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Author SHA1 Message Date
Dai Ha bb29b001e4 fleetd #669 Unit C: add the COLLABORATOR role and its authorization row
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Adds Role.COLLABORATOR, Principal.collaborator(), and the Authz.permits grant:
READ/METRICS open, REPLY/ASK via ownership, SEND limited to a configured lead
or collaborator via a new classifier parameter, everything else denied.
isSpawnedMember() stays WORKER || ARCHITECT. fleet_whoami reports role and
collaborator name with no leader key.

Per a same-day ticket correction, the existing 3-argument Authz.permits is
kept (fail-closed default via the new NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR
classifier) rather than deleted, so the 47 pre-existing call sites in
AuthzTest/CallerResolverTest are untouched; both production gates
(FleetMcp#denyFor, FleetApp#allow via the new permitsFor seam) call the
4-argument form explicitly with the shared constant.

Mutation-verified: removing the classifier conjunct from the SEND arm kills
exactly 3 tests (AuthzTest, FleetMcpAuthzTest, FleetAppAuthTest), one per
gate, no cascade.

Full mvn clean install at this commit: 1974 tests, 0 failures (baseline at
f0ff252 was 1964; +10 are the new collaborator-matrix tests). Independently
counted from target/surefire-reports/*.xml after rm -rf: 173 report files,
aggregate tests=1974 failures=0 errors=0.
2026-10-04 00:22:27 +02:00
Dai Ha f0ff25221e Merge PR #697: fleetd #669 Unit B — recognise-only fleet.collaborators config block
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2026-10-04 00:02:10 +02:00
Dai Ha 780cb342ad fleetd #669: pin the fleet-wide tabLabel-vs-collaborator-tab check
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Adds a test driving validateLeadTabPrefixes()'s fleet-wide
fleet.tabLabel branch directly against a collaborator tab, with no
profile override involved. Every existing collaborator test exercised
only the profile-override branch below it, leaving the fleet-wide
branch without a pinning test.
2026-10-03 23:55:47 +02:00
Dai Ha 5c563f02c8 fleetd #669: comments-only fixes — drop history/narration and premature behaviour claims
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The duplicate-collaborator test's javadoc narrated the before/after and a
timestamp; replaced with the present-tense behaviour it protects, per the
project's code-comment rule.

The Collaborator record javadoc and fleetd.example.yaml both claimed the
daemon "learns to address" a collaborator tab. Nothing does yet — that is
Units C-E. Dropped the claim from the record's contract and the example
now says the block is parsed and validated today, nothing more.

Also drops a confidence marker and a cross-class pointer from the
Collaborator record javadoc. No logic, assertion, or file outside this
PR's existing three changed.
2026-10-03 23:47:16 +02:00
Dai Ha ad593c9bb9 fleetd #669: add collaborators to the duplicate-slot-key guard
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FLEET_POOL_KEYS was missing "collaborators", so a duplicated
fleet.collaborators.<name> key took the skipValue branch in
rejectDuplicateSlotsInPools and silently collapsed last-wins, unlike
the other five pools. Measured: before this change, a test loading a
config with a duplicated collaborator name observed no exception;
after, it fails exactly like the existing architect-pool case.

Also updates the javadoc's "five pools" count to six.
2026-10-03 23:41:13 +02:00
Dai Ha 736fd9cf4b Merge PR #696: fleetd #692 — bound the unbounded userinfo mask in redact()
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2026-10-03 23:33:37 +02:00
Dai Ha 05244a82b3 fleetd #669 Unit B: recognise-only fleet.collaborators config block
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Adds fleet.collaborators.<name>.tab (a Collaborator record with only a tab
field — no profile, no instances, no kind; never auto-launched) and widens
the two startup refusals that stop it being a privilege hole:

- validatePanePlacementAgainstLeadTabs() now fires on either a lead tab or
  a collaborator tab, and no longer early-returns when fleet.leaders is
  empty but fleet.collaborators is not.
- validateLeadTabPrefixes() now also refuses a tabLabel template able to
  render as a collaborator tab, two collaborators sharing one exact tab,
  and a collaborator tab equal to a lead tab (case-insensitively).

validateMembers() refuses a collaborator with no (or blank) tab, next to
the existing leader-must-name-a-tab check.

Does not touch Authz, CallerResolver, LeadTabScanner, MemberRole or
FleetMcp — those are later units per the ticket's plan.
2026-10-03 23:33:28 +02:00
Dai Ha ef4996a01e fleetd #692: bound the unbounded userinfo mask at redact()'s line 273
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redact()'s final fallthrough still used the unbounded [^@]* class #638
removed from the verdict-line masker, so a diff line with a URL that has
no userinfo plus a later @ elsewhere had its text between them silently
deleted. Share one bounded implementation, mask_url_userinfo(), between
redact() and mask_verdict_userinfo() so the bound lives in one place.
