms.bridged.config.BridgedConfig;
import dev.ltms.bridged.guard.SubscriptionGuard;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.Agent;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.WorkspaceControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.Capability;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.util.EnumSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.UUID;
import java.util.function.Function;
import java.util.function.LongSupplier;
import java.util.function.Supplier;
/**
* The {@link HerdrPeerLauncher} adapter for <strong>Claude Code</strong> — the safe path from a
* delegation request to a running off-subscription Claude.
*
* <p>Everything transport-related (tab/pane placement, the CB-306 spawn-readiness gate, unique
* naming, CB-117 orphan reap, teardown, listing, cwd resolution) lives in the base. This class
* supplies only the two Claude-specific seams:
* <ul>
* <li>the {@code claude} name prefix (so reap matches {@code claude-*} panes, never another
* adapter's), and</li>
* <li>{@link #buildLaunch}, which encodes the subscription boundary: build the worker env with
* {@code ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL}, assert that host is on the allowlist <em>before</em> touching
* herdr, and mount the bridge MCP + reply charter as inline launch flags. A worker's base_url
* lives in the env map handed to herdr and nowhere else; {@code bridged}'s own environment is
* never mutated, and nothing is written to the worker's profile.</li>
* </ul>
*/
public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
/** Label prefix for this adapter's herdr agent names (drives naming + orphan reap). */
private static final String NAME_PREFIX = "claude";
private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(ClaudeCodeLauncher.class);
private final SubscriptionGuard guard;
/**
* Production constructor — disables the spawn-ready gate ({@code spawnReadyTimeoutMs == 0}) so
* existing deployments and tests keep the legacy non-blocking spawn semantics.
*/
public ClaudeCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces, SubscriptionGuard guard,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env) {
this(agents, spaces, guard, profiles, defaultProfile, env, 0,
System::currentTimeMillis, () -> sleepUninterruptibly(300));
}
/**
* Production constructor with spawn-ready gate enabled. The gate polls {@code agents.status()}
* until the pane reports an injectable state or {@code spawnReadyTimeoutMs} elapses.
*/
public ClaudeCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces, SubscriptionGuard guard,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs) {
this(agents, spaces, guard, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, spawnReadyPollMs, null);
}
/**
* Production constructor carrying the fleet-wide tab-label template (CB-557). The template comes
* from {@code fleet.tabLabel}, which a profile cannot know because it names the member's
* <em>role</em>; a profile may still override it with its own {@code tabLabel}.
*/
public ClaudeCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces, SubscriptionGuard guard,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet) {
this(agents, spaces, guard, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
System::currentTimeMillis, () -> sleepUninterruptibly(spawnReadyPollMs),
fleet);
}
/**
* Production constructor, plus the CB-596 {@code memberCredentials} policy supplier.
*/
public ClaudeCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces, SubscriptionGuard guard,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
this(agents, spaces, guard, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
System::currentTimeMillis, () -> sleepUninterruptibly(spawnReadyPollMs),
fleet, memberCredentials);
}
/**
* Full testability constructor. Every injectable collaborator is explicit so unit tests supply
* fakes for the clock ({@code nowMillis}) and poll-loop wait ({@code sleeper}). The
* {@code sleeper} is never called when the gate is disabled ({@code spawnReadyTimeoutMs == 0}).
*
* @param agents herdr agent control (start, status, close)
* @param spaces workspace / tab control (ensure, create, close)
* @param guard subscription-boundary guard (checked before spawning)
* @param profiles configured worker profiles
* @param defaultProfile profile a no-argument spawn uses (nullable)
* @param env host env lookup (injectable for tests)
* @param spawnReadyTimeoutMs max ms to wait for injectable state (0 disables the gate)
* @param nowMillis monotonic clock source (e.g. {@code System::currentTimeMillis})
* @param sleeper sleep/wait hook (e.g. {@code () -> Thread.sleep(pollMs)}); it
* already encodes the poll interval, so the 8th positional argument
* (poll ms) is accepted for API symmetry but otherwise unused here
*/
public ClaudeCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces, SubscriptionGuard guard,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper) {
this(agents, spaces, guard, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, null);
}
/**
* Full testability constructor, plus the fleet-wide tab-label template (CB-557).
*
* @param fleet live fleet config, read once for each spawn
*/
public ClaudeCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces, SubscriptionGuard guard,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet) {
super(NAME_PREFIX, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, fleet);
this.guard = guard;
}
/**
* Full testability constructor, plus the CB-596 {@code memberCredentials} policy supplier.
*/
public ClaudeCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces, SubscriptionGuard guard,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
super(NAME_PREFIX, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, fleet, memberCredentials);
this.guard = guard;
}
/**
* Full testability constructor, plus an injectable host-env-names source for the CB-596
* criterion-4 gap detector. Test seam only — every production call site leaves this at the
* default (the real {@code System.getenv()} key set) via the constructor above.
*/
public ClaudeCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces, SubscriptionGuard guard,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials,
Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames) {
super(NAME_PREFIX, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, fleet, memberCredentials, hostEnvNames);
this.guard = guard;
}
/**
* {@inheritDoc}
*
* <p>The spawn sequence encodes the subscription boundary: assert the profile's base_url is on
* the allowlist <em>before</em> any herdr call, then build the worker env with
* {@code ANTHROPIC_*}, the parity-neutral git-forge grant, and the bridge MCP + reply charter
* mounted as inline launch flags. When the request carries session identity (CB-547a) it is
* applied here — see {@link #applySessionIdentity}.
*/
@Override
protected Launch buildLaunch(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg, LaunchSpec spec) {
// CB-539: a profile may deliberately opt into the subscription (subscription: true) when no
// off-subscription endpoint exists for it — e.g. `sonnet` on `ccs`. That profile gets no
// ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL/AUTH_TOKEN (there is nothing to point them at) and the guard's base_url
// requirement is skipped FOR IT ONLY. Every other profile keeps the hard boundary below.
boolean onSubscription = cfg.isSubscription();
String baseUrl = cfg.baseUrl();
if (onSubscription) {
// NO SILENT CONTRADICTION: subscription:true + a baseUrl state opposite intents; refuse
// loudly rather than pick a winner.
if (baseUrl != null && !baseUrl.isBlank()) {
throw new IllegalStateException("profile '" + cfg.profile()
+ "' sets both subscription: true and a baseUrl ('" + baseUrl + "') — the two "
+ "are contradictory: a subscription profile must not point at an endpoint. "
+ "Drop baseUrl, or drop subscription: true.");
}
// Visible without anyone going looking for it: this worker bills the subscription.
log.warn("spawning profile '{}' on the Claude subscription (subscription: true) — this "
+ "worker WILL bill the operator's subscription", cfg.profile());
} else {
guard.assertWorker(baseUrl); // hard stop before we spawn anything
}
Map<String, String> workerEnv = baseEnv(cfg);
if (onSubscription) {
// CB-542 belt-and-braces: on the subscription path no guard vets these two keys, and the
// profile's env: is layered in by baseEnv — so strip any that rode in there. Config load
// already rejects this (loudly, naming the profile); this makes the boundary hold even
// for a profile built in code that never passed through that validation.
workerEnv.remove("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL");
workerEnv.remove("ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN");
} else {
workerEnv.put("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", baseUrl);
putIfPresent(workerEnv, "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN", env.apply(cfg.tokenEnv()));
}
putIfPresent(workerEnv, "ANTHROPIC_MODEL", cfg.model());
putIfPresent(workerEnv, "CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR", cfg.configDir());
applyGitToken(workerEnv, cfg);
// CB-547a: Claude Code can MINT its own session id, so bridged chooses it — a fresh spawn
// gets a UUID we pass as --session-id and return from agentSessionId(), so the resume
// handle is known BEFORE the agent has written anything; a resume spawn adopts its prior
// id via -r and passes no --session-id (the two conflict). Both are injected before the
// model flag so --model keeps outranking the operator's own argv.
// mutableArgv: argvWithBridge may hand back the profile's own (immutable) List.of when it
// has neither MCP nor a charter — session flags must be added into a list we own.
List<String> argv = mutableArgv(argvWithBridge(cfg, spec.charter()));
String agentSessionId = applySessionIdentity(argv, spec.sessionName(), spec.resumeSessionId());
return new Launch(workerEnv, argvWithModel(argv, cfg), agentSessionId);
}
/**
* Add the Claude-specific session-identity flags to {@code argv} and return the peer's OWN
* session id — the resume handle. A resume request passes the prior id via {@code -r} and
* returns that id; a fresh named session mints a new UUID, passes it via {@code --session-id},
* and returns the mint. The bridge's logical name rides along as {@code -n} when present. When
* <em>no</em> identity is requested (sessionName and resumeSessionId both blank) this adds
* nothing and returns {@code null}, keeping the legacy no-identity launch byte-identical.
*/
private static String applySessionIdentity(List<String> argv, String sessionName, String resumeSessionId) {
boolean resuming = resumeSessionId != null && !resumeSessionId.isBlank();
boolean named = sessionName != null && !sessionName.isBlank();
if (!resuming && !named) {
return null; // no identity requested — keep the legacy launch byte-identical
}
if (named) {
argv.add("-n");
argv.add(sessionName);
}
if (resuming) {
argv.add("-r");
argv.add(resumeSessionId);
return resumeSessionId;
}
String minted = UUID.randomUUID().toString();
argv.add("--session-id");
argv.add(minted);
return minted;
}
/**
* The launch argv, plus an inline {@code --mcp-config} when {@code worker.mcpUrl} is set and
* {@code --append-system-prompt} when the base composed a charter. Neither touches the profile's
* config; both are pure command-line flags. This inline-flag mount is Claude Code specific —
* other adapters mount MCP and instructions their own way.
*/
private List<String> argvWithBridge(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg, String charter) {
if (!cfg.hasMcp() && charter == null) {
return cfg.argv();
}
List<String> argv = mutableArgv(cfg.argv());
if (cfg.hasMcp()) {
String mcpJson = "{\"mcpServers\":{\"bridge\":{\"type\":\"http\",\"url\":\""
+ cfg.mcpUrl() + "\"}}}";
argv.add("--mcp-config");
argv.add(mcpJson);
}
if (charter != null) {
argv.add("--append-system-prompt");
argv.add(charter);
}
return argv;
}
/**
* Pin the model on the command line as well as in {@code ANTHROPIC_MODEL} (CB-533).
*
* <p>The env var alone is not a reliable pin for this adapter, because the argv is usually a
* launcher rather than {@code claude} itself — {@code ["ccs", "<profile>"]} — and {@code ccs}
* exports its profile's own model family ({@code ANTHROPIC_MODEL}, {@code DEFAULT_OPUS/SONNET/
* HAIKU}, {@code CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL}) over whatever it inherited. A worker profile that
* set {@code model:} therefore got silently overruled by its own launcher. Claude Code's
* {@code --model} flag outranks the environment, and {@code ccs <profile> [claude-args...]}
* passes trailing arguments through, so the flag survives the wrapper.
*
* <p>Appended last so it also outranks anything in the operator's own {@code argv}. Profiles
* that deliberately leave {@code model:} unset (letting {@code ccs} own model selection, as
* {@code gx10} does) are untouched — this adds nothing when there is nothing to add. This is
* the {@code kind: claude} counterpart of the opencode adapter's {@code -m provider/model}.
*/
private static List<String> argvWithModel(List<String> argv, BridgedConfig.Profile cfg) {
if (cfg.model() == null || cfg.model().isBlank()) {
return argv;
}
List<String> withModel = mutableArgv(argv);
withModel.add("--model");
withModel.add(cfg.model());
return withModel;
}
// --- Agent-returning convenience spawns (used by callers/tests that want the herdr Agent) ---
/** Spawn a worker for the default profile in the resolved default cwd. */
public Agent spawn() {
return spawnInternal(null, null, null);
}
/** Spawn a worker for a named profile (null → default) in the resolved default cwd. */
public Agent spawn(String profileName) {
return spawnInternal(profileName, null, null);
}
/** Spawn a worker for a named profile with an explicit requested/caller cwd (CB-112). */
public Agent spawn(String profileName, String requestedCwd, String callerCwd) {
return spawnInternal(profileName, requestedCwd, callerCwd);
}
// --- capabilities --------------------------------------------------------------------------
@Override
public Set<Capability> capabilities() {
Set<Capability> caps = EnumSet.of(Capability.MID_TURN_ASK, Capability.WORKTREE,
Capability.CONTEXT_RESET, Capability.ORPHAN_REAP,
Capability.SESSION_NAME, Capability.SESSION_RESUME);
if (hasGitTokenProfile()) {
caps.add(Capability.SELF_PR);
}
return Set.copyOf(caps);
}
@Override
public boolean clearContext(String id) {
String target = agentTarget(id);
if (target == null) {
return false;
}
// This deliberately bypasses Injector: /clear is housekeeping, not a delegated turn.
agents().send(target, "/clear");
return true;
}
/** Whether any configured profile opts into a git-forge token (required for {@link Capability#SELF_PR}). */
private boolean hasGitTokenProfile() {
return profileConfigs().stream().anyMatch(BridgedConfig.Profile::hasGitToken);
}
// --- CB-117 reap predicate (Claude prefix), kept for direct unit testing -------------------
/**
* Whether {@code name} is a Claude Code bridge worker started by a <em>different</em> process
* than {@code currentNonce}. A thin {@code claude}-prefix binding of
* {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#isForeignWorker(String, String, String)}.
*/
static boolean isForeignWorker(String name, String currentNonce) {
return HerdrPeerLauncher.isForeignWorker(NAME_PREFIX, name, currentNonce);
}
}
@@ -1,995 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.member;
import dev.ltms.bridged.config.BridgedConfig;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.Agent;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.HerdrException;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.Tab;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.Workspace;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.WorkspaceControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.Capability;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.CharterReceipt;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.MemberRole;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.PeerHandle;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.PeerLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.PeerUnreachableException;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.SpawnRequest;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Collection;
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.UUID;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentMap;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong;
import java.util.function.Function;
import java.util.function.LongSupplier;
import java.util.function.Supplier;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
/**
* Abstract base for {@link PeerLauncher} adapters that materialize a peer as a <em>herdr</em>
* agent (a CLI coding agent running in a herdr tab/pane). It owns everything that is the same
* regardless of <em>which</em> coding agent runs: tab/pane placement, the CB-306 spawn-readiness
* gate, unique naming, CB-117 orphan reap, teardown, {@link #list() listing}, and cwd resolution.
*
* <p>Two seams are peer-specific and supplied by the concrete adapter:
* <ul>
* <li>{@code namePrefix} (constructor arg) — the label prefix ({@code claude}, {@code opencode})
* that drives both unique naming and the orphan-reap pattern, so each adapter reaps only its
* own kind of pane and never another's.</li>
* <li>{@link #buildLaunch(BridgedConfig.Profile, LaunchSpec)} — the peer-specific env map + argv, including any
* subscription/guard check, MCP mount, and instruction injection. The base never sees how the
* peer is configured; it only places and starts the returned {@link Launch}.</li>
* </ul>
*
* <p>Placement: in the default {@code tab} policy a peer lands in its own tab inside a dedicated
* worker space (found-or-created once, then shared), so peers never split or clutter the user's
* real work spaces. Teardown removes the peer's pane <em>and</em> its now-empty tab, tolerating an
* already-gone peer so a repeated DELETE is harmless.
*/
public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(HerdrPeerLauncher.class);
/** herdr rejects a duplicate agent {@code name}; we retry a bumped name this many times. */
private static final int NAME_RETRIES = 8;
/**
* Retries for {@code agent.start} against a seed pane whose shell has not reached its prompt
* yet — {@code tab.create}/{@code pane.split} return as soon as the pane exists, and herdr
* refuses to start an agent in a pane that is not "an available shell" ({@code agent_pane_busy}).
*/
private static final int SHELL_READY_RETRIES = 20;
private final String namePrefix; // label prefix: naming + reap scheme
private final AgentControl agents;
private final WorkspaceControl spaces;
private final Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles; // profile name → spawn settings
private final String defaultProfile; // profile a no-arg spawn uses (nullable)
/** Host env lookup (injectable for tests); adapters read it in {@link #buildLaunch}. */
protected final Function<String, String> env;
private final AtomicLong nameSeq = new AtomicLong(); // per-peer counter (herdr agent names only)
/**
* Live fleet config, read once per spawn. A null supplier or value leaves tab labels at their
* default and supplies no role charter. A profile's own {@code tabLabel} still overrides it.
*
* <p>CB-559: a supplier rather than a snapshot, so a config reload affects the next launch
* without a restart. Existing tabs keep the label they were given.
*/
private final Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet;
/**
* CB-596: the live {@code memberCredentials:} policy, read once per spawn (same hot-reload shape
* as {@link #fleet}). {@code null} — either the supplier itself, or what it returns — means no
* policy is configured and {@link #applyMemberCredentialPolicy} shadows nothing.
*/
private final Supplier<BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials;
/**
* Enumerates the daemon's own process environment variable NAMES ONLY, never values — the CB-596
* criterion-4 gap detector's data source (see {@link #logCredentialGap}). Injectable for tests;
* production always resolves to the real {@code System.getenv()} key set.
*
* <p>Deliberately the daemon's own environment, not the spawned pane's: nothing in the herdr
* client surface lets the daemon read back an arbitrary command's output from a pane before the
* peer starts in it, so there is no channel to inspect the pane's environment directly. The
* daemon's own process is started the same way (a login shell sourcing the same secret store —
* see CB-592's investigation of {@code secrets.sh}), so on a single-host deployment its env
* mirrors what the pane's login shell is about to export.
*/
private final Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames;
/** The final instruction always requires a bridge reply when the bridge MCP is mounted. */
protected static final String REPLY_CHARTER =
"You are a spawned member in the claude-bridge fleet. Every message you receive arrives "
+ "through the bridge, and the ONLY channel back to the sender is the bridge_reply MCP tool. "
+ "Text you write in your terminal is NOT sent anywhere — the sender cannot see your screen, "
+ "so an in-terminal answer is silently discarded. Therefore you MUST end EVERY turn by calling "
+ "bridge_reply with `content` set to your complete response. This holds for every message without "
+ "exception — tasks, questions, clarifications, acknowledgements, and ordinary back-and-forth "
+ "conversation. Call bridge_reply exactly once, as the final action of your turn, with your full "
+ "answer in `content`; never wait for confirmation first. If you end a turn without calling "
+ "bridge_reply, the sender receives nothing and the exchange stalls.";
/**
* Tab numbers, counted per {@code role/profile} pair (CB-557).
*
* <p>Deliberately not {@link #nameSeq}. That counter is shared by every profile this launcher
* serves, because its job is to make herdr <em>agent names</em> unique. Reusing it for the tab
* label made the numbers global, so sibling tabs read {@code #4}, {@code #9}, {@code #17} — gaps
* that look like a member died. Counting per role+profile makes {@code dev: sonnet #2} mean the
* second sonnet dev, which is what a reader assumes it means.
*
* <p>Resets when the daemon restarts, and that is fine: the label is a human-facing hint, not an
* identity. Identity is {@link PeerHandle#id()}.
*/
private final ConcurrentMap<String, AtomicLong> labelSeq = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
private final long spawnReadyTimeoutMs; // 0 = disable gate (legacy non-blocking spawn)
private final LongSupplier nowMillis; // monotonic clock (injectable for tests)
private final Runnable sleeper; // sleep/wait hook (injectable for tests; never real-sleep in unit tests)
// Per-process token mixed into each peer name so a fresh process (nameSeq back at 0) cannot
// collide with same-profile peers that outlived a restart. See startUniquelyNamed.
private final String nameNonce = String.format("%06x", new SecureRandom().nextInt(1 << 24));
// CB-519: PeerHandle.id() is a host-unique opaque UUID, decoupled from the herdr pane id. The
// routing/registry key is the UUID; the herdr pane id is a launcher-private placement/teardown
// coordinate. This map bridges the two so stop(id) can resolve a host-unique key back to the
// exact pane it must tear down. The pane id is launcher-private (never the routing key) — see
// PeerHandle.id().
private final ConcurrentMap<String, String> paneByAgentId = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
private final AtomicBoolean resetUnsupportedLogged = new AtomicBoolean();
/**
* @param namePrefix label prefix for this peer kind (drives naming and reap)
* @param agents herdr agent control (start, status, close)
* @param spaces workspace / tab control (ensure, create, close)
* @param profiles configured peer profiles
* @param defaultProfile profile a no-argument spawn uses (nullable)
* @param env host env lookup (injectable for tests)
* @param spawnReadyTimeoutMs max ms to wait for injectable state (0 disables the gate)
* @param nowMillis monotonic clock source (e.g. {@code System::currentTimeMillis})
* @param sleeper sleep/wait hook (never called when the gate is disabled); the poll
* interval is baked into this hook, so the base needs no poll field
*/
protected HerdrPeerLauncher(String namePrefix, AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper) {
this(namePrefix, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
nowMillis, sleeper, null);
}
/**
* As above, plus the live {@code fleet} config (CB-557).
*
* @param fleet live fleet config, read once per spawn; {@code null} ⇒ default tab label and no
* role charter. A separate constructor rather than a new parameter on the one
* above, so every existing call site keeps the default without an edit.
*/
protected HerdrPeerLauncher(String namePrefix, AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet) {
this(namePrefix, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
nowMillis, sleeper, fleet, null);
}
/**
* As above, plus the live {@code memberCredentials} policy (CB-596).
*
* @param memberCredentials live member-credential policy, read once per spawn; {@code null} ⇒
* no policy configured, so a spawn shadows nothing. A separate
* constructor rather than a new parameter on the one above, so every
* existing call site keeps the pre-CB-596 default without an edit.
*/
protected HerdrPeerLauncher(String namePrefix, AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
this(namePrefix, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
nowMillis, sleeper, fleet, memberCredentials, null);
}
/**
* As above, plus an injectable {@link #hostEnvNames} source for the CB-596 gap detector. Test
* seam only — every production call site leaves this {@code null} and gets the real host env.
*/
protected HerdrPeerLauncher(String namePrefix, AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials,
Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames) {
this.fleet = fleet;
this.namePrefix = namePrefix;
this.agents = agents;
this.spaces = spaces;
this.profiles = Map.copyOf(profiles);
this.defaultProfile = defaultProfile;
this.env = env;
this.spawnReadyTimeoutMs = spawnReadyTimeoutMs;
this.nowMillis = nowMillis;
this.sleeper = sleeper;
this.memberCredentials = memberCredentials;
this.hostEnvNames = hostEnvNames != null ? hostEnvNames : () -> System.getenv().keySet();
}
// --- adapter seams -------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Build the peer-specific launch for {@code cfg}: the environment map and argv handed to herdr.
* Any subscription/guard check, MCP mount, and instruction injection happen here. The env map
* and argv are adapter-private; the base only places and starts what is returned.
*/
protected abstract Launch buildLaunch(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg, LaunchSpec spec);
/** Direct transport access for peer-specific, non-turn control operations. */
protected final AgentControl agents() {
return agents;
}
/** Resolve the public peer id to the launcher's private herdr target. */
protected final String agentTarget(String id) {
return paneByAgentId.get(id);
}
@Override
public boolean clearContext(String id) {
if (resetUnsupportedLogged.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
log.warn("context reset is unsupported for peer kind {}; clearAfterTurn is a no-op",
namePrefix);
}
return false;
}
/**
* A peer-specific launch: the herdr {@code env} map and {@code argv}, plus — for an adapter
* that carries durable session identity (CB-547a) — the peer's OWN session id
* ({@link PeerHandle#agentSessionId()}), known before the peer has written anything. Null for
* a launch that carries no identity.
*/
protected record Launch(Map<String, String> env, List<String> argv, String agentSessionId) {
/** A launch without a discoverable agent session id (an adapter that carries none). */
Launch(Map<String, String> env, List<String> argv) {
this(env, argv, null);
}
}
/** All per-spawn values adapters may need, including the base-composed effective charter. */
protected record LaunchSpec(String sessionName, String resumeSessionId, MemberRole role, String charter) {
}
// --- profile surface -----------------------------------------------------------------------
/** The configured peer profile names (what {@code spawn(profile)} accepts). */
@Override
public Set<String> profiles() {
return profiles.keySet();
}
/** The parity-overlay file list for {@code profileName} (default list when unset). */
@Override
public List<String> parityOverlay(String profileName) {
String name = (profileName == null || profileName.isBlank()) ? defaultProfile : profileName;
if (name == null || name.isBlank()) {
return List.of();
}
BridgedConfig.Profile cfg = profiles.get(name);
return cfg == null ? List.of() : cfg.parityOverlay();
}
/** The profile a no-argument spawn uses, or {@code null} if none is configured. */
@Override
public String defaultProfile() {
return defaultProfile;
}
/**
* {@inheritDoc}
*
* <p>One {@link HerdrPeerLauncher} instance always serves exactly one adapter kind, so every
* profile it owns shares that adapter's {@link #capabilities()} — {@code profileName} only
* needs validating (throwing on an unknown profile, same as {@link #spawn}), not routing.
*/
@Override
public Set<Capability> capabilitiesFor(String profileName) {
requireProfile(profileName);
return capabilities();
}
/** The configured profiles, for adapter capability decisions (e.g. any git-token grant). */
protected Collection<BridgedConfig.Profile> profileConfigs() {
return profiles.values();
}
/** Resolve {@code profileName} (null/blank → default) to its config, or throw with the options. */
protected BridgedConfig.Profile requireProfile(String profileName) {
String name = (profileName == null || profileName.isBlank()) ? defaultProfile : profileName;
if (name == null || name.isBlank()) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("no default worker profile is configured — "
+ "pass a profile; configured: " + profiles.keySet());
}
BridgedConfig.Profile cfg = profiles.get(name);
if (cfg == null) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("unknown worker profile '" + name
+ "' — configured: " + profiles.keySet());
}
return cfg;
}
// --- spawn ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* A started peer plus the launch's agent-session id (the resume handle, or null) and the
* charter receipt (CB-571) the base composed for it.
*/
private record Spawned(Agent agent, String agentSessionId, CharterReceipt receipt) {
}
/**
* Spawn a peer. {@code profileName} null/blank → the default profile. The working directory
* (CB-112) is resolved by {@link #resolveCwd}: an explicit {@code requestedCwd}, else the
* profile's configured {@code cwd}, else {@code callerCwd} (the primary's cwd, when the spawn
* came from the primary over MCP), else the daemon's cwd — never assumed to be {@code $HOME}.
* The adapter's {@link #buildLaunch} runs before any herdr call.
*/
protected Agent spawnInternal(String profileName, String requestedCwd, String callerCwd) {
return spawnInternal(profileName, requestedCwd, callerCwd, null, null).agent();
}
/** Pre-CB-557 shape: no explicit role, so the tab is labelled as a {@code dev}. */
protected Spawned spawnInternal(String profileName, String requestedCwd, String callerCwd,
String sessionName, String resumeSessionId) {
return spawnInternal(profileName, requestedCwd, callerCwd, sessionName, resumeSessionId,
MemberRole.DEV);
}
/**
* Spawn a peer with session identity (CB-547a). The session values, role, and charter are
* threaded from the {@link SpawnRequest} into {@link #buildLaunch(BridgedConfig.Profile,
* LaunchSpec)}, and the launch's resolved agent-session id is returned alongside the agent so
* the caller can put it on the {@link PeerHandle}.
*/
protected Spawned spawnInternal(String profileName, String requestedCwd, String callerCwd,
String sessionName, String resumeSessionId, MemberRole role) {
BridgedConfig.Profile cfg = requireProfile(profileName);
BridgedConfig.Fleet liveFleet = fleet == null ? null : fleet.get();
String roleCharter = liveFleet == null ? null : liveFleet.charterFor(role);
String replyCharter = cfg.hasMcp() ? REPLY_CHARTER : null;
String charter = roleCharter == null ? replyCharter
: replyCharter == null ? roleCharter : roleCharter + "\n\n" + replyCharter;
// CB-571: fingerprint the exact composed charter bytes once, here in the base, before the
// string leaves for an adapter — so Claude and OpenCode derive the same digest. A failed
// start has no bridge_spawn result and no roster row, so the failure log below is the only
// surface the byte count can appear on. The charter text itself is never logged.
CharterReceipt receipt = CharterReceipt.compose(role, cfg.profile(), roleCharter, charter);
try {
Launch launch = buildLaunch(cfg, new LaunchSpec(sessionName, resumeSessionId, role, charter));
String cwd = resolveCwd(requestedCwd, cfg, callerCwd);
Agent agent = cfg.tabPlacement()
? spawnInTab(cfg, launch.env(), launch.argv(), cwd, role, liveFleet)
: spawnAsPane(cfg, launch.env(), launch.argv(), cwd, charter);
logCharterReceipt(receipt, true);
return new Spawned(agent, launch.agentSessionId(), receipt);
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
logCharterReceipt(receipt, false);
throw e;
}
}
/**
* The one place the charter's size and digest appear in the logs. {@code success} true after a
* start, false from the failure path of {@link #spawnInternal} where no handle or roster row
* exists to carry the receipt. Always metadata only — never the charter text.
*/
private static void logCharterReceipt(CharterReceipt receipt, boolean success) {
String role = receipt.role() == null ? "" : receipt.role().wireName();
if (success) {
log.info("spawned role={} profile={} charterSource={} charterSha256={} charterBytes={}",
role, receipt.profile(), receipt.charterSource(),
receipt.charterSha256(), receipt.charterBytes());
} else {
log.warn("spawn failed; charter role={} profile={} charterSource={} charterSha256={} charterBytes={}",
role, receipt.profile(), receipt.charterSource(),
receipt.charterSha256(), receipt.charterBytes());
}
}
/**
* The next tab number for {@code role} on {@code profile}, starting at 1.
*
* <p>Starts at 1 rather than 0 because the number is read by a person: {@code "dev: sonnet #1"}
* is the first one, and {@code #0} invites the question of where {@code #1} went.
*/
private long nextLabelSeq(MemberRole role, String profile) {
String key = (role == null ? "" : role.wireName()) + "/" + profile;
return labelSeq.computeIfAbsent(key, _ -> new AtomicLong()).incrementAndGet();
}
/**
* {@inheritDoc}
*
* <p>Delegates to {@link #spawnInternal} and wraps the resulting herdr {@link Agent} in a
* {@link WorkerHandle} whose {@link PeerHandle#id()} is a fresh <em>host-unique</em> opaque
* UUID (CB-519), deliberately decoupled from the herdr pane id: the id is the registry/routing
* key and must never collide across daemon processes on the same host, while the herdr pane id
* stays a launcher-private placement/teardown coordinate, remembered here so {@link #stop}
* can resolve the host-unique key back to its pane. When {@code spawnReadyTimeoutMs > 0},
* blocks until the peer's herdr status is injectable or the timeout elapses; on timeout the
* pane is closed (no orphan) and a {@link PeerUnreachableException} is thrown.
*/
@Override
public PeerHandle spawn(SpawnRequest req) {
Spawned spawned = spawnInternal(req.profileName(), req.requestedCwd(), req.callerCwd(),
req.sessionName(), req.resumeSessionId(), req.role());
Agent agent = spawned.agent();
String paneId = agent.paneId();
if (spawnReadyTimeoutMs > 0) {
waitUntilInjectableOrThrow(paneId);
}
// CB-519: the handle id is a host-unique UUID; the herdr pane it maps to stays internal.
String id = UUID.randomUUID().toString();
paneByAgentId.put(id, paneId);
return new WorkerHandle(id, agent.terminalId(), requireProfile(req.profileName()).profile(),
req.sessionName(), spawned.agentSessionId(), spawned.receipt());
}
@Override
public String effectiveCwd(SpawnRequest req) {
return effectiveCwd(req.profileName(), req.requestedCwd(), req.callerCwd());
}
/**
* CB-301: the effective working directory a spawn for {@code profileName} would use, without
* actually spawning.
*/
private String effectiveCwd(String profileName, String requestedCwd, String callerCwd) {
return resolveCwd(requestedCwd, requireProfile(profileName), callerCwd);
}
/**
* CB-112 cwd resolution: spawn arg → profile config → the primary's cwd → the daemon's cwd.
* Never returns {@code null}/blank: {@code "."} (the daemon's own working directory) is the
* guaranteed last resort so a pathological environment with an unset {@code user.dir} still
* honours the "never assume {@code $HOME}" contract rather than letting herdr default the pane.
*/
private static String resolveCwd(String requestedCwd, BridgedConfig.Profile cfg, String callerCwd) {
return firstNonBlank(requestedCwd, cfg.cwd(), callerCwd, System.getProperty("user.dir"), ".");
}
private static String firstNonBlank(String... values) {
for (String v : values) {
if (v != null && !v.isBlank()) return v;
}
return null;
}
/** Dedicated worker space → own tab (carrying cwd+env) → start the peer into the seed pane. */
private Agent spawnInTab(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg, Map<String, String> workerEnv,
List<String> argv, String cwd, MemberRole role, BridgedConfig.Fleet liveFleet) {
Workspace space = spaces.ensureWorkspace(cfg.workspace());
Tab.Created tab = spaces.createTab(space.workspaceId(), cwd, workerEnv);
log.info("spawning {} profile={} space={} tab={} cwd={}",
namePrefix, cfg.profile(), space.workspaceId(), tab.tab().tabId(), cwd);
Started started;
try {
if (tab.rootPaneId() == null) {
// Protocol 19 starts the agent INTO the seed pane — without one there is nowhere
// to start, and a partial tab would be left behind.
throw new IllegalStateException("tab " + tab.tab().tabId()
+ " had no seed pane in the create response — cannot start a peer in it");
}
started = startUniquelyNamed(cfg, argv, tab.rootPaneId());
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
// The peer never started — don't leave the tab we just created orphaned.
// Best-effort cleanup; never let it mask the real spawn failure.
try {
spaces.closeTab(tab.tab().tabId());
} catch (RuntimeException cleanup) {
log.warn("failed to close orphaned tab {} after spawn error: {}",
tab.tab().tabId(), cleanup.getMessage());
}
throw e;
}
// The peer is LIVE now, in the seed pane itself (no shell pane to drop — protocol 19).
// Labelling is cosmetic: it must not fail the spawn or orphan the running peer — on error
// we log and still return it so the caller gets its paneId and can tear it down.
tidy("label tab " + tab.tab().tabId(),
() -> spaces.renameTab(tab.tab().tabId(),
cfg.renderTabLabel(
liveFleet == null ? null : liveFleet.tabLabel(),
role, nextLabelSeq(role, cfg.profile()))));
log.info("{} started pane={} tab={} terminal={}",
namePrefix, started.agent().paneId(), started.agent().tabId(), started.agent().terminalId());
return started.agent();
}
/** Run a best-effort post-start cleanup step, logging (not throwing) on failure. */
private void tidy(String what, Runnable step) {
try {
step.run();
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.warn("post-start step failed ({}) — peer is running regardless: {}", what, e.getMessage());
}
}
/**
* Legacy placement: split the currently-focused tab; the peer still starts in {@code cwd}.
*
* <p>CB-571: this is the one legacy log that printed the full argv, and the charter travels
* inside argv — so the charter text went to the daemon log on every pane-placement spawn. The
* {@code spawnInTab} path never logs argv, so only this site is fixed. {@code charter} is the
* composed charter, if any; its argv element is replaced by its digest so the log still shows
* which args were passed without exposing the charter prose.
*/
private Agent spawnAsPane(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg, Map<String, String> workerEnv,
List<String> argv, String cwd, String charter) {
log.info("spawning {} (pane placement) profile={} cwd={} argv={}",
namePrefix, cfg.profile(), cwd, redactCharter(argv, charter));
String paneId = spaces.splitPane(cwd, workerEnv);
if (paneId == null) {
throw new IllegalStateException("pane.split returned no pane — cannot start a peer");
}
Agent peer = startUniquelyNamed(cfg, argv, paneId).agent();
log.info("{} started pane={} terminal={}", namePrefix, peer.paneId(), peer.terminalId());
return peer;
}
/**
* A copy of {@code argv} with an element equal to {@code charter} replaced by its digest, so
* the pane log never prints the charter prose. The charter is handed to an adapter as one argv
* element, so exact-equality is the right match; every other argument passes through unchanged.
*/
private static List<String> redactCharter(List<String> argv, String charter) {
if (charter == null || charter.isBlank() || argv == null || argv.isEmpty()) {
return argv;
}
String digest = CharterReceipt.digestOf(charter);
return argv.stream()
.map(a -> a.equals(charter) ? "<charter sha256=" + digest + ">" : a)
.toList();
}
/** A started peer together with the sequence its unique name/label used. */
private record Started(Agent agent, long seq) {
}
/**
* Start the peer under a unique herdr agent name. herdr requires each running agent's
* {@code name} to be distinct (a 2nd identical {@code name} fails {@code agent_name_taken}) —
* the exact case that makes multiple peers useful. The name is
* {@code <prefix>-<profile>-<nonce>-<seq>}: {@code seq} distinguishes peers within this process,
* and the per-process {@code nonce} keeps a fresh process (whose {@code seq} restarts at 0) from
* colliding with same-profile peers that outlived a restart. The retry is a belt-and-braces
* backstop for the astronomically unlikely nonce+seq clash; the name is a label only — herdr
* detects kind and status from terminal output, not from it.
*/
private Started startUniquelyNamed(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg, List<String> argv, String paneId) {
// Protocol 19 resolves the executable from the agent kind (== namePrefix here), so
// argv[0] — the configured executable — is dropped and only the extra args are passed.
List<String> args = argv.isEmpty() ? argv : argv.subList(1, argv.size());
HerdrException last = null;
for (int attempt = 0; attempt < NAME_RETRIES; attempt++) {
long seq = nameSeq.incrementAndGet();
String name = namePrefix + "-" + cfg.profile() + "-" + nameNonce + "-" + seq;
try {
return new Started(startAwaitingShellPrompt(name, args, paneId), seq);
} catch (HerdrException e) {
if (!"agent_name_taken".equals(e.code())) throw e;
log.debug("peer name '{}' taken, retrying", name);
last = e;
}
}
throw last;
}
/** Start the agent into {@code paneId}, waiting out the seed shell's boot with the sleeper. */
private Agent startAwaitingShellPrompt(String name, List<String> args, String paneId) {
HerdrException busy = null;
for (int attempt = 0; attempt < SHELL_READY_RETRIES; attempt++) {
try {
return agents.start(name, namePrefix, args, paneId);
} catch (HerdrException e) {
if (!"agent_pane_busy".equals(e.code())) throw e;
log.debug("pane {} not at its shell prompt yet, retrying agent.start", paneId);
busy = e;
sleeper.run();
}
}
throw busy;
}
// --- discovery + reap ----------------------------------------------------------------------
/** All herdr-tracked agents — discovery for "what peers exist". */
@Override
public List<Agent> list() {
return agents.list();
}
/**
* Reap peer panes left behind by an earlier daemon process (CB-117). herdr keeps a peer's pane
* alive across a daemon restart <em>by design</em>, and that pane's id is held only by its
* spawner — so a peer whose owning process exited before issuing the matching teardown leaks
* with nothing tracking it. On boot we scan herdr for agents whose name matches our
* {@code <prefix>-<profile>-<nonce>-<seq>} scheme with a nonce <em>other</em> than this
* process's {@link #nameNonce}, and tear each one down (its pane and, via {@link #stop}, its
* now-empty dedicated tab). A current-nonce peer is ours and live, so it is left running; a
* user's own session carries no such name and is never touched. A peer from a <em>different</em>
* adapter (different prefix) is likewise never touched. Best-effort: a failed listing, or a
* failure to stop any one peer, is logged and never aborts startup.
*
* @return the number of orphaned peers reaped
*/
@Override
public int reapOrphanWorkers() {
List<Agent> all;
try {
all = agents.list();
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.warn("orphan-peer reap skipped — agent.list failed: {}", e.getMessage());
return 0;
}
int reaped = 0;
for (Agent a : all) {
if (!isForeignWorker(namePrefix, a.name(), nameNonce)) continue;
try {
stop(a.paneId());
reaped++;
log.info("reaped orphan {} {} (pane={} tab={}) left by a prior daemon",
namePrefix, a.name(), a.paneId(), a.tabId());
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.warn("could not reap orphan {} {} (pane={}): {}",
namePrefix, a.name(), a.paneId(), e.getMessage());
}
}
if (reaped > 0) {
log.info("orphan-peer reap complete — {} stale {} peer(s) removed at startup", reaped, namePrefix);
}
return reaped;
}
/** The {@code <prefix>-<profile>-<nonce>-<seq>} name pattern; group 1 captures the 6-hex nonce. */
static Pattern workerNamePattern(String prefix) {
return Pattern.compile(prefix + "-.*-([0-9a-f]{6})-\\d+");
}
/**
* Whether {@code name} is a peer of kind {@code prefix} started by a <em>different</em> process
* than {@code currentNonce} — the reap predicate (CB-117). True only for the prefix's naming
* scheme with a foreign nonce: a non-peer name, a different adapter's name, or our own live
* nonce is excluded. Pure and package-private so the decision is unit-testable without herdr.
*/
static boolean isForeignWorker(String prefix, String name, String currentNonce) {
String nonce = workerNonce(prefix, name);
return nonce != null && !nonce.equals(currentNonce);
}
/** The 6-hex nonce embedded in a {@code prefix} peer name, or {@code null} if not one. */
static String workerNonce(String prefix, String name) {
if (name == null) return null;
Matcher m = workerNamePattern(prefix).matcher(name);
return m.matches() ? m.group(1) : null;
}
/** This process's peer-name nonce (a label component only; exposed for reaper tests). */
String nameNonce() {
return nameNonce;
}
// --- teardown ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Tear a peer down: close the pane, and close its tab <em>only</em> when the peer is that tab's
* sole occupant. The single-pane check is what makes this safe regardless of how the peer was
* placed (or a placement-config change across a restart): a pane-placement peer sitting in one
* of the user's shared tabs has siblings, so its tab is never closed — we only ever remove a
* tab we created to hold one peer.
*
* <p>{@code idOrPane} is the {@link PeerHandle#id()} of a peer this launcher spawned (CB-519's
* host-unique opaque UUID), resolved through {@link #paneByAgentId} to the pane it must tear
* down. An argument that is not one of our ids is treated as a raw herdr pane id — the
* {@link #reapOrphanWorkers() orphan-reap} and spawn-gate-timeout paths, plus any caller that
* passes a pane directly, keep working without an owning id.
*
* <p>Resolves the tab from the pane <em>before</em> closing it. An already-gone pane/tab
* (repeated DELETE, crashed peer) is treated as success; any other failure propagates so a
* genuinely failed teardown is not reported as done.
*/
@Override
public void stop(String idOrPane) {
// Teardown knows only the pane, not which profile spawned it. Attempt tab cleanup when any
// profile uses tab placement (so the bridge may have created a dedicated peer tab); the
// single-occupant check below is what actually protects the user's shared tabs.
String paneId = paneByAgentId.remove(idOrPane);
if (paneId == null) {
paneId = idOrPane; // raw-pane fallback (reap, gate timeout, pane-addressed callers)
}
WorkspaceControl.PaneLocation loc = usesTabPlacement() ? spaces.locatePane(paneId) : null;
try {
agents.close(paneId);
} catch (HerdrException e) {
if (!isAlreadyGone(e)) throw e;
log.debug("pane.close({}) ignored — already gone: {}", paneId, e.getMessage());
}
if (loc != null && loc.tabPaneCount() == 1) {
spaces.closeTab(loc.tabId());
} else if (loc != null) {
log.debug("not closing tab {} — it holds {} panes (not a dedicated peer tab)",
loc.tabId(), loc.tabPaneCount());
}
}
/** Whether any configured profile places peers in their own tab (so tabs may need cleanup). */
private boolean usesTabPlacement() {
return profiles.values().stream().anyMatch(BridgedConfig.Profile::tabPlacement);
}
/** True when a herdr error means the target is already gone (safe to treat as done). */
private static boolean isAlreadyGone(HerdrException e) {
return e.code() != null && e.code().endsWith("_not_found");
}
// --- spawn-readiness gate (CB-306) ---------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Poll {@link AgentControl#status} until the pane reports an injectable state or the configured
* timeout elapses. On timeout, close the pane (self-reap) and throw.
*/
private void waitUntilInjectableOrThrow(String paneId) {
long deadline = nowMillis.getAsLong() + spawnReadyTimeoutMs;
while (nowMillis.getAsLong() < deadline) {
if (agents.status(paneId).injectable()) {
log.debug("peer pane={} reached injectable state", paneId);
return;
}
sleeper.run();
}
log.warn("peer pane={} did not become injectable within {}ms — closing", paneId, spawnReadyTimeoutMs);
stop(paneId);
throw new PeerUnreachableException(
"worker pane " + paneId + " did not reach injectable state within "
+ spawnReadyTimeoutMs + "ms");
}
/**
* A concrete {@link PeerHandle} wrapping herdr agent coordinates, the profile that spawned it,
* the session identity the launch resolved (CB-547a): the bridge's logical name and the peer's
* own session id, both null when the spawn carried no identity — and the charter receipt
* (CB-571) the base computed for this launch.
*/
private record WorkerHandle(String id, String terminalId, String profile,
String sessionName, String agentSessionId,
CharterReceipt receipt) implements PeerHandle {
@Override
public CharterReceipt charterReceipt() {
return receipt;
}
}
// --- shared helpers ------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Put {@code k → v} only when {@code v} is present (non-null, non-blank). */
protected static void putIfPresent(Map<String, String> m, String k, String v) {
if (v != null && !v.isBlank()) {
m.put(k, v);
}
}
/** Host env lookup that tolerates an unconfigured (null/blank) var name — returns null then. */
protected String resolveEnv(String name) {
return (name == null || name.isBlank()) ? null : env.apply(name);
}
/**
* The parity-neutral git-forge token grant (CB-302): when {@code cfg} opts in via
* {@code gitTokenEnv} and the token resolves, inject {@code GITEA_TOKEN} plus its paired
* {@code GITEA_HOST}. Push over SSH is unaffected; the only incremental grant is PR-create.
* Peer-neutral, so every herdr adapter reuses it unchanged.
*/
protected void applyGitToken(Map<String, String> workerEnv, BridgedConfig.Profile cfg) {
if (!cfg.hasGitToken()) {
return;
}
String gitToken = resolveEnv(cfg.gitTokenEnv());
if (gitToken != null) {
workerEnv.put("GITEA_TOKEN", gitToken);
putIfPresent(workerEnv, "GITEA_HOST", resolveEnv(cfg.gitHostEnv()));
}
}
/**
* CB-596: overlay value that shadows any host credential a herdr pane otherwise inherits from
* herdr's own login-shell process environment (gitea issue #82, superseding CB-592's single
* hardcoded {@code GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN} name — see {@link #applyMemberCredentialPolicy}). herdr
* spawns a pane from its <em>own</em> process environment and layers our map on top —
* {@link dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.WorkspaceControl#createTab} and {@code #splitPane} send only
* the keys we put in that map, so any key we never mention passes straight through from
* herdr's own shell, admin credentials included.
*
* <p>Deliberately a non-blank sentinel, not {@code ""}. Whether an empty-string overlay value
* overrides an inherited variable or is skipped as blank could not be settled by reading this
* codebase — herdr's server-side merge is an external process, not something in this repo.
* A non-blank replacement sidesteps that ambiguity entirely: {@link #baseEnv}'s own {@code
* PATH} seeding already depends on the overlay reliably replacing an inherited value (see its
* javadoc), and that is only demonstrated for a non-blank value, so this reuses the same,
* proven-reliable shape rather than the unverified one.
*
* <p><b>MEASURED ON A LIVE PANE, 2026-08-15 (CB-592): this sentinel alone does NOT hold.</b> The
* overlay itself works — {@code GITEA_TOKEN} is injected here, is exported by no shell file, and
* does reach the pane. The sentinel loses one step later. A herdr pane runs a <em>login</em>
* shell, {@code ~/.zprofile} sources {@code ${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh}, and that file does a
* plain unconditional {@code export GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN=...}. A login shell overwrites a value
* already in the environment, so the real admin token is put back over this sentinel before the
* member process ever starts. That defeat applies to <em>every</em> name {@code secrets.sh}
* exports, and no launcher-side overlay can win against it.
*
* <p>So this constant is not the control on its own — {@link #MEMBER_MARKER} is the other half.
* Keeping the sentinel is still worth it: it is correct for any peer kind whose pane does not
* start a login shell, and it makes the intent explicit at the one place every adapter passes.
*/
private static final String BLOCKED_CREDENTIAL_SENTINEL =
"blocked-by-bridged-cb596-see-gitea-issue-82";
/**
* CB-592: marks a pane as a bridged member so a shell startup file can decline to export
* operator-only credentials into it (gitea issue #77).
*
* <p>This name is deliberately one that {@code secrets.sh} never exports, which is exactly why
* it survives the login shell that wipes {@link #BLOCKED_GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN}. The mechanism is
* measured, not assumed: {@code GITEA_TOKEN} is injected the same way, is absent from a login
* shell of its own, and was observed set inside a live member pane.
*
* <p>It is a no-op until the operator guards the export, which is a one-line change in a file
* this repo does not own and must not edit unasked:
*
* <pre>{@code
* [ -n "${BRIDGED_MEMBER:-}" ] || export GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN=...
* }</pre>
*
* <p>Setting the marker now costs nothing and means that edit is the whole remaining fix.
*/
static final String MEMBER_MARKER = "BRIDGED_MEMBER";
/**
* Seed a worker's environment (CB-511): the daemon's own {@code PATH}, then the profile's
* {@code env:} entries, then the CB-592 admin-token shadow.
*
* <p>Why this exists: bridged passes herdr an explicit env map, and herdr merges it into
* <em>its own</em> process environment. So before this, a worker inherited whatever PATH the
* herdr server happened to be started with — on this host, one from weeks earlier with no JDK
* and no Maven, which left workers unable to run the build they were being asked to run. The
* worker's toolchain must follow from configuration, not from how a long-lived daemon was
* launched.
*
* <p>Adapter-specific variables are layered on top of this by {@code buildLaunch} and therefore
* win. That ordering is deliberate and load-bearing: it stops a profile's {@code env:} from
* overriding {@code ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL} and slipping past {@link
* dev.ltms.bridged.guard.SubscriptionGuard}, which is checked against the profile's
* {@code baseUrl} and nothing else.
*
* <p>The CB-596 credential shadow and the CB-592 marker are put in <em>last</em>, after the
* profile's own {@code env:}, so no profile — present or future — can restore a blocked
* credential, or hide that the pane is a member, by naming either in config. This is the one
* place both are applied: every {@code buildLaunch} in every adapter calls this first, so a new
* profile, and a peer kind not yet written, gets them for free.
*/
protected Map<String, String> baseEnv(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg) {
Map<String, String> workerEnv = new LinkedHashMap<>();
String path = env.apply("PATH");
if (path != null && !path.isBlank()) {
workerEnv.put("PATH", path);
}
if (cfg != null && cfg.env() != null) {
workerEnv.putAll(cfg.env());
}
applyMemberCredentialPolicy(workerEnv);
workerEnv.put(MEMBER_MARKER, "1");
return workerEnv;
}
/**
* CB-596: shadow every configured {@code memberCredentials.known} name that is not also
* {@code allow}-ed, replacing CB-592's single hardcoded {@code GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN} name (gitea
* issue #82). An allow-listed name is deliberately left unmentioned here — see {@link
* #BLOCKED_CREDENTIAL_SENTINEL}'s javadoc for why an overlay entry is the only way to shadow an
* inherited value, which is exactly why an allowed name must get NO entry: any entry at all,
* blank or not, risks overriding the real value the pane needs.
*
* <p>No {@code memberCredentials} configured — the supplier is {@code null}, or it resolves to
* one whose {@code known} list is empty — shadows nothing. This is a real, config-driven gap
* (see {@link BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials}'s javadoc), not a safe default: deny-by-default
* only defends names the operator has actually enumerated in {@code known}.
*/
private void applyMemberCredentialPolicy(Map<String, String> workerEnv) {
BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials creds = memberCredentials == null ? null : memberCredentials.get();
if (creds == null) {
return;
}
for (String name : creds.blockedSet()) {
workerEnv.put(name, BLOCKED_CREDENTIAL_SENTINEL);
}
logCredentialGap(creds);
}
/** Credential-shaped env var name heuristic for {@link #logCredentialGap} — case-insensitive. */
private static final Pattern CREDENTIAL_SHAPED_NAME =
Pattern.compile("(?i).*(TOKEN|SECRET|_KEY|APIKEY|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|AUTH).*");
/** Guards {@link #logCredentialGap} to one WARN per launcher instance, not one per spawn. */
private final AtomicBoolean credentialGapLogged = new AtomicBoolean();
/**
* CB-596 criterion 4: a credential-shaped host env var name on neither {@code known} nor
* {@code allow} is not silently allowed — it is reported. {@link #hostEnvNames} enumerates the
* daemon's own environment (see that field's javadoc for why the daemon's env is read rather
* than the spawned pane's, which the daemon has no channel to inspect at spawn time); this logs
* every such NAME, at WARN, at most once per launcher instance — never a value, a prefix of a
* value, or a hash of a value, so the log itself cannot leak anything.
*/
private void logCredentialGap(BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials creds) {
Set<String> covered = new HashSet<>(creds.known());
covered.addAll(creds.allow());
List<String> gap = hostEnvNames.get().stream()
.filter(name -> CREDENTIAL_SHAPED_NAME.matcher(name).matches())
.filter(name -> !covered.contains(name))
.sorted()
.toList();
if (gap.isEmpty()) {
return;
}
if (credentialGapLogged.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
log.warn("memberCredentials gap: {} credential-shaped env var name(s) are on neither "
+ "known: nor allow: — every member pane inherits them UNBLOCKED — {}. "
+ "Add each to memberCredentials.known (blocked by default) or .allow "
+ "(if a member legitimately needs it).",
gap.size(), gap);
}
}
/** Defensive copy of {@code argv} plus room to append launch flags. */
protected static List<String> mutableArgv(List<String> argv) {
return new ArrayList<>(argv);
}
/**
* Uninterruptible sleep — the production {@link #sleeper}. Tests supply their own no-op /
* fast-faking sleeper so they never real-sleep.
*/
protected static void sleepUninterruptibly(long ms) {
try {
Thread.sleep(ms);
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
// preserve the interrupt flag but continue — poll loops should not be aborted by an
// interrupt that was not meant for them.
}
}
}
@@ -1,496 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.member;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.ObjectNode;
import dev.ltms.bridged.config.BridgedConfig;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.Agent;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.WorkspaceControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.Capability;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.CharterReceipt;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.PeerHandle;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.SpawnRequest;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.UncheckedIOException;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.EnumSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.function.Function;
import java.util.function.LongSupplier;
import java.util.function.Supplier;
/**
* The {@link HerdrPeerLauncher} adapter for <strong>opencode</strong> — an open-source,
* provider-agnostic terminal coding agent. Its whole reason for existing is to prove the
* {@code PeerLauncher} SPI is genuinely provider-neutral: opencode shares none of Claude Code's
* private launch seams, yet reuses every line of shared transport in the base (tab/pane placement,
* the CB-306 readiness gate, unique naming + CB-117 reap, teardown, listing, cwd).
*
* <p>The divergences from {@link ClaudeCodeLauncher}, all confined to {@link #buildLaunch}:
* <ul>
* <li><strong>No subscription boundary.</strong> opencode carries no {@code ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL}
* and there is no {@link dev.ltms.bridged.guard.SubscriptionGuard} — the guard is a
* Claude-private concern, not part of the SPI. opencode reads the operator's own provider
* credentials from its global {@code auth.json}; the bridge injects none.</li>
* <li><strong>File-based MCP mount + instructions.</strong> opencode has no inline
* {@code --mcp-config}/{@code --append-system-prompt}. Instead the bridge writes an ephemeral
* {@code opencode.json} that declares the bridge as a {@code remote} MCP server and lists a
* member-charter file under {@code instructions}, then points the worker at it with
* {@code OPENCODE_CONFIG}. This is the one place the launcher touches disk — Claude never did.</li>
* <li><strong>Model as a flag.</strong> the {@code provider/model} selector is passed as
* {@code -m}, not an env var.</li>
* <li><strong>{@code opencode} name prefix</strong> so reap matches {@code opencode-*} panes and
* never another adapter's.</li>
* </ul>
*/
public final class OpenCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
/** Label prefix for this adapter's herdr agent names (drives naming + orphan reap). */
private static final String NAME_PREFIX = "opencode";
/** Writer for the generated {@code opencode.json}. */
private static final ObjectMapper JSON = new ObjectMapper();
/** Root under which per-spawn opencode config dirs are created (injectable for tests). */
private final Path configRoot;
/**
* Session discovery against opencode's on-disk storage ({@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery}) —
* the one seam that knows opencode's private session-file layout. Its root is injectable for
* tests so they never touch the operator's real {@code ~/.local/share/opencode}.
*/
private final OpenCodeSessionDiscovery discovery;
/**
* Production constructor — disables the spawn-ready gate ({@code spawnReadyTimeoutMs == 0}) so it
* matches the legacy non-blocking spawn semantics. Config dirs are created under the JVM temp dir.
