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Author SHA1 Message Date
Dai Ha fe46311266 CB-604: reject an unrecognized profile kind at config load
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 53s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
2026-08-16 18:37:21 +02:00
Dai Ha 27bbd11f06 Merge CB-584: carry the agent session id on a failed ticket's detail
CI / contract (push) Successful in 47s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m23s
Most of issue #65 was already shipped in 5d5b3bd - MemberSession
records agentSessionId, PeerHandle.agentSessionId() has no default, the
roster exposes it, and bridge_spawn accepts sessionName and
resumeSessionId. That commit left one item for follow-up: carrying the
id on ReleaseDetail.

This does that item. CB-578 stage C already lets a lead re-dispatch onto
the same worktree after a failure; without the session id that is a cold
start. With it, the work and the thread both survive.

Also updates the bridge_spawn and bridge_list rows in the CLAUDE.md
intent table, which the earlier commit missed.

Verified here: trial merge onto main builds 830 tests BUILD SUCCESS,
unpiped. Confirmed against the code that items 1-4 really were already
on main, so the scope-down is correct rather than work skipped.

Closes #65
2026-08-16 18:29:24 +02:00
Dai Ha 48d7841fbf CB-589: document that weighted placement is not cheapest-first
CI / contract (push) Successful in 50s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m43s
The weight ratio does not express a preference order. weighted spreads
spawns across every profile with a free slot, so paid spawns happen
while the free box is idle - and a profile at maxLoad freezes its score,
so it can lose the next pick after a slot frees.

The real fix is a cost-first policy (CB-589). This documents the
workaround and its trap next to the key, because bridged.yaml is
gitignored: a fresh host starts without the workaround and quietly pays,
with nothing to tell the operator why.

Comments only. BridgedConfigTest: 85 tests, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-08-16 18:27:19 +02:00
Dai Ha cc1df11f69 CB-584: carry agentSessionId on a failed ticket's ReleaseDetail
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m6s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m42s
Closes the one piece issue #65 deliberately left out of 5d5b3bd: a
released member's agentSessionId now rides alongside worktree, branch
and snapshotRef on ReleaseDetail, and Bridged's onRelease handler
names it in the abandon reason, so a lead can resume the member's
conversation instead of only re-dispatching a fresh one onto the same
files.

Also updates the CLAUDE.md bridge_spawn/bridge_list table row, which
5d5b3bd shipped the sessionName/resumeSessionId/agentSessionId surface
for but never updated.
2026-08-16 18:25:24 +02:00
Dai Ha fdfd4ac491 Merge CB-600: make installing the launchd agent safe
CI / contract (push) Successful in 51s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m42s
Three gaps that only bite once the agent is loaded, plus one wrong
comment.

The script computed its log path from its own location while the plist
hard-codes one. Run from a different checkout, every post-restart check
would read the wrong file and report a clean restart while the daemon
crash-looped. It now compares the two and fails, not warns.

A failed 'launchctl load' after a successful 'unload -w' left the agent
stopped AND persistently disabled - worse than before the redeploy. It
now retries once, then dies naming the exact recovery command.

The plist now says plainly that ThrottleInterval paces restarts but does
not bound them, and what actually stops the loop.

Verified here: ran the script with --check from the merged tree and it
behaves exactly as before, so the unsupervised path - my only restart
route - is intact. Exercised the log-path check against match, mismatch
and missing-plist fixtures using a truncated copy with no mutating code
in it: ok/1/1. 829 tests BUILD SUCCESS.

Closes #91
2026-08-16 18:17:11 +02:00
Dai Ha d5dd5639ae Merge CB-602: guard against a config key that never reaches the example
bridged.yaml is gitignored, so bridged.example.yaml is the only
committed description of the config schema. Two tests already covered
example -> code; nothing covered code -> example, so a brand-new key
could ship undocumented and no test would notice.

A new test compares BridgedConfig.KNOWN_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS against the
example scanned as TEXT, so a key documented only as a comment counts as
documented. That is what makes the guard correct rather than annoying:
most of the example is commented on purpose.

Verified here: added an undocumented key and watched the test fail with
an actionable message naming it; then documented that key as a comment
only and watched it pass. Probe reverted, tree clean.

Closes #96
2026-08-16 18:17:11 +02:00
Dai Ha 7a120b3256 Merge CB-598: per-item reminder counts so backoff-window work is never orphaned
CI / contract (push) Successful in 45s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m39s
The reminder count was one counter per lead per source, carried forward
across ticks. A counter carried forward has no memory of which item it
counted, so work arriving during the backoff window inherited an
already-capped count and was never named in a nudge.

tick() now recomputes each source's count fresh from the minimum count
among the items actually pending, tracked per item. A fresh item keeps
its source eligible; an older capped item still rides along in the text
without spending more budget. decide() is unchanged.

Verified here: read the diff; the bumped set is exactly the set named in
the nudge, and the empty early-return skips the bump. Trial merge onto
main builds 826 tests BUILD SUCCESS, unpiped.

Closes #87
2026-08-16 18:13:29 +02:00
Dai Ha 863d477966 CB-603: make FakeHerdr.calls thread-safe
Background loops call the fake from their own scheduler threads while a
test polls called() from the test thread. The list was a plain
ArrayList, so a nudge landing mid-stream threw
ConcurrentModificationException out of called().

It surfaced while I was verifying CB-598, which nudges more often, but
the race is on main today and is unrelated to that change.

824 tests, BUILD SUCCESS.
2026-08-16 18:12:23 +02:00
Dai Ha cec48832be CB-600: make it safe to install the launchd agent
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 1m21s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m26s
- redeploy-bridged.sh now refuses (not warns) a supervised restart when
  its computed log path disagrees with the loaded plist's StandardOutPath
  — otherwise every post-restart check reads the wrong file and can
  report a clean restart while the daemon crash-loops. The check is a
  pure, testable function; the script gained a source-for-test guard so
  it can be exercised without installing the agent or touching launchd.
- a failed 'launchctl load' after a successful 'unload' now retries once
  and, on ultimate failure, tells the operator the agent is stopped AND
  disabled plus the exact recovery command, instead of leaving that
  silently worse than the pre-redeploy state.
- the plist documents honestly that the crash loop launchd retries is
  unbounded (ThrottleInterval only paces it), and what actually stops it.
- fixed the requiredSecretEnvVars javadoc: the auth.tokenEnv startup
  throw is ~370 lines below its call site, not a few lines above it, and
  only fires in auth.mode: token.
2026-08-16 18:08:58 +02:00
Dai Ha a36b7ccd7c Merge CB-601: make the recovery-race test deterministic
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m5s
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m7s
The test asserted one of two interleavings that are both correct, and
steered toward it with a 5 ms Thread.sleep. Under load the other
interleaving happened and main went red on a correct implementation.

The head start is now a latch counted down from inside the sweep's
guarded loop, so the ordering is guaranteed, not likely. Test file only;
the production guard is unchanged.

Verified here: 822 tests BUILD SUCCESS; 10/10 passes while a full clean
install ran in parallel; 5/5 failures with the guard removed, so the test
still catches the bug it exists for.

Closes #95
2026-08-16 18:08:18 +02:00
Dai Ha 32bf324a1e CB-602: guard against a config key that never reaches the example
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 49s
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 1m24s
BridgedConfig.KNOWN_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS is now package-private so a test can assert
every key the parser accepts appears in bridged.example.yaml — live or
commented-out, since the file is gitignored and the example is the only
committed description of the config schema. The existing tests only checked
the example->code direction; this adds code->example.
2026-08-16 18:06:36 +02:00
Dai Ha 16de9df000 CB-601: make the recovery-race test's head start deterministic, not a sleep
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m8s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m9s
2026-08-16 18:02:57 +02:00
ltms 65c9deb4d1 Merge CB-597: correct bridged.example.yaml, including two knobs that do nothing
CI / contract (push) Successful in 42s
CI / build (push) Successful in 2m2s
My premise for this ticket was wrong and the worker corrected it. I reported five whole sections missing from the example; nothing was missing. My comparison script only counted uncommented lines, so every section documented as a commented-out example looked absent. Earlier tickets had each updated the example alongside their feature.

What it found instead is more useful than what I asked for — real inaccuracies, found by tracing each field through the parser and its consumers:

- `health.workingSuspectAfterSeconds` and `paneProbeIntervalSeconds` documented enforced minimums that do not exist. I checked: both names appear **only** in the `Health` record declaration and are read by nothing. Only `intervalSeconds` is clamped, and it is silently raised to 15 rather than rejected.
- `notifications.mode: webhook` only flips what `bridge_list` reports as `healthCoverage`. It sends no webhook — "webhook" appears in one `configured()` boolean and there is no delivery code in the repo.
- `lifecycle.clearAfterTurn` was undocumented, and is a no-op for any peer kind other than claude-code.
- The reload doc claimed the whole `fleet:` block is hot; `fleet.leaders` is built once at startup and is not rebuilt, so a change is silently accepted and does nothing until a restart.
- The `fleet.leaders` demotion consequence is now stated next to the block itself: an unmatched pane is silently an ordinary worker and every orchestration call it makes is refused, with no startup error.

Documenting a knob as dead is worth more than documenting it as working. Someone tuning `workingSuspectAfterSeconds` would otherwise have concluded their monitor was broken.

Comments only — no parsing or production code touched. Verified by the lead: parses cleanly under the project's own snakeyaml 1.30, top-level live keys `[bind, herdrSocket, profiles, placement, fleet, guard]`, the rest correctly commented examples. Both dead-knob claims verified by grep against `src/main` rather than taken on the worker's word.
2026-08-16 17:59:41 +02:00
ltms 28ae27b8e1 Merge CB-599: a capacity refusal now tells the caller why
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m19s
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m25s
`PlacementException extends IllegalStateException`, and neither spawn path caught that type, so it escaped to Javalin's default handler as a bare `500 Server Error` with a text/plain body — while every other failure on the same endpoint returned structured JSON. The reason existed and was good, but only in the daemon log.

I hit this live while orchestrating: asked for a member on a full profile, got a blank 500, guessed another profile, got a blank 500 again, and spent two round trips learning things the daemon already knew.

Both surfaces now catch it. REST returns 503 with `{"error":"no_capacity","detail":...}`; MCP returns the same reason in the `isError` shape it already uses for every other spawn failure. 503 is right because the request was valid and will likely succeed later — the caller did nothing wrong, so 400 would have been a lie.

The other throw sites all funnel through the same type, so quarantine cooldowns, weight-0 exclusion, and the all-at-cap / all-quarantined / all-unreachable messages now reach callers too. That last group matters most: those three distinguish "wait a moment" from "your backends are gone", and all three used to arrive as the identical blank 500.

Tests assert the caller can read the *reason*, not merely that the status changed — one per surface.

Verified by the lead: `mvn -f bridged/pom.xml clean install` unpiped, exit code captured — Tests run: 824, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0 — BUILD SUCCESS.

No exception message was reworded. This change delivers messages that were already written.
2026-08-16 17:54:44 +02:00
Dai Ha 81a0cf4710 CB-598: track reminder counts per pending item, not per lead per source
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m12s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
Work that arrived during the ~15s push_backoff_ms window between two
ticks landed in the pending map before the next tick's start-of-tick
snapshot, so a shared per-lead-per-source counter (carried forward via
scheduleNext(lead, count+1, ...)) already treated it as exhausted
backlog even though no nudge had ever named it. ReplyPushLoop.tick now
recomputes each source's reminder count fresh every tick as the
minimum nudge count among that source's currently pending items, so a
freshly-arrived item (count 0) keeps its source eligible regardless of
how depleted an older, still-undrained sibling's count is. decide()
itself is unchanged.
2026-08-16 17:49:21 +02:00
Dai Ha 8a837a2830 CB-599: surface a capacity refusal's reason instead of a bare 500
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 50s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m35s
PlacementException extends IllegalStateException, which neither BridgedApp
nor BridgeMcp's spawn catch blocks handled, so a maxLoad/quarantine/
all-exhausted refusal fell through to a blank 500 on REST and lost its
message on MCP. Catch it on both surfaces, ahead of the unrelated
IllegalArgumentException(unknown_profile) mapping, and return its message
structured: REST as {"error":"no_capacity","detail":...} with status 503,
MCP as an isError result prefixed "no capacity: ...".
2026-08-16 17:43:07 +02:00
Dai Ha 0a2b3a4a56 CB-597: fix inaccuracies the example config already had, none actually missing
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m7s
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 1m21s
Audited bridged.example.yaml against BridgedConfig's KNOWN_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS and
found every top-level key already documented (broker, health, lifecycle,
configReload, quarantineCooldownSeconds, fleet.leaders/architects/reviewers
included) — CB-573/CB-566/CB-559/CB-579/CB-527/528 each updated the example
alongside their feature. What was actually wrong:

- health.workingSuspectAfterSeconds/paneProbeIntervalSeconds claimed enforced
  minimums (300/60) that don't exist in code — only intervalSeconds is
  clamped (floor 15); the other two are parsed but never read anywhere.
- notifications.mode: webhook was undocumented as only flipping the
  healthCoverage label bridge_list reports — no webhook is ever sent.
- lifecycle.clearAfterTurn was missing entirely.
- the HOT bullet under configReload claimed the whole fleet: block reloads
  live, but ConfigRef's own javadoc carves out fleet.leaders as needing a
  restart with no deferred-list warning — added that exception.
- fleet.leaders' demotion consequence (unmatched tab -> silent WORKER
  demotion, no startup error) is now stated inline next to the block, not
  just implied by the multi-lead rationale higher up.
2026-08-16 17:37:28 +02:00
ltms 613ece92dc Merge CB-594: make supervision and a working fleet possible at the same time
CI / contract (push) Successful in 49s
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m45s
The launchd unit was a CHANGEME template that had never been installed, and it could not have worked if it were: launchd does not source a login shell, so the daemon would have started with no forge or gateway token, and the failure would only appear much later as workers unable to open a PR.

Four parts: a wrapper that execs one login shell in place so the job inherits the secret store; a startup report naming which required secret env vars resolved and which are MISSING, by name only, never a value; the plist filled in with this host's real verified paths; and `redeploy-bridged.sh` detecting the agent and switching stop/start to `launchctl unload -w` / `load -w`, falling back to the existing kill + nohup when it is not installed.

Verified by the lead. My own unpiped build of the branch: 813 tests, BUILD SUCCESS. Trial-merged onto current main (which had moved twice) and rebuilt: Tests run: 822, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0 — BUILD SUCCESS. All three host paths in the plist exist; no CHANGEME remains; the secret report leaks no values.

An independent reviewer, briefed only from the diff, verified the parts that matter today and said merge. It confirmed live that the unsupervised path is unchanged, that `launchctl list` exits 113 for an absent agent so the detection reads correctly, that the wrapper round-trips arguments containing spaces and quotes and stays a single exec chain, and that neither branch of the secret report can print a value.

Its two open findings only bite once the agent is actually loaded, which has not happened and is the operator's call. Filed as #91 — that must land before the agent is ever installed. The important one is that the script computes its log path from its own location while the plist hard-codes an absolute one; if they ever disagree, the post-restart ERROR check reads the wrong file and reports "ok" while the daemon crash-loops.