2026-10-03 23:27:15 +02:00
Dai Ha edbd8d816a Merge PR #694: fleetd #689 — check SEND before reading the request body in sendMessage
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2026-10-03 22:58:17 +02:00
Dai Ha d0688c8a60 Merge PR #695: fleetd #693 — pin the lead-tab guard's case-insensitivity; fleetd #676 — drop the last stale validator count
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2026-10-03 22:54:04 +02:00
Dai Ha 2c467c2553 fleetd #693, #676: pin lead-tab case-insensitivity, drop stale validator count
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#693: add a FleetConfigTest case for two fleet.leaders tabs differing only
in case — mutating equalsIgnoreCase to equals left this uncaught before.

#676: rename theSweepMechanismIsGenericNotHardcodedToFleetConfigsSixNames
to theSweepRunsEveryValidateMethodOnAnUnrelatedClass, since there are
eight validators now, not six, and the count had drifted into the name
and its class-javadoc {@link}.
2026-10-03 22:51:23 +02:00
Dai Ha bfee23acc3 Merge PR #691: fleetd #677 — refuse two leads sharing one exact tab (supersedes #686)
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2026-10-03 22:45:23 +02:00
Dai Ha 7dec74f1b4 Merge PR #690: fleetd #638 — stop the verdict userinfo mask from crossing / or whitespace (supersedes #685)
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2026-10-03 22:39:42 +02:00
Dai Ha 482598e2a6 fleetd #677: refuse two leads that share one exact tab
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validateLeadTabPrefixes() compared each lead's tab against the member
tabLabel template, but never against another lead's tab. Two leads
configured with the same exact tab loaded cleanly, even though exact
tab is the only thing lead identity is matched on, so only one of them
could ever be found.

Add an independent pass, case-insensitive, that refuses when two
fleet.leaders entries share one exact tab, with its own exception so
the message stays accurate for this relation.

Decided not to also refuse a lead's tab starting with a sibling's
tabPrefix: tabPrefix plays no role in identity resolution (only the
exact tab does), and the default tabPrefix is "lead:", the same
string used as the conventional lead tab prefix throughout this
codebase's own fixtures (e.g. "lead: opus" / "lead: sol"). Refusing
that case would reject the standard multi-lead setup with no matching
identity hazard.
2026-10-03 22:36:44 +02:00
Dai Ha 5f5d16fbd4 fleetd #638: stop the verdict userinfo mask from crossing / or whitespace
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mask_verdict_userinfo's character class [^@]* crossed a '/' or a space, so a
verdict line with a URI that has no userinfo plus a later @ (e.g. an email
address in diagnostic prose) had everything between them destroyed. Restrict
the class to [^@/[:space:]]* so the match stops at the end of the URI.

Adds the uncovered-direction test: a URI with no userinfo plus a later @ in
the same line must pass through byte for byte. Also drops the design-rationale
sentence from the helper's comment (now in the PR description).
2026-10-03 22:34:02 +02:00
Dai Ha 7df7985a16 Merge remote-tracking branch 'refs/remotes/pr/686' into worker/677-fix-lead-collision-f69073-12 2026-10-03 22:29:29 +02:00
Dai Ha 724b35b46e Merge remote-tracking branch 'refs/remotes/pr/685' into worker/638-fix-overmask-dbb1bf-11 2026-10-03 22:29:14 +02:00
Dai Ha cb4a6869b9 fleetd #677: guard exact lead tab collisions
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2026-10-03 22:10:29 +02:00
Dai Ha 28b45d97e5 fleetd #638: mask userinfo in the daemon verdict line before it prints
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Apply the userinfo-only rewrite (sed -E 's#://[^@]*@#://<redacted>@#g') to every
path that prints config-edit.sh's $VERDICT_LINE: restore_and_confirm's two
prints, report_outcome's shared local copy (covering its clean/needs-restart/
refused branches), and check_mode's "last verdict in log" line via
last_verdict_line. Deliberately not routed through redact() — that function's
key:value masking does not match this line's prose, and the rest of the line
(e.g. the pattern quoted in a parse-failure refusal) is the detail an operator
needs to fix the refusal.

No current refusal message echoes a URI, token or password, so this is a guard
against a future validator doing so, not a fix for an observed leak.
2026-10-03 22:06:54 +02:00
15 changed files with 1083 additions and 202 deletions
+9
View File
@@ -669,6 +669,15 @@ fleet:
# kind: opencode
# model: openai/gpt-5.6-terra
# A collaborator tab, keyed by name (fleetd #669). This block is parsed and validated today;
# nothing yet recognises or addresses the tab it names. Recognise-only, like a profile-less
# `leaders:` entry above: there is no `profile:`, no `instances:` and no `kind:`. `tab:` is
# REQUIRED and is the only field identity depends on, matched case-insensitively — the same
# GET-THE-VALUE-RIGHT warning above the `leaders:` block applies here too.
# collaborators:
# reviewer-alex:
# tab: "collab: alex"
# architects:
# architect-1:
# profile: opus # a strong model, on the operator's subscription
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.auth;
import java.util.function.Predicate;
/**
* The authorization table (CB-505), stated once and enforced on both entry paths.
