MessageServicePollUsageTest's messages.poll( receiver anchor only
covers a MessageService reached through a variable, field, or
parameter named "messages". Adds a second assertion in the same
class that every such declaration under src/main/java uses that
name, with its own file-walk and declaration-count controls, so a
future declaration under a different name turns this check red
instead of leaving the original scan silently blind to it.
Also tightens the Authz.permits(Principal, Action, String) javadoc
sentence to read as a plain contract statement.
Adds a source-scrape test over src/main/java that fails if any caller
reaches the fail-open single-argument poll(String) overload instead of
poll(String, String). The scan anchors on the "messages.poll(" receiver
to avoid matching java.util.Queue.poll(), and balances parentheses to
avoid being fooled by a two-argument call whose first argument contains
nested parens.
Also documents Authz.permits(Principal, Action, String) as a test
convenience whose default classifier denies every collaborator.
Three parts. GET /tasks/{ticket} passed no caller, so it used the overload that skips the ownership
check and any worker could read any ticket; it now passes the caller resolved from the same CALLER
attribute the authorization gate reads. The wait:false send path recorded no creator terminal, so a
REST-created ticket matched no terminal-bearing caller and its own creator was refused; it now
records one. Both handlers gained a scrape guard with its own control assertion.
Resolved one conflict in FleetMcpAuthzTest by keeping both sides: PR #717 and this branch each
appended tests at the same point. The test count is the check on that resolution — 2014 + 3 + 1 =
2018, so no test was dropped.
Verified in a throwaway worktree off main: Tests run: 2018, Failures: 0, BUILD SUCCESS. Three
mutations, each confirmed live with mvn -o compile before the suite ran. FleetMcp:527 is the one
that survived before this work and now kills theFleetPollHandlerActuallyThreadsCallerTerminalIntoPoll.
FleetApp:698 kills the new creator test. FleetApp:899 kills three, including the behavioural test.
Every file restored byte-identical.
A worker now gets neither array, and the key is absent rather than present-and-empty. leads stays
visible to the primary, an architect and a collaborator; members only to the primary and an
architect. That split follows the rule the collaborators array already states: you may list what
you could address. A collaborator may send to a lead, and leads is the only place the bridge gives
it that address, so hiding it would have left a shipped grant unusable.
Verified in a throwaway worktree off main: Tests run: 2014, Failures: 0, BUILD SUCCESS, against a
main baseline of 2008 that I measured myself. Dropping the collaborator clause from leadsVisibleTo
compiled green and then killed exactly two tests, the truth-table row and the behavioural test.
sendMessage's wait:false branch now records the resolved caller's own
terminal as the ticket's creatorTerminal, the same way taskStatus already
resolves its caller, so a REST-created ticket's own creator can still poll
it under the ownership check that now gates GET /tasks/{ticket}.
A collaborator may SEND to a lead, and fleet_list's leads array is the
only place this tool gives it a lead's sessionId -- its own
fleet_whoami carries no lead address. leadsVisibleTo now returns true
for caller.isCollaborator() as well as primary and architect, matching
the existing rule for the sibling collaborators array (every role that
may SEND to a named peer). membersVisibleTo is unchanged: a
collaborator may never SEND to a spawned member.
Updated the truth-table tests for both predicates, added a behavioural
test proving a collaborator's fleet_list output contains leads and not
members, and updated fleet_list's tool description.
The block is the instruction surface this repo ships, so a merged change that makes it false is an
incomplete change. Two had gone stale:
- the lead table said fleet_list does not report collaborators. #709 made it report them, visible
to the primary, an architect and another collaborator, never a worker.
- the collaborator section justified the ticket refusal by saying ticket ids are a plain counter
with no owner check. #712 added that owner check, so the stated reason no longer held. The role
gate is what refuses a collaborator; the recorded creator terminal is the second line.
wiki/7-Use-Cases.md carries the same edit and was pushed to its own remote, verified by ref. The
sync check prints True.