The agent is deliberately NOT installed by this merge. Nothing here changes how the daemon runs today.
2026-08-16 17:32:57 +02:00
ltms 8d4206c2b5 Merge CB-590: one nudge schedule per lead, with a reminder budget per source
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m7s
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m15s
Carries PR #84 (its head `78ca24d` is an ancestor of this one), so this single merge delivers both rounds.

CB-590 collapses the CB-307 reply schedule and the CB-588 ticket schedule into one per lead, which closes the double-injection race. The review round found that this also collapsed the two reminder caps into one shared budget — so a busy reply stream could exhaust the cap and a ticket arriving afterwards would never be nudged at all. That was a regression, not a pre-existing wart: before this PR the two sources had independent counters.

The follow-up keeps the single schedule and gives each source its own budget. `decide()` returns INJECT while either source has pending work under its own cap, and STOP only when neither does. `stopOrRestart` and its snapshot-diff race logic are untouched.

Verified by the lead: `mvn -f bridged/pom.xml clean install` unpiped, exit code captured — Tests run: 814, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0 — BUILD SUCCESS. `ReplyPushLoopTest`: 41 tests.

Known and deliberately out of scope: an item arriving during the 15s backoff is already inside the tick's "before" snapshot, so at-cap work can be abandoned rather than nudged once. That shape predates this PR in the ticket-only loop and is filed as #87 (CB-598).
2026-08-16 17:28:57 +02:00
ltms 03286a589b Merge CB-527/CB-528: bound AMQP prefetch, confirm publishes, and close the recovery race
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m4s
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m18s
Carries PR #83 (its head is an ancestor of this one), so this single merge delivers both rounds.

CB-527 bounds prefetch. CB-528 makes a publish wait for its broker confirm, so a failed publish is never reported as success, and correlates a `mandatory` Return back to the right publish.

The review round on #83 found one real race: `failPendingPublishesOnRecovery` swept the pending maps without holding `publishChannelLock`, so a publish issued on the already-recovered channel could be failed by the sweep — the exact inversion of what CB-528 exists to prevent, and undetectable by dedup because `MessageService.reply` mints a fresh msgId per call. Fixed by taking the same lock. `close()` now fails in-flight publishes promptly instead of letting them time out after 10s.

Verified by the lead, not taken on the worker's word:
- `mvn -f bridged/pom.xml clean install` unpiped: Tests run: 809, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0 — BUILD SUCCESS
- `mvn test -Pcontract -Dtest=AmqpReplyInboxContractTest` against a real broker: Tests run: 8 — BUILD SUCCESS

That second run mattered: #83's own new tests are contract-tagged, so the default suite and CI prove nothing about them.
2026-08-16 17:27:21 +02:00
Dai Ha c553d795d8 CB-528: close the recovery race in AmqpReplyInbox
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 44s
CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 1m20s
failPendingPublishesOnRecovery walked and cleared pendingBySeq/pendingByMsgId
without holding publishChannelLock, so a publish() that registered while the
sweep was still iterating could be failed even though it published on the
already-recovered channel — a successful publish reported as failed, and
since MessageService.reply mints a fresh msgId per retry, dedup can't catch
the resulting duplicate. Guard the sweep with publishChannelLock: publish()
only holds it for the seq/map-put/basicPublish, so the sweep can only ever
wait for an in-flight basicPublish to return, never a broker round trip.

Also make close() fail in-flight publishes immediately with a clear message
instead of leaving them to idle out the 10s confirm timeout, and record the
(currently unreachable) msgId-uniqueness assumption pendingByMsgId relies on.

AmqpReplyInboxRecoveryRaceTest drives the sweep and a real publish() against
each other directly (no live broker reconnect) using Proxy-backed fake AMQP
channels and a large in-flight backlog to make the race window observable;
confirmed it fails without the guard (reply "fresh" wrongly failed as
"connection recovered mid-publish") and passes with it.
2026-08-16 17:24:43 +02:00
Dai Ha 3ba6d6784c CB-594: make supervision and a working fleet possible at the same time
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 44s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m40s
Adds scripts/bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh so the launchd-run daemon still gets
WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN/AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN by execing through a login shell (launchd
never sources secrets.sh itself). bridged now logs at startup which required
token env vars (derived from each profile's tokenEnv/gitTokenEnv, not a
hand-written list) resolved or are MISSING, by name only. Fills in the real
paths in deploy/dev.ltms.bridged.plist for this host and points it at the
wrapper. scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh now detects a loaded launchd agent and
uses launchctl unload/load instead of a raw kill+nohup, because a bare
SIGTERM exits this JVM at 143 (measured) which KeepAlive.SuccessfulExit=false
reads as a crash and would race the script's own restart; --check reports
installed/loaded state and stays read-only.
2026-08-16 17:13:17 +02:00
Dai Ha 4fa6553db5 CB-527/CB-528: bound AMQP prefetch and confirm publishes before claiming durable
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m3s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m15s
CB-527: basicQos(prefetch) on the consume channel before basicConsume, configurable
via broker.prefetch (default 32), so an undrained inbox backlog stays on the broker
instead of growing the JVM heap without limit.