*
@@ -60,58 +62,92 @@ public final class Authz {
}
/**
* Whether {@code caller} may perform {@code action} against {@code targetSession}.
*
* @param targetSession the session id in the request path; only consulted for the worker-scoped
* actions ({@code REPLY}, {@code ASK}), ignored otherwise, may be
* {@code null}
* Stands in for the terminal-to-tab registry a collaborator's {@code SEND} is checked
* against, until one exists: answers no for every target, so a collaborator reaches nothing
* today. Both production gates ({@code FleetMcp#denyFor}, {@code FleetApp#allow}) pass this
* exact instance, so the classifier is defined once and replacing it is a one-line change in
* each.
*/
public static final Predicate<String> NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR = target -> false;
/**
* Convenience form for a caller with no classifier to supply. Fails closed: a collaborator's
* {@code SEND} is refused, as if no terminal were a configured lead or collaborator — the
* same decision {@link #NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR} gives explicitly. Every other action's
* result is identical to the four-argument form's, since none of them consult the classifier.
*/
public static boolean permits(Principal caller, Action action, String targetSession) {
return permits(caller, action, targetSession, NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR);
}
/**
* Whether {@code caller} may perform {@code action} against {@code targetSession}.
*
* @param targetSession the session id in the request path; only consulted for the
* worker-scoped actions ({@code REPLY}, {@code ASK}) and for a
* collaborator's {@code SEND}, ignored otherwise, may be
* {@code null}
* @param knownLeadOrCollaborator whether a terminal is a configured lead or collaborator —
* consulted only for a collaborator's {@code SEND}, to confine
* it to another named peer and never a spawned member's
* terminal
*/
public static boolean permits(Principal caller, Action action, String targetSession,
Predicate<String> knownLeadOrCollaborator) {
if (caller == null || caller.isAnonymous()) {
return false; // authenticated as nothing ⇒ authorized for nothing
}
return switch (action) {
// Fleet lifecycle is the primary's alone — spawn, stop, drain. An architect
// deliberately does NOT get these (CB-548), so it cannot tear down or stand up workers
// even though it coordinates them; and a worker driving any of these would be a worker
// escalating into the orchestrator role.
// Fleet lifecycle is the primary's alone — spawn, stop, drain. An architect and a
// collaborator deliberately do NOT get these, so neither can tear down or stand up
// workers even though one of them coordinates them; and a worker driving any of these
// would be a worker escalating into the orchestrator role.
case SPAWN, STOP, DRAIN, HANDOVER -> caller.isPrimary();
// Delivering a turn to a local session is open to the primary and the architect: an
// architect delegates to workers (that is the role's point) but still has no lifecycle
// rights. A worker is excluded — sending would be it escalating.
case SEND -> caller.isPrimary() || caller.isArchitect();
// Delivering a turn to a local session is open to the primary, the architect, and a
// collaborator whose target is itself a configured lead or collaborator: the architect
// delegates to workers (that is the role's point); a collaborator may reach only
// another named peer, never a spawned member's terminal. A worker is excluded —
// sending would be it escalating.
case SEND -> caller.isPrimary() || caller.isArchitect()
|| (caller.isCollaborator() && knownLeadOrCollaborator.test(targetSession));
// Same grant as SEND. Resolving a worker's blocked question is part of delegating to
// it, not a separate capability.
// Resolving a worker's blocked question is part of delegating to it, open to the same
// two roles that may stand up that delegation in the first place. Not a collaborator:
// resuming another session's turn is lifecycle-adjacent, not peer messaging.
case ANSWER -> caller.isPrimary() || caller.isArchitect();
// Same grant as SEND. This leaves the daemon over the coordination broker rather than
// addressing a local session, but the caller who may do one may do the other.
// Leaves the daemon over the coordination broker rather than addressing a local
// session, open to the same two roles as ANSWER. Not a collaborator: it is a
// local-tab peer with no cross-host route.
case COORD_SEND -> caller.isPrimary() || caller.isArchitect();
// The load-bearing rule: a caller acts only as the pane it occupies. CB-532 widened who
// that can be — a lead answering another lead is replying for its OWN terminal, which
// this already permits — while the rule itself is unchanged, and is what stops anyone
// forging a reply for a rendezvous someone else is waiting on. An architect's own pane
// passes through the same check, so it can answer a funnel that delegated to it. An
// unnamed primary (token/loopback, no pane) owns nothing and is still excluded.