Omit the leads and members keys entirely (never an empty array) from
fleet_list's result for a worker, matching the existing
coordinatorVisibleTo/collaboratorsVisibleTo pattern: two new named
predicates (leadsVisibleTo, membersVisibleTo) are consulted before
assembling either array, so a worker holding only READ can no longer
read every session on the daemon through this tool. Primary and
architect callers are unaffected.
GET /tasks/{ticket} now resolves the caller the same way allow(...) does and
threads that terminal into MessageService.poll(ticket, callerTerminal) instead
of the no-check overload, so a worker can no longer read a ticket a different
session created over REST. Adds a source-scrape guard (with its own control
assertion) for both the fleet_poll MCP handler and this REST route, plus a
behavioural test driving GET /tasks/{ticket} with three differently-resolved
callers against one shared MessageService.
The roster is consulted ahead of every tab map, so a live registered member
is no longer read back as a lead. Both refusals still matter, for the narrower
case where the pane is alive and the roster holds no entry for it.
Behaviour unchanged. Verified in a throwaway worktree, not piped:
Tests run: 2008, FleetConfigTest 170, BUILD SUCCESS.
It returned architectTerminals, so its name contradicted its contents and
collided with fleet_list's members array. No production caller.
Verified in a throwaway worktree, not piped: Tests run: 2008, BUILD SUCCESS.
Closes the MCP door only. The REST door (GET /tasks/{ticket}) still calls the
no-check poll overload, so #705 stays open.
Verified in a throwaway worktree, not piped: Tests run: 2008, BUILD SUCCESS.
Both refusals said a member landing in a lead's or collaborator's
labelled tab would be read back as that identity. CallerResolver
consults the spawned-member roster ahead of every tab map, so a live
registered member is never misread this way. State the real condition
instead: the hazard applies only while the pane is alive and carries
no entry in the spawned-member roster.
A ticket id is a plain sequential counter, so any session holding
TASK_READ could walk task-1, task-2, ... and read another session's
delegation reply. sendAsync now records the creating caller's terminal
on the Task, and poll refuses a caller whose terminal differs from it.
A caller with no terminal (the unnamed primary) is still allowed
through regardless, since it never carries a herdr pane to compare.
A collaborator could find and message a lead, but a lead had nowhere to read a
collaborator's sessionId, so the channel only worked once the collaborator
spoke first. fleet_list now carries a collaborators array, and
CallerResolver.collaborators() has its first caller outside the resolver.
Visible to the primary, an architect and a collaborator; absent for a worker.
The rule is that the roles which may see a collaborator row are the roles that
can act on it, and a worker cannot send to a collaborator at all. Narrowed in
the payload the way coordinatorVisibleTo already does it, because fleet_list is
gated on READ and a worker holds READ.
Each row carries the registry name and the sessionId only. A collaborator is
never spawned and has no profile, so a lead row's context and seat fields have
no meaning for it.
mvn clean install: exit 0, BUILD SUCCESS, Tests run: 2005, Failures: 0.
Nothing yet pins the handler to collaboratorsVisibleTo, unlike the coordinator
flag, so a literal passed there would regress silently. Tracked in #710.
Threads CallerResolver#collaborators() into fleet_list's canonical listFleet
overload and adds a collaborators array (name, sessionId), visible only to
the primary, an architect, and a collaborator -- the same roles Authz grants
SEND to a named peer -- never a worker. Gives CallerResolver#collaborators()
its first real caller outside the resolver itself.
The example file said two things stop the tab-name convention from becoming a
way to claim leadership, and named workspace exclusion as the first. Production
builds the scanner with an empty excludedWorkspaceLabels, so that defence does
not exist. It now names the two that do: the startup refusal of a colliding
tabPrefix/tabLabel, and CallerResolver asking the live spawned-member roster
before any tab map.
It also said a lead's workspace default is "leads" and must not be a member
workspace. The default is "fleet", the same space the members use, so that
advice was against the shipped shape.
Adds the test nobody wrote: a lead is still discovered when its workspace is
the member workspace, with an empty exclusion set. Corrects a test javadoc that
called itself the guard that matters while covering a parameter production never
passes.
mvn clean install: exit 0, BUILD SUCCESS, Tests run: 2000, Failures: 0.