CB-528: publish moves to its own confirm-mode channel with mandatory=true and a
return listener, so an unroutable or unconfirmed reply now throws instead of
vanishing silently. The confirm callback checks the per-message returned flag
(set by the return listener, which the broker always fires before the matching
confirm) so an acked-but-returned publish is still reported as a failure. The ack
path stays on its own channel/lock and never waits on a publish confirm.
2026-08-16 16:55:40 +02:00
21 changed files with 1547 additions and 78 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ the merge — and merging on a reviewer's word is delegating it by proxy.
|---|---|
| Confirm your own role | `bridge_whoami` |
| See backends available | `bridge_profiles` |
| Start a member | `bridge_spawn{role?, profile?, cwd?, worktree?, ticket?}` → `sessionId` + `paneId` |
| See the fleet | `bridge_list` → `leads` (your peers) + `members` · one peer's state: `bridge_status{sessionId}` |
| Start a member | `bridge_spawn{role?, profile?, cwd?, worktree?, ticket?, sessionName?, resumeSessionId?}` → `sessionId` + `paneId` |
| See the fleet | `bridge_list` → `leads` (your peers) + `members` (each carries `agentSessionId` when its backend knows one) · one peer's state: `bridge_status{sessionId}` |
| Delegate (blocking) | `bridge_send{sessionId, content}` |
| Delegate (long task) | `bridge_send{sessionId, content, wait:false}` → ticket → `bridge_poll{ticket}` |
| Answer a member's `bridge_ask` | `bridge_send{turnId, content}` — **not** `sessionId` |
+61 -8
View File
@@ -88,15 +88,28 @@ bind:
# backoffMs: 60000
# quietNudgeCap: 3
# Fleet health detection is dormant unless enabled. It reads one whole-fleet agent list per tick.
# It can run without a webhook; bridge_list then reports healthCoverage: detection-only.
# Fleet health detection is dormant unless enabled (CB-573). It reads one whole-fleet agent list
# per tick.
# intervalSeconds → how often a tick runs (default 30). ENFORCED floor of 15: the code computes
# Math.max(15, intervalSeconds), so a lower value is silently raised, not
# rejected.
# workingSuspectAfterSeconds, paneProbeIntervalSeconds → accepted and parsed, but NOT YET READ by
# anything — the dormant monitor only consumes intervalSeconds today (CB-573
# shipped ahead of the evidence publishers these two knobs are for). Setting
# them changes nothing right now, and no minimum is enforced on either, because
# nothing reads them to enforce one. They exist so a later build can start
# honouring them without another config-shape change.
# notifications.mode → "webhook" flips what bridge_list REPORTS (healthCoverage: "full" instead
# of "detection-only") — it does NOT make bridged send any webhook call; no
# delivery mechanism is implemented yet. Any other value, or omitting the
# block, reports "detection-only".
# health:
# enabled: true
# intervalSeconds: 30 # minimum 15
# workingSuspectAfterSeconds: 600 # minimum 300
# paneProbeIntervalSeconds: 60 # minimum 60
# intervalSeconds: 30
# workingSuspectAfterSeconds: 600
# paneProbeIntervalSeconds: 60
# notifications:
# mode: disabled # disabled (default) or webhook
# mode: disabled
# herdr Unix socket. Omit to use the client default
# (${HERDR_SOCKET_PATH:-~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock}).
@@ -262,6 +275,26 @@ profiles:
# argv: ["opencode"]
# How an unqualified spawn chooses a profile: fixed (default, reproduces pre-CB-518 behaviour),
# round-robin, or weighted. Omitting this key is a strict no-op for existing configs.
#
# `weighted` IS NOT "cheapest first" — read this before you set weights (CB-589).
# It is smooth weighted round-robin: it spreads spawns across EVERY profile that has a free slot,
# in weight ratio. It has no idea which profile costs money. So with local:10 / paid:2 you do not
# get "use local, overflow to paid" — you get roughly one spawn in six going to the paid profile
# while the local box still has a free slot.
#
# There is a sharper second effect. The policy's running score map lives for the daemon's whole
# life. While a profile is at maxLoad it is filtered out and its score FREEZES, so the paid
# profiles keep accumulating against it. When the local slot frees up it returns with a stale
# score and can LOSE the next pick — a paid spawn while the free box sits idle.
#
# Until a real cost-first policy exists, the workaround is to make the ratio decisive rather than
# proportional: give the free profile a weight so large that it wins every pick it is eligible
# for, and paid profiles only ever take genuine overflow. On this host that is local weight 100
# against paid weights of ~1.
#
# The gotcha with that workaround: it expresses a PREFERENCE ORDER through a RATIO knob. Add a
# future profile at weight 150 and it silently outranks the free box, with nothing to warn you.
# Re-check the weights whenever you add a profile.
placement: weighted
# How long a credential sits out after a BACKEND_EXHAUSTED classification (CB-578 stage B), in
@@ -286,6 +319,11 @@ placement: weighted
# / credentialId. Those are hot because the placement policy (and, for credentialId,
# the CB-578 stage B quarantine check) reads them through a supplier — being config is
# not by itself enough to make a key hot.
# EXCEPT `fleet.leaders`: Bridged.main reads it once at startup to build the lead tab
# scanner and launcher, and neither is rebuilt on reload. A changed/added/removed
# `fleet.leaders` entry is silently accepted — the reload reports "config reloaded"
# with nothing in the deferred list — but has NO effect until you restart. Treat it
# as deferred in practice, even though today's reload output does not say so.
# DEFERRED → accepted into the new config, but the wiring built at startup keeps the old value
# until you restart: `lifecycle:`, `leadHeartbeat:`, `guard:`, `worktreeRoot:`,
# `spawnReadyTimeoutMs` / `spawnReadyPollMs`, `quarantineCooldownSeconds` (CB-578
@@ -368,6 +406,12 @@ fleet:
# An auto-launched lead is NOT a member: it gets no worker reply charter, is never registered with
# the session lifecycle (the idle reaper would kill your orchestrator), and stays on the
# subscription — ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL/AUTH_TOKEN are stripped from its env whatever the profile says.
#
# GET THE `tab:` VALUE RIGHT. A pane that does not match any configured `tab:` (a typo, a renamed
# tab, a pane no entry names at all) is not recognised as a lead — it resolves as an ordinary
# WORKER instead, silently, and every orchestration call it makes (spawn/stop/send/drain) is
# refused. There is no error at startup for this: an unmatched pane is simply not a lead. If your
# primary suddenly can't spawn or send, check this section first.
# leaders:
# opus-5.0:
# profile: opus # omit to never create this lead, only recognise it
@@ -423,10 +467,15 @@ guard:
# idleTtlSeconds → reap READY/DONE sessions idle longer than this (never BUSY/SPAWNING)
# contextCap → force-release a session after this many delegated turns
# drainTimeoutSeconds → seconds to wait for BUSY sessions on shutdown before forced teardown
# clearAfterTurn → whether a reusable worker discards its conversation context after every
# completed delegated turn (default false). Works for claude-code workers
# only — any other peer kind (e.g. opencode) logs "context reset is
# unsupported for peer kind …" once and the reset is a no-op.
# lifecycle:
# idleTtlSeconds: 300
# contextCap: 10
# drainTimeoutSeconds: 5
# clearAfterTurn: false
# Durable reply delivery (CB-307 Stage 2). OMIT this block entirely to keep the default
# in-memory, soft-state reply inbox (late worker replies are held only until a daemon bounce).
@@ -434,10 +483,14 @@ guard:
# on a durable per-target queue (agent.<target>.inbox) and survive a restart — the broker
# redelivers anything the primary had not yet drained. Production default is LavinMQ; a stock
# RabbitMQ speaks the same AMQP 0-9-1, so it is a URI-only swap.
# uri → AMQP connection URI. No trailing slash ⇒ the default vhost "/"; an empty path ("/")
# is vhost "" and will NOT connect. Encode a named vhost as .../%2Fmyvhost.
# uri → AMQP connection URI. No trailing slash ⇒ the default vhost "/"; an empty path ("/")
# is vhost "" and will NOT connect. Encode a named vhost as .../%2Fmyvhost.
# prefetch → CB-527: consumer basicQos, capping how many unacked messages the inbox holds
# in-heap per owned target (the rest sits on the broker's durable queue instead of
# growing the JVM heap). Default 32 when omitted.
# broker:
# uri: amqp://guest:guest@127.0.0.1:5672
# prefetch: 32
# Active push-to-primary (CB-307 Stage 3). When a worker reply lands with no open bridge_send,
# the ReplyPushLoop injects a *drain nudge* (never the payload) into the primary's own herdr
@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ public final class Bridged {
static void main(String[] args) {
Path configPath = Path.of(args.length > 0 ? args[0] : "bridged.yaml");
BridgedConfig cfg = BridgedConfig.load(configPath);
// CB-594: report which secret env vars the config actually needs, by name, before anything
// else can fail on a silently-empty one. A daemon started without a login shell (launchd)
// boots fine either way — this is the only thing that says so out loud.
reportRequiredSecrets(cfg);
// CB-559: `cfg` stays the startup snapshot — every validation and every piece of one-time
// wiring below reads it, and must, because those decisions cannot be unmade. `config` is the
// live reference the hot paths read per use. Which keys can actually move is ConfigRef's
@@ -348,8 +352,9 @@ public final class Bridged {
// connection, so keep the reference to close it in the ordered shutdown hook.
final ReplyInbox replyInbox;
if (cfg.broker() != null && cfg.broker().isConfigured()) {
replyInbox = AmqpReplyInbox.open(cfg.broker().uri());
log.info("reply inbox: AMQP broker (durable) at {}", cfg.broker().uri());
replyInbox = AmqpReplyInbox.open(cfg.broker().uri(), cfg.broker().prefetchOrDefault());
log.info("reply inbox: AMQP broker (durable) at {} (prefetch={})",
cfg.broker().uri(), cfg.broker().prefetchOrDefault());
} else {
replyInbox = new InMemoryReplyInbox();
log.info("reply inbox: in-memory (soft-state)");
@@ -436,6 +441,11 @@ public final class Bridged {
reason += "; worktree=" + detail.worktreePath() + " branch=" + detail.branch()
+ " snapshot=" + (detail.snapshotRef() != null ? detail.snapshotRef() : "none");
}
// CB-584 (issue #65 criterion 5): also name the agent session, so a lead can resume the
// member's conversation instead of only re-dispatching a fresh one onto the same files.
if (detail.agentSessionId() != null) {
reason += " agentSessionId=" + detail.agentSessionId();
}
messages.abandon(detail.terminalId(), reason);
replyInbox.release(detail.terminalId());
primaryRegistry.forgetDelegation(detail.terminalId()); // CB-532: don't leak the lead binding
@@ -543,6 +553,66 @@ public final class Bridged {
return target -> presence.isPresent(target) || leads.get().containsKey(target);
}
/**
* CB-594: which env vars the loaded config actually needs, and why — every non-{@code
* subscription} profile's {@code tokenEnv} (a subscription profile never reads one, see
* {@link BridgedConfig.Profile#isSubscription()}), plus every profile's {@code gitTokenEnv}
* where set (opt-in). Derived from the config, not hard-coded, so a new profile is covered for
* free. A var required by more than one profile is one entry naming every profile that needs
* it. Deliberately excludes {@code auth.tokenEnv}: that one is already enforced loudly, by a
* startup throw in {@code main()} — about 370 lines <em>below</em> this method's call site
* ({@link #reportRequiredSecrets(BridgedConfig)}), not a few lines above it. That throw only
* fires when {@code auth.mode: token} is configured; under the default loopback-trust mode it
* never runs, and {@code auth.tokenEnv} is simply not required.
*
* <p>Package-private and pure (no I/O, no logging) so the derivation is unit-testable without
* capturing log output; {@link #reportRequiredSecrets(BridgedConfig)} is the logging caller.
*/
static Map<String, List<String>> requiredSecretEnvVars(BridgedConfig cfg) {
Map<String, List<String>> requiredBy = new LinkedHashMap<>();
cfg.profiles().forEach((name, profile) -> {
if (!profile.isSubscription()) {
requiredBy.computeIfAbsent(profile.tokenEnv(), _ -> new ArrayList<>())
.add("profile '" + name + "' tokenEnv");
}
if (profile.hasGitToken()) {
requiredBy.computeIfAbsent(profile.gitTokenEnv(), _ -> new ArrayList<>())
.add("profile '" + name + "' gitTokenEnv");
}
});
return requiredBy;
}
/**
* CB-594: log, by name only, which required env vars (see {@link #requiredSecretEnvVars}) are
* set in the daemon's own process environment — the environment every profile's {@code
* tokenEnv}/{@code gitTokenEnv} is read from at spawn time (see
* {@code HerdrPeerLauncher.resolveEnv}). Never logs a value, a prefix, or a length.
*
* <p>A missing entry only warns — it must never refuse to start. A daemon that boots and says
* what is wrong is strictly more useful than one that will not boot at all.
*/
private static void reportRequiredSecrets(BridgedConfig cfg) {
Map<String, List<String>> requiredBy = requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg);
if (requiredBy.isEmpty()) {
log.info("startup secrets: no profile references a token env var — nothing to check");
return;
}
Map<String, String> env = System.getenv();
requiredBy.forEach((varName, sources) -> {
String value = env.get(varName);
if (value != null && !value.isBlank()) {
log.info("startup secret {}: set ({})", varName, String.join(", ", sources));
} else {
log.warn("startup secret {}: MISSING ({}) — the daemon will start anyway, and this "
+ "failure stays invisible until a worker actually needs it. Fix "
+ "${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh and restart bridged from a LOGIN "
+ "shell (see scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh).",
varName, String.join(", ", sources));
}
});
}
/**
* Poll herdr's {@code ping} until it answers or {@link #HERDR_WAIT_SECONDS} elapses (CB-504).
*
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.JsonParser;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.JsonToken;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.dataformat.yaml.YAMLFactory;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.AmqpReplyInbox;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.MemberRole;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
@@ -532,16 +533,24 @@ public record BridgedConfig(
* stays soft-state. Production default is LavinMQ; a stock RabbitMQ speaks the same AMQP 0-9-1
* and is a URI-only swap.
*
* @param uri AMQP connection URI, e.g. {@code amqp://guest:guest@127.0.0.1:5672/}. Blank/{@code null}
* ⇒ the broker block is treated as absent (in-memory adapter).
* @param uri AMQP connection URI, e.g. {@code amqp://guest:guest@127.0.0.1:5672/}. Blank/
* {@code null} ⇒ the broker block is treated as absent (in-memory adapter).
* @param prefetch CB-527: the consumer's {@code basicQos} prefetch count, bounding how many
* unacked messages the AMQP inbox holds in-heap per owned target. {@code null}/
* non-positive ⇒ {@link AmqpReplyInbox#DEFAULT_PREFETCH}.
*/
@JsonIgnoreProperties(ignoreUnknown = true)
public record Broker(String uri) {
public record Broker(String uri, Integer prefetch) {
/** True when a usable broker URI is configured (an empty block does not enable AMQP). */
public boolean isConfigured() {
return uri != null && !uri.isBlank();
}
/** The prefetch to use, defaulting to {@link AmqpReplyInbox#DEFAULT_PREFETCH} when unset. */
public int prefetchOrDefault() {
return (prefetch != null && prefetch > 0) ? prefetch : AmqpReplyInbox.DEFAULT_PREFETCH;
}
}
/**
@@ -958,8 +967,12 @@ public record BridgedConfig(
/**
* Top-level keys this version understands. Used only to warn about the rest — see
* {@link #warnUnknownTopLevelKeys}. Keep in step with the record components.
*
* <p>Package-private (not {@code private}) so a test can assert every key here is documented in
* {@code bridged.example.yaml} — the only committed description of the config schema, since
* {@code bridged.yaml} itself is gitignored.
*/
private static final Set<String> KNOWN_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS = Set.of(
static final Set<String> KNOWN_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS = Set.of(
"bind", "herdrSocket", "profiles", "guard", "worktreeRoot",
"lifecycle", "spawnReadyTimeoutMs", "spawnReadyPollMs", "broker", "primary", "fleet",
"leadHeartbeat", "health", "placement", "auth", "configReload", "quarantineCooldownSeconds");
@@ -973,6 +986,7 @@ public record BridgedConfig(
warnUnknownTopLevelKeys(yaml, path);
rejectDuplicateMemberSlots(yaml);
rejectNegativeMaxLoad(yaml);
rejectUnknownKind(yaml);
BridgedConfig cfg = YAML.readValue(yaml, BridgedConfig.class);
return cfg.withDefaults();
} catch (IOException e) {
@@ -1267,6 +1281,53 @@ public record BridgedConfig(
}
}
/** The peer kinds this build has an adapter for — {@link Profile#kind()}'s only valid values. */
private static final Set<String> KNOWN_KINDS = Set.of(Profile.KIND_CLAUDE_CODE, Profile.KIND_OPENCODE);
/**
* Reject a profile whose {@code kind:} is not one of {@link #KNOWN_KINDS} (CB-604), naming the
* profile, the value it set, and the accepted set.
*
* <p>{@link Profile}'s compact constructor only lower-cases {@code kind} and compares it against
* {@code KIND_OPENCODE} — anything else, including a typo like {@code opencod}, silently falls
* into the claude-code bucket ({@link dev.ltms.bridged.member.CompositePeerLauncher} routes by
* exact adapter claim, not by membership in a known set). With {@code argv:} also unset, the argv
* default special-cases only the exact string {@code "claude-code"}, so the launch command falls
* back to {@code List.of(kind)} — the daemon then tries to run a program literally named after the
* typo. {@code CompositePeerLauncher}'s constructor already treats a profile claimed by two
* adapters as fatal (CB-402); an unrecognized kind is the same class of adapter-routing mistake