// forging a reply for a rendezvous someone else is waiting on. An architect's or a
// collaborator's own pane passes through the same check, so each can answer a funnel
// that delegated to it. An unnamed primary (token/loopback, no pane) owns nothing and
// is still excluded.
case REPLY, ASK -> caller.ownsSession(targetSession);
// READ is roster, profile, and identity observation — fleet_list, fleet_profiles, and
// fleet_whoami — and carries no secrets: no ticket reply, no pending question, and no
// other session's turn state. Those live under TASK_READ. METRICS is the separate
// Prometheus scrape. Both stay open to every authenticated role.
case READ, METRICS -> caller.isPrimary() || caller.isWorker() || caller.isArchitect();
// Prometheus scrape. Both are open to every authenticated role, including a
// collaborator.
case READ, METRICS -> caller.isPrimary() || caller.isWorker() || caller.isArchitect()
|| caller.isCollaborator();
// Ticket polling and session status, open to every authenticated role the same as READ.
// Unlike READ, a holder may poll a ticket it did not create, or read another session's
// pending question and the turnId that answers it.
// Ticket polling and session status, open to every role READ is open to except a
// collaborator: ticket ids are a sequential counter with no owner check, so a holder
// could walk every ticket and read another session's delegation reply.
case TASK_READ -> caller.isPrimary() || caller.isWorker() || caller.isArchitect();
// fleetd #421: reading held lead-to-lead mail is the primary's alone. An architect
// holds READ today (CB-548), so "not primary" must mean not-architect here too — this
// is coordination between leads, not observation of the roster.
// is coordination between leads, not observation of the roster. The same reasoning
// excludes a collaborator.
case COORD_READ -> caller.isPrimary();
};
}
@@ -11,7 +11,9 @@ package dev.ltms.fleet.auth;
* @param pid the connecting process id, or {@code -1} when not resolvable (audit context)
* @param name for a lead resolved from the CB-530 {@code leaders:} registry, which lead it is;
* for an architect resolved from the CB-548 {@code architects:} registry, which
* slot it occupies; {@code null} for every other caller, including an unnamed primary
* slot it occupies; for a collaborator resolved from the {@code collaborators:}
* registry, which collaborator it is; {@code null} for every other caller,
* including an unnamed primary
*/
public record Principal(Role role, String terminal, long pid, String name) {
@@ -73,6 +75,19 @@ public record Principal(Role role, String terminal, long pid, String name) {
return new Principal(Role.ARCHITECT, terminal, pid, slotName);
}
/**
* A collaborator: a human-opened tab recognised by its exact label in the
* {@code collaborators:} registry.
*
* <p>Carries {@link Role#COLLABORATOR}. {@code name} is reporting only — it lets
* {@code fleet_whoami} say which collaborator is asking. Identity is the {@code terminal}:
* like a worker's it comes from the connection, so {@code ownsSession} works exactly as it
* does for a worker — a collaborator acts as its own pane and no other.
*/
public static Principal collaborator(String name, String terminal, long pid) {
return new Principal(Role.COLLABORATOR, terminal, pid, name);
}
public boolean isPrimary() {
return role == Role.PRIMARY;
}
@@ -81,6 +96,10 @@ public record Principal(Role role, String terminal, long pid, String name) {
return role == Role.ARCHITECT;
}
public boolean isCollaborator() {
return role == Role.COLLABORATOR;
}
public boolean isWorker() {
return role == Role.WORKER;
}
@@ -120,6 +139,7 @@ public record Principal(Role role, String terminal, long pid, String name) {
return switch (role) {
case WORKER -> "worker:" + terminal;
case ARCHITECT -> "architect:" + name;
case COLLABORATOR -> "collaborator:" + name;
case PRIMARY -> name == null ? "primary" : "leader:" + name;
case ANONYMOUS -> "anonymous";
};
@@ -34,6 +34,17 @@ public enum Role {
*/
ARCHITECT,
/**
* A config-declared, human-opened tab recognised by its exact label (the {@code
* fleet.collaborators.<name>.tab} registry). Never spawned — identity comes from the
* connection, never a request argument, exactly like {@link #WORKER} and {@link #ARCHITECT}.
* May {@code SEND} only to a configured lead or collaborator, {@code REPLY}/{@code ASK} only
* as its own pane, and {@code READ}/{@code METRICS}; may not {@code SPAWN}/{@code STOP}/
* {@code DRAIN}/{@code HANDOVER}, poll a ticket ({@code TASK_READ}), or reach the
* coordination broker ({@code COORD_SEND}/{@code COORD_READ}).
*/
COLLABORATOR,
/** Authenticated as nothing. Authorized for nothing but {@code /healthz}. */
ANONYMOUS
}
@@ -1129,11 +1129,8 @@ public record FleetConfig(
* {@code tab} can never be discovered, launched or not
* @param instances how many of this lead should be live (default 1). The daemon
* launches only the shortfall, so a restart adopts rather than doubles
* @param tabPrefix no longer used to find a lead's tab — {@code tab} is matched
* exactly. Its only remaining job is the startup collision guard
* ({@link #validateLeadTabPrefixes()}), which still uses it to refuse
* a worker {@code tabLabel} template that could be misread as a lead.