*/
public OpenCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env) {
this(agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env, 0,
System::currentTimeMillis, () -> sleepUninterruptibly(300),
defaultConfigRoot(), defaultDiscoveryRoot());
}
/**
* Production constructor with the spawn-ready gate enabled. Polls {@code agents.status()} until
* the pane reports an injectable state or {@code spawnReadyTimeoutMs} elapses.
*/
public OpenCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs) {
this(agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, spawnReadyPollMs, null);
}
/**
* Production constructor carrying the fleet-wide tab-label template (CB-557). The template comes
* from {@code fleet.tabLabel}, which a profile cannot know because it names the member's
* <em>role</em>; a profile may still override it with its own {@code tabLabel}.
*/
public OpenCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet) {
this(agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
System::currentTimeMillis, () -> sleepUninterruptibly(spawnReadyPollMs),
defaultConfigRoot(), defaultDiscoveryRoot(), fleet);
}
/**
* Production constructor, plus the CB-596 {@code memberCredentials} policy supplier.
*/
public OpenCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
this(agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
System::currentTimeMillis, () -> sleepUninterruptibly(spawnReadyPollMs),
defaultConfigRoot(), defaultDiscoveryRoot(), fleet, memberCredentials);
}
/**
* Full testability constructor. Every injectable collaborator is explicit so unit tests supply a
* fake clock ({@code nowMillis}), poll-loop wait ({@code sleeper}), and a temp {@code configRoot}
* they can inspect the generated {@code opencode.json}/charter under.
*
* @param agents herdr agent control (start, status, close)
* @param spaces workspace / tab control (ensure, create, close)
* @param profiles configured worker profiles
* @param defaultProfile profile a no-argument spawn uses (nullable)
* @param env host env lookup (injectable for tests)
* @param spawnReadyTimeoutMs max ms to wait for injectable state (0 disables the gate)
* @param nowMillis monotonic clock source (e.g. {@code System::currentTimeMillis})
* @param sleeper sleep/wait hook (encodes the poll interval; never called when the
* gate is disabled)
* @param configRoot existing directory under which per-spawn config dirs are created
* @param discoveryRoot opencode's on-disk storage root to scan for session records
* (injectable for tests; opencode's layout is matched at
* {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery})
*/
public OpenCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper,
Path configRoot, Path discoveryRoot) {
this(agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
nowMillis, sleeper, configRoot, discoveryRoot, null);
}
/**
* Full testability constructor, plus the fleet-wide tab-label template (CB-557).
*
* @param fleet live fleet config, read once for each spawn
*/
public OpenCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper,
Path configRoot, Path discoveryRoot,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet) {
super(NAME_PREFIX, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, fleet);
this.configRoot = configRoot;
this.discovery = new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(discoveryRoot);
}
/**
* Full testability constructor, plus the CB-596 {@code memberCredentials} policy supplier.
*/
public OpenCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper,
Path configRoot, Path discoveryRoot,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
super(NAME_PREFIX, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, fleet, memberCredentials);
this.configRoot = configRoot;
this.discovery = new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(discoveryRoot);
}
private static Path defaultConfigRoot() {
return Path.of(System.getProperty("java.io.tmpdir"));
}
/** The default opencode storage root: {@code ~/.local/share/opencode} (the XDG data dir). */
private static Path defaultDiscoveryRoot() {
return Path.of(System.getProperty("user.home"), ".local", "share", "opencode");
}
/**
* {@inheritDoc}
*
* <p>Builds the opencode launch: no {@code ANTHROPIC_*} and no guard (opencode reads its own
* provider credentials); when the profile mounts the bridge MCP or has a member charter,
* generate an ephemeral {@code opencode.json} (remote MCP server + member-charter instructions)
* and point the worker at it via {@code OPENCODE_CONFIG}; carry the parity-neutral git-forge
* grant; and select the model with {@code -m}.
*/
@Override
protected Launch buildLaunch(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg, LaunchSpec spec) {
Map<String, String> workerEnv = baseEnv(cfg);
// A config file is needed for the bridge MCP mount, a member charter, or a pinned endpoint (CB-508).
if (cfg.hasMcp() || spec.charter() != null || hasCustomProvider(cfg)) {
workerEnv.put("OPENCODE_CONFIG", writeConfig(cfg, spec.charter()).toString());
}
applyGitToken(workerEnv, cfg);
return new Launch(workerEnv,
argvWithResume(argvWithModel(argvWithAuto(cfg), cfg), spec.resumeSessionId()));
}
/**
* True when this profile pins its own OpenAI-compatible endpoint (CB-508) rather than using
* whatever provider opencode resolves by default.
*
* <p>Note this reuses {@code baseUrl}, the same field the Claude adapter injects as
* {@code ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL} — but it does <em>not</em> go through {@code SubscriptionGuard}.
* That asymmetry is deliberate and safe: the guard exists to stop a worker borrowing the
* primary's Anthropic subscription, and an opencode process has no Anthropic credential path
* at all. Pointing it at a local vLLM cannot leak the subscription.
*/
private static boolean hasCustomProvider(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg) {
return cfg.baseUrl() != null && !cfg.baseUrl().isBlank();
}
/**
* The launch argv plus the unconditional {@code --auto} flag, which auto-approves the
* permissions opencode does not explicitly deny. It is unconditional, not a preference: a
* spawned peer has no human at its pane — the bridge spawned it — so one that stops at an
* approval prompt is a wedged agent, indistinguishable from a legitimate mid-turn wait and
* unable to end its turn with {@code bridge_reply}. opencode's own help calls this
* "dangerous!", but the blast radius here is already bounded by design: a worker runs in its
* own git worktree on its own branch, is off-subscription, and cannot merge — the lead is the
* gate.
*/
private List<String> argvWithAuto(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg) {
List<String> argv = mutableArgv(cfg.argv());
argv.add("--auto");
return argv;
}
/**
* The launch argv plus, on a resumed spawn, opencode's {@code -s <id>} flag to continue a prior
* conversation by its session id. {@code -s, --session <id>} resumes an existing session; on a
* fresh spawn (no resume target) no flag is added, letting opencode start a brand-new session.
* The id comes from the base launch spec.
*/
private List<String> argvWithResume(List<String> argv, String id) {
if (id == null || id.isBlank()) {
return argv;
}
List<String> withResume = mutableArgv(argv);
withResume.add("-s");
withResume.add(id);
return withResume;
}
/** The launch argv plus, when a model is configured, the opencode {@code -m provider/model} flag. */
private List<String> argvWithModel(List<String> argv, BridgedConfig.Profile cfg) {
if (cfg.model() != null && !cfg.model().isBlank()) {
argv.add("-m");
argv.add(cfg.model());
}
return argv;
}
/**
* Write an ephemeral {@code opencode.json} (and the member-charter file it references) into a
* fresh per-spawn directory under {@link #configRoot}, and return the config file's path for
* {@code OPENCODE_CONFIG}. The dir is unique per spawn so concurrent workers never race on it;
* it is best-effort cleaned on JVM exit (worker config is disposable — regenerated every spawn).
*/
private Path writeConfig(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg, String charterText) {
try {
Path dir = Files.createTempDirectory(configRoot, "bridged-opencode-");
dir.toFile().deleteOnExit();
ObjectNode root = JSON.createObjectNode();
root.put("$schema", "https://opencode.ai/config.json");
// CB-523, opencode side: a worker that runs out of context dies mid-turn, and its reply
// — the entire point of the turn — is lost with it. Auto-compaction is therefore not an
// operator preference for a bridged worker, it is a condition of the turn contract.
//
// Stated deliberately even though it is redundant today: OPENCODE_CONFIG is MERGED over
// ~/.config/opencode/config.json rather than replacing it, so a worker already inherits
// an `auto: true` set at home. We do not want that inheritance to be what the guarantee
// rests on — the home file is outside this repo, differs per machine, and is not ours.
//
// Know the cost before removing it: this key WINS over the home config (verified — an
// OPENCODE_CONFIG value overrides the home value, it does not defer to it), so an
// operator who sets `compaction.auto: false` at home cannot turn it off for bridged
// workers. That is the intended trade for peers we spawn and whose turns we must land;
// if per-profile control is ever wanted, add a profile knob rather than dropping this.
root.putObject("compaction").put("auto", true);
if (charterText != null) {
Path charter = dir.resolve("member-charter.md");
Files.writeString(charter, charterText);
charter.toFile().deleteOnExit();
root.putArray("instructions").add(charter.toAbsolutePath().toString());
}
if (cfg.hasMcp()) {
ObjectNode bridge = root.putObject("mcp").putObject("bridge");
bridge.put("type", "remote");
bridge.put("url", cfg.mcpUrl());
bridge.put("enabled", true);
}
if (hasCustomProvider(cfg)) {
addCustomProvider(root, cfg);
}
Path cfgFile = dir.resolve("opencode.json");
// Built with Jackson rather than string concatenation: the provider block is nested and
// carries operator-supplied values (URL, model id, api key), so escaping must be real.
Files.writeString(cfgFile, JSON.writerWithDefaultPrettyPrinter().writeValueAsString(root));
cfgFile.toFile().deleteOnExit();
return cfgFile;
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new UncheckedIOException(
"cannot write opencode config for profile " + cfg.profile(), e);
}
}
/**
* Declare a custom OpenAI-compatible provider so the worker talks to a pinned endpoint (a local
* vLLM, say) instead of opencode's default gateway (CB-508).
*
* <p>The provider id comes from the {@code provider/model} selector in {@code model:}, so one
* field drives both the declaration and the {@code -m} flag and they cannot drift apart.
*/
private void addCustomProvider(ObjectNode root, BridgedConfig.Profile cfg) {
String[] parts = splitModelSelector(cfg);
String providerId = parts[0];
String modelId = parts[1];
ObjectNode provider = root.putObject("provider").putObject(providerId);
provider.put("npm", "@ai-sdk/openai-compatible");
provider.put("name", providerId + " (bridged)");
ObjectNode options = provider.putObject("options");
options.put("baseURL", openAiBaseUrl(cfg.baseUrl()));
// vLLM and friends usually ignore the key, but the AI SDK still requires a non-empty one.
String token = resolveEnv(cfg.tokenEnv());
options.put("apiKey", (token == null || token.isBlank()) ? "bridged-local-noauth" : token);
provider.putObject("models").putObject(modelId).put("name", modelId);
}
/**
* Split {@code model:} into its {@code provider} and {@code model} halves. A pinned endpoint
* needs both, so a bare model name is rejected loudly rather than silently falling back to the
* default gateway — a worker quietly talking to the wrong endpoint is the failure this avoids.
*/
private static String[] splitModelSelector(BridgedConfig.Profile cfg) {
String model = cfg.model();
int slash = model == null ? -1 : model.indexOf('/');
if (model == null || model.isBlank() || slash <= 0 || slash == model.length() - 1) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"profile " + cfg.profile() + " sets baseUrl (a pinned opencode endpoint) so"
+ " model: must be \"<provider>/<model>\", e.g."
+ " \"local-vllm/deepseek-v4-flash\"; got "
+ (model == null ? "null" : '"' + model + '"'));
}
return new String[]{model.substring(0, slash), model.substring(slash + 1)};
}
/**
* The OpenAI-compatible base URL for {@code baseUrl}. A bare {@code host:port} gets {@code /v1}
* appended (where these servers put the API); a URL that already carries a path is taken as-is,
* so an endpoint mounted somewhere unusual is still reachable.
*/
private static String openAiBaseUrl(String baseUrl) {
String trimmed = baseUrl.trim();
while (trimmed.endsWith("/")) {
trimmed = trimmed.substring(0, trimmed.length() - 1);
}
int schemeEnd = trimmed.indexOf("://");
String afterScheme = schemeEnd < 0 ? trimmed : trimmed.substring(schemeEnd + 3);
return afterScheme.contains("/") ? trimmed : trimmed + "/v1";
}
/** Add lazy on-disk session discovery to the base handle. */
@Override
public PeerHandle spawn(SpawnRequest req) {
PeerHandle inner = super.spawn(req);
return new SessionAwareHandle(inner, discovery, effectiveCwd(req));
}
/**
* A {@link PeerHandle} that delegates everything to the base's worker handle but resolves
* {@link #agentSessionId()} lazily through opencode session discovery. Delegate-only, so the
* base's id/terminalId/profile semantics (CB-519's host-unique routing key, herdr coordinates)
* are untouched — only the opencode-specific identity answer is added. {@code sessionName()}
* stays null: opencode has no display-name seam, so the logical name lives only in the bridge's
* roster (see the SESSION_NAME capability).
*/
private static final class SessionAwareHandle implements PeerHandle {
private final PeerHandle delegate;
private final OpenCodeSessionDiscovery discovery;
private final String cwd;
SessionAwareHandle(PeerHandle delegate, OpenCodeSessionDiscovery discovery, String cwd) {
this.delegate = delegate;
this.discovery = discovery;
this.cwd = cwd;
}
@Override
public String id() {
return delegate.id();
}
@Override
public String terminalId() {
return delegate.terminalId();
}
@Override
public String profile() {
return delegate.profile();
}
@Override
public String sessionName() {
return delegate.sessionName();
}
@Override
public String agentSessionId() {
// Lazy + retried, never a spawn-time blocker: opencode writes the session record only
// when the session is first persisted, so null here is the correct interim answer and
// the caller re-calls later (each call re-scans, picking up a record that has since
// appeared).
return discovery.sessionIdForDirectory(cwd);
}
@Override
public CharterReceipt charterReceipt() {
return delegate.charterReceipt();
}
}
// --- Agent-returning convenience spawns (used by callers/tests that want the herdr Agent) ---
/** Spawn a worker for the default profile in the resolved default cwd. */
public Agent spawn() {
return spawnInternal(null, null, null);
}
/** Spawn a worker for a named profile (null → default) in the resolved default cwd. */
public Agent spawn(String profileName) {
return spawnInternal(profileName, null, null);
}
/** Spawn a worker for a named profile with an explicit requested/caller cwd (CB-112). */
public Agent spawn(String profileName, String requestedCwd, String callerCwd) {
return spawnInternal(profileName, requestedCwd, callerCwd);
}
// --- capabilities --------------------------------------------------------------------------
@Override
public Set<Capability> capabilities() {
Set<Capability> caps = EnumSet.of(Capability.MID_TURN_ASK, Capability.WORKTREE,
Capability.ORPHAN_REAP, Capability.SESSION_RESUME);
if (hasGitTokenProfile()) {
caps.add(Capability.SELF_PR);
}
// Deliberately NOT SESSION_NAME: opencode has no display-name flag, so the bridge's logical
// name can't surface in the peer's own UI — declaring the capability would hide that
// asymmetry rather than make it honest. For opencode the name lives only in the bridge's
// roster (see PeerHandle.sessionName() returning null).
return Set.copyOf(caps);
}
/** Whether any configured profile opts into a git-forge token (required for {@link Capability#SELF_PR}). */
private boolean hasGitTokenProfile() {
return profileConfigs().stream().anyMatch(BridgedConfig.Profile::hasGitToken);
}
// --- CB-117 reap predicate (opencode prefix), kept for direct unit testing -----------------
/**
* Whether {@code name} is an opencode bridge worker started by a <em>different</em> process than
* {@code currentNonce}. A thin {@code opencode}-prefix binding of
* {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#isForeignWorker(String, String, String)}.
*/
static boolean isForeignWorker(String name, String currentNonce) {
return HerdrPeerLauncher.isForeignWorker(NAME_PREFIX, name, currentNonce);
}
}
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.member;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.stream.Stream;
/**
* Resolves the opencode session id for a bridged worker from opencode's on-disk storage — the
* only place this adapter touches opencode's private layout, and deliberately the <em>only</em>
* class that does.
*
* <p><strong>Why this is isolated behind one seam.</strong> The layout is version-coupled and not a
* stable contract: opencode writes one JSON file per session under
* {@code <storageRoot>/session/<projectID>/<ses_*.json>}, and each record carries a
* {@code "version"} field (e.g. {@code "1.1.31"}), so the exact directory shape, file naming, and
* field names can move between opencode releases. opencode also ships a headless HTTP server that
* may supersede file scanning entirely. Everything this adapter knows about that private storage —
* its shape, naming, and field names — lives here, so a layout change, or a switch to the HTTP
* server, changes exactly one class and nothing in {@link OpenCodeLauncher}.
*
* <p>The determinism that makes this useful is structural, not a guess: every bridged worker runs
* in its own unique git worktree, so the record's {@code directory} (its project root) equals the
* worker's cwd identifies <em>its</em> session unambiguously. We match on {@code directory} rather
* than diffing {@code opencode session list} before/after — that races under concurrent spawns, and
* the CLI listing does not even show the directory.
*
* <p>All reads are best-effort and never throw: a missing or unreadable storage root, a record that
* fails to parse, or a directory with no record yet all yield {@code null}, and the caller (the
* session handle) treats that as "identity not resolved yet" and retries later.
*/
final class OpenCodeSessionDiscovery {
private final Path storageRoot; // e.g. ~/.local/share/opencode (injectable for tests)
private final ObjectMapper json;
OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(Path storageRoot) {
this.storageRoot = storageRoot;
this.json = new ObjectMapper();
}
/**
* The opencode session id whose record references {@code directory} (the worker's cwd), or
* {@code null} when no record matches yet. When several records share the directory — e.g.
* repeated spawns into the same worktree — the <em>most recently modified</em> one wins: it is
* the session the pane most likely corresponds to.
*
* <p>Never throws: a missing {@code storageRoot}, an unreadable/malformed record, or a
* directory that has not been persisted yet all resolve to {@code null} rather than failing a
* spawn. A bridged worker's session record is written lazily (when the session is first
* persisted), so {@code null} here is the normal answer right after the pane is ready, and the
* caller retries later.
*
* @param directory the worker's cwd, as resolved for this spawn
* @return the matching session id, or {@code null} if none is known yet
*/
String sessionIdForDirectory(String directory) {
if (directory == null || directory.isBlank()) {
return null;
}
Path sessionRoot = storageRoot.resolve("session");
if (!Files.isDirectory(sessionRoot)) {
return null;
}
String best = null;
long bestMtime = Long.MIN_VALUE;
try (Stream<Path> projectDirs = Files.list(sessionRoot)) {
for (Path projectDir : projectDirs.filter(Files::isDirectory).toList()) {
try (Stream<Path> records = Files.list(projectDir)) {
for (Path record : records.toList()) {
String id = matchId(record, directory);
if (id == null) {
continue;
}
long mtime = lastModifiedEpochMillis(record);
if (mtime > bestMtime) {
bestMtime = mtime;
best = id;
}
}
} catch (IOException ignored) {
// one project dir unreadable — skip it; another may still match
}
}
} catch (IOException ignored) {
// storage root vanished or became unreadable — "no session known yet"
return null;
}
return best;
}
/**
* The record's session id when it references {@code directory}, else {@code null}. A record
* that is not JSON, lacks {@code id}/{@code directory}, or points at a different directory is
* simply not our session; a malformed one is skipped, never fatal.
*/
private String matchId(Path record, String directory) {
try {
JsonNode node = json.readTree(record.toFile());
JsonNode id = node == null ? null : node.get("id");
JsonNode dir = node == null ? null : node.get("directory");
if (id == null || dir == null || !directory.equals(dir.asText())) {
return null;
}
return id.asText();
} catch (IOException e) {
return null;
}
}
/** The record's last-modified epoch ms, or {@code Long.MIN_VALUE} if unreadable (never wins). */
private static long lastModifiedEpochMillis(Path record) {
try {
return Files.getLastModifiedTime(record).toMillis();
} catch (IOException e) {
return Long.MIN_VALUE;
}
}
}
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.peer;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Set;
/**
* SPI for materializing a connected peer — the only way the bridge core creates or tears down
* a peer process. Every launcher is a first-party, in-tree adapter selected by (future) profile
* config; today's single adapter is the {@code ClaudeCodeLauncher} / Claude Code over herdr.
*
* <p>The core delegates spawn and teardown to this interface without knowing how the peer is set
* up. Environment variables, CLI flags, subscription guards, transport (herdr tab/pane) layout,
* and naming conventions are all adapter-private — the core sees only the returned
* {@link PeerHandle} whose {@code id()} is the registry/routing key.
*
* <p>The interface is a superset of what {@code SessionManager} and {@code Bridged.main} call
* on the concrete launcher today.
*/
public interface PeerLauncher {
/**
* The set of {@link Capability capabilities} this launcher declares. A peer whose profile
* opts into a git-forge token should include {@link Capability#SELF_PR}; the base set for
* the Claude Code herdr adapter is always {@code MID_TURN_ASK, WORKTREE, ORPHAN_REAP}.
*/
Set<Capability> capabilities();
/**
* The capabilities of the adapter that {@code profileName} resolves to (null/blank → the
* default profile, the same resolution {@link #spawn} uses). Distinct from {@link
* #capabilities()}, which unions every configured adapter: a caller that must know whether
* <em>this</em> profile's backend supports a capability — e.g. {@link Capability#SESSION_RESUME}
* before honoring {@link SpawnRequest#resumeSessionId()} — needs the per-profile answer, not
* the fleet-wide union, or a mixed fleet could OK a resume that lands on a non-supporting
* adapter (CB-584).
*
* @throws IllegalArgumentException if the profile is unknown and no default is configured
*/
Set<Capability> capabilitiesFor(String profileName);
/**
* {@code profileName}/requestedCwd null/blank → default resolution. Returns after the peer
* process is live (env + argv + placement complete). Never returns {@code null}.
*
* @param req the spawn parameters (profile, requested cwd, caller cwd)
* @return a handle whose {@link PeerHandle#id()} is the registry/routing key
* @throws IllegalArgumentException if the profile is unknown and no default is configured
*/
PeerHandle spawn(SpawnRequest req);
/**
* The configured worker profile names — the set of names {@code spawn(profileName)} accepts.
*/
Set<String> profiles();
/**
* The profile a no-argument {@link #spawn(SpawnRequest)} uses, or {@code null} if none is configured.
*/
String defaultProfile();
/**
* Resolve the effective working directory for a spawn {@code req} without actually spawning.
* Resolution order: requestedCwd → profile cwd → callerCwd → daemon cwd.
*
* @return the resolved absolute path, never null/blank
*/
String effectiveCwd(SpawnRequest req);
/**
* The parity-overlay file list for {@code profileName} (default list when unset). Used by
* worktree provisioning to copy config files into the isolated checkout before spawning.
*/
List<String> parityOverlay(String profileName);
/**
* The set of all agents this launcher currently tracks, transport-specific. Each element
* exposes at minimum a pane-like {@code id()} matching this launcher's {@link PeerHandle}
* scheme, plus transport-level status. Callers merge this set with the session registry to
* build a live roster view.
*/
List<?> list();
/**
* Reap orphaned peers left behind by a prior daemon process. Only peers whose naming scheme
* matches this launcher's and whose nonce differs from the current process are eligible.
* Best-effort: a failure to list or to stop any one peer is logged and never aborts startup.
*
* @return the number of orphaned peers reaped
*/
int reapOrphanWorkers();
/**
* Tear a peer down by its registry/routing key ({@link PeerHandle#id()}). Tolerates an
* already-gone peer. Also cleans up launcher-private resources (e.g. empty dedicated tabs)
* when safe to do so.
*/
void stop(String id);
/**
* Discard the context of the peer identified by {@code id}. Implementations must bypass normal
* bridge delivery/turn accounting. Unsupported peer kinds return {@code false} without sending
* a guessed command.
*
* @return {@code true} when a reset was sent and its status transition must settle before reuse
*/
boolean clearContext(String id);
}
@@ -1,510 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.session;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
import java.io.UncheckedIOException;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.nio.file.StandardCopyOption;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Optional;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong;
import java.util.stream.Collectors;
/**
* Production {@link Worktrees} implementation that shells {@code git} via {@link ProcessBuilder}.
* Non-zero exits become {@link WorktreeException}. Worktree directories live under a configurable
* root (default: a sibling {@code .bridged-worktrees} of the repo root) so they are never nested
* inside the primary working tree.
*/
public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(GitWorktrees.class);
/** Project-level MCP config. Present in the repo, so every worktree would otherwise inherit the
* primary's IDE server mounts (a CB-523 worker edited the primary checkout; see the isolation
* javadoc). Neutralized unconditionally. */
private static final String MCP_CONFIG = ".mcp.json";
/** What {@link #isolateToolSurface} writes for {@code .mcp.json}: a valid, explicitly empty server map. */
private static final String NEUTRAL_MCP_CONFIG = "{\n \"mcpServers\": {}\n}\n";
/** OpenCode's repo-level config. Tracked here, so it lands in every worktree, and it mounts the
* primary's gitea and context7 servers with the primary's credentials. Neutralized so the worker
* gets only the config its launcher writes via {@code OPENCODE_CONFIG}.
*
* <p>The reason has changed shape and is now stronger. It used to be a crash: the file carried
* {@code {file:.secrets/...}} references to gitignored files that never reached a worktree, and
* opencode refuses to start on a dangling reference (CB-543). Those credentials now live in one
* shell-level store and the file reads them as {@code {env:...}}, so in a worktree the reference
* resolves instead of failing. That is worse, not better: a member would silently inherit the
* primary's admin-scoped {@code GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN}. A loud crash became a quiet privilege leak,
* so this entry protects a boundary now rather than papering over a startup error. */
private static final String OPENCODE_CONFIG = "opencode.json";
/** What {@link #isolateToolSurface} writes for {@code opencode.json}: a valid, empty JSON object. */
private static final String NEUTRAL_OPENCODE_CONFIG = "{}\n";
/** Autoenv's repo-level config. Not tracked today, but re-landing it must stay safe: autoenv
* authorizes by path, so a fresh worktree path is always unauthorized and its interactive prompt
* would block every spawn — neutralize it so it can never be committed. */
private static final String AUTOENV_CONFIG = ".autoenv";
/** What {@link #isolateToolSurface} writes for {@code .autoenv}: a valid, empty env file. */
private static final String NEUTRAL_AUTOENV_CONFIG = "";
/**
* A tracked project config that is hostile in a provisioned worktree, and what to replace it
* with. {@link #file} is the repo-relative path; {@link #stub} is a neutral but VALID payload for
* that file's format — a malformed stub would only trade one crash for another;
* {@link #createIfAbsent} keeps {@code .mcp.json}'s long-standing behaviour of writing its stub
* even when the repo carries no such file, whereas the others are only touched when present.
*/
private record WorktreeHostileConfig(String file, String stub, boolean createIfAbsent) {}
/** The worktree-hostile configs neutralized in every provisioned worktree, in order. */
private static final List<WorktreeHostileConfig> WORKTREE_HOSTILE_CONFIGS = List.of(
new WorktreeHostileConfig(MCP_CONFIG, NEUTRAL_MCP_CONFIG, true),
new WorktreeHostileConfig(OPENCODE_CONFIG, NEUTRAL_OPENCODE_CONFIG, false),
new WorktreeHostileConfig(AUTOENV_CONFIG, NEUTRAL_AUTOENV_CONFIG, false)
);
private final String configuredRoot;
private final SecureRandom random = new SecureRandom();
private final AtomicLong seq = new AtomicLong();
/** Default constructor: worktree root is derived per-repo as {@code <repoRoot>/../.bridged-worktrees}. */
public GitWorktrees() {
this(null);
}
/** @param configuredRoot nullable absolute or relative path; null/blank derives a sibling of the repo root. */
public GitWorktrees(String configuredRoot) {
this.configuredRoot = configuredRoot;
}
@Override
public String add(String repoRoot, String branch, String baseRef) {
String base = (baseRef == null || baseRef.isBlank()) ? "HEAD" : baseRef;
String nonce = nonce();
Path root = resolveRoot(repoRoot);
Path path = root.resolve(nonce);
try {
Files.createDirectories(root);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new WorktreeException("cannot create worktree root " + root + ": " + e.getMessage(), e);
}
String wt = path.toAbsolutePath().toString();
log.info("adding worktree branch={} path={} base={}", branch, wt, base);
exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "worktree", "add", wt, "-b", branch, base);
isolateToolSurface(wt);
return wt;
}
/**
* Neutralize the worktree's worktree-hostile project configs so a worker inherits only the tools
* and environment its launcher mounts (the bridge via {@code --mcp-config}, the opencode config
* via {@code OPENCODE_CONFIG}) — never the primary's.
*
* <p>This is unconditional, and it is not the same job as the parity overlay. The repo's own
* committed {@code .mcp.json} declares the primary's IDE servers, so a fresh checkout mounts them
* whether or not the overlay copies anything; a worker that inherits them navigates and edits
* through tools bound to the <em>primary's</em> IntelliJ project, which silently hands it absolute
* paths outside its own worktree. That is not hypothetical: a CB-523 worker made all 59 of its
* edits in the primary checkout while compiling its worktree, so every build it ran was of code
* that did not contain its changes. {@code opencode.json} is the same trap one tool over — tracked,
* so it lands in every worktree, and it mounts gitea and context7 with the primary's own
* credentials, which a member must never hold. {@code .autoenv} extends the principle to a
* config that is not tracked today: autoenv authorizes by path, so a fresh worktree path is always
* unauthorized and its interactive prompt would block every spawn, so re-landing one must be safe.
*
* <p>Where a config exists it is replaced by a valid neutral stub (an explicitly empty
* map/object, or an empty env file — never a deletion, which would still let a later
* {@code git checkout} restore the hostile copy). The {@code --skip-worktree} bit keeps the
* neutralized copy from ever showing up as a local modification the worker might commit. A config
* the repo does not carry is skipped silently — no stub is invented for a file the repo does not
* have, and one missing file must never fail provisioning.
*/
private void isolateToolSurface(String worktreePath) {
Path root = Path.of(worktreePath).toAbsolutePath().normalize();
for (WorktreeHostileConfig cfg : WORKTREE_HOSTILE_CONFIGS) {
neutralize(root, worktreePath, cfg);
}
}
private void neutralize(Path root, String worktreePath, WorktreeHostileConfig cfg) {
Path target = root.resolve(cfg.file());
if (!Files.exists(target) && !cfg.createIfAbsent()) {
log.debug("{} absent in the worktree — skipping (repo does not carry it)", cfg.file());
return;
}
try {
Files.writeString(target, cfg.stub());
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new WorktreeException("cannot neutralize " + cfg.file() + " in the worktree: "
+ e.getMessage(), e);
}
if (isTracked(root, cfg.file())) {
exec("git", "-C", worktreePath, "update-index", "--skip-worktree", cfg.file());
}
log.debug("neutralized {} — worker tool surface is launcher-mounted only", cfg.file());
}
@Override
public void remove(String repoRoot, String worktreePath) {
Path p = Path.of(worktreePath);
if (!Files.exists(p)) {
log.debug("worktree {} already gone — nothing to remove", worktreePath);
return;
}
log.info("removing worktree {}", worktreePath);
exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "worktree", "remove", "--force", worktreePath);
}
@Override
public boolean hasUncommitted(String worktreePath) {
// A worktree that is already gone holds no work to lose, and it must not break teardown:
// git -C <missing-dir> status exits non-zero and would throw where release() is mid-way
// through stopping a pane. Mirror remove()'s already-gone tolerance by treating it as clean.
Path p = Path.of(worktreePath);
if (!Files.exists(p)) {
log.debug("worktree {} already gone — nothing can be uncommitted", worktreePath);
return false;
}
// No --untracked-files=no: the exact shape of the work lost in CB-576 was a new file
// that was never added, so an untracked-only worktree is still dirty.
String out = exec("git", "-C", worktreePath, "status", "--porcelain");
return !out.isBlank();
}
@Override
public void overlayParity(String repoRoot, String worktreePath, List<String> overlay) {
if (overlay == null || overlay.isEmpty()) {
return;
}
Path srcRoot = Path.of(repoRoot).toAbsolutePath().normalize();
Path dstRoot = Path.of(worktreePath).toAbsolutePath().normalize();
for (String rel : overlay) {
Path src = srcRoot.resolve(rel).normalize();
if (!Files.exists(src)) {
log.debug("parity overlay source missing — skipping {}", rel);
continue;
}
Path dst = dstRoot.resolve(rel).normalize();
try {
Files.createDirectories(dst.getParent());
Files.copy(src, dst, StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING, StandardCopyOption.COPY_ATTRIBUTES);
log.debug("copied parity overlay {}", rel);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new WorktreeException("cannot copy overlay " + rel + ": " + e.getMessage(), e);
}
if (isTracked(dstRoot, rel)) {
exec("git", "-C", worktreePath, "update-index", "--skip-worktree", rel);
log.debug("marked overlay --skip-worktree {}", rel);
}
}
}
@Override
public String repoRoot(String cwd) {
String out = exec("git", "-C", cwd, "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel");
return Path.of(out.trim()).toAbsolutePath().normalize().toString();
}
/**
* CB-578 stage C, fixed by CB-587. Stages into a <em>temporary</em> index (never the worktree's
* real one, which the worker may still be writing to) — but that temp index is first <em>seeded</em>
* from the worktree's real one, rather than starting empty:
*
* <pre>
* cp $(git -C worktree rev-parse --git-path index) &lt;temp&gt;
* GIT_INDEX_FILE=&lt;temp&gt; git -C worktree add -A
* tree=$(GIT_INDEX_FILE=&lt;temp&gt; git -C worktree write-tree)
* commit=$(git -C worktree commit-tree $tree -p HEAD -m message)
* git -C worktree update-ref refs/wip/branch $commit
* </pre>
*
* A fresh empty index carries none of the real index's {@code --skip-worktree} /
* {@code --assume-unchanged} bits, so {@code add -A} into it stages a skip-worktree file's local
* on-disk content even though {@code git status --porcelain} correctly hides that file (CB-587).
* Seeding from the real index preserves those bits, so {@code add -A} then skips exactly what
* {@code git status} skips. {@code add -A} (never {@code -f}) also still respects
* {@code .gitignore} exactly as it would in the real index — a gitignored file staying ignored is
* what keeps secrets and local config out of the snapshot's tree. The temporary index file is
* removed afterwards regardless of outcome; the worker's real index is never opened for writing.
*/
@Override
public Optional<String> snapshot(String worktreePath, String branch, String message) {
if (!Files.exists(Path.of(worktreePath))) {
log.debug("worktree {} already gone — nothing to snapshot", worktreePath);
return Optional.empty();
}
Path tempIndex;
try {
tempIndex = Files.createTempFile("bridged-wip-index-", ".tmp");
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new WorktreeException("cannot create a temporary index for snapshot: " + e.getMessage(), e);
}
Map<String, String> indexEnv = Map.of("GIT_INDEX_FILE", tempIndex.toAbsolutePath().toString());
try {
Path realIndex = resolveRealIndex(worktreePath);
try {
Files.copy(realIndex, tempIndex, StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new WorktreeException("cannot copy the worktree's real index (" + realIndex
+ ") into the temporary snapshot index: " + e.getMessage(), e);
}
exec(indexEnv, "git", "-C", worktreePath, "add", "-A");
String tree = exec(indexEnv, "git", "-C", worktreePath, "write-tree").trim();
String commit = exec("git", "-C", worktreePath, "commit-tree", tree, "-p", "HEAD", "-m", message).trim();
exec("git", "-C", worktreePath, "update-ref", "refs/wip/" + branch, commit);
log.info("snapshotted worktree {} to refs/wip/{} commit={}", worktreePath, branch, commit);
return Optional.of(commit);
} finally {
try {
Files.deleteIfExists(tempIndex);
} catch (IOException e) {
log.debug("could not delete temporary snapshot index {}: {}", tempIndex, e.getMessage());
}
}
}
/**
* Resolve the path of {@code worktreePath}'s real index. Never assume {@code <worktree>/.git/index}:
* in a linked worktree {@code .git} is a <em>file</em> pointing at the main repo's
* {@code worktrees/<name>/} directory, and that is where the real per-worktree index lives.
* {@code git rev-parse --git-path index} resolves this correctly for both a linked worktree and
* the main checkout. Throws {@link WorktreeException} — same as every other failure in this
* class — if the command fails or the resolved path does not exist, rather than silently
* snapshotting from an empty index.
*/
private Path resolveRealIndex(String worktreePath) {
String out = exec("git", "-C", worktreePath, "rev-parse", "--git-path", "index").trim();
Path index = Path.of(out);
if (!index.isAbsolute()) {
index = Path.of(worktreePath).resolve(index).normalize();
}
if (!Files.exists(index)) {
throw new WorktreeException("worktree's real index not found at resolved path " + index
+ " (git rev-parse --git-path index reported '" + out + "')");
}
return index;
}
/**
* One {@code refs/wip/<branch>} snapshot ref as read by {@link #listWipRefs}: its full ref name,
* the snapshot commit's sha, and that commit's committer time in unix millis (the age of the
* snapshot — a snapshot is written once and never rewritten, so the commit date is the ref's).
*/
private record WipRef(String refName, String sha, long committerMillis) {
String branch() {
return refName.substring("refs/wip/".length());
}
}
@Override
public WipRefStats wipRefs(String repoRoot) {
List<WipRef> refs = listWipRefs(repoRoot);
long costBytes = 0;
for (WipRef ref : refs) {
costBytes += treeSize(repoRoot, ref.sha());
}
return new WipRefStats(refs.size(), costBytes);
}
@Override
public int pruneWipRefs(String repoRoot, long minAgeMillis) {
// The rule is documented on Worktrees#pruneWipRefs: delete only a snapshot whose tree
// content is already reachable from main AND that is older than minAgeMillis. Reachability
// is the floor that keeps a worker's last copy; the age floor keeps a just-written snapshot
// from being swept while a lead may still be looking at it.
List<WipRef> refs = listWipRefs(repoRoot);
if (refs.isEmpty()) {
return 0;
}
long nowMillis = System.currentTimeMillis();
// Resolve what main carries once per sweep, not once per ref.
Set<String> mainObjects = reachableObjectsFromMain(repoRoot);
int deleted = 0;
for (WipRef ref : refs) {
long ageMillis = nowMillis - ref.committerMillis();
if (ageMillis <= minAgeMillis) {
continue; // too recent — never swept, even if it looks recoverable (CB-586)
}
String tree = exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "rev-parse", ref.sha() + "^{tree}").trim();
if (!mainObjects.contains(tree)) {
// Last copy of the snapshot's content — the worker's work exists nowhere else.
// Never delete automatically (CB-586 criterion 2).
continue;
}
exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "update-ref", "-d", ref.refName());
deleted++;
log.info("pruned snapshot ref refs/wip/{} commit={} (age {}h): its tree is already "
+ "reachable from main, so the work is preserved; recover from reflog via "
+ "git update-ref refs/wip/{} {}",
ref.branch(), ref.sha(), TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS.toHours(ageMillis),
ref.branch(), ref.sha());
}
return deleted;
}
/**
* Every {@code refs/wip/*} ref (see {@link WipRef}). The committer date is read as a unix
* count of seconds and converted to millis. {@code %00} (NUL) separates the fields because a
* branch name may contain spaces.
*/
private List<WipRef> listWipRefs(String repoRoot) {
String out = exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "for-each-ref",
"--format=%(refname)%00%(objectname)%00%(committerdate:unix)", "refs/wip/");
List<WipRef> refs = new ArrayList<>();
for (String line : out.split("\\R")) {
if (line.isBlank()) {
continue;
}
String[] parts = line.split("\u0000", -1);
if (parts.length == 3 && !parts[1].isBlank()) {
refs.add(new WipRef(parts[0], parts[1], Long.parseLong(parts[2]) * 1000L));
}
}
return refs;
}
/**
* The set of object shas reachable from {@code main}, or an empty set when {@code main} cannot
* be resolved. An empty set is the safe direction: the retention sweep then concludes nothing
* is recoverable, so it deletes nothing — a repo with no {@code main} must never cause a
* worker's last copy of a snapshot to be dropped on a reachability misreading.
*/
private Set<String> reachableObjectsFromMain(String repoRoot) {
if (exitCode("git", "-C", repoRoot, "rev-parse", "--verify", "main") != 0) {
log.debug("refs/wip retention: no 'main' ref in {} — treating nothing as reachable", repoRoot);
return Set.of();
}
String out = exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "rev-list", "--objects", "main");
Set<String> objects = new HashSet<>();
for (String line : out.split("\\R")) {
if (line.isBlank()) {
continue;
}
int sp = line.indexOf(' ');
objects.add(sp < 0 ? line : line.substring(0, sp));
}
return objects;
}
/** Approximate cost of a snapshot: the sum of every blob's size in its committed tree. */
private long treeSize(String repoRoot, String sha) {
String out = exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "ls-tree", "-r", "-l", sha);
long total = 0;
for (String line : out.split("\\R")) {
if (line.isBlank()) {
continue;
}
// ls-tree -l row: "<mode> <type> <object> <size>\t<path>"; the size is only numeric for
// blobs (trees read "-"), so gate on the type token and take the 4th whitespace field.
String[] parts = line.split("\\s+");
if (parts.length >= 4 && "blob".equals(parts[1])) {
try {
total += Long.parseLong(parts[3]);
} catch (NumberFormatException ignored) {
// a '-' size (or any anomaly) contributes nothing to the rough figure
}
}
}
return total;
}
/** Resolve the directory that will hold per-session worktree checkouts. */
private Path resolveRoot(String repoRoot) {
if (configuredRoot != null && !configuredRoot.isBlank()) {
return Path.of(configuredRoot).toAbsolutePath().normalize();
}
Path repo = Path.of(repoRoot).toAbsolutePath().normalize();
return repo.resolveSibling(".bridged-worktrees");
}
private String nonce() {
return String.format("%06x", random.nextInt(1 << 24)) + "-" + seq.incrementAndGet();
}
private boolean isTracked(Path worktreeRoot, String rel) {
return exitCode("git", "-C", worktreeRoot.toString(), "ls-files", "--error-unmatch", rel) == 0;
}
/**
* Run a command and return its stdout. Non-zero exit → {@link WorktreeException} with both
* stdout and stderr (merged by redirectErrorStream).
*/
private String exec(String... command) {
return exec(Map.of(), command);
}
/** Same as {@link #exec(String...)}, with extra environment variables set on the child process. */
private String exec(Map<String, String> extraEnv, String... command) {
String out;
int code;
Process p;
try {
ProcessBuilder pb = new ProcessBuilder(command).redirectErrorStream(true);
if (extraEnv != null && !extraEnv.isEmpty()) {
pb.environment().putAll(extraEnv);
}
p = pb.start();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new WorktreeException("failed to start " + command[0] + ": " + e.getMessage(), e);
}
try (BufferedReader r = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(p.getInputStream(), StandardCharsets.UTF_8))) {
out = r.lines().collect(Collectors.joining("\n"));
} catch (IOException e) {
p.destroyForcibly();
throw new UncheckedIOException(e);
}
try {
if (!p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS)) {
p.destroyForcibly();
throw new WorktreeException("command timed out: " + String.join(" ", command) + "\n" + out);
}
code = p.exitValue();
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
p.destroyForcibly();
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
throw new WorktreeException("interrupted waiting for command: " + String.join(" ", command), e);
}
if (code != 0) {
throw new WorktreeException("exit " + code + " for: " + String.join(" ", command)
+ (out.isBlank() ? "" : "\n" + out));
}
return out;
}
private int exitCode(String... command) {
Process p;
try {
p = new ProcessBuilder(command).redirectErrorStream(true).start();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new WorktreeException("failed to start " + command[0] + ": " + e.getMessage(), e);
}
try {
if (!p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS)) {
p.destroyForcibly();
throw new WorktreeException("command timed out: " + String.join(" ", command));
}
return p.exitValue();
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
p.destroyForcibly();
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
throw new WorktreeException("interrupted waiting for command: " + String.join(" ", command), e);
}
}
}
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged;
import dev.ltms.bridged.config.BridgedConfig;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* CB-594: {@link Bridged#requiredSecretEnvVars(BridgedConfig)} is what decides what the startup
* secret report checks — it must derive that set from the config, not a hand-written list, or a
* new profile's token silently stops being reported.
*/
class RequiredSecretEnvVarsTest {
private static BridgedConfig load(Path dir, String yaml) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("bridged.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml);
return BridgedConfig.load(f);
}
@Test
void collectsATokenEnvPerNonSubscriptionProfile(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, """
profiles:
local:
baseUrl: http://gx00.gw:8000
tokenEnv: AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
""");
Map<String, List<String>> required = Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg);
assertTrue(required.containsKey("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN"));
assertEquals(List.of("profile 'local' tokenEnv"), required.get("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN"));
}
@Test
void aSubscriptionProfileNeedsNoTokenEnv(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, """
profiles:
opus:
subscription: true
model: claude-opus-5
""");
assertTrue(Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg).isEmpty(),
"subscription: true never reads ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN — see Profile#isSubscription");
}
@Test
void gitTokenEnvIsOptInAndCollectedWhenSet(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, """
profiles:
local:
baseUrl: http://gx00.gw:8000
tokenEnv: AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
gitTokenEnv: WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN
""");
Map<String, List<String>> required = Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg);
assertTrue(required.containsKey("WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN"));
assertEquals(List.of("profile 'local' gitTokenEnv"), required.get("WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN"));
}
@Test
void noGitTokenEnvMeansNothingIsRequiredForIt(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, """
profiles:
local:
baseUrl: http://gx00.gw:8000
tokenEnv: AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
""");
assertFalse(Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg).containsKey("WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN"));
}
@Test
void aVarSharedByTwoProfilesIsReportedOnceNamingBoth(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, """
profiles:
local:
baseUrl: http://gx00.gw:8000
tokenEnv: AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
gitTokenEnv: WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN
gx:
kind: opencode
baseUrl: https://llm.ltms.dev/v1
tokenEnv: AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
gitTokenEnv: WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN
""");
Map<String, List<String>> required = Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg);
assertEquals(List.of("profile 'local' tokenEnv", "profile 'gx' tokenEnv"),
required.get("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN"));
assertEquals(List.of("profile 'local' gitTokenEnv", "profile 'gx' gitTokenEnv"),
required.get("WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN"));
}
@Test
void noProfilesMeansNothingIsRequired(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, "bind:\n host: 127.0.0.1\n port: 8765\n");
assertTrue(Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg).isEmpty());
}
}
@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.health;
import ch.qos.logback.classic.Logger;
import ch.qos.logback.classic.spi.ILoggingEvent;
import ch.qos.logback.core.read.ListAppender;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.FakeHerdr;
import dev.ltms.bridged.inject.Injector;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.InMemoryReplyInbox;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.MessageService;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.Rendezvous;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.SessionManager;
import dev.ltms.bridged.member.ClaudeCodeLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.WorkspaceControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.guard.SubscriptionGuard;
import dev.ltms.bridged.config.BridgedConfig;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.Executors;
import java.util.function.BiConsumer;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
class FleetHealthMonitorTest {
@Test void oneTickUsesOneFleetListForAnyRosterSize() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
BridgedConfig.Profile profile = new BridgedConfig.Profile("test", "http://test:1", null,
null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null);
ClaudeCodeLauncher launcher = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(agents, new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("test")), Map.of("test", profile), "test", _ -> "token");
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(launcher);
sessions.acquire("test", null, null, null);
sessions.acquire("test", null, null, null);
herdr.calls.clear();
MessageService messages = new MessageService(agents, new Injector(agents), new Rendezvous(), new InMemoryReplyInbox());
var scheduler = Executors.newSingleThreadScheduledExecutor();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = new FleetHealthMonitor(agents, sessions::roster, messages, scheduler, () -> 1, 60,
(_, _) -> { });
monitor.tick();
monitor.stop();
assertEquals(1, herdr.calls.stream().filter(call -> call.method().equals("agent.list")).count());
}
@Test void failedTickDoesNotStopTheNextTick() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().healthy(false);
AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
var scheduler = Executors.newSingleThreadScheduledExecutor();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = new FleetHealthMonitor(agents, java.util.List::of,
new MessageService(agents, new Injector(agents), new Rendezvous(), new InMemoryReplyInbox()),
scheduler, () -> 1, 60, (_, _) -> { });
monitor.tick();
herdr.healthy(true);
monitor.tick();
monitor.stop();
assertEquals(2, herdr.calls.stream().filter(call -> call.method().equals("agent.list")).count());
}
@Test void faultTransitionLogsOnlyOnceUntilItChanges() {
Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(FleetHealthMonitor.class);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.start();
logger.addAppender(appender);
try {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
var scheduler = Executors.newSingleThreadScheduledExecutor();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = new FleetHealthMonitor(agents, java.util.List::of,
new MessageService(agents, new Injector(agents), new Rendezvous(), new InMemoryReplyInbox()),
scheduler, () -> 1, 60, (_, _) -> { });
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.TURN_BOUNDARY_LOST);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.TURN_BOUNDARY_LOST);
monitor.stop();
assertEquals(1, appender.list.stream().filter(event -> event.getFormattedMessage()
.contains("member=term_a state=TURN_BOUNDARY_LOST")).count());
} finally {
logger.detachAppender(appender);
}
}
// --- CB-580: a member that reaches GONE/NEVER_READY must fail its waiting tickets
private static FleetHealthMonitor monitorWith(BiConsumer<String, String> failTarget) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
var scheduler = Executors.newSingleThreadScheduledExecutor();
return new FleetHealthMonitor(agents, java.util.List::of,
new MessageService(agents, new Injector(agents), new Rendezvous(), new InMemoryReplyInbox()),
scheduler, () -> 1, 60, failTarget);
}
@Test void terminalTransitionFailsTheTargetOnce() {
RecordingFailTarget failTarget = new RecordingFailTarget();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitorWith(failTarget);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
monitor.stop();
assertEquals(1, failTarget.calls.size());
assertEquals("term_a", failTarget.calls.get(0).target());
assertTrue(failTarget.calls.get(0).reason().contains("GONE"));
}
@Test void neverReadyNamesItselfAsTheReason() {
RecordingFailTarget failTarget = new RecordingFailTarget();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitorWith(failTarget);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.NEVER_READY);
monitor.stop();
assertEquals(1, failTarget.calls.size());
assertTrue(failTarget.calls.get(0).reason().contains("NEVER_READY"));
}
@Test void stayingInATerminalStateProducesOneFailureNotN() {
RecordingFailTarget failTarget = new RecordingFailTarget();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitorWith(failTarget);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
monitor.stop();
assertEquals(1, failTarget.calls.size());
}
@Test void aNonTerminalFaultStateDoesNotFailTheTarget() {
RecordingFailTarget failTarget = new RecordingFailTarget();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitorWith(failTarget);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.TURN_BOUNDARY_LOST);
monitor.stop();
assertEquals(0, failTarget.calls.size());
}
@Test void failTargetRetryIsBounded() {
AlwaysThrowingFailTarget failTarget = new AlwaysThrowingFailTarget();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitorWith(failTarget);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
monitor.stop();
assertEquals(FleetHealthMonitor.MAX_FAIL_TARGET_ATTEMPTS, failTarget.calls);
}
@Test void exhaustedRetryStillDoesNotRefireOnAnUnchangedTick() {
AlwaysThrowingFailTarget failTarget = new AlwaysThrowingFailTarget();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitorWith(failTarget);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
int afterFirstTransition = failTarget.calls;
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
monitor.stop();
assertEquals(afterFirstTransition, failTarget.calls);
}
private record RecordedCall(String target, String reason) { }
private static final class RecordingFailTarget implements BiConsumer<String, String> {
final java.util.List<RecordedCall> calls = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
@Override public void accept(String target, String reason) {
calls.add(new RecordedCall(target, reason));
}
}
private static final class AlwaysThrowingFailTarget implements BiConsumer<String, String> {
int calls = 0;
@Override public void accept(String target, String reason) {
calls++;
throw new RuntimeException("boom");
}
}
}
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.herdr;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/** Unit tests for PID → pane resolution (the herdr half of connection-based MCP identity). */
class PaneLocatorTest {
private final PaneLocator loc = new PaneLocator(new FakeHerdr());
@Test
void resolvesTerminalForAForegroundPid() {
assertEquals("term_a", loc.terminalForPid(FakeHerdr.WORKER_PID));
}
@Test
void nullForAPidInNoPane() {
assertNull(loc.terminalForPid(999_999));
}
@Test
void nullForNonPositivePid() {
assertNull(loc.terminalForPid(0));
assertNull(loc.terminalForPid(-1));
}
}
@@ -1,501 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.inject;
import ch.qos.logback.classic.Level;
import ch.qos.logback.classic.LoggerContext;
import ch.qos.logback.classic.spi.ILoggingEvent;
import ch.qos.logback.core.read.ListAppender;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.FakeHerdr;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.Rendezvous;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.TestTurnTokens;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.TurnToken;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/** Unit behaviour of the CB-106 completion resolver in isolation from the injector. */
class CompletionResolverTest {
@Test
void skipsTheScrapeWhenNoSendIsWaiting() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous(); // no waiter opened
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
resolver.resolve("term_a", null); // no in-flight turn captured for this target
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.read"),
"a turn nobody is blocked on must not cost a transcript scrape");
}
@Test
void failSkipsTheScrapeWhenNoSendIsWaiting() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous(); // no waiter opened
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
resolver.fail("term_a", null); // no in-flight turn, and no registered waiter to fall back to
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.read"),
"a wedge nobody is blocked on must not cost a transcript scrape");
}
@Test
void captureBaselineSkipsTheReadWhenNoSendIsWaiting() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText("⏺ X\n❯ ");
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous(); // no waiter opened
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
resolver.captureBaseline("term_a", TestTurnTokens.inert("term_a")); // no send to attribute a later completion to
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.read"),
"with no waiting send there is no turn to baseline — skip the scrape");
}
// --- CB-115 clean scrape: extract the last assistant block ----------------
@Test
void extractsTheLastAssistantBlockStrippingChrome() {
String raw = """
⏺ Reading the file…
⏺ Done. The bug was an off-by-one in the loop bound.
╭──────────────────────────────────────╮
│ > │
╰──────────────────────────────────────╯
⏵⏵ auto mode on · ? for shortcuts
""";
assertEquals("Done. The bug was an off-by-one in the loop bound.",
CompletionResolver.lastAssistantBlock(raw));
}
@Test
void keepsMultiLineAssistantContent() {
String raw = "⏺ Line one.\nLine two.\n❯ ";
assertEquals("Line one.\nLine two.", CompletionResolver.lastAssistantBlock(raw));
}
@Test
void fallsBackToRawTextWhenThereIsNoMarker() {
String raw = "plain worker output with no glyph";
assertEquals("plain worker output with no glyph", CompletionResolver.lastAssistantBlock(raw));
}
@Test
void blankScrapeYieldsEmpty() {
assertTrue(CompletionResolver.lastAssistantBlock("").isEmpty());
assertTrue(CompletionResolver.lastAssistantBlock(null).isEmpty());
}
@Test
void stripsSpinnerAndRuleChrome() {
String raw = """
⏺ Channel check confirmed — your message got through.
✻ Brewed for 11s
─────────────────────────────────────
""";
assertEquals("Channel check confirmed — your message got through.",
CompletionResolver.lastAssistantBlock(raw));
}
@Test
void cutsANextTurnPromptEchoAndTrailingTipsFromTheBlock() {
// The exact turn-2 leak: the scrape captured the settled answer, then a "✻ Cooked" spinner,
// then the NEXT turn's echoed prompt, then a "✶ Forming…" spinner and trailing tips/warnings
// whose lines (⎿, ⚠) are not themselves chrome-terminated. Stopping at the first boundary
// (the ✻ spinner) is what keeps every one of those interface lines out of the reply.
String raw = """
⏺ Channel confirmed — the bridge reply delivered successfully.
✻ Cooked for 9s
❯ Thanks. Now a small task: what is 17 * 23? Show just the number.