* and gets the same treatment here, at config load, rather than surfacing later as a failed spawn.
*
* @param yaml the raw config text
* @throws IllegalStateException when any profile's {@code kind} is a non-blank value not in
* {@link #KNOWN_KINDS} (case-insensitive)
*/
static void rejectUnknownKind(String yaml) {
Map<?, ?> raw;
try {
raw = YAML.readValue(yaml, Map.class);
} catch (IOException | IllegalArgumentException e) {
return; // a malformed file is reported by the real parse, not here
}
if (raw == null || !(raw.get("profiles") instanceof Map<?, ?> profiles)) {
return;
}
List<String> bad = profiles.entrySet().stream()
.filter(e -> e.getValue() instanceof Map<?, ?> p
&& p.get("kind") instanceof String k && !k.isBlank()
&& !KNOWN_KINDS.contains(k.toLowerCase()))
.map(e -> String.valueOf(e.getKey()) + "=" + ((Map<?, ?>) e.getValue()).get("kind"))
.sorted()
.toList();
if (!bad.isEmpty()) {
throw new IllegalStateException("refusing to start: profile(s) [" + String.join(", ", bad)
+ "] set an unrecognized kind — accepted values are "
+ String.join(", ", KNOWN_KINDS.stream().sorted().toList())
+ " (case-insensitive); an unrecognized kind would otherwise fall back to the"
+ " claude-code adapter and try to launch a program named after the typo.");
}
}
static List<String> unknownTopLevelKeys(String yaml) {
Map<?, ?> raw;
try {
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.MessageService;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.Rendezvous;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.PeerUnreachableException;
import dev.ltms.bridged.placement.BackendQuarantine;
import dev.ltms.bridged.placement.PlacementException;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.SessionManager;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.MemberSession;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.WorktreeRequest;
@@ -692,6 +693,10 @@ public final class BridgeMcp {
return text(json(memberView(member)));
} catch (GuardException e) {
return error("subscription boundary: " + e.getMessage());
} catch (PlacementException e) {
// CB-599: no candidate had capacity (maxLoad, quarantine, or all-exhausted) — distinct
// from "profile does not exist" below.
return error("no capacity: " + e.getMessage());
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
return error(e.getMessage()); // unknown / no-default profile, or a refused resumeSessionId
} catch (PeerUnreachableException e) {
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import com.rabbitmq.client.ConnectionFactory;
import com.rabbitmq.client.DeliverCallback;
import com.rabbitmq.client.Recoverable;
import com.rabbitmq.client.RecoveryListener;
import com.rabbitmq.client.Return;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
@@ -14,7 +15,13 @@ import java.io.IOException;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.NavigableMap;
import java.util.concurrent.CompletableFuture;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentSkipListMap;
import java.util.concurrent.ExecutionException;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeoutException;
/**
* AMQP-backed {@link ReplyInbox} (CB-307 Stage 2): genuine cross-restart durability behind the same
@@ -29,6 +36,27 @@ import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
* leaves them on the broker — it redelivers on reconnect. That is the durability the in-memory
* adapter cannot give, with the port contract preserved.
*
* <p><strong>Prefetch bounds the held backlog (CB-527).</strong> The consumer channel calls
* {@code basicQos} with a configurable prefetch count ({@link #DEFAULT_PREFETCH} unless the caller
* passes another value to {@link #open(String, int)}) before starting any consumer. Without a bound,
* the broker pushes its entire queue into {@link #held} the instant a target is {@link #own owned},
* so an undrained primary grows the JVM heap without limit and any queue-level control
* ({@code x-max-length}, per-message TTL) never fires because the queue never actually holds a
* backlog. Prefetch keeps the backlog where it is visible — on the broker — until the owner drains it.
*
* <p><strong>Publishes require a confirmed, routable delivery (CB-528).</strong> {@link #publish}
* runs on a channel separate from the consume/ack channel ({@link #channel}), so a slow or blocked
* publish confirm can never hold {@link #channelLock} and stall an ack — the ack path never waits on
* a publish confirm. That publish channel is in publisher-confirm mode and every publish sets the
* {@code mandatory} flag, so an unroutable publish (queue not declared, e.g. the owner never called
* {@link #own}) is returned by the broker instead of silently dropped. The broker sends the
* <em>return</em> for an unroutable message before the <em>confirm</em> that covers it — the ack/nack
* callback checks the returned-set at confirm time rather than assuming an ack means routed — so
* "confirmed" here means "durably queued", not merely "accepted by the broker". A returned or nacked
* (or un-confirmed within the timeout) publish surfaces as an {@link IllegalStateException} on the
* caller's thread; the caller — {@link MessageService#reply} — must not report success for a
* black-holed reply.
*
* <p><strong>Ownership is explicit.</strong> {@link #own} declares the queue and starts the consumer;
* {@link #release} cancels it. {@link #publish} sends to the queue but does <em>not</em> imply ownership
* and does not attach a consumer. This split is required by CB-308 federation, where one gateway may
@@ -54,6 +82,12 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
private static final String QUEUE_PREFIX = "agent.";
private static final String QUEUE_SUFFIX = ".inbox";
/** CB-527: the prefetch used when a caller does not pass an explicit value to {@link #open(String, int)}. */
public static final int DEFAULT_PREFETCH = 32;
/** How long {@link #publish} waits for its publisher confirm before failing the call (CB-528). */
private static final long CONFIRM_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000L;
private final Connection connection;
private final Channel channel;
/** All channel operations (publish/declare/ack/cancel) serialize on this — a Channel is not thread-safe. */
@@ -63,39 +97,87 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
/** Targets whose queue is declared and consumer is running, mapped to their broker consumer tag. */
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, String> consumerTags = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/**
* CB-528: a dedicated channel for {@link #publish}, kept separate from {@link #channel} (consume
* + ack) so a publish confirm round trip never blocks under {@link #channelLock} and stalls an ack.
*/
private final Channel publishChannel;
private final Object publishChannelLock = new Object();
/** In-flight publishes awaiting their confirm, keyed by the publish channel's sequence number. */
private final ConcurrentSkipListMap<Long, Pending> pendingBySeq = new ConcurrentSkipListMap<>();
/**
* The same in-flight publishes, keyed by {@code msgId} — a broker {@code Return} carries no delivery
* tag. Assumes {@code msgId} is unique per in-flight publish: a second {@link #publish} for a
* {@code msgId} still awaiting its confirm would overwrite this entry and misdirect
* {@link #onReturn}'s lookup. Not reachable today — {@code MessageService.reply} generates a fresh
* {@code UUID} per call — so no guard is added for it.
*/
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, Pending> pendingByMsgId = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/** A message pulled off the broker but not yet acked: its delivery-tag plus the port payload. */
private record Held(long deliveryTag, InboxMessage message) {}
/** Connect to {@code uri} (e.g. {@code amqp://guest:guest@127.0.0.1:5672/}) and open the inbox. */
/** A publish awaiting its confirm; {@link #returned} records whether the broker already returned it. */
private static final class Pending {
final String msgId;
final CompletableFuture<Void> confirmed = new CompletableFuture<>();
volatile boolean returned;
Pending(String msgId) {
this.msgId = msgId;
}
}
/** Connect to {@code uri} (e.g. {@code amqp://guest:guest@127.0.0.1:5672/}) with {@link #DEFAULT_PREFETCH}. */
public static AmqpReplyInbox open(String uri) {
return open(uri, DEFAULT_PREFETCH);
}
/** As {@link #open(String)}, with an explicit consumer prefetch (CB-527: caps the held backlog per target). */
public static AmqpReplyInbox open(String uri, int prefetch) {
try {
ConnectionFactory factory = new ConnectionFactory();
factory.setUri(uri);
// Self-heal transient blips; topology recovery re-declares queues and re-attaches consumers.
factory.setAutomaticRecoveryEnabled(true);
factory.setTopologyRecoveryEnabled(true);
return new AmqpReplyInbox(factory.newConnection("bridged-reply-inbox"));
return new AmqpReplyInbox(factory.newConnection("bridged-reply-inbox"), prefetch);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("cannot connect to AMQP broker at " + uri, e);
}
}
/** Wrap an already-open connection (injection seam for the contract test). */
/** Wrap an already-open connection with {@link #DEFAULT_PREFETCH} (injection seam for the contract test). */
AmqpReplyInbox(Connection connection) {
this(connection, DEFAULT_PREFETCH);
}
/** As above, with an explicit prefetch (injection seam for the contract test). */
AmqpReplyInbox(Connection connection, int prefetch) {
this.connection = connection;
try {
this.channel = connection.createChannel();
// CB-527: bound the held backlog per owned target — must be set before any own()/basicConsume.
this.channel.basicQos(prefetch);
this.publishChannel = connection.createChannel();
this.publishChannel.confirmSelect();
this.publishChannel.addReturnListener(this::onReturn);
this.publishChannel.addConfirmListener(this::onAck, this::onNack);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("cannot open AMQP channel", e);
}
// On automatic recovery the broker redelivers unacked messages with FRESH delivery-tags; the
// tags we were holding are now stale. Drop the held snapshot so the re-attached consumer
// repopulates it with valid tags (dedup by msgId still prevents any double-queue).
// repopulates it with valid tags (dedup by msgId still prevents any double-queue). Any publish
// confirm still in flight when the connection dropped is equally stale — its sequence number
// meant nothing on the old channel and means nothing on the recovered one, so fail it now
// rather than let it silently ride out CONFIRM_TIMEOUT_MS.
if (connection instanceof Recoverable recoverable) {
recoverable.addRecoveryListener(new RecoveryListener() {
@Override
public void handleRecovery(Recoverable recoverable) {
held.clear();
failPendingPublishesOnRecovery();
log.info("AMQP connection recovered; cleared held replies for fresh redelivery");
}
@@ -141,6 +223,12 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
}
}
/**
* Publish {@code content} and block until the broker's publisher confirm for it lands (CB-528).
* Throws {@link IllegalStateException} if the message is returned as unroutable, nacked, or not
* confirmed within {@link #CONFIRM_TIMEOUT_MS} — the caller must treat that as a failed publish,
* not a lost-and-forgotten one.
*/
@Override
public void publish(String target, String msgId, String content) {
AMQP.BasicProperties props = new AMQP.BasicProperties.Builder()
@@ -148,12 +236,35 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
.deliveryMode(2) // persistent — survives a broker restart
.contentType("text/plain")
.build();
try {
synchronized (channelLock) {
channel.basicPublish("", queueName(target), props, content.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
Pending pending = new Pending(msgId);
long seq;
synchronized (publishChannelLock) {
seq = publishChannel.getNextPublishSeqNo();
pendingBySeq.put(seq, pending);
pendingByMsgId.put(msgId, pending);
try {
publishChannel.basicPublish("", queueName(target), true, props,
content.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
} catch (IOException e) {
pendingBySeq.remove(seq, pending);
pendingByMsgId.remove(msgId, pending);
throw new IllegalStateException("cannot publish reply to " + queueName(target), e);
}
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("cannot publish reply to " + queueName(target), e);
}
try {
pending.confirmed.get(CONFIRM_TIMEOUT_MS, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS);
} catch (ExecutionException e) {
Throwable cause = e.getCause();
throw cause instanceof RuntimeException re ? re : new IllegalStateException(cause);
} catch (TimeoutException e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("publish confirm for reply " + msgId + " to " + queueName(target)
+ " timed out after " + CONFIRM_TIMEOUT_MS + "ms — broker may be unreachable or overloaded", e);
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
throw new IllegalStateException("interrupted awaiting publish confirm for " + msgId, e);
} finally {
pendingBySeq.remove(seq, pending);
pendingByMsgId.remove(msgId, pending);
}
}
@@ -222,17 +333,115 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
};
}
/** Broker return for an unroutable {@code mandatory} publish — arrives BEFORE its confirm (CB-528). */
private void onReturn(Return r) {
String msgId = r.getProperties() == null ? null : r.getProperties().getMessageId();
Pending pending = msgId == null ? null : pendingByMsgId.get(msgId);
if (pending != null) {
pending.returned = true;
} else {
log.warn("AMQP return for reply {} (routingKey={}, {} {}) with no matching in-flight publish"
+ " — already resolved by a prior confirm", msgId, r.getRoutingKey(), r.getReplyCode(),
r.getReplyText());
}
}
private void onAck(long seq, boolean multiple) {
resolveConfirm(seq, multiple, true);
}
private void onNack(long seq, boolean multiple) {
resolveConfirm(seq, multiple, false);
}
/**
* Resolve every pending publish covered by this confirm (a single seq, or — {@code multiple} —
* every seq up to and including it). Checks {@link Pending#returned} at confirm time: since the
* broker's return for an unroutable message always precedes its confirm, an ack that arrives after
* a return means "confirmed but never routed", not "durably queued".
*/
private void resolveConfirm(long seq, boolean multiple, boolean ack) {
NavigableMap<Long, Pending> covered = multiple
? pendingBySeq.headMap(seq, true)
: pendingBySeq.subMap(seq, true, seq, true);
for (var it = covered.entrySet().iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Pending pending = it.next().getValue();
it.remove();
pendingByMsgId.remove(pending.msgId, pending);
if (ack && !pending.returned) {
pending.confirmed.complete(null);
} else if (ack) {
pending.confirmed.completeExceptionally(new IllegalStateException(
"reply " + pending.msgId + " was returned as unroutable (queue not declared/owned)"));
} else {
pending.confirmed.completeExceptionally(new IllegalStateException(
"broker nacked publish of reply " + pending.msgId));
}
}
}
/**
* Fail every publish still awaiting its confirm — their sequence numbers are stale after recovery.
* Guarded by {@link #publishChannelLock}, the same lock {@link #publish} holds while it takes its
* sequence number and registers its {@link Pending}: without it, a {@link #publish} that starts
* after the connection has already recovered (so it publishes — and will be confirmed — on the
* <em>new</em> channel) can register between this sweep's iteration and its clear, and this sweep
* then fails a publish that actually succeeded. {@link #publish} only holds the lock for the
* seq/map-put/{@code basicPublish} — it awaits the confirm outside it — so this sweep can only ever
* wait for an in-flight {@code basicPublish} call to return, never for a broker round trip. No
* deadlock.
*
* <p>Package-private (rather than {@code private}) only so the unit test can drive it directly
* against a concurrent {@link #publish} without a live broker reconnect.
*/
void failPendingPublishesOnRecovery() {
synchronized (publishChannelLock) {
for (var it = pendingBySeq.entrySet().iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Pending pending = it.next().getValue();
it.remove();
pendingByMsgId.remove(pending.msgId, pending);
pending.confirmed.completeExceptionally(new IllegalStateException(
"AMQP connection recovered mid-publish; confirm status of reply " + pending.msgId
+ " is unknown"));
}
}
}
/**
* Fail every publish still awaiting its confirm with a clear, immediate error instead of leaving it
* to time out after {@link #CONFIRM_TIMEOUT_MS} once the channels are closed underneath it. Guarded
* by {@link #publishChannelLock} for the same reason as {@link #failPendingPublishesOnRecovery}.
*/
private void failPendingPublishesOnClose() {
synchronized (publishChannelLock) {
for (var it = pendingBySeq.entrySet().iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Pending pending = it.next().getValue();
it.remove();
pendingByMsgId.remove(pending.msgId, pending);
pending.confirmed.completeExceptionally(new IllegalStateException(
"AMQP reply inbox closed while publish of reply " + pending.msgId
+ " was still awaiting its confirm"));
}
}
}
private static String queueName(String target) {
return QUEUE_PREFIX + target + QUEUE_SUFFIX;
}
@Override
public void close() {
failPendingPublishesOnClose();
try {
channel.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
log.debug("AMQP channel close: {}", e.toString());
}
try {
publishChannel.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
log.debug("AMQP publish channel close: {}", e.toString());
}
try {
connection.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
@@ -66,8 +66,13 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
private final long backoffMs;
private final Metrics metrics; // CB-512: nullable — no registry in unit tests
/** Worker targets with a reply queued, and the lead to nudge about it, keyed by target. */
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, String> pendingReplies = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/**
* Worker targets with a reply queued, keyed by target. Each entry carries its own nudge
* count (CB-598) rather than sharing one counter per lead per source: a target's count only