Two follow-ups to #669, verified together in one throwaway worktree.
PR #707 (f820737): ConfigRef reports that a fleet.collaborators change needs a
restart. The map is read once at startup and a reload does not rebuild it, so
before this an operator saw a clean reload and no live effect.
PR #706 (20fc42b): deliverableTo opens for a collaborator. A collaborator is
never in MemberPresence and never found by the lead scan, so every send to one
was authorized, then held on the injector gate for ~60s and dropped without a
keystroke reaching the pane.
mvn clean install on the merged tree: exit 0, BUILD SUCCESS, Tests run: 1999,
Failures: 0, Errors: 0. ConfigRefTest 32, FleetDeliverabilityTest 9.
A collaborator's terminal was authorized at Authz but never deliverable: it
is never enrolled in MemberPresence and never discovered by the lead scan,
so a send to a collaborator sat on the injector's readiness gate for
~60s and failed, never typed into the pane. deliverableTo now takes a
third collaborators supplier, read through on each call like the lead
supplier, and FleetdAssembly wires the existing collaboratorTerminals
supplier into it.
The comment above the collaborators: example said the block 'is parsed and
validated today; nothing yet recognises or addresses the tab it names'. That
was true when Unit B landed the config shape. Units C, D and E have since
merged and deployed, so the tab is recognised, the role is authorized, and
the pane routes to the lead herdr daemon.
This is the worst place for that sentence to go stale: it sits in the file an
operator copies to turn the feature on, and it tells them the block does
nothing. Replaced with what the role may and may not do, taken from the rows
in auth/Authz.java rather than from the wiki, plus the #703 limit that a lead
cannot discover a collaborator.
FleetConfigTest (which loads this file) green at 170 tests.
A configured collaborator's terminal now routes to the lead herdr daemon
rather than the member one. FleetdAssembly ORs a second terminal map into
the predicate it hands HerdrRouter, and the predicate's field is renamed
isLead -> routeToLead so its name matches the widened contract.
Verified in the lead's own throwaway worktree: mvn clean install green at
1992 tests, 0 failures (174 surefire report files, fresh worktree). The
fix rests on one test, so I reproduced the mutation myself rather than
taking the worker's word: dropping the collaborator clause from the
predicate turns FleetdAssemblyCollaboratorHerdrRoutingTest red at runtime
with two distinct AgentControl identities, while HerdrRouterTest's 4 tests
stay green. That confirms both the kill and that the two-distinct-fakes
setup is actually discriminating.
Also checked by hand: both terminal maps come from LeadTabScanner's one
byKind helper and are keyed terminal_id -> name, so containsKey(target) is
correct for both; no agentsFor call runs between router construction and
the ref being set, so the publication window is harmless and matches the
one leadsRef already had.
One reviewer fanned out against the diff, briefed from the diff rather
than the implementer's rationale. It reported no issue.
HerdrRouter.agentsFor picked the member daemon for any terminal the lead
predicate did not recognize, so a configured collaborator's pane (opened
by a person, exactly like a lead's) was routed to the member herdr
daemon instead of the lead one.
FleetdAssembly now combines the leads map and the collaborator-terminals
map into the predicate it hands HerdrRouter. HerdrRouter's isLead field
and constructor parameter are renamed to routeToLead, with its javadoc
naming the real contract: true for any terminal whose pane lives in the
lead daemon, lead or collaborator.
The block is the instruction surface this repo ships, and Unit D made
four of its statements false. A session can now resolve as
collaborator, read "Which role am I?", and find no section telling it
what it may do.
Each claim below was read from the merged tree at b5bc5d4.
- fleet_whoami returns four roles, not three. FleetMcp.whoami returns
before the lead branch, so a collaborator gets its registry name
and its own sessionId, and no leader key.
- The fallback ladder said only that it cannot separate a worker from
an architect. It also fires for no collaborator at all: every rung
detects a spawned member, and nothing launched a collaborator. It
therefore falls to "act as a worker", which is the safe direction
but leaves it unable to learn what it is without asking.