✶ Forming…
⎿ Tip: Name your conversations with /rename
⚠ claude.ai connectors are disabled because ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is set
""";
assertEquals("Channel confirmed — the bridge reply delivered successfully.",
CompletionResolver.lastAssistantBlock(raw));
}
// --- CB-115 misattribution guard: suppress a stale (unchanged) completion -------
@Test
void suppressesACompletionWhoseScrapeIsUnchangedFromDelivery() {
// Rapid back-to-back turn: the pane still shows the PREVIOUS turn's answer when this turn's
// (misattributed) completion boundary fires. The scrape == the delivery baseline, so the
// send must NOT be resolved with the stale answer.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText("⏺ 391\n❯ ");
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a"); // a send is blocked on this turn
// The turn as captured at delivery: its waiter, and the previous turn's answer still on screen.
var turn = new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, "391");
resolver.resolve("term_a", turn); // scrape still "391" == baseline → suppress
assertFalse(waiter.isDone(), "a completion with no output change must not resolve the send");
assertTrue(rendezvous.isWaiting("term_a"), "the send stays waiting for a real reply");
}
@Test
void resolvesACompletionWhoseScrapeChangedSinceDelivery() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText("⏺ No, 391 = 17 × 23.\n❯ "); // the worker's real answer
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
// Delivery baseline was the previous turn's "391"; the scrape now differs → resolve.
var turn = new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, "391");
resolver.resolve("term_a", turn);
assertTrue(waiter.isDone(), "a completion with new output must resolve the send");
assertEquals(Rendezvous.Kind.COMPLETION, waiter.getNow(null).kind());
assertEquals("No, 391 = 17 × 23.", waiter.getNow(null).text());
}
@Test
void marksAClippedCompletionPaneTail() {
String block = "⏺ " + "x".repeat(CompletionResolver.MAX_SCRAPE_CHARS + 1) + "\n❯ ";
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText(block);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.resolve("term_a", new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null));
assertEquals("x".repeat(CompletionResolver.MAX_SCRAPE_CHARS)
+ "\n[Pane tail clipped: member did not call bridge_reply.]",
waiter.getNow(null).text());
}
@Test
void leavesAnUnclippedCompletionPaneTailUnmarked() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText("⏺ complete report\n❯ ");
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.resolve("term_a", new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null));
assertEquals("complete report", waiter.getNow(null).text());
}
@Test
void resolvesSynchronouslyBeforePostTurnContextClearing() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText("⏺ previous answer\n❯ ");
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.captureBaseline("term_a", new TurnToken("term_a", waiter));
herdr.readText("⏺ answer that /clear would erase\n❯ ");
resolver.resolveBeforePostAction("term_a");
assertTrue(waiter.isDone(), "the answer is captured before the adapter sends /clear");
assertEquals("answer that /clear would erase", waiter.getNow(null).text());
}
@Test
void suppressesAnUnchangedCompletionEvenWhenTheBlockExceedsTheScrapeCap() {
// The fan-out issue-hunt finding: captureBaseline once stored the RAW (unclipped) assistant
// block while resolve compares against a clip()'d tail. For a block longer than MAX_SCRAPE_CHARS
// the two capped representations differ even when the pane never changed, so the CB-115
// byte-identical guard failed to fire and a stale completion could resolve the send. Both sides
// must clip identically. The returned-text marker is added only after this comparison, so an
// unchanged >cap block on rapid back-to-back turns still stays suppressed.
String longBlock = "⏺ " + "x".repeat(CompletionResolver.MAX_SCRAPE_CHARS + 500) + "\n❯ ";
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText(longBlock);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a"); // a send is blocked on this turn
resolver.captureBaseline("term_a", new TurnToken("term_a", waiter)); // baseline is the clipped >cap block
var turn = resolver.inFlight("term_a");
assertEquals(CompletionResolver.MAX_SCRAPE_CHARS, turn.baseline().length(),
"the delivery baseline is clipped to the same cap resolve() applies to the tail");
resolver.resolve("term_a", turn); // scrape unchanged → clipped tail == baseline → suppress
assertFalse(waiter.isDone(),
"an unchanged >cap block must still be recognised as stale and suppressed");
assertTrue(rendezvous.isWaiting("term_a"), "the send stays waiting for a real reply");
}
@Test
void resolvesWhenThereIsNoBaseline() {
// No delivery baseline (e.g. the pre-turn read failed) ⇒ never suppress; the completion resolves.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText("⏺ hello\n❯ ");
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.resolve("term_a", new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null));
assertTrue(waiter.isDone(), "with no baseline a completion resolves as before");
assertEquals("hello", waiter.getNow(null).text());
}
@Test
void resolvesWhenTheScrapeItselfFailsEvenWithABaselinePresent() {
// The most important branch of the CB-115 guard: a failed read means the resolver could not
// SEE the screen — "couldn't see", not "no change". It must still resolve the send (an empty
// tail beats hanging until the caller's timeout), even though a baseline was captured. The
// baseline here is "" (an empty pane at delivery), so without the !scrapeFailed clause the
// byte-identical guard would wrongly match the empty tail and suppress.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().healthy(false); // agent.read throws HerdrException
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
var turn = new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, ""); // empty pane baselined at delivery
resolver.resolve("term_a", turn);
assertTrue(waiter.isDone(),
"a failed scrape must still resolve the send, not hang until the caller's timeout");
assertEquals(Rendezvous.Kind.COMPLETION, waiter.getNow(null).kind());
assertEquals("", waiter.getNow(null).text(), "the tail is empty because the screen was unreadable");
}
// --- CB-115/CB-116 fail guard: an already-done or absent waiter is left alone ---------
@Test
void failLeavesAnAlreadyResolvedWaiterUntouchedAndSkipsTheScrape() {
// The send was already resolved (e.g. by the worker's explicit reply) before fail fired.
// fail must not overwrite that value, and must not even scrape the worker — nobody needs it.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText("an error screen");
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
var turn = new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null);
assertTrue(rendezvous.resolveCompletion(waiter, "already replied"));
resolver.fail("term_a", turn);
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.read"),
"fail must not scrape a waiter that is already done");
assertEquals(Rendezvous.Kind.COMPLETION, waiter.getNow(null).kind(),
"fail must not overwrite the existing resolution");
assertEquals("already replied", waiter.getNow(null).text());
}
@Test
void failFallsBackToTheRegisteredWaiterWhenThereIsNoInFlightTurn() {
// A never-delivered readiness failure has no in-flight record but still has a blocked send;
// fail falls back to the waiter currently registered on the Rendezvous and fails it.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText("stuck on an error screen");
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a"); // send registered, but no captureBaseline ever ran
resolver.fail("term_a", null); // no in-flight turn → fall back to the registered waiter
assertTrue(waiter.isDone(), "fail falls back to the registered waiter when no turn is in flight");
assertEquals(Rendezvous.Kind.FAILED, waiter.getNow(null).kind());
assertEquals("stuck on an error screen", waiter.getNow(null).text());
}
@Test
void failIsLoggedAtWarnWithTheReason() {
// CB-564: this used to be a bare DEBUG "failed send to X via turn-stall fallback" — a symptom
// with no cause, and below the level anyone watching for member health would see. A fail that
// resolves a caller's blocked send is at least WARN and must carry the reason.
LoggerContext ctx = (LoggerContext) LoggerFactory.getILoggerFactory();
ch.qos.logback.classic.Logger resolverLog =
(ch.qos.logback.classic.Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(CompletionResolver.class);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.setContext(ctx);
appender.start();
resolverLog.addAppender(appender);
resolverLog.setLevel(Level.WARN);
try {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText("stuck on an error screen");
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.fail("term_a", null);
String warn = appender.list.stream()
.filter(e -> e.getLevel().equals(Level.WARN))
.map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage)
.findFirst()
.orElse("no turn-stall WARN logged");
assertTrue(warn.contains("term_a"), "the log names the target: " + warn);
assertTrue(warn.contains("stuck on an error screen"), "the log carries the reason: " + warn);
assertTrue(waiter.isDone());
} finally {
resolverLog.detachAppender(appender);
}
}
// --- CB-116 waiter identity: a late completion never crosses into the next turn ---------
@Test
void aLateCompletionForOneTurnNeverResolvesTheNextTurnsWaiter() {
// The cross-turn stale reply the conversation test surfaced: turn N's completion fallback
// fires AFTER turn N was resolved by an explicit bridge_reply and turn N+1 has opened its own
// waiter on the same session. Resolving "whatever is waiting now" would hand turn N's stale
// scrape to turn N+1; targeting turn N's captured waiter makes the late completion a no-op.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText("⏺ turn N answer\n❯ ");
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiterN = rendezvous.open("term_a"); // turn N's send
// The turn as the injector captured it at delivery (waiter + pre-turn baseline).
var turnN = new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiterN, "an earlier answer");
// Turn N is resolved by the worker's explicit reply, and its send deregisters the waiter.
assertTrue(rendezvous.resolve("term_a", "N replied"));
rendezvous.close("term_a", waiterN); // the sender's finally, before the next turn opens
// Turn N+1's send opens its own waiter on the same session (CB-548: open fails if the
// previous waiter is still registered, so a clean turn deregisters it first as above).
var waiterN1 = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.resolve("term_a", turnN); // turn N's completion fallback finally fires
assertFalse(waiterN1.isDone(), "turn N's late completion must not resolve turn N+1's waiter");
assertEquals(Rendezvous.Kind.REPLY, waiterN.getNow(null).kind(),
"turn N stays resolved by its own reply");
assertTrue(rendezvous.isWaiting("term_a"), "turn N+1 is still awaiting its own resolution");
}
// --- CB-578 stage A: backend-exhausted classification ---------------------------------
@Test
void classifiesAMatchingScrapeAsBackendExhaustedInsteadOfACompletedReply() {
String block = "⏺ Working on it...\nThe usage limit has been reached. Try again later.\n❯ ";
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText(block);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
ExhaustedPatternLookup patterns = target -> Pattern.compile("usage limit has been reached");
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, patterns, ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.resolve("term_a", new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null));
assertTrue(waiter.isDone(), "a matching scrape still resolves the blocked send");
assertEquals(Rendezvous.Kind.BACKEND_EXHAUSTED, waiter.getNow(null).kind(),
"not reported as a completed reply — the classification is distinct");
}
@Test
void theExhaustedReasonCarriesTheMatchedLine() {
String block = "⏺ Working on it...\nThe usage limit has been reached. Try again later.\n❯ ";
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText(block);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
ExhaustedPatternLookup patterns = target -> Pattern.compile("usage limit has been reached");
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, patterns, ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.resolve("term_a", new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null));
assertEquals("backend exhausted (usage limit): The usage limit has been reached. Try again later.",
waiter.getNow(null).text(), "the reason names the real cause and carries the matched line");
}
@Test
void aWinningBackendExhaustedClassificationNotifiesTheExhaustionSink() {
String block = "⏺ Working on it...\nThe usage limit has been reached. Try again later.\n❯ ";
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText(block);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
ExhaustedPatternLookup patterns = target -> Pattern.compile("usage limit has been reached");
java.util.List<String> notified = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
ExhaustionSink sink = (target, reason) -> notified.add(target + ": " + reason);
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, patterns, sink);
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.resolve("term_a", new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null));
assertEquals(1, notified.size(), "the sink is notified exactly once for the winning classification");
assertTrue(notified.get(0).startsWith("term_a: "), "the sink is told which target exhausted");
assertTrue(notified.get(0).contains("The usage limit has been reached"),
"the sink is told the matched reason: " + notified.get(0));
}
@Test
void aLosingBackendExhaustedClassificationNeverNotifiesTheExhaustionSink() {
// The waiter was already resolved (e.g. by the worker's own reply) before this scrape landed —
// resolveExhausted loses the race and must return false, so the sink must not fire either.
String block = "⏺ Working on it...\nThe usage limit has been reached. Try again later.\n❯ ";
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText(block);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
ExhaustedPatternLookup patterns = target -> Pattern.compile("usage limit has been reached");
java.util.List<String> notified = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
ExhaustionSink sink = (target, reason) -> notified.add(target + ": " + reason);
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, patterns, sink);
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
var turn = new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null);
assertTrue(rendezvous.resolveCompletion(waiter, "already replied"));
resolver.resolve("term_a", turn);
assertTrue(notified.isEmpty(), "a classification that loses the race must not quarantine anything");
assertEquals("already replied", waiter.getNow(null).text(), "the earlier resolution stands untouched");
}
@Test
void aNonMatchingScrapeResolvesAsAnOrdinaryCompletion() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText("⏺ complete report\n❯ ");
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
ExhaustedPatternLookup patterns = target -> Pattern.compile("usage limit has been reached");
CompletionResolver resolver = new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, patterns, ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.resolve("term_a", new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null));
assertEquals(Rendezvous.Kind.COMPLETION, waiter.getNow(null).kind(),
"a scrape that does not match the pattern is an ordinary completion");
assertEquals("complete report", waiter.getNow(null).text());
}
@Test
void aProfileWithNoConfiguredPatternKeepsTodaysCompletionFallbackUnchanged() {
// Even a scrape that WOULD have matched some other profile's pattern must resolve as a
// plain completion when this target's own profile has none configured (CB-578 criterion 4).
String block = "⏺ The usage limit has been reached.\n❯ ";
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().readText(block);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
CompletionResolver resolver =
new CompletionResolver(new AgentControl(herdr), rendezvous, ExhaustedPatternLookup.none(), ExhaustionSink.none());
var waiter = rendezvous.open("term_a");
resolver.resolve("term_a", new CompletionResolver.InFlight(waiter, null));
assertEquals(Rendezvous.Kind.COMPLETION, waiter.getNow(null).kind(),
"no pattern configured for this target's profile ⇒ unchanged completion-fallback behaviour");
assertEquals("The usage limit has been reached.", waiter.getNow(null).text());
}
@Test
void coverageIsOffWhenNoProfileHasAPatternConfigured() {
assertEquals("off (no profile has an exhaustedPattern configured; profiles: [terra])",
CompletionResolver.coverage(Set.of("terra"), Set.of()));
}
@Test
void coverageIsFullWhenEveryProfileHasAPatternConfigured() {
assertEquals("full (all profiles configured: [gx10, terra])",
CompletionResolver.coverage(Set.of("terra", "gx10"), Set.of("terra", "gx10")));
}
@Test
void coverageIsPartialAndNamesWhichProfilesAreConfigured() {
assertEquals("partial (configured: [terra]; not configured: [gx10])",
CompletionResolver.coverage(Set.of("terra", "gx10"), Set.of("terra")));
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,465 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.member;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import dev.ltms.bridged.config.BridgedConfig;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.FakeHerdr;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.WorkspaceControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.Capability;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.CharterReceipt;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.PeerHandle;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.PeerUnreachableException;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.SpawnRequest;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService;
import java.util.concurrent.Executors;
import java.util.concurrent.Future;
import java.util.function.Supplier;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* The opencode adapter's launch build: a file-based MCP mount + reply-charter instructions (no
* inline flags, no {@code ANTHROPIC_*}, no guard), the {@code -m} model flag, and the shared base
* transport (naming, reap, readiness gate) proving the {@link HerdrPeerLauncher} SPI is neutral.
*/
class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
private static BridgedConfig.Profile opencodeCfg(String model, String mcpUrl, String gitTokenEnv) {
return new BridgedConfig.Profile("gemini", null, model, null, "BRIDGED_WORKER_TOKEN",
List.of("opencode"), "tab", "bridged-workers", "opencode: {model} #{n}", mcpUrl,
null, null, gitTokenEnv, null, BridgedConfig.Profile.KIND_OPENCODE);
}
/** Gate-disabled launcher whose per-spawn config dirs land under an inspectable temp root. */
private static OpenCodeLauncher service(FakeHerdr herdr, Path configRoot, BridgedConfig.Profile cfg) {
return new OpenCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(), k -> "GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN".equals(k) ? "tok" : null,
0, System::currentTimeMillis, () -> { }, configRoot, configRoot);
}
private static OpenCodeLauncher service(FakeHerdr herdr, Path configRoot, BridgedConfig.Profile cfg,
Supplier<BridgedConfig.Fleet> fleet) {
return new OpenCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(), _ -> null,
0, System::currentTimeMillis, () -> { }, configRoot, configRoot, fleet);
}
private static OpenCodeLauncher serviceWithCredentials(FakeHerdr herdr, Path configRoot,
BridgedConfig.Profile cfg,
BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials creds) {
return new OpenCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(), k -> "GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN".equals(k) ? "tok" : null,
0, System::currentTimeMillis, () -> { }, configRoot, configRoot, null, () -> creds);
}
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
private static Map<String, Object> lastStart(FakeHerdr herdr) {
return (Map<String, Object>) herdr.lastCall("agent.start").params();
}
/** Protocol 19: the worker's env is injected at pane creation (tab.create), not agent.start. */
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
private static Map<String, String> startEnv(FakeHerdr herdr) {
Map<String, String> env =
(Map<String, String>) ((Map<String, Object>) herdr.lastCall("tab.create").params()).get("env");
return env == null ? Map.of() : env;
}
/** Protocol 19: agent.start carries only the args after the kind-resolved executable. */
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
private static List<String> startArgs(FakeHerdr herdr) {
return (List<String>) lastStart(herdr).get("args");
}
@Test
void writesRemoteMcpConfigAndCharterInstructionsWhenMcpUrlSet(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
BridgedConfig.Fleet fleet = new BridgedConfig.Fleet(Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(),
Map.of("dev", "role rule"), null);
service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg("google/gemini-2.5-pro", "http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp", null),
() -> fleet).spawn();
Map<String, String> env = startEnv(herdr);
assertNull(env.get("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL"), "opencode carries no ANTHROPIC_* / subscription boundary");
String cfgPath = env.get("OPENCODE_CONFIG");
assertNotNull(cfgPath, "OPENCODE_CONFIG points the worker at the generated config file");
assertTrue(Path.of(cfgPath).startsWith(root), "config file is generated under the injected root");
// Assert on parsed structure, not substrings: the generated config is real JSON and its
// whitespace is the formatter's business, not the contract's.
JsonNode json = new ObjectMapper().readTree(Path.of(cfgPath).toFile());
assertTrue(json.path("compaction").path("auto").asBoolean(),
"spawned opencode peers explicitly enable automatic compaction");
JsonNode bridge = json.path("mcp").path("bridge");
assertEquals("remote", bridge.path("type").asText(), "bridge is mounted as a remote MCP server");
assertEquals("http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp", bridge.path("url").asText(),
"the profile's bridge MCP url is present");
assertTrue(bridge.path("enabled").asBoolean(), "the bridge server is enabled");
assertTrue(json.path("instructions").isArray() && !json.path("instructions").isEmpty(),
"the member charter is mounted via instructions");
// The instructions entry is a real file path holding the composed member charter.
Path charter = Path.of(cfgPath).resolveSibling("member-charter.md");
assertTrue(Files.exists(charter), "the charter file the config references was written");
assertEquals("role rule\n\n" + HerdrPeerLauncher.REPLY_CHARTER, Files.readString(charter),
"the composed charter keeps the role rule first and the reply rule last");
assertEquals(charter.toAbsolutePath().toString(), json.path("instructions").get(0).asText(),
"instructions names the charter file by its absolute path");
}
@Test
void noConfigFileWhenMcpUrlAbsent(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg("google/gemini-2.5-pro", null, null)).spawn();
assertNull(startEnv(herdr).get("OPENCODE_CONFIG"),
"no bridge MCP url → no config file and no OPENCODE_CONFIG");
}
@Test
void roleCharterWithoutMcpOrCustomProviderStillWritesAConfig(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
BridgedConfig.Fleet fleet = new BridgedConfig.Fleet(Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(),
Map.of("dev", "role rule"), null);
Path configRoot = Files.createDirectory(root.resolve("configs"));
Path checkout = Files.createDirectory(root.resolve("checkout"));
service(herdr, configRoot, opencodeCfg("google/gemini-2.5-pro", null, null), () -> fleet).spawn();
String cfgPath = startEnv(herdr).get("OPENCODE_CONFIG");
assertNotNull(cfgPath, "a role charter needs a config even without MCP or custom provider");
JsonNode json = new ObjectMapper().readTree(Path.of(cfgPath).toFile());
Path charter = Path.of(json.path("instructions").get(0).asText());
assertEquals("role rule", Files.readString(charter), "the base-composed role charter is unchanged");
assertTrue(json.path("mcp").isMissingNode(), "a charter does not add an MCP mount");
assertTrue(charter.startsWith(configRoot), "the charter is written under the temp config root");
try (var files = Files.walk(checkout)) {
assertFalse(files.anyMatch(path -> path.getFileName().toString().equals("member-charter.md")),
"the worker checkout receives no charter file");
}
}
@Test
void nullCharterWritesNoCharterFileOrInstructions(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, pinnedCfg("local-vllm/model", "http://127.0.0.1:8000", null),
() -> new BridgedConfig.Fleet(Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(), null)).spawn();
String config = startEnv(herdr).get("OPENCODE_CONFIG");
assertNotNull(config, "the custom provider still needs a config");
JsonNode json = new ObjectMapper().readTree(Path.of(config).toFile());
assertTrue(json.path("instructions").isMissingNode(), "a null charter adds no instructions entry");
try (var files = Files.walk(root)) {
assertFalse(files.anyMatch(path -> path.getFileName().toString().equals("member-charter.md")),
"a null charter creates no charter file");
}
}
@Test
void concurrentSpawnsWriteSeparateCharterDirectories(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfg("google/gemini-2.5-pro", "http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp", null);
ExecutorService executor = Executors.newFixedThreadPool(2);
try {
Future<String> first = executor.submit(() -> spawnConfigPath(root, cfg));
Future<String> second = executor.submit(() -> spawnConfigPath(root, cfg));
Path firstCharter = Path.of(first.get()).resolveSibling("member-charter.md");
Path secondCharter = Path.of(second.get()).resolveSibling("member-charter.md");
assertNotEquals(firstCharter.getParent(), secondCharter.getParent(),
"each concurrent spawn owns a separate config directory");
assertTrue(Files.exists(firstCharter));
assertTrue(Files.exists(secondCharter));
} finally {
executor.shutdownNow();
}
}
private static String spawnConfigPath(Path root, BridgedConfig.Profile cfg) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, cfg).spawn();
return startEnv(herdr).get("OPENCODE_CONFIG");
}
@Test
void passesTheModelAsDashMFlagAlongsideAutoApprove(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg("google/gemini-2.5-pro", null, null)).spawn();
List<String> args = startArgs(herdr);
assertTrue(args.contains("--auto"),
"--auto is present alongside -m so a spawned peer never blocks on approval");
int m = args.indexOf("-m");
assertTrue(m >= 0, "model is selected with -m");
assertEquals("google/gemini-2.5-pro", args.get(m + 1), "the provider/model selector follows -m");
}
@Test
void autoApproveIsUnconditionalWhenModelBlank(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg(null, null, null)).spawn();
assertEquals(List.of("--auto"), startArgs(herdr),
"--auto is unconditional: a model-less worker still must never block on approval");
}
@Test
void injectsForgeTokenWhenProfileGrantsIt(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg(null, null, "GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN")).spawn();
assertEquals("tok", startEnv(herdr).get("GITEA_TOKEN"),
"a git-token profile gets the peer-neutral GITEA_TOKEN grant, same as Claude");
}
/**
* CB-596: the config-driven shadow lives in {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#baseEnv}, shared by every
* adapter — this pins that the opencode path gets it too, not just Claude's. See the matching
* tests in {@code ClaudeCodeLauncherTest} for the full rationale (gitea #82, superseding CB-592's
* single hardcoded name).
*/
@Test
void aKnownNameNotAllowedIsShadowedWithTheSentinel(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials creds = new BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials(
null, List.of("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN"), List.of("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN", "GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN"));
serviceWithCredentials(herdr, root, opencodeCfg(null, null, null), creds).spawn();
String shadowed = startEnv(herdr).get("GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN");
assertNotNull(shadowed, "GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN must be explicitly overlaid, not left unmentioned");
assertFalse(shadowed.isBlank(), "a blank overlay value's override behaviour is unverified — must be non-blank");
assertFalse(startEnv(herdr).containsKey("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN"),
"an allow-listed name must get no overlay entry at all");
}
/** No {@code memberCredentials} configured (the pre-CB-596 constructor overloads) blocks nothing. */
@Test
void noMemberCredentialsConfiguredBlocksNothing(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg(null, null, null)).spawn();
assertNull(startEnv(herdr).get("GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN"),
"with no memberCredentials configured, nothing is shadowed — config must supply the policy");
}
@Test
void capabilitiesDeclareOrphanReapAndMcpAskAndConditionalSelfPr(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
assertEquals(java.util.Set.of(Capability.MID_TURN_ASK, Capability.WORKTREE, Capability.ORPHAN_REAP,
Capability.SESSION_RESUME),
service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg(null, null, null)).capabilities(),
"opencode can be resumed by its own session id, so SESSION_RESUME is always declared");
assertFalse(service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg(null, null, null))
.capabilities().contains(Capability.SESSION_NAME),
"opencode has no display-name flag, so SESSION_NAME must NOT be declared");
assertTrue(service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg(null, null, "GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN"))
.capabilities().contains(Capability.SELF_PR),
"a git-token profile adds SELF_PR");
}
// --- CB-547: resume + post-hoc session discovery --------------------------------------------
@Test
void aResumeSpawnPassesTheSessionIdAsDashS(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg("google/gemini-2.5-pro", null, null))
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null, null, "ses_41b79fc90ffeI9E8uZv6VprUn2"));
List<String> args = startArgs(herdr);
int s = args.indexOf("-s");
assertTrue(s >= 0, "a resumed spawn carries opencode's -s flag");
assertEquals("ses_41b79fc90ffeI9E8uZv6VprUn2", args.get(s + 1),
"the resume target id follows -s");
}
@Test
void aFreshSpawnCarriesNoSessionFlag(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg(null, null, null))
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null, null, null));
assertFalse(startArgs(herdr).contains("-s"),
"no resume target → a fresh session with no -s flag");
}
@Test
void theHandleDiscoversTheSessionIdForTheWorkersCwdOnlyAfterItAppears(@TempDir Path root,
@TempDir Path discRoot)
throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
OpenCodeLauncher launcher = new OpenCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr),
new WorkspaceControl(herdr), Map.of("gemini", opencodeCfg(null, null, null)),
"gemini", _ -> null, 0, System::currentTimeMillis, () -> { }, root, discRoot);
PeerHandle handle = launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, "/work/dir", null));
// opencode writes the record only when the session is first persisted — the instant the
// pane is ready it does not exist, so agentSessionId() is null (never a spawn failure).
assertNull(handle.agentSessionId(), "no record yet → null, not a spawn-time block");
// Once the record appears (here: same cwd), lazy discovery resolves it — the handle's
// session id matches its own worktree, not another's.
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "p1", "ses_a.json",
"ses_resolved", "/work/dir", 1000L);
assertEquals("ses_resolved", handle.agentSessionId(),
"agentSessionId() re-scans and picks up a record that has since been written");
}
@Test
void foreignWorkerMatchesOpencodePrefixButNotClaude() {
String nonce = "abc123";
assertTrue(OpenCodeLauncher.isForeignWorker("opencode-gemini-def456-1", nonce),
"an opencode pane from another process is foreign");
assertFalse(OpenCodeLauncher.isForeignWorker("opencode-gemini-" + nonce + "-1", nonce),
"our own opencode pane (same nonce) is not foreign");
assertFalse(OpenCodeLauncher.isForeignWorker("claude-ltms-local-def456-1", nonce),
"a claude pane is never reaped by the opencode adapter");
}
@Test
void productionConstructorsWireThroughToTheBase() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
BridgedConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfg(null, null, null);
// 5-arg (gate disabled) and 7-arg (gate enabled) production constructors both expose the profile.
OpenCodeLauncher disabled = new OpenCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(), _ -> null);
OpenCodeLauncher gated = new OpenCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(), _ -> null, 5000, 100);
assertEquals(java.util.Set.of("gemini"), disabled.profiles());
assertEquals("gemini", gated.defaultProfile());
}
@Test
void spawnGateThrowsPeerUnreachableWhenNeverInjectable(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
herdr.agentStatus("unknown"); // never injectable
long[] clock = {0};
OpenCodeLauncher svc = new OpenCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
Map.of("gemini", opencodeCfg(null, null, null)), "gemini", _ -> null,
1000, () -> clock[0], () -> clock[0] += 50, root, root);
PeerUnreachableException ex = assertThrows(PeerUnreachableException.class,
() -> svc.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null)));
assertTrue(clock[0] >= 1000, "the fake clock advanced past the timeout: " + clock[0]);
long closes = herdr.calls.stream()
.filter(c -> c.method().equals("pane.close"))
.filter(c -> "w9:pRoot_1".equals(((Map<?, ?>) c.params()).get("pane_id")))
.count();
assertEquals(1, closes, "the worker pane was reaped on timeout (no orphan)");
assertNotNull(ex.getMessage());
}
@Test
void spawnReturnsHandleWhenGateDisabled(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
PeerHandle handle = service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg(null, null, null))
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null));
assertNotNull(handle, "spawn returns a handle when the gate is disabled");
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.get"), "no polling when the gate is disabled");
}
@Test
void handleCarriesTheRealCharterReceiptNotTheInterfaceDefault(@TempDir Path root) {
// The base's WorkerHandle computes a real CharterReceipt (CB-571), but the opencode adapter
// wraps it in SessionAwareHandle for lazy session discovery. Before this fix that decorator
// did not override charterReceipt(), so it silently inherited PeerHandle's `null` default
// and the real receipt sitting on its delegate was lost.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
BridgedConfig.Fleet fleet = new BridgedConfig.Fleet(Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(), Map.of(),
Map.of("dev", "role rule"), null);
PeerHandle handle = service(herdr, root,
opencodeCfg("google/gemini-2.5-pro", "http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp", null), () -> fleet)
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null));
assertNotNull(handle.charterReceipt(),
"an opencode spawn's charterReceipt() must not silently be null");
String composed = "role rule\n\n" + HerdrPeerLauncher.REPLY_CHARTER;
assertEquals(CharterReceipt.digestOf(composed), handle.charterReceipt().charterSha256(),
"the receipt on the wrapped handle must match the exact composed charter bytes");
}
// --- CB-508: pinned OpenAI-compatible endpoint (e.g. a local vLLM) ---------------------------
/** A profile with a baseUrl but no model provider prefix cannot be resolved — fail loudly. */
private static BridgedConfig.Profile pinnedCfg(String model, String baseUrl, String mcpUrl) {
return new BridgedConfig.Profile("local", baseUrl, model, null, "BRIDGED_WORKER_TOKEN",
List.of("opencode"), "tab", "bridged-workers", "opencode: {model} #{n}", mcpUrl,
null, null, null, null, BridgedConfig.Profile.KIND_OPENCODE);
}
@Test
void baseUrlDeclaresACustomOpenAiCompatibleProvider(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, pinnedCfg("local-vllm/deepseek-v4-flash", "http://127.0.0.1:8000", null))
.spawn();
String cfgPath = startEnv(herdr).get("OPENCODE_CONFIG");
assertNotNull(cfgPath, "a pinned endpoint needs a config file even with no bridge MCP url");
JsonNode provider = new ObjectMapper().readTree(Path.of(cfgPath).toFile())
.path("provider").path("local-vllm");
assertFalse(provider.isMissingNode(), "the provider id comes from the model selector");
assertEquals("@ai-sdk/openai-compatible", provider.path("npm").asText());
assertEquals("http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1", provider.path("options").path("baseURL").asText(),
"a bare host:port gets /v1 appended — that is where these servers mount the API");
assertFalse(provider.path("options").path("apiKey").asText().isBlank(),
"the AI SDK requires a non-empty key even when the server ignores it");
assertFalse(provider.path("models").path("deepseek-v4-flash").isMissingNode(),
"the model half of the selector is declared under the provider");
}
@Test
void aBaseUrlThatAlreadyCarriesAPathIsUsedVerbatim(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, pinnedCfg("local-vllm/m", "http://127.0.0.1:8000/openai/v1", null)).spawn();
JsonNode json = new ObjectMapper()
.readTree(Path.of(startEnv(herdr).get("OPENCODE_CONFIG")).toFile());
assertEquals("http://127.0.0.1:8000/openai/v1",
json.path("provider").path("local-vllm").path("options").path("baseURL").asText(),
"an endpoint mounted on a custom path must not have /v1 bolted on");
}
@Test
void aPinnedEndpointRejectsAModelWithNoProviderPrefix(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
OpenCodeLauncher launcher =
service(herdr, root, pinnedCfg("deepseek-v4-flash", "http://127.0.0.1:8000", null));
// Silently falling back to the default gateway would point the worker at the wrong LLM
// while looking healthy — the one failure mode worth being loud about.
IllegalArgumentException e = assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, launcher::spawn);
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("<provider>/<model>"), "the error says how to fix it");
}
@Test
void aPinnedEndpointAndTheBridgeMcpCoexistInOneConfig(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, pinnedCfg("local-vllm/deepseek-v4-flash",
"http://127.0.0.1:8000", "http://127.0.0.1:8766/mcp")).spawn();
JsonNode json = new ObjectMapper()
.readTree(Path.of(startEnv(herdr).get("OPENCODE_CONFIG")).toFile());
assertEquals("remote", json.path("mcp").path("bridge").path("type").asText(),
"pinning an endpoint must not drop the bridge MCP mount");
assertFalse(json.path("provider").path("local-vllm").isMissingNode(),
"and the provider block is still declared alongside it");
assertTrue(json.path("instructions").isArray() && !json.path("instructions").isEmpty(),
"the reply charter survives too");
}
@Test
void noBaseUrlDeclaresNoProviderSoTheDefaultGatewayIsUsed(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg("opencode/some-free-model", "http://127.0.0.1:8766/mcp", null))
.spawn();
JsonNode json = new ObjectMapper()
.readTree(Path.of(startEnv(herdr).get("OPENCODE_CONFIG")).toFile());
assertTrue(json.path("provider").isMissingNode(),
"without a baseUrl opencode resolves its own provider as before");
}
}
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.member;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.nio.file.attribute.FileTime;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery} matches an opencode session record by the worker's cwd (its
* {@code directory}) against opencode's on-disk storage. These tests populate a TEMP storage root
* themselves — never the operator's real {@code ~/.local/share/opencode}.
*/
class OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest {
/**
* Write a session record {@code {"id":..., "directory":...}} under
* {@code <root>/session/<projectID>/<fileName>} and stamp it with a known last-modified time,
* so "most recently modified wins" is deterministic. Static so the launcher test can reuse it.
*/
static void writeRecord(Path root, String projectId, String fileName, String id,
String directory, long lastModifiedEpochMillis) throws Exception {
Path dir = root.resolve("session").resolve(projectId);
Files.createDirectories(dir);
Path file = dir.resolve(fileName);
Files.writeString(file, "{\"id\":\"" + id + "\",\"directory\":\"" + directory
+ "\",\"projectID\":\"" + projectId + "\",\"version\":\"1.1.31\"}");
Files.setLastModifiedTime(file, FileTime.fromMillis(lastModifiedEpochMillis));
}
@Test
void findsTheRecordWhoseDirectoryEqualsTheCwd(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "p1", "ses_a.json", "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "p2", "ses_b.json", "ses_bbb", "/w/b", 2000L);
assertEquals("ses_bbb", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/b"),
"the record whose directory equals the cwd is the one found");
assertEquals("ses_aaa", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"));
}
@Test
void aNonMatchingDirectoryYieldsNullRatherThanAMismatch(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "p1", "ses_a.json", "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/other"),
"no record for this cwd yet → null, not a wrong session");
}
@Test
void prefersTheMostRecentlyModifiedRecordWhenSeveralMatch(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "p1", "old.json", "ses_old", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "p2", "new.json", "ses_new", "/w/a", 5000L);
assertEquals("ses_new", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"),
"the freshest record for the cwd wins");
}
@Test
void aMissingOrEmptyStorageRootYieldsNullWithoutThrowing(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
// Missing: no session dir at all under the root.
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"));
// Present but empty: a session dir with nothing in it produces no match, not a throw.
Path emptyRoot = root.resolve("empty");
Files.createDirectories(emptyRoot.resolve("session"));
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(emptyRoot).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"));
}
@Test
void aBlankOrNullDirectoryYieldsNull(@TempDir Path root) {
OpenCodeSessionDiscovery discovery = new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root);
assertNull(discovery.sessionIdForDirectory(null));
assertNull(discovery.sessionIdForDirectory(" "));
}
@Test
void aMalformedRecordIsSkippedRatherThanFatal(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
// A record that fails to parse must not abort the scan of its siblings.
Path dir = root.resolve("session").resolve("p1");
Files.createDirectories(dir);
Files.writeString(dir.resolve("broken.json"), "{not valid json");
writeRecord(root, "p1", "good.json", "ses_good", "/w/a", 1000L);
assertEquals("ses_good", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"),
"an unreadable record is skipped; a later valid one still matches");
}
}
@@ -1,625 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.session;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Optional;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* CB-525 acceptance test for tool-surface isolation. This is one of the few tests that drives real
* {@code git} — the behaviour under test is precisely what {@link GitWorktrees} does to a checkout,
* so a fake would assert nothing. Everything happens inside a {@link TempDir} throwaway repo.
*/
class GitWorktreesTest {
/** A project MCP config with servers in it — what this repo actually commits. */
private static final String WITH_SERVERS = """
{
"mcpServers": {
"jetbrains": { "type": "sse", "url": "http://localhost:64342/sse" }
}
}
""";
/** An opencode config carrying a {@code {file:.secrets/...}} reference — CB-543's crash repro. */
private static final String OPENCODE_WITH_FILE_REF = """
{
"env": {
"CONTEXT7_TOKEN": "{file:.secrets/context7-token}"
}
}
""";
/** A non-empty autoenv file — the form that would prompt for authorization in a worktree. */
private static final String AUTOENV_WITH_DIRECTIVE = "export HELLO=world\n";
private static Path initRepo(Path dir) throws Exception {
Files.createDirectories(dir);
git(dir, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
git(dir, "config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid");
git(dir, "config", "user.name", "Test");
Files.writeString(dir.resolve(".mcp.json"), WITH_SERVERS);
Files.writeString(dir.resolve("README.md"), "seed\n");
git(dir, "add", ".mcp.json", "README.md");
git(dir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "seed");
return dir;
}
private static void git(Path cwd, String... args) throws Exception {
List<String> cmd = new java.util.ArrayList<>(List.of("git"));
cmd.addAll(List.of(args));
Process p = new ProcessBuilder(cmd).directory(cwd.toFile()).redirectErrorStream(true).start();
String out = new String(p.getInputStream().readAllBytes());
assertTrue(p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS), "git timed out: " + String.join(" ", cmd));
assertEquals(0, p.exitValue(), "git " + String.join(" ", args) + " failed:\n" + out);
}
/** Pending changes to {@code file} in {@code cwd}, empty when git considers it unmodified. */
private static String status(Path cwd, String file) throws Exception {
Process p = new ProcessBuilder("git", "status", "--porcelain", "--", file)
.directory(cwd.toFile()).redirectErrorStream(true).start();
String out = new String(p.getInputStream().readAllBytes());
assertTrue(p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS), "git status timed out");
return out;
}
/** Every pending change in {@code cwd} — the whole-tree porcelain status, unlike {@link #status}. */
private static String fullStatus(Path cwd) throws Exception {
Process p = new ProcessBuilder("git", "status", "--porcelain")
.directory(cwd.toFile()).redirectErrorStream(true).start();
String out = new String(p.getInputStream().readAllBytes());
assertTrue(p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS), "git status timed out");
return out;
}
private static String revParse(Path cwd, String ref) throws Exception {
Process p = new ProcessBuilder("git", "-C", cwd.toString(), "rev-parse", ref)
.redirectErrorStream(true).start();
String out = new String(p.getInputStream().readAllBytes()).trim();
assertTrue(p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS), "git rev-parse timed out");
assertEquals(0, p.exitValue(), "git rev-parse " + ref + " failed:\n" + out);
return out;
}
/** The recursive file list of a commit's tree — used to check what a snapshot actually committed. */
private static String lsTree(Path cwd, String ref) throws Exception {
Process p = new ProcessBuilder("git", "-C", cwd.toString(), "ls-tree", "-r", "--name-only", ref)
.redirectErrorStream(true).start();
String out = new String(p.getInputStream().readAllBytes());
assertTrue(p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS), "git ls-tree timed out");
assertEquals(0, p.exitValue(), "git ls-tree " + ref + " failed:\n" + out);
return out;
}
/** The set of paths in {@code git diff --name-only from..to} — used to check exactly what a
* snapshot's tree changed relative to its parent, the same shape {@code git status --porcelain}
* reports for the worktree it was taken from. */
private static Set<String> diffNameOnly(Path cwd, String from, String to) throws Exception {
Process p = new ProcessBuilder("git", "-C", cwd.toString(), "diff", "--name-only", from, to)
.redirectErrorStream(true).start();
String out = new String(p.getInputStream().readAllBytes());
assertTrue(p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS), "git diff timed out");
assertEquals(0, p.exitValue(), "git diff " + from + ".." + to + " failed:\n" + out);
Set<String> paths = new HashSet<>();
for (String line : out.split("\\R")) {
if (!line.isBlank()) {
paths.add(line.trim());
}
}
return paths;
}
/** The set of paths a {@code git status --porcelain} listing names, stripping the two-char status
* code prefix each line carries. */
private static Set<String> porcelainPaths(String porcelain) {
Set<String> paths = new HashSet<>();
for (String line : porcelain.split("\\R")) {
if (!line.isBlank()) {
paths.add(line.substring(3).trim());
}
}
return paths;
}
private static String forEachRef(Path cwd, String pattern) throws Exception {
Process p = new ProcessBuilder("git", "-C", cwd.toString(), "for-each-ref", pattern)
.redirectErrorStream(true).start();
String out = new String(p.getInputStream().readAllBytes());
assertTrue(p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS), "git for-each-ref timed out");
assertEquals(0, p.exitValue(), "git for-each-ref " + pattern + " failed:\n" + out);
return out;
}
/** Write {@code content} as a blob into the object database; returns its sha. */
private static String blobOf(Path cwd, String content) throws Exception {
Process p = new ProcessBuilder("git", "-C", cwd.toString(), "hash-object", "-w", "--stdin")
.redirectErrorStream(true).start();
p.getOutputStream().write(content.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
p.getOutputStream().close();
String out = new String(p.getInputStream().readAllBytes()).trim();
assertTrue(p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS), "git hash-object timed out");
assertEquals(0, p.exitValue(), "git hash-object failed:\n" + out);
return out;
}
/** Build a single-file tree object from {@code blob}; returns the tree's sha. */
private static String treeOf(Path cwd, String path, String blob) throws Exception {
Process p = new ProcessBuilder("git", "-C", cwd.toString(), "mktree")
.redirectErrorStream(true).start();
p.getOutputStream().write(("100644 blob " + blob + "\t" + path + "\n").getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
p.getOutputStream().close();
String out = new String(p.getInputStream().readAllBytes()).trim();
assertTrue(p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS), "git mktree timed out");
assertEquals(0, p.exitValue(), "git mktree failed:\n" + out);
return out;
}
/** {@code git commit-tree} rooted at {@code tree} with a chosen committer date; returns the sha. */
private static String commitTree(Path cwd, String tree, String parent, String committerDate,
String message) throws Exception {
ProcessBuilder pb = new ProcessBuilder("git", "-C", cwd.toString(), "commit-tree",
tree, "-p", parent, "-m", message);
pb.environment().put("GIT_COMMITTER_DATE", committerDate);
Process p = pb.redirectErrorStream(true).start();
String out = new String(p.getInputStream().readAllBytes()).trim();
assertTrue(p.waitFor(30, TimeUnit.SECONDS), "git commit-tree timed out");
assertEquals(0, p.exitValue(), "git commit-tree failed:\n" + out);
return out;
}
/** {@code git update-ref <ref> <sha>} — create the snapshot ref directly. */
private static void updateRef(Path cwd, String ref, String sha) throws Exception {
git(cwd, "update-ref", ref, sha);
}
/** True when {@code ref} exists in the repo (for-each-ref on a missing ref is empty, not an error). */
private static boolean refExists(Path cwd, String ref) throws Exception {
return !forEachRef(cwd, ref).trim().isEmpty();
}
/**
* The heart of CB-525: a provisioned worktree must not inherit the primary's MCP servers. Without
* the isolation step the checked-out {@code .mcp.json} carries them in, and a worker navigating
* through the primary's IDE servers edits the primary's tree while building its own.
*/
@Test
void aProvisionedWorktreeInheritsNoMcpServers(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
String wt = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString())
.add(repo.toString(), "cb-525-a", "HEAD");
Path mcp = Path.of(wt).resolve(".mcp.json");
assertTrue(Files.exists(mcp), ".mcp.json must still exist — present and explicitly empty");
String body = Files.readString(mcp);
assertFalse(body.contains("jetbrains"), "worktree inherited the primary's MCP servers:\n" + body);
assertTrue(body.replaceAll("\\s+", "").contains("\"mcpServers\":{}"),
"expected an explicitly empty server map, got:\n" + body);
}
/** Neutralizing must not look like work in progress, or a worker would commit it into its PR. */
@Test
void theNeutralizedConfigIsNotAPendingLocalModification(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
String wt = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString())
.add(repo.toString(), "cb-525-b", "HEAD");
assertEquals("", status(Path.of(wt), ".mcp.json"),
"the neutralized .mcp.json shows as modified — --skip-worktree did not take");
}
/** Isolation is the worktree's business only; the primary's own checkout must be untouched. */
@Test
void thePrimaryCheckoutIsLeftAlone(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString()).add(repo.toString(), "cb-525-c", "HEAD");
assertEquals(WITH_SERVERS, Files.readString(repo.resolve(".mcp.json")),
"the primary's .mcp.json was rewritten — isolation reached out of the worktree");
}
/** A repo that commits no {@code .mcp.json} still gets one, so nothing can be inherited later. */
@Test
void aRepoWithoutAnMcpConfigStillGetsANeutralOne(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = tmp.resolve("repo");
Files.createDirectories(repo);
git(repo, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
git(repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid");
git(repo, "config", "user.name", "Test");
Files.writeString(repo.resolve("README.md"), "seed\n");
git(repo, "add", "README.md");
git(repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "seed");
String wt = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString())
.add(repo.toString(), "cb-525-d", "HEAD");
// Untracked is the normal case here, so the --skip-worktree branch must be skipped rather
// than run and fail: `update-index --skip-worktree` on an unknown path exits non-zero.
String body = Files.readString(Path.of(wt).resolve(".mcp.json"));
assertTrue(body.replaceAll("\\s+", "").contains("\"mcpServers\":{}"), body);
}
/**
* CB-543's repro: a tracked {@code opencode.json} carries a {@code {file:.secrets/...}} reference
* to a gitignored secret that never reaches a worktree, and opencode refuses to start on it. The
* worktree's copy must be neutralized and hidden like {@code .mcp.json}.
*/
@Test
void aTrackedOpencodeConfigIsNeutralizedAndHidden(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = tmp.resolve("repo");
Files.createDirectories(repo);
git(repo, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
git(repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid");
git(repo, "config", "user.name", "Test");
Files.writeString(repo.resolve(".mcp.json"), WITH_SERVERS);
Files.writeString(repo.resolve("opencode.json"), OPENCODE_WITH_FILE_REF);
Files.writeString(repo.resolve("README.md"), "seed\n");
git(repo, "add", ".mcp.json", "opencode.json", "README.md");
git(repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "seed");
String wt = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString())
.add(repo.toString(), "cb-543-a", "HEAD");
String body = Files.readString(Path.of(wt).resolve("opencode.json"));
assertFalse(body.contains(".secrets"),
"worktree kept a dangling {file:...} secret reference:\n" + body);
assertEquals("{}", body.replaceAll("\\s+", ""),
"expected an empty JSON object stub, got:\n" + body);
assertEquals("", status(Path.of(wt), "opencode.json"),
"the neutralized opencode.json shows as modified — --skip-worktree did not take");
}
/** A config the repo does not carry must be skipped — no stub invented, provisioning still succeeds. */
@Test
void anAbsentConfigIsSkippedWithoutError(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo")); // only .mcp.json + README are committed
String wt = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString())
.add(repo.toString(), "cb-543-b", "HEAD");
assertFalse(Files.exists(Path.of(wt).resolve("opencode.json")),
"a stub was invented for a config the repo does not carry");
assertFalse(Files.exists(Path.of(wt).resolve(".autoenv")),
"a stub was invented for a config the repo does not carry");
// .mcp.json's long-standing create-always behaviour must be unchanged.
assertTrue(Files.exists(Path.of(wt).resolve(".mcp.json")), ".mcp.json stub was dropped");
}
/**
* CB-576. {@code hasUncommitted} must treat a freshly-provisioned worktree as clean, but a
* worktree holding a brand-new, never-added file as dirty. The untracked-file-only shape is
* exactly the work lost in the incident — a worker's draft that compiled but was never
* committed because it stopped to ask its lead a question.
*/
@Test
void anUntrackedOnlyWorktreeCountsAsDirty(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
String wt = gitWorktrees.add(repo.toString(), "cb-576-u", "HEAD");
assertFalse(gitWorktrees.hasUncommitted(wt),
"a freshly provisioned worktree must read as clean");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve("brand-new.txt"), "draft that was never added\n");
assertTrue(gitWorktrees.hasUncommitted(wt),
"an untracked-only file must count as dirty");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve("README.md"), "edited tracked file\n");
assertTrue(gitWorktrees.hasUncommitted(wt),
"a tracked modification must also count as dirty");
}
/**
* CB-576 review. {@code hasUncommitted} must tolerate a missing worktree exactly like
* {@code remove}: an already-gone directory holds no work to lose, and throwing here would
* break teardown — SessionManager.release() calls it before stopping the pane, so an
* exception would orphan a live pane and skip the release notification (CB-516).
*/
@Test
void hasUncommittedOnAMissingWorktreeReturnsFalseWithoutThrowing(@TempDir Path tmp) {
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
String gone = tmp.resolve("wts").resolve("does-not-exist").toString();
assertFalse(gitWorktrees.hasUncommitted(gone),
"a missing worktree is reported clean, not an error");
}
/** All three protected configs are covered: each one present in a worktree is neutralized and hidden. */
@Test
void allThreeConfigsAreNeutralizedWhenPresent(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = tmp.resolve("repo");
Files.createDirectories(repo);
git(repo, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
git(repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid");
git(repo, "config", "user.name", "Test");
Files.writeString(repo.resolve(".mcp.json"), WITH_SERVERS);
Files.writeString(repo.resolve("opencode.json"), OPENCODE_WITH_FILE_REF);
Files.writeString(repo.resolve(".autoenv"), AUTOENV_WITH_DIRECTIVE);
Files.writeString(repo.resolve("README.md"), "seed\n");
git(repo, "add", ".mcp.json", "opencode.json", ".autoenv", "README.md");
git(repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "seed");
String wt = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString())
.add(repo.toString(), "cb-543-c", "HEAD");
assertTrue(Files.readString(Path.of(wt).resolve(".mcp.json"))
.replaceAll("\\s+", "").contains("\"mcpServers\":{}"),
".mcp.json was not neutralized");
assertEquals("{}", Files.readString(Path.of(wt).resolve("opencode.json")).replaceAll("\\s+", ""),
"opencode.json was not neutralized");
assertEquals("", Files.readString(Path.of(wt).resolve(".autoenv")),
".autoenv was not neutralized");
assertEquals("", status(Path.of(wt), ".mcp.json"), ".mcp.json still shows as modified");
assertEquals("", status(Path.of(wt), "opencode.json"), "opencode.json still shows as modified");
assertEquals("", status(Path.of(wt), ".autoenv"), ".autoenv still shows as modified");
}
/**
* CB-578 stage C, acceptance criterion 1. A dirty worktree — a tracked edit plus a brand-new
* untracked file, exactly the shape lost in CB-576 — must land in {@code refs/wip/<branch>}'s
* tree, and that ref must live outside {@code refs/heads} so it never shows up in
* {@code git branch} or gets swept by a branch cleanup.
*/
@Test
void dirtySnapshotCreatesARefWhoseTreeContainsUntrackedAndTrackedChanges(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
String branch = "cb-578-c-a";
String wt = gitWorktrees.add(repo.toString(), branch, "HEAD");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve("untracked.txt"), "draft that was never added\n");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve("README.md"), "edited tracked file\n");
Optional<String> ref = gitWorktrees.snapshot(wt, branch, "test snapshot");
assertTrue(ref.isPresent(), "a dirty worktree snapshot returns a commit sha");
String tree = lsTree(repo, "refs/wip/" + branch);
assertTrue(tree.contains("untracked.txt"), "snapshot tree must include the untracked file:\n" + tree);
assertTrue(tree.contains("README.md"), "snapshot tree must include the tracked edit:\n" + tree);
String heads = forEachRef(repo, "refs/heads");
assertFalse(heads.contains("refs/wip/"), "the snapshot ref must not live under refs/heads:\n" + heads);
}
/**
* CB-578 stage C, acceptance criterion 2. Building the commit through a temporary
* {@code GIT_INDEX_FILE} must leave the worker's own index, working tree, and HEAD exactly as
* they were — the worker may still be mid-write, and staging into the real index would corrupt
* that.
*/
@Test
void snapshotDoesNotTouchTheWorkersOwnIndexWorkingTreeOrHead(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
String branch = "cb-578-c-b";
String wt = gitWorktrees.add(repo.toString(), branch, "HEAD");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve("untracked.txt"), "draft that was never added\n");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve("README.md"), "edited tracked file\n");
String headBefore = revParse(Path.of(wt), "HEAD");
String statusBefore = fullStatus(Path.of(wt));
gitWorktrees.snapshot(wt, branch, "test snapshot");
assertEquals(headBefore, revParse(Path.of(wt), "HEAD"), "snapshot must not move HEAD");
assertEquals(statusBefore, fullStatus(Path.of(wt)),
"snapshot must not change the worker's own index or working tree status");
}
/**
* CB-578 stage C, acceptance criterion 3. {@code add -A} (never {@code -f}) respects
* {@code .gitignore}, and that is the only thing keeping a gitignored file (secrets, local
* config) out of a snapshot commit — an untracked file that is NOT ignored must still be
* included, so this isn't just "untracked files are dropped".
*/
@Test
void gitignoredFileIsExcludedButOtherUntrackedFilesAreNot(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = tmp.resolve("repo");
Files.createDirectories(repo);
git(repo, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
git(repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid");
git(repo, "config", "user.name", "Test");
Files.writeString(repo.resolve(".gitignore"), ".env\n");
Files.writeString(repo.resolve("README.md"), "seed\n");
git(repo, "add", ".gitignore", "README.md");
git(repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "seed");
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
String branch = "cb-578-c-c";
String wt = gitWorktrees.add(repo.toString(), branch, "HEAD");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve(".env"), "SECRET=shh\n");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve("untracked.txt"), "draft that was never added\n");
Optional<String> ref = gitWorktrees.snapshot(wt, branch, "test snapshot");
assertTrue(ref.isPresent());
String tree = lsTree(repo, "refs/wip/" + branch);
assertFalse(tree.contains(".env"), "a gitignored file must never enter the snapshot:\n" + tree);
assertTrue(tree.contains("untracked.txt"),
"a non-ignored untracked file must still be included:\n" + tree);
}
/** CB-578 stage C. A clean worktree still produces a valid, if tree-identical, commit — the caller
* (SessionManager) is the one that decides not to call this on a clean worktree. */
@Test
void snapshotOfAMissingWorktreeReturnsEmptyWithoutThrowing(@TempDir Path tmp) {
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
String gone = tmp.resolve("wts").resolve("does-not-exist").toString();
assertTrue(gitWorktrees.snapshot(gone, "some-branch", "msg").isEmpty(),
"a missing worktree has nothing to snapshot, and must not throw");
}
/**
* CB-587, acceptance criteria 1 and 2. A file with a REAL {@code --skip-worktree} bit set in the
* worktree's own index must never enter the snapshot, even though its on-disk content has locally
* diverged from what is committed — that is exactly the divergence {@code --skip-worktree} exists
* to hide from {@code git status}, and a snapshot built from a fresh empty temp index (the bug)
* stages that local content anyway because the fresh index carries none of the real index's flags.
* The snapshot's diff against its parent must list exactly what {@code git status --porcelain}
* reports for the worktree — no more, no less.
*/
@Test
void dirtySnapshotHonoursARealSkipWorktreeBit(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = tmp.resolve("repo");
Files.createDirectories(repo);
git(repo, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
git(repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid");
git(repo, "config", "user.name", "Test");
Files.writeString(repo.resolve("protected.cfg"), "committed-value\n");
Files.writeString(repo.resolve("README.md"), "seed\n");
git(repo, "add", "protected.cfg", "README.md");
git(repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "seed");
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
String branch = "cb-587-a";
String wt = gitWorktrees.add(repo.toString(), branch, "HEAD");
git(Path.of(wt), "update-index", "--skip-worktree", "protected.cfg");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve("protected.cfg"), "locally-diverged-never-commit\n");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve("untracked.txt"), "draft that was never added\n");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve("README.md"), "edited tracked file\n");
String porcelain = fullStatus(Path.of(wt));
assertFalse(porcelain.contains("protected.cfg"),
"test setup invalid — protected.cfg must not show in git status once skip-worktree is set:\n"
+ porcelain);
Optional<String> ref = gitWorktrees.snapshot(wt, branch, "test snapshot");
assertTrue(ref.isPresent(), "a dirty worktree snapshot returns a commit sha");
Set<String> diffPaths = diffNameOnly(repo, "HEAD", "refs/wip/" + branch);
assertFalse(diffPaths.contains("protected.cfg"),
"a --skip-worktree file's local drift leaked into the snapshot:\n" + diffPaths);
assertEquals(porcelainPaths(porcelain), diffPaths,
"snapshot diff must list exactly what git status --porcelain reports, no more, no less");
}
/**
* CB-587, acceptance criterion 6. If the worktree's real index cannot be resolved/read, snapshot
* must fail loudly (throw) rather than silently falling back to an empty temp index and producing
* a wrong snapshot. SessionManager's caller already catches and WARNs on any exception here — this
* only needs to confirm the failure is not swallowed inside snapshot() itself.
*/
@Test
void snapshotThrowsWhenTheWorktreesRealIndexCannotBeResolved(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
String branch = "cb-587-b";
String wt = gitWorktrees.add(repo.toString(), branch, "HEAD");
// Break git's ability to resolve the worktree's real index by removing the linked worktree's
// `.git` file (which normally points at the main repo's worktrees/<name>/ directory).