* ever reflects nudges that actually named that target, so a target that joins while the
* schedule is already deep into another target's reminders still reads as fresh.
*/
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, ReplyEntry> pendingReplies = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/** Tickets that have gone terminal but not yet been polled, keyed by ticket. */
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, PendingTicket> pendingTickets = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/** CB-590: leads with an active combined reminder schedule (replies and/or tickets). */
@@ -116,10 +121,10 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
Set<String> result = new HashSet<>();
for (var entry : pendingReplies.entrySet()) {
String target = entry.getKey();
String owningLead = entry.getValue();
if (!lead.equals(owningLead)) continue;
ReplyEntry owning = entry.getValue();
if (!lead.equals(owning.lead())) continue;
if (inbox.peek(target).isEmpty()) {
pendingReplies.remove(target, owningLead);
pendingReplies.remove(target, owning);
continue;
}
result.add(target);
@@ -127,8 +132,15 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
return result;
}
/** A ticket awaiting collection: which lead to nudge, and whether it ended in failure. */
private record PendingTicket(String ticket, String lead, boolean failed) {
/** A pending reply target: which lead to nudge, and how many nudges have named it so far. */
private record ReplyEntry(String lead, int nudgeCount) {
}
/**
* A ticket awaiting collection: which lead to nudge, whether it ended in failure, and how
* many nudges have named it so far (CB-598 — tracked per ticket, not per lead per source).
*/
private record PendingTicket(String ticket, String lead, boolean failed, int nudgeCount) {
}
/** Tickets still pending for {@code lead}, snapshotted fresh for one tick. */
@@ -142,6 +154,41 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
.collect(Collectors.toUnmodifiableSet());
}
/**
* The reply-source reminder count {@link #decide} should see for {@code lead} on this tick:
* the <em>minimum</em> nudge count among the reply targets currently pending for it (CB-598).
*
* <p>Before this, the count passed to {@code decide} was a single counter carried forward
* across scheduled ticks ({@code scheduleNext(lead, count + 1, ...)}), incremented whenever
* the source had <em>any</em> pending work — not tied to which target that work was. A target
* that joined while an older target's count was already near the cap inherited that count on
* its very next tick, even though no nudge had ever named it. Taking the minimum over what is
* actually pending now means a fresh target (count 0) keeps the source eligible regardless of
* how many times an older, still-undrained target has already been nudged; that older target
* keeps riding along in the combined nudge text without spending any more of its own budget
* (see {@link #bumpNudgeCounts}). Returns 0 when nothing is pending — {@link #decide} never
* consults the count in that case, since {@code hasReplyWork} is false.
*/
private int minReplyNudgeCountFor(String lead) {
int min = Integer.MAX_VALUE;
for (String target : pendingReplyTargetsFor(lead)) {
ReplyEntry entry = pendingReplies.get(target);
if (entry != null) {
min = Math.min(min, entry.nudgeCount());
}
}
return min == Integer.MAX_VALUE ? 0 : min;
}
/** As {@link #minReplyNudgeCountFor}, for the ticket source. */
private int minTicketNudgeCountFor(String lead) {
int min = Integer.MAX_VALUE;
for (PendingTicket ticket : pendingTicketsFor(lead)) {
min = Math.min(min, ticket.nudgeCount());
}
return min == Integer.MAX_VALUE ? 0 : min;
}
/**
* Pure decision function: examine everything pending for {@code lead} — reply targets and
* tickets alike — and return what the loop should do.
@@ -155,9 +202,14 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
* {@link Action#INJECT}. Only when neither source has eligible work does the loop
* {@link Action#STOP}.
*
* <p><strong>CB-598: the counts are per-item, not per-tick.</strong> {@link #tick} no longer
* carries these counts forward across scheduled calls — it recomputes them fresh every tick via
* {@link #minReplyNudgeCountFor} / {@link #minTicketNudgeCountFor}, so this function itself did
* not need to change; only what its caller feeds it did.
*
* @param lead the lead terminal to nudge
* @param replyReminderCount how many nudges have covered pending reply work for this lead
* @param ticketReminderCount how many nudges have covered pending ticket work for this lead
* @param replyReminderCount the lowest nudge count among reply targets pending for this lead
* @param ticketReminderCount the lowest nudge count among tickets pending for this lead
* @return the action the caller should take
*/
Action decide(String lead, int replyReminderCount, int ticketReminderCount) {
@@ -204,7 +256,8 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
log.debug("push: no lead is known to be waiting on {}, skipping reminder", target);
return;
}
pendingReplies.put(target, lead.get());
pendingReplies.compute(target, (t, existing) ->
new ReplyEntry(lead.get(), existing == null ? 0 : existing.nudgeCount()));
startOrCoalesce(lead.get());
}
@@ -232,7 +285,8 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
ticket, target);
return;
}
pendingTickets.put(ticket, new PendingTicket(ticket, lead.get(), failed));
pendingTickets.compute(ticket, (id, existing) ->
new PendingTicket(ticket, lead.get(), failed, existing == null ? 0 : existing.nudgeCount()));
startOrCoalesce(lead.get());
}
@@ -255,28 +309,37 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
return;
}
log.debug("push: starting reminder loop for lead {}", lead);
scheduleNext(lead, 0, 0);
scheduleNext(lead);
}
/** Execute one loop tick — called on the scheduler thread. */
private void tick(String lead, int replyReminderCount, int ticketReminderCount) {
/**
* Execute one loop tick — called on the scheduler thread (or directly by a test; package-private
* for the same reason as {@link #stopOrRestart}).
*
* <p><strong>CB-598.</strong> The reminder counts fed into {@link #decide} are recomputed fresh
* every tick from what is actually pending right now ({@link #minReplyNudgeCountFor} /
* {@link #minTicketNudgeCountFor}), rather than carried forward as running counters across
* scheduled calls. A counter carried forward has no memory of which item it was counting for:
* a target or ticket that joined mid-backoff — after the previous tick fired but before this one
* did — is already sitting in {@code repliesBefore} / {@code ticketsBefore} below by the time this
* tick takes its snapshot, indistinguishable at that point from backlog the cap is meant to
* silence. Recomputing from the per-item counts fixes that: a newly-joined item's own count is
* still 0, so it keeps its source eligible regardless of how depleted an older, still-undrained
* item's count is.
*/
void tick(String lead) {
Set<String> repliesBefore = pendingReplyTargetsFor(lead);
Set<String> ticketsBefore = pendingTicketIdsFor(lead);
int replyReminderCount = minReplyNudgeCountFor(lead);
int ticketReminderCount = minTicketNudgeCountFor(lead);
var action = decide(lead, replyReminderCount, ticketReminderCount);
switch (action) {
case INJECT -> {
injectNudge(lead, replyReminderCount, ticketReminderCount);
// Only the source(s) actually eligible this tick spend a unit of their own budget —
// an exhausted source riding along in the combined message (still pending, still
// named) does not get charged again; its count stays put until it drains.
boolean replyEligible = !repliesBefore.isEmpty() && replyReminderCount < maxReminders;
boolean ticketEligible = !ticketsBefore.isEmpty() && ticketReminderCount < maxReminders;
scheduleNext(lead,
replyEligible ? replyReminderCount + 1 : replyReminderCount,
ticketEligible ? ticketReminderCount + 1 : ticketReminderCount);
scheduleNext(lead);
}
// Re-check after the configured backoff; the lead may become injectable soon.
case WAIT_BUSY -> scheduleNext(lead, replyReminderCount, ticketReminderCount);
case WAIT_BUSY -> scheduleNext(lead);
case STOP -> stopOrRestart(lead, repliesBefore, ticketsBefore);
}
}
@@ -317,7 +380,7 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
|| pendingTicketIdsFor(lead).stream().anyMatch(t -> !ticketsBefore.contains(t));
if (racedIn && activeLeads.putIfAbsent(lead, Boolean.TRUE) == null) {
log.debug("push: new work for lead {} raced the reminder loop's stop — restarting", lead);
scheduleNext(lead, 0, 0);
scheduleNext(lead);
return;
}
log.debug("push: reminder loop ended for lead {}", lead);
@@ -344,11 +407,28 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
log.warn("push: failed to nudge lead {} (reply {}/{}, ticket {}/{}): {}",
lead, replyReminderCount + 1, maxReminders, ticketReminderCount + 1, maxReminders, e.toString());
}
// Bump every item actually named in this nudge, not just whatever the shared source-level
// eligibility used to gate (CB-598) — each item's own count is what the next tick's
// minReplyNudgeCountFor / minTicketNudgeCountFor will read. An item already at or over the
// cap keeps riding along in the text (still pending, still named) but its extra bumps here
// are inert: decide() already treats it as ineligible once its count reaches maxReminders.
bumpNudgeCounts(replyTargets, tickets);
}
/** Record that every one of these items was just named in a sent (or attempted) nudge. */
private void bumpNudgeCounts(Set<String> replyTargets, List<PendingTicket> tickets) {
for (String target : replyTargets) {
pendingReplies.computeIfPresent(target, (t, e) -> new ReplyEntry(e.lead(), e.nudgeCount() + 1));
}
for (PendingTicket ticket : tickets) {
pendingTickets.computeIfPresent(ticket.ticket(),
(id, e) -> new PendingTicket(e.ticket(), e.lead(), e.failed(), e.nudgeCount() + 1));
}
}
/** Schedule the next tick on the scheduler thread pool. */
private void scheduleNext(String lead, int nextReplyReminderCount, int nextTicketReminderCount) {
scheduler.schedule(() -> tick(lead, nextReplyReminderCount, nextTicketReminderCount),
private void scheduleNext(String lead) {
scheduler.schedule(() -> tick(lead),
backoffMs, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS);
}
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.HerdrClient;
import dev.ltms.bridged.herdr.HerdrException;
import dev.ltms.bridged.inject.MemberPresence;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.PeerUnreachableException;
import dev.ltms.bridged.placement.PlacementException;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.MessageService;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.SessionManager;
import dev.ltms.bridged.peer.MemberRole;
@@ -292,6 +293,11 @@ public final class BridgedApp {
ctx.status(201).json(view(member));
} catch (GuardException e) {
ctx.status(403).json(Map.of("error", "subscription_boundary", "detail", e.getMessage()));
} catch (PlacementException e) {
// CB-599: no candidate had capacity (maxLoad, quarantine, or all-exhausted) — a benign,
// likely-transient refusal, distinct from "profile does not exist" below. 503: the
// request was valid and will likely succeed later.
ctx.status(503).json(Map.of("error", "no_capacity", "detail", e.getMessage()));
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
ctx.status(400).json(Map.of("error", "unknown_profile", "detail", e.getMessage()));
} catch (PeerUnreachableException e) {
@@ -293,8 +293,10 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
// blocked caller fails fast with a real reason instead of sitting on a rendezvous
// nothing will ever resolve. CB-578 stage C: carry the worktree/branch/snapshot ref
// too, so a failed ticket's detail can point a lead at the same tree to re-dispatch.
// CB-584 (issue #65 criterion 5): carry agentSessionId alongside them, so a lead can
// also resume the member's conversation, not just re-dispatch onto its files.
notifyReleased(new ReleaseDetail(removed.terminalId(), removed.worktree(),
removed.branch(), snapshotRef));
removed.branch(), snapshotRef, removed.agentSessionId()));
}
}
// CB-581: the pane must always stop, even if the dirty check above threw. A session removed
@@ -348,7 +350,8 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
* are {@code null} for a shared-tree session; {@code snapshotRef} is {@code null} unless this
* release snapshotted a dirty worktree into {@code refs/wip/<branch>}.
*/
public record ReleaseDetail(String terminalId, String worktreePath, String branch, String snapshotRef) {
public record ReleaseDetail(String terminalId, String worktreePath, String branch, String snapshotRef,
String agentSessionId) {
}
/**
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged;
import dev.ltms.bridged.config.BridgedConfig;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* CB-594: {@link Bridged#requiredSecretEnvVars(BridgedConfig)} is what decides what the startup
* secret report checks — it must derive that set from the config, not a hand-written list, or a
* new profile's token silently stops being reported.
*/
class RequiredSecretEnvVarsTest {
private static BridgedConfig load(Path dir, String yaml) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("bridged.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml);
return BridgedConfig.load(f);
}
@Test
void collectsATokenEnvPerNonSubscriptionProfile(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, """
profiles:
local:
baseUrl: http://gx00.gw:8000
tokenEnv: AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
""");
Map<String, List<String>> required = Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg);
assertTrue(required.containsKey("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN"));
assertEquals(List.of("profile 'local' tokenEnv"), required.get("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN"));
}
@Test
void aSubscriptionProfileNeedsNoTokenEnv(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, """
profiles:
opus:
subscription: true
model: claude-opus-5
""");
assertTrue(Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg).isEmpty(),
"subscription: true never reads ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN — see Profile#isSubscription");
}
@Test
void gitTokenEnvIsOptInAndCollectedWhenSet(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, """
profiles:
local:
baseUrl: http://gx00.gw:8000
tokenEnv: AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
gitTokenEnv: WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN
""");
Map<String, List<String>> required = Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg);
assertTrue(required.containsKey("WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN"));
assertEquals(List.of("profile 'local' gitTokenEnv"), required.get("WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN"));
}
@Test
void noGitTokenEnvMeansNothingIsRequiredForIt(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, """
profiles:
local:
baseUrl: http://gx00.gw:8000
tokenEnv: AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
""");
assertFalse(Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg).containsKey("WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN"));
}
@Test
void aVarSharedByTwoProfilesIsReportedOnceNamingBoth(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, """
profiles:
local:
baseUrl: http://gx00.gw:8000
tokenEnv: AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
gitTokenEnv: WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN
gx:
kind: opencode
baseUrl: https://llm.ltms.dev/v1
tokenEnv: AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
gitTokenEnv: WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN
""");
Map<String, List<String>> required = Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg);
assertEquals(List.of("profile 'local' tokenEnv", "profile 'gx' tokenEnv"),
required.get("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN"));
assertEquals(List.of("profile 'local' gitTokenEnv", "profile 'gx' gitTokenEnv"),
required.get("WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN"));
}
@Test
void noProfilesMeansNothingIsRequired(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
BridgedConfig cfg = load(dir, "bind:\n host: 127.0.0.1\n port: 8765\n");
assertTrue(Bridged.requiredSecretEnvVars(cfg).isEmpty());
}
}
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
@@ -1039,6 +1040,44 @@ class BridgedConfigTest {
"an opencode worker with no argv defaults to the opencode binary, never claude");
}
/**
* CB-604: an unrecognized {@code kind:} used to silently fall into the claude-code bucket — not
* matching {@code "opencode"} was the only check. With {@code argv:} also unset that meant the
* daemon tried to launch a program literally named after the typo.
*/
@Test
void unknownKindIsRefusedAtLoadNamingTheValueAndTheAcceptedSet(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("kind-typo.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
profiles:
gemini:
kind: opencod
model: google/gemini-2.5-pro
""");
IllegalStateException e = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, () -> BridgedConfig.load(f));
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("gemini"), "error names the profile: " + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("opencod"), "error names the bad value: " + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("claude-code") && e.getMessage().contains("opencode"),
"error names the accepted set: " + e.getMessage());
}
@Test
void blankKindStillDefaultsToClaudeCode(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("kind-blank.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
profiles:
gx10:
baseUrl: http://gx10.gw:8000
kind: ""
argv: ["ccs", "gx10"]
""");
BridgedConfig cfg = BridgedConfig.load(f);
assertEquals(BridgedConfig.Profile.KIND_CLAUDE_CODE, cfg.profiles().get("gx10").kind(),
"a blank kind: is documented to behave exactly like an absent one");
}
@Test
void authDefaultsToLoopbackTrustSoExistingConfigsBehaveAsBefore(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("no-auth-block.yaml");
@@ -1189,6 +1228,79 @@ class BridgedConfigTest {
assertEquals(5, cfg.leadHeartbeat().quietNudgeCap());