* Default {@code "lead:"}
* @param tabPrefix lead-tab naming convention checked against member labels. Lead
* identity uses {@code tab}. Default {@code "lead:"}
* @param scanIntervalSeconds how long a tab scan is cached before herdr is asked again; also the
* worst case before a newly-labelled tab is recognised. Default 10
* @param kind which agent runs there ({@code claude}, {@code opencode}, …)
@@ -1179,6 +1176,25 @@ public record FleetConfig(
}
}
/**
* A tab fleetd recognises as a collaborator, keyed by name (fleetd #669).
*
* <p>Recognise-only: there is no {@code profile}, no {@code instances} and no {@code kind}.
* Nothing here ever launches a pane.
*
* <p>{@code tabPrefix} is absent. Identity is matched on the exact {@code tab} alone.
*
* @param tab the exact tab label hosting this collaborator, matched case-insensitively; the
* only field identity depends on. Required — an entry with no {@code tab} can
* never be discovered.
*/
@JsonIgnoreProperties(ignoreUnknown = true)
public record Collaborator(String tab) {
public Collaborator {
tab = (tab == null || tab.isBlank()) ? null : tab.strip();
}
}
/**
* One entry of a {@code fleet:} role pool — a role paired with the backend it runs on.
*
@@ -1216,15 +1232,18 @@ public record FleetConfig(
* is exactly compatible with that. The pool is also what replaced {@code defaultProfile:} — an
* unqualified spawn names a role, and the role's pool supplies the candidates.
*
* @param leaders panes that orchestrate rather than are orchestrated, keyed by lead name
* @param architects profiles the {@code architect} role may run on
* @param developers profiles the {@code dev} role may run on
* @param hunters profiles the {@code hunter} role may run on
* @param reviewers profiles the {@code reviewer} role may run on
* @param charters optional launch-charter text keyed by singular role wire name
* @param tabLabel template for a member tab's label; {@code {role}}, {@code {profile}},
* {@code {model}} and {@code {n}} (a per role+profile counter) are
* substituted. Default {@link #DEFAULT_TAB_LABEL}
* @param leaders panes that orchestrate rather than are orchestrated, keyed by lead name
* @param architects profiles the {@code architect} role may run on
* @param developers profiles the {@code dev} role may run on
* @param hunters profiles the {@code hunter} role may run on
* @param reviewers profiles the {@code reviewer} role may run on
* @param charters optional launch-charter text keyed by singular role wire name
* @param tabLabel template for a member tab's label; {@code {role}}, {@code {profile}},
* {@code {model}} and {@code {n}} (a per role+profile counter) are
* substituted. Default {@link #DEFAULT_TAB_LABEL}
* @param collaborators tabs fleetd recognises as collaborators (fleetd #669), keyed by name.
* Recognise-only, exactly like a {@code profile}-less {@link Leader}:
* nothing here is ever auto-launched.
*/
@JsonIgnoreProperties(ignoreUnknown = true)
public record Fleet(Map<String, Leader> leaders,
@@ -1233,13 +1252,11 @@ public record FleetConfig(
Map<String, Slot> hunters,
Map<String, Slot> reviewers,
Map<String, String> charters,
String tabLabel) {
String tabLabel,
Map<String, Collaborator> collaborators) {
/**
* Role first, so the tab bar reads as the fleet and so the label shares a namespace with a
* lead's {@code tabPrefix}. Because {@code {role}} comes from a closed enum, a generated
* member label can never begin with {@code "lead:"} — the clash that
* {@link #validateLeadTabPrefixes()} used to have to check for is unrepresentable here.
* Role first, so the tab bar identifies the member's fleet role.
*/
public static final String DEFAULT_TAB_LABEL = "{role}: {profile} #{n}";
@@ -1251,26 +1268,30 @@ public record FleetConfig(
reviewers = unmodifiableOrEmpty(reviewers);
charters = unmodifiableOrEmpty(charters);
tabLabel = (tabLabel == null || tabLabel.isBlank()) ? DEFAULT_TAB_LABEL : tabLabel;
collaborators = unmodifiableOrEmpty(collaborators);
}
/**
* A fleet with no configured launch charters — the shape every deployment had before
* CB-566, and what most tests want.
* A fleet with no configured launch charters and no collaborators — the shape every
* deployment had before CB-566, and what most tests want.
*
* <p>Kept deliberately, even though an overload that drops a new field is normally the
* shape to avoid. It is safe here because nothing <em>reads</em> a charter through a
* constructor: the launcher reads {@code fleet.charters()} from the live config. Jackson
* binds the canonical constructor, so this one cannot swallow an operator's YAML.
* {@code collaborators} is dropped the same way and for the same reason: no caller of
* this overload has ever needed to set it, so it defaults to empty here exactly as the
* canonical constructor would default an absent YAML key.