Files.delete(Path.of(wt).resolve(".git"));
assertThrows(WorktreeException.class, () -> gitWorktrees.snapshot(wt, branch, "test snapshot"),
"an unresolvable real index must fail loudly, not silently snapshot from an empty index");
}
/**
* CB-586, criterion 2. A snapshot whose content is NOT reachable from {@code main} is the last
* copy of a worker's work, and must never be deleted automatically — even when it is old and
* even when the caller passes a zero age floor. Uses the real snapshot path on a dirty worktree,
* so the unreachable tree is exactly the shape CB-576/CB-578 stage C exist to protect.
*/
@Test
void anUnreachableSnapshotIsNeverPruned(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
String branch = "cb-586-unreachable";
String wt = gitWorktrees.add(repo.toString(), branch, "HEAD");
Files.writeString(Path.of(wt).resolve("worker-draft.txt"), "work that exists nowhere else\n");
Optional<String> ref = gitWorktrees.snapshot(wt, branch, "snapshot with unreachable content");
assertTrue(ref.isPresent());
// Age floor 0 makes age a non-issue: only reachability can save it — and it must.
assertEquals(0, gitWorktrees.pruneWipRefs(repo.toString(), 0),
"the unreachable snapshot is the last copy and must not be pruned");
assertTrue(refExists(repo, "refs/wip/" + branch),
"an unreachable snapshot must survive the sweep");
}
/**
* CB-586, criterion 1 (the reachable half). A snapshot whose tree content IS already reachable
* from {@code main} and which is older than the age floor is pure duplication — the work is
* recovered — so it must be pruned.
*/
@Test
void aReachableSnapshotOlderThanTheFloorIsPruned(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
// A snapshot whose tree is exactly main's current tree: fully reachable from main.
String mainTree = revParse(repo, "main^{tree}");
String old = commitTree(repo, mainTree, revParse(repo, "HEAD"), "2020-01-01T00:00:00", "snapshot");
updateRef(repo, "refs/wip/recovered", old);
assertEquals(1, gitWorktrees.pruneWipRefs(repo.toString(), TimeUnit.HOURS.toMillis(24)),
"an old, main-reachable snapshot must be pruned");
assertFalse(refExists(repo, "refs/wip/recovered"),
"the reachable snapshot's ref must be gone after the sweep");
}
/**
* CB-586, the age floor. A snapshot whose content IS reachable from {@code main} but which is
* younger than the age floor must not be swept — a lead may still be looking at it.
*/
@Test
void aReachableButRecentSnapshotIsNotPruned(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
// Reachable from main, but committed "now" — a fresh snapshot. The 24h floor must protect it.
String mainTree = revParse(repo, "main^{tree}");
String fresh = commitTree(repo, mainTree, revParse(repo, "HEAD"),
"2038-01-01T00:00:00", "snapshot just taken");
updateRef(repo, "refs/wip/fresh", fresh);
assertEquals(0, gitWorktrees.pruneWipRefs(repo.toString(), TimeUnit.HOURS.toMillis(24)),
"a recent snapshot must be kept even when reachable");
assertTrue(refExists(repo, "refs/wip/fresh"),
"the recent reachable snapshot must survive the sweep");
}
/**
* CB-586, criterion 5. A fleet that has never snapshotted anything has no {@code refs/wip/*},
* so a sweep is a no-op and the census reports none — identical to before CB-586 existed.
*/
@Test
void aFleetWithNoSnapshotsPrunesNothingAndReportsNothing(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
assertEquals(0, gitWorktrees.pruneWipRefs(repo.toString(), 0),
"no snapshot refs means nothing to prune");
Worktrees.WipRefStats stats = gitWorktrees.wipRefs(repo.toString());
assertEquals(0, stats.count(), "a never-snapshotted fleet has zero refs/wip refs");
assertEquals(0L, stats.costBytes(), "a never-snapshotted fleet costs zero bytes");
}
/** CB-586, criterion 4: the census reports how many refs exist and roughly what they cost. */
@Test
void wipRefsReportsCountAndCost(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
GitWorktrees gitWorktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString());
String blob = blobOf(repo, "a recoverable snapshot's worth of content");
String tree = treeOf(repo, "snapshot.txt", blob);
updateRef(repo, "refs/wip/one", commitTree(repo, tree, revParse(repo, "HEAD"),
"2020-01-01T00:00:00", "snapshot"));
updateRef(repo, "refs/wip/two", commitTree(repo, tree, revParse(repo, "HEAD"),
"2020-01-02T00:00:00", "snapshot"));
Worktrees.WipRefStats stats = gitWorktrees.wipRefs(repo.toString());
assertEquals(2, stats.count(), "two snapshot refs are reported");
assertTrue(stats.costBytes() > 0, "the cost of the snapshots is a positive byte count");
}
}
@@ -1,36 +1,36 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<!--
CB-504 / CB-594 — launchd agent for bridged (macOS).
CB-504 / CB-594 — launchd agent for fleetd (macOS).
This is the real supervision target today: the dogfooded daemon runs on macOS, where there is
no systemd. A systemd unit ships alongside (deploy/bridged.service) for the Linux gateways
no systemd. A systemd unit ships alongside (deploy/fleetd.service) for the Linux gateways
CB-308 introduces.
Install:
cp deploy/dev.ltms.bridged.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents/
launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.ltms.bridged.plist
launchctl list | grep bridged
cp deploy/dev.ltms.fleetd.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents/
launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.ltms.fleetd.plist
launchctl list | grep fleetd
The paths below are already filled in for this host (resolved 2026-08-16 from
`/usr/libexec/java_home`... except that reported the system Applet-plugin JVM, not the jenv-
managed JDK 25 actually used to build/run bridged, so JAVA_HOME here is the real one:
managed JDK 25 actually used to build/run fleetd, so JAVA_HOME here is the real one:
`JENV_VERSION=25.0.3 java -XshowSettings:properties -version 2>&1 | grep java.home`; `which mvn`;
`echo $HOME`). If this file is copied to a different host, re-resolve all three paths and check
no placeholder path is left behind; scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh's check mode does not (and
no placeholder path is left behind; scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh's check mode does not (and
cannot) check this file for you.
CB-594 — launchd cannot run a login shell (see the PATH comment on EnvironmentVariables below,
and scripts/bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh for the fix): ProgramArguments below execs THAT wrapper,
and scripts/fleetd-launchd-wrapper.sh for the fix): ProgramArguments below execs THAT wrapper,
not java directly, so WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN and AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN still get sourced from
${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh even though launchd itself never sources anything.
Note on ordering: launchd has no "start after herdr" primitive for user agents, and neither
does systemd in a way that survives a socket appearing late. bridged retries the herdr socket
does systemd in a way that survives a socket appearing late. fleetd retries the herdr socket
on startup instead, so an agent that comes up before herdr converges rather than dying — that
retry is the actual fix; KeepAlive below is the backstop.
CB-594 — KeepAlive vs. scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh: a bare SIGTERM makes this JVM exit 143 even
CB-594 — KeepAlive vs. scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh: a bare SIGTERM makes this JVM exit 143 even
with its shutdown hook running to completion (measured, see the CB-594 report), which
SuccessfulExit:false below reads as a crash and races to restart the OLD jar. The redeploy
script now detects a loaded agent and uses `launchctl unload`/`load` instead of a raw kill, so
@@ -40,20 +40,20 @@
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>Label</key>
<string>dev.ltms.bridged</string>
<string>dev.ltms.fleetd</string>
<key>ProgramArguments</key>
<array>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/scripts/bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/scripts/fleetd-launchd-wrapper.sh</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/Softwares/jdks/jdk-25.0.3.jdk/Contents/Home/bin/java</string>
<string>-jar</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/bridged/target/bridged.jar</string>
<string>bridged.yaml</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/fleetd/target/fleetd.jar</string>
<string>fleetd.yaml</string>
</array>
<!-- Config path in ProgramArguments is relative, so the working directory must be the module. -->
<key>WorkingDirectory</key>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/bridged</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/fleetd</string>
<key>EnvironmentVariables</key>
<dict>
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
<key>HERDR_SOCKET_PATH</key>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/.config/herdr/herdr.sock</string>
<!--
PATH matters more than it looks (CB-511): bridged propagates its own PATH to every worker
PATH matters more than it looks (CB-511): fleetd propagates its own PATH to every worker
it spawns, so this line decides whether the fleet can run a build at all. launchd does NOT
source .zprofile/.zshrc, so without this the daemon (and therefore every worker) gets a
bare /usr/bin:/bin and no JDK or Maven. Keep the toolchain entries first.
@@ -71,10 +71,10 @@
<string>/Users/dai.ha/Softwares/jdks/jdk-25.0.3.jdk/Contents/Home/bin:/Users/dai.ha/Softwares/apache-maven/bin:/opt/homebrew/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin</string>
<!--
Worker/API tokens are NOT set here: this file is committed. CB-594 —
scripts/bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh (named in ProgramArguments above) is what supplies
scripts/fleetd-launchd-wrapper.sh (named in ProgramArguments above) is what supplies
them, by execing a login shell that sources ${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh before the
daemon itself starts. bridged also reads the API token from the env var named by
auth.tokenEnv (default BRIDGED_API_TOKEN) and only in auth.mode: token — the wrapper
daemon itself starts. fleetd also reads the API token from the env var named by
auth.tokenEnv (default FLEETD_API_TOKEN) and only in auth.mode: token — the wrapper
covers that one too, since it is the same login shell.
-->
</dict>
@@ -84,21 +84,21 @@
<!--
CB-600 — read this before assuming ThrottleInterval bounds anything. It paces restarts to at
most one per 10s; it does NOT cap how many times launchd retries. If bridged fails fast on
every start — a bad bridged.yaml, for example auth.mode: token with the token env var unset,
most one per 10s; it does NOT cap how many times launchd retries. If fleetd fails fast on
every start — a bad fleetd.yaml, for example auth.mode: token with the token env var unset,
which throws in main() before the daemon ever binds a port — launchd restarts it forever,
once every 10s, until a human intervenes. LaunchAgents have no "give up after N attempts"
primitive, so this is not something a config change here can fix.
That loop stops only two ways: (1) `launchctl unload -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.ltms.bridged.plist`,
That loop stops only two ways: (1) `launchctl unload -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.ltms.fleetd.plist`,
or (2) the underlying cause gets fixed, so the process starts successfully and stays up (no
more exits to restart). scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh does not add a third way — it does not
make bridged self-disable on a config error, on purpose: a fail-fast exit path that
more exits to restart). scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh does not add a third way — it does not
make fleetd self-disable on a config error, on purpose: a fail-fast exit path that
sometimes decides "this is unrecoverable, stop trying" is one more thing that can misfire,
and a wrongly self-disabled daemon needs the exact same manual `launchctl load -w` recovery
this comment already names — so it buys nothing an operator watching for the crash loop
doesn't already have, at the cost of a new way to be silently down. Watch for it with
`launchctl list dev.ltms.bridged` (a high restart count) or by tailing bridged.out for the
`launchctl list dev.ltms.fleetd` (a high restart count) or by tailing fleetd.out for the
same startup error repeating every ~10s.
-->
<key>KeepAlive</key>
@@ -110,16 +110,16 @@
<integer>10</integer>
<!--
CB-594 — same file scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh already tails ($BRIDGED/bridged.out), and both
CB-594 — same file scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh already tails ($BRIDGED/fleetd.out), and both
streams point at it, not two separate log files: the script's fresh-line / ERROR-count checks
after a restart read this one path regardless of whether launchd or the script started the
process, and a stdout/stderr split would make half of what happens during a launchd-driven
restart invisible to it.
-->
<key>StandardOutPath</key>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/bridged/bridged.out</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/fleetd/fleetd.out</string>
<key>StandardErrorPath</key>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/bridged/bridged.out</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/fleetd/fleetd.out</string>
<key>ProcessType</key>
<string>Background</string>
@@ -1,45 +1,45 @@
# CB-504 — systemd unit for bridged (Linux).
# CB-504 — systemd unit for fleetd (Linux).
#
# The macOS launchd agent (deploy/dev.ltms.bridged.plist) is the supervision target for the
# The macOS launchd agent (deploy/dev.ltms.fleetd.plist) is the supervision target for the
# current single-host deployment. This unit exists for the per-host gateways CB-308 introduces,
# which will run on Linux.
#
# Install (user service — bridged drives the user's herdr, not a system daemon):
# Install (user service — fleetd drives the user's herdr, not a system daemon):
# mkdir -p ~/.config/systemd/user
# cp deploy/bridged.service ~/.config/systemd/user/
# cp deploy/fleetd.service ~/.config/systemd/user/
# # edit ExecStart / WorkingDirectory / Environment below, then:
# systemctl --user daemon-reload
# systemctl --user enable --now bridged
# journalctl --user -u bridged -f
# systemctl --user enable --now fleetd
# journalctl --user -u fleetd -f
[Unit]
Description=bridged — claude-bridge message server
Documentation=https://git.ltms.dev/lms/claude-bridge/wiki
Description=fleetd — claude-bridge message server
Documentation=https://git.ltms.dev/fleet/fleetd/wiki
# Ordering only: herdr is a user process and its socket may appear after us. This is advisory —
# bridged retries the herdr socket rather than exiting, which is what actually makes a late
# socket survivable. Do NOT add Requires=: a herdr restart must not take bridged down with it.
# fleetd retries the herdr socket rather than exiting, which is what actually makes a late
# socket survivable. Do NOT add Requires=: a herdr restart must not take fleetd down with it.
After=herdr.service
Wants=herdr.service
[Service]
Type=simple
WorkingDirectory=%h/src/claude-bridge/bridged
ExecStart=/usr/lib/jvm/temurin-25-jdk/bin/java -jar target/bridged.jar bridged.yaml
WorkingDirectory=%h/src/claude-bridge/fleetd
ExecStart=/usr/lib/jvm/temurin-25-jdk/bin/java -jar target/fleetd.jar fleetd.yaml
Environment=HERDR_SOCKET_PATH=%h/.config/herdr/herdr.sock
# PATH matters more than it looks (CB-511): bridged propagates its own PATH to every worker it
# PATH matters more than it looks (CB-511): fleetd propagates its own PATH to every worker it
# spawns, so this line decides whether the fleet can run a build at all. systemd does not source a
# login shell, so without it the daemon — and every worker — gets a bare default with no JDK/Maven.
Environment=PATH=/usr/lib/jvm/temurin-25-jdk/bin:/usr/share/maven/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin
# Secrets are NOT set here — this file is committed. Put the API/worker tokens in a private
# drop-in that systemd reads with restrictive permissions:
# systemctl --user edit bridged → [Service] / Environment=BRIDGED_API_TOKEN=...
# systemctl --user edit fleetd → [Service] / Environment=FLEETD_API_TOKEN=...
# or point EnvironmentFile at a 0600 file:
# EnvironmentFile=%h/.config/bridged/env
# EnvironmentFile=%h/.config/fleetd/env
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=10s
# A bad config (e.g. a non-loopback bind without token auth) makes bridged fail fast by design.
# A bad config (e.g. a non-loopback bind without token auth) makes fleetd fail fast by design.
# Give up rather than restart-loop on a permanent error.
StartLimitBurst=5
StartLimitIntervalSec=120
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ RestrictSUIDSGID=true
StandardOutput=journal
StandardError=journal
SyslogIdentifier=bridged
SyslogIdentifier=fleetd
[Install]
WantedBy=default.target
+9 -9
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# LavinMQ — the AMQP broker behind bridged's durable ReplyInbox (CB-307 Stage 2).
# LavinMQ — the AMQP broker behind fleetd's durable ReplyInbox (CB-307 Stage 2).
#
# Why this file exists: the broker was previously run ad hoc and simply vanished from the host,
# which takes bridged down with it — AmqpReplyInbox.open throws on an unreachable broker and
# Bridged.java:187 does not guard it, so a missing broker is a hard startup failure, not a
# which takes fleetd down with it — AmqpReplyInbox.open throws on an unreachable broker and
# Fleetd.java:187 does not guard it, so a missing broker is a hard startup failure, not a
# degraded mode. This pins the version, keeps the data, and brings itself back after a reboot.
#
# Usage:
@@ -14,27 +14,27 @@
#
# Management UI: http://127.0.0.1:15672 (guest / guest)
#
# This is bridged's OWN broker. Do not point bridged at any other AMQP server on this host —
# This is fleetd's OWN broker. Do not point fleetd at any other AMQP server on this host —
# notably not the `local-rabbitmq` container, which belongs to a different project and would end
# up carrying this project's queues.
name: bridged-broker
name: fleetd-broker
services:
lavinmq:
# Pinned deliberately: :latest silently moves the broker under a running daemon.
image: cloudamqp/lavinmq:2.9.1
container_name: bridged-lavinmq
container_name: fleetd-lavinmq
# The failure this deployment exists to prevent — survive reboots and Docker restarts, but
# stay down if it was stopped on purpose.
restart: unless-stopped
# Loopback-bound on purpose. LavinMQ ships a default guest/guest account, which is only
# acceptable because nothing off-host can reach it. bridged connects over 127.0.0.1, and
# acceptable because nothing off-host can reach it. fleetd connects over 127.0.0.1, and
# binding 0.0.0.0 here would expose a broker with default credentials to the network.
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:5672:5672" # AMQP — bridged.yaml broker.uri points here
- "127.0.0.1:5672:5672" # AMQP — fleetd.yaml broker.uri points here
- "127.0.0.1:15672:15672" # HTTP management API + UI
# The whole point of Stage 2. Held-but-unacked replies live here; without a named volume a
@@ -57,4 +57,4 @@ services:
volumes:
lavinmq-data:
name: bridged-lavinmq-data
name: fleetd-lavinmq-data
+531
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,531 @@
# CB-201 and CB-227 refinement
Date: 2026-09-03
## Decision
#201 and #227 are one delivery program, but they are not one implementation unit.
#201 has a real seam: `CompletionResolver` can publish a typed backend-error event only after its
waiter resolution wins. #227 can consume that event without knowing any pane text. The classifier
must land before the final #227 wiring. However, the policy engine, roster state, and lead nudge can
be built in parallel with the classifier.
I propose five units. Units 1 to 4 own separate files and can run in parallel. Unit 5 owns all
composition files and lands after them. It also depends on the #234 defect 2 fix named in the task.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
U1["Unit 1: typed backend-error classification"] --> U5["Unit 5: wire policy, spawn gate, and fleet views"]
U2["Unit 2: credential outage policy"] --> U5
U3["Unit 3: lead outage nudge"] --> U5
U4["Unit 4: durable member outcome"] --> U5
D234["#234 defect 2: fail-loud target resolution"] --> U5
```
*Figure 1. Four file-disjoint foundations feed one composition unit.*
This split keeps `Fleetd.java` under one owner. It also keeps every other production file under one
unit in this plan.
## Evidence checked in the current branch
I read both issue pages in full. Each page reports zero comments.
| Evidence | What the code says now |
|---|---|
| `inject/CompletionResolver.java:229-237` | A turn below two seconds fails before normal scrape classification. A matching fast backend error is therefore only a generic failure today. |
| `inject/CompletionResolver.java:260-276` and `:332-367` | #211 already added raw-screen classification when `lastAssistantBlock` is empty. The “dead-code question” in #201 is stale on this branch. |
| `inject/CompletionResolver.java:288-317` | Exhaustion wins before the hard-coded `API Error:` match. A backend error then goes through generic `fail(...)`. |
| `inject/CompletionResolver.java:311-316` | The code admits that the pattern is a heuristic. A member report which quotes an API error may match it. |
| `inject/CompletionResolver.java:449-467` | Startup coverage exists only for `exhaustedPattern`. |
| `inject/ExhaustedPatternLookup.java:13-25` | The current lookup and explicit `none()` value are a good shape for the new classifier seam. |
| `Fleetd.java:196-207` | One `BackendQuarantine` is shared by placement and the exhaustion sink. Its cooldown comes from `quarantineCooldownSeconds`. |
| `Fleetd.java:322-363` | Pattern compilation, target-to-profile lookup, and the live `ExhaustionSink` are composed in `Fleetd.main`. The sink on this branch still ends in `.ifPresent(...)`. This plan assumes #234 replaces that silent path. |
| `placement/BackendQuarantine.java:60-87` | A repeated exhaustion restarts one long quarantine. The store is credential-keyed and uses an injected monotonic clock. |
| `member/CompositePeerLauncher.java:260-317` | Explicit and policy-selected spawns have separate gates. Both paths must learn about outage cool-off. |
| `member/CompositePeerLauncher.java:347-379` | Exhaustion refusal already checks a credential for explicit spawns and filters policy candidates. Its error text says “exhausted”. |
| `placement/PlacementContext.java:10-22` and `PlacementPolicyUtil.java:14-83` | Automatic placement has only one transient exclusion set named `quarantined`. Reusing it would make outage errors say “backend exhausted”. |
| `mcp/FleetMcp.java:913-1025` | `fleet_list` sets `free: 0` and adds `credentialId` plus `quarantinedForSeconds` when quarantine is active. |
| `session/MemberSession.java:51-59` | The roster has `DONE` and generic `FAILED`, but no backend-error state or stored reason. |
| `session/SessionManager.java:695-773` | A normal boundary moves `BUSY` to `DONE`. A failure moves any non-released session to `FAILED`. The async completion resolver can race the `DONE` update. |
| `session/SessionManager.java:648-687` | `rosterView` reports the session state, but it reports no terminal reason. |
| `msg/MessageService.java:922-940` | CB-588 already nudges for every terminal async ticket, including failures. Current code would report failed tickets, but it would not report one correlated outage. |
| `msg/ReplyPushLoop.java:20-48` | Replies, terminal tickets, and questions share one per-lead schedule. This prevents two push sources from injecting competing turns. |
| `msg/ReplyPushLoop.java:305-395` | Each push entry point resolves the owning lead through `PrimaryRegistry`. Missing ownership is logged and the durable or pending item remains the backstop. |
| `msg/ReplyPushLoop.java:496-547` | One tick builds one combined nudge. Pending items have separate reminder counts. |
| `health/FleetHealthMonitor.java:91-143` | Health is a slow periodic observer of members and message-layer facts. It does not receive completion classifications. |
| `health/FleetHealthMonitor.java:206-208` | `healthCoverage` means health enabled plus webhook configured. It does not describe lead-pane alerts. |
| `Fleetd.java:465-486` | Health stays `detection-only` without the webhook notification setting. |
I also read the related unit tests for `CompletionResolver`, `ReplyPushLoop`, `BackendQuarantine`,
`CompositePeerLauncher`, `PlacementPolicyUtil`, `SessionManager`, `MessageService`, and `FleetMcp`.
I did not inspect the in-progress #234 branch. I only used the two measured facts in the task. No
peer architect was named, so I did not exchange a design with one.
## Required behaviour
The policy should use these first values:
- Threshold: **2** classified backend errors.
- Window: **60 seconds**, measured from the first error to the second.
- Cool-off: **60 seconds**, starting when the threshold is reached.
- Correlation key: `credentialId`, never profile name and never error text.
- Incident rule: one active incident per credential. Errors during its cool-off do not extend it and
do not create more lead notices.
- Rearm rule: after cool-off ends, two fresh errors are needed for another incident.
Two errors are the smallest threshold which protects the honest one-turn failure. A 60-second window
fits the measured two-member outage. A 60-second cool-off blocks immediate repeat spawns without
turning a short backend fault into the default 1,800-second exhaustion quarantine.
A single classified error still fails its send and marks its member `backend_error`. It does not
cool a credential and does not send an outage notice. This is what “a single error changes nothing”
must mean at the credential level. It cannot mean that the failed member still looks successful.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant R1 as Resolver for member A
participant R2 as Resolver for member B
participant P as Outage policy
participant S as Spawn gate
participant N as Lead push loop
participant L as Lead pane
R1->>P: backend error for credential C
Note over P: Count 1, no cool-off
R2->>P: backend error for credential C within 60s
P->>P: Start one 60s incident
P->>S: Credential C is cooling off
P->>N: Queue one incident notice
N->>L: Inject when lead is idle, blocked, or done
L->>S: Request another spawn on credential C
S-->>L: Refuse and report remaining cool-off
```
*Figure 2. The second independent classification creates the fleet-level event.*
Against the 2026-09-01 case, the second failed member would start cool-off. `fleet_list` would show
zero free capacity and both members as `backend_error`. The push loop would inject one outage notice
even if the lead had not polled either ticket yet. The design reports the outage. It does not recover
uncommitted work from the members.
## Unit 1 — Typed backend-error classification
### Scope
Replace the direct hard-coded check inside `CompletionResolver` with a lookup and a sink. Keep the
public send result as a failed send. The typed internal event is the seam #227 consumes.
The lookup returns the pattern for a target. The sink receives the target, matched line, and full
failure reason. It fires only after `Rendezvous.resolveFailure(...)` wins for that exact captured
waiter. This copies the race rule already used by `ExhaustionSink`.
The classifier must run in all three current paths:
1. a normal non-empty assistant block;
2. the #211 raw scrape fallback;
3. a turn inside `MIN_TURN_NANOS`, before it becomes a generic too-fast failure.
In every path, the order stays: stale-baseline guard, exhaustion, backend error, then generic
failure or completion. A fast turn still fails when no configured pattern matches.
Keep `(?i)\bAPI Error\s*:` as a compatibility pattern for profiles without `errorPattern` until the
operator config is updated. Do not call this full coverage. Startup reporting in Unit 5 must name
profiles using this weaker legacy default.
### Files owned
- Add `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/inject/BackendErrorPatternLookup.java`.
- Add `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/inject/BackendErrorSink.java`.
- Change `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/inject/CompletionResolver.java`.
- Change `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/inject/CompletionResolverTest.java`.
No other unit may edit these files.
### Acceptance criteria
1. A target-specific error pattern matches a normal assistant block and resolves the send as failed.
2. The same match calls `BackendErrorSink` exactly once after the waiter resolution wins.
3. A late classification which loses to `fleet_reply` does not call the sink.
4. An exhausted line that also matches the generic error pattern stays `BACKEND_EXHAUSTED`. It calls
only `ExhaustionSink`.
5. A raw pane with leading Terminal User Interface (TUI) chrome and no assistant marker still uses
the #211 fallback and calls the backend-error sink.
6. A matching error inside the two-second floor is typed and sent to the sink. A non-matching fast
turn stays a generic failure.
7. An unchanged delivery baseline which contains old backend-error text is suppressed. It never
increments outage evidence.
8. A non-match keeps the existing completion result and text.
9. Constructors used by current callers keep compiling. They use the legacy default lookup and an
explicit inert sink until Unit 5 supplies the production objects.
10. Unit tests pass. The developer runs the focused test first, then `mvn clean install` from
`fleetd/`.
### Dependencies
None. Unit 1 can run with Units 2, 3, and 4.
Unit 5 depends on its new lookup, sink, and constructor.
### What to report back
- The exact classifier order in all three paths.
- The focused test command and result.
- The test which proves a losing waiter race does not publish an event.
- The test which proves a fast matching failure is typed.
- The final `mvn clean install` result.
- Any constructor kept only for transition and where Unit 5 replaces it.
## Unit 2 — Credential outage policy
### Scope
Build a small credential-keyed state machine. It accepts already-classified backend-error events.
It does not read pane text, profiles, sessions, or lead state.
Use an injected monotonic clock. A call records `credentialId`, target, and reason. It returns a new
incident only on the threshold crossing. The incident contains a stable event id, credential id,
the distinct affected targets, evidence count, window, and remaining cool-off.
This class owns both correlation and short cool-off. Keeping them together makes threshold crossing
and the cool-off deadline one atomic state change.
### Files owned
- Add `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/placement/BackendOutagePolicy.java`.
- Add `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/placement/BackendOutagePolicyTest.java`.
No other unit may edit these files.
### Acceptance criteria
1. One error creates no incident and no cool-off.
2. Two errors for one credential within 60 seconds create exactly one incident and a 60-second
cool-off.
3. Two errors more than 60 seconds apart do not create an incident.
4. The exact 60-second boundary has a pinned result. Use inclusive `<= 60s` so scheduler delay does
not discard evidence at the boundary.
5. Different credentials never share evidence.
6. Different profiles which supply the same credential id do share evidence. The policy itself only
sees the credential id.
7. More errors during active cool-off do not extend its deadline and do not return another incident.
8. After expiry, old evidence is cleared. Two fresh errors are needed to create the next incident.
9. Remaining seconds round up, matching `BackendQuarantine` reporting.
10. Concurrent second and third errors cannot return two incidents.
11. The focused tests and `mvn clean install` pass.
### Dependencies
None. Unit 2 can run with Units 1, 3, and 4.
Unit 5 depends on the policy API.
### What to report back
- The state transition table and locking method.
- The exact threshold, window, cool-off, and boundary rule.
- The test which proves one incident under concurrent calls.
- The focused test and `mvn clean install` results.
## Unit 3 — Lead outage nudge
### Scope
Add backend incidents as a fourth pending source in `ReplyPushLoop`. Do not create another scheduler
or call `AgentControl.send` from `Fleetd`. The existing combined per-lead schedule is the control
which prevents competing injected turns.
The entry point takes an incident id, affected worker targets, credential id, affected profile
names, and remaining cool-off. It resolves distinct owning leads through `PrimaryRegistry`.
Each `(incidentId, lead)` item is one-shot. It waits while the lead is not injectable. After one
successful `agents.send`, remove it. A send exception keeps it pending for a bounded retry. It never
uses the repeated reminder behaviour of an uncollected ticket.
Also add a fail-loud entry point for a classified target that Unit 5 cannot map to a credential. It
uses `PrimaryRegistry.nudgeTargetFor(target)` and says that correlation could not run. If no lead is
known, log at `WARN`, not `DEBUG`.
### Files owned
- Change `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/msg/ReplyPushLoop.java`.
- Change `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/msg/ReplyPushLoopTest.java`.
No other unit may edit these files.
### Acceptance criteria
1. One incident affecting two workers owned by one lead causes one successful pane injection.
2. Two affected workers owned by two leads cause one successful injection per affected lead. This
is one notice per event per lead, not one notice per member.
3. Repeating the same incident id is idempotent.
4. A busy or unknown lead is not injected. The item stays pending until the lead becomes injectable
or its attempt cap is reached.
5. After one successful injection, later ticks do not mention that incident again.
6. A failed `agents.send` is retried within the existing bound. A successful retry still gives only
one successful send.
7. A pending ticket and an outage incident for one lead appear in one combined nudge, not two
competing turns.
8. The text names the credential, profiles, affected workers, and remaining cool-off. It tells the
lead to run `fleet_list`.
9. An unmapped target produces a direct warning notice when a lead is known. If no lead is known,
the code logs a `WARN` naming the target and reason.
10. `stop()` clears incident state as it clears other push state.
11. Existing reply, ticket, and question tests stay green. The focused tests and
`mvn clean install` pass.
### Dependencies
None. The API uses plain values, not the Unit 2 incident class. This lets Unit 3 run in parallel.
Unit 5 adapts the Unit 2 incident into this entry point.
### What to report back
- The exact one-shot and retry rules.
- The test showing one combined nudge with a failed ticket.
- The test showing one successful send for two affected workers.
- The focused test and `mvn clean install` results.
## Unit 4 — Durable member backend-error outcome
### Scope
Make a classified backend failure remain visible after its ticket is collected or expires.
Add `BACKEND_ERROR` to `MemberSession.State`. Add a nullable failure detail to `MemberSession` and
render it as `failureReason` in `SessionManager.rosterView`. Add
`SessionManager.onBackendError(target, reason)`.
The transition must handle both completion orderings:
- `BUSY -> BACKEND_ERROR` when classification wins before the normal completion state update;
- `DONE -> BACKEND_ERROR` when the async resolver runs after `SessionManager.onTurnComplete`.
It must use a compare-and-set retry or another atomic update. `RELEASED` must never return to the
roster. A backend-error member is terminal and cannot accept another delivery.
### Files owned
- Change `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/session/MemberSession.java`.
- Change `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/session/SessionManager.java`.
- Change `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/session/SessionManagerTest.java`.
No other unit may edit these files.
### Acceptance criteria
1. `onBackendError` moves a `BUSY` member to `BACKEND_ERROR` and stores the reason.
2. It also moves `DONE` to `BACKEND_ERROR`, covering the resolver race.
3. A later normal `onTurnComplete` cannot change `BACKEND_ERROR` back to `DONE`.
4. A released or unknown member is not recreated. The unknown case logs at `WARN` and returns an
explicit false result to its caller.
5. `onDelivered` refuses a `BACKEND_ERROR` member, just as it refuses generic `FAILED`.
6. `rosterView` reports `state: backend_error` and `failureReason` after the send ticket is gone.
7. Ordinary members do not gain a blank or invented `failureReason` field.
8. Existing constructors keep source compatibility for tests and adapters.
9. The focused tests and `mvn clean install` pass.
### Dependencies
None. Unit 4 can run with Units 1, 2, and 3.
Unit 5 calls the new session method from the production sink.
### What to report back
- The two race orderings and the tests for both.
- The exact roster JSON shape.
- The unknown-target result and log level.
- The focused test and `mvn clean install` results.
## Unit 5 — Production wiring, spawn gate, and fleet views
### Scope
Compose Units 1 to 4 in production. This is the only unit which edits `Fleetd.java`.
Add per-profile `errorPattern` config beside `exhaustedPattern`. Compile both once at startup. A
configured pattern wins over the legacy default. Report configured profiles and legacy-default
profiles separately at startup. A bad regex must stop startup with the profile and key in the
message.
Wire one production `BackendErrorSink` with this order:
1. mark the member `backend_error` with its reason;
2. resolve the profile and its current `effectiveCredentialId()` through the fail-loud #234 seam;
3. record the error in `BackendOutagePolicy`;
4. on a new incident, submit one event to `ReplyPushLoop`.
If target metadata cannot be resolved, do not end in `Optional.ifPresent`. Log an error and call the
Unit 3 unmapped-target notice. The failed send still reaches its ticket through CB-588.
Teach both spawn paths about a separate cool-off source. Exhaustion quarantine has priority when
both states are active. Automatic placement needs a distinct `coolingOff` set so its refusal does
not say “exhausted”.
Extend the MCP (Model Context Protocol) views:
- A cooling profile has `free: 0`, `credentialId`, and `coolingOffForSeconds` in `fleet_list`.
- It does not have `quarantinedForSeconds` unless exhaustion quarantine is also active.
- `fleet_profiles` has a separate `coolingOff` map, not an entry in `quarantined`.
- A direct spawn refusal says the credential is cooling off after repeated backend errors and gives
the remaining seconds.
Do not change `FleetHealthMonitor.coverage`. It still describes the periodic health webhook path.
Lead-pane outage delivery is a separate capability.
### Files owned
- `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/Fleetd.java`
- `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/config/FleetConfig.java`
- `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/config/ConfigRef.java`
- `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/member/CompositePeerLauncher.java`
- `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/placement/PlacementContext.java`
- `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/placement/PlacementPolicyUtil.java`
- `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/mcp/FleetMcp.java`
- `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/config/FleetConfigTest.java`
- `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/config/ConfigRefTest.java`
- `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/member/CompositePeerLauncherTest.java`
- `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/placement/PlacementPolicyTest.java`
- `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/mcp/FleetMcpTest.java`
- Add `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/BackendOutageFlowTest.java`.
- `fleetd/fleetd.example.yaml`
- `CLAUDE.md`
No earlier unit edits these files.
The lead, not a worker, must update `wiki/7-Use-Cases.md`, `wiki/9-Implementation.md`, and
`wiki/11-Features.md`. Project rules forbid workers from committing `wiki/`. The portable block in
`CLAUDE.md` and `wiki/7-Use-Cases.md` must remain byte-identical.
### Acceptance criteria
1. `errorPattern` binds per profile. Blank uses the legacy default and is reported as degraded
coverage. A config reload which changes it is reported as deferred because patterns are compiled
at startup.
2. A malformed `errorPattern` stops startup and names `profiles.<name>.errorPattern`.
3. The real production sink never silently drops an unknown target. A test captures its error log
and the fallback notice call.
4. One real backend-error classification through `CompletionResolver` marks only its member. It does
not cool the credential and does not send an outage notice.
5. Two real classifications for one credential within 60 seconds start one incident.
6. The integration test then calls the real explicit-profile spawn gate. It is refused before any
adapter spawn call, with “cooling off” and remaining seconds in the message.
7. The same test calls an automatic placement path. A cooling candidate is skipped. If every
candidate is cooling, the error names cool-off rather than exhaustion.
8. Profiles sharing the credential are all blocked. A profile on another credential stays usable.
9. `fleet_list` from the same fixture shows both members as `backend_error`, preserves each failure
reason, and reports `free: 0`, the credential, and `coolingOffForSeconds`.
10. `fleet_profiles` reports cool-off separately from quarantine.
11. The real `ReplyPushLoop` receives one incident and makes one successful lead-pane send. Existing
failed-ticket notice content may share that same combined send.
12. Exhaustion still wins when a line matches both patterns. A simultaneous exhaustion quarantine
also wins in spawn errors and fleet views.
13. After the 60-second cool-off, spawn is allowed again. A new incident needs two fresh errors.
14. `healthCoverage` has the same value before and after this change for the same health config.
15. `fleetd.example.yaml` explains `errorPattern`, the legacy fallback, 2/60/60 policy, and the
difference between cool-off and exhaustion quarantine.
16. `CLAUDE.md` tells leads how `fleet_profiles` and `fleet_list` report cool-off. The lead later
applies the matching wiki updates and runs the documented byte-sync check.
17. The developer records the new end-to-end test failing before implementation, then passing. The
focused suites and `mvn clean install` pass.
### Dependencies
Unit 5 starts only after Units 1 to 4 are merged or rebased into its branch. It also starts after the
#234 defect 2 fix lands, because both areas touch the same target-resolution control path.
### What to report back
- The exact commits used for Units 1 to 4 and #234.
- The startup coverage line with one configured and one legacy-default profile.
- The red test output before the implementation and its green result after.
- The explicit and automatic spawn refusal text.
- Sample `fleet_list` and `fleet_profiles` JSON for cool-off and exhaustion.
- The number and text of lead-pane sends in the real-path test.
- The focused test commands and final `mvn clean install` result.
- The exact `CLAUDE.md` change and the wiki edits the lead must apply.
## File ownership summary
| Area | Unit | Shared edit risk |
|---|---:|---|
| Completion classification | 1 | Only Unit 1 edits `CompletionResolver` and its test. |
| Correlation and cool-off state | 2 | New files only. |
| Lead push scheduling | 3 | Only Unit 3 edits `ReplyPushLoop` and its test. |
| Member terminal state | 4 | Only Unit 4 edits `MemberSession`, `SessionManager`, and their test. |
| Main composition, config, placement, MCP views, shipped prompt | 5 | Only Unit 5 edits `Fleetd`, `FleetConfig`, `CompositePeerLauncher`, placement context, `FleetMcp`, and `CLAUDE.md`. |
| Wiki propagation | Lead after Unit 5 | Workers do not commit the wiki submodule. |
## What I would not build
1. **Do not reuse `BackendQuarantine` for outages.** Its repeat call restarts a long credential
quarantine. Its fields and errors say “exhausted”. That is wrong for a short outage.
2. **Do not merge the exhaustion and generic error patterns.** Exhaustion must win because it has a
different policy and duration.
3. **Do not group by error string.** One outage can produce different text. The shared operational
limit is the credential.
4. **Do not mark a profile unusable until config changes.** The current classifier cannot safely
tell a permanent malformed request from a transient service fault. A permanent state would need
a stronger error taxonomy first.
5. **Do not quarantine on the first generic backend error.** That would turn one bad request or one
false pattern match into a fleet-wide capacity loss.
6. **Do not add this to `FleetHealthMonitor`.** The monitor samples slow member health. The exact
backend event already exists at completion resolution, and moving it to polling would lose type
and time.
7. **Do not add another direct lead injector.** `ReplyPushLoop` already owns status gating,
per-lead coalescing, retry bounds, and heartbeat stand-down.
8. **Do not change `healthCoverage` to `full`.** That field still means a webhook notification sink
exists for periodic health. A backend outage nudge does not make every health event visible.
9. **Do not persist incident history across daemon restart in this work.** Existing exhaustion
quarantine is also in memory. A 60-second state does not justify a new durable store.
10. **Do not build work recovery.** The PR-body survival story proves why checkpoint-first work is
useful, but these tickets are about detection, capacity, and signalling.
11. **Do not remove the legacy `API Error:` fallback in the first release.** Doing so would turn an
unedited config back into a false successful completion. Report it as degraded coverage instead.
12. **Do not reorder or add the old `visibleTurn` fallback from #201.** #211 already implemented the
narrow raw-scrape fallback at `CompletionResolver.classifyRawScrapeFallback`.
## Riskiest assumption and cheapest experiment
The riskiest assumption is that a configured error regex means “the backend failed this turn”. The
current code and test already show the counterexample: a worker may quote `API Error:` while writing
a valid report. Two such false matches on one credential would now remove capacity for 60 seconds.
The cheapest experiment is a replay corpus before Unit 5 ships:
1. Save the full pane text from the measured 2026-09-01 outage.
2. Produce one safe failure per backend with a disposable invalid endpoint or request.
3. Save one valid member report which quotes each error line.
4. Replay all samples through the real `CompletionResolver` test fixture.
5. Require outage samples to match and quoted-report samples not to match after assistant-block
extraction and baseline checks.
This costs no outage deployment and no real sleep. If quoted reports still match, narrow the profile
patterns before enabling correlation. Do not raise the threshold to hide a bad classifier.
## Sequencing with three developers
First wave:
1. Developer A: Unit 1, typed classification.
2. Developer B: Unit 2, credential outage policy.
3. Developer C: Unit 3, lead outage nudge.
As soon as one slot is free, start Unit 4. It is file-disjoint from every first-wave unit. Merge and
review Units 1 to 4 independently.
Start Unit 5 only after all four foundations and #234 are available. Unit 5 is the only high-conflict
integration branch, so no other active unit should touch its file list.
## Checks performed for this refinement
- Read issue #201 and issue #227 through their Gitea pages. Both showed zero comments.
- Read the source and tests named in the evidence section.
- Ran `git status --short --branch`; the branch was clean before this document was added.
- Ran `git log --oneline -12` to identify the branch base.
- I did not run Maven because this change adds only a design document.
- Rendered both Mermaid blocks with `npx @mermaid-js/mermaid-cli`; both commands succeeded.
+8 -8
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
**Status:** design spec for review → delegate implementation.
**Grounded in:** `WorkerService`, `Injector`/`StatusPoller`/`TurnListener`, `MessageService`,
`BridgeMcp`, `BridgedApp` (see [wiki 9. Implementation](../wiki/9-Implementation.md)).
`FleetMcp`, `FleetApp` (see [wiki 9. Implementation](../wiki/9-Implementation.md)).
## Problem
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Consequences today:
since when?" without shelling to herdr for a raw agent list (no state, no ownership, no age).
- Cleanup of a worker that outlived its owning process depends entirely on the boot-time
name-nonce **reaper** (CB-117) — there is no live, authoritative roster during a run.
- `bridge_list` (CB-304) can only surface herdr's view, not a bridge-owned roster.
- `fleet_list` (CB-304) can only surface herdr's view, not a bridge-owned roster.
- There is no seam for per-session policy (checkpoint on teardown → CB-302; idle_ttl /
context_cap / drain → CB-303).
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Under no-reuse, a released session is terminal. A new `acquire` always creates a
subscription-guarded spawn/teardown mechanics; `SessionManager` adds the registry, lifecycle, and
ownership on top.
**Package:** new `dev.ltms.bridged.session` — keeps the registry/lifecycle concern separate from
**Package:** new `dev.ltms.fleet.session` — keeps the registry/lifecycle concern separate from
the `worker` spawn mechanics. Holds `SessionManager` + `WorkerSession`.
### `WorkerSession` (record or small mutable holder)
@@ -96,13 +96,13 @@ final class SessionManager {
### Integration points
- **`Bridged.main`** — construct `SessionManager(workerService, ...)`; wire it as/decorating the
- **`Fleetd.main`** — construct `SessionManager(workerService, ...)`; wire it as/decorating the
`TurnListener` alongside `CompletionResolver` so it sees turn boundaries, and give it the
`WorkerPresence` signal for `READY`.
- **`BridgeMcp.spawn` / `BridgedApp.spawnWorker`** — route spawn through `SessionManager.acquire`
(carry `callerTerminal` as `ownerTerminal`). **`bridge_stop` / `DELETE /workers/{paneId}`** →
- **`FleetMcp.spawn` / `FleetApp.spawnWorker`** — route spawn through `SessionManager.acquire`
(carry `callerTerminal` as `ownerTerminal`). **`fleet_stop` / `DELETE /workers/{paneId}`** →
`SessionManager.release`.
- **`bridge_list` / `GET /sessions` (CB-304 later)** — read `SessionManager.roster()`.
- **`fleet_list` / `GET /sessions` (CB-304 later)** — read `SessionManager.roster()`.
- **`MessageService`** — no change required for one-shot; a later CB-303 auto-release hook can call
`release` from `onTurnComplete` under policy.
@@ -121,4 +121,4 @@ final class SessionManager {
- **CB-302** — attach a checkpoint step (`STATE.md` + commit) to the `release` path.
- **CB-303** — a policy loop over `roster()` using `spawnedAtNanos`/state to auto-`release` on
`idle_ttl`, or drain on `context_cap`.
- **CB-304** — `bridge_list` reads `roster()` for a bridge-owned roster + live join.
- **CB-304** — `fleet_list` reads `roster()` for a bridge-owned roster + live join.
+7 -7
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
**Status:** ✅ shipped — implemented at commit `97ecc71` (per-worker git worktree + config-parity
overlay). As-built: `session/GitWorktrees.java` behind the `Worktrees` port, wired in
`Bridged.main` and configurable via `worktreeRoot` / per-profile `parityOverlay`
(see `bridged.example.yaml`). Branch/worktree surface in `bridge_list` landed with CB-304
`Fleetd.main` and configurable via `worktreeRoot` / per-profile `parityOverlay`
(see `fleetd.example.yaml`). Branch/worktree surface in `fleet_list` landed with CB-304
(`9fe04bf`); the worker-opened-PR checkpoint landed as CB-302 (`64e70ef`).
**Extends:** [CB-301 Session Manager](CB-301-Session-Manager.md) (shipped, commit `54d907c`).
**Realizes:** the config-parity requirement in [Worker Git Workflow](Worker-Git-Workflow.md).
**Grounded in:** `SessionManager`, `WorkerService.spawn/effectiveCwd`, `BridgedConfig.Worker`,
**Grounded in:** `SessionManager`, `WorkerService.spawn/effectiveCwd`, `FleetConfig.Worker`,
`inject/…LsofPeerPidLookup` (the `ProcessBuilder` exec pattern).
## Problem
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ provider.
### `WorktreeRequest` (new, nullable = "no worktree")
```java
package dev.ltms.bridged.session;
package dev.ltms.fleet.session;
/** Ask acquire() to provision an isolated worktree. null ⇒ run in the shared primary tree. */
public record WorktreeRequest(String ticketSlug, String baseRef) {
// ticketSlug seeds the branch name; baseRef null/blank ⇒ current HEAD of the repo.
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ untouched.
### `Worktrees` seam (new)
```java
package dev.ltms.bridged.session;
package dev.ltms.fleet.session;
public interface Worktrees {
/** git -C <repoRoot> worktree add <path> -b <branch> <baseRef|HEAD>. Returns the worktree path. */
String add(String repoRoot, String branch, String baseRef);
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ public void release(String paneId) {
}
```
### Config — `BridgedConfig.Worker.parityOverlay` + a `worktreeRoot`
### Config — `FleetConfig.Worker.parityOverlay` + a `worktreeRoot`
- Add `List<String> parityOverlay` to the `Worker` record (12th field). Compact-constructor default
when null/empty: `[".mcp.json", ".claude/settings.local.json", ".env", ".envrc"]` (missing paths are
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ public void release(String paneId) {
### Surface: MCP + REST
- `bridge_spawn` gains an optional `worktree` arg: `true`, or a ticket slug string. Truthy ⇒ build a
- `fleet_spawn` gains an optional `worktree` arg: `true`, or a ticket slug string. Truthy ⇒ build a
`WorktreeRequest(slug, null)` and call the 5-arg `acquire`.
- `POST /workers` gains `worktree` (+ optional `ticket`) in the body/query, same mapping.
- `workerView`/`view(WorkerSession)` include `worktree` and `branch` **when non-null** (omit for
+11 -11
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
# CB-306 — Spawn-Readiness Gate (launcher-owned terminal readiness)
**Status:** design note / delegation spec (branch `worker/cb-306-readiness`)
**Issue:** gitea `lms/claude-bridge` #4
**Issue:** gitea `fleet/fleetd` #4
**Owner of the behaviour:** `ClaudeCodeLauncher` (the `PeerLauncher` adapter) — NOT core.
## 1. Problem
`bridge_spawn` today returns a session the instant the herdr pane is started. The pane is not
`fleet_spawn` today returns a session the instant the herdr pane is started. The pane is not
yet a usable Claude REPL — it may still be sitting at the folder-trust prompt, or the CLI may
never come up at all. Nothing blocks or times out on that. Consequences:
- A `bridge_send` to a not-yet-ready worker surfaces as a **~60 s MCP-client timeout** (the send
- A `fleet_send` to a not-yet-ready worker surfaces as a **~60 s MCP-client timeout** (the send
blocks waiting for a turn that can't start) instead of a fast, explicit spawn failure.
- A worker stuck at the folder-trust prompt lingers in `SPAWNING` forever; nothing fails it.
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ a crash, and a slow start all present as "never becomes injectable" and all corr
or `spawnReadyTimeoutMs` elapses.
3. **Ready** → return the `WorkerHandle(paneId, terminalId)` as today.
4. **Timeout** → the launcher **closes the pane it started** (and its tab, via the same path
`release`/`stop` uses) and throws **`PeerUnreachableException`** (new, in `dev.ltms.bridged.peer`).
`release`/`stop` uses) and throws **`PeerUnreachableException`** (new, in `dev.ltms.fleet.peer`).
No orphan pane is left behind — the launcher cleans up its own failed birth.
`spawnReadyTimeoutMs == 0` (or unset) **disables** the gate = legacy non-blocking behaviour, so the
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ Unit tests (add to the existing `ClaudeCodeLauncher` test):
## 5. Config
Add to the launcher-level config (a bridged-level knob, not per-profile) in `bridged.yaml` +
`BridgedConfig`:
Add to the launcher-level config (a fleetd-level knob, not per-profile) in `fleetd.yaml` +
`FleetConfig`:
```yaml
spawn_ready_timeout_ms: 20000 # 0 disables the gate (legacy non-blocking spawn)
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ spawn_ready_poll_ms: 300
```
Jackson ignores unknown keys, so omitting them in existing YAML is safe; pick sane defaults in code
(`20000` / `300`). Keep the names consistent with existing config field style in `BridgedConfig`.
(`20000` / `300`). Keep the names consistent with existing config field style in `FleetConfig`.
## 6. Core / MCP propagation
@@ -99,11 +99,11 @@ Jackson ignores unknown keys, so omitting them in existing YAML is safe; pick sa
`spawn` throws — verify the new exception flows through it (worktree removed, nothing registered).
- The **non-worktree** path registers the session only *after* `spawn` returns, so a throw means no
half-live `SPAWNING` session is ever registered — confirm this and add a test.
- `bridge_spawn` (MCP verb) must return an **error result** carrying the exception message, not a
success with a dead session. Trace `BridgeMcp`/`BridgedApp` spawn handlers and make sure the
- `fleet_spawn` (MCP verb) must return an **error result** carrying the exception message, not a
success with a dead session. Trace `FleetMcp`/`FleetApp` spawn handlers and make sure the
exception becomes a clean tool error, not an uncaught 500 with a stack trace.
**Out of scope (do NOT do here):** gating `bridge_send` on session `READY` (existing status-gate +
**Out of scope (do NOT do here):** gating `fleet_send` on session `READY` (existing status-gate +
this spawn gate already close the window), MCP-handshake-as-readiness signal, the CB-307 broker,
any config `kind:` discriminator, any second adapter.
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ any config `kind:` discriminator, any second adapter.
- `ClaudeCodeLauncher.spawn` blocks until injectable or throws `PeerUnreachableException` +
self-reaps the pane; gate disabled when timeout is 0.
- New `PeerUnreachableException` in `dev.ltms.bridged.peer`.
- New `PeerUnreachableException` in `dev.ltms.fleet.peer`.
- Config knobs wired (`spawn_ready_timeout_ms`, `spawn_ready_poll_ms`) with safe defaults.
- Existing `SPAWNING→READY` MCP-contact transition untouched.
- New unit tests (ready / timeout+reap / disabled) green; **all existing tests still pass unchanged**.
+20 -20
View File
@@ -13,28 +13,28 @@ Stage 2 (the AMQP/LavinMQ adapter behind the same port) is explicitly **out of s
## 1. The bug this fixes (grounded in current code)
The reverse (worker→primary) path is `Rendezvous` — a `ConcurrentHashMap<session, CompletableFuture<Resolution>>`
of **live blocking waiters only**. No queue, no store. When a worker calls `bridge_reply` and **no send
of **live blocking waiters only**. No queue, no store. When a worker calls `fleet_reply` and **no send
is currently open** for that worker:
- `Rendezvous.resolve(session, content)` → `complete(...)` → `waiters.get(session) == null` →
returns `false` (`msg/Rendezvous.java:212-215`).
- The `content` string is **never retained** — it is dropped. The worker is told it failed:
`BridgeMcp.reply` returns `error("no send is awaiting a reply for this worker")` (`mcp/BridgeMcp.java:270-272`);
REST returns `409 no_pending_send` (`rest/BridgedApp.java:339-345`).
`FleetMcp.reply` returns `error("no send is awaiting a reply for this worker")` (`mcp/FleetMcp.java:270-272`);
REST returns `409 no_pending_send` (`rest/FleetApp.java:339-345`).
This is the observed "communication break": a worker that finishes just after its `bridge_send` timed
This is the observed "communication break": a worker that finishes just after its `fleet_send` timed
out (the ~60s sync window) replies into the void. There is **no message-id, dedup, or ack** anywhere in
the message path today.
## 2. What to build
### 2.1 The port — `dev.ltms.bridged.msg.ReplyInbox`
### 2.1 The port — `dev.ltms.fleet.msg.ReplyInbox`
A thin interface owned by the `msg` layer. The in-memory adapter is Stage 1; the AMQP adapter (Stage 2)
implements the **same** interface, so keep it broker-agnostic.
```java
package dev.ltms.bridged.msg;
package dev.ltms.fleet.msg;
import java.util.List;
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ public interface ReplyInbox {
seen-set — your call; preserve insertion order).
- `peek` returns an immutable copy; `ack` removes by `msgId`. Thread-safe (concurrent publish vs. drain).
- **This is soft-state, NOT persistence.** Lost on a `java -jar` bounce — that is correct and consistent
with "bridged stays soft-state." Do **not** add any file/DB backing.
with "fleetd stays soft-state." Do **not** add any file/DB backing.
### 2.3 Publish seam — route reply through the service layer
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ in `MessageService`, which already owns the `Rendezvous` and will own the `Reply
- Add `MessageService.reply(String session, String content)`:
```java
/** Route a worker's explicit bridge_reply: resolve an open send, or queue it in the inbox if none. */
/** Route a worker's explicit fleet_reply: resolve an open send, or queue it in the inbox if none. */
public boolean reply(String session, String content) {
if (rendezvous.resolve(session, content)) {
return true; // a live send took it — unchanged fast path
@@ -89,12 +89,12 @@ in `MessageService`, which already owns the `Rendezvous` and will own the `Reply
}
```
- Repoint the two callers off the bare `rendezvous.resolve(...)` onto `messages.reply(...)`:
- `BridgeMcp.reply` (`mcp/BridgeMcp.java:262-273`) — on success return a normal ack; **remove** the
- `FleetMcp.reply` (`mcp/FleetMcp.java:262-273`) — on success return a normal ack; **remove** the
`error("no send is awaiting a reply…")` branch (that case is now a successful queue).
- `BridgedApp.replyMessage` (`rest/BridgedApp.java:330-346`) — return `200` (queued) instead of
- `FleetApp.replyMessage` (`rest/FleetApp.java:330-346`) — return `200` (queued) instead of
`409 no_pending_send`.
**DO NOT touch the QUESTION path.** `bridge_ask` / `rendezvous.resolveQuestion` must keep today's
**DO NOT touch the QUESTION path.** `fleet_ask` / `rendezvous.resolveQuestion` must keep today's
`NO_WAITER` behaviour — a mid-turn question is **interactive** (the worker blocks synchronously and cannot
consume a late answer), so it must **never** be queued. Only terminal `REPLY`s go to the inbox.
@@ -110,27 +110,27 @@ The primary re-checks a worker it delegated to. Expose a drain keyed by **worker
- Add `MessageService.drainReplies(String target)`: `peek` the inbox, `ack` each returned `msgId`, hand
back the `List<InboxMessage>` (or just the contents). At-least-once: peek→deliver→ack (ack only after
the caller has them, so an in-flight failure re-surfaces them).