}
/**
* A top-level key {@code BridgedConfig} reads but that appears nowhere in
* {@code bridged.example.yaml} — live or commented — is invisible drift: {@code bridged.yaml}
* is gitignored, so the example is the ONLY committed description of the config schema, and
* neither {@link #shippedExampleConfigParses} (example → code: does the example still parse)
* nor {@link #everyOptionalKnobDocumentedInTheExampleBinds} (a hand-maintained list of keys
* that must bind) can catch a brand-new key nobody added to either.
*
* <p>This test compares the OTHER direction: every key in {@link BridgedConfig#KNOWN_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS}
* (the parser's own accepted set, which backs the unknown-key WARN) must appear as a top-level
* key in the example text, live or commented-out — see {@link #topLevelKeyDocumented}.
*/
@Test
void everyKnownTopLevelKeyIsDocumentedInTheExample() throws Exception {
Path example = Path.of("bridged.example.yaml");
assertTrue(Files.exists(example), "bridged.example.yaml must ship next to the pom");
String text = Files.readString(example);
List<String> undocumented = BridgedConfig.KNOWN_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS.stream()
.filter(key -> !topLevelKeyDocumented(text, key))
.sorted()
.toList();
assertTrue(undocumented.isEmpty(), () -> "key(s) " + undocumented
+ " are read by BridgedConfig but appear nowhere in bridged.example.yaml — "
+ "document each one there, commented out if optional. bridged.yaml is "
+ "gitignored, so this file is the only committed description of the config "
+ "schema an operator or a worker can see.");
}
/**
* Most of {@code bridged.example.yaml} is deliberately commented out — optional sections are
* documented as commented blocks so the shipped file stays a working minimal config. A key
* documented ONLY as a comment must still count as documented; parsing the file as YAML and
* reading its live key set (as an earlier attempt at this guard did) gets this wrong, because
* every commented section then looks entirely absent.
*/
@Test
void commentedOnlyTopLevelKeyCountsAsDocumented() {
String yaml = """
bind:
port: 8765
# broker:
# uri: amqp://guest:guest@127.0.0.1:5672
""";
assertTrue(topLevelKeyDocumented(yaml, "broker"),
"a key documented only inside a commented-out block must still count as documented");
}
/** A key that appears in neither a live nor a commented top-level line must NOT count. */
@Test
void absentTopLevelKeyIsNotDocumented() {
String yaml = """
bind:
port: 8765
""";
assertFalse(topLevelKeyDocumented(yaml, "broker"),
"a key mentioned nowhere in the example must not be reported as documented");
}
/**
* True when {@code key} appears as a top-level YAML key in {@code yaml} — either live
* ({@code key:} at column 0) or commented out ({@code # key:}, also at column 0, with only
* whitespace between the {@code #} and the key). Anchoring on column 0 is what keeps this a
* top-level check: an indented occurrence (a nested field, or prose inside a comment that
* happens to end in a colon) never matches, because {@code ^} requires the key's own first
* character — or the sole leading {@code #} — to sit at the very start of the line.
*/
private static boolean topLevelKeyDocumented(String yaml, String key) {
Pattern p = Pattern.compile("(?m)^(?:#\\s*)?" + Pattern.quote(key) + ":");
return p.matcher(yaml).find();
}
@Test
void placementDefaultsToFixedForExistingConfigs(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("no-placement.yaml");
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.concurrent.CopyOnWriteArrayList;
/**
* Recording fake {@link HerdrClient} for unit/acceptance tests. Returns canned frames
@@ -22,7 +23,13 @@ public final class FakeHerdr implements HerdrClient {
public static final long WORKER_PID = 4242;
private final ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
public final List<Call> calls = new ArrayList<>();
/**
* Thread-safe on purpose. Background loops — {@link dev.ltms.bridged.msg.ReplyPushLoop} and the
* lead heartbeat — call this fake from their own scheduler threads while a test polls
* {@link #called} from the test thread. A plain {@code ArrayList} threw
* {@code ConcurrentModificationException} out of {@code called()} when a nudge landed mid-stream.
*/
public final List<Call> calls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private boolean healthy = true;
private final List<String> extraWorkspaces = new ArrayList<>();
private final List<String> extraAgents = new ArrayList<>();
@@ -16,12 +16,15 @@ import dev.ltms.bridged.inject.MemberPresence;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.MemberSession;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.WorktreeRequest;
import dev.ltms.bridged.member.ClaudeCodeLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.member.CompositePeerLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.placement.BackendQuarantine;
import dev.ltms.bridged.placement.PlacementPolicies;
import io.modelcontextprotocol.spec.McpSchema;
import dev.ltms.bridged.msg.InMemoryReplyInbox;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.CompletableFuture;
@@ -423,6 +426,35 @@ class BridgeMcpTest {
assertTrue(textOf(res).contains("unknown worker profile"), textOf(res));
}
/**
* CB-599: a profile at its {@code maxLoad} cap must surface a readable reason on the MCP
* surface too, not merely flip {@code isError} with an opaque or absent message.
*/
@Test
void spawnAtMaxLoadSurfacesTheCapacityReason() {
FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
BridgedConfig.Profile wcfg = new BridgedConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "BRIDGED_WORKER_TOKEN", null,
"tab", "bridged-workers", "worker: {profile} #{n}", null,
null, null, null, null, null, null, null, 0, null, null, null);
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles = Map.of(wcfg.profile(), wcfg);
ClaudeCodeLauncher delegate = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(
new AgentControl(h), new WorkspaceControl(h), new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")),
profiles, wcfg.profile(), k -> "BRIDGED_WORKER_TOKEN".equals(k) ? "tok" : null);
CompositePeerLauncher composite = new CompositePeerLauncher(
List.of(delegate), wcfg.profile(), profiles, PlacementPolicies.fixed(), _ -> 0);
SessionManager sm = new SessionManager(composite);
McpSchema.CallToolResult res = BridgeMcp.spawn(sm, "ltms-local");
assertTrue(res.isError());
String text = textOf(res);
assertTrue(text.contains("no capacity"), "surfaces a capacity reason, not a bare error: " + text);
assertTrue(text.contains("ltms-local"), "names the profile: " + text);
assertTrue(text.contains("maxLoad"), "explains the refusal: " + text);
assertFalse(h.called("agent.start"), "at cap, the spawn is refused before any herdr call");
}
@Test
void spawnPassesTheRequestedCwdToTheWorker() {
FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import java.util.List;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
@@ -166,6 +167,88 @@ class AmqpReplyInboxContractTest {
}
}
@Test
void prefetchBoundsTheHeldBacklog() throws Exception {
String target = "worker-prefetch-" + System.nanoTime();
int prefetch = 4;
int published = 10;
try (AmqpReplyInbox inbox = new AmqpReplyInbox(newConnection(), prefetch);
Connection inspect = newConnection()) {
inbox.own(target);
for (int i = 0; i < published; i++) {
inbox.publish(target, "m" + i, "payload " + i);
}
awaitHeldAtLeast(inbox, target, prefetch);
long depth;
try (Channel ch = inspect.createChannel()) {
depth = ch.queueDeclarePassive(queueName(target)).getMessageCount();
}
assertTrue(depth >= published - prefetch,
"broker should still hold at least " + (published - prefetch)
+ " undelivered messages behind a prefetch of " + prefetch + ", saw " + depth);
drainUntilEmpty(inbox, target, inspect);
}
}
@Test
void unroutablePublishReportsFailureNotSilentSuccess() throws Exception {
String target = "worker-unroutable-" + System.nanoTime();
try (AmqpReplyInbox inbox = AmqpReplyInbox.open(uri())) {
// Deliberately never own(target): the queue is never declared, so the default-exchange
// route to agent.<target>.inbox does not exist and the broker must return the publish.
IllegalStateException ex = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class,
() -> inbox.publish(target, "m1", "nobody home"));
assertTrue(ex.getMessage() != null && ex.getMessage().toLowerCase().contains("unroutable"),
"expected an unroutable-publish failure, got: " + ex.getMessage());
}
}
@Test
void confirmedPublishDeliversNormally() throws Exception {
String target = "worker-confirm-" + System.nanoTime();
try (AmqpReplyInbox inbox = AmqpReplyInbox.open(uri())) {
inbox.own(target);
inbox.publish(target, "m1", "confirmed delivery"); // must return normally: routed and confirmed
List<ReplyInbox.InboxMessage> got = awaitPeek(inbox, target);
assertEquals(1, got.size());
assertEquals("confirmed delivery", got.getFirst().content());
inbox.ack(target, "m1");
}
}
/** Poll peek until at least {@code n} replies for {@code target} are held, or ~10s elapse. */
@SuppressWarnings("BusyWait")
private static void awaitHeldAtLeast(AmqpReplyInbox inbox, String target, int n) throws InterruptedException {
long deadline = System.nanoTime() + TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(10);
while (inbox.peek(target).size() < n && System.nanoTime() < deadline) {
Thread.sleep(50);
}
}
/**
* Repeatedly ack whatever is currently held (freeing prefetch slots for the next delivery) until
* both the local snapshot and the broker's own queue depth are empty, or ~10s elapse.
*/
@SuppressWarnings("BusyWait")
private static void drainUntilEmpty(AmqpReplyInbox inbox, String target, Connection inspect) throws Exception {
long deadline = System.nanoTime() + TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(10);
while (System.nanoTime() < deadline) {
for (ReplyInbox.InboxMessage msg : inbox.peek(target)) {
inbox.ack(target, msg.msgId());
}
try (Channel ch = inspect.createChannel()) {
if (ch.queueDeclarePassive(queueName(target)).getMessageCount() == 0 && inbox.peek(target).isEmpty()) {
return;
}
}
Thread.sleep(50);
}
throw new AssertionError("did not drain " + target + " to empty within the deadline");
}
/** Poll peek (broker delivery is async) until a reply for {@code target} appears or ~10s elapse. */
@SuppressWarnings("BusyWait") // deliberate poll for async broker delivery, bounded by the deadline
private static List<ReplyInbox.InboxMessage> awaitPeek(AmqpReplyInbox inbox, String target)
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
package dev.ltms.bridged.msg;
import com.rabbitmq.client.AMQP;
import com.rabbitmq.client.Channel;
import com.rabbitmq.client.ConfirmCallback;
import com.rabbitmq.client.Connection;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Timeout;
import java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler;
import java.lang.reflect.Proxy;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.concurrent.CopyOnWriteArrayList;
import java.util.concurrent.CountDownLatch;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicReference;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNotNull;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNull;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* CB-528 follow-up: {@link AmqpReplyInbox#failPendingPublishesOnRecovery()} must not fail a publish
* that registers concurrently with (and was not yet visible when) the recovery sweep began — that
* would report a publish that actually succeeded as failed, and {@code MessageService.reply} retries
* with a fresh {@code msgId}, so the reply is delivered twice. A live broker reconnect cannot be
* forced reliably, so this drives {@link AmqpReplyInbox#failPendingPublishesOnRecovery} and a real
* {@link AmqpReplyInbox#publish} against each other directly, against fake AMQP channels built with
* {@link Proxy} (no mocking library is on the classpath).
*
* <p>Also covers Finding 2 (CB-528 follow-up): {@link AmqpReplyInbox#close()} must fail an in-flight
* publish promptly instead of leaving it to idle out the 10s confirm timeout.
*/
class AmqpReplyInboxRecoveryRaceTest {
/** Large enough that thousands of entries are still unprocessed by the time the very first one
* is observed as failed (see {@code sweepIsHoldingTheLock} below) — that gap is what makes the
* head start deterministic instead of a coin flip. 100,000 gave the same guarantee but made the
* test far more expensive than the guarantee needs; the ordering no longer depends on a timing
* window sized to the full backlog; just to the tail of it. */
private static final int STALE_PUBLISHES = 2_000;
@Test
@Timeout(30)
void recoverySweepDoesNotFailAPublishThatRegistersWhileItIsRunning() throws Exception {
AtomicLong seqCounter = new AtomicLong();
List<Long> seqOrder = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
List<String> msgIdOrder = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
AtomicReference<ConfirmCallback> ackCallback = new AtomicReference<>();
AtomicReference<ConfirmCallback> nackCallback = new AtomicReference<>();
Channel publishChannel = fakeChannel(seqCounter, seqOrder, msgIdOrder, ackCallback, nackCallback);
Channel consumeChannel = fakeChannel(seqCounter, seqOrder, msgIdOrder, ackCallback, nackCallback);
Connection connection = fakeConnection(consumeChannel, publishChannel);
AmqpReplyInbox inbox = new AmqpReplyInbox(connection, AmqpReplyInbox.DEFAULT_PREFETCH);
// STALE_PUBLISHES in-flight publishes that never get confirmed — they sit in pendingBySeq /
// pendingByMsgId exactly like publishes whose confirm never arrived before a connection drop.
// Virtual threads make this many concurrent blocking publish() calls cheap.
CountDownLatch staleStarted = new CountDownLatch(STALE_PUBLISHES);
// Counted down by the FIRST stale publish thread to observe its own failure. That can only
// happen from inside failPendingPublishesOnRecovery() — nothing else in this test ever
// completes a stale Pending exceptionally (no nack/return is simulated for any "stale-*"
// msgId) — so seeing it fire is direct, observable proof the sweep is inside its loop, not a
// timing guess. It replaces the old fixed Thread.sleep(5) head start.
CountDownLatch sweepIsHoldingTheLock = new CountDownLatch(1);
for (int i = 0; i < STALE_PUBLISHES; i++) {
String msgId = "stale-" + i;
Thread.ofVirtual().start(() -> {
staleStarted.countDown();
try {
inbox.publish("worker-stale", msgId, "x");
} catch (IllegalStateException expected) {
sweepIsHoldingTheLock.countDown();
}
});
}
staleStarted.await();
// Let the registrations (the synchronized put into pendingBySeq/pendingByMsgId) actually land
// for all of them before the sweep starts, so the sweep begins with a large, real backlog.
Thread.sleep(300);
AtomicReference<Throwable> sweepError = new AtomicReference<>();
Thread sweepThread = new Thread(() -> {
try {
inbox.failPendingPublishesOnRecovery();
} catch (Throwable t) {
sweepError.set(t);
}
}, "recovery-sweep");
sweepThread.start();
// Deterministic head start: block until the sweep has actually failed one of the stale
// publishes. failPendingPublishesOnRecovery() (once guarded, as it is on main) holds
// publishChannelLock for its ENTIRE loop, not just per entry — so this failure proves the
// sweep is, at this instant, still holding that lock. With STALE_PUBLISHES this large, the
// remaining ~1,999 entries give an enormous margin between "first failure observed" and "sweep
// releases the lock": there is no window left for "fresh" to slip in before the sweep starts,
// or to win the lock ahead of it — see the case-2 note below. This also means Case 1 (the sweep
// is already inside its loop, holding the lock, when "fresh" tries to register) is now
// guaranteed by construction rather than merely likely under a fixed sleep.
assertTrue(sweepIsHoldingTheLock.await(20, TimeUnit.SECONDS),
"the sweep never failed a single stale publish — it may not have started");
// Case 2 ("fresh" wins publishChannelLock before the sweep even starts, so it genuinely
// published on the stale channel and the sweep correctly fails it) is impossible by
// construction in this test: freshThread.start() below is reached only after
// sweepIsHoldingTheLock has counted down, which can only happen once
// failPendingPublishesOnRecovery() is already running and has already failed a stale entry.
// There is no code path that lets "fresh" start before the sweep starts. That case is real
// and correct production behaviour (see AmqpReplyInbox#failPendingPublishesOnRecovery's
// javadoc), it is just not reachable from this deterministic ordering, so it does not need a
// separate assertion here.
// This is the exact interleaving CB-528's follow-up describes: "the still-running recovery
// sweep" racing a publish that registers while it is mid-flight.
AtomicReference<Throwable> publishError = new AtomicReference<>();
Thread freshThread = new Thread(() -> {
try {
inbox.publish("worker-fresh", "fresh", "hello");
} catch (Throwable t) {
publishError.set(t);
}
}, "fresh-publish");
freshThread.start();
sweepThread.join(20_000);
assertNull(sweepError.get(), "sweep threw: " + sweepError.get());
// Simulate the broker's real confirm for "fresh" now that the sweep is done, so a correct
// implementation's publish() returns normally instead of idling out CONFIRM_TIMEOUT_MS. Poll
// for the registration rather than checking once: freshThread may still be contending for
// publishChannelLock (behind the sweep's own hold on it, and possibly other stale threads
// still unwinding) even though the sweep itself has already finished.
long deadline = System.nanoTime() + TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(9);
int idx = -1;
while (idx < 0 && System.nanoTime() < deadline) {
idx = msgIdOrder.indexOf("fresh");
if (idx < 0) {
Thread.sleep(20);
}
}
if (idx >= 0 && ackCallback.get() != null) {
ackCallback.get().handle(seqOrder.get(idx), false);
}
freshThread.join(15_000);
assertNull(publishError.get(),
"a publish that registered while the recovery sweep was running must not be failed by "
+ "it, but got: " + publishError.get());
}
@Test
@Timeout(15)