- Invariant 3 said send is lead or architect. Authz SEND also allows
a collaborator when the target passes knownLeadOrCollaborator, so
it may reach a lead or another collaborator and no spawned member.
- The invariants heading said "both roles"; there are now four.
New Collaborator section, placed after the member turn contract because
a collaborator must be told that contract is not its own. It owes no
fleet_reply: nothing delegates to it. Its two surprising limits are
written down rather than left to be discovered, and both were measured
in Authz: it cannot reach a worker, and it cannot read a ticket,
because TASK_READ is withheld where READ is not.
The intent table gains a row for messaging a collaborator, and that row
states the gap instead of implying discovery works: fleet_list emits
only "leads" and "members", and CallerResolver.collaborators() has no
caller outside the resolver, so a lead cannot find a collaborator
unless the collaborator tells it its sessionId.
The wiki template is byte-identical again, verified with the project's
own check in the main clone, which printed False before the propagation
and True after.
The new spawned-member roster step returned Principal.architect from the roster's
own MemberRole.ARCHITECT alone, never reconfirming against memberSlotRoles. A slot
revoked after the bind kept granting ARCHITECT to the already-bound session,
regressing fleetd #424's "config governs what a bound slot still grants" half. The
roster now only answers that the pane is a live spawned member; a confirmed live
slot role still decides whether that grants ARCHITECT, falling through to WORKER
otherwise — mirroring the existing architect-slot step a few lines below.
Also corrects LeadTabScanner.buildTabIndex's javadoc: a colliding lead/collaborator
key resolves to the lead because the lead entry is put last (overwriting), not
because it is put first.
CallerResolver.resolve() now checks the spawned-member roster first, ahead
of every tab map, so a live member's own role wins over a lead or
collaborator tab naming the same terminal (closes#661 at the resolver
level). Adds collaborator resolution (Role.COLLABORATOR) and a real
knownLeadOrCollaborator() classifier, wired into both FleetMcp.denyFor and
FleetApp.allow in place of the inert NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR stand-in.
LeadTabScanner is generalized to match lead and collaborator tabs in one
pass, keeping every existing liveness/caching/grace-scan property for both
kinds. FleetdAssembly wires the collaborator tab map and a roster-backed
spawned-member lookup; a collaborator-only fleet (no leaders configured)
falls back to a 10s scan interval, matching FleetConfig.Leader's own default.
Adds Role.COLLABORATOR, Principal.collaborator(), and the Authz.permits grant:
READ/METRICS open, REPLY/ASK via ownership, SEND limited to a configured lead
or collaborator via a new classifier parameter, everything else denied.
isSpawnedMember() stays WORKER || ARCHITECT. fleet_whoami reports role and
collaborator name with no leader key.
Per a same-day ticket correction, the existing 3-argument Authz.permits is
kept (fail-closed default via the new NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR
classifier) rather than deleted, so the 47 pre-existing call sites in
AuthzTest/CallerResolverTest are untouched; both production gates
(FleetMcp#denyFor, FleetApp#allow via the new permitsFor seam) call the
4-argument form explicitly with the shared constant.
Mutation-verified: removing the classifier conjunct from the SEND arm kills
exactly 3 tests (AuthzTest, FleetMcpAuthzTest, FleetAppAuthTest), one per
gate, no cascade.
Full mvn clean install at this commit: 1974 tests, 0 failures (baseline at
f0ff252 was 1964; +10 are the new collaborator-matrix tests). Independently
counted from target/surefire-reports/*.xml after rm -rf: 173 report files,
aggregate tests=1974 failures=0 errors=0.
Adds a test driving validateLeadTabPrefixes()'s fleet-wide
fleet.tabLabel branch directly against a collaborator tab, with no
profile override involved. Every existing collaborator test exercised
only the profile-override branch below it, leaving the fleet-wide
branch without a pinning test.
The duplicate-collaborator test's javadoc narrated the before/after and a
timestamp; replaced with the present-tense behaviour it protects, per the
project's code-comment rule.
The Collaborator record javadoc and fleetd.example.yaml both claimed the
daemon "learns to address" a collaborator tab. Nothing does yet — that is
Units C-E. Dropped the claim from the record's contract and the example
now says the block is parsed and validated today, nothing more.