*/
public Fleet(Map<String, Leader> leaders, Map<String, Slot> architects,
Map<String, Slot> developers, Map<String, Slot> reviewers,
Map<String, String> charters, String tabLabel) {
this(leaders, architects, developers, null, reviewers, charters, tabLabel);
this(leaders, architects, developers, null, reviewers, charters, tabLabel, null);
}
public Fleet(Map<String, Leader> leaders, Map<String, Slot> architects,
Map<String, Slot> developers, Map<String, Slot> reviewers, String tabLabel) {
this(leaders, architects, developers, null, reviewers, null, tabLabel);
this(leaders, architects, developers, null, reviewers, null, tabLabel, null);
}
/**
@@ -1916,7 +1937,7 @@ public record FleetConfig(
/** The {@code fleet:} child blocks whose direct children are slot names. */
private static final Set<String> FLEET_POOL_KEYS =
Set.of("leaders", "architects", "developers", "hunters", "reviewers");
Set.of("leaders", "architects", "developers", "hunters", "reviewers", "collaborators");
/**
* Reject a {@code fleet:} role pool whose slot names repeat (CB-548, re-homed by CB-557).
@@ -1926,7 +1947,7 @@ public record FleetConfig(
* daemon would never know. Jackson's YAML parser does not fail on duplicate mapping keys by
* default, so duplicates are caught here, at parse time, before the map is built.
*
* <p>Only the five pools <em>directly under the top-level {@code fleet:}</em> are considered,
* <p>Only the six pools <em>directly under the top-level {@code fleet:}</em> are considered,
* and only their direct child keys (the slot names). A nested field elsewhere, even one also
* named {@code developers:}, is ignored, so parsing of the rest of the config is unaffected.
*
@@ -2685,31 +2706,21 @@ public record FleetConfig(
}
/**
* Reject a lead-scan convention that a worker tab would also satisfy (CB-531).
* Reject a member tab-label template that could render as a configured lead or collaborator
* tab or match a lead-tab naming convention, and reject two {@code fleet.leaders} or
* {@code fleet.collaborators} entries — across either registry — that share one exact tab.
*
* <p>The scan reads a tab label and concludes "a lead lives here". fleetd also <em>writes</em>
* tab labels — every member gets one rendered into its tab. Choose a lead {@code tabPrefix} that
* a member template matches and the daemon starts labelling its own members as leads, promoting
* the entire fleet to {@link dev.ltms.fleet.auth.Role#PRIMARY} with no message and no diff.
* {@link #validatePanePlacementAgainstLeadTabs()} is the check that stops a pane-placed member
* from landing inside a lead's tab in the first place; this check is a second, independent
* guard that catches the hazard even when every profile places members correctly, by refusing
* a label that a scan would still misread as a lead.
* <p>{@code fleet.collaborators} has no {@code tabPrefix}: identity is matched on the exact
* {@code tab} alone, so only the exact-render check applies there, not the prefix check.
*
* <p>CB-557 shrank this check rather than removing it. The default template is
* {@code "{role}: {profile} #{n}"} and {@code {role}} comes from a closed enum, so a
* <em>generated</em> label can no longer collide by construction. What remains checkable is what
* an operator still writes by hand: the {@code fleet.tabLabel} template and any per-profile
* {@code tabLabel} override.
*
* <p>Fatal rather than a warning, unlike {@link #warnUnknownTopLevelKeys}: an unknown key means
* a feature does nothing, while this means a feature does the opposite of what it says.
*
* @throws IllegalStateException when the fleet template or any profile's {@code tabLabel}
* override starts with a configured lead prefix
* @throws IllegalStateException when the fleet template or a profile {@code tabLabel} override
* can render as a configured lead or collaborator tab or match a
* lead-tab prefix, or when two entries — of either registry, or
* one of each — carry the same exact {@code tab}
* (case-insensitively)
*/
public void validateLeadTabPrefixes() {
if (fleet == null || fleet.leaders().isEmpty()) {
if (fleet == null) {
return;
}
List<String> bad = new ArrayList<>();
@@ -2717,51 +2728,173 @@ public record FleetConfig(
if (leader == null) {
return;
}
String tab = leader.tab();
String prefix = leader.tabPrefix();
// The fleet-wide template is checked once per prefix: it labels every member that has no
// override, so one bad template promotes the entire fleet, not one profile.