void closeFailsInFlightPublishPromptlyInsteadOfWaitingOutTheConfirmTimeout() throws Exception {
AtomicLong seqCounter = new AtomicLong();
List<Long> seqOrder = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
List<String> msgIdOrder = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
AtomicReference<ConfirmCallback> ackCallback = new AtomicReference<>();
AtomicReference<ConfirmCallback> nackCallback = new AtomicReference<>();
Channel publishChannel = fakeChannel(seqCounter, seqOrder, msgIdOrder, ackCallback, nackCallback);
Channel consumeChannel = fakeChannel(seqCounter, seqOrder, msgIdOrder, ackCallback, nackCallback);
Connection connection = fakeConnection(consumeChannel, publishChannel);
AmqpReplyInbox inbox = new AmqpReplyInbox(connection, AmqpReplyInbox.DEFAULT_PREFETCH);
CountDownLatch publishReturned = new CountDownLatch(1);
AtomicReference<Throwable> publishError = new AtomicReference<>();
AtomicLong elapsedMillis = new AtomicLong();
Thread publishThread = new Thread(() -> {
long start = System.nanoTime();
try {
inbox.publish("worker-close", "never-confirmed", "x");
} catch (Throwable t) {
publishError.set(t);
} finally {
elapsedMillis.set((System.nanoTime() - start) / 1_000_000);
publishReturned.countDown();
}
}, "publish-during-close");
publishThread.start();
Thread.sleep(200); // let publish() register before close() runs
inbox.close();
assertTrue(publishReturned.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS), "publish() did not return after close()");
assertNotNull(publishError.get(), "a publish in flight when close() runs must fail, not hang");
assertTrue(publishError.get().getMessage() != null
&& publishError.get().getMessage().toLowerCase().contains("closed"),
"expected a clear closed-inbox message, got: " + publishError.get());
assertTrue(elapsedMillis.get() < 5_000,
"close() should fail the in-flight publish promptly, not wait out the confirm timeout — took "
+ elapsedMillis.get() + "ms");
}
/** A {@link Proxy}-backed {@link Channel}: only the calls {@link AmqpReplyInbox} actually makes
* are meaningfully implemented; everything else returns a harmless default. */
private static Channel fakeChannel(AtomicLong seqCounter, List<Long> seqOrder, List<String> msgIdOrder,
AtomicReference<ConfirmCallback> ackCallback,
AtomicReference<ConfirmCallback> nackCallback) {
InvocationHandler handler = (proxy, method, args) -> {
String name = method.getName();
if (name.equals("getNextPublishSeqNo")) {
long value = seqCounter.incrementAndGet();
seqOrder.add(value);
return value;
}
if (name.equals("basicPublish")) {
AMQP.BasicProperties props = (AMQP.BasicProperties) args[3];
msgIdOrder.add(props.getMessageId());
return null;
}
if (name.equals("addConfirmListener")) {
ackCallback.set((ConfirmCallback) args[0]);
nackCallback.set((ConfirmCallback) args[1]);
return null;
}
if (name.equals("equals")) {
return proxy == args[0];
}
if (name.equals("hashCode")) {
return System.identityHashCode(proxy);
}
if (name.equals("toString")) {
return "FakeChannel";
}
return defaultValue(method.getReturnType());
};
return (Channel) Proxy.newProxyInstance(AmqpReplyInboxRecoveryRaceTest.class.getClassLoader(),
new Class<?>[] {Channel.class}, handler);
}
/** A {@link Proxy}-backed {@link Connection} handing out {@code first} then {@code second} from
* successive {@code createChannel()} calls, matching {@link AmqpReplyInbox}'s constructor. */
private static Connection fakeConnection(Channel first, Channel second) {
AtomicInteger calls = new AtomicInteger();
InvocationHandler handler = (proxy, method, args) -> {
String name = method.getName();
if (name.equals("createChannel") && (args == null || args.length == 0)) {
return calls.getAndIncrement() == 0 ? first : second;
}
if (name.equals("equals")) {
return proxy == args[0];
}
if (name.equals("hashCode")) {
return System.identityHashCode(proxy);
}
if (name.equals("toString")) {
return "FakeConnection";
}
return defaultValue(method.getReturnType());
};
return (Connection) Proxy.newProxyInstance(AmqpReplyInboxRecoveryRaceTest.class.getClassLoader(),
new Class<?>[] {Connection.class}, handler);
}
private static Object defaultValue(Class<?> type) {
if (!type.isPrimitive() || type == void.class) {
return null;
}
if (type == boolean.class) {
return Boolean.FALSE;
}
if (type == long.class) {
return 0L;
}
if (type == short.class) {
return (short) 0;
}
if (type == byte.class) {
return (byte) 0;
}
if (type == char.class) {
return (char) 0;
}
if (type == double.class) {
return 0.0d;
}
if (type == float.class) {
return 0.0f;
}
return 0;
}
}
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ class ReplyPushLoopTest {
private static final String PRIMARY = "term_primary";
private static final String WORKER = "term_worker";
private static final String WORKER2 = "term_worker2";
private static final ObjectMapper MAPPER = new ObjectMapper();
private PrimaryRegistry registry;
@@ -579,6 +580,83 @@ class ReplyPushLoopTest {
"both the reply and the ticket source are at their own cap — must still stop");
}
// --- CB-598: work arriving during a backoff must not read as stale backlog -------------------
@Test
void aTargetArrivingDuringTheBackoffGetsNudgedDespiteAnAlreadyCappedSibling() {
// The bug: reminder counts used to be a single counter per lead per source, carried
// forward across scheduled ticks (scheduleNext(lead, count + 1, ...)) rather than tracked
// per pending item. WORKER gets nudged once here, which — with cap=1 — exhausts the
// shared reply-source counter for this lead. WORKER2 then queues a reply for the SAME
// lead "during the backoff": while the schedule from WORKER's tick is still active, before
// the next tick's own start-of-tick snapshot runs. At that next tick, the OLD code passed
// the already-exhausted shared counter into decide() regardless of WORKER2 never having
// been named in any nudge, and — because WORKER2 was already present in that tick's
// "before" snapshot — stopOrRestart's race check (proven correct on its own elsewhere in
// this file) does not save it either: it looks like ordinary stale backlog, not a race.
// WORKER2 was then stranded forever with no live schedule and no nudge ever naming it.
//
// tick() is driven directly (package-private, same reasoning as stopOrRestart being
// directly testable) so the exact interleaving is deterministic instead of racing the
// scheduler thread over a real ~15s backoff.
//
// Before the fix, this test fails on the second assertEquals: rec.sendCount() stays at 1
// (decide() returns STOP on the second tick(), so injectNudge is never called a second
// time) and the "must still get one" assertion never even runs.
int cap = 1;
var rec = recordingClient();
agents = new AgentControl(rec);
inbox.own(WORKER2);
inbox.publish(WORKER, "m1", "hello");
var loop = loop(cap, 100_000); // huge backoff — nothing fires on its own; we drive tick()
loop.onReplyQueued(WORKER);
loop.tick(PRIMARY); // first tick: nudges WORKER alone; WORKER's own count reaches the cap
assertEquals(1, rec.sendCount(), "the first tick should nudge about WORKER");
// WORKER2 "arrives during the backoff": queued for the same lead while the schedule from
// the tick above is still active (activeLeads still holds PRIMARY), before the next tick
// (simulated below) takes its own start-of-tick snapshot.
inbox.publish(WORKER2, "m2", "hello2");
loop.onReplyQueued(WORKER2);
loop.tick(PRIMARY); // the tick that would fire once that backoff elapsed
assertEquals(2, rec.sendCount(),
"WORKER2 was never named in any nudge yet and must still get one, even though "
+ "WORKER's own reminder count is already at the cap");
String secondNudge = rec.sentParams().get(1).getValue().toString();
assertTrue(secondNudge.contains(WORKER2), "the never-named target must be named: " + secondNudge);
// Criterion #3: isActive() must reflect that this lead still had a live nudge to give —
// the second tick took the INJECT branch, so the schedule stayed live rather than being
// torn down under WORKER2.
assertTrue(loop.isActive(), "the schedule must stay active after nudging the fresh target");
}
@Test
void aTicketArrivingDuringTheBackoffGetsNudgedDespiteAnAlreadyCappedSibling() {
// Mirrors the reply-side test above for the ticket source.
int cap = 1;
var rec = recordingClient();
agents = new AgentControl(rec);
var loop = loop(cap, 100_000);
loop.onTicketTerminal("task-1", WORKER, false);
loop.tick(PRIMARY); // first tick: nudges task-1 alone; its count reaches the cap
assertEquals(1, rec.sendCount(), "the first tick should nudge about task-1");
loop.onTicketTerminal("task-2", WORKER, false); // arrives during the backoff, same lead
loop.tick(PRIMARY);
assertEquals(2, rec.sendCount(),
"task-2 was never named in any nudge yet and must still get one, even though "
+ "task-1's reminder count is already at the cap");
String secondNudge = rec.sentParams().get(1).getValue().toString();
assertTrue(secondNudge.contains("task-2"), "the never-named ticket must be named: " + secondNudge);
assertTrue(loop.isActive(), "the schedule must stay active after nudging the fresh ticket");
}
// --- metrics (CB-512) ----------------------------------------------------------------------
@Test
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ import dev.ltms.bridged.session.GitWorktrees;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.SessionManager;
import dev.ltms.bridged.session.Worktrees;
import dev.ltms.bridged.member.ClaudeCodeLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.member.CompositePeerLauncher;
import dev.ltms.bridged.placement.PlacementPolicies;
import io.javalin.Javalin;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
@@ -240,6 +242,43 @@ class BridgedAppTest {
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.start"), "an unknown profile must not spawn anything");
}
/**
* CB-599: a profile at its {@code maxLoad} cap must not surface as a bare 500 — the caller
* needs a structured, readable reason, distinct from "unknown_profile".
*/
@Test
void spawnAtMaxLoadIs503WithTheCapacityReasonNotABare500() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
BridgedConfig.Profile wcfg = new BridgedConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "BRIDGED_WORKER_TOKEN", null,
"tab", "bridged-workers", "worker: {profile} #{n}", null,
null, null, null, null, null, null, null, 0, null, null, null);
Map<String, BridgedConfig.Profile> profiles = Map.of(wcfg.profile(), wcfg);
ClaudeCodeLauncher delegate = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(
new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr), new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")),
profiles, wcfg.profile(), k -> "BRIDGED_WORKER_TOKEN".equals(k) ? "tok-abc" : null);
CompositePeerLauncher workers = new CompositePeerLauncher(
List.of(delegate), wcfg.profile(), profiles, PlacementPolicies.fixed(), _ -> 0);
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workers, new GitWorktrees());
this.presence = sessions.asPresence();
Injector injector = new Injector(new AgentControl(herdr));
InMemoryReplyInbox inbox = new InMemoryReplyInbox();
sessions.onAcquire(inbox::own);
MessageService messages = new MessageService(new AgentControl(herdr), injector, new Rendezvous(), inbox);
app = new BridgedApp(herdr, workers, sessions, messages, this.presence, null).build().start("127.0.0.1", 0);
int port = app.port();
HttpResponse<String> res = req(port, "POST", "/members?profile=ltms-local");
assertEquals(503, res.statusCode(), res.body());
JsonNode body = mapper.readTree(res.body());
assertEquals("no_capacity", body.get("error").asText());
String detail = body.get("detail").asText();
assertTrue(detail.contains("ltms-local"), "detail names the profile: " + detail);
assertTrue(detail.contains("maxLoad"), "detail explains the refusal: " + detail);
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.start"), "at cap, the spawn is refused before any herdr call");
}
@Test
void spawnWorkerReusesExistingWorkerSpace() throws Exception {
// A space labelled "bridged-workers" already exists → no second workspace.create.
@@ -422,6 +422,28 @@ class WorktreeSessionManagerTest {
"acceptance criterion 6: a failed ticket's detail must carry the snapshot ref");
}
@Test
void releaseNotifiesTheListenerWithTheAgentSessionId() {
// CB-584 (issue #65 criterion 5): a failed ticket's detail must also name the agent
// session, alongside worktree/branch/snapshot, so a lead can resume the conversation
// rather than only re-dispatch a fresh member onto the same files.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FakeWorktrees worktrees = new FakeWorktrees().withRepoRoot("/repo").withPrefix("/wt")
.withDirty(true);
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workerService(herdr), worktrees);
java.util.List<SessionManager.ReleaseDetail> released = new java.util.concurrent.CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
sessions.onRelease(released::add);
MemberSession s = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", MemberRole.DEV, null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-584-e", null), "cb-584-session", null);
assertNotNull(s.agentSessionId(), "a named session must mint an agent session id to assert on");
sessions.release(s.paneId());
assertEquals(1, released.size());
SessionManager.ReleaseDetail detail = released.getFirst();
assertEquals(s.agentSessionId(), detail.agentSessionId());
}
@Test
void aFailingSnapshotStillPreservesTheWorktreeStopsThePaneAndNotifies() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
+62 -15
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<!--
CB-504 — launchd agent for bridged (macOS).
CB-504 / CB-594 — launchd agent for bridged (macOS).
This is the real supervision target today: the dogfooded daemon runs on macOS, where there is
no systemd. A systemd unit ships alongside (deploy/bridged.service) for the Linux gateways
@@ -9,14 +9,33 @@
Install:
cp deploy/dev.ltms.bridged.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents/
# edit the paths + JAVA_HOME below to match this host, then:
launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.ltms.bridged.plist
launchctl list | grep bridged
The paths below are already filled in for this host (resolved 2026-08-16 from
`/usr/libexec/java_home`... except that reported the system Applet-plugin JVM, not the jenv-
managed JDK 25 actually used to build/run bridged, so JAVA_HOME here is the real one:
`JENV_VERSION=25.0.3 java -XshowSettings:properties -version 2>&1 | grep java.home`; `which mvn`;
`echo $HOME`). If this file is copied to a different host, re-resolve all three paths and check
no placeholder path is left behind; scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh's check mode does not (and
cannot) check this file for you.
CB-594 — launchd cannot run a login shell (see the PATH comment on EnvironmentVariables below,
and scripts/bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh for the fix): ProgramArguments below execs THAT wrapper,
not java directly, so WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN and AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN still get sourced from
${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh even though launchd itself never sources anything.
Note on ordering: launchd has no "start after herdr" primitive for user agents, and neither
does systemd in a way that survives a socket appearing late. bridged retries the herdr socket
on startup instead, so an agent that comes up before herdr converges rather than dying — that
retry is the actual fix; KeepAlive below is the backstop.
CB-594 — KeepAlive vs. scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh: a bare SIGTERM makes this JVM exit 143 even
with its shutdown hook running to completion (measured, see the CB-594 report), which
SuccessfulExit:false below reads as a crash and races to restart the OLD jar. The redeploy
script now detects a loaded agent and uses `launchctl unload`/`load` instead of a raw kill, so
only one supervisor ever touches the process at a time — read that script's own output on a
redeploy for the confirmation.
-->
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
@@ -25,22 +44,23 @@
<key>ProgramArguments</key>
<array>
<string>/Users/CHANGEME/Tool/jdk-25.0.2.jdk/Contents/Home/bin/java</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/scripts/bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/Softwares/jdks/jdk-25.0.3.jdk/Contents/Home/bin/java</string>
<string>-jar</string>
<string>/Users/CHANGEME/src/claude-bridge/bridged/target/bridged.jar</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/bridged/target/bridged.jar</string>
<string>bridged.yaml</string>
</array>
<!-- Config path in ProgramArguments is relative, so the working directory must be the module. -->
<key>WorkingDirectory</key>
<string>/Users/CHANGEME/src/claude-bridge/bridged</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/bridged</string>
<key>EnvironmentVariables</key>
<dict>
<key>JAVA_HOME</key>
<string>/Users/CHANGEME/Tool/jdk-25.0.2.jdk/Contents/Home</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/Softwares/jdks/jdk-25.0.3.jdk/Contents/Home</string>
<key>HERDR_SOCKET_PATH</key>
<string>/Users/CHANGEME/.config/herdr/herdr.sock</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/.config/herdr/herdr.sock</string>
<!--
PATH matters more than it looks (CB-511): bridged propagates its own PATH to every worker
it spawns, so this line decides whether the fleet can run a build at all. launchd does NOT
@@ -48,19 +68,39 @@
bare /usr/bin:/bin and no JDK or Maven. Keep the toolchain entries first.
-->
<key>PATH</key>
<string>/Users/CHANGEME/Tool/jdk-25.0.2.jdk/Contents/Home/bin:/Users/CHANGEME/Tool/apache-maven-3.9.16/bin:/opt/homebrew/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/Softwares/jdks/jdk-25.0.3.jdk/Contents/Home/bin:/Users/dai.ha/Softwares/apache-maven/bin:/opt/homebrew/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin</string>
<!--
Worker/API tokens are NOT set here: this file is committed. Export them from a private
launchd override or a wrapper script. bridged reads the API token from the env var named
by auth.tokenEnv (default BRIDGED_API_TOKEN) and only in auth.mode: token.