Also drops a confidence marker and a cross-class pointer from the
Collaborator record javadoc. No logic, assertion, or file outside this
PR's existing three changed.
FLEET_POOL_KEYS was missing "collaborators", so a duplicated
fleet.collaborators.<name> key took the skipValue branch in
rejectDuplicateSlotsInPools and silently collapsed last-wins, unlike
the other five pools. Measured: before this change, a test loading a
config with a duplicated collaborator name observed no exception;
after, it fails exactly like the existing architect-pool case.
Also updates the javadoc's "five pools" count to six.
Adds fleet.collaborators.<name>.tab (a Collaborator record with only a tab
field — no profile, no instances, no kind; never auto-launched) and widens
the two startup refusals that stop it being a privilege hole:
- validatePanePlacementAgainstLeadTabs() now fires on either a lead tab or
a collaborator tab, and no longer early-returns when fleet.leaders is
empty but fleet.collaborators is not.
- validateLeadTabPrefixes() now also refuses a tabLabel template able to
render as a collaborator tab, two collaborators sharing one exact tab,
and a collaborator tab equal to a lead tab (case-insensitively).
validateMembers() refuses a collaborator with no (or blank) tab, next to
the existing leader-must-name-a-tab check.
Does not touch Authz, CallerResolver, LeadTabScanner, MemberRole or
FleetMcp — those are later units per the ticket's plan.
redact()'s final fallthrough still used the unbounded [^@]* class #638
removed from the verdict-line masker, so a diff line with a URL that has
no userinfo plus a later @ elsewhere had its text between them silently
deleted. Share one bounded implementation, mask_url_userinfo(), between
redact() and mask_verdict_userinfo() so the bound lives in one place.
A unit test on the extracted helper proves the helper, not the call
site in sendMessage. allow() logs an AuditLog.allowed() entry for
every granted non-READ/METRICS/TASK_READ action, so a granted turnId
request must log both SEND and ANSWER, and a granted plain request
must log SEND alone. Verified this goes red when the call site is
deleted from sendMessage, and restores to a clean diff.
#693: add a FleetConfigTest case for two fleet.leaders tabs differing only
in case — mutating equalsIgnoreCase to equals left this uncaught before.
#676: rename theSweepMechanismIsGenericNotHardcodedToFleetConfigsSixNames
to theSweepRunsEveryValidateMethodOnAnUnrelatedClass, since there are
eight validators now, not six, and the count had drifted into the name
and its class-javadoc {@link}.
Authorize twice: the coarse SEND grant first, with no body read, then
parse the body, then check ANSWER too when turnId is present. Restores
the pre-#687 ordering (no attacker-controlled body parse before the
gate) while keeping the SEND/ANSWER split #687 introduced.
validateLeadTabPrefixes() compared each lead's tab against the member
tabLabel template, but never against another lead's tab. Two leads
configured with the same exact tab loaded cleanly, even though exact
tab is the only thing lead identity is matched on, so only one of them
could ever be found.
Add an independent pass, case-insensitive, that refuses when two
fleet.leaders entries share one exact tab, with its own exception so
the message stays accurate for this relation.
Decided not to also refuse a lead's tab starting with a sibling's
tabPrefix: tabPrefix plays no role in identity resolution (only the
exact tab does), and the default tabPrefix is "lead:", the same
string used as the conventional lead tab prefix throughout this
codebase's own fixtures (e.g. "lead: opus" / "lead: sol"). Refusing
that case would reject the standard multi-lead setup with no matching
identity hazard.
mask_verdict_userinfo's character class [^@]* crossed a '/' or a space, so a
verdict line with a URI that has no userinfo plus a later @ (e.g. an email
address in diagnostic prose) had everything between them destroyed. Restrict
the class to [^@/[:space:]]* so the match stops at the end of the URI.
Adds the uncovered-direction test: a URI with no userinfo plus a later @ in
the same line must pass through byte for byte. Also drops the design-rationale
sentence from the helper's comment (now in the PR description).
Dai Ha