- **DECISION (required default): expose via the existing poll verb, keyed by target.** Extend `bridge_poll`
- **DECISION (required default): expose via the existing poll verb, keyed by target.** Extend `fleet_poll`
to accept an optional `target` (worker session) and, when present, return that worker's drained replies —
alongside a matching REST route `GET /sessions/{id}/replies`. Do **not** change `send`/`answer` semantics
(do not drain inside `send` — that conflates "deliver to worker" with "collect its mail"). Keep the
existing ticket-based `bridge_poll(ticket)` path working unchanged. If you see a cleaner surface, still
existing ticket-based `fleet_poll(ticket)` path working unchanged. If you see a cleaner surface, still
ship this default and note the alternative for review.
## 3. Config
**None for Stage 1.** The in-memory adapter is the unconditional default — wire `new InMemoryReplyInbox()`
into `MessageService` in `Bridged.main`. Do **not** add a `broker:` config block (that arrives with the
into `MessageService` in `Fleetd.main`. Do **not** add a `broker:` config block (that arrives with the
Stage-2 AMQP adapter: absent → in-memory, present → AMQP).
## 4. Acceptance criteria (what the primary will verify)
1. New `ReplyInbox` + `InboxMessage` + `InMemoryReplyInbox` in `dev.ltms.bridged.msg`.
2. `bridge_reply` with **no open send** now **succeeds and queues** (no more `error` / `409`); the reply is
1. New `ReplyInbox` + `InboxMessage` + `InMemoryReplyInbox` in `dev.ltms.fleet.msg`.
2. `fleet_reply` with **no open send** now **succeeds and queues** (no more `error` / `409`); the reply is
later retrievable and identical.
3. The queued reply is drainable by the primary keyed by target; draining **acks** it (a second drain
returns nothing); dedup by `msgId` (re-publishing the same id does not double-queue).
4. **QUESTION path unchanged** — `bridge_ask` with no open send still returns `NO_WAITER` (add/keep a test
4. **QUESTION path unchanged** — `fleet_ask` with no open send still returns `NO_WAITER` (add/keep a test
proving a question is never queued).
5. Completion/failure fallbacks unchanged.
6. Unit tests covering: `InMemoryReplyInbox` publish/peek/ack/dedup/FIFO/concurrency; `MessageService.reply`
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ Stage-2 AMQP adapter: absent → in-memory, present → AMQP).
## 5. Build & verification (worker side)
- Build with Maven from the worktree's `bridged/` dir. **Capture the exit code without a masking pipe**
- Build with Maven from the worktree's `fleetd/` dir. **Capture the exit code without a masking pipe**
(`mvn clean install; echo "MVN_EXIT=$?"` — never `mvn … | tail`, which hides failures).
- Read the real test totals from `target/surefire-reports/TEST-*.xml`, not from stdout scroll.
- You do **not** have IDE MCP access — do not claim `ide_diagnostics` results. The **primary** runs the
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ Stage-2 AMQP adapter: absent → in-memory, present → AMQP).
- **`.mcp.json` is `--skip-worktree` in your worktree — never edit, `git add`, or commit it.**
- **`wiki/` is a submodule — never run git in it; never touch it.**
- Commit only your feature changes (the new port/adapter, the `msg`/`mcp`/`rest` wiring, tests, and if
you add config wiring in `Bridged.java`). Nothing else.
you add config wiring in `Fleetd.java`). Nothing else.
- Work only inside your assigned worktree on your feature branch. The primary fast-forwards `main` after
re-gating — do not touch `main`.
- Java 25 idioms are welcome (unnamed `_` params, records). Keep the diff minimal and match surrounding style.
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ removal, msgId dedup, cross-restart redelivery). It is `@Tag("contract")`, so th
untouched. Run it explicitly when Docker (or a broker) is available:
```bash
cd bridged
cd fleetd
mvn -Pcontract test -Dtest=AmqpReplyInboxContractTest # local: spins a RabbitMQ Testcontainers fixture
```
+17 -17
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ The design rests on three pieces (the shape this ticket proposes):
1. **Dedicated per-agent channels** — every agent has its own addressable inbox on the broker.
2. **A federated agent directory** — a global "who/where/status" lookup, assembled from per-host
presence, not a central database.
3. **A per-host gateway** — each host runs a `bridged` that owns its local herdr, registers/manages
3. **A per-host gateway** — each host runs a `fleetd` that owns its local herdr, registers/manages
its own sessions, and proxies messages to/from other hosts over the broker.
## 2. What is single-host today (the assumptions to break)
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ The design rests on three pieces (the shape this ticket proposes):
flowchart TB
subgraph host["Single host (today)"]
primary["primary<br/>(MCP client)"]
daemon["bridged daemon<br/>127.0.0.1:8765"]
daemon["fleetd daemon<br/>127.0.0.1:8765"]
reg["in-process registry<br/>keyed by PeerHandle.id() == paneId"]
herdr["herdr<br/>(local unix-socket PTY mux)"]
w1["worker pane wQ:p1"]
@@ -48,21 +48,21 @@ Three concrete bake-ins assume one host:
|---|---|---|
| **herdr is local** | `herdr/` unix socket `~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock` | You cannot drive another host's PTYs → each host **must** own its herdr. This is why a per-host gateway is mandatory. |
| **registry is in-process, keyed by `paneId`** | `session/SessionManager` | `paneId` (e.g. `wQ:p2B`) is a herdr-local coordinate — meaningless off-host. Routing needs a host-unique id. |
| **loopback, no authn** | `rest/BridgedApp` binds `127.0.0.1:8765` | Fine on one host; the moment a second host can talk to a gateway, that link is a trust boundary. |
| **loopback, no authn** | `rest/FleetApp` binds `127.0.0.1:8765` | Fine on one host; the moment a second host can talk to a gateway, that link is a trust boundary. |
## 3. Target architecture
```mermaid
flowchart TB
subgraph hostA["HOST A"]
gA["gateway = bridged A"]
gA["gateway = fleetd A"]
regA["local registry + herdr"]
primary["primary (MCP client)"]
gA --- regA
primary --- gA
end
subgraph hostB["HOST B"]
gB["gateway = bridged B"]
gB["gateway = fleetd B"]
regB["local registry + herdr"]
wb["worker panes"]
gB --- regB
@@ -96,13 +96,13 @@ host's terminals.*
delayed-message exchange (the remind/backoff loop for free) — the same reasons CB-307 picked it.
- **Federated agent directory** = a **soft-state, bridge-owned** roster, *not* a broker-stored
database. Per the persistence-boundary decision (bridged is soft-state; the broker owns *message*
database. Per the persistence-boundary decision (fleetd is soft-state; the broker owns *message*
durability, not *who/where/status*), each gateway announces its local agents `(globalId, host,
status, capabilities)` on a `roster.*` presence topic with periodic heartbeats. Every gateway
builds an eventually-consistent **union view** — literally CB-304's `rosterView`, federated. A
stale entry expires by missed heartbeat (reuses CB-303's idle/TTL thinking).
- **Per-host gateway** = today's `bridged` daemon, evolved. It already registers/manages sessions
- **Per-host gateway** = today's `fleetd` daemon, evolved. It already registers/manages sessions
and controls its local herdr; multi-host adds exactly two responsibilities: (a) a broker client
that consumes its agents' inboxes and injects into local herdr, and (b) presence announce +
union-roster assembly. Evolution, not rewrite.
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ host's terminals.*
```mermaid
flowchart LR
send["bridge_send(globalId, msg)"] --> lookup{"directory:<br/>is globalId local?"}
send["fleet_send(globalId, msg)"] --> lookup{"directory:<br/>is globalId local?"}
lookup -->|"yes"| local["inject via local herdr<br/>(today's Injector path)"]
lookup -->|"no"| pub["publish agent.&lt;id&gt;.inbox<br/>(broker routes to owning gateway)"]
pub --> consume["owning gateway consumes<br/>→ injects into its local herdr"]
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ broker. A sender is oblivious to which branch it took.*
## 4. What CB-307 already provides vs. what is net-new
**CB-307 delivers the transport half** and is independently valuable on a single host: the AMQP
broker fabric, the `bridged → broker` client/adapter, at-least-once + idempotent (dedup-by-id)
broker fabric, the `fleetd → broker` client/adapter, at-least-once + idempotent (dedup-by-id)
delivery, DLQ, and delayed-retry (remind). That *is* the "proxy cross-host message" backbone;
extending the same broker from "worker→primary reliability" to "gateway↔gateway" is incremental.
@@ -158,17 +158,17 @@ sequenceDiagram
participant BR as broker
participant GA as gateway A
participant P as primary (host A, MCP client)
W->>GB: bridge_reply
W->>GB: fleet_reply
GB->>BR: publish primary-bound (durable, msg id)
BR->>GA: route to A's primary inbox
Note over GA: held durably until the primary pulls
P->>GA: blocking bridge_send resolves / bridge_poll
P->>GA: blocking fleet_send resolves / fleet_poll
GA-->>P: reply (then ACK to broker)
```
*Figure 4 — the broker makes the middle hop lossless, ordered, and idempotent; the **final** hop
into the primary is still a **pull** (gateway A holds the message until the primary's blocking
`bridge_send` or `bridge_poll`). Cross-host neither improves nor worsens this — it just spans hosts.
`fleet_send` or `fleet_poll`). Cross-host neither improves nor worsens this — it just spans hosts.
This is precisely the gap CB-307 closes on one host and CB-308 stretches across hosts.*
## 6. Staging & dependencies
@@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ they overlap (notably: the envelope is no longer optional, and dedup is split by
gateway's host. This extends the single-host invariant — *identity comes from the connection,
never an argument* — across the broker: cross-host, identity comes from the key. Complements
(not replaces) per-gateway broker logins over TLS.
2. **Profiles are owned by the worker's host.** `bridge_spawn(profile, host)` resolves the name in
the *target* gateway's `bridged.yaml`. Gateways advertise their profile names in presence
2. **Profiles are owned by the worker's host.** `fleet_spawn(profile, host)` resolves the name in
the *target* gateway's `fleetd.yaml`. Gateways advertise their profile names in presence
heartbeats, so a leader sees what each host offers before spawning; an unknown name is a clear
error from the target. Secrets (base URLs, tokens) never leave the host that uses them.
3. **Repo provisioning — clone from the forge, pinned.** A cross-host spawn names the repo URL and
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ they overlap (notably: the envelope is no longer optional, and dedup is split by
serialize acks fleet-wide. Ordering caveat: a *return* (unroutable) arrives **before** the
confirm, so "confirmed" ≠ "routed"; the sender checks the returned-set at confirm time.
`mandatory` is false only for `BROADCAST`, where an empty group is legal silence.
10. **Queue lifecycle is session lifecycle.** `bridge_stop`/reap deletes the worker's inbox queue
10. **Queue lifecycle is session lifecycle.** `fleet_stop`/reap deletes the worker's inbox queue
(its `broadcast.*` bindings die with it — no broadcasts to the dead); `x-expires` collects
queues orphaned by a crashed gateway (long for main/orchestrator inboxes, short for workers).
Queue names carry a version suffix (`.v2`): AMQP refuses to redeclare an existing durable
@@ -275,11 +275,11 @@ they overlap (notably: the envelope is no longer optional, and dedup is split by
- **Gateway discovery:** how gateways find the broker and each other (static config vs. discovery).
- **Control authorization — THE GATE ON U4.** Signing (§7.1) settles *who sent it*; authorization
is *who may do what*. **Cross-host spawn must not land before the minimal version exists**: a
per-host allowlist in `bridged.yaml` — beside the peer public keys — of gateway ids permitted to
per-host allowlist in `fleetd.yaml` — beside the peer public keys — of gateway ids permitted to
publish control to this host, checked against the verified signature. A few lines of config and
check; without them, any principal holding broker credentials can start processes on every host
in the fleet.
- **Key distribution & rotation:** static config (host → public key in each `bridged.yaml`) is
- **Key distribution & rotation:** static config (host → public key in each `fleetd.yaml`) is
fine at the current 2–3 host scale; rotation is manual. A refinement, not a blocker.
- **Gateway death mid-turn:** the roster reaps it by missed heartbeat, and in-flight primary-bound
messages survive by broker durability; still open is reconciling *worker* state when the dead
+7 -7
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ the core learning any one peer's environment.
## 1. Why
`claude-bridge` is a **communication bus between heterogeneous AI agents** — its stable surface is
the protocol (`bridge_spawn / send / poll / reply / ask / list / stop / status`), and that surface
the protocol (`fleet_spawn / send / poll / reply / ask / list / stop / status`), and that surface
should stay provider-neutral. Today the daemon can only materialize one kind of peer: an
off-subscription Claude Code CLI over herdr. Everything specific to *how that peer is set up*
(`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`, the subscription guard, `--mcp-config`/system-prompt flags, `claude-*`
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Where Claude/herdr specifics actually live today:
| `claude-<profile>-<nonce>-<seq>` naming, `WORKER_NAME` regex, orphan reap (CB-117) | `WorkerService` | **→ adapter** (naming is a herdr-label detail) |
| `GITEA_TOKEN` / `GITEA_HOST` injection (CB-302 checkpoint) | `WorkerService.spawn` | **→ adapter** + a **capability** (§6) |
| tab/pane placement, worker space, tab labels | `WorkerService.spawnInTab/spawnAsPane` via herdr `WorkspaceControl` | **→ adapter** (herdr transport detail) |
| `BridgedConfig.Worker` profile shape (`baseUrl`, `model`, `configDir`, …) | `config` | **mostly adapter-shaped** — see §5 |
| `FleetConfig.Worker` profile shape (`baseUrl`, `model`, `configDir`, …) | `config` | **mostly adapter-shaped** — see §5 |
| FSM, registry, roster, `reapIdle`/`drainAll`/`contextCap`, `rosterView` | `SessionManager` | **stays core** |
| turn/completion detection (`TurnListener`, `CompletionResolver`, `StatusPoller`, `WorkerPresence`) | `inject/` | **stays core**, but reads herdr terminal output → transport-coupled (§4b) |
| message store & routing | `msg/` | **stays core** |
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ hard-wire "turns come from herdr".
## 5. Config shape
`BridgedConfig.Worker` is Claude-shaped (`baseUrl`, `model`, `configDir`, `tokenEnv`). Rather than
`FleetConfig.Worker` is Claude-shaped (`baseUrl`, `model`, `configDir`, `tokenEnv`). Rather than
break existing YAML, CB-401 keeps `workers:` exactly as-is and treats those fields as the
**ClaudeCodeLauncher's** profile schema. A future peer kind adds a `kind:` discriminator
(default `"claude-code"`) selecting the launcher; unknown-kind → clear config error. No migration of
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ existing configs. (Jackson already ignores unknown keys, so adding `kind` is bac
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant MCP as bridge_spawn (MCP/REST)
participant MCP as fleet_spawn (MCP/REST)
participant SM as SessionManager
participant L as PeerLauncher (by profile.kind)
participant T as transport (herdr)
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ degrades gracefully when a launcher lacks one:
| Capability | Meaning | Claude Code | Codex (likely) | Human |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `MID_TURN_ASK` | supports `bridge_ask` rendezvous | ✓ | ? | ✗ |
| `MID_TURN_ASK` | supports `fleet_ask` rendezvous | ✓ | ? | ✗ |
| `SELF_PR` | can open its own PR at checkpoint (CB-302) | ✓ (opt-in token) | ? | ✗ |
| `WORKTREE` | can run in a provisioned git worktree | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| `ORPHAN_REAP` | spawner can reconcile orphaned peers on boot | ✓ | ? | ✗ |
@@ -185,13 +185,13 @@ messages, not verified facts.
Deliverable for CB-401 Stage A — mechanical, behaviour-preserving:
1. `PeerLauncher` interface + `PeerHandle` (opaque id) + `SpawnRequest` (profile, requestedCwd,
callerCwd) + `Capability` enum, new package `dev.ltms.bridged.peer`.
callerCwd) + `Capability` enum, new package `dev.ltms.fleet.peer`.
2. `ClaudeCodeLauncher implements PeerLauncher` = today's `WorkerService`, adapted: `spawn(...)`
returns a `PeerHandle` (id = paneId), `capabilities()` declares
`MID_TURN_ASK, SELF_PR(when token), WORKTREE, ORPHAN_REAP`.
3. `SessionManager` depends on `PeerLauncher`, not `WorkerService` concretely; routing keys on
`PeerHandle.id()` (== paneId today, so zero value change).
4. `Bridged.main` wires the concrete `ClaudeCodeLauncher` behind the interface.
4. `Fleetd.main` wires the concrete `ClaudeCodeLauncher` behind the interface.
5. **No behaviour change, no config change.** Full green gate: `ide_sync` → `ide_diagnostics`
(0 errors/0 warnings) → `mvn clean install` with `MVN_EXIT` captured (no masking pipe). All
existing tests pass unchanged; add tests only for the new `PeerHandle` indirection.
+21 -21
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ All five increments of §4 are done, including increment 5 (the §5 live checkli
## 1. Goal
Prove the [`PeerLauncher`](../bridged/src/main/java/dev/ltms/bridged/peer/PeerLauncher.java) SPI
Prove the [`PeerLauncher`](../fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/peer/PeerLauncher.java) SPI
actually holds for a **non-Claude** coding agent by shipping a second, first-class in-tree
adapter: **opencode** (`opencode` 1.1.31, a provider-agnostic terminal coding agent).
@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ flowchart TB
*Figure 1 — the two concerns tangled inside today's single launcher; CB-402 splits them.*
There is also a **Stage-A deferral** to finish: `Bridged.main` still casts
`(ClaudeCodeLauncher) workers` at the `BridgeMcp` and `BridgedApp` constructors. Those two
There is also a **Stage-A deferral** to finish: `Fleetd.main` still casts
`(ClaudeCodeLauncher) workers` at the `FleetMcp` and `FleetApp` constructors. Those two
callers only invoke `profiles()`, `defaultProfile()`, and `list()` — **all already on the
`PeerLauncher` interface**. The cast survives for one reason only: `PeerLauncher.list()`
returns `List<?>` (element type erased) while the callers use `Agent` element methods in their
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ roster join. Finishing the migration is therefore small and contained (§4.D).
## 3. Target design
Template-Method base + two thin adapters + a routing composite that keeps the Stage-A seam
(one `PeerLauncher` reference held by `SessionManager` / `BridgeMcp` / `BridgedApp`) intact.
(one `PeerLauncher` reference held by `SessionManager` / `FleetMcp` / `FleetApp`) intact.
```mermaid
flowchart TB
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ Two adapter **hooks** (abstract):
protected abstract String namePrefix(); // "claude" | "opencode"
/** Build the peer-specific launch: env map + argv. Runs any pre-spawn guard here. */
protected abstract Launch buildLaunch(BridgedConfig.Worker cfg, SpawnRequest req);
protected abstract Launch buildLaunch(FleetConfig.Worker cfg, SpawnRequest req);
record Launch(Map<String,String> env, List<String> argv) {}
```
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ so the opencode adapter never reaps a `claude-*` pane and vice-versa. The compos
### B. `kind:` config discriminator
Add one field to `BridgedConfig.Worker`:
Add one field to `FleetConfig.Worker`:
```java
String kind // "claude-code" (default) | "opencode"
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ String kind // "claude-code" (default) | "opencode"
so the record stays declarative.)
- Keep the existing back-compat constructors; `kind` is additive and optional.
`bridged.example.yaml` documents a two-kind `workers:` block.
`fleetd.example.yaml` documents a two-kind `workers:` block.
### C. `OpenCodeLauncher` — the adapter hooks for opencode
@@ -164,13 +164,13 @@ String kind // "claude-code" (default) | "opencode"
### D. `CompositePeerLauncher` + finish the Stage-A migration
- `Bridged.main` groups configured profiles by `kind`, instantiates one launcher per kind
- `Fleetd.main` groups configured profiles by `kind`, instantiates one launcher per kind
present, and wraps them in `CompositePeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher`.
- Routing methods (`spawn(req)`, `effectiveCwd(req)`, `parityOverlay(name)`) dispatch by the
profile's kind. Fan-out methods (`list()`, `reapOrphanWorkers()`, `capabilities()`,
`profiles()`, `defaultProfile()`) merge across sub-launchers. `stop(id)` tries each (teardown
only knows the pane id) — already best-effort/idempotent.
- **Migrate `BridgeMcp` + `BridgedApp` to the `PeerLauncher` interface**, dropping both
- **Migrate `FleetMcp` + `FleetApp` to the `PeerLauncher` interface**, dropping both
`(ClaudeCodeLauncher)` casts. Only friction is `list()`'s `List<?>`; resolve by giving the SPI
a typed roster element (small neutral `PeerAgent` view exposing `id()`/`name()`/status) that
the CB-304 roster join consumes — or, minimally, narrow at the callsite. Prefer the typed view.
@@ -179,12 +179,12 @@ String kind // "claude-code" (default) | "opencode"
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant P as Primary
participant M as BridgeMcp / REST
participant M as FleetMcp / REST
participant C as CompositePeerLauncher
participant O as OpenCodeLauncher
participant B as HerdrPeerLauncher (base)
participant H as herdr
P->>M: bridge_spawn(profile="oc-impl")
P->>M: fleet_spawn(profile="oc-impl")
M->>C: spawn(SpawnRequest)
C->>C: kind(profile)=="opencode"
C->>O: spawn(req)
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
`ClaudeCodeLauncher` extend it with `namePrefix()="claude"` and `buildLaunch()` wrapping
today's guard+env+argv logic. Green build, identical tests — pure refactor. *(IDE
`refactor` where possible; the primary re-runs the gate workers can't.)*
2. **`kind:` discriminator.** Add the field + normalization + `bridged.example.yaml`. Default
2. **`kind:` discriminator.** Add the field + normalization + `fleetd.example.yaml`. Default
path unchanged (`kind=claude-code`).
3. **`OpenCodeLauncher`.** Implement the three hooks; unit-test `buildLaunch` (env has no
`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`; `OPENCODE_CONFIG` points at a file carrying the bridge MCP block +
@@ -226,11 +226,11 @@ until it is "major" (Stage-B whole), per the CB-401 bar.
- **opencode TUI ⇄ herdr injection.** herdr drives a pane by typing into a TUI. Must confirm
opencode's TUI accepts injected keystrokes/submit the way `claude` does, and reaches an
`injectable` status the CB-306 gate recognizes. *Validation:* spawn one opencode worker,
watch the readiness gate pass, `bridge_send` a trivial task.
watch the readiness gate pass, `fleet_send` a trivial task.
- **Bridge MCP visibility in opencode.** Confirm `OPENCODE_CONFIG` (or `opencode mcp add`)
actually surfaces the `bridge_*` tools inside the opencode session, and that `bridge_reply`
actually surfaces the `fleet_*` tools inside the opencode session, and that `fleet_reply`
is callable — the reply-charter is worthless if the tool isn't mounted. *Validation:* the
worker completes a task by calling `bridge_reply`; the reply lands via the CB-307 path.
worker completes a task by calling `fleet_reply`; the reply lands via the CB-307 path.
- **opencode MCP/config schema drift.** opencode is fast-moving (1.1.31 today). Pin the config
schema we generate against the installed version; treat the exact keys (`type: "remote"` vs
`"http"`, `instructions` shape) as a dogfood-verified fact, not an assumption.
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ until it is "major" (Stage-B whole), per the CB-401 bar.
- **Unit (hermetic):** base-extraction regression (existing `ClaudeCodeLauncher` tests pass
unchanged); `OpenCodeLauncher.buildLaunch` env/argv/config assertions; `kind` normalization
in `BridgedConfigTest`; `CompositePeerLauncher` routing + fan-out (merge of `profiles()`,
in `FleetConfigTest`; `CompositePeerLauncher` routing + fan-out (merge of `profiles()`,
summed `reapOrphanWorkers()`, per-kind reap isolation) with fake sub-launchers.
- **Live (dogfood, manual):** the §5 checklist on the running daemon.
- **Gate (primary):** IDE diagnostics 0/0 on every changed file, `mvn clean install` green with
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ until it is "major" (Stage-B whole), per the CB-401 bar.
## 8. As-built — live dogfood (2026-07-29)
Run against `bridged` on `127.0.0.1:8766` at main `19cdf8d`, with opencode **1.18.5** installed
Run against `fleetd` on `127.0.0.1:8766` at main `19cdf8d`, with opencode **1.18.5** installed
via Homebrew. Every §5 risk is now a verified fact rather than an assumption.
**The version-drift risk was the real one, and it did not bite.** This adapter was designed against
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ as a dogfood-verified fact for 1.18.5.
| §5 risk | Result |
|---|---|
| opencode TUI ⇄ herdr injection; CB-306 gate | ✅ `peer pane=wD:p3 reached injectable state` ~0.6s after `agent.start` |
| Bridge MCP visible + `bridge_reply` callable | ✅ MCP `initialize` from `Implementation[name=opencode, version=1.18.5]`; worker replied through the tool |
| Bridge MCP visible + `fleet_reply` callable | ✅ MCP `initialize` from `Implementation[name=opencode, version=1.18.5]`; worker replied through the tool |
| Config schema drift (1.1.31 → 1.18.5) | ✅ unchanged, see above |
| Provider credentials | ✅ free tier, zero credentials |
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ Full lifecycle exercised through the REST surface:
to `OpenCodeLauncher` (`spawning opencode profile=opencode-free`), pane `wD:p3`.
2. Readiness: `{"ready":true,"status":"idle"}`, roster state `ready`.
3. `POST /sessions/{id}/message` → **`{"replySource":"reply","reply":"391"}`** — a *structured*
`bridge_reply`, not the CB-115 completion-fallback transcript scrape. The clean path.
`fleet_reply`, not the CB-115 completion-fallback transcript scrape. The clean path.
4. `DELETE /workers/wD:p3` → `204`, roster empty, tolerant teardown (`tab_not_found` ignored —
opencode had already closed its own tab).
@@ -301,5 +301,5 @@ identity (loopback peer PID → herdr pane) classified an **opencode** process a
opencode-specific handling — confirming the identity model is peer-kind-agnostic, which is exactly
what CB-308 needs when it stretches the roster across hosts.
CB-502 counters for the same run: `bridged_sends_total{outcome="replied"} 1`,
`bridged_replies_total{path="rendezvous"} 1`, `bridged_inbox_depth{...} 0`.
CB-502 counters for the same run: `fleet_sends_total{outcome="replied"} 1`,
`fleet_replies_total{path="rendezvous"} 1`, `fleet_inbox_depth{...} 0`.
+20 -20
View File
@@ -38,14 +38,14 @@ never toolchain ownership (§7).
flowchart TB
human["human (types)"]
primary["PRIMARY (Opus)<br/>MCP client — pull-only"]
daemon["bridged daemon<br/>127.0.0.1:8765 (single host)"]
daemon["fleetd daemon<br/>127.0.0.1:8765 (single host)"]
comp["CompositePeerLauncher<br/>routes by kind"]
cc["ClaudeCodeLauncher"]
oc["OpenCodeLauncher"]
w1["worker pane (gx00 vLLM)"]
w2["worker pane (ollama)"]
human --> primary
primary -->|"bridge_send / spawn / ask"| daemon
primary -->|"fleet_send / spawn / ask"| daemon
daemon --> comp
comp --> cc
comp --> oc
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ flowchart TB
m1["main A: Opus<br/>MCP client"]
m2["main B: cloud module<br/>MCP client"]
end
subgraph bus["bridged fabric (CB-307/308 substrate)"]
subgraph bus["fleetd fabric (CB-307/308 substrate)"]
chan["per-agent inbox channels<br/>agent.&lt;globalId&gt;.inbox"]
roster["federated roster (union view)"]
end
@@ -146,11 +146,11 @@ env-manager" rule (§7).*
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant M as main (delegator)
participant D as bridged
participant D as fleetd
participant SL as SandboxLauncher
participant SB as sandbox (peer-owned)
participant A as agent in sandbox
M->>D: bridge_spawn(profile=backend, role=backend)
M->>D: fleet_spawn(profile=backend, role=backend)
D->>SL: spawn(SpawnRequest)
SL->>SB: start entrypoint (image = backend role)
Note over SL,SB: bridge injects guarded ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL,<br/>mounts bridge MCP url + reply charter
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ flowchart TB
m2["main B: cloud module<br/>MCP client (pull-only)"]
end
reg["PrimaryRegistry → multi-slot<br/>(terminal per main)"]
subgraph fabric["bridged"]
subgraph fabric["fleetd"]
ca["agent.A.inbox"]
cb["agent.B.inbox"]
push["ReplyPushLoop → N terminals"]
@@ -211,14 +211,14 @@ transport is already peer-neutral — what was missing is N pull endpoints).*
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant MA as main A (Opus)
participant BR as bridged / broker
participant BR as fleetd / broker
participant MB as main B (cloud)
MA->>BR: bridge_send(to = main B, msg)
MA->>BR: fleet_send(to = main B, msg)
BR->>BR: publish agent.B.inbox (durable, msg id)
Note over BR: held until B pulls (B is a client too)
MB->>BR: blocking bridge_send / poll resolves
MB->>BR: blocking fleet_send / poll resolves
BR-->>MB: msg (then ACK)
MB->>BR: bridge_reply(to = main A)
MB->>BR: fleet_reply(to = main A)
BR->>BR: publish agent.A.inbox
MA->>BR: poll resolves
BR-->>MA: reply
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ push-loop fan-out; relax "orchestration tools only the primary calls" to "any re
## 6. Development C — Orchestrator tier
> **SUPERSEDED — do not implement this model.** The operator rejected a supervisor above the lead.
> The human continues to drive the pre-existing lead directly; bridged neither spawns nor resumes that
> The human continues to drive the pre-existing lead directly; fleetd neither spawns nor resumes that
> lead. What replaced this proposal is **one lead, two short-lived advisory architects, and N workers**:
> the lead engages architects sideways for a strong-model assessment, then discards them. Architect
> slots are declared in `architects:` (see Gitea issue #16), rather than making leads managed sessions.
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ push-loop fan-out; relax "orchestration tools only the primary calls" to "any re
> **Historical alternative retained.** The text and figures below record the considered model and why it
> was rejected: it re-rooted the human-facing session above the lead, violating the still-true premise
> that configured leaders pre-exist, are recognised, and cannot be resumed by bridged.
> that configured leaders pre-exist, are recognised, and cannot be resumed by fleetd.
The orchestrator is **`SessionManager` recursed one tier up**: today it spawns/names/reaps *worker*
sessions; the orchestrator does the same for *main* sessions, and adds **context scoping**.
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
H->>O: high-level goal (large context)
O->>O: name/resume main A session
O->>MA: task + SCOPED context slice (not the whole history)
MA->>W: bridge_send(delegation, carrying only the relevant slice)
MA->>W: fleet_send(delegation, carrying only the relevant slice)
W-->>MA: result
MA-->>O: rollup
O->>O: fold into orchestrator context, pick next main/turn
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ ticket is an extension of an existing pattern (CB-402 for A, CB-308 for B/C).
The follow-up question — *"clarify the architecture when we have distributed agents in sandboxes"* —
resolves the fork left open in §4 and §9. **Decision: Development A (sandbox launcher) and CB-308
(per-host federation) *compose*, not compete — each host runs a `bridged` gateway whose launcher
(per-host federation) *compose*, not compete — each host runs a `fleetd` gateway whose launcher
spawns agents into that host's *local* sandboxes.** A sandbox is never reached across the network; it
is reached by the gateway sitting next to it.
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ is reached by the gateway sitting next to it.
The bus delivers a turn by **herdr keystroke-injection** — `Injector → AgentControl.send` writes into
a PTY that its **local** herdr owns. The broker moves *messages and presence*, **never keystrokes**.
So an agent's PTY must live in a herdr that *some* `bridged` instance drives locally: a remote
So an agent's PTY must live in a herdr that *some* `fleetd` instance drives locally: a remote
container with no local herdr **cannot be injected into**. That rules out a central daemon reaching
remote PTYs, and collapses the design to a single identity:
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ remote PTYs, and collapses the design to a single identity:
flowchart TB
subgraph hostA["HOST A — gateway"]
mA["main / orchestrator<br/>MCP client → LOCAL gateway"]
gA["bridged A<br/>herdr + CompositePeerLauncher<br/>(incl. SandboxLauncher)"]
gA["fleetd A<br/>herdr + CompositePeerLauncher<br/>(incl. SandboxLauncher)"]
cBEa["sandbox: backend<br/>(local container)"]
cFEa["sandbox: frontend<br/>(local container)"]
mA --- gA
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ flowchart TB
roster["roster.* (federated presence)"]
end
subgraph hostB["HOST B — gateway"]
gB["bridged B<br/>herdr + SandboxLauncher"]
gB["fleetd B<br/>herdr + SandboxLauncher"]
cBEb["sandbox: backend<br/>(local container)"]
gB -->|"spawn → PTY in B's herdr"| cBEb
end
@@ -440,13 +440,13 @@ sequenceDiagram
participant BR as broker
participant GB as gateway B
participant SB as sandbox agent (host B, container)
MA->>GA: bridge_send(globalId on B, msg)
MA->>GA: fleet_send(globalId on B, msg)
GA->>GA: directory lookup - is globalId local? NO
GA->>BR: publish agent.ID.inbox (durable)
BR->>GB: route to the owning gateway
GB->>SB: inject via B's LOCAL herdr (keystrokes)
Note over GB,SB: SandboxLauncher already spawned the container -<br/>its PTY is in B's herdr, CB-306 readiness passed
SB-->>GB: bridge_reply (to B's LOCAL MCP endpoint)
SB-->>GB: fleet_reply (to B's LOCAL MCP endpoint)
GB->>BR: publish primary-bound (durable, msg id)
BR->>GA: route back to A
Note over GA: held until the main pulls (the main is a client)
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ unchanged — the sandbox is transparent to it.*
| Concern | Provided by |
|---|---|
| Per-host gateway (owns local herdr + sessions) | **CB-308** (today's `bridged`, evolved) |
| Per-host gateway (owns local herdr + sessions) | **CB-308** (today's `fleetd`, evolved) |
| Spawn into a local sandbox / role→image | **Development A** `SandboxLauncher` (§4), routed by `CompositePeerLauncher` |
| Addressing a remote sandboxed agent | **CB-308** global id + federated roster (host + role as metadata) |
| Orphan reap after a gateway restart | **CB-117** per-gateway, summed by the composite — each reaps only its **local** herdr |
+21 -21
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ with no terminator, and our third-party members cannot detect it (§7.2).
· **Upstream issue:** [systems/vms#31](https://git.ltms.dev/systems/vms/issues/31)
The gateway went live on 2026-08-15 and replaced Bifrost. This plan says what that means for a
**member definition** in `bridged.yaml`, because that is the part of this repo the change actually
**member definition** in `fleetd.yaml`, because that is the part of this repo the change actually
touches.
---
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Three facts about our side that decide the shape of this work:
`ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN` (the value is read from a host env var and never stored in config).
`local` sets no `tokenEnv` today, because a direct vLLM needs no token.
2. **`SubscriptionGuard` refuses any host not on an allowlist**, and that allowlist is
`guard.offSubscriptionHosts: [gx00.gw]`. It is built once in `Bridged.java:93` and handed to the
`guard.offSubscriptionHosts: [gx00.gw]`. It is built once in `Fleetd.java:93` and handed to the
launcher, so **it is a restart-required key**, not a hot one. Changing `baseUrl` without changing
this makes every `local` spawn throw.
3. **The wiki names us as a blocker.** Under *Not done yet*: retiring the shared `legacy` token is
@@ -132,18 +132,18 @@ own provider credentials. So 3b needs **no allowlist change**; only 3a does.
**Both still need a restart, for a different reason.** `tokenEnv` is resolved by
`HerdrPeerLauncher.resolveEnv` → `env.apply(name)`, which reads the **daemon's own process
environment**. The running `bridged` inherited its environment when it started, so a variable added to
environment**. The running `fleetd` inherited its environment when it started, so a variable added to
`secrets.sh` afterwards is simply not there — the launcher would inject an empty token and the
gateway would answer 401. This is the same failure as trap 1 in `scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh`
gateway would answer 401. This is the same failure as trap 1 in `scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh`
(`WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN`), and it has the same fix: **restart from a login shell**, and use
`scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh --check` to confirm the name resolves before restarting anything.
`scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh --check` to confirm the name resolves before restarting anything.
### 3c. What this does to `ccs`
Once a profile carries `baseUrl`, `tokenEnv` and `model` itself, the ccs instance stops being what
routes a member. Be precise about what is left, though: `configDir` still supplies **folder trust**
and `settings.json`, and dropping it is what produced the trust dialog and the wrong-model error
recorded in `bridged.yaml`. So ccs goes from *deciding where the tokens go* to *holding client-side
recorded in `fleetd.yaml`. So ccs goes from *deciding where the tokens go* to *holding client-side
state*. Less load-bearing, not removable.
### Why `/anthropic` and never `/v1/chat/completions`
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ Switching buys four things we do not have:
- **Free opencode capacity, off the shared credential.** The largest single win. See §3b — it retires
a real single point of failure, not just a cost line.
- **Per-consumer usage figures.** The cockpit counts requests per consumer. That is the first real
measurement of what the fleet consumes, and it feeds [CB-589](https://git.ltms.dev/lms/claude-bridge/issues/74) Gap 2 directly.
measurement of what the fleet consumes, and it feeds [CB-589](https://git.ltms.dev/fleet/fleetd/issues/74) Gap 2 directly.
- **Our own revocable token.** One consumer to revoke if a worker ever leaks it, instead of a shared
`legacy` token used by four systems.
- **It works off-LAN.** `gx00.gw` resolves on the LAN only.
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ every member spawn. The wiki keeps the direct route open precisely because "if t
nothing that matters is blocked."
So keep it. Add a second profile `local-direct` pointing at `http://gx00.gw:8000` with **`weight: 0`**
— never auto-selected, still spawnable with an explicit `bridge_spawn{profile: "local-direct"}`.
— never auto-selected, still spawnable with an explicit `fleet_spawn{profile: "local-direct"}`.
That is exactly what CB-554 made `weight: 0` mean, and it turns the escape hatch into something the
lead can actually reach during an incident.
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ worker's honesty rule leans on it ("never claim the result of a check you had no
- **Keep bridge-only.** The invariant stays true and simple. Workers stay cheap and narrow.
- **Add the gateway MCP.** Implementers get context7 documentation lookups, which is genuinely useful
for library work. But `mcpUrl` in `BridgedConfig.Profile` is a **single `String`**, so a
for library work. But `mcpUrl` in `FleetConfig.Profile` is a **single `String`**, so a
claude-code member can mount exactly one MCP — this needs a code change, not a config edit.
Note the invariant is **already inaccurate**: `opencode.json` gives `sol` and `terra` both context7
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ defensible; picking one is not mine to do.
### D3 — token scope
One consumer, `claude-bridge`, its token in `${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh` as `AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN`,
referenced by name only. Never the literal value in `bridged.yaml` — `tokenEnv` exists for this.
referenced by name only. Never the literal value in `fleetd.yaml` — `tokenEnv` exists for this.
---
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ referenced by name only. Never the literal value in `bridged.yaml` — `tokenEnv
```mermaid
flowchart TB
U1["U1 · consumer token<br/>issue via cockpit, add to secrets.sh"]
U2["U2 · profile + guard<br/>bridged.yaml, restart"]
U2["U2 · profile + guard<br/>fleetd.yaml, restart"]
U3["U3 · verify live<br/>spawn, prove thinking survives"]
U4["U4 · context7 via gateway<br/>.mcp.json + opencode.json"]
U5["U5 · docs<br/>CLAUDE.md, wiki 11-Features"]
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ flowchart TB
| # | Scope | Who | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| U1 | Issue the `claude-bridge` consumer at `auth.ltms.dev`; store as `AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN` | **operator** | touches secrets and a host we do not own |
| U2a | New `gx` opencode profile on `/v1` — pure config, no guard change | **lead** | `bridged.yaml` is gitignored, so a worker cannot see or edit it |
| U2a | New `gx` opencode profile on `/v1` — pure config, no guard change | **lead** | `fleetd.yaml` is gitignored, so a worker cannot see or edit it |
| U2b | `local` → `/anthropic`; add `local-direct` weight 0; add `llm.ltms.dev` to the guard allowlist | **lead** | same |
| U2c | One restart from a **login shell**, after U2a and U2b | **lead** | picks up `AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN` into the daemon env *and* the guard allowlist, in one stop |
| U3 | Live spawn on both new profiles; confirm reasoning survives on each surface | **lead** | needs real spawns and the running daemon |
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ Each of these cost someone real debugging time upstream. They apply to us.
1. **Rotating a token restarts the auth proxy, which drops in-flight streaming responses.** For us
that means rotating `AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN` kills every live member mid-turn, and an async ticket's
report goes with it. This is the same rule as a daemon redeploy: **drain the fleet first**
(`bridge_list` → `bridge_poll` anything wanted → `bridge_stop`), then rotate.
(`fleet_list` → `fleet_poll` anything wanted → `fleet_stop`), then rotate.
2. **The gateway's own `SecurityPolicy` fails open.** Standalone `aigw run` accepts it and silently
ignores it — an unauthenticated request returned **200**. Auth is the Caddy proxy in front, and
nothing else. Never reason as if the gateway authenticates.
@@ -283,10 +283,10 @@ Each of these cost someone real debugging time upstream. They apply to us.
Merging config is not proving it. The checks, in order:
1. `bridge_spawn{profile: "gx"}` succeeds and the member completes a real turn ending in
`bridge_reply`. This is the first proof of the token, the URL and the model name, and it risks
1. `fleet_spawn{profile: "gx"}` succeeds and the member completes a real turn ending in
`fleet_reply`. This is the first proof of the token, the URL and the model name, and it risks
nothing the fleet depends on.
2. `bridge_spawn{profile: "local"}` succeeds. If the guard allowlist was missed, this **throws** — a
2. `fleet_spawn{profile: "local"}` succeeds. If the guard allowlist was missed, this **throws** — a
loud, self-correcting failure, which is the good kind. If the restart was missed, it also throws,
for the same reason.
3. A `local` member completes a turn. That exercises streaming through two TLS edges, the auth proxy
@@ -297,9 +297,9 @@ Merging config is not proving it. The checks, in order:
deltas. For `gx` on `/v1`, this answers the open question in §3 rather than assuming it.
5. The cockpit at `auth.ltms.dev` shows requests counted against the `claude-bridge` consumer, not
`legacy`. That is the whole point of taking our own token.
6. `bridge_spawn{profile: "local-direct"}` still works, so the escape hatch is real rather than
6. `fleet_spawn{profile: "local-direct"}` still works, so the escape hatch is real rather than
theoretical.
7. `bridge_list` shows `gx` carrying no `credentialId`, so a `sol`/`terra` exhaustion cannot
7. `fleet_list` shows `gx` carrying no `credentialId`, so a `sol`/`terra` exhaustion cannot
quarantine it. This is the single-point-of-failure claim in §3b, checked rather than asserted.
---
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ one turn; this one costs the whole task and is indistinguishable from a slow wor
> **Diagnosing a stuck opencode member.** Do not read its pane. The launcher writes its config to a
> temp dir and passes it as `OPENCODE_CONFIG` — find it with
> `ls -dt /var/folders/*/*/T/bridged-opencode-* | head -1`, check the provider block and the key's
> `ls -dt /var/folders/*/*/T/fleetd-opencode-* | head -1`, check the provider block and the key's
> length and prefix (never its value), then reproduce with `opencode run --auto -m <provider>/<model>`
> using the same `OPENCODE_CONFIG`. That is what turned "it hangs" into a one-line error.
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ one turn; this one costs the whole task and is indistinguishable from a slow wor
- `/v1/models` returns exactly `["deepseek-v4-flash"]`, so trap 3 is clear.
- **Reasoning survives both surfaces** — see §3b above.
- The launcher's generated opencode provider block is correct, carrying a real 48-character `llmk-`
key rather than the `bridged-local-noauth` placeholder.
key rather than the `fleetd-local-noauth` placeholder.
- `SubscriptionGuard` accepted `llm.ltms.dev` after the allowlist edit and the restart: `local`
spawned without throwing, which is the check that catches a missed restart.
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ code.** That is the whole reason this section exists.
## 8. Related
- [CB-589 / #74](https://git.ltms.dev/lms/claude-bridge/issues/74) — cost-first placement and a
- [CB-589 / #74](https://git.ltms.dev/fleet/fleetd/issues/74) — cost-first placement and a
gateway that reports live capacity. The per-consumer figures this migration unlocks are the first
input that ticket actually needs.
- `docs/CB-500-Multi-Tier-Coordination.md` §11 — the distributed-sandbox topology this gateway is
+18 -18
View File
@@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ not after it.
## 1. Why this stage is not optional bookkeeping
`bridged` today has **exactly one security control: the loopback bind**. Every other guarantee
`fleetd` today has **exactly one security control: the loopback bind**. Every other guarantee
rests on it.
The identity model (`mcp/ConnectionIdentity.java`) resolves a caller from the connection alone —
the OS reports the connecting PID, herdr owns the PID→pane map, so a worker cannot forge another
worker. Its own javadoc is explicit: *"Single-host only (the herd shares the `bridged` host); the
worker. Its own javadoc is explicit: *"Single-host only (the herd shares the `fleetd` host); the
token path is the split-host fallback."* The token path does not exist yet.
That leaves a seam that is **latent today and load-bearing the moment the bind moves**:
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ it will be disabled and the stage is wasted. So:
auth:
mode: loopback-trust # default — behaves exactly like today: loopback ⇒ PRIMARY, no token needed
# mode: token # every non-worker caller must present a valid bearer token
# tokenEnv: BRIDGED_API_TOKEN # host env var holding the token; never the literal value
# tokenEnv: FLEETD_API_TOKEN # host env var holding the token; never the literal value
```
`mode: loopback-trust` is the current behaviour, named honestly and now *chosen* rather than
@@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The roadmap says "systemd unit". **This host is macOS — there is no systemd on
not found), and the daemon that has been dogfooded for weeks runs as a bare foreground
`java -jar`. Ship **both**:
- `deploy/dev.ltms.bridged.plist` — launchd agent, the *actual* runtime here, with `KeepAlive` and
- `deploy/dev.ltms.fleet.plist` — launchd agent, the *actual* runtime here, with `KeepAlive` and
ordered start after herdr.
- `deploy/bridged.service` — systemd unit for the Linux gateways CB-308 introduces.
- `deploy/fleetd.service` — systemd unit for the Linux gateways CB-308 introduces.
Ordering after herdr is advisory in both: the herdr socket may not exist at boot, so the daemon
must **retry the socket rather than exit** — supervision ordering is a nicety, socket-retry is the
@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ configured. It already leaks nothing but herdr's version and up/down.
### 3.1 There are TWO entry paths, and only one of them has identity today
The wiki describes MCP as "a thin adapter over the REST core". **At the code level that is not
literally true, and the difference is security-relevant.** `BridgeMcp` calls `MessageService` /
literally true, and the difference is security-relevant.** `FleetMcp` calls `MessageService` /
`SessionManager` *directly*; it never issues an HTTP request against a Javalin route. And `/mcp` is
mounted as a raw servlet on Jetty's `ServletContextHandler`
(`BridgedApp.build → cfg.jetty.modifyServletContextHandler`), so it does **not** pass through
(`FleetApp.build → cfg.jetty.modifyServletContextHandler`), so it does **not** pass through
Javalin's `before` filters at all.
The current split is the mirror image of what you'd expect:
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ The current split is the mirror image of what you'd expect:
| REST routes | ❌ **none at all** — the session id is taken from the URL path and trusted | ❌ none |
So REST is the *more* exposed surface: `POST /sessions/{id}/reply` accepts any `{id}` from the
path, whereas the MCP `bridge_reply` derives the worker from the connection and refuses to read it
path, whereas the MCP `fleet_reply` derives the worker from the connection and refuses to read it
from an argument. Loopback-only bind is what makes this safe today.
**Therefore CB-505 must enforce on both paths against one shared resolver** — not at a single
@@ -188,15 +188,15 @@ Deliberately small; every one maps to a failure mode we have actually hit.
| Metric | Type | Why it exists |
|---|---|---|
| `bridged_sends_total{outcome}` | counter | outcome ∈ replied\|completion_fallback\|timeout\|failed — the completion-fallback rate is the health signal for turn detection (CB-115/116/118) |
| `bridged_send_duration_seconds` | histogram | delegated turn latency |
| `bridged_replies_total{path}` | counter | path ∈ rendezvous\|inbox — how often a reply strands (CB-307's whole reason to exist) |
| `bridged_inbox_depth{target}` | gauge | undrained replies; steady-state should be 0 |
| `bridged_push_nudges_total{outcome}` | counter | outcome ∈ delivered\|exhausted — a rising `exhausted` means the primary is not draining |
| `bridged_spawns_total{kind,outcome}` | counter | outcome ∈ ready\|timeout\|guard_rejected; per peer kind (CB-402) |
| `bridged_sessions{state}` | gauge | SPAWNING/READY/BUSY/DONE census |
| `bridged_herdr_calls_total{method,outcome}` | counter | socket health — the dependency everything rests on |
| `bridged_auth_failures_total{reason}` | counter | only meaningful once CB-501 lands; catches misconfigured workers |
| `fleet_sends_total{outcome}` | counter | outcome ∈ replied\|completion_fallback\|timeout\|failed — the completion-fallback rate is the health signal for turn detection (CB-115/116/118) |
| `fleet_send_duration_seconds` | histogram | delegated turn latency |
| `fleet_replies_total{path}` | counter | path ∈ rendezvous\|inbox — how often a reply strands (CB-307's whole reason to exist) |
| `fleet_inbox_depth{target}` | gauge | undrained replies; steady-state should be 0 |
| `fleet_push_nudges_total{outcome}` | counter | outcome ∈ delivered\|exhausted — a rising `exhausted` means the primary is not draining |
| `fleet_spawns_total{kind,outcome}` | counter | outcome ∈ ready\|timeout\|guard_rejected; per peer kind (CB-402) |
| `fleet_sessions{state}` | gauge | SPAWNING/READY/BUSY/DONE census |
| `fleet_herdr_calls_total{method,outcome}` | counter | socket health — the dependency everything rests on |
| `fleet_auth_failures_total{reason}` | counter | only meaningful once CB-501 lands; catches misconfigured workers |
---
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ was answered from the forge itself. Kept here as the decision record.*
1. ✅ **TLS scope (D3) — confirmed.** Bearer auth + the fail-fast bind guard ship in the daemon;
TLS terminates at a reverse proxy, documented with a worked example. AMQP gets TLS via an
`amqps://` URI. No keystore handling in `bridged`.
`amqps://` URI. No keystore handling in `fleetd`.
2. ✅ **Micrometer (D4) — confirmed dropped.** Zero-dependency Prometheus text renderer, for the
reasons in D4 (pom reconciliation burden + the mandated CVE gate being un-runnable this
session). Revisit if a push-gateway or JVM-metrics requirement appears; the endpoint is the
+34 -34
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# M4 - Fleet health, recovery, routing, and capacity
**Status:** Design accepted on 2026-08-15. CB-573 part 1 has shipped the classification model and
the `bridge_list` capacity view; the remaining M4 units are not yet shipped. See
the `fleet_list` capacity view; the remaining M4 units are not yet shipped. See
[Unit 2 — what has landed so far](#unit-2---what-has-landed-so-far) before planning Unit 2 work:
some of its criteria were met by separate CB tickets, and one of them contradicts the unit text.
**Scope:** Fleet evidence, safe mechanical repair, lead routing, capacity reporting, and optional
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ post-teardown invariant so a later regression becomes `DELEGATION_ORPHANED`.
### 2.2 Corrections made during design
The first state table missed `BUSY` in bridged plus `IDLE` or `DONE` in herdr. It would have found
The first state table missed `BUSY` in fleetd plus `IDLE` or `DONE` in herdr. It would have found
the real trace only through a late, weak stall timer. The final model adds
`TURN_BOUNDARY_LOST` as a strong disagreement state.
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ Idle may drive configured resource cleanup. It never opens an incident and never
| `TURN_BOUNDARY_LOST` | Same session turn stays `BUSY`; same accepted task stays open; two raw snapshots show `IDLE` or `DONE` | Strong disagreement. Strict reconciliation may repair it. |
| `ERROR_ON_SCREEN` | Suspicious non-working state survives grace; `detection` matches a tested adapter-specific fatal signature | Certain only for the matched signature. A bare word such as `Exception` is not enough. |
| `STALL_SUSPECTED` | Open turn is older than the configured threshold; two normalised `recent_unwrapped` digests are unchanged; no boundary or reply occurs | Not certain. A long valid API call can look the same. Lead decides. |
| `MUTE` | Turn resolves through completion fallback instead of `bridge_reply` | Certain that no structured reply won. It does not prove an MCP failure. A single event is a metric, not an incident. |
| `MUTE` | Turn resolves through completion fallback instead of `fleet_reply` | Certain that no structured reply won. It does not prove an MCP failure. A single event is a metric, not an incident. |
| `REPLY_STRANDED` | Typed reply or health message remains after owning-lead push reaches its cap | Collection failed. This does not explain whether the lead is busy, dead, or ignoring the nudge. |
| `DELEGATION_ORPHANED` | Target is gone, failed, or released, but one or more tasks remain `PENDING` after reconciliation grace | Certain bridge invariant failure. This is not an inbox-drain fault. |
| `WORK_PRODUCT_AT_RISK` | Provisioned branch has commits after its recorded base; member is `DONE`, `FAILED`, or preserved after release; no turn or inbox item remains; long-idle threshold passed | A warning, not proof of loss. Work may already have an open pull request or a squash merge. |
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ request or merge state. If committed work appears with `REPLY_STRANDED` or
| State | Exact evidence | Certainty and action |
|---|---|---|
| `CONTROL_LINK_DOWN` | Two full-fleet `agent.list` calls fail across the grace, and herdr `ping` also fails | Certain for the bridged-to-herdr link. Retry calls, record the incident, and use human escalation if no lead can be reached. |
| `CONTROL_LINK_DOWN` | Two full-fleet `agent.list` calls fail across the grace, and herdr `ping` also fails | Certain for the fleetd-to-herdr link. Retry calls, record the incident, and use human escalation if no lead can be reached. |
A failed fleet list alone is not a dead-member claim. A single `_not_found` with a healthy global
link is a target fault, not a control-link fault.
@@ -230,8 +230,8 @@ Only the lead may:
- choose how to use partial work in a worktree;
- restart herdr or change network, model, credentials, backend, or configuration.
Reports include literal safe tool calls such as `bridge_status(sessionId="...")`,
`bridge_poll(ticket="...")`, `bridge_list()`, and optional `bridge_stop(paneId="...")`. A judgement
Reports include literal safe tool calls such as `fleet_status(sessionId="...")`,
`fleet_poll(ticket="...")`, `fleet_list()`, and optional `fleet_stop(paneId="...")`. A judgement
state never presents stop as the only action.
### 5.3 Release causes and worktree safety
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ preserving cause.
Before abnormal release removes the live session, M4 writes an atomic manifest under the worktree
root. It records session identity, owner, role, profile, repository, path, branch, base commit,
release cause, release time, state, and pending task ids. `bridge_list.preservedWorktrees` loads these
release cause, release time, state, and pending task ids. `fleet_list.preservedWorktrees` loads these
manifests after restart. Stop output and WARN logs also name the path and cause. M4 never
auto-deletes a preserved worktree.
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ Compiled brakes apply even if config asks for more:
- at most two pane reads occur in one fleet tick;
- targets rotate fairly;
- only a normalised digest and optional clipped local excerpt are stored;
- no pane excerpt leaves bridged in a human webhook.
- no pane excerpt leaves fleetd in a human webhook.
Use `detection` for tested screen signatures. Use normalised `recent_unwrapped` only for progress
comparison.
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ The reader uses AMQP `content_type`, never body sniffing:
```text
Legacy v0: text/plain
Typed family: application/vnd.ltms.bridged.inbox-message+json
Typed family: application/vnd.ltms.fleet.inbox-message+json
```
A legacy reply may begin with `{`. It remains plain text because its media type is `text/plain`.
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ Invalid known-format data is copied byte-for-byte to durable queue
before the original is acknowledged. A failed quarantine handoff leaves the original unacknowledged.
The raw body never enters logs.
Decode failure creates a redacted WARN, metric, `bridge_list` summary, and routed health incident.
Decode failure creates a redacted WARN, metric, `fleet_list` summary, and routed health incident.
One bad entry never escapes the consumer callback and never stops later valid messages.
Safe downgrade is not supported. The previous build ignores `content_type` and would show typed JSON
@@ -399,13 +399,13 @@ Choose the candidate with the fewest assigned foreign incidents. Break ties by s
then terminal id. Pin the recipient. Reassign only if that peer becomes unhealthy or retires. A
routing generation marks a reassignment, and old pending assignments become superseded.
`bridge_list` lead rows show health, health age, assigned foreign incident count, and a bounded list
`fleet_list` lead rows show health, health age, assigned foreign incident count, and a bounded list
of incident id, subject, state, severity, age, and routing generation. The top-level view also shows
owner, recipient, and routing reason.