if (startsWithIgnoreCase(fleet.tabLabel(), prefix)) {
if (templateCanRenderAs(fleet.tabLabel(), tab)) {
bad.add("fleet.tabLabel=\"" + fleet.tabLabel() + "\" can render as the tab of "
+ "lead '" + leadName + "' (\"" + tab + "\")");
} else if (startsWithIgnoreCase(fleet.tabLabel(), prefix)) {
bad.add("fleet.tabLabel=\"" + fleet.tabLabel() + "\" starts with the tabPrefix of "
+ "lead '" + leadName + "' (\"" + prefix + "\")");
}
profiles().entrySet().stream()
.filter(e -> startsWithIgnoreCase(e.getValue().tabLabel(), prefix))
.map(Map.Entry::getKey)
.sorted()
.forEach(p -> bad.add("profile '" + p + "' overrides tabLabel with \""
+ profiles().get(p).tabLabel() + "\", which starts with the tabPrefix of "
+ "lead '" + leadName + "' (\"" + prefix + "\")"));
.forEach(p -> {
String label = profiles().get(p).tabLabel();
if (templateCanRenderAs(label, tab)) {
bad.add("profile '" + p + "' overrides tabLabel with \"" + label
+ "\", which can render as the tab of lead '" + leadName
+ "' (\"" + tab + "\")");
} else if (startsWithIgnoreCase(label, prefix)) {
bad.add("profile '" + p + "' overrides tabLabel with \"" + label
+ "\", which starts with the tabPrefix of lead '" + leadName
+ "' (\"" + prefix + "\")");
}
});
});
if (bad.isEmpty()) {
fleet.collaborators().forEach((collabName, collaborator) -> {
if (collaborator == null) {
return;
}
String tab = collaborator.tab();
if (templateCanRenderAs(fleet.tabLabel(), tab)) {
bad.add("fleet.tabLabel=\"" + fleet.tabLabel() + "\" can render as the tab of "
+ "collaborator '" + collabName + "' (\"" + tab + "\")");
}
profiles().entrySet().stream()
.map(Map.Entry::getKey)
.sorted()
.forEach(p -> {
String label = profiles().get(p).tabLabel();
if (templateCanRenderAs(label, tab)) {
bad.add("profile '" + p + "' overrides tabLabel with \"" + label
+ "\", which can render as the tab of collaborator '"
+ collabName + "' (\"" + tab + "\")");
}
});
});
if (!bad.isEmpty()) {
throw new IllegalStateException("refusing to start: " + String.join("; ", bad)
+ ". Every member labelled that way would be read back as a lead or "
+ "collaborator and granted that identity's authority. Change one of the two "
+ "so member tabs cannot be confused with a lead's or collaborator's tab.");
}
List<String> collisions = new ArrayList<>();
List<String> leadNames = fleet.leaders().keySet().stream().sorted().toList();
for (int i = 0; i < leadNames.size(); i++) {
String nameA = leadNames.get(i);
Leader a = fleet.leaders().get(nameA);
if (a == null || a.tab() == null || a.tab().isBlank()) {
continue;
}
for (int j = i + 1; j < leadNames.size(); j++) {
String nameB = leadNames.get(j);
Leader b = fleet.leaders().get(nameB);
if (b == null || b.tab() == null || b.tab().isBlank()) {
continue;
}
if (a.tab().equalsIgnoreCase(b.tab())) {
collisions.add("lead '" + nameA + "' and lead '" + nameB + "' both use tab \""
+ a.tab() + "\"");
}
}
}
List<String> collabNames = fleet.collaborators().keySet().stream().sorted().toList();
for (int i = 0; i < collabNames.size(); i++) {
String nameA = collabNames.get(i);
Collaborator a = fleet.collaborators().get(nameA);
if (a == null || a.tab() == null || a.tab().isBlank()) {
continue;
}
for (int j = i + 1; j < collabNames.size(); j++) {
String nameB = collabNames.get(j);
Collaborator b = fleet.collaborators().get(nameB);
if (b == null || b.tab() == null || b.tab().isBlank()) {
continue;
}
if (a.tab().equalsIgnoreCase(b.tab())) {
collisions.add("collaborator '" + nameA + "' and collaborator '" + nameB
+ "' both use tab \"" + a.tab() + "\"");
}
}
}
for (String leadName : leadNames) {
Leader lead = fleet.leaders().get(leadName);
if (lead == null || lead.tab() == null || lead.tab().isBlank()) {
continue;
}
for (String collabName : collabNames) {
Collaborator collaborator = fleet.collaborators().get(collabName);
if (collaborator == null || collaborator.tab() == null
|| collaborator.tab().isBlank()) {
continue;
}
if (lead.tab().equalsIgnoreCase(collaborator.tab())) {
collisions.add("lead '" + leadName + "' and collaborator '" + collabName
+ "' both use tab \"" + lead.tab() + "\"");
}
}
}
if (collisions.isEmpty()) {
return;
}
throw new IllegalStateException("refusing to start: " + String.join("; ", bad)
+ ". Every member labelled that way would be read back as a lead and granted "
+ "spawn/stop/send on the whole fleet. Change one of the two so member tabs and "
+ "lead tabs cannot be confused.");
throw new IllegalStateException("refusing to start: " + String.join("; ", collisions)
+ ". Tab identity is matched exactly, so only one of two entries sharing a tab can "
+ "ever be found — the other is silently unreachable. Give each lead and "
+ "collaborator its own exact tab.");
}
private static boolean templateCanRenderAs(String template, String tab) {
if (template == null || template.isBlank() || tab == null || tab.isBlank()) {
return false;
}
var placeholders = Pattern.compile("\\{(?:role|profile|model|n)}").matcher(template);
StringBuilder expression = new StringBuilder("^");
int literalStart = 0;
while (placeholders.find()) {
expression.append(Pattern.quote(template.substring(literalStart, placeholders.start())));
expression.append(".*");
literalStart = placeholders.end();
}
expression.append(Pattern.quote(template.substring(literalStart))).append("$");
return Pattern.compile(expression.toString(), Pattern.CASE_INSENSITIVE).matcher(tab).matches();
}
/** Case-insensitive prefix test that tolerates a null or blank label. */
private static boolean startsWithIgnoreCase(String label, String prefix) {
if (label == null || prefix == null || prefix.isBlank()) {
return false;
}
String stripped = label.strip();
return stripped.regionMatches(true, 0, prefix, 0, prefix.length());
}
/**
* Reject a profile that places its members by {@code "pane"} while any {@code fleet.leaders}
* entry names a {@code tab}. A pane-placed member lands inside the focused tab rather than its
* own, so it can land inside a lead's own labelled tab. {@link
* dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.LeadTabScanner} identifies a lead purely by that tab's label — it does
* not exclude the member space — so a member that ends up there would be read back as the lead
* and granted spawn/stop/send on the whole fleet.