Worker/API tokens are NOT set here: this file is committed. CB-594 —
scripts/bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh (named in ProgramArguments above) is what supplies
them, by execing a login shell that sources ${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh before the
daemon itself starts. bridged also reads the API token from the env var named by
auth.tokenEnv (default BRIDGED_API_TOKEN) and only in auth.mode: token — the wrapper
covers that one too, since it is the same login shell.
-->
</dict>
<key>RunAtLoad</key>
<true/>
<!-- Restart on crash, but not in a tight loop if the config is bad (bridged fails fast on a
non-loopback bind without token auth — that is a config error, not a transient one). -->
<!--
CB-600 — read this before assuming ThrottleInterval bounds anything. It paces restarts to at
most one per 10s; it does NOT cap how many times launchd retries. If bridged fails fast on
every start — a bad bridged.yaml, for example auth.mode: token with the token env var unset,
which throws in main() before the daemon ever binds a port — launchd restarts it forever,
once every 10s, until a human intervenes. LaunchAgents have no "give up after N attempts"
primitive, so this is not something a config change here can fix.
That loop stops only two ways: (1) `launchctl unload -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.ltms.bridged.plist`,
or (2) the underlying cause gets fixed, so the process starts successfully and stays up (no
more exits to restart). scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh does not add a third way — it does not
make bridged self-disable on a config error, on purpose: a fail-fast exit path that
sometimes decides "this is unrecoverable, stop trying" is one more thing that can misfire,
and a wrongly self-disabled daemon needs the exact same manual `launchctl load -w` recovery
this comment already names — so it buys nothing an operator watching for the crash loop
doesn't already have, at the cost of a new way to be silently down. Watch for it with
`launchctl list dev.ltms.bridged` (a high restart count) or by tailing bridged.out for the
same startup error repeating every ~10s.
-->
<key>KeepAlive</key>
<dict>
<key>SuccessfulExit</key>
@@ -69,10 +109,17 @@
<key>ThrottleInterval</key>
<integer>10</integer>
<!--
CB-594 — same file scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh already tails ($BRIDGED/bridged.out), and both
streams point at it, not two separate log files: the script's fresh-line / ERROR-count checks
after a restart read this one path regardless of whether launchd or the script started the
process, and a stdout/stderr split would make half of what happens during a launchd-driven
restart invisible to it.
-->
<key>StandardOutPath</key>
<string>/Users/CHANGEME/src/claude-bridge/bridged/logs/bridged.out.log</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/bridged/bridged.out</string>
<key>StandardErrorPath</key>
<string>/Users/CHANGEME/src/claude-bridge/bridged/logs/bridged.err.log</string>
<string>/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/claude-bridge/bridged/bridged.out</string>
<key>ProcessType</key>
<string>Background</string>
+32
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# CB-594 — the only reason this file exists: launchd does not run a login shell.
#
# WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN and AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN live in ${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh, sourced only by a
# LOGIN shell (.zprofile/.zshrc etc). launchd execs a job's ProgramArguments directly — no shell, no
# profile, nothing sourced (the plist's own PATH comment documents the same gap one variable over).
# A daemon started that way boots fine and looks healthy; the failure is invisible until a worker
# tries to open a PR (WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN empty) or a gateway profile gets a 401 (AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
# empty) — hours later, with nothing tying the two together (CB-591, CLAUDE.md "Redeploying the
# daemon"). Bridged now also logs which required secret names resolved at startup (see
# Bridged.reportRequiredSecrets), but that log line can only tell the truth if the tokens had a
# chance to be sourced in the first place — which is this script's entire job.
#
# So: launchd execs THIS script instead of java directly. This script execs a login shell
# ('zsh -l'), which sources secrets.sh, and that shell execs the real command in its place — one
# process throughout (exec, not a subshell fork), so launchd's PID tracking, KeepAlive, and
# StandardOut/ErrorPath all still see the one process they expect.
#
# The plist passes the full command as THIS script's own arguments, e.g.:
# ProgramArguments = [ .../bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh, /path/to/java, -jar, /path/to/bridged.jar,
# bridged.yaml ]
# so the wrapper stays generic and the actual command lives in exactly one place (the plist), not
# duplicated here.
set -euo pipefail
if [ "$#" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh: no command given — check the plist's ProgramArguments" >&2
exit 2
fi
exec /bin/zsh -lc 'exec "$@"' -- "$@"
+137 -9
View File
@@ -5,13 +5,14 @@
# A merge is not a deployment: the running daemon holds the jar it was started with, so code merged
# to main does nothing until this runs. See CLAUDE.md -> "Redeploying the daemon".
#
# This script exists to turn five remembered traps into one auditable command:
# This script exists to turn six remembered traps into one auditable command:
#
# 1. A piped `mvn` hides BUILD FAILURE behind a zero exit, so the build here is never piped.
# 2. The daemon must start from a LOGIN shell, or the tokens it hands to members are empty:
# WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN (workers cannot open a PR) and AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN (401 at llm.ltms.dev).
# Both are read from the DAEMON's own environment at spawn time, so a value added to
# secrets.sh after startup is absent. Nothing logs this, so the script checks and says so.
# secrets.sh after startup is absent. Nothing logs this here, so the script checks and says
# so — and since CB-594, bridged's own startup log says so too, by env var name.
# 3. An old daemon that never actually died looks identical from the outside, so the script waits
# for the process to exit and for the port to free before it starts a new one.
# 4. "It started" is not "it works": the script polls /healthz until it answers, and reports the
@@ -19,6 +20,13 @@
# mismatch.
# 5. Restarting under live members drops their tickets, so the script refuses unless you confirm
# the fleet is drained.
# 6. CB-594 — the launchd agent (deploy/dev.ltms.bridged.plist), if installed and loaded, is a
# SECOND supervisor: its KeepAlive.SuccessfulExit=false restarts the daemon on any nonzero
# exit, and a bare SIGTERM makes this JVM exit 143 even with its shutdown hook running to
# completion (measured — see the CB-594 report). A plain `kill` here would race launchd's own
# restart of the OLD jar. So this script detects whether the agent is loaded and, only then,
# swaps `kill` + manual `nohup` for `launchctl unload`/`load` — the one supervisor in control
# at any moment is whichever one you asked to act, never both.
#
# Usage:
# scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh # build, confirm, restart, verify
@@ -43,13 +51,17 @@ HEALTH='http://127.0.0.1:8765/healthz'
STOP_WAIT=30 # seconds to wait for a clean exit before reporting failure
HEALTH_WAIT=60 # seconds to wait for /healthz to answer after start
# CB-594: the launchd agent this script must not fight with (see trap 6 above).
LAUNCHD_LABEL='dev.ltms.bridged'
LAUNCHD_PLIST="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/$LAUNCHD_LABEL.plist"
DO_BUILD=1; ASSUME_YES=0; CHECK_ONLY=0
for arg in "$@"; do
case "$arg" in
--yes|-y) ASSUME_YES=1 ;;
--no-build) DO_BUILD=0 ;;
--check) CHECK_ONLY=1 ;;
-h|--help) sed -n '3,30p' "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}"; exit 0 ;;
-h|--help) sed -n '3,37p' "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}"; exit 0 ;;
*) echo "unknown option: $arg (try --help)" >&2; exit 2 ;;
esac
done
@@ -61,6 +73,58 @@ die() { printf '\n FAIL %s\n\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
jar_id() { [ -f "$JAR" ] && shasum -a 256 "$JAR" | cut -c1-12 || echo "absent"; }
running_pid() { pgrep -f "$PATTERN" || true; }
# `launchctl list <label>` exits 0 iff the label is loaded (registered with launchd) — true whether
# or not it is currently running, which is exactly "supervision is active" for our purposes. Read-
# only: neither helper below changes anything, so both are also safe under --check.
launchd_installed() { [ -f "$LAUNCHD_PLIST" ]; }
launchd_loaded() { launchctl list "$LAUNCHD_LABEL" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
# CB-600: the script computes its own log path from where it sits on disk (REPO, above); the
# plist hard-codes an absolute StandardOutPath. Nothing forced the two to agree — if this script
# were ever run from a checkout other than the one the loaded plist names, launchd would start and
# log the daemon correctly, while every check below (the fresh "bridged listening" line, the
# ERROR-count scan) would read a different, empty or stale file and the script would report a
# clean restart while the daemon crash-loops. Pure and side-effect-free besides `die`/`ok` — reads
# the two paths, resolves them, compares — so it never touches launchd or the daemon and can be
# exercised by sourcing this script (see the SOURCED guard below) without installing the agent.
check_log_path_matches_plist() {
local script_out="$1" plist_path="$2"
local plist_out resolved_out resolved_plist_out
# Checked by exit status, not by emptiness: on a missing file/key PlistBuddy exits nonzero but
# still writes a message ("File Doesn't Exist, Will Create: ...") that command substitution
# would happily capture as if it were the real value — testing only `-z` missed that case.
if ! plist_out="$(/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Print :StandardOutPath' "$plist_path" 2>/dev/null)" \
|| [ -z "$plist_out" ]; then
die "launchd agent is loaded but PlistBuddy could not read StandardOutPath from
$plist_path
— cannot verify the daemon logs where this script is about to look. Fix the plist before
redeploying supervised."
fi
resolved_out="$(cd "$(dirname "$script_out")" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P)/$(basename "$script_out")" || true
resolved_plist_out="$(cd "$(dirname "$plist_out")" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P)/$(basename "$plist_out")" || true
if [ -z "$resolved_out" ] || [ -z "$resolved_plist_out" ] || [ "$resolved_out" != "$resolved_plist_out" ]; then
die "log path mismatch — this script reads
$script_out (resolved: ${resolved_out:-<directory does not exist>})
but the loaded plist's StandardOutPath is
$plist_out (resolved: ${resolved_plist_out:-<directory does not exist>})
Under supervision the daemon writes to the PLIST's path, not necessarily this script's — every
post-restart check below (the fresh 'bridged listening' line, the ERROR-count scan) would read
the wrong file and could report a clean restart while the daemon crash-loops. Fix the mismatch
(move this checkout to match the plist, or edit the plist's StandardOutPath/StandardErrorPath)
before redeploying supervised."
fi
ok "log path check: script and plist agree ($resolved_out)"
}
# CB-600: sourceable for testing. When this file is SOURCED (not executed) it stops here — nothing
# below runs — so a test harness can `source` it to call check_log_path_matches_plist (or the
# other pure helpers above) against a throwaway plist fixture without ever reaching the mutating
# flow (build/stop/start) or touching the real daemon or launchd. On a normal `./redeploy-bridged.sh`
# invocation `(return 0 2>/dev/null)` fails (return is illegal at top level of an executed script),
# so this whole block is a no-op and every line below still runs exactly as before.
if (return 0 2>/dev/null); then
return 0
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- report state
@@ -74,6 +138,25 @@ fi
ok "jar on disk: $(jar_id) ($([ -f "$JAR" ] && date -r "$JAR" '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S' || echo 'none'))"
ok "HEAD: $(git -C "$REPO" log --oneline -1)"
# CB-594: supervision state. Installed and loaded are different facts — a copied-but-never-loaded
# plist supervises nothing, and a loaded label with no file backing it (rare, but possible after an
# edited/moved plist) is still what launchd will act on.
if launchd_installed; then
ok "launchd agent installed: $LAUNCHD_PLIST"
else
warn "launchd agent NOT installed (no supervision — a crash will not restart the daemon)."
fi
SUPERVISED=0
if launchd_loaded; then
SUPERVISED=1
ok "launchd agent loaded ($LAUNCHD_LABEL) — launchd supervises this daemon"
# CB-600: fail loudly here, before ANY other check runs, if this script and the loaded plist
# would read different log files — every check after this point is worthless otherwise.
check_log_path_matches_plist "$OUT" "$LAUNCHD_PLIST"
else
warn "launchd agent not loaded — this script is the only thing that will restart the daemon."
fi
# The trap with no log line. Checked in a LOGIN shell, because that is how the daemon is started
# below. Never prints the value — only whether it resolved.
if zsh -lc '[ -n "${WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN:-}" ]' 2>/dev/null; then
@@ -137,11 +220,26 @@ if [ -n "$OLD_PID" ] && [ "$ASSUME_YES" = 0 ]; then
fi
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ stop
#
# CB-594: when SUPERVISED, launchd owns the stop — never a raw `kill` here. A bare SIGTERM makes
# this JVM exit 143 even with its shutdown hook running to completion (verified separately: a
# throwaway Java process with an equivalent shutdown hook, sent SIGTERM from a login shell that
# could `wait` on it directly, reported exit code 143 every time — never 0). launchd's
# KeepAlive.SuccessfulExit=false treats any nonzero exit as a crash and restarts the OLD jar,
# which would race this script's own restart of the NEW one. `launchctl unload` avoids that race
# by deregistering the job first, so no KeepAlive is left armed when the process actually stops.
if [ -n "$OLD_PID" ]; then
say "stop"
RESTART_MARK="$(wc -l < "$OUT" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" # verify a FRESH line appears later
kill "$OLD_PID"
if [ "$SUPERVISED" = 1 ]; then
echo " supervision is ON: using 'launchctl unload' (not kill) so launchd's own KeepAlive"
echo " cannot restart the OLD jar out from under this script — see the CB-594 comment above."
launchctl unload -w "$LAUNCHD_PLIST" \
|| die "launchctl unload failed — the daemon may still be under supervision; investigate before retrying"
else
kill "$OLD_PID"
fi
for _ in $(seq "$STOP_WAIT"); do
[ -z "$(running_pid)" ] && break
sleep 1
@@ -152,18 +250,48 @@ if [ -n "$OLD_PID" ]; then
leave worktrees and panes behind. Investigate, then kill -9 by hand if you accept that."
fi
ok "pid $OLD_PID exited"
elif [ "$SUPERVISED" = 1 ]; then
# Loaded but not currently running (e.g. throttled after a crash loop). Unload it anyway so the
# start step below does a clean load, never a load stacked on an already-loaded label.
say "stop"
RESTART_MARK="$(wc -l < "$OUT" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
launchctl unload -w "$LAUNCHD_PLIST" 2>/dev/null || true
ok "launchd agent unloaded (was already not running)"
else
RESTART_MARK="$(wc -l < "$OUT" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
fi
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ start
# Login shell (zsh -l) is what puts the secrets on the daemon's environment. cwd must be bridged/
# because the daemon resolves bridged.yaml, logs/ and target/ relative to it.
# Unsupervised: login shell (zsh -l) is what puts the secrets on the daemon's environment, and cwd
# must be bridged/ because the daemon resolves bridged.yaml, logs/ and target/ relative to it.
# Supervised: launchd does both — deploy/dev.ltms.bridged.plist points ProgramArguments at
# scripts/bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh (CB-594), which is what execs the login shell in launchd's
# place, and WorkingDirectory in the plist already pins bridged/.
say "start"
# Absolute jar path so `ps` names which checkout is running; cwd still bridged/ because the daemon
# resolves bridged.yaml, logs/ and target/ relative to it.
( cd "$BRIDGED" && zsh -lc "nohup java -jar '$JAR' >> bridged.out 2>&1 &" )
if [ "$SUPERVISED" = 1 ]; then
echo " supervision is ON: using 'launchctl load' so launchd starts and keeps supervising this"
echo " process, instead of a manual nohup that launchd would know nothing about."
# CB-600: 'launchctl unload -w' above already persisted Disabled=true for this label. A load -w
# that succeeds clears it; a load -w that FAILS leaves the agent both stopped and disabled — worse
# than before this script ran, because a later reboot or login will not bring it back either. One
# retry covers a transient race (e.g. launchd not yet fully done deregistering); if it still fails,
# die with the exact recovery command rather than a bare "failed".
if ! launchctl load -w "$LAUNCHD_PLIST" 2>/dev/null; then
warn "launchctl load failed on the first attempt — retrying once after a short pause"
sleep 2
launchctl load -w "$LAUNCHD_PLIST" || die "launchctl load failed twice.
The agent is now STOPPED and DISABLED — it will NOT come back on its own, not even after a
reboot or login, because 'launchctl unload -w' above persisted Disabled=true and load -w
never got the chance to clear it. Recover with:
launchctl load -w \"$LAUNCHD_PLIST\"
If that still fails, check 'launchctl list $LAUNCHD_LABEL', validate the plist with
'plutil -lint \"$LAUNCHD_PLIST\"', and check $OUT before assuming a retry will succeed."
fi
else
# Absolute jar path so `ps` names which checkout is running.
( cd "$BRIDGED" && zsh -lc "nohup java -jar '$JAR' >> bridged.out 2>&1 &" )
fi
for _ in $(seq 10); do
NEW_PID="$(running_pid)"