A peer incident is published under the recipient lead's inbox key, not the failed subject's key. Its
status-gated nudge names the failed lead and gives the exact
`bridge_poll(target="<recipient-terminal>")` call.
`fleet_poll(target="<recipient-terminal>")` call.
### 7.5 Lead inbox ownership
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ An idle, reachable lead may receive the existing bounded nudge. An unreachable o
has no safe in-loop recovery. The bridge must not restart or replace it. A new lead would not have the
failed lead's plan or context, and an uncertain relaunch could create two orchestrators.
With no webhook, only `bridge_list`, `/healthz`, metrics, WARN logs, and the incident journal remain.
With no webhook, only `fleet_list`, `/healthz`, metrics, WARN logs, and the incident journal remain.
These are passive surfaces. They are not a human notification.
## 8. Lost-boundary reconciliation
@@ -520,8 +520,8 @@ A repaired result uses distinct `RECONCILED_COMPLETION` values in `Rendezvous`,
task poll source, and metrics. The lead sees:
```text
[repaired completion - bridged detected a lost turn boundary. The member did not call
bridge_reply; pane-derived text follows and may be partial]
[repaired completion - fleetd detected a lost turn boundary. The member did not call
fleet_reply; pane-derived text follows and may be partial]
```
Clipped text also keeps the existing clipped-tail marker.
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ failure operation once. It never recreates the task.
Capacity is a view, not a health state.
`bridge_list` adds one block per profile:
`fleet_list` adds one block per profile:
```text
profile, maxLoad, live, free, reclaimable
@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ incident feeds lead-health evidence. If the lead then becomes unhealthy, peer or
Webhook mode requires a resolved environment variable. Turning notification off stops outbound
attempts but keeps incidents. Turning it back on resumes still-open human incidents.
Without a sink, `bridge_list.healthCoverage` states that human escalation is unavailable. `/healthz`
Without a sink, `fleet_list.healthCoverage` states that human escalation is unavailable. `/healthz`
keeps its existing HTTP liveness result and adds a nested `fleetHealth.status=partial` component.
Metrics and one startup or reload WARN expose the same limit.
@@ -687,14 +687,14 @@ The sink response body is ignored. A webhook cannot direct recovery. n8n remains
M4 adds bounded-label series:
```text
bridged_health_incidents{scope,state,severity}
bridged_health_incidents_total{event}
bridged_health_notifications_total{event,outcome}
bridged_health_notification_queue_depth
bridged_health_notification_last_success_seconds
bridged_health_notification_capability{mode,status}
bridged_lead_health{lead,state}
bridged_lead_assigned_incidents{lead}
fleet_health_incidents{scope,state,severity}
fleet_health_incidents_total{event}
fleet_health_notifications_total{event,outcome}
fleet_health_notification_queue_depth
fleet_health_notification_last_success_seconds
fleet_health_notification_capability{mode,status}
fleet_lead_health{lead,state}
fleet_lead_assigned_incidents{lead}
```
Metric labels never include terminal ids, incident ids, URLs, or error text.
@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ Acceptance criteria:
them.
16. Explicit stop is state-aware. Any pending task or non-terminal state preserves the worktree.
17. Atomic preserved-worktree manifests reload after restart and appear in lead-only
`bridge_list.preservedWorktrees`.
`fleet_list.preservedWorktrees`.
18. Manifest failure preserves the worktree and opens an operator-visible health failure.
19. Provision records the base commit. Terminal, long-idle worktrees report
`WORK_PRODUCT_AT_RISK` only under the evidence in Section 4.2 and never auto-delete work.
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ Checked against `main` at `e09cac6` on 2026-08-15. Unit 2 was written as one blo
have since been built by separate CB tickets. Read this before planning the rest, or that work gets
done twice.
The check was a symbol survey of `bridged/src/main/java` plus the merge history. It tells you whether
The check was a symbol survey of `fleetd/src/main/java` plus the merge history. It tells you whether
the machinery exists at all. It is **not** a line-by-line audit of whether each criterion is fully
met, and I did not run one.
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ met, and I did not run one.
| 14 | `DELEGATION_ORPHANED` | 3 files | **Partial.** The health state exists. The teardown-invariant check that creates it, and the retry rule, do not. |
| 15 | `SPAWN_ROLLBACK` | 0 files | **Contradicted — see below.** |
| 16 | — | — | Partial at best. CB-576 made release preserve a dirty worktree; whether explicit stop is state-aware is not checked. |
| 17, 18 | `preservedWorktrees` | 0 files | Not started. No manifest, and no lead-only `bridge_list` field. |
| 17, 18 | `preservedWorktrees` | 0 files | Not started. No manifest, and no lead-only `fleet_list` field. |
| 19 | `WORK_PRODUCT_AT_RISK` | 0 files | Not started. |
**Criterion 15 no longer matches the code, and the code is right.** It says "normal `COMPLETED`
@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ preserve it. `SPAWN_ROLLBACK` itself does not exist yet.
### Unit 3 - Typed inbox and member routing
Scope: semantic record, AMQP migration, both adapters, member routing, polling, and member health in
`bridge_list`.
`fleet_list`.
Acceptance criteria:
@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ Acceptance criteria:
6. Invalid known data never escapes the callback, appears as a reply, or blocks later valid messages.
7. Invalid data reaches durable per-target quarantine before original ack. Failed handoff leaves the
original unacked.
8. Decode failures create redacted WARN, metric, `bridge_list` summary, and routed incident without
8. Decode failures create redacted WARN, metric, `fleet_list` summary, and routed incident without
raw content.
9. Both adapters pass one semantic contract for fields, FIFO, dedup, ownership, ack, and release.
10. Lead keys require explicit ownership. Publication never claims a queue.
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ Acceptance criteria:
15. RabbitMQ contract tests pass with `mvn test -Pcontract`. The same cases run once on production
LavinMQ, or the release states that LavinMQ was not checked.
16. Member incidents route to the exact delegating lead and never resolve a task rendezvous.
17. `bridge_list` shows compact member health and capacity without pane content. Member
17. `fleet_list` shows compact member health and capacity without pane content. Member
`idleForSeconds` is present only when no accepted turn or inbox item exists.
### Unit 4 - Lead health and peer routing
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ Acceptance criteria:
8. A selected working peer is not interrupted. Its push waits for an injectable window.
9. Recipient assignment stays pinned. Reassignment increments generation and supersedes old pending
assignment.
10. `bridge_list` shows bounded foreign assignments, recipient, reason, and generation without pane
10. `fleet_list` shows bounded foreign assignments, recipient, reason, and generation without pane
content.
11. `LeadInboxRegistry` owns configured and discovered lead keys before publication.
12. Missing leads keep ownership. Retirement needs an empty queue and handled incidents.
@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ Acceptance criteria:
3. Webhook mode requires a resolved environment value. Bad notification config does not disable an
already valid detector.
4. Mode changes keep open incidents. Re-enable resumes eligible incidents.
5. `bridge_list`, `/healthz`, metrics, and one WARN show partial coverage without a sink. HTTP
5. `fleet_list`, `/healthz`, metrics, and one WARN show partial coverage without a sink. HTTP
liveness behavior stays unchanged.
6. One-lead, no-sink coverage states that lead failure has no active notification or recovery.
7. Incident and outbound dedupe use the stable keys in Section 10.3.
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ Acceptance criteria:
15. Webhook response bodies are ignored and cannot direct recovery.
16. Tests cover disabled mode, one lead without sink, open/update/reminder/resolve, restart, dedup,
reassignment, disable/re-enable, and sink failure while local health continues.
17. `bridged.example.yaml` documents all hot keys and compiled floors.
17. `fleetd.example.yaml` documents all hot keys and compiled floors.
18. The operator Features wiki is updated separately. The portable `CLAUDE.md` block is checked and
changed only if shipped tool or inbox semantics make it untrue.
19. `mvn clean install` passes.
+126 -327
View File
@@ -1,311 +1,162 @@
# MCP Contract — `bridged`'s unified gateway
# MCP flows and error model — `fleetd`
> **Status: 🔴 HISTORICAL DESIGN — do NOT use as the tool reference.** Written 2026-07-14, before
> any MCP code existed. The system shipped and this page never caught up, so **its tool names,
> parameter names and REST paths are wrong today**. Audited 2026-08-17; the specific drift:
> **What this page is.** The **flows**: how a delegation, a clarification, a detached task and a
> silent member each travel through `fleetd`. These shapes are what shipped, and they are hard to
> read off the code because they span the MCP face, the rendezvous registry, the `Injector` and
> herdr.
>
> - **Tools it names that do not exist:** `bridge_read`, `bridge_cancel`.
> - **Shipped tools it omits:** `bridge_poll`, `bridge_ack`, `bridge_profiles`, `bridge_whoami`.
> - **Parameter names are wrong nearly everywhere** — it says `message`/`target`/`timeout_seconds`/
> `block` where the code takes `content`/`sessionId`/`timeoutMs`/`wait`; `text` where
> `bridge_reply` takes `content`; `target` where `bridge_stop` takes `paneId`.
> - **REST paths are wrong:** it says `POST /workers` and `DELETE /workers/{paneId}`; the daemon
> serves `POST /members` and `DELETE /members/{paneId}`.
> **What this page is NOT: a tool reference.** It deliberately holds no tool catalogue, no
> parameter tables and no REST paths. **The live MCP schema is the authority** — each tool's own
> description and parameters, as mounted — with the intent→tool table in `CLAUDE.md` as the short
> form.
>
> **The authoritative tool surface is the live MCP schema** (each tool's own description and
> parameters, as mounted), with the intent→tool table in `CLAUDE.md` as the short form. Both were
> checked against `mcp/BridgeMcp.java` on 2026-08-17 and are accurate.
> That absence is the fix for fleetd #114 (CB-609), and it is worth stating why. This page used to
> carry a full tool catalogue written in July 2026, before any MCP code existed. The code shipped;
> the page did not follow. By August it named two tools that do not exist, omitted five that do,
> had the wrong name for nearly every parameter, pointed at REST paths the daemon does not serve,
> and — worst — still described an identity model (*"any connection that does not map to a known
> worker is treated as a primary"*) that was a real privilege bug, fixed since by the ancestry
> walk in fleetd #161. Every one of those errors is the same error: **a second, hand-maintained
> copy of something the code already states**. So the second copy is gone rather than corrected.
> Only the flows remain, because a flow is a shape rather than a name, and shapes are what this
> page was ever good for.
>
> What is still worth reading here is **§6 — the flows and the error model** (rendezvous,
> `bridge_ask`, detached delivery, the turn-done fallback). The shapes it describes are the ones
> that shipped; only the names around them drifted. Rewriting this page is tracked as **CB-609**.
`bridged` is the **sole communication gateway** for every Claude session in the bridge. Both
the **primary** (Opus, on subscription) and every **worker** (off-subscription Claude Code)
mount the *same* MCP server with a single `claude mcp add` line, and talk only through its
tools. No Claude session ever addresses a broker, a peer, or the network directly.
This document defines every MCP tool that face must expose, who may call it, its blocking
semantics, and how it maps onto the code already in the tree.
> The names that do appear below are checked by `McpContractDocTest`, which fails if this page
> names a `fleet_*` tool the server does not register. That test is the whole reason it is safe to
> write a tool name here at all.
---
## 1. Design constraints (non-negotiable)
## 1. Rendezvous flows
These come from the project's core invariants and bound every decision below.
### 1.1 Delegation — happy path
1. **One server, both roles.** The primary and all workers mount an identical server. The
catalog must serve both, and `bridged` must decide *who is calling* from the connection —
never from a caller-supplied argument that could be spoofed.
2. **Subscription-safe by construction.** No MCP tool ever reads, sets, or forwards
`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`. Mounting the bridge cannot move a session off subscription.
Enforced today by [`SubscriptionGuard`](1-Architecture).
3. **Blocking rendezvous, no busy-poll.** The primary consumes a worker's reply through a
*single* MCP call that `bridged` holds open — never a cross-turn poll loop that would burn
subscription quota.
4. **Status-gated delivery.** Anything that puts text into a worker flows through the existing
[`Injector`](1-Architecture): delivered only when the worker is `idle`/`blocked`, at most
one message per turn.
5. **`bridged` owns policy; herdr owns PTYs.** MCP tools express *intent*; `bridged`
translates it into guard checks, rendezvous bookkeeping, and herdr `agent.*` calls.
---
## 2. Topology
Both faces live in the one daemon. The **north face** is MCP (this document); the **south
face** is the herdr Unix socket. REST/SSE remains only for non-Claude clients and dashboards.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
OPUS["Opus — primary<br/>(Claude Code, env CLEAN)<br/>MCP client"]
subgraph BD["bridged — standalone daemon"]
MCP["MCP server (north face)<br/>bridge_send · bridge_reply<br/>bridge_ask · bridge_status · lifecycle"]
RDV["rendezvous registry<br/>(blocking-call waiters)"]
INJ["Injector + StatusPoller<br/>(status-gated writer)"]
SOCK["herdr socket client (south face)"]
MCP --> RDV
RDV --> INJ
INJ --> SOCK
MCP --> SOCK
end
HERDR["herdr<br/>panes · agent-status"]
W["worker claude pane<br/>ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL set<br/>MCP client"]
OPUS -->|"bridge_send (blocks)"| MCP
W -.->|"bridge_reply / bridge_ask"| MCP
SOCK -->|"agent.start · agent.send<br/>agent.get · pane.close"| HERDR
HERDR -->|"drives PTY"| W
classDef ext fill:#2b6cb0,stroke:#1a365d,color:#ffffff;
classDef core fill:#2f855a,stroke:#22543d,color:#ffffff;
class OPUS,W ext
class MCP,RDV,INJ,SOCK core
```
---
## 3. Identity & addressing
Because the same server is mounted by everyone, `bridged` resolves the caller's role on every
request — this is the linchpin of the whole contract and has no code yet.
- **Workers are known.** `bridged` spawns every worker
([`WorkerService`](1-Architecture)) and records its herdr session UUID / `terminal_id` on
the returned [`Agent`]. When a call arrives on a connection that maps to a known worker,
the caller is *that* worker — so **workers never pass a target**; routing is implicit.
- **The primary is "not a worker".** Any connection that does not map to a known worker is
treated as a primary. It addresses workers **explicitly** by `target` — a session UUID,
a `terminal_id`, or a friendly `profile` name.
- **Turn correlation.** A blocking `bridge_send` registers a *waiter* keyed by worker
identity. A worker's later `bridge_reply` / `bridge_ask` on the same identity resolves that
waiter. A `turn_id` is minted per exchange so a clarification round-trip
(§6.2) rejoins the right turn.
---
## 4. Transport
`bridged` is a long-lived daemon serving **multiple** concurrent clients (one primary + N
workers), so a per-client stdio child is the wrong shape. The recommended transport is
**streamable-HTTP / SSE** on the same bind as the REST face:
```bash
# identical on primary and every worker
claude mcp add --transport http bridged http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp
```
This adds an MCP-server dependency the pom does not yet carry. See [Open decisions](#10-open-decisions).
---
## 5. Tool catalog
| Tool | Caller | Blocks? | Backing (exists today?) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [`bridge_send`](#bridge_send) | primary | yes (default) | `Injector.enqueue` ✅ · rendezvous registry ❌ (CB-104) |
| [`bridge_reply`](#bridge_reply) | worker | no | rendezvous ❌ · pane injection via `Injector` ✅ |
| [`bridge_ask`](#bridge_ask) | worker | yes | reverse rendezvous ❌ |
| [`bridge_status`](#bridge_status) | either | no | `AgentControl.status` ✅ · `Injector.activeTargets` ✅ |
| [`bridge_spawn`](#lifecycle) | primary | no | `WorkerService.spawn` ✅ (`POST /workers`) |
| [`bridge_list`](#lifecycle) | either | no | `WorkerService.list` ✅ (`/agents`) |
| [`bridge_stop`](#lifecycle) | primary | no | `WorkerService.stop` ✅ (`DELETE /workers/{paneId}`) |
| [`bridge_read`](#bridge_read) | primary | no | `AgentControl.read` ✅ |
| [`bridge_cancel`](#bridge_cancel) | primary | no | — ❌ (future) |
### Core: delegation & rendezvous
#### `bridge_send`
*(primary → worker — the headline tool, CB-104)*
- **Params:** `message` (required); `target` (optional — defaults to the sole worker / default
profile); `timeout_seconds` (default 600); `block` (default `true`); `auto_spawn`
(default `true`); `turn_id` (optional — supplied when answering a worker's `bridge_ask`).
- **Blocking (`block:true`):** enqueue `message` via the `Injector`, then hold the call open
until exactly one of:
- worker calls `bridge_reply` → `{ outcome:"reply", text }`
- worker calls `bridge_ask` → `{ outcome:"question", text, turn_id }`
- worker's `agent_status` reaches done/idle with no reply → `{ outcome:"turn_done", text:<terminal tail> }`
- deadline elapses → `{ outcome:"timeout" }`
- worker gone → error `worker_gone`
- **Detached (`block:false`):** enqueue and return `{ outcome:"dispatched", dispatch_id }`
immediately. The eventual reply is injected into the primary's idle pane (§6.3), or drained
via `bridge_status` on a split-host primary.
#### `bridge_reply`
*(worker → primary)*
- **Params:** `text` (required); `final` (default `true`).
- **Behavior:** resolve the primary waiter registered against this worker with `text`. If no
waiter exists (detached delegation), `bridged` **injects the primary's idle pane** instead.
Returns `{ delivered:true, mode:"resolved"|"injected" }`. No `target` — identity is implicit.
#### `bridge_ask`
*(worker → primary — the reverse rendezvous)*
- **Params:** `question` (required); `timeout_seconds`.
- **Behavior:** blocks the *worker's* call. Surfaces the question to the primary (resolving its
open `bridge_send` with `outcome:"question"`, or injecting its pane). When the primary
answers — a `bridge_send` carrying the matching `turn_id` — that unblocks this call and
returns `{ answer }` to the worker, which continues **in the same turn**.
### Worker lifecycle
<a id="lifecycle"></a>
Thin adapters over [`WorkerService`](1-Architecture) — parity with the existing REST routes.
- **`bridge_spawn`** — `{ profile? }` → worker view (`sessionId`, `terminalId`, `paneId`,
`status`). Guard-checked; a boundary breach returns error `subscription_boundary` (the
REST `403`).
- **`bridge_list`** — no params → all workers + `agent_status`. Read-only, either role.
- **`bridge_stop`** — `{ target }` → tears down the pane and its dedicated tab. Idempotent.
### Observability
#### `bridge_status`
*(either role — the README's 4th named tool)*
- **Params:** `target?`.
- **Behavior:** per-worker `agent_status`, queue depth (`Injector.activeTargets`), whether a
rendezvous is open, and ids. For the *calling* session it also reports/drains **pending
messages addressed to me** — the path a split-host primary's `Stop`-hook uses to wake and
collect replies without being injectable. Read-only, non-blocking.
#### `bridge_read`
*(primary)*
- **Params:** `target`; `source` ∈ `visible | recent | recent_unwrapped | detection`.
- **Behavior:** returns the worker's terminal text so the primary can peek at a *detached*
worker's progress. Adapter over `AgentControl.read`.
### Control (future)
#### `bridge_cancel`
*(primary)*
- **Params:** `target`. Interrupt the worker's current turn / abandon the rendezvous. No
backing code yet.
---
## 6. Rendezvous flows
### 6.1 Delegation — happy path
One blocking call, zero polls.
One blocking call, zero polls. The lead's call is held open by `fleetd` until the member answers.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant P as Primary (Opus)
participant B as bridged (MCP + Injector)
participant P as "Lead (primary)"
participant B as "fleetd (MCP + Injector)"
participant H as herdr
participant W as Worker (Claude)
participant W as "Member"
P->>B: bridge_send("do X", target=w) — blocks
B->>B: register waiter(w)
B->>H: agent.send(w, "do X") (idle window)
H-->>W: prompt injected
W->>W: works the turn
W->>B: bridge_reply("result")
B->>B: resolve waiter(w)
B-->>P: { outcome:"reply", text:"result" }
P->>B: "fleet_send{sessionId, content} — blocks"
B->>B: "register waiter(sessionId)"
B->>H: "agent.send — only in an injectable window"
H-->>W: "prompt injected"
W->>W: "works the turn"
W->>B: "fleet_reply{content}"
B->>B: "resolve waiter"
B-->>P: "{ outcome: reply }"
```
### 6.2 Clarification — reverse rendezvous (`bridge_ask`)
**The cap that matters:** a blocking `fleet_send` is bounded by the *caller's own* MCP client
timeout, about 60 seconds — not by the task. Anything slower than that must use the detached flow
in §1.3, or the lead's call returns while the member is still working.
The worker pauses mid-turn to ask; the primary answers; the worker resumes in the same turn.
### 1.2 Clarification — reverse rendezvous
The member pauses mid-turn to ask, the lead answers, and the member resumes **the same turn** with
its context intact.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant P as Primary
participant B as bridged
participant W as Worker
participant P as "Lead"
participant B as fleetd
participant W as "Member"
P->>B: bridge_send("do X", target=w) — blocks
B-->>W: "do X" (injected)
W->>B: bridge_ask("which config?") — worker blocks
B-->>P: { outcome:"question", text:"which config?", turn_id }
P->>B: bridge_send("config.yaml", target=w, turn_id) — blocks again
B-->>W: resolve bridge_ask → { answer:"config.yaml" }
W->>W: resumes same turn
W->>B: bridge_reply("done")
B-->>P: { outcome:"reply", text:"done" }
P->>B: "fleet_send{sessionId, content} — blocks"
B-->>W: "content injected"
W->>B: "fleet_ask{question} — member blocks"
B-->>P: "{ outcome: question, turnId }"
P->>B: "fleet_send{turnId, content} — answers THIS turn"
B-->>W: "fleet_ask returns the answer"
W->>W: "resumes the same turn"
W->>B: "fleet_reply{content}"
B-->>P: "{ outcome: reply }"
```
### 6.3 Detached delegation — pane injection
**Answer with `turnId`, never `sessionId`.** A `sessionId` send starts a new turn; it does not
resolve the waiting `fleet_ask`.
The primary does not block; the reply arrives later in its idle pane.
**The window is about 55 seconds and no nudge extends it.** So never brief a member to "ask me":
decide before delegating, or give the member an explicit default to fall back on.
### 1.3 Detached delegation — the lead does not block
The lead gets a ticket immediately and collects the answer later. This is the flow for any real
task, because of the ~60s cap in §1.1.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant P as Primary
participant B as bridged
participant W as Worker
participant P as "Lead"
participant B as fleetd
participant W as "Member"
P->>B: bridge_send("do X", target=w, block=false)
B-->>P: { outcome:"dispatched", dispatch_id }
P->>P: continues its own work
W->>B: bridge_reply("result")
Note over B: no waiter → detached path
B->>B: Injector.enqueue(primary_pane, "result")
B-->>P: injected into idle pane (status-gated)
P->>B: "fleet_send{sessionId, content, wait:false}"
B-->>P: "accepted — ticket"
P->>P: "continues its own work"
W->>B: "fleet_reply{content}"
Note over B: "no waiter is blocked — the reply is held"
B->>B: "nudge the lead's own pane (status-gated)"
P->>B: "fleet_poll{ticket}"
B-->>P: "the member's report"
P->>B: "fleet_ack{target, msgId}"
```
### 6.4 Uncooperative worker — turn-done fallback
A terminal ticket nudges the lead's pane by itself, so a detached task does not need watching. The
nudge needs an injectable lead pane and is capped, so it is a convenience rather than a guarantee.
A worker that never calls `bridge_reply` still returns a result: `bridged` reads its terminal
tail when the turn completes.
### 1.4 The member never replies — turn-done fallback
A member that ends its turn without `fleet_reply` still produces something: `fleetd` reads its
pane tail. This is a **fallback, not a channel** — it is lossy in three separate ways, and every
one of them has produced a wrong answer in practice.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant P as Primary
participant B as bridged
participant W as Worker
participant P as "Lead"
participant B as fleetd
participant W as "Member"
P->>B: bridge_send("do X", target=w) — blocks
B-->>W: "do X" (injected)
W->>W: works, never calls bridge_reply
B->>B: StatusPoller sees agent_status → idle/done
B->>B: AgentControl.read(w, "recent")
B-->>P: { outcome:"turn_done", text:<terminal tail> }
P->>B: "fleet_send — blocks or detaches"
B-->>W: "content injected"
W->>W: "works, never calls fleet_reply"
B->>B: "StatusPoller sees the turn end"
B->>B: "read the pane tail"
B->>B: "classify: exhausted? echoed brief? real report?"
B-->>P: "{ outcome: turn_done } or a named failure"
```
The three ways it goes wrong, and what each looks like now:
| What happened | What the lead used to get | What it gets today |
|---|---|---|
| The report is longer than the scrape window | The **end** silently cut off | Still clipped, but marked partial |
| The member never started — spent credential | The lead's **own brief** echoed back as a report | A named failure: backend exhausted |
| The member is simply slow | A tail of work in progress | Unchanged — read it as a hint, not a result |
The echoed-brief case is the one to remember: it reads as a long, on-topic report with nothing in
it from the member. It is suppressed now, but the general rule stands — **check the member's
worktree with `git log` before believing a report you did not watch arrive.**
---
## 7. Status gating
## 2. Status gating
Delivery only happens in a safe window. This is the state machine the `Injector` already
enforces via `AgentStatus.injectable()`; MCP `bridge_send` is simply its producer.
Delivery only happens in a safe window. `fleet_send` is a producer for the `Injector`, which
already enforces this through `AgentStatus.injectable()`.
```mermaid
stateDiagram-v2
[*] --> IDLE
IDLE --> WORKING: message delivered / picks up
WORKING --> IDLE: turn done
WORKING --> BLOCKED: awaits input
BLOCKED --> WORKING: input delivered
IDLE --> UNKNOWN: detection glitch
BLOCKED --> UNKNOWN: detection glitch
UNKNOWN --> IDLE: re-detected
IDLE --> WORKING: "message delivered, picked up"
WORKING --> IDLE: "turn done"
WORKING --> BLOCKED: "awaits input"
BLOCKED --> WORKING: "input delivered"
IDLE --> UNKNOWN: "detection glitch"
BLOCKED --> UNKNOWN: "detection glitch"
UNKNOWN --> IDLE: "re-detected"
note right of IDLE
injectable — deliver head of FIFO
@@ -321,69 +172,17 @@ stateDiagram-v2
end note
```
At most one message is delivered per turn: after a send the `Injector` waits for a `WORKING`
pickup before delivering the next, with a `PICKUP_GRACE_POLLS` fallback for turns faster than
the poll interval. A herdr `events.subscribe` stream can later replace the sampling without
touching this state machine.
**At most one message per turn.** After a send, the `Injector` waits for a `WORKING` pickup before
delivering the next, with a grace-poll fallback for turns that finish faster than the poll
interval.
---
Two consequences a lead feels directly:
## 8. Error model
- **A second send to a busy member never lands.** It reports as queued and times out. The member
is fine; the message simply waits, and then restarts the member when it next goes idle.
- **A spawned member is not deliverable until it has mounted the MCP.** Until then a send waits on
that gate for about 60 seconds and then fails without ever reaching the pane.
| Condition | `bridge_send` result | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Worker replies | `{ outcome:"reply" }` | normal |
| Worker asks | `{ outcome:"question", turn_id }` | answer with `bridge_send(turn_id)` |
| Turn ends, no reply | `{ outcome:"turn_done" }` | terminal tail as text |
| Deadline elapsed | `{ outcome:"timeout" }` | message may still be queued/delivered |
| Worker vanished | error `worker_gone` | `Injector.drop` fails the queued future |
| Guard breach on spawn | error `subscription_boundary` | REST `403` parity |
| Delivery failed at herdr | error, message dropped | poisoned message not left blocking the FIFO |
`bridge_reply` from a worker with no open waiter is **not** an error — it falls through to
detached pane injection (§6.3).
---
## 9. Mapping to existing code
The MCP face is a thin adapter layer; nearly every capability already exists behind the REST
seam. Only the **rendezvous registry** and the **caller-identity resolver** are new.
| MCP tool | Existing collaborator | New work |
|---|---|---|
| `bridge_send` | `Injector.enqueue`, `AgentControl.send` | waiter registry, timeout, outcome mux (CB-104) |
| `bridge_reply` / `bridge_ask` | `Injector` (pane injection) | reverse rendezvous, identity resolver |
| `bridge_status` | `AgentControl.status`, `Injector.activeTargets` | pending-drain projection |
| `bridge_spawn` / `list` / `stop` | `WorkerService.{spawn,list,stop}` | MCP adapter only |
| `bridge_read` | `AgentControl.read` | MCP adapter only |
Because the REST routes in `BridgedApp` already exercise the collaborators, MCP tools are
validated by **parity** against those routes, not by re-testing behavior.
---
## 10. Open decisions
1. **`bridge_ask` direction.** This page defines it as *worker-asks-primary* (a genuine reverse
channel, matching the "inject the primary's pane" language). The alternative — a synonym for
a blocking primary→worker send — is weaker and produces different plumbing. **Recommend
worker-asks-primary.**
2. **Detached delivery shape.** A `block:false` param on `bridge_send` (keeps the catalog
small) vs. a separate `bridge_dispatch` tool. **Recommend the param.**
3. **Auto-spawn on send.** `bridge_send` provisions a worker per profile when none exists
(simplest primary UX) vs. requiring an explicit `bridge_spawn` first. **Recommend
auto-spawn, defaulting on.**
4. **Transport & SDK.** Streamable-HTTP/SSE co-located with the REST bind (recommended) vs.
stdio. Requires choosing a Java MCP server SDK and adding it to the pom.
---
## 11. Implementation staging
- **CB-104** — blocking `bridge_send` + rendezvous registry + caller-identity resolver
(the producer that finally drives the inert `StatusPoller`).
- **CB-1xx** — `bridge_reply` / `bridge_ask` reverse rendezvous + detached pane injection.
- **CB-1xx** — lifecycle + observability adapters (`bridge_spawn/list/stop/status/read`).
- **CB-1xx** — transport wiring + `claude mcp add` docs; parity tests vs. REST.
- **Later** — `bridge_cancel`; swap `StatusPoller` for herdr `events.subscribe`.
`UNKNOWN` is deliberately neither injectable nor a pickup. A pane whose status cannot be read is
not a pane that is safe to write to — see fleetd #176 for what happens when a gate treats an
unreadable pane as a ready one.
+7 -7
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# v1.0.0 — One leader, one host, complete
This is the first release of **`bridged`**.
This is the first release of **`fleetd`**.
`bridged` lets one main Claude Code session (the **leader**, on your Pro/Max subscription)
`fleetd` lets one main Claude Code session (the **leader**, on your Pro/Max subscription)
run a team of **workers** — extra Claude Code sessions on a cheaper or local model, and
non-Claude agents too. The leader's own session is never touched: it stays on subscription,
with a clean environment.
@@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ of this one.
## One gateway for all messages
- **Everyone talks through the same door.** The leader and every worker connect to the same
MCP server and use only its tools: `bridge_whoami` · `bridge_profiles` · `bridge_spawn` ·
`bridge_list` · `bridge_status` · `bridge_send` · `bridge_reply` · `bridge_ask` ·
`bridge_poll` · `bridge_ack` · `bridge_stop`.
MCP server and use only its tools: `fleet_whoami` · `fleet_profiles` · `fleet_spawn` ·
`fleet_list` · `fleet_status` · `fleet_send` · `fleet_reply` · `fleet_ask` ·
`fleet_poll` · `fleet_ack` · `fleet_stop`.
- **You are who your connection says you are.** The bridge finds out who is calling from the
connection itself, never from a name the caller sends. So a worker cannot pretend to be
someone else, and `bridge_whoami` tells each agent its own role — no guessing.
someone else, and `fleet_whoami` tells each agent its own role — no guessing.
- **The subscription line cannot be crossed.** Only a spawned worker gets
`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`; the leader never does. Each worker profile has a list of allowed
model hosts, checked before anything starts.
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ had to ask for its replies. That gap is now closed on a single machine:
- **The leader gets a tap on the shoulder.** When a reply lands, the bridge nudges the
leader's own pane — only when the leader is free, and only a few times. If the leader is on
another machine, this quietly falls back to pick-up mode; the reply still waits.
- **Workers can ask questions.** With `bridge_ask`, a worker can pause mid-task, ask the
- **Workers can ask questions.** With `fleet_ask`, a worker can pause mid-task, ask the
leader something, and continue the *same* task with the answer.
## More than one kind of worker
+19 -19
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
# Team — lead orchestrating a mixed Claude + local-LLM fleet
The message server (`bridged`) delivers **one turn into one worker**. A **team** is the
The message server (`fleetd`) delivers **one turn into one worker**. A **team** is the
layer above it: a **Claude team-lead** that fans a job out across a **mixed fleet** of
workers — some on Claude, some on the remote local LLM — and reduces their replies. Same
`bridged` delivery, same subscription boundary; this doc is only about **orchestration** —
`fleetd` delivery, same subscription boundary; this doc is only about **orchestration** —
who the workers are, how the lead picks one, and how it runs many at once.
> Delivery mechanics (blocking `POST /message`, status-gated reply envelope) live in the
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ who the workers are, how the lead picks one, and how it runs many at once.
## The team
- **Team-lead** — the primary **Opus** (Claude Code, env **CLEAN**, on Pro/Max). Not a
worker; a **thin client of `bridged`**. It plans, routes, dispatches, and integrates, and
worker; a **thin client of `fleetd`**. It plans, routes, dispatches, and integrates, and
never sets `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`.
- **Workers** — a herd of `claude` panes in herdr, each an addressable `bridged` session
- **Workers** — a herd of `claude` panes in herdr, each an addressable `fleetd` session
with its **own model/env**:
- **Claude workers** (clean env, e.g. Sonnet) — reasoning-heavy or high-accuracy subtasks.
- **Local workers** (`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://llm.ltms.dev/anthropic`) — bulk, cheap, or
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ MCP) — only its model differs. Scale each kind horizontally by adding panes.
```mermaid
flowchart TB
LEAD["lead — Opus<br/>(Claude Code, env CLEAN)"]
BD["bridged<br/>message server + router"]
BD["fleetd<br/>message server + router"]
HERDR["herdr<br/>panes · agent-status"]
WC1["w-claude-1<br/>Sonnet · CLEAN"]
WC2["w-claude-2<br/>Sonnet · CLEAN"]
@@ -62,14 +62,14 @@ flowchart TB
| `w-local-*` | `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` set | local LLM | task is bulk / cheap / embarrassingly parallel |
The lead applies this rubric itself, guided by its `CLAUDE.md` team charter (below). Worker
selection is **policy in the lead**, not a `bridged` concern — `bridged` just delivers to
selection is **policy in the lead**, not a `fleetd` concern — `fleetd` just delivers to
the session the lead names.
## Subscription boundary in a team
Unchanged from the base architecture, and it scales with the fleet: **only local-worker
panes** launch with `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`. The lead and every Claude worker stay env-clean on
the subscription. `bridged` enforces which panes may carry the off-subscription env, so
the subscription. `fleetd` enforces which panes may carry the off-subscription env, so
adding workers never widens the boundary.
## Parallel fan-out (map / reduce)
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ different workers at once, then results are gathered.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant L as lead (Opus)
participant B as bridged
participant B as fleetd
participant WC as w-claude-1
participant WL as w-local-1
@@ -100,26 +100,26 @@ sequenceDiagram
```
- **Map:** the lead issues N concurrent blocking `POST /message` calls (one per subtask → its
chosen worker). Each call blocks only *that* request; `bridged` holds it open until the
chosen worker). Each call blocks only *that* request; `fleetd` holds it open until the
worker's turn completes (status-gated) and returns the reply envelope.
- **Reduce:** the lead collects the N envelopes and integrates. A slow local worker never
blocks a fast Claude worker — wall-clock ≈ the slowest single subtask, not the sum.
- **Detached / long jobs** use the async broker path instead of a held request (Channel 2 in
the base architecture), so the lead never busy-polls across turns.
Fan-out is bounded by the herd size (pane count) and `bridged`'s concurrency policy, not by
Fan-out is bounded by the herd size (pane count) and `fleetd`'s concurrency policy, not by
the lead.
## Knowing the roster
The lead discovers its team from `bridged` (session list / roles) rather than hard-coding
The lead discovers its team from `fleetd` (session list / roles) rather than hard-coding
pane ids, so workers can be added or restarted without editing the lead. A minimal charter
in the lead's `CLAUDE.md` turns Opus into the orchestrator:
```markdown
## Your team (via bridged)
You are the team-lead. Delegate through the bridged client — never launch workers yourself.
Roster: ask bridged for current sessions/roles.
## Your team (via fleetd)
You are the team-lead. Delegate through the fleetd client — never launch workers yourself.
Roster: ask fleetd for current sessions/roles.
- w-claude-* — Claude Sonnet. Reasoning-heavy / high-accuracy subtasks.
- w-local-* — remote local LLM. Bulk, cheap, or parallelizable subtasks.
@@ -133,22 +133,22 @@ tool instead of hand-rolling the HTTP request.
## What this layer does NOT change
- **Delivery** is still `bridged` → herdr `pane.send_text` + status events (Message-Server).
- **Delivery** is still `fleetd` → herdr `pane.send_text` + status events (Message-Server).
- **Completion timing** is still the worker status event; **reply content** still rides the
worker `Stop`-hook envelope.
- **Single-host** still applies: herdr's socket is local, so the whole herd lives on the
`bridged` host. The lead may be remote — it only needs HTTP to `bridged`.
`fleetd` host. The lead may be remote — it only needs HTTP to `fleetd`.
## Open questions
- **Routing intelligence:** rubric-in-`CLAUDE.md` (lead decides) vs. a `bridged` role-router
- **Routing intelligence:** rubric-in-`CLAUDE.md` (lead decides) vs. a `fleetd` role-router
(label-based). Start with the former; promote to the latter if routing logic grows.
- **Backpressure:** per-role concurrency caps in `bridged` so a fan-out can't exhaust the
- **Backpressure:** per-role concurrency caps in `fleetd` so a fan-out can't exhaust the
local gateway.
- **Result schema:** whether reply envelopes should carry structured metadata (worker, model,
tokens) to help the lead's reduce step.
## Status
🟡 Design (2026-07-11). Orchestration layer over the selected `bridged` server; inherits
🟡 Design (2026-07-11). Orchestration layer over the selected `fleetd` server; inherits
herdr (chosen) + AgentAPI (fallback). Delivery unchanged — see the Message-Server design.
+10 -10
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ requirement, not a nice-to-have.**
- **Worktree provisioned by the daemon** — `SessionManager` creates a dedicated git worktree +
branch per session, **hydrates it to full config parity** (below), and tears it down on release.
- **Worker opens its own PR** — the worker commits, pushes its branch, and opens the PR/MR itself,
returning the PR URL in its `bridge_reply`.
returning the PR URL in its `fleet_reply`.
## Why worktrees (the hazard being fixed)
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ worktree checks out anyway. Amber is the real gap — untracked local config the
3. **Never overlay the git plumbing** — the worktree's own `.git` file/branch is what gives
isolation; that's the *one* thing that must differ from the main tree.
The overlay set lives in config (`BridgedConfig.Worker.parityOverlay` — a list of repo-relative
The overlay set lives in config (`FleetConfig.Worker.parityOverlay` — a list of repo-relative
paths, with sane defaults) so it's auditable and per-repo tunable.
> **Trust note (deliberate).** Hydrating local config means the primary's local secrets/tokens
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
Note over W: implement in the isolated worktree
W->>G: git commit + git push (SSH, same user)
W->>G: open PR (branch to main)
W-->>P: bridge_reply (prUrl, branch, summary, tests)
W-->>P: fleet_reply (prUrl, branch, summary, tests)
P->>SM: release(paneId)
SM->>G: git worktree remove wt
Note over G: branch + PR persist for review/merge
@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ earlier `STATE.md` idea — a PR is reviewable, mergeable, and self-describing.*
## Infra facts (verified this session)
- **Remote:** `ssh://git@git.ltms.dev:2224/lms/claude-bridge.git` (gitea). Push is over **SSH** —
- **Remote:** `ssh://git@git.ltms.dev:2224/fleet/fleetd.git` (gitea). Push is over **SSH** —
a worker running as the same user with the same keys can `git push` **with no extra credential**.
- **gitea is NOT in the project `.mcp.json`** (only `jetbrains`, `intellij-index`, `bridged`). The
- **gitea is NOT in the project `.mcp.json`** (only `jetbrains`, `intellij-index`, `fleetd`). The
primary's gitea MCP comes from a global/user config, so **workers do not inherit it**. A worker
gets only the `bridge` MCP mounted (via `--mcp-config` launch flag).
- **No gitea CLI** (`tea`) installed; `glab` is present but is the GitLab CLI (wrong backend).
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ earlier `STATE.md` idea — a PR is reviewable, mergeable, and self-describing.*
| Option | Mechanism | Trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| **A. gitea REST + token** | Worker `curl`s `POST /api/v1/repos/lms/claude-bridge/pulls` with a scoped token injected by the daemon into the worker env | Minimal, no new server; token lives in the off-subscription worker's env (scope it tightly) |
| **A. gitea REST + token** | Worker `curl`s `POST /api/v1/repos/fleet/fleetd/pulls` with a scoped token injected by the daemon into the worker env | Minimal, no new server; token lives in the off-subscription worker's env (scope it tightly) |
| **B. mount gitea MCP into workers** | Add the gitea MCP to the worker's `--mcp-config` alongside `bridge` | Clean tool call, but the gitea MCP's own auth/token must be provisioned per worker; more moving parts |
| **C. install `tea` CLI** | Worker runs `tea pr create` with a token | Another dependency to install + configure; same token question as A |
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ and the token is a single scoped secret the daemon injects like it already injec
- Off-subscription workers already *could* push (SSH, same user). The **incremental grant is
PR-create**, i.e. a gitea API token.
- Scope the token **minimally**: the `lms/claude-bridge` repo, `write:repository` (create branch +
- Scope the token **minimally**: the `fleet/fleetd` repo, `write:repository` (create branch +
PR), **not** merge/admin/org. A leaked token can open PRs, not merge them — the primary/human is
still the merge gate.
- Inject via the daemon (env var, e.g. `GITEA_TOKEN`), never written to the worker's config dir —
@@ -153,11 +153,11 @@ and the token is a single scoped secret the daemon injects like it already injec
|---|---|---|
| Worktree provision/teardown | **CB-301 ext** — `SessionManager.acquire`/`release`; `WorkerSession` gains `worktree`, `branch` | daemon shells out to `git worktree add/remove` |
| **Config-parity overlay** | **CB-301 ext** — `SessionManager.acquire`, after `git worktree add` | symlink/copy the `parityOverlay` set into the worktree so the worker is a full peer; **this is what makes worktrees viable, not a dead-end** |
| Overlay config | `BridgedConfig.Worker.parityOverlay` — repo-relative paths, sane defaults | auditable, per-repo tunable; keep explicit + minimal (trust) |
| Overlay config | `FleetConfig.Worker.parityOverlay` — repo-relative paths, sane defaults | auditable, per-repo tunable; keep explicit + minimal (trust) |
| Branch naming | `worker/<ticket-slug>-<nonce>` off `main` (or a configured base) | one branch per session |
| Commit + push + PR handoff | **CB-302** — worker-driven, guided by the skill | push = SSH; PR = option A |
| Implementer skill | `.claude/skills/implementer/SKILL.md` | worktree-aware playbook (see below); mounts automatically since workers inherit repo cwd |
| gitea token injection | `WorkerService` env + `BridgedConfig` | repo-scoped, minimal perms |
| gitea token injection | `WorkerService` env + `FleetConfig` | repo-scoped, minimal perms |
| PR review + merge | Primary (has gitea MCP + judgment) | merge on green; the human/primary gate stays |
## Implementer skill (outline)
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ A worker-facing playbook (sibling to the existing `reviewer` skill):
3. **Push** your branch (`git push -u origin HEAD`).
4. **Open a PR** to `main` (option A `curl`, or the decided mechanism) with a title/body describing
the change and referencing the ticket.
5. **Reply** via `bridge_reply` with the **PR URL**, branch name, files changed, and test names —
5. **Reply** via `fleet_reply` with the **PR URL**, branch name, files changed, and test names —
that reply is the whole handoff.
6. Do **not** merge; do **not** touch `.mcp.json` or `wiki/`.
+11 -11
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Worker startup: working directory & the folder-trust prompt
When `bridged` spawns a worker, the worker CLI may show an **interactive startup prompt** before it
When `fleetd` spawns a worker, the worker CLI may show an **interactive startup prompt** before it
is ready to accept a task — most importantly a *"Do you trust the files in this folder?"* dialog. An
unattended worker parked on that prompt never becomes injectable: the status-gated injector waits for
`idle`/`blocked`, the task is never delivered, and (worst case) a stray Enter answers the dialog
@@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ rule that **a worker inherits the primary's directory** (never `$HOME`), and how
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A["bridge_spawn / POST /workers"] --> B{"explicit cwd?<br/>(profile cwd or spawn arg)"}
A["fleet_spawn / POST /workers"] --> B{"explicit cwd?<br/>(profile cwd or spawn arg)"}
B -->|"yes — told otherwise"| C["use that cwd"]
B -->|"no"| D{"caller PID resolvable?<br/>(MCP peer PID)"}
D -->|"yes"| E["cwd = the primary's cwd<br/>lsof -a -p PID -d cwd"]
D -->|"no (REST / off-host)"| F["cwd = bridged daemon cwd<br/>(never $HOME by assumption)"]
D -->|"no (REST / off-host)"| F["cwd = fleetd daemon cwd<br/>(never $HOME by assumption)"]
C --> G["ensureWorkspace → tab.create → agent.start {cwd}"]
E --> G
F --> G
@@ -51,10 +51,10 @@ only affect the seed shell, which the bridge closes).
| # | Source | When |
|---|--------|------|
| 1 | Explicit `cwd` — a per-profile `cwd:` in config, or a spawn argument | "told otherwise" — pin a fixed workdir |
| 2 | The **primary's cwd**, auto-detected from the `bridge_spawn` caller | normal MCP spawn from the primary |
| 3 | The `bridged` daemon's own cwd | REST spawn / off-host caller — **never `$HOME`** |
| 2 | The **primary's cwd**, auto-detected from the `fleet_spawn` caller | normal MCP spawn from the primary |
| 3 | The `fleetd` daemon's own cwd | REST spawn / off-host caller — **never `$HOME`** |
The primary's cwd (source 2) is discoverable with no new plumbing: `bridged` already resolves the MCP
The primary's cwd (source 2) is discoverable with no new plumbing: `fleetd` already resolves the MCP
caller's loopback **peer PID** for connection identity (`ConnectionIdentity` → `LsofPeerPidLookup`);
the same PID yields its cwd via `lsof -a -p <pid> -d cwd -Fn` (the `n…` line). The primary maps to no
worker pane (it is not a worker), but its PID and cwd are still readable.
@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ worker pane (it is not a worker), but its PID and cwd are still readable.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant P as "Primary (main)"
participant B as "bridged"
participant B as "fleetd"
participant O as "OS (lsof)"
participant H as "herdr"
P->>B: "bridge_spawn {profile} (no cwd)"
P->>B: "fleet_spawn {profile} (no cwd)"
B->>O: "peer PID for this connection's port"
O-->>B: "pid"
B->>O: "cwd of pid (lsof -d cwd)"
@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@ sequenceDiagram
*Figure 2 — a no-cwd spawn inherits the primary's directory from the caller's PID.*
> **Status:** implemented (CB-112). `bridged` threads the resolved `cwd` onto **`agent.start {cwd}`**
> **Status:** implemented (CB-112). `fleetd` threads the resolved `cwd` onto **`agent.start {cwd}`**
> (verified: the worker process is rooted there), keeping the single shared worker space. On an MCP
> `bridge_spawn` the primary's cwd is auto-detected from the caller's PID; over REST (no MCP caller)
> `fleet_spawn` the primary's cwd is auto-detected from the caller's PID; over REST (no MCP caller)
> it is the explicit `cwd` param else the daemon's cwd. Both placements (`tab` and legacy `pane`)
> carry it, since it rides `agent.start`.
@@ -133,5 +133,5 @@ unattended.
## See also
- `docs/MCP-Contract.md` — the tool surface (`bridge_spawn`, `bridge_profiles`, …).
- `docs/MCP-Contract.md` — the tool surface (`fleet_spawn`, `fleet_profiles`, …).
- `wiki/2-Message-Server.md` — the herdr `agent.*` / `workspace.*` schema (`workspace.create {cwd}`).
+208
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
# Wiki audit for #168
**Source checked:** `.wiki-snapshot/` at `68e32c6` (2026-08-31). I did not use
`wiki/`. Code references below are from the current `fleetd` source tree. A quoted
line is a concrete claim that needs correction, unless the table says `KEEP`.
| Page | Verdict | One-line reason |
|---|---|---|
| `Home.md` | REVISE | Good overview, but it still names the retired product. |
| `_Sidebar.md` | REVISE | The heading still says `claude-bridge`. |
| `1-Architecture.md` | REBUILD | Its component contract mixes current names with removed tools, routes, and planned backends. |
| `2-Message-Server.md` | REBUILD | The claimed MCP schema, mount command, REST/SSE surface, and fallback paths are pre-build design. |
| `3-Approaches.md` | REVISE | Useful research history, but it presents unbuilt AgentAPI as a selectable fallback. |
| `4-Setup.md` | RETIRE | It is an intentional stub that only redirects to chapter 13. |
| `5-Operations.md` | RETIRE | It is an intentional stub that only redirects to chapter 13. |
| `6-Team.md` | REBUILD | It teaches role-addressed sends and a Claude-only team model that the shipped API does not have. |
| `7-Use-Cases.md` | REBUILD | Its flagship flow depends on removed `ccs` profiles and removed send parameters. |
| `8-Roadmap.md` | REBUILD | It is a historical plan, but it presents old implementation choices and planned work as the current stack. |
| `9-Implementation.md` | REBUILD | Its package, class, endpoint, and outcome map has drifted from the source. |
| `10-Cross-Host-Messaging.md` | REVISE | It labels most federation work proposed, but misses the shipped `coordinator:` lead channel. |
| `11-Features.md` | REVISE | It is the right catalogue, but code-path names are old and it misses the second-herdr-daemon capability. |
| `12-Claude-to-OpenCode.md` | REVISE | The porting guide is mostly current, but calls the product and spawned-member path a bridge. |
| `13-User-Guide.md` | REVISE | It is the best operator page, but needs the product rename and the second-herdr-daemon setup. |
## Pages needing work
### `Home.md` — REVISE
- Quote: `# claude-bridge` (line 1) and `` `claude-bridge` keeps`` (line 11).
The product is `fleet` / `fleetd`. The MCP server identifies itself as `fleet` in
`fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/mcp/FleetMcp.java:313-315`.
- Quote: `AgentAPI ... swappable fallback injector` (lines 73-76).
There is no AgentAPI implementation under `fleetd/src/main/java`; the actual
launchers are selected by `Profile.kind` in
`fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/config/FleetConfig.java:265-270`.
### `_Sidebar.md` — REVISE
- Quote: `### 📖 claude-bridge` (line 1).
Rename it to `fleet`. `FleetMcp` registers the current product-facing tool set at
`fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/mcp/FleetMcp.java:301-326`.
### `1-Architecture.md` — REBUILD
- Quote: `` `claude-bridge` lets`` (line 3). The product was renamed; the MCP
server name is `fleet` (`FleetMcp.java:313-315`).
- Quote: ``fleet_read`` in the tool list (line 102). No such tool is registered.
The complete registered list is `fleet_send` through `fleet_whoami` at
`FleetMcp.java:301-326`; `fleet_read` is absent.
- Quote: `SSE (GET /events)` (line 143). `FleetApp.build()` registers no `/events`
route; its routes are listed at `FleetApp.java:143-159`.
- Quote: `Redis Streams / NATS JetStream, or an embedded queue` (line 106).
The shipped durable inbox is AMQP, configured by `broker`, at
`FleetConfig.java:49-50` and `FleetConfig.java:655-714`.
- Quote: `AgentAPI (fallback)` (line 107). No AgentAPI adapter exists; shipped
launcher kinds are `claude-code` and `opencode` (`FleetConfig.java:265-270`).
### `2-Message-Server.md` — REBUILD
- Quote: `claude mcp add --transport http bridge http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp`
(line 67). The daemon defaults to port `8765` in `FleetConfig.java:183-187`,
and identifies its server as `fleet` at `FleetMcp.java:313-315`.
- Quote: ``fleet_send(message, target?, {block, timeout_seconds, auto_spawn,
turn_id})`` (line 80). The real parameters are `sessionId`, `content`,
`timeoutMs`, `wait`, `turnId`, and `coordId` (`FleetMcp.java:1096-1108`).
- Quote: ``fleet_read(target, source)`` (line 85). It is not registered; see the
complete registration at `FleetMcp.java:301-326`.
- Quote: `docs/MCP-Contract.md ... normative` (lines 87-88). That is not a valid
reference: only §6 is current, as the current operator guide itself says at
`.wiki-snapshot/13-User-Guide.md:466`.
- Quote: `SSE (GET /events)` (line 45). No route exists in the built REST surface,
`FleetApp.java:143-159`.
### `3-Approaches.md` — REVISE
- Quote: `AgentAPI ... remains a swappable fallback injector` (lines 78-84).
It was never built. The shipped adapter selection is only `claude-code` or
`opencode` (`FleetConfig.java:265-270`). Keep it as discarded research, not an
operational fallback.
- Quote: `claude-bridge` (line 109). Rename the product to `fleet`; the runtime
package is `dev.ltms.fleet`, for example `FleetMcp.java:1`.
### `4-Setup.md` — RETIRE
It is a 25-line redirect and says its procedure was never written (lines 3-9).
Chapter 13 is the maintained install procedure. Keeping a second navigation page
adds no working documentation.
### `5-Operations.md` — RETIRE
It is a 35-line redirect and says its runbook was never written (lines 3-14).
Chapter 13 now owns run and recovery instructions.
### `6-Team.md` — REBUILD
- Quote: `fleet_send {role: w-claude, prompt: A}` (line 98). `fleet_send` accepts
`sessionId` and `content`, not `role` or `prompt` (`FleetMcp.java:1096-1108`).
- Quote: `some on Claude, some on the remote local LLM` (lines 3-5) and `Every
worker is ... Claude Code` (line 25). `opencode` is a first-class launcher kind,
not a Claude worker (`FleetConfig.java:265-270`).
- Quote: `fleetd's concurrency policy` (line 121). The configured capacity control
is per-profile `maxLoad` (`FleetConfig.java:251-264`), not the role routing model
described here.
### `7-Use-Cases.md` — REBUILD
- Quote: `ccs profile` (line 10), `ccs + herdr` (line 22), and `ccs-spawn`
(line 45). The configuration has `profiles` and `fleet`, not `ccs`:
`FleetConfig.java:34-58` and `FleetConfig.java:81-101`.
- Quote: `fleet_send({"to", "kind", "body", "block"})` (lines 55-62).
None of those are the shipped send parameters. The schema is
`FleetMcp.java:1096-1108`.
- Quote: `fleet_list() → { "profiles": ... }` (lines 74-80). `fleet_list` is a
roster view; `fleet_profiles` is the configured-backend view, as registered at
`FleetMcp.java:307-311` and described at `FleetMcp.java:1176-1182`.
### `8-Roadmap.md` — REBUILD
- Quote: `Java 21+` (line 43). The current project guidance and source use Java 25;
the `FleetConfig` source itself uses Java 25 unnamed lambda parameters, for
example `FleetConfig.java:102`.
- Quote: `herdr 0.7.0 / protocol 14` (line 46). The current REST health endpoint
reports the live protocol returned by herdr (`FleetApp.java:240-244`), while the
current operator guide records protocol 19 at
`.wiki-snapshot/13-User-Guide.md:76-85`.
- Quote: `ccs <profile> claude` and `ccs env <profile>` (lines 47-48). Shipped
configuration uses `Profile` records and launcher `kind`,
`FleetConfig.java:313-330` and `FleetConfig.java:265-270`.
- Quote: `Redis Streams via Lettuce` (line 50). The actual durable inbox is AMQP
`broker`, `FleetConfig.java:655-714`.
### `9-Implementation.md` — REBUILD
- Quote: `rest.FleetdApp` and `mcp.BridgeMcp` (lines 29-30). The classes are
`rest.FleetApp` and `mcp.FleetMcp` (`FleetApp.java:46`; `FleetMcp.java:67`).
- Quote: `dev.ltms.fleetd` (line 67). The source package is `dev.ltms.fleet`
(`FleetMcp.java:1`).
- Quote: `WorkerPresence` (line 110). The current class is `MemberPresence`, as
imported and used by `FleetMcp` at `FleetMcp.java:12` and `465-469`.
- Quote: the outcome list ending in `STALE_TURN` (lines 128-131). The code also
has `BACKEND_EXHAUSTED` (`FleetMcp.java:550-554`) and async `ASKING` handling
(`FleetMcp.java:664-668`).
- Quote: `FleetdApp` (line 207) and `FleetdConfig` (line 211). These names do not
resolve; current classes are `FleetApp` and `FleetConfig`.
### `10-Cross-Host-Messaging.md` — REVISE
- Quote: the chapter says the cross-host fabric is proposed except for the
single-host inbox (lines 3-8). Cross-host **lead-to-lead** delivery shipped:
`fleet_send` accepts `coordId` (`FleetMcp.java:1094-1107`) and publishes it at
`FleetMcp.java:616-641`; configuration has `coordinator` at
`FleetConfig.java:74-78` and `99-101`.
- Quote: `bridge.dlx` (line 90). This product name is stale. The shipped lead path
uses `LeadChannel`, not the proposed exchange flow (`FleetMcp.java:95-96` and
`616-641`). Keep the proposed federation design, but add a clear shipped/proposed
boundary for CB-637.
### `11-Features.md` — REVISE
- Quote: `mcp/BridgeMcp` (line 22), `config/FleetdConfig` (lines 25-27), and other
index references. These paths no longer resolve; the source classes are
`mcp/FleetMcp` (`FleetMcp.java:67`) and `config/FleetConfig`
(`FleetConfig.java:81`).
- Quote: `fleet_whoami` returns only `primary` or `worker` (lines 99-100).
It also returns `architect` (`FleetMcp.java:1235-1244`).
- The page needs the missing separate member-herdr-daemon feature listed below.
### `12-Claude-to-OpenCode.md` — REVISE
- Quote: `same bridge mount` (line 5) and `a bridge-spawned worker` (line 94).
Rename the product path to `fleet`. The daemon exposes the MCP server as `fleet`
(`FleetMcp.java:313-315`), and profiles select OpenCode with `kind: opencode`
(`FleetConfig.java:332-335`).
- Quote: the sample mount name is `fleetd` (line 67). The server name is `fleet`;
update the sample to avoid teaching a second product name.
### `13-User-Guide.md` — REVISE
- Quote: `The bridge is the only channel` (line 63). The invariant is correct, but
the product term needs the `fleet` rename. The daemon's MCP server name is
`fleet` (`FleetMcp.java:313-315`).
- Quote: it describes one herdr socket (lines 72-85). It needs the optional
`memberHerdrSocket` setup and two-daemon health meaning. The config key is in
`FleetConfig.java:34-37`, and `/healthz` checks both daemons when configured at
`FleetApp.java:210-245`.
## MISSING
`11-Features.md` has a body section for **routing members through a separate herdr daemon**
(`## memberHerdrSocket`, line 2174), but **no row in the index table** at the top of the page
(lines 20-95). That table is how the page is meant to be read, so a capability absent from it is
effectively undiscoverable. Lead note: this is my own omission — I added the section on 2026-08-31
and did not add the matching row. Fixed in the wiki at `68e32c6`'s successor.
The original audit stated the feature had no entry at all. That was wrong: the section exists. The
gap is the index row. Recorded here rather than silently corrected, because the difference matters —
"undocumented" and "documented but unindexed" are different jobs.
Evidence for the feature itself: `FleetConfig.java:34-37` and `FleetApp.java:103-115`, `210-245`,
and `247-263`.
## Audit method and coverage
I checked all 15 pages. I checked concrete tool, route, config, class, file, and
product-name claims claim-by-claim on 11 pages: Home, Sidebar, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9,
11, and 13. I skimmed the remaining four long historical or research pages (3, 8, 10,
12), then checked their concrete claims that affect the verdict. This is an audit of
the supplied snapshot, not a wiki rewrite.
+6 -6
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
A standard, repeatable **live** end-to-end test of the two-way channel: it drives a real
multi-turn conversation between a primary and an off-subscription worker **through the
running `bridged` daemon**, captures the full transcript, and grades the channel.
running `fleetd` daemon**, captures the full transcript, and grades the channel.
This is the committed form of the ad-hoc channel test that discovered the CB-115 gaps
(herdr `unknown` misclassification wedging delivery, dirty completion scrapes, and workers
never calling `bridge_reply` in conversation). Run it after any change to the injector,
never calling `fleet_reply` in conversation). Run it after any change to the injector,
status handling, completion/failure paths, or the worker reply charter.
## What it exercises
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ construction** — it only calls the bridge's loopback REST face.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant T as conversation_test.py
participant B as bridged (REST)
participant B as fleetd (REST)
participant W as worker (off-sub)
T->>B: POST /workers (spawn)
T->>B: GET /sessions/{id}/status (await ready)
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
T->>B: POST /sessions/{id}/message {wait:false}
B-->>T: ticket
B->>W: inject prompt (status-gated)
W-->>B: bridge_reply
W-->>B: fleet_reply
T->>B: GET /tasks/{ticket} (poll)
B-->>T: done + reply
end
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
## Prerequisites
- `bridged` is running (default REST on `http://127.0.0.1:8765`) with at least one worker
- `fleetd` is running (default REST on `http://127.0.0.1:8765`) with at least one worker
profile configured and its backend reachable.
- herdr is up (the daemon needs it).
- Python 3 (standard library only — no pip installs).
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Per-turn grade:
| Grade | Meaning |
|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `OK` | delivered and resolved by an explicit `bridge_reply` (`source=reply`) |
| `OK` | delivered and resolved by an explicit `fleet_reply` (`source=reply`) |
| `DEGRADED` | delivered and answered, but resolved via completion-scrape fallback |
| `EMPTY` | turn completed but the reply was empty |
| `FAILED` | the worker's turn ended in failure (`phase=failed`) |
+8 -8
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sustained back-and-forth bridge test — ONE primary, ONE worker, many dependent turns
over a fixed wall-clock window (default 5 minutes), through the running `bridged` daemon.
over a fixed wall-clock window (default 5 minutes), through the running `fleetd` daemon.
Where conversation_test.py proves a handful of turns work and issue_hunt_test.py proves
fan-out isolation, this proves the channel stays healthy under a *sustained, stateful*
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Usage:
--turn-timeout per-turn max wait, seconds (default 150)
--keep-worker do not stop the worker at the end
Exit code: 0 if every turn in the window resolved via a clean bridge_reply with no channel
Exit code: 0 if every turn in the window resolved via a clean fleet_reply with no channel
break; 1 otherwise. A live per-turn log streams to stdout so the run can be watched.
"""
import argparse
@@ -47,12 +47,12 @@ STEPS = [7, 3, 11, 5, 9, 4, 13, 6, 8, 2]
RULES = (
"Let's play a running-total game across several messages. The total starts at 0. "
"In each message I'll tell you to add a number; keep the running total yourself and "
"reply via bridge_reply with ONLY the current total as a plain integer — no words, no "
"reply via fleet_reply with ONLY the current total as a plain integer — no words, no "
"punctuation, just the number. Do not restate the arithmetic. First move: add {step}."
)
NEXT = ("Add {step}. Reply via bridge_reply with only the new running total.")
NEXT = ("Add {step}. Reply via fleet_reply with only the new running total.")
REANCHOR = ("Let's re-sync — the running total is {total}. Now add {step}. Reply via "
"bridge_reply with only the new running total.")
"fleet_reply with only the new running total.")
def parse_int(reply):
@@ -142,15 +142,15 @@ def main():
print("=" * 72)
print(f"SUSTAINED CONVERSATION SUMMARY — 1 primary <-> 1 worker over {dur}s (~{dur/60:.1f} min)")
print(f" turns: {turns}")
print(f" clean bridge_reply exchanges: {oks + drifts}/{turns} (channel breaks: {breaks})")
print(f" clean fleet_reply exchanges: {oks + drifts}/{turns} (channel breaks: {breaks})")
print(f" arithmetic correct (continuity held): {oks}/{turns} (drifts: {drifts})")
print(f" latency: avg {avg}s over {turns} turns")
ok = breaks == 0 and turns >= 2
if ok and drifts == 0:
print(" RESULT: PASS — every turn resolved via bridge_reply and the worker held the "
print(" RESULT: PASS — every turn resolved via fleet_reply and the worker held the "
"running total across the whole window.")
elif ok:
print(f" RESULT: PASS (channel) — every turn resolved via bridge_reply for the full "
print(f" RESULT: PASS (channel) — every turn resolved via fleet_reply for the full "
f"window; {drifts} arithmetic drift(s) (worker recovered after re-anchor).")
else:
print(" RESULT: FAIL — the channel broke on at least one turn (see CHANNEL BREAK above).")
+5 -5
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Standard bridge conversation test — a multi-turn primary↔worker exchange through
the running `bridged` daemon, fully captured, with automatic gap analysis.
the running `fleetd` daemon, fully captured, with automatic gap analysis.
This is the repeatable form of the ad-hoc channel test that surfaced the CB-115 gaps
(herdr `unknown` misclassification, dirty completion scrape, workers not calling
bridge_reply). It drives a real off-subscription worker over the live gateway exactly
fleet_reply). It drives a real off-subscription worker over the live gateway exactly
as a primary Opus session would (async fire-and-poll), records every turn, and grades
the channel.
@@ -130,9 +130,9 @@ def grade(rec):
phase, source, reply = rec["phase"], rec["source"], rec["reply"]
has_reply = bool(reply and reply.strip())
if phase == "done" and source == "reply" and has_reply:
return "OK", "clean explicit bridge_reply"
return "OK", "clean explicit fleet_reply"
if phase == "done" and has_reply:
return "DEGRADED", f"resolved via {source} (worker did not call bridge_reply)"
return "DEGRADED", f"resolved via {source} (worker did not call fleet_reply)"
if phase == "done" and not has_reply:
return "EMPTY", "turn completed but reply was empty"
if phase == "failed":
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ def main():
ok = all(g in ("OK", "DEGRADED") for g in grades)
reply_clean = all(g == "OK" for g in grades)
if reply_clean:
print(" RESULT: PASS — every turn delivered and got a clean bridge_reply.")
print(" RESULT: PASS — every turn delivered and got a clean fleet_reply.")
elif ok:
print(" RESULT: PASS (with notes) — every turn delivered & replied, but some via fallback.")
else:
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Live bridge_ask test — the REVERSE rendezvous (CB-205), watched end to end.
"""Live fleet_ask test — the REVERSE rendezvous (CB-205), watched end to end.
Every other harness drives the forward path: primary `bridge_send` → worker `bridge_reply`.
Every other harness drives the forward path: primary `fleet_send` → worker `fleet_reply`.
This drives the one that runs the other way. A worker is told to pause its delegated turn,
ask the primary a question via `bridge_ask`, and only finish once it has the answer — so the
ask the primary a question via `fleet_ask`, and only finish once it has the answer — so the
turn round-trips primary→worker→primary→worker inside a SINGLE delegation.
The mechanics that only this path exercises:
• a worker's mid-turn question surfacing on the primary's *own* blocked send (Outcome.QUESTION),
• the `turnId` correlation that lets the primary answer the exact paused turn,
• the answer resuming that same turn and the worker's final `bridge_reply` landing on the
• the answer resuming that same turn and the worker's final `fleet_reply` landing on the
re-opened forward waiter (never a stale or cross-wired one).
It is two blocking REST calls, no polling:
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Like the rest of the suite it talks ONLY to the bridge's REST face on loopback
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL and never touches herdr, so it is subscription-safe by construction.
Usage:
python3 bridge_ask_test.py [--base URL] [--profile NAME] [--repo DIR] [--out DIR]
python3 fleet_ask_test.py [--base URL] [--profile NAME] [--repo DIR] [--out DIR]
[--send-timeout SECS] [--answer-timeout SECS] [--keep-worker]
--base bridge REST base URL (default http://127.0.0.1:8765)
@@ -57,14 +57,14 @@ ANSWER_COLOR = "blue"
# A task that CANNOT be completed without asking: the worker is not told which color to choose,
# only that the primary will name one when asked. So a correct final reply is only reachable by
# actually calling bridge_ask and using the answer.
# actually calling fleet_ask and using the answer.
TASK_PROMPT = (
"You are a bridge worker in a quick coordination game. You do NOT know which color to pick — "
"only the primary does. Do exactly this, in order:\n"
"1. Call the `bridge_ask` tool with EXACTLY this question: \"PICK A COLOR: red or blue?\"\n"
"1. Call the `fleet_ask` tool with EXACTLY this question: \"PICK A COLOR: red or blue?\"\n"
"2. The primary will answer with one color word. Take that color and uppercase it.\n"
"3. Call `bridge_reply` with EXACTLY one line: CHOSEN=<COLOR> (e.g. CHOSEN=GREEN if told green).\n"
"Do not guess a color. Do not call bridge_reply before bridge_ask has returned an answer. "
"3. Call `fleet_reply` with EXACTLY one line: CHOSEN=<COLOR> (e.g. CHOSEN=GREEN if told green).\n"
"Do not guess a color. Do not call fleet_reply before fleet_ask has returned an answer. "
"Do nothing else — no file reads, no other tools."
)
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ def run(base, profile, repo, send_timeout, answer_timeout):
rec.update(tid=tid, pane=pane, spawned=True)
await_ready(base, tid)
# 1) Delegate the ask-forcing task. This blocks until the worker calls bridge_ask, at which
# 1) Delegate the ask-forcing task. This blocks until the worker calls fleet_ask, at which
# point our own send unblocks carrying the question and the turnId to answer on.
print(f"[{now()}] delegating task (blocks until the worker asks; up to {send_timeout}s)…")
t0 = time.time()
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ def run(base, profile, repo, send_timeout, answer_timeout):
rec.update(phase="no_turnid", detail="question surfaced without a turnId to answer on")
return rec
# 2) Answer on that exact turn. This blocks again until the resumed worker calls bridge_reply.
# 2) Answer on that exact turn. This blocks again until the resumed worker calls fleet_reply.
print(f"[{now()}] answering '{ANSWER_COLOR}' on turn {rec['turnId']} (blocks until reply; up to {answer_timeout}s)…")
t1 = time.time()
rec["phase"] = "awaiting_reply"
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ def run(base, profile, repo, send_timeout, answer_timeout):
def grade(rec):
"""PASS only if the worker asked, the turn resumed, and the reply reflects the answer."""
if rec["phase"] == "no_question":
return "NO_ASK", "the worker finished/stalled without ever calling bridge_ask"
return "NO_ASK", "the worker finished/stalled without ever calling fleet_ask"
if rec["phase"] in ("send_error", "answer_error", "spawn"):
return "ERROR", rec.get("detail") or "transport error before the round-trip completed"
if rec["phase"] == "no_turnid":
@@ -203,26 +203,26 @@ def grade(rec):
return "OK", "asked, resumed the same turn, and the reply reflected the primary's answer"
if reflected:
return "DEGRADED", f"reply reflected the answer but resolved via {rec['replySource']} " \
"(worker did not call bridge_reply cleanly)"
"(worker did not call fleet_reply cleanly)"
return "WRONG_ANSWER", f"the worker replied but did not reflect '{ANSWER_COLOR}' — " \
f"the answer may not have reached the resumed turn: {rec['reply']!r}"
return "WEDGE", f"unexpected terminal phase {rec['phase']}: {rec.get('detail')}"
def write_transcript(out_dir, rec, meta):
path = out_dir / "bridge_ask_transcript.md"
path = out_dir / "fleet_ask_transcript.md"
g, note = grade(rec)
with path.open("w") as f:
f.write(f"# Live bridge_ask — reverse rendezvous — {datetime.now():%Y-%m-%d %H:%M}\n\n")
f.write(f"# Live fleet_ask — reverse rendezvous — {datetime.now():%Y-%m-%d %H:%M}\n\n")
f.write(f"One worker paused its delegated turn to ask the primary, then resumed with the "
f"answer (profile `{meta['profile']}`). Result: **`{g}`**.\n\n")
f.write("## Round-trip\n\n")
f.write(f"1. **primary → worker** (delegation): the ask-forcing task.\n")
f.write(f"2. **worker → primary** (`bridge_ask`, {rec.get('ask_latency')}s): "
f.write(f"2. **worker → primary** (`fleet_ask`, {rec.get('ask_latency')}s): "
f"{rec.get('question')!r} — surfaced on the primary's blocked send as a "
f"`question` with `turnId={rec.get('turnId')}`.\n")
f.write(f"3. **primary → worker** (answer on that turn): `{ANSWER_COLOR}`.\n")
f.write(f"4. **worker → primary** (`bridge_reply`, {rec.get('answer_latency')}s, "
f.write(f"4. **worker → primary** (`fleet_reply`, {rec.get('answer_latency')}s, "
f"source={rec.get('replySource')}): {rec.get('reply')!r}\n\n")
f.write(f"> **{g}:** {note}\n")
if rec.get("detail"):
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ def write_transcript(out_dir, rec, meta):
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Live bridge_ask reverse-rendezvous test (CB-205)")
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Live fleet_ask reverse-rendezvous test (CB-205)")
ap.add_argument("--base", default="http://127.0.0.1:8765")
ap.add_argument("--profile", default=None)
ap.add_argument("--repo", default=str(REPO_ROOT))
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ def main():
ap.add_argument("--keep-worker", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
print(f"[{now()}] live bridge_ask: 1 primary, 1 worker "
print(f"[{now()}] live fleet_ask: 1 primary, 1 worker "
f"(profile={args.profile or 'default'}, repo={args.repo})\n")
rec = {"spawned": False, "pane": None}
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ def main():
print()
print("=" * 72)
print("LIVE bridge_ask SUMMARY — reverse rendezvous (CB-205)")
print("LIVE fleet_ask SUMMARY — reverse rendezvous (CB-205)")
print(f" asked: {rec.get('question')!r} (turnId={rec.get('turnId')}, {rec.get('ask_latency')}s)")
print(f" answered: {ANSWER_COLOR!r}")
print(f" replied: {rec.get('reply')!r} (source={rec.get('replySource')}, {rec.get('answer_latency')}s)")
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
# Live bridge_ask — reverse rendezvous — 2026-07-16 16:30
# Live fleet_ask — reverse rendezvous — 2026-07-16 16:30
One worker paused its delegated turn to ask the primary, then resumed with the answer (profile `default`). Result: **`OK`**.
## Round-trip
1. **primary → worker** (delegation): the ask-forcing task.
2. **worker → primary** (`bridge_ask`, 6.6s): 'PICK A COLOR: red or blue?' — surfaced on the primary's blocked send as a `question` with `turnId=term_656bb47d2c42a9e#1`.
2. **worker → primary** (`fleet_ask`, 6.6s): 'PICK A COLOR: red or blue?' — surfaced on the primary's blocked send as a `question` with `turnId=term_656bb47d2c42a9e#1`.
3. **primary → worker** (answer on that turn): `blue`.
4. **worker → primary** (`bridge_reply`, 7.9s, source=reply): 'CHOSEN=BLUE'
4. **worker → primary** (`fleet_reply`, 7.9s, source=reply): 'CHOSEN=BLUE'
> **OK:** asked, resumed the same turn, and the reply reflected the primary's answer
+8 -8
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Standard bridge fan-out test — ONE primary vs MANY workers, concurrently, for
issue hunting through the running `bridged` daemon, fully captured, with gap analysis.
issue hunting through the running `fleetd` daemon, fully captured, with gap analysis.
Where conversation_test.py exercises a single worker over multiple turns, this drives
the path that only appears under fan-out: the primary spawns N workers, sends each a
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ and collects every reply concurrently. That stresses what a single worker never
• reply routing under concurrency (worker A's answer must never resolve worker B's send),
and, as the payload, whether a fleet of off-subscription workers can actually surface
real issues in the repo and report them back structurally via bridge_reply.
real issues in the repo and report them back structurally via fleet_reply.
It talks ONLY to the bridge's REST face on loopback — it never sets ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL
and never touches herdr directly, so it is subscription-safe by construction.
@@ -53,18 +53,18 @@ REPO_ROOT = HERE.parent
# hot files this project has been iterating on, so a real issue is plausible to find.
DEFAULT_ASSIGNMENTS = [
{"id": "completion", "probe": "CompletionResolver",
"target": "bridged/src/main/java/dev/ltms/bridged/inject/CompletionResolver.java"},
"target": "fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/inject/CompletionResolver.java"},
{"id": "worker", "probe": "WorkerService",
"target": "bridged/src/main/java/dev/ltms/bridged/worker/WorkerService.java"},
"target": "fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/worker/WorkerService.java"},
{"id": "rendezvous", "probe": "Rendezvous",
"target": "bridged/src/main/java/dev/ltms/bridged/msg/Rendezvous.java"},
"target": "fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/msg/Rendezvous.java"},
]
PROMPT_TMPL = (
"You are one of several issue-hunting workers in the claude-bridge repo (it is your "
"current working directory). Your assignment: inspect the file `{target}` and find the "
"SINGLE most important real bug, correctness gap, or risk in it. Read the file before "
"answering. Reply via bridge_reply with EXACTLY these four lines:\n"
"answering. Reply via fleet_reply with EXACTLY these four lines:\n"
"1. {target}:<line>\n"
"2. issue: <one sentence>\n"
"3. fix: <one line>\n"
@@ -147,9 +147,9 @@ def grade(rec):
phase, source, reply = rec["phase"], rec["source"], rec["reply"]
has_reply = bool(reply and reply.strip())
if phase == "done" and source == "reply" and has_reply:
return "OK", "clean explicit bridge_reply"
return "OK", "clean explicit fleet_reply"
if phase == "done" and has_reply:
return "DEGRADED", f"resolved via {source} (worker did not call bridge_reply)"
return "DEGRADED", f"resolved via {source} (worker did not call fleet_reply)"
if phase == "done" and not has_reply:
return "EMPTY", "turn completed but reply was empty"
if phase == "failed":
+16
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
# Build output
target/
dependency-reduced-pom.xml
# Local runtime config (copy from fleetd.example.yaml). Both names are ignored: fleetd.yaml is
# the current name, and bridged.yaml is the legacy name Fleetd still falls back to.
fleetd.yaml
bridged.yaml
# CB-505 audit trail + daemon stdout/stderr — runtime records, never source
logs/
# Editor / OS
*.iml
.idea/
.DS_Store
@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@
## Why this exists
Stage 2 gave a worker→primary reply a **durable place to wait** when no `bridge_send` is
Stage 2 gave a worker→primary reply a **durable place to wait** when no `fleet_send` is
open: it lands in `agent.<target>.inbox` on the broker and survives a daemon bounce. But
delivery is still **pull** — the primary only sees the reply if it happens to call
`bridge_poll(target)` / `GET /sessions/{id}/replies`. A reply can sit indefinitely while
`fleet_poll(target)` / `GET /sessions/{id}/replies`. A reply can sit indefinitely while
the primary works on something else.
This layer makes delivery **active**: the bridge *pushes* a nudge to the primary the moment
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ pointed at the primary's pane instead.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
W["worker"] -->|"bridge_reply (no open send)"| MS["MessageService.reply"]
W["worker"] -->|"fleet_reply (no open send)"| MS["MessageService.reply"]
MS -->|"inbox.publish"| INBOX[("agent.&lt;target&gt;.inbox<br/>(durable, LavinMQ)")]
MS -->|"notify"| LOOP["ReplyPushLoop"]
LOOP -->|"status-gated inject"| PANE["primary's herdr pane"]
PANE -->|"primary drains"| DRAIN["bridge_poll(target)<br/>= peek + ack"]
PANE -->|"primary drains"| DRAIN["fleet_poll(target)<br/>= peek + ack"]
DRAIN -->|"inbox now empty"| LOOP
LOOP -.->|"still non-empty →<br/>re-inject on backoff"| PANE
classDef store fill:#2c5282,stroke:#1a365d,color:#ffffff;
@@ -51,13 +51,13 @@ the caller runs in a herdr pane on this host. Today it's discarded for the prima
(`presence.markPresent` is a no-op on it).
**Plan:** a single-slot `PrimaryRegistry` (thread-safe) holding the primary's `terminal_id`.
Populate it from the **orchestration-side** MCP tools — `bridge_send`, `bridge_spawn`,
`bridge_poll`, `bridge_list`, `bridge_status`, `bridge_profiles` — capturing
Populate it from the **orchestration-side** MCP tools — `fleet_send`, `fleet_spawn`,
`fleet_poll`, `fleet_list`, `fleet_status`, `fleet_profiles` — capturing
`callerTerminal(exchange)` when it is (a) non-null and (b) **not** a registered worker
session in `SessionManager`. That caller is, by construction, the primary. Worker-side tools
(`bridge_reply`, `bridge_ask`) never set it.
(`fleet_reply`, `fleet_ask`) never set it.
- **Config override / pin:** a `primary: { terminal: "<id>" }` block in `BridgedConfig`
- **Config override / pin:** a `primary: { terminal: "<id>" }` block in `FleetConfig`
(nested record, same shape as `Broker`). Lets an operator pin it, or supply it when
derivation can't (see degrade case).
- **Degrade:** if the primary is off-host or in a non-herdr terminal, `terminalForPid`
@@ -71,13 +71,13 @@ A `ReplyPushLoop` component, notified at the single no-waiter call site
(`MessageService.reply` → the `inbox.publish` branch, `MessageService.java:192`).
- **Inject a nudge, not the payload.** The injected turn tells the primary *to drain*
(e.g. "Worker `<target>` returned a reply — run `bridge_poll(target=<target>)` to collect
(e.g. "Worker `<target>` returned a reply — run `fleet_poll(target=<target>)` to collect
it"), it does **not** carry the reply text. Rationale: replies can be large/multiline and
terminal injection would mangle them; the drain response is the clean transport. Keeps the
push idempotent — re-nudging is harmless.
- **Ack = drain.** The primary draining (`drainReplies` = peek + ack) is the acknowledgement.
The loop's **stop condition is `inbox.peek(target).isEmpty()`** — the reply is gone from the
inbox because it was acked. No new `bridge_ack` tool needed for v1 (see Increment 3).
inbox because it was acked. No new `fleet_ack` tool needed for v1 (see Increment 3).
- **Status-gated injection (mechanism (b), chosen).** A dedicated lightweight scheduled loop,
**not** the worker `Injector`. It injects via `AgentControl.send(primaryTerminal, nudge)`
(the same herdr `agent.send` = `pane send-text` + submit that delivers to workers) only when
@@ -93,10 +93,10 @@ A `ReplyPushLoop` component, notified at the single no-waiter call site
the reply remains in the durable inbox and the next natural poll (or a later worker reply's
nudge) still surfaces it. Bounded so the bridge never spams the primary.
### Increment 3 — optional per-`msgId` `bridge_ack` tool (deferred)
### Increment 3 — optional per-`msgId` `fleet_ack` tool (deferred)
Drain-as-ack is coarse: it clears *all* pending replies for a target at once. If finer
control is ever needed (ack one reply, leave others held), add a `bridge_ack(msgId)` tool
control is ever needed (ack one reply, leave others held), add a `fleet_ack(msgId)` tool
mapping to `inbox.ack(target, msgId)` — the port already supports per-`msgId` ack. Not built
in v1; the stop-on-empty loop is sufficient.
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ in v1; the stop-on-empty loop is sufficient.
resolved terminal is non-null **and not a registered worker session**, seen on an
orchestration-side tool. This never mislabels a worker (workers are in `SessionManager`)
and needs no new env var or argument (identity stays connection-derived, per the existing
`BridgeMcp` invariant).
`FleetMcp` invariant).
2. **Readiness-gate mismatch → dedicated loop.** The existing `Injector` gates delivery on
`ready.test(target)` = `WorkerPresence` (the *worker's* MCP connected). The primary is not
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ boundary**. The bridge is signalling the primary that it has mail — not drivin
non-null terminal AND not a registered session" predicate; the loop's stop-on-empty and
bounded-reminder logic with an injected clock + a fake injector (no real herdr).
- **Live dogfood (primary-side):** with the daemon on the broker jar + a real worker,
delegate a task, let the worker reply after the `bridge_send` window closes, and observe the
delegate a task, let the worker reply after the `fleet_send` window closes, and observe the
bridge inject a drain nudge into *this* primary pane; confirm draining stops the reminders;
confirm an unreachable primary (registry empty) degrades to pull with no loss.
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
# bridged configuration (example). Copy to bridged.yaml and adjust.
# fleetd configuration (example). Copy to fleetd.yaml and adjust.
#
# bridged is the sole gateway between primary/worker Claude sessions and herdr.
# fleetd is the sole gateway between primary/worker Claude sessions and herdr.
# It is NOT a Claude process and must never carry ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL.
# REST + MCP listen address. Keep it on loopback unless you also switch auth.mode to `token`
# below — bridged REFUSES TO START on a non-loopback bind under loopback-trust (see auth).
# below — fleetd REFUSES TO START on a non-loopback bind under loopback-trust (see auth).
bind:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 8765
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ bind:
# bind — the daemon fails fast otherwise, because "unauthenticated ⇒
# primary" on a reachable port would hand spawn/stop/send to anyone.
# tokenEnv → host env var holding the token (never the literal value). Default
# BRIDGED_API_TOKEN. Read only in token mode; empty ⇒ startup fails.
# FLEETD_API_TOKEN. Read only in token mode; empty ⇒ startup fails.
#
# TLS is deliberately NOT terminated in the daemon (CB-501 D3): run a reverse proxy in front and
# let it own certificate lifecycle, e.g.
@@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ bind:
# The broker link gets TLS from its own URI (amqps://…) — see `broker` below.
# auth:
# mode: token
# tokenEnv: BRIDGED_API_TOKEN
# tokenEnv: FLEETD_API_TOKEN
# Optional pinned primary terminal (CB-307). Names the herdr pane the PRIMARY itself runs in:
# a caller whose connection maps to this pane resolves as the primary (no credential needed —
# the pane mapping is as unforgeable as a worker's), and reply nudges are pushed to it.
# REQUIRED when the primary runs inside a herdr pane — without it the pane match reads the
# primary as a worker and refuses spawn/send/stop. Get the id from bridge_whoami; re-pin if
# primary as a worker and refuses spawn/send/stop. Get the id from fleet_whoami; re-pin if
# the primary moves panes.
# primary:
# terminal: term_0123456789abcd
@@ -48,13 +48,13 @@ bind:
# every orchestration call. List each lead's pane here and all of them resolve as leads.
#
# tab → the ONLY field identity depends on (CB-579); the exact label of the tab hosting the lead.
# Label the tab yourself, or let bridged label one it launches — see `fleet.leaders:` below.
# kind/model → descriptive; they document what runs in the pane and are echoed by bridge_whoami
# Label the tab yourself, or let fleetd label one it launches — see `fleet.leaders:` below.
# kind/model → descriptive; they document what runs in the pane and are echoed by fleet_whoami
#
# A lead's tab must already carry its label (or be launched by bridged, which labels it) — there is
# A lead's tab must already carry its label (or be launched by fleetd, which labels it) — there is
# no terminal id to paste in and nothing to re-pin when the session restarts: the tab survives, so
# the same label resolves the same lead again on the next scan.
# `bridge_whoami` reports `{"role":"primary","leader":"<name>"}`; role stays "primary" because a lead
# `fleet_whoami` reports `{"role":"primary","leader":"<name>"}`; role stays "primary" because a lead
# IS a primary for authorization, so nothing that keys on the role breaks.
#
# KEEP `primary:` when adding leads: it still addresses the CB-307 push loop, which needs a single
@@ -63,13 +63,13 @@ bind:
# Leads are configured under `fleet.leaders:` — see THE FLEET further down.
#
# Two things stop the tab-name convention from becoming a way to claim leadership: the configured
# member spaces are excluded from the scan, so nothing bridged places can land in a matching tab;
# member spaces are excluded from the scan, so nothing fleetd places can land in a matching tab;
# and startup REFUSES a `tabPrefix` that the fleet tabLabel template, or any per-profile `tabLabel`
# override, also matches — so the two namespaces cannot overlap by accident. The label is a NAME,
# never a capability: what a pane may do is decided by the role the daemon resolves for it.
# CB-551: IDLE-LEAD HEARTBEAT — nudge the single lead back to work when it has been continuously
# idle (no open bridge_send driving it) past the quiet period. The fleet is one lead + architects +
# idle (no open fleet_send driving it) past the quiet period. The fleet is one lead + architects +
# workers, so a lead that stalls is a single point of failure; the ReplyPushLoop only nudges when a
# reply lands, and this timer catches the gap where nothing lands and the lead just sits idle.
#
@@ -93,21 +93,20 @@ bind:
# intervalSeconds → how often a tick runs (default 30). ENFORCED floor of 15: the code computes
# Math.max(15, intervalSeconds), so a lower value is silently raised, not
# rejected.
# workingSuspectAfterSeconds, paneProbeIntervalSeconds → accepted and parsed, but NOT YET READ by
# anything — the dormant monitor only consumes intervalSeconds today (CB-573
# shipped ahead of the evidence publishers these two knobs are for). Setting
# them changes nothing right now, and no minimum is enforced on either, because
# nothing reads them to enforce one. They exist so a later build can start
# honouring them without another config-shape change.
# notifications.mode → "webhook" flips what bridge_list REPORTS (healthCoverage: "full" instead
# of "detection-only") — it does NOT make bridged send any webhook call; no
# workingSuspectAfterSeconds → age before a BUSY member is suspected of a stall (default 600).
# ENFORCED floor of 300: a lower value is silently raised.
# paneProbeIntervalSeconds → accepted and parsed, but NOT YET READ by anything. Setting it changes
# nothing right now. It exists so a later build can start honouring it without
# another config-shape change.
# notifications.mode → "webhook" flips what fleet_list REPORTS (healthCoverage: "full" instead
# of "detection-only") — it does NOT make fleetd send any webhook call; no
# delivery mechanism is implemented yet. Any other value, or omitting the
# block, reports "detection-only".
# health:
# enabled: true
# intervalSeconds: 30
# workingSuspectAfterSeconds: 600
# paneProbeIntervalSeconds: 60
# intervalSeconds: 30 # floor 15
# workingSuspectAfterSeconds: 600 # floor 300 — how long BUSY with no activity means STALL_SUSPECTED
# paneProbeIntervalSeconds: 60 # parsed, but nothing reads it yet — changing it changes nothing
# notifications:
# mode: disabled
@@ -115,6 +114,18 @@ bind:
# (${HERDR_SOCKET_PATH:-~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock}).
herdrSocket: ~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock
# Optional socket for member panes. Omit this to use herdrSocket for both leads and members.
# memberHerdrSocket: /Users/member/.config/herdr/herdr.sock
# fleetd #213: the login shell the member OS user (memberHerdrSocket above) actually runs. ONLY
# read when memberHerdrSocket is set — fleetd's own $SHELL says nothing about a pane running
# under a different OS user, and there is no channel to ask herdr for that user's shell, so this
# must be told rather than guessed. Absent, blank, or anything not ending in "zsh" is treated the
# same as "not zsh": the memberCredentials.policy: allow-list ZDOTDIR scrub (see worktreeGroup
# below) is skipped in favour of the weaker CB-596 sentinel overlay — a degraded control, never a
# refusal to spawn. When memberHerdrSocket is absent this key is never consulted at all.
# memberLoginShell: /bin/zsh
# How member sessions are spawned. Define one or more named profiles (backends) under
# `profiles`; each key is the profile name (also the ccs profile). A profile says only WHICH
# BACKEND — model, CLI adapter, credentials, cost. It says nothing about what a member spawned on
@@ -124,8 +135,34 @@ herdrSocket: ~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock
# Shared knobs (placement/workspace) can be repeated per profile; they usually match.
# placement: tab → each worker lands in its OWN tab in a dedicated worker space (default).
# Use `pane` for the legacy behaviour (split the focused tab).
# mcpUrl → bridged mounts the bridge MCP (--mcp-config, inline) + reply charter
# mcpUrl → fleetd mounts the bridge MCP (--mcp-config, inline) + reply charter
# (--append-system-prompt) as launch flags; nothing is written to the profile.
# ideMcpUrl → opt-in (CB-634), default off. When set, fleetd mounts the IDE Index MCP as a
# second inline server named `intellij`, and adds an IDE charter that pins every
# ide_* call to the member's own worktree. A URL, not a boolean — host and port
# are host-specific. Set it only on a host where the IDE actually runs.
# ideProjectDir → repo-relative module dir the IDE opens and the overlay pins (CB-634). Only read
# when ideMcpUrl is set. This repo's Maven pom lives in `fleetd/`, not at the
# worktree root, so opening the root imports no module and ide_* resolves nothing;
# set this to `fleetd`. Omit for a repo whose project is the worktree root.
# ideOpenCommand → host command that opens ideProjectDir in the IDE at spawn (CB-634 auto-open).
# Only read when ideMcpUrl is set. `{dir}` is replaced with the absolute module
# dir and the command runs through `/bin/sh -c`, so set env inline if needed —
# e.g. `env DISPLAY=:10.0 idea {dir}`. Best-effort: a failure is logged, never
# fails the spawn. Omit to open the member's module by hand. There is no close
# half yet — an opened module stays open until the operator closes it.
# autoCompactWindow → opt-in, default off. A bounded token window that forces a spawned member to
# compact its context instead of running on the backend's own default and dying
# mid-turn (losing its fleet_reply — the whole point of the turn — with it).
# Validated at config load to [100000, 1000000] — the band Claude Code's own
# --autocompact flag accepts.
# CROSS-BACKEND SEMANTICS DIFFER: on claude-code this is a launch-time
# `--autocompact <tokens>` flag — the member compacts AT this window. opencode
# has no equivalent flag (it only forces `compaction.auto: true`, unconditionally,
# already), so this is instead applied as the model's `limit.context` in the
# generated opencode.json — the member compacts WITHIN this window, not exactly
# at it — and only when this profile's `model:` is in `provider/model` form; if it
# isn't, fleetd logs a WARN naming the profile rather than silently doing nothing.
# tokenEnv → host env var holding the worker's auth token (value never stored in config);
# omit for a backend that needs no token (e.g. a local ollama).
# cwd → pin this profile's working directory (CB-112). Omit to inherit the primary's
@@ -135,7 +172,12 @@ herdrSocket: ~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock
# skills/MCP/hooks. Omit to leave the worker on the host default.
# parityOverlay → repo-relative paths copied primary→worktree so a worker in a provisioned
# worktree sees the same local config (CB-301-ext). Omit for the default set:
# [.claude/settings.local.json, .env, .envrc].
# [.env] only (CB-148). .envrc is left out of the default on purpose: it is
# executable shell that direnv runs on every cd, so copying it carries
# behaviour into the worker, not just values, unlike .env. An operator who
# wants it copied can still write parityOverlay: [.env, .envrc] explicitly.
# (.claude/settings.local.json is NOT in the default — it
# pre-approves IDE/tool grants a member must not hold ambiently; CB-525/CB-634.)
#
# Do NOT add .mcp.json (CB-525). A worker's tools are whatever its launcher
# mounts — the bridge, and nothing else. Replicating the primary's MCP config
@@ -143,7 +185,7 @@ herdrSocket: ~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock
# checkout, so its navigation returned paths OUTSIDE its own worktree: one
# worker made all 59 of its edits in the primary tree while compiling its
# worktree, and every build it ran was of code that did not contain them.
# bridged neutralizes a provisioned worktree's .mcp.json for this reason;
# fleetd neutralizes a provisioned worktree's .mcp.json for this reason;
# listing it here would copy the primary's back over that.
# gitTokenEnv → host env var holding the git-forge API token. When set, its value is injected
# as GITEA_TOKEN so the worker can open its OWN PR at checkpoint (CB-302).
@@ -152,11 +194,11 @@ herdrSocket: ~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock
# gitHostEnv → host env var holding the forge host (default GITEA_HOST). Injected as
# GITEA_HOST *only* alongside a resolved gitTokenEnv.
# exhaustedPattern → regex matched against a completion-fallback scrape (CB-578 stage A) to
# classify a turn that ended with no bridge_reply as the backend having
# classify a turn that ended with no fleet_reply as the backend having
# refused on a subscription usage limit, rather than a real answer. Opt-in —
# omit and this profile's completion fallback behaves exactly as before.
# Every backend words its refusal differently, so this is config, never a
# vendor string baked into bridged itself.
# vendor string baked into fleetd itself.
# DEFERRED: compiled once into a startup pattern map — editing it needs a
# daemon restart, same as this profile's model/baseUrl/argv.
# credentialId → CB-578 stage B: the credential this profile quarantines WITH when a
@@ -168,18 +210,51 @@ herdrSocket: ~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock
# profile quarantines alone, under its own name, exactly as if the field did
# not exist. Cooldown length is the top-level quarantineCooldownSeconds below.
# HOT: read live at every spawn/exhaustion check — no restart needed.
# errorPattern → fleetd #201 / #227: regex matched against a completion-fallback scrape to
# classify a turn that ended with no fleet_reply as a BACKEND ERROR — a
# credential outage or a provider 5xx — rather than a real answer or a
# usage-limit exhaustion (exhaustedPattern above always wins when a line
# matches both). Opt-in. Omit it and this profile falls back to fleetd's
# built-in legacy pattern `(?i)\bAPI Error\s*:` — classification still
# happens, just without a profile-specific match; every backend words its
# failure differently, so a hardcoded sentence would only ever match one
# of them.
# DEFERRED: compiled once into a startup pattern map, same as exhaustedPattern
# — editing it needs a daemon restart.
# # errorPattern: "503 Service Unavailable" # opt-in: classify a backend outage
#
# What happens once a match fires (BackendOutagePolicy, credentialId-keyed,
# SEPARATE from the CB-578 stage B quarantine above and never merged with it):
# - threshold 2 — TWO DISTINCT TARGETS (never raw events) on the same
# effective credential inside a 60-second window start an "incident" and a
# 60-second cool-off for that credential. One member repeating the same
# classified line twice never cools anything off — a real outage hits
# every target on that credential, so requiring a second, independent
# target loses nothing against the case this guards against, while
# protecting against a heuristic misfire on one flaky member.
# - a fresh error while a credential is already cooling off is ignored
# outright: it neither extends the 60s deadline nor starts a new incident.
# - `fleet_list`/`fleet_profiles` report a cooling credential with
# `coolingOffForSeconds` (never `quarantinedForSeconds`, unless CB-578
# exhaustion quarantine is ALSO independently active for the same
# credential — the two checks can both fire at once). A spawn onto a
# cooling profile is refused with a message naming the credential and
# remaining seconds — "cooling off", never "exhausted", so an operator can
# tell a short transient fault from a spent subscription at a glance.
# - the lead gets ONE nudge per incident (not one per affected target), via
# the same push loop that already delivers ticket/question reminders.
# env → extra environment for this profile's workers, as a literal key/value map
# (CB-511). Use it to give workers a toolchain.
#
# A worker's environment does NOT come from your shell. bridged hands herdr an
# A worker's environment does NOT come from your shell. fleetd hands herdr an
# explicit env map and herdr merges it into ITS OWN process env — so before
# CB-511 a worker inherited whatever PATH the herdr server happened to be
# started with, which on a long-lived herdr can predate your toolchain entirely
# and leave workers unable to run `mvn` or `java` at all.
# bridged now propagates ITS OWN PATH to every worker by default; set `env:`
# fleetd now propagates ITS OWN PATH to every worker by default; set `env:`
# only to override that or add more (JAVA_HOME, …). Since the default is the
# daemon's PATH, make sure the daemon is started with a good one — see the PATH
# lines in deploy/dev.ltms.bridged.plist and deploy/bridged.service.
# lines in deploy/dev.ltms.fleet.plist and deploy/fleetd.service.
#
# Adapter-owned variables always win over `env:`: ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL and the
# rest of the ANTHROPIC_*/CLAUDE_* wiring are applied after it, so an `env:`
@@ -192,20 +267,20 @@ profiles:
baseUrl: http://gx01.gw:8000 # the vLLM host this profile targets (gx00.gw / gx01.gw)
model: coder
placement: tab
workspace: bridged-workers
workspace: fleetd-workers
# tabLabel: an optional per-profile override; the fleet template usually covers it
mcpUrl: http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp
tokenEnv: BRIDGED_WORKER_TOKEN
tokenEnv: FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN
argv: ["ccs", "gx10"]
# weight: relative selection weight for automatic placement (weighted, round-robin, and
# fixed's fallback walk). Absent defaults to 1.0. An explicit 0 or negative value means
# "never auto-select this profile" (CB-554) — it stays reachable via an explicit
# `bridge_spawn{profile:"gx10"}`, which bypasses placement entirely; only automatic
# `fleet_spawn{profile:"gx10"}`, which bypasses placement entirely; only automatic
# selection skips it.
weight: 0.5
# maxLoad: max live workers on this profile. Omit for unlimited. An explicit 0 (CB-585) caps
# the profile at zero live members — it is excluded from automatic placement and an explicit
# `bridge_spawn{profile:"gx10"}` against it is refused too; a cap holds even when the profile
# `fleet_spawn{profile:"gx10"}` against it is refused too; a cap holds even when the profile
# is named directly. Negative is refused at config load — there is no sane meaning for it.
maxLoad: 2
# subscription: true
@@ -224,24 +299,58 @@ profiles:
# subscription path no guard would vet the URL, so allowing both would be a way around the
# guard rather than a configuration.
#
# GOTCHA 1 — it is invisible to the startup secret check. `Bridged.reportRequiredSecrets`
# GOTCHA 1 — it is invisible to the startup secret check. `Fleetd.reportRequiredSecrets`
# skips subscription profiles on purpose (they need no token), so a boot log that reports
# every secret as fine says nothing about these profiles.
#
# GOTCHA 2 — `maxLoad` is the ONLY throttle you have here. There is no metering, no budget
# and no refusal on cost; the cap on live members is the single thing standing between a
# fan-out and your monthly limit. Set it deliberately and keep it small.
#
# GOTCHA 3 (fleetd #176) — `maxLoad` counts members, never the lead itself. The lead is a live
# `claude` session on this SAME account (a lead is never moved off-subscription, whatever its
# own profile says), so it already holds one seat before any member spawns. If a lead's
# `fleet.leaders.<name>.profile` names THIS profile — or ANY OTHER `subscription: true`
# profile that shares this one's account (see THE SENTINEL, just below, next to
# `credentialId:`) — `fleet_list`'s `free` for this profile subtracts that lead's live
# seat(s) automatically; see `profile:` under THE FLEET below. If no lead entry names a
# profile sharing this account, fleetd has no way to know a lead holds a seat here, and `free`
# will overstate what a fresh `fleet_spawn` actually gets by exactly the seats the lead is
# quietly holding.
#
# THE SENTINEL (fleetd #176 stage 2, correcting an inert stage 1 fix): every `subscription:
# true` profile that leaves `credentialId` unset shares ONE implicit account-wide credential
# id with every other such profile on this host — because a subscription profile doesn't
# authenticate with a credential of its own, it authenticates as the operator's own Claude
# login, and there is exactly one of those. So on a typical host, `opus` (the lead's profile)
# and `sonnet` (the members' profile) are linked automatically, with NOTHING to set here — that
# is what makes GOTCHA 3 above work without also writing matching `credentialId:` values on
# both. This linkage is not just cosmetic: it is the same key `BackendQuarantine`/cool-off use,
# so a usage-limit hit on `opus` now quarantines `sonnet` too (and vice versa) — correct, since
# they are one Claude account, but worth knowing before you wonder why an unrelated-looking
# profile went quarantined.
#
# WHEN TO OVERRIDE — set explicit, DIFFERENT `credentialId:` values on two `subscription: true`
# profiles only when they are genuinely two separate Claude logins on the same host (a real,
# if unusual, setup). An explicit `credentialId` always wins over the sentinel, so this is the
# one way to keep two subscription profiles from being treated as one account for lead-seat
# counting AND for quarantine/cool-off grouping alike.
# gitTokenEnv: GITEA_TOKEN # opt-in: let this profile's workers open their own PR (CB-302)
# gitHostEnv: GITEA_HOST # defaults to GITEA_HOST; injected only with gitTokenEnv
# exhaustedPattern: "usage limit has been reached" # opt-in: classify a usage-limit refusal (CB-578)
# credentialId: shared-openai # opt-in: quarantine together with every other profile sharing this id (CB-578)
# errorPattern: "503 Service Unavailable" # opt-in: classify a backend outage (fleetd #201/#227) — see the key doc above
# configDir: /Users/me/.ccs/instances/gx10 # CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR — inherit that profile's skills/MCP
# cwd: /Users/me/src/myrepo # pin the working dir; omit to inherit the primary's
# parityOverlay: [".claude/settings.local.json", ".env", ".envrc"] # never add .mcp.json — see above
# parityOverlay: [".env"] # the default; add ".envrc" explicitly if you want it copied too (CB-148) — never add .mcp.json or .claude/settings.local.json — see above
# ideMcpUrl: http://127.0.0.1:29170/index-mcp/streamable-http # opt-in (CB-634): IDE code intelligence, pinned to the worktree
# ideProjectDir: fleetd # CB-634: module dir the IDE opens + the overlay pins (this repo's pom is in fleetd/)
# ideOpenCommand: env DISPLAY=:10.0 idea {dir} # CB-634 auto-open: opens {dir} in the IDE at spawn; omit to open by hand
# autoCompactWindow: 250000 # opt-in: bound member context; claude-code compacts AT this, opencode within it (model limit.context)
gx11: # a second backend, so `placement: weighted` has a choice
baseUrl: http://gx01.gw:8000 # self-hosted; ccs handles the model + token
placement: tab
workspace: bridged-workers
workspace: fleetd-workers
# tabLabel: an optional per-profile override; the fleet template usually covers it
mcpUrl: http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp
argv: ["ccs", "gx11"]
@@ -259,15 +368,15 @@ profiles:
# The bridge MCP + reply charter mount via a generated OPENCODE_CONFIG file, and the model is a
# `provider/model` selector. Placement, tabs, cwd, and the readiness gate are shared with Claude.
#
# Dogfood-verified 2026-07-29 against opencode 1.18.5 (spawn → readiness gate → bridge_send →
# structured bridge_reply → teardown). The `opencode/*-free` models run on opencode's own gateway
# Dogfood-verified 2026-07-29 against opencode 1.18.5 (spawn → readiness gate → fleet_send →
# structured fleet_reply → teardown). The `opencode/*-free` models run on opencode's own gateway
# and need NO credentials — check `opencode models` for the current free list, since the names
# change. That also makes the worker off-subscription by construction.
# opencode-free:
# kind: opencode
# model: opencode/north-mini-code-free # `provider/model` selector, injected as `-m`
# placement: tab
# workspace: bridged-workers
# workspace: fleetd-workers
# tabLabel: "opencode: {profile} #{n}"
# mcpUrl: http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp
# argv: ["opencode"]
@@ -292,7 +401,7 @@ profiles:
# baseUrl: http://127.0.0.1:8000
# model: local-vllm/deepseek-v4-flash
# placement: tab
# workspace: bridged-workers
# workspace: fleetd-workers
# tabLabel: "opencode: {profile} #{n}"
# mcpUrl: http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp
# argv: ["opencode"]
@@ -327,11 +436,17 @@ placement: weighted
# DEFERRED: baked once into the BackendQuarantine built at startup — a running quarantine keeps
# its original cooldown regardless; a new value only applies to a quarantine that starts after a
# restart. Editing this needs a daemon restart to take effect.
#
# This does NOT govern the fleetd #201 / #227 backend-error cool-off documented under errorPattern
# above — that mechanism is a separate, shorter-lived, NOT-configurable policy (threshold 2 distinct
# targets, 60-second window, 60-second cool-off), on purpose: it exists to survive a brief transient
# fault, not to replace this 30-minute exhaustion quarantine. Do not conflate the two when reading
# fleet_list/fleet_profiles — coolingOffForSeconds and quarantinedForSeconds are independent facts.
# quarantineCooldownSeconds: 1800
# Re-read this file without restarting the daemon (CB-559). Off unless you add this block, so an
# upgraded bridged keeps the old behaviour: the file is read once at boot and never again.
# enabled → turn the watch on. bridged checks the file's modified time on a timer and
# upgraded fleetd keeps the old behaviour: the file is read once at boot and never again.
# enabled → turn the watch on. fleetd checks the file's modified time on a timer and
# reloads when it moves.
# intervalSeconds → how often to check (default 10). One `stat` per tick, so this is cheap.
#
@@ -342,7 +457,7 @@ placement: weighted
# / credentialId. Those are hot because the placement policy (and, for credentialId,
# the CB-578 stage B quarantine check) reads them through a supplier — being config is
# not by itself enough to make a key hot.
# EXCEPT `fleet.leaders`: Bridged.main reads it once at startup to build the lead tab
# EXCEPT `fleet.leaders`: Fleetd.main reads it once at startup to build the lead tab
# scanner and launcher, and neither is rebuilt on reload. A changed/added/removed
# `fleet.leaders` entry is silently accepted — the reload reports "config reloaded"
# with nothing in the deferred list — but has NO effect until you restart. Treat it
@@ -353,8 +468,10 @@ placement: weighted
# stage B — baked once into the quarantine tracker built at startup), ADDING or
# REMOVING a profile (a new backend needs its own launcher, and launchers are built
# once), AND an existing profile's launch settings — model, baseUrl, argv, env,
# configDir, mcpUrl, tabLabel, exhaustedPattern. The launcher takes a copy of
# `profiles:` at startup and resolves every spawn out of that copy, so those never
# configDir, mcpUrl, tabLabel, exhaustedPattern, errorPattern (fleetd #201 / #227 —
# compiled once into a startup pattern map the same way exhaustedPattern is). The
# launcher takes a copy of `profiles:` at startup and resolves every spawn out of
# that copy, so those never
# reach a launch until you restart. The reload logs them by name rather than
# pretending they applied.
# COLD → cannot change at all: `bind:`, `herdrSocket:`, `broker:` and `auth:`. The socket is
@@ -415,6 +532,22 @@ fleet:
# recognised: give it a `profile:` and the daemon launches the shortfall when fewer than
# `instances` are live. Omit `profile:` and it is recognise-only, as before.
#
# `profile:` has a SECOND job as of fleetd #176, even for a recognise-only lead you never want
# auto-launched: it is also how fleetd learns which account this lead's own session shares. A
# `subscription: true` profile bills the operator's Claude account, and the lead itself is always
# a live `claude` session on that same account — `maxLoad` never counted that seat. If a lead
# entry here names a profile that shares a worker profile's account, `fleet_list`'s `free` for
# that worker profile subtracts the lead's live seat(s) automatically. "Shares the account" is
# decided by matching `effectiveCredentialId()`, which (fleetd #176 stage 2 — see THE SENTINEL,
# next to `credentialId:`, in THE WORKERS above) means: an explicit, matching `credentialId:` on
# both, OR — the common case, needing NO extra config — both being `subscription: true` with
# `credentialId` left unset, since those all share one implicit account-wide id. A lead on `opus`
# and workers on `sonnet` link automatically this way; they do NOT need the same profile name.
# Setting `profile:` on an already-running, recognise-only lead is safe — the daemon only launches
# the SHORTFALL below `instances`, so naming a profile here does not, by itself, start anything.
# Omit it and fleetd has no way to derive the sharing — there is no other reliable signal on the
# daemon's side — so that lead's seat goes uncounted, exactly as before this ticket.
#
# `tab:` (CB-579) is REQUIRED and is the only field identity depends on — the exact label of the
# tab hosting the lead, matched case-insensitively. Label the tab yourself and put that same
# string here, and the pane is recognised on the next rescan. Reopen the tab later, or the session
@@ -446,8 +579,8 @@ fleet:
# workspace: leads # where a launched lead's tab is created (default "leads").
# # MUST NOT be a member workspace — those are excluded from the
# # scan, so a lead placed in one is never found again.
# cwd: /path/to/repo # the launched lead's working directory (default: bridged's own)
# kind: claude # descriptive; reported by bridge_whoami
# cwd: /path/to/repo # the launched lead's working directory (default: fleetd's own)
# kind: claude # descriptive; reported by fleet_whoami
# gpt-sol-5.6:
# tab: "lead: gpt-sol-5.6"
# kind: opencode
@@ -475,7 +608,7 @@ guard:
# Member credential policy (CB-596, gitea issue #82). A herdr pane runs a LOGIN shell, and that
# shell re-sources the operator's own secret store — so a spawned member inherits every credential
# the operator's shell holds, not just the ones bridged means to give it. Measured on this host:
# the operator's shell holds, not just the ones fleetd means to give it. Measured on this host:
# 31 credential names, all set, with only ONE (GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN) blocked before this — and that
# block was a single name hardcoded in HerdrPeerLauncher.java, not driven by this file. This block
# replaces that hardcoded shadow with a config-driven list of names.
@@ -505,20 +638,51 @@ guard:
# through either: the daemon logs a WARN naming any credential-shaped env var it finds on neither
# list (never its value), so a secret added to the store later does not go unnoticed forever.
#
# policy → only "deny-by-default" exists today (an operator-authored deny-list was deliberately
# rejected — see above). An unrecognized value refuses to start, naming it.
# allow → credential names a member legitimately needs. Left OUT of the pane's env overlay
# entirely, so the value the pane's own (login) shell exports passes through untouched.
# known → every credential name the operator's store is known to export. Every name here NOT
# also in `allow` is overlaid with a non-secret sentinel value before the pane's login
# shell runs — real protection only for names the login shell does not itself re-export
# (see the ROUND-2 CORRECTION note above for the ones it does).
# policy → "deny-by-default" (the default; also accepted spelled "deny-list") overlays each
# known-but-not-allowed name BEFORE the pane's login shell runs — real protection only
# where that shell does not re-export the name (see ROUND-2 CORRECTION above). An
# unrecognized value refuses to start, naming it.
# policy → "allow-list" (CB-633) moves the control to a per-spawn ZDOTDIR directory the daemon
# generates and passes through tab.create's env map. Each generated startup file sources
# its ~/ counterpart FIRST and then runs the scrub, so the scrub happens after the
# operator's whole chain and no sourced file can undo it.
# The scrub is sourced from BOTH the generated .zshrc and the generated .zlogin, because
# herdr does not open the same kind of shell everywhere: macOS panes run a LOGIN zsh (so
# .zlogin runs), Linux panes run a plain interactive zsh (so .zlogin never runs at all).
# A scrub in .zlogin alone would be a control that silently does nothing on Linux.
# The allow-list is DERIVED, never typed:
# every profile's tokenEnv/gitTokenEnv/gitHostEnv values and env-map keys, plus an
# infrastructure set (PATH HOME SHELL TERM LANG LC_* TMPDIR USER LOGNAME PWD SHLVL EDITOR
# PAGER JAVA_HOME XDG_* ZDOTDIR), plus whatever keys this spawn's own env overlay carries.
# Adding a profile can therefore only widen the list, never break another spawn's scrub.
# Under this policy `known`/`allow` below become REPORTING ONLY — they feed the gap WARN,
# they are no longer a control. If the member's login shell is NOT zsh, the daemon logs a
# loud WARN saying protection is off and falls back to deny-by-default's overlay.
# Each pane writes a scrub-report.txt naming how many variables it kept of how many it
# saw; the daemon logs that "allowed N of M" line when the pane stops. If the report is
# MISSING the daemon logs a WARN instead — the scrub cannot then be confirmed to have
# run, and a silently-dead control is exactly what this policy exists to prevent.
# allow → credential names a member legitimately needs. Under deny-by-default, left OUT of the
# pane's env overlay entirely, so the value the pane's own (login) shell exports passes
# through untouched. Under allow-list: reporting only.
# known → every credential name the operator's store is known to export. Under deny-by-default,
# every name here NOT also in `allow` is overlaid with a non-secret sentinel value before
# the pane's login shell runs — real protection only for names that shell does not itself
# re-export (see the ROUND-2 CORRECTION note above). Under allow-list: reporting only.
# sshAuthSock → whether SSH_AUTH_SOCK may pass through under allow-list ("allow") or must be
# blanked like any other non-derived name ("block", the default). This is a decision you
# have to make explicitly: SSH_AUTH_SOCK is a handle to YOUR ssh-agent, and a member
# holding it can sign with your keys — it sits in no secret file and looks like no
# credential, which is why it slipped past three earlier tickets (gitea #110). Blocking
# it breaks git over SSH inside members (push/fetch authenticate as you); use HTTPS
# remotes or scoped deploy keys instead of allowing it lightly.
#
# HOT-RELOADABLE the same way `fleet:` is (CB-559): read fresh on every spawn, so editing this list
# and reloading config (or restarting) changes what the NEXT spawn inherits; already-running members
# are unaffected either way.
# memberCredentials:
# policy: deny-by-default
# policy: deny-by-default # or "deny-list", or "allow-list" (CB-633) — see above
# sshAuthSock: block # allow-list only; see the sshAuthSock note above
# allow:
# - AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN # named in a profile's tokenEnv (local/gx) — a member reaching the
# # gateway is by design, not a leak
@@ -570,6 +734,24 @@ guard:
# to a sibling directory of the repo root.
# worktreeRoot: /Users/me/src/.bridged-worktrees
# Worktree group sharing (fleetd #185 stage 3). OPTIONAL, off by default. Names an OS group
# that a provisioned worktree's repo is made group-writable for (git config
# core.sharedRepository group, plus a one-time chgrp/chmod/setgid fix-up), so a member spawned
# under a DIFFERENT OS user (see memberHerdrSocket) can write its own worktree, its
# per-worktree git metadata, and its own commit objects — without it, every file GitWorktrees
# creates is owned by fleetd's own uid and unwritable by another user.
# CAUTION: this isolates credentials, not the repository — a member in the group can still
# write the operator's git objects and refs in the shared repo. The operator running fleetd
# must already be a member of the named group, or every provisioning spawn fails loudly.
#
# fleetd #213: this is also the ONE group the memberCredentials.policy: allow-list ZDOTDIR scrub
# reuses when memberHerdrSocket is set — deliberately not a second config key. Under
# memberHerdrSocket, the scrub directory is generated under worktreeRoot (never java.io.tmpdir,
# which the member OS user cannot reach) and shared read-only with this group. If worktreeGroup
# is unset while memberHerdrSocket is set, the scrub cannot be guaranteed reachable by the member,
# so fleetd falls back to the weaker CB-596 sentinel overlay instead (a WARN names the gap).
# worktreeGroup: fleet-workers
# Session lifecycle limits (CB-303). All knobs are opt-in; omit or set to null to keep
# the feature disabled. By default the daemon never reaps, caps, or drains sessions.
# idleTtlSeconds → reap READY/DONE sessions idle longer than this (never BUSY/SPAWNING)
@@ -593,14 +775,36 @@ guard:
# RabbitMQ speaks the same AMQP 0-9-1, so it is a URI-only swap.
# uri → AMQP connection URI. No trailing slash ⇒ the default vhost "/"; an empty path ("/")
# is vhost "" and will NOT connect. Encode a named vhost as .../%2Fmyvhost.
# uriEnv → CB-151: name of a host env var holding the AMQP URI, preferred over `uri` (wins
# whenever set). The URI carries `user:pass@` inline, so naming a variable keeps the
# password out of fleetd.yaml — same pattern as auth.tokenEnv/Profile.tokenEnv. A
# uriEnv that resolves to an unset or blank variable is treated as NOT configured and
# the daemon falls back to the in-memory inbox, warning loudly.
# prefetch → CB-527: consumer basicQos, capping how many unacked messages the inbox holds
# in-heap per owned target (the rest sits on the broker's durable queue instead of
# growing the JVM heap). Default 32 when omitted.
# broker:
# uri: amqp://guest:guest@127.0.0.1:5672
# uriEnv: LAVINMQ_URI
# prefetch: 32
# Active push-to-primary (CB-307 Stage 3). When a worker reply lands with no open bridge_send,
# Shared cross-host LEADER coordination broker. OMIT this block to leave lead-to-lead messaging
# off entirely (config-only in this ticket — nothing here wires it into a live LeadMailbox yet).
# This is a SEPARATE AMQP vhost from `broker:` above: member/worker inboxes always stay on the
# per-fleet `broker:` vhost, and this vhost carries only leader-to-leader traffic, so two fleets
# whose members must never see each other can still share one coordination vhost for their leads.
# uriEnv → name of a host env var holding the coordination AMQP URI, same convention as
# broker.uriEnv (keeps the credential out of fleetd.yaml). Wins over `uri` when set.
# selfId → this daemon's own lead coord-id — the name its mailbox is owned under
# (lead.<selfId>.inbox), e.g. "mac-opus" or "fleet01-lead". Must be globally unique
# across every daemon sharing this vhost.
# prefetch → consumer basicQos, capping how many unacked messages the mailbox holds in-heap.
# Default 32 when omitted.
# coordinator:
# uriEnv: LEAD_COORD_URI
# selfId: mac-opus
# prefetch: 32
# Active push-to-primary (CB-307 Stage 3). When a worker reply lands with no open fleet_send,
# the ReplyPushLoop injects a *drain nudge* (never the payload) into the primary's own herdr
# pane — status-gated (only when injectable, never mid-turn) and bounded. Ack = drain: the loop
# stops as soon as the primary's inbox is empty.
@@ -611,11 +815,11 @@ guard:
#
# REQUIRED (CB-522) if the primary itself runs inside a herdr pane. Caller
# identity resolves a loopback PID to its herdr pane, and PaneLocator scans
# EVERY pane — not just bridged-spawned ones — so such a primary is otherwise
# EVERY pane — not just fleetd-spawned ones — so such a primary is otherwise
# classified as a WORKER and refused SPAWN/SEND/STOP. That failure is
# self-locking: the learned terminal is populated by the very orchestration
# calls being refused, so only this pinned value can break the cycle. Read the
# id off bridge_whoami (it reports the current terminal even while
# id off fleet_whoami (it reports the current terminal even while
# misclassified) and re-pin whenever the primary moves panes.
# pushReminders → max nudges before giving up (default 5)
# pushBackoffMs → delay between nudges in ms (default 15000)
+28 -7
View File
@@ -5,17 +5,17 @@
<modelVersion>4.0.0</modelVersion>
<groupId>dev.ltms</groupId>
<artifactId>bridged</artifactId>
<artifactId>fleetd</artifactId>
<version>1.0.0</version>
<packaging>jar</packaging>
<name>bridged</name>
<description>claude-bridge message server: sole gateway between primary/worker Claude sessions and herdr</description>
<name>fleetd</name>
<description>fleet message server: sole gateway between a lead session, its members, and herdr</description>
<properties>
<maven.compiler.release>25</maven.compiler.release>
<project.build.sourceEncoding>UTF-8</project.build.sourceEncoding>
<mainClass>dev.ltms.bridged.Bridged</mainClass>
<mainClass>dev.ltms.fleet.Fleetd</mainClass>
<jackson.version>2.19.0</jackson.version>
<javalin.version>6.7.0</javalin.version>
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
<testcontainers.version>1.20.4</testcontainers.version>
<commons-compress.version>1.27.1</commons-compress.version>
<commons-lang3.version>3.18.0</commons-lang3.version>
<sqlite-jdbc.version>3.53.4.0</sqlite-jdbc.version>
</properties>
<!--
@@ -44,6 +45,12 @@
3.0-rc5; bumping Jackson 3 to the patched 3.2.x breaks the SDK (annotation mismatch).
Only the loopback /mcp endpoint parses this JSON, from trusted local Claude clients.
The 11.0.23 -> 11.0.25 bump did clear jetty CVE-2024-8184 (5.9) and CVE-2024-6763.
fleetd #206: org.xerial:sqlite-jdbc 3.53.4.0 (added for OpenCodeSessionDiscovery) — the
only known advisory against this artifact is CVE-2023-32697 (RCE via an attacker-controlled
JDBC URL), fixed in 3.41.2.2; 3.53.4.0 is well past that fix and OSV.dev reports no open
advisory against it. Checked via the OSV.dev API (no Mend.io/JetBrains IDE MCP mount
available from this worktree) on 2026-08-31.
-->
<!-- Force the latest patched Jetty 11.x across all Javalin-pulled Jetty modules (no version
@@ -106,7 +113,7 @@
</dependency>
<!-- MCP server: the SERVER face. Streamable-HTTP servlet mounted on Javalin's Jetty at
/mcp, exposing bridge_send/bridge_reply/bridge_status as thin adapters over REST. -->
/mcp, exposing fleet_send/fleet_reply/fleet_status as thin adapters over REST. -->
<dependency>
<groupId>io.modelcontextprotocol.sdk</groupId>
<artifactId>mcp</artifactId>
@@ -123,6 +130,17 @@
<version>${amqp.version}</version>
</dependency>
<!-- fleetd #206: opencode moved its session store from a JSON tree to SQLite
(opencode.db). This is the JDBC driver OpenCodeSessionDiscovery uses to read it
read-only. Ships bundled native libraries (linux/mac/windows, several archs), so it
is a heavier jar than most deps here — see the pom's dependency-security note below
for the size/CVE tradeoff actually measured. -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.xerial</groupId>
<artifactId>sqlite-jdbc</artifactId>
<version>${sqlite-jdbc.version}</version>
</dependency>
<!-- Logging -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.slf4j</groupId>
@@ -161,7 +179,10 @@
</dependencies>
<build>
<finalName>bridged</finalName>
<!-- CB-634: the cutover renamed the module dir (bridged/ -> fleetd/), the jar, and the
launchd plist together. The installed plist names fleetd/target/fleetd.jar and
KeepAlive is armed, so this name, the plist, and the wrapper must move as one. -->
<finalName>fleetd</finalName>
<plugins>
<plugin>
<groupId>org.apache.maven.plugins</groupId>
@@ -203,7 +224,7 @@
</configuration>
</plugin>
<!-- Runnable fat jar: java -jar target/bridged.jar -->
<!-- Runnable fat jar: java -jar target/fleetd.jar -->
<plugin>
<groupId>org.apache.maven.plugins</groupId>
<artifactId>maven-shade-plugin</artifactId>
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.auth;
package dev.ltms.fleet.auth;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.auth;
package dev.ltms.fleet.auth;
/**
* The authorization table (CB-505), stated once and enforced on both entry paths.
*
* <p>Most of these rules are already true de facto — {@code BridgeMcp} derives a worker's identity
* <p>Most of these rules are already true de facto — {@code FleetMcp} derives a worker's identity
* from the connection rather than reading it from an argument, so a worker has never been able to
* reply <em>as</em> another worker over MCP. What was missing is that the REST surface trusted the
* session id in the URL path, and neither surface checked role at all. This class makes the
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.auth;
package dev.ltms.fleet.auth;
import dev.ltms.bridged.mcp.ConnectionIdentity;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.MemberRole;
import dev.ltms.fleet.mcp.ConnectionIdentity;
import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.MemberRole;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.security.MessageDigest;
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import java.util.function.Supplier;
/**
* Resolves every caller to a {@link Principal}, for both entry paths into the core (CB-501).
*
* <p>There are two of them and they are not layered the way the docs suggest: {@code BridgeMcp}
* <p>There are two of them and they are not layered the way the docs suggest: {@code FleetMcp}
* calls the service layer directly and is mounted as a raw servlet (so it never passes through a
* Javalin filter), while the REST routes historically resolved no identity at all. Both now
* delegate here, so the authorization rules are stated once instead of drifting apart.
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ public final class CallerResolver {
* <p>Like {@link #leadTerminals}, a supplier rather than a fixed map, so a binding injected
* after startup — when the later spawn lifecycle establishes a live architect session, or an
* operator pins one — takes effect without a restart. Consulted per resolve; today's wiring
* in {@code Bridged} reads a constant from config, which is the degenerate live case.
* in {@code Fleetd} reads a constant from config, which is the degenerate live case.
*/
private final Supplier<Map<String, String>> architectTerminals;
private final Function<String, MemberRole> memberSlotRoles;
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ public final class CallerResolver {
// loopback-trust: same-host callers that are not workers are the primary. A non-loopback
// caller is anonymous even here — and startup refuses that combination anyway
// (BridgedConfig.validateAuthExposure), so this is defence in depth, not the control.
// (FleetConfig.validateAuthExposure), so this is defence in depth, not the control.
return isLoopback(remoteAddr) ? Principal.primary(c.pid()) : Principal.anonymous();
}
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.auth;
import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.MemberRole;
/** Optional session lifecycle hook for live member-slot bindings. */
public interface MemberLifecycle {
/** A slot held before a member process starts. */
record SlotReservation(String slot, String profile) { }
MemberLifecycle NONE = new MemberLifecycle() {
@Override
public MemberRole acquired(MemberRole role, String profile, String terminal) {
return role; // no registry configured — nothing to bind against, so the request stands
}
@Override
public void released(String terminal) {
}
@Override
public void requireSlotFor(MemberRole role, String profile) {
// no registry configured — nothing to validate against, so nothing is refused
}
@Override
public SlotReservation reserve(MemberRole role, String profile) {
return null;
}
@Override
public boolean bind(SlotReservation reservation, String terminal) {
return false;
}
@Override
public void release(SlotReservation reservation) {
}
};
/**
* Try to bind a newly spawned {@code terminal} into the role it was granted.
*
* @return the role this session actually holds: {@code role} unchanged for a role with no
* live slot-binding semantics (dev, reviewer), or when the bind succeeded; a fallback
* role — never {@code role} — when a slot-bound role (architect) could not be bound.
* Callers must record THIS value on the session, never the requested {@code role}, so
* a later roster read never reports a role the session does not hold (CB-619). In
* normal operation this fallback should not happen once a reservation has been bound.
* It remains the honest answer if a caller has no reservation, or if binding a
* reservation unexpectedly fails.
*/
MemberRole acquired(MemberRole role, String profile, String terminal);
void released(String terminal);
/**
* Refuse an acquire before anything spawns when {@code role} requires a live slot binding and
* no configured slot carries {@code profile} (CB-619 / fleetd #123). A no-op for a role with
* no slot-binding semantics.
*
* @throws IllegalArgumentException naming the role, the profile, and the pools that do carry it
*/
void requireSlotFor(MemberRole role, String profile);
/** Reserve a matching slot before launch, or refuse before a charter can be delivered. */
SlotReservation reserve(MemberRole role, String profile);
/** Convert a reservation into a live terminal binding. */
boolean bind(SlotReservation reservation, String terminal);
/** Return an unbound reservation after a failed launch. */
void release(SlotReservation reservation);
}
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.auth;
package dev.ltms.fleet.auth;
import dev.ltms.bridged.config.BridgedConfig;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.MemberRole;
import dev.ltms.fleet.config.FleetConfig;
import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.MemberRole;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.util.Collections;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Objects;
@@ -55,11 +56,13 @@ public final class MemberRegistry implements MemberLifecycle {
}
private final Map<String, Entry> slots;
/** Live {@code terminal_id → qualified slot key}; guarded by {@code this}. */
/** Live {@code terminal_id → qualified slot key}; guarded by {@code terminalToSlot}. */
private final Map<String, String> terminalToSlot = new HashMap<>();
/** Slot keys held between reservation and the terminal binding. Guarded by terminalToSlot. */
private final java.util.Set<String> reservedSlots = new java.util.HashSet<>();
/** Flatten every role pool in {@code fleet} into one registry. Leaders are not members. */
public MemberRegistry(BridgedConfig.Fleet fleet) {
public MemberRegistry(FleetConfig.Fleet fleet) {
Map<String, Entry> flat = new LinkedHashMap<>();
if (fleet != null) {
for (MemberRole role : MemberRole.values()) {
@@ -94,7 +97,7 @@ public final class MemberRegistry implements MemberLifecycle {
* An immutable copy of the live {@code terminal_id → slot name} bindings.
*
* <p>Passed to {@link CallerResolver} as the source of architect identity, and what
* {@code bridge_whoami}/the roster will read to say which slot a pane hosts. Empty until the
* {@code fleet_whoami}/the roster will read to say which slot a pane hosts. Empty until the
* spawn lifecycle binds a slot.
*/
public Map<String, String> snapshot() {
@@ -166,7 +169,7 @@ public final class MemberRegistry implements MemberLifecycle {
if (existingSlot != null) {
return slot.equals(existingSlot); // already this slot (idempotent) or a different one
}
if (terminalToSlot.containsValue(slot)) {
if (terminalToSlot.containsValue(slot) || reservedSlots.contains(slot)) {
return false; // slot already hosts a terminal — no second one
}
terminalToSlot.put(terminal, slot);
@@ -206,19 +209,116 @@ public final class MemberRegistry implements MemberLifecycle {
*
* <p>The role check is lifecycle policy. {@link CallerResolver} repeats it when resolving a
* binding, so a later lifecycle regression cannot turn a worker into an architect.
*
* <p>CB-619 / fleetd #123: the return value is the role this session actually holds, and the
* caller is required to record THAT — never the requested {@code role} — on the session. Before
* this fix the caller kept the requested role regardless of whether the bind below succeeded, so
* a demoted session's {@code GET /members} row still said {@code "architect"} while
* {@code fleet_whoami} (which reads the live binding, not the request) correctly said
* {@code "worker"} — three sources of truth that disagreed about one live member, silently.
*/
@Override
public void acquired(MemberRole role, String profile, String terminal) {
public MemberRole acquired(MemberRole role, String profile, String terminal) {
if (role != MemberRole.ARCHITECT || terminal == null || terminal.isBlank()) {
return;
return role;
}
// slotsFor preserves definition order, so duplicate-profile slots use the first free one.
for (Entry entry : slotsFor(MemberRole.ARCHITECT).values()) {
if (Objects.equals(profile, entry.profile()) && bind(entry.key(), terminal)) {
return;
return MemberRole.ARCHITECT;
}
}
// fleetd #123: at least WARN — a role downgrade that the roster must now also reflect is
// not routine bookkeeping. requireSlotFor already refuses the config-gap case (no slot at
// all carries this profile) before a process ever spawns; reaching here means the config DID
// carry a matching slot but every one of them was already bound to a different terminal — a
// race this pre-spawn check cannot close on its own (see requireSlotFor's javadoc).
log.warn("member slot: no free architect slot for profile={} terminal={}; holding the session "
+ "as {} instead of the architect it asked for — every configured slot for this "
+ "profile is already bound to a different terminal", profile, terminal,
MemberRole.DEV.wireName());
return MemberRole.DEV;
}
/**
* CB-619 / fleetd #123: refuse an architect acquire before anything spawns when no configured
* slot carries {@code profile} — the config-gap case from the original defect report (a spawn
* asked for {@code role=architect, profile=sonnet}, and {@code fleet.architects} carried only
* {@code opus} and {@code sol}). A dev/reviewer acquire is always a no-op: those pools are
* placement candidates only (see {@code CompositePeerLauncher}), never a live identity binding,
* so there is nothing here to refuse — an explicit profile outside the pool for those roles is a
* documented operator override, not a defect.
*
* <p>This closes the config-gap case, not the live-capacity case: a profile that DOES carry a
* slot can still lose the race to a concurrent spawn between this check and the actual
* {@link #bind}, which is why {@link #acquired} must still answer honestly even after this
* check has passed.
*/
@Override
public void requireSlotFor(MemberRole role, String profile) {
if (role != MemberRole.ARCHITECT) {
return;
}
boolean hasSlot = slotsFor(MemberRole.ARCHITECT).values().stream()
.anyMatch(e -> Objects.equals(profile, e.profile()));
if (hasSlot) {
return;
}
List<String> pools = slotsFor(MemberRole.ARCHITECT).values().stream()
.map(Entry::profile)
.distinct()
.toList();
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"no " + role.wireName() + " slot for profile '" + profile + "' — an architect's "
+ "identity IS the slot it is bound to, so there is nothing to bind this "
+ "session's identity to. fleet." + role.configKey() + " carries profiles: "
+ (pools.isEmpty() ? "(none configured)" : String.join(", ", pools))
+ "; add profile '" + profile + "' there, or spawn " + role.wireName()
+ " on one of those profiles instead");
}
@Override
public SlotReservation reserve(MemberRole role, String profile) {
if (role != MemberRole.ARCHITECT) {
return null;
}
synchronized (terminalToSlot) {
for (Entry entry : slotsFor(MemberRole.ARCHITECT).values()) {
if ((profile == null || profile.isBlank() || Objects.equals(profile, entry.profile()))
&& !terminalToSlot.containsValue(entry.key()) && reservedSlots.add(entry.key())) {
return new SlotReservation(entry.key(), entry.profile());
}
}
}
throw new IllegalArgumentException("no free architect slot for profile '" + profile
+ "' — every matching slot is already bound or reserved");
}
@Override
public boolean bind(SlotReservation reservation, String terminal) {
if (reservation == null || terminal == null || terminal.isBlank()) {
return false;
}
synchronized (terminalToSlot) {
if (!reservedSlots.remove(reservation.slot())) {
return false;
}
if (!isSlot(reservation.slot()) || terminalToSlot.containsKey(terminal)
|| terminalToSlot.containsValue(reservation.slot())) {
return false;
}
terminalToSlot.put(terminal, reservation.slot());
return true;
}
}
@Override
public void release(SlotReservation reservation) {
if (reservation != null) {
synchronized (terminalToSlot) {
reservedSlots.remove(reservation.slot());
}
}
log.info("member slot: no free architect slot for profile={}; session remains a worker", profile);
}
/** Unbind a released terminal using the compare-safe registry operation. */
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.auth;
package dev.ltms.fleet.auth;
/**
* A resolved caller: its {@link Role}, and — for a worker — the herdr {@code terminal_id} that
@@ -39,14 +39,14 @@ public record Principal(Role role, String terminal, long pid, String name) {
*
* <p>Carries {@link Role#PRIMARY}: a lead <em>is</em> a primary as far as authorization goes,
* so every existing {@code isPrimary()} gate keeps working unchanged and the role table needed
* no new entry. The name is reporting only — it lets {@code bridge_whoami} say <em>which</em>
* no new entry. The name is reporting only — it lets {@code fleet_whoami} say <em>which</em>
* lead is asking once more than one is configured.
*
* <p><strong>CB-532: a lead now carries the terminal it was matched by.</strong> Under CB-530 it
* deliberately did not, because {@code terminal} meant "which worker pane" everywhere and a
* non-null one would have enrolled the lead in the worker presence map. That reading was what
* made a lead unaddressable: {@link #ownsSession} could never be true for it, so
* {@code bridge_reply} was refused and one lead could send to another but never be answered.
* {@code fleet_reply} was refused and one lead could send to another but never be answered.
* The terminal now means "which pane is this caller", the presence map keys on
* {@link #isSpawnedMember()} instead, and a lead is a peer that can both send and receive.
*/
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ public record Principal(Role role, String terminal, long pid, String name) {
* An architect (CB-548), identified by the slot it occupies and the pane bound to it.
*
* <p>Carries {@link Role#ARCHITECT}. {@code slotName} is reporting only — it lets
* {@code bridge_whoami} say <em>which</em> architect slot is asking, and it is the key the
* {@code fleet_whoami} say <em>which</em> architect slot is asking, and it is the key the
* (future) spawn lifecycle reads a profile back from. Identity is the {@code terminal}: like a
* worker's it comes from the connection and the live terminal→slot binding, so
* {@code ownsSession} works exactly as it does for a worker — an architect acts as its own
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.auth;
package dev.ltms.fleet.auth;
/**
* What a caller is allowed to be on the bus (CB-501).
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.config;
package dev.ltms.fleet.config;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import java.util.function.Supplier;
/**
* The daemon's live configuration, re-readable without a restart (CB-559).
*
* <p>Consumers hold this, not a {@link BridgedConfig}, and read through {@link #get()} at the point
* <p>Consumers hold this, not a {@link FleetConfig}, and read through {@link #get()} at the point
* of use. A component that captures {@code ref.get()} into a field at construction has opted out of
* reload — which is sometimes right (see <em>deferred</em> below), but it must then be a deliberate
* choice rather than an accident of where the field was initialised.
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ import java.util.function.Supplier;
* {@code placement:}, and an existing profile's {@code weight} / {@code maxLoad}. Those
* three are read through a supplier on {@code CompositePeerLauncher}, which is what makes
* them hot — not the fact that they are config. <strong>This does NOT include
* {@code fleet.leaders}</strong>: {@code Bridged.main} reads {@code cfg.fleet().leaders()}
* {@code fleet.leaders}</strong>: {@code Fleetd.main} reads {@code cfg.fleet().leaders()}
* once at startup to build the {@code LeadTabScanner} and the {@code LeadLauncher}, and
* neither is reconstructed on reload — so a lead added, removed, or re-{@code tab}'d under
* {@code fleet.leaders} needs a restart, the same as any deferred key below.</li>
@@ -42,8 +42,10 @@ import java.util.function.Supplier;
* {@code guard:}, {@code worktreeRoot:}, adding or removing a profile (a new backend needs its own launcher,
* which is constructed once), <em>and an existing profile's launch settings</em> —
* {@code model}, {@code baseUrl}, {@code argv}, {@code env}, {@code mcpUrl},
* {@code exhaustedPattern} (CB-578 stage A — compiled once into {@code Bridged.main}'s
* pattern map at startup), and the rest. {@code credentialId} (CB-578 stage B) is NOT on
* {@code exhaustedPattern} (CB-578 stage A — compiled once into {@code Fleetd.main}'s
* pattern map at startup), {@code errorPattern} (fleetd #201 Unit 5 — compiled once into
* {@code Fleetd.main}'s backend-error pattern map at startup, the same way), and the rest.
* {@code credentialId} (CB-578 stage B) is NOT on
* this list — it is read live off the config supplier at every quarantine check and
* exhaustion event, exactly like {@code weight} / {@code maxLoad}, so it is hot instead.
* {@code HerdrPeerLauncher} takes {@code Map.copyOf(profiles)} at construction and resolves
@@ -65,30 +67,30 @@ import java.util.function.Supplier;
* running. A config file being edited is normally read once mid-save; degrading a working daemon
* because it caught a half-written file would be a bad trade.
*/
public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<BridgedConfig> {
public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<FleetConfig> {
private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(ConfigRef.class);
/** Keys that cannot change under a running daemon — see the class doc. */
private static final Set<String> COLD_KEYS =
Set.of("bind", "herdrSocket", "broker", "auth");
Set.of("bind", "herdrSocket", "memberHerdrSocket", "broker", "auth");
private final Path path;
private final AtomicReference<BridgedConfig> current;
private final AtomicReference<FleetConfig> current;
public ConfigRef(Path path, BridgedConfig initial) {
public ConfigRef(Path path, FleetConfig initial) {
this.path = path;
this.current = new AtomicReference<>(Objects.requireNonNull(initial, "initial config"));
}
/** A fixed reference that never reloads — for tests and for wiring built from a config in code. */
public static ConfigRef fixed(BridgedConfig cfg) {
public static ConfigRef fixed(FleetConfig cfg) {
return new ConfigRef(null, cfg);
}
/** The live configuration. Read this per use; do not cache it in a field. */
@Override
public BridgedConfig get() {
public FleetConfig get() {
return current.get();
}
@@ -128,7 +130,7 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<BridgedConfig> {
}
if (!applied) {
return "config reload refused — these keys cannot change under a running daemon: "
+ String.join(", ", coldKeys) + ". Restart bridged to apply them.";
+ String.join(", ", coldKeys) + ". Restart fleetd to apply them.";
}
if (!deferred.isEmpty()) {
return "config reloaded; these changes need a restart to take effect: "
@@ -149,10 +151,10 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<BridgedConfig> {
if (path == null) {
return Outcome.failed("this config was built in code and has no file to reload from");
}
BridgedConfig old = current.get();
BridgedConfig fresh;
FleetConfig old = current.get();
FleetConfig fresh;
try {
fresh = BridgedConfig.load(path);
fresh = FleetConfig.load(path);
// The same gate startup runs. A config that would have refused to boot must not be able
// to slip in through a reload — that is how a daemon ends up in a state it could never
// have started in, which is the hardest kind to debug.
@@ -182,7 +184,7 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<BridgedConfig> {
}
/** Cold keys whose value differs between the running config and the candidate. */
private static List<String> changedColdKeys(BridgedConfig old, BridgedConfig fresh) {
private static List<String> changedColdKeys(FleetConfig old, FleetConfig fresh) {
List<String> changed = new ArrayList<>();
if (!Objects.equals(old.bind(), fresh.bind())) {
changed.add("bind");
@@ -190,6 +192,9 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<BridgedConfig> {
if (!Objects.equals(old.herdrSocket(), fresh.herdrSocket())) {
changed.add("herdrSocket");
}
if (!Objects.equals(old.memberHerdrSocket(), fresh.memberHerdrSocket())) {
changed.add("memberHerdrSocket");
}
if (!Objects.equals(old.broker(), fresh.broker())) {
changed.add("broker");
}
@@ -202,7 +207,7 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<BridgedConfig> {
}
/** Changed keys that were accepted but whose effect waits for a restart. */
private static List<String> changedDeferredKeys(BridgedConfig old, BridgedConfig fresh) {
private static List<String> changedDeferredKeys(FleetConfig old, FleetConfig fresh) {
List<String> changed = new ArrayList<>();
if (!Objects.equals(old.lifecycle(), fresh.lifecycle())) {
changed.add("lifecycle");
@@ -226,9 +231,9 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<BridgedConfig> {
if (!Objects.equals(old.quarantineCooldownSeconds(), fresh.quarantineCooldownSeconds())) {
changed.add("quarantineCooldownSeconds");
}
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> before =
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> before =
old.profiles() == null ? Map.of() : old.profiles();
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> after =
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> after =
fresh.profiles() == null ? Map.of() : fresh.profiles();
// Adding or removing a profile is deferred: a new backend needs its own launcher, and
// launchers are built once at startup.
@@ -247,7 +252,7 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<BridgedConfig> {
// a reload can produce, because the operator has no reason to doubt it.
List<String> relaunch = new ArrayList<>();
before.forEach((name, was) -> {
BridgedConfig.Profile now = after.get(name);
FleetConfig.Profile now = after.get(name);
if (now != null && !sameLaunchSettings(was, now)) {
relaunch.add(name);
}
@@ -266,7 +271,7 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<BridgedConfig> {
* {@code CompositePeerLauncher}/the CB-578 stage B exhaustion sink) and really do take effect on
* the next spawn.
*/
private static boolean sameLaunchSettings(BridgedConfig.Profile a, BridgedConfig.Profile b) {
private static boolean sameLaunchSettings(FleetConfig.Profile a, FleetConfig.Profile b) {
return Objects.equals(a.baseUrl(), b.baseUrl())
&& Objects.equals(a.model(), b.model())
&& Objects.equals(a.configDir(), b.configDir())
@@ -276,6 +281,9 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<BridgedConfig> {
&& Objects.equals(a.workspace(), b.workspace())
&& Objects.equals(a.tabLabel(), b.tabLabel())
&& Objects.equals(a.mcpUrl(), b.mcpUrl())
// CB-634: the IDE MCP mount is a launch flag, fixed at spawn like mcpUrl — a
// reload changes it only for members spawned after, so a changed value is deferred.
&& Objects.equals(a.ideMcpUrl(), b.ideMcpUrl())
&& Objects.equals(a.cwd(), b.cwd())
&& Objects.equals(a.parityOverlay(), b.parityOverlay())
&& Objects.equals(a.gitTokenEnv(), b.gitTokenEnv())
@@ -283,9 +291,13 @@ public final class ConfigRef implements Supplier<BridgedConfig> {
&& Objects.equals(a.kind(), b.kind())
&& Objects.equals(a.env(), b.env())
&& Objects.equals(a.subscription(), b.subscription())
// CB-578 stage B: exhaustedPattern is compiled once into Bridged.main's pattern map
// CB-578 stage B: exhaustedPattern is compiled once into Fleetd.main's pattern map
// at startup (see ExhaustedPatternLookup wiring) — a reload never re-reads it, so a
// changed pattern must be reported as deferred, exactly like model/baseUrl/argv.
&& Objects.equals(a.exhaustedPattern(), b.exhaustedPattern());
&& Objects.equals(a.exhaustedPattern(), b.exhaustedPattern())
// fleetd #201 Unit 5: errorPattern is compiled once into Fleetd.main's backend-error
// pattern map at startup (see BackendErrorPatternLookup wiring), the same way
// exhaustedPattern is — a reload never re-reads it either.
&& Objects.equals(a.errorPattern(), b.errorPattern());
}
}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.config;
package dev.ltms.fleet.config;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import java.util.concurrent.ScheduledExecutorService;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
/**
* Polls {@code bridged.yaml}'s modified time and asks {@link ConfigRef} to reload when it moves
* Polls {@code fleetd.yaml}'s modified time and asks {@link ConfigRef} to reload when it moves
* (CB-559). Opt-in through {@code configReload.enabled}.
*
* <p><strong>Why polling and not a filesystem watch.</strong> {@code WatchService} on macOS has no
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.guard;
package dev.ltms.fleet.guard;
/** Thrown when the subscription boundary would be violated. Never swallow this. */
public class GuardException extends RuntimeException {
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.guard;
package dev.ltms.fleet.guard;
import java.net.URI;
import java.net.URISyntaxException;
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import java.util.Set;
* means its traffic would leave the subscription. That is a hard stop.</li>
* </ul>
*
* Both checks throw {@link GuardException} on violation. {@code bridged} calls
* Both checks throw {@link GuardException} on violation. {@code fleetd} calls
* {@link #assertWorker} before spawning a worker and {@link #assertPrimaryClean}
* against its own environment at startup.
*/
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.health;
package dev.ltms.fleet.health;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentStatus;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.MemberSession;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.AgentStatus;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.MemberSession;
/**
* Pure classifier. Collection and repair are deliberately outside this package.
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.health;
package dev.ltms.fleet.health;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.Agent;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentControl;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentStatus;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.MessageService;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.MemberSession;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.Agent;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.AgentControl;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.AgentStatus;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.HerdrException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.msg.MessageService;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.MemberSession;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
@@ -25,6 +26,8 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
/** Bounded attempts to run {@link #failTarget} for one transition. Never retried tick-to-tick (CB-580). */
static final int MAX_FAIL_TARGET_ATTEMPTS = 3;
// CB-641: Match the injector's 60s readiness gate so health allows a full first boot.
static final long READINESS_GRACE_NANOS = TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(60);
private final AgentControl agents;
private final Supplier<List<MemberSession>> roster;
@@ -32,29 +35,48 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
private final ScheduledExecutorService scheduler;
private final LongSupplier clock;
private final long intervalSeconds;
private final long workingSuspectAfterNanos;
private final BiConsumer<String, String> failTarget;
private final Map<String, HealthPrior> priors = new HashMap<>();
private final Map<String, HealthState> states = new HashMap<>();
/**
* CB-643: consecutive ticks on which a target looked like an orphaned delegation. The fact
* {@link MessageService#hasOrphanedDelegation} reports is a true snapshot, but it can read true
* for one tick during an ordinary race — an async ticket exists before its virtual thread has
* reached {@code rendezvous.open()}, so for that instant nothing is accepted or queued behind
* it. {@code decide} maps the field straight to {@code DELEGATION_ORPHANED} with no cross-tick
* smoothing of its own, so a single racy read would log a fault that clears on the next tick.
* Requiring two consecutive observations costs one interval of latency on a real orphan and
* removes that false positive entirely.
*/
private final Map<String, Integer> orphanStreaks = new HashMap<>();
// These facts need the evidence publishers introduced by later M4 units. They are not negatives.
private static final boolean NOT_YET_OBSERVED = false;
/** How many consecutive ticks a target must look orphaned before health reports it (CB-643). */
static final int ORPHAN_CONFIRM_TICKS = 2;
// CB-643: every HealthSnapshot field now carries real evidence. The NOT_YET_OBSERVED placeholder
// that stood in for 7 of the 12 is gone, and with it the reason 8 of the 9 fault states were
// unreachable — GONE and NEVER_READY included, which is what kept CB-580's failTarget from ever
// firing. Do not reintroduce a constant here: a field with no publisher is a dead state, and the
// tests pass either way, so nothing else will tell you.
/**
* @param failTarget CB-568's idempotent target-wide failure operation (e.g. {@code messages::abandon}),
* invoked once when a member transitions into a terminal health state. Required —
* there is deliberately no defaulting overload; a caller that does not want the
* fail-tickets-on-terminal-health behavior must pass an explicit inert value (see
* {@code TestTurnTokens.inert} / {@code BridgeMcp.CapacitySource.none()} for the pattern).
* {@code TestTurnTokens.inert} / {@code FleetMcp.CapacitySource.none()} for the pattern).
*/
public FleetHealthMonitor(AgentControl agents, Supplier<List<MemberSession>> roster, MessageService messages,
ScheduledExecutorService scheduler, LongSupplier clock, long intervalSeconds,
BiConsumer<String, String> failTarget) {
long workingSuspectAfterSeconds, BiConsumer<String, String> failTarget) {
this.agents = agents;
this.roster = roster;
this.messages = messages;
this.scheduler = scheduler;
this.clock = clock;
this.intervalSeconds = intervalSeconds;
this.workingSuspectAfterNanos = TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(workingSuspectAfterSeconds);
this.failTarget = Objects.requireNonNull(failTarget, "failTarget");
}
@@ -69,28 +91,50 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
// Package-private so tests can run one tick without waiting.
void tick() {
try {
List<Agent> agentsNow = agents.list(); // Exactly one list call for this complete observation.
List<MemberSession> rosterNow = roster.get(); // One in-memory roster snapshot for this tick.
List<Agent> agentsNow;
boolean controlLinkDown = false;
try {
agentsNow = agents.list(); // Exactly one list call for this complete observation.
} catch (HerdrException error) {
agentsNow = List.of();
controlLinkDown = true;
log.warn("fleet health control link unavailable; classifying roster", error);
}
Map<String, Agent> live = new HashMap<>();
for (Agent agent : agentsNow) live.put(agent.terminalId(), agent);
HashSet<String> current = new HashSet<>();
long nowNanos = clock.getAsLong();
for (MemberSession session : rosterNow) {
current.add(session.terminalId());
Agent agent = live.get(session.terminalId());
AgentStatus status = agent == null ? AgentStatus.UNKNOWN : agent.status();
boolean accepted = messages.hasAcceptedDelivery(session.terminalId());
HealthSnapshot snapshot = new HealthSnapshot(session.state(), status, accepted, NOT_YET_OBSERVED,
messages.hasInboxMessage(session.terminalId()), agent != null, NOT_YET_OBSERVED,
NOT_YET_OBSERVED, NOT_YET_OBSERVED, NOT_YET_OBSERVED, NOT_YET_OBSERVED, NOT_YET_OBSERVED);
boolean present = agent != null;
boolean targetNotFound = !controlLinkDown && !present
&& session.state() != MemberSession.State.SPAWNING;
boolean readinessGraceElapsed = nowNanos - session.spawnedAtNanos() >= READINESS_GRACE_NANOS;
boolean stalled = session.state() == MemberSession.State.BUSY
&& nowNanos - session.lastActivityAtNanos() >= workingSuspectAfterNanos;
// CB-643: the three message-layer facts CB-640 published. Read them here rather than
// leaving them false — that constant is what made 8 of the 9 fault states dead.
boolean queuedDelivery = messages.hasQueuedDelivery(session.terminalId());
boolean replyStranded = messages.hasStrandedReply(session.terminalId());
boolean orphanedDelegation = confirmOrphan(session.terminalId(),
messages.hasOrphanedDelegation(session.terminalId()));
HealthSnapshot snapshot = new HealthSnapshot(session.state(), status, accepted, queuedDelivery,
messages.hasInboxMessage(session.terminalId()), present, targetNotFound, controlLinkDown,
readinessGraceElapsed, orphanedDelegation, replyStranded, stalled);
HealthDecision decision = decide(snapshot, priors.getOrDefault(session.terminalId(), HealthPrior.NONE),
clock.getAsLong());
nowNanos);
priors.put(session.terminalId(), decision.prior());
reportTransition(session.terminalId(), decision.state());
}
priors.keySet().retainAll(current);
states.keySet().retainAll(current);
orphanStreaks.keySet().retainAll(current);
} catch (Throwable error) {
// A list failure is health evidence, and must never kill the monitor's only scheduler task.
// Any unclassified collection failure must never kill the monitor's only scheduler task.
log.warn("fleet health collection failed; will retry next tick", error);
} finally {
if (!scheduler.isShutdown()) {
@@ -99,6 +143,20 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
}
}
/**
* Debounce {@link MessageService#hasOrphanedDelegation} across ticks (CB-643). Returns true only
* once {@code observed} has held for {@link #ORPHAN_CONFIRM_TICKS} consecutive ticks; a single
* false reading resets the streak, so a transient race never reaches the classifier.
*/
private boolean confirmOrphan(String target, boolean observed) {
if (!observed) {
orphanStreaks.remove(target);
return false;
}
int streak = orphanStreaks.merge(target, 1, Integer::sum);
return streak >= ORPHAN_CONFIRM_TICKS;
}
void reportTransition(String target, HealthState next) {
HealthState previous = states.put(target, next);
if (previous == next) return;
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.health;
package dev.ltms.fleet.health;
/** Classification plus the private fact that the next pure decision needs. */
public record HealthDecision(HealthState state, HealthPrior prior) { }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.health;
package dev.ltms.fleet.health;
/** Private cross-tick observation. It is deliberately not a reported health value. */
public record HealthPrior(boolean busyButDone) {
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.health;
package dev.ltms.fleet.health;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.AgentStatus;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.MemberSession;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.AgentStatus;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.MemberSession;
/** Read-only facts from one fleet collection tick. */
public record HealthSnapshot(MemberSession.State sessionState, AgentStatus liveStatus,
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.health;
package dev.ltms.fleet.health;
/** Health classifications reported for a member. */
public enum HealthState {
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.health;
package dev.ltms.fleet.health;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.Rendezvous;
import dev.ltms.fleet.msg.Rendezvous;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
/**
* Counts turns that ended via the completion fallback instead of {@code bridge_reply}.
* Counts turns that ended via the completion fallback instead of {@code fleet_reply}.
* MUTE is an observation by target and profile, not a classifier state and never suppresses faults.
*/
public final class MuteCounter {
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.health;
package dev.ltms.fleet.health;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.HashMap;
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.herdr;
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.herdr;
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ public final class AgentControl {
this.herdr = herdr;
}
/** The herdr daemon this control object sends its agent calls to. */
public HerdrClient herdr() {
return herdr;
}
/** One agent-targeted call, translating a terminal id to its pane id (retrying once fresh). */
private JsonNode agentCall(String method, String target, Map<String, Object> extra) {
String resolved = resolveTarget(target);
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.herdr;
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
/**
* A herdr agent's lifecycle state, as reported by {@code agent_status}. Drives the
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ public enum AgentStatus {
};
}
/** Whether {@code bridged} may inject a message now without stepping on a live turn. */
/** Whether {@code fleetd} may inject a message now without stepping on a live turn. */
public boolean injectable() {
return this == IDLE || this == BLOCKED || this == DONE;
}
@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.herdr;
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
/**
* Client face onto the herdr daemon (protocol 14, herdr 0.7.0).
*
* <p>This is the ONLY thing in {@code bridged} that speaks to herdr. Every method
* <p>This is the ONLY thing in {@code fleetd} that speaks to herdr. Every method
* maps to a herdr JSON-RPC call over its Unix domain socket. Requests are
* newline-delimited JSON with a <em>string</em> id; responses carry either a
* {@code result} object (whose {@code type} field discriminates the payload) or an
* {@code error} object.
*
* <p>Higher layers ({@code bridged}'s policy brain, REST endpoints, MCP adapters)
* <p>Higher layers ({@code fleetd}'s policy brain, REST endpoints, MCP adapters)
* depend on this interface, not on the socket. Tests substitute a fake; the
* {@code contract}-tagged suite exercises the real implementation against a running
* herdr to catch protocol drift.
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.herdr;
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.JsonProcessingException;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.herdr;
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
/**
* Raised when a herdr call fails: transport error, or an {@code error} envelope
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import java.util.Objects;
import java.util.function.Predicate;
/** Routes lead operations and member operations to their owning herdr daemon. */
public final class HerdrRouter implements AutoCloseable {
private final HerdrClient lead;
private final HerdrClient member;
private final AgentControl leadAgents;
private final AgentControl memberAgents;
private final WorkspaceControl leadSpaces;
private final WorkspaceControl memberSpaces;
private final Predicate<String> isLead;
public HerdrRouter(HerdrClient lead, HerdrClient member, Predicate<String> isLead) {
this.lead = Objects.requireNonNull(lead, "lead");
this.member = member != null ? member : lead;
this.isLead = Objects.requireNonNull(isLead, "isLead");
leadAgents = new AgentControl(this.lead);
memberAgents = this.member == this.lead ? leadAgents : new AgentControl(this.member);
leadSpaces = new WorkspaceControl(this.lead);
memberSpaces = this.member == this.lead ? leadSpaces : new WorkspaceControl(this.member);
}
public AgentControl leadAgents() { return leadAgents; }
public WorkspaceControl leadSpaces() { return leadSpaces; }
public AgentControl memberAgents() { return memberAgents; }
public WorkspaceControl memberSpaces() { return memberSpaces; }
public AgentControl agentsFor(String targetId) { return isLead.test(targetId) ? leadAgents : memberAgents; }
HerdrClient leadClient() { return lead; }
HerdrClient memberClient() { return member; }
@Override
public void close() {
lead.close();
if (member != lead) member.close();
}
}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.herdr;
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import java.util.function.Supplier;
/**
* Discovers which panes host a lead by scanning herdr for tabs the operator labelled by convention
* (CB-531), and hands {@link dev.ltms.bridged.auth.CallerResolver} the resulting
* (CB-531), and hands {@link dev.ltms.fleet.auth.CallerResolver} the resulting
* {@code terminal_id → lead name} map.
*
* <p><strong>Why scan at all.</strong> A lead is never spawned — a human opens a tab and starts an
@@ -39,18 +39,18 @@ import java.util.function.Supplier;
* <li>Worker spaces are excluded wholesale ({@code excludedWorkspaceLabels}), so a worker cannot
* become a lead by being placed — as a split, say — inside a matching tab.</li>
* <li>A worker cannot rename a tab: {@code tab.rename} is reachable only through
* {@link WorkspaceControl}, which no {@code bridge_*} tool exposes. The label is writable by
* {@link WorkspaceControl}, which no {@code fleet_*} tool exposes. The label is writable by
* the human at the terminal and by nobody the bridge is defending against.</li>
* <li>The label is a <em>name</em>, not a capability. What a pane may do is decided by
* {@code Authz} against the role {@code CallerResolver} returns; a tab that calls itself a
* lead still cannot act as one unless the daemon's own registry agrees.</li>
* </ol>
*
* <p><strong>CB-558 — bridged now writes lead labels too.</strong> This class used to be able to say
* that bridged never renames a lead tab, so the label was always the human's own writing and there
* <p><strong>CB-558 — fleetd now writes lead labels too.</strong> This class used to be able to say
* that fleetd never renames a lead tab, so the label was always the human's own writing and there
* was no round-trip from the daemon's rename back into its next decision.
* {@code dev.ltms.bridged.lead.LeadLauncher} ends that: an auto-launched lead is labelled by the
* daemon and found again by this scan. The trust direction above is unaffected — bridged writing a
* {@code dev.ltms.fleet.lead.LeadLauncher} ends that: an auto-launched lead is labelled by the
* daemon and found again by this scan. The trust direction above is unaffected — fleetd writing a
* name for a lead it just started is not a pane promoting itself — but <em>staleness</em> becomes
* real: a label left behind by a session that has since died would read as a live lead forever.
* This scanner does not solve that (its job is naming, and a stale name costs nothing here); the
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ import java.util.function.Supplier;
* ever make a decision that <em>removes</em> something based on this map, add the same check.
* The remaining hazard is an <em>operator</em> one — a worker {@code tabLabel} template that
* happens to start with the same prefix would promote the whole fleet — and that is refused at
* startup by {@code BridgedConfig.validateLeadTabPrefixes} rather than documented here.
* startup by {@code FleetConfig.validateLeadTabPrefixes} rather than documented here.
*
* <p><strong>Caching.</strong> {@link #get()} is on the request path (every resolve), so the scan
* is TTL-cached and a stale-but-valid map is preferred to a herdr round-trip. A failed scan keeps
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.OptionalLong;
import java.util.Set;
/**
* Resolves which herdr pane a process belongs to — the herdr half of connection-based MCP
* identity (CB-105). Given the PID that opened an MCP connection, {@link #terminalForPid} finds
* the agent pane whose process tree contains it, so {@code fleetd} can tell <em>which worker</em>
* is calling without the worker sending anything spoofable.
*
* <p>herdr owns the PID→pane truth: {@code pane.process_info} reports each pane's {@code shell_pid}
* and foreground process PIDs. A pid that is neither of those directly — e.g. a grandchild a
* worker spawned, such as a {@code python3} or {@code curl} helper that opens its own MCP
* connection — is resolved by walking its ancestry (via {@link ParentResolver}) up to the root and
* matching any ancestor against a pane's {@code shell_pid} or foreground pids (CB-161). Without
* this walk such a pid matches no pane, and the caller falls through to loopback-trust and is
* resolved as the primary — a worker→primary privilege escalation.
*
* <p>This scans agent panes; a spawn-time {@code pid→terminal} cache is the obvious optimization
* once wired into {@code ClaudeCodeLauncher}.
*
* <p>CB-185 split the fleet across two herdr daemons — lead operations on one, members on the
* other ({@code memberHerdrSocket}). A caller's pane can live on <em>either</em> daemon (a lead's
* MCP connection resolves against the lead daemon; a member's against the member daemon), so this
* must be able to search more than one client. {@link #PaneLocator(HerdrClient, HerdrClient)}
* searches the lead client first, then the member client, and collapses to a single scan when the
* two are the same object (the historical single-daemon deployment). The caller's ancestor set is
* computed once per {@link #terminalForPid} call and reused across every client searched — it
* does not depend on which daemon a pane happens to live on.
*/
public final class PaneLocator {
/**
* Bound on how many ancestor generations {@link #ancestorsOf} walks. This runs on every MCP
* call, so a cycle or a pathologically deep process tree must not hang identity resolution;
* 32 generations is far more than any real worker→helper process tree needs.
*/
private static final int MAX_ANCESTRY_DEPTH = 32;
private final List<HerdrClient> herdrs;
private final ParentResolver parentResolver;
/** Search only this client — the single-daemon deployment. */
public PaneLocator(HerdrClient herdr) {
this(herdr, ParentResolver.PROCESS_HANDLE);
}
/** Search only this client, resolving ancestry through {@code parentResolver} — for tests. */
public PaneLocator(HerdrClient herdr, ParentResolver parentResolver) {
this.herdrs = List.of(herdr);
this.parentResolver = parentResolver;
}
/**
* Search {@code lead} first, then {@code member} — the two-daemon deployment (CB-185). When
* the caller passes the same client for both (no {@code memberHerdrSocket} configured), this
* collapses to one client and one scan, exactly {@link #PaneLocator(HerdrClient)}'s behaviour.
*/
public PaneLocator(HerdrClient lead, HerdrClient member) {
this(lead, member, ParentResolver.PROCESS_HANDLE);
}
/** Two-daemon deployment, resolving ancestry through {@code parentResolver} — for tests. */
public PaneLocator(HerdrClient lead, HerdrClient member, ParentResolver parentResolver) {
this.herdrs = lead == member ? List.of(lead) : List.of(lead, member);
this.parentResolver = parentResolver;
}
/**
* The {@code terminal_id} of the agent pane whose process tree contains {@code pid}, or
* {@code null} if no agent pane on any searched daemon owns it (e.g. the caller is the
* primary, or off-host).
*/
public String terminalForPid(long pid) {
if (pid <= 0) {
return null;
}
Set<Long> ancestry = ancestorsOf(pid);
for (HerdrClient herdr : herdrs) {
String terminal = terminalForPid(herdr, ancestry);
if (terminal != null) {
return terminal;
}
}
return null;
}
/**
* {@code pid} itself plus its ancestor chain, walked through {@link #parentResolver} up to
* {@link #MAX_ANCESTRY_DEPTH} generations or pid 1, whichever comes first. A vanished ancestor
* ({@link ParentResolver#parentOf} returning empty) ends the walk without error — it just means
* the chain is shorter than the bound. A cycle in a fake resolver is caught by the "already
* seen" check and also ends the walk, so this can never loop.
*/
private Set<Long> ancestorsOf(long pid) {
Set<Long> ancestry = new LinkedHashSet<>();
long current = pid;
for (int depth = 0; depth < MAX_ANCESTRY_DEPTH; depth++) {
if (current <= 0 || !ancestry.add(current)) {
break; // vanished/invalid pid, or a cycle back to a pid already recorded
}
if (current == 1) {
break; // reached the root of the process tree
}
OptionalLong parent = parentResolver.parentOf(current);
if (parent.isEmpty()) {
break; // vanished ancestor — not an error, just the end of the chain
}
current = parent.getAsLong();
}
return ancestry;
}
private static String terminalForPid(HerdrClient herdr, Set<Long> ancestry) {
for (JsonNode pane : herdr.call("pane.list", Map.of()).path("panes")) {
String paneId = pane.path("pane_id").asText(null);
if (paneId != null && paneOwnsAnyOf(herdr, paneId, ancestry)) {
return pane.path("terminal_id").asText(null);
}
}
return null;
}
private static boolean paneOwnsAnyOf(HerdrClient herdr, String paneId, Set<Long> ancestry) {
JsonNode info;
try {
info = herdr.call("pane.process_info", Map.of("pane_id", paneId)).path("process_info");
} catch (HerdrException e) {
return false; // pane vanished mid-scan — just skip it
}
if (ancestry.contains(info.path("shell_pid").asLong(-1))) {
return true;
}
for (JsonNode p : info.path("foreground_processes")) {
if (ancestry.contains(p.path("pid").asLong(-1))) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import java.util.OptionalLong;
/**
* Resolves a pid's parent pid — the seam {@link PaneLocator} walks a process's ancestry through,
* so its tests can drive the walk from a fake pid→parent map instead of spawning real processes.
*
* <p>{@link #PROCESS_HANDLE} is the production implementation, backed by {@link ProcessHandle}.
*/
public interface ParentResolver {
/** The parent pid of {@code pid}, or empty if {@code pid} is gone or has no known parent. */
OptionalLong parentOf(long pid);
/** Production resolver: asks the JVM's {@link ProcessHandle} view of the OS process tree. */
ParentResolver PROCESS_HANDLE = pid -> ProcessHandle.of(pid)
.flatMap(ProcessHandle::parent)
.map(parent -> OptionalLong.of(parent.pid()))
.orElse(OptionalLong.empty());
}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.herdr;
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.herdr;
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;

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