* or {@code fleet.collaborators} entry names a {@code tab}. A pane-placed member lands inside
* the focused tab rather than its own, so it can land inside a lead's or collaborator's own
* labelled tab. {@link dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.LeadTabScanner} identifies a lead or collaborator
* purely by that tab's label — it does not exclude the member space — so a member that ends up
* there would be read back as that lead or collaborator and granted that identity's authority.
*
* <p>Only a leader with a non-blank {@code tab} is in scope: one with no {@code tab} feeds
* <p>Only an entry with a non-blank {@code tab} is in scope: one with no {@code tab} feeds
* nothing into {@link dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.LeadTabScanner}, so it creates no hazard here.
*
* @throws IllegalStateException when any {@code profiles:} entry is pane-placed while any
* {@code fleet.leaders} entry names a non-blank {@code tab}
* {@code fleet.leaders} or {@code fleet.collaborators} entry
* names a non-blank {@code tab}
*/
public void validatePanePlacementAgainstLeadTabs() {
if (fleet == null || fleet.leaders().isEmpty()) {
if (fleet == null) {
return;
}
boolean anyLeaderHasTab = fleet.leaders().values().stream()
.anyMatch(leader -> leader != null && leader.tab() != null && !leader.tab().isBlank());
if (!anyLeaderHasTab) {
boolean anyCollaboratorHasTab = fleet.collaborators().values().stream()
.anyMatch(c -> c != null && c.tab() != null && !c.tab().isBlank());
if (!anyLeaderHasTab && !anyCollaboratorHasTab) {
return;
}
List<String> bad = new ArrayList<>();
@@ -2774,10 +2907,11 @@ public record FleetConfig(
return;
}
throw new IllegalStateException("refusing to start: profile(s) " + bad
+ " use placement: pane while fleet.leaders names a tab. A pane-placed member can "
+ "land inside a lead's labelled tab and be read back as the lead, granted "
+ "spawn/stop/send on the whole fleet. Set placement: tab for each named profile, "
+ "or remove the tab from every fleet.leaders entry.");
+ " use placement: pane while fleet.leaders or fleet.collaborators names a tab. A "
+ "pane-placed member can land inside that labelled tab and be read back as the "
+ "lead or collaborator, granted that identity's authority. Set placement: tab for "
+ "each named profile, or remove the tab from every fleet.leaders and "
+ "fleet.collaborators entry.");
}
/**
@@ -2800,15 +2934,6 @@ public record FleetConfig(
}
}
/** Case-insensitive prefix test that tolerates a null/blank label. */
private static boolean startsWithIgnoreCase(String label, String prefix) {
if (label == null || prefix == null || prefix.isBlank()) {
return false;
}
String stripped = label.strip();
return stripped.regionMatches(true, 0, prefix, 0, prefix.length());
}
/**
* Reject a subscription profile whose {@code env:} block tries to reseat the Anthropic binding
* (CB-542).
@@ -2893,8 +3018,14 @@ public record FleetConfig(
* so duplicates are unrepresentable by construction once loaded — and {@link #load(Path)}
* already rejects a duplicated slot name at parse time, before the map collapses.
*
* @throws IllegalStateException when a slot names no profile or an unknown one, or when a lead
* can be neither found nor created, naming the offending entry
* <p>Also rejects a {@code fleet.collaborators} entry with no (or a blank) {@code tab}. A
* {@code profile}-less lead is still useful recognise-only — {@code tab} is the only field
* that matters to it either way. A collaborator carries no other field at all, so a blank
* {@code tab} leaves nothing for the entry to mean.
*
* @throws IllegalStateException when a slot names no profile or an unknown one, when a lead
* can be neither found nor created, or when a collaborator names
* no tab, naming the offending entry
*/
public void validateMembers() {
if (fleet == null) {
@@ -2932,6 +3063,16 @@ public record FleetConfig(
+ "auto-launched, labelled) purely by its tab, so every entry must name one.");
}
});
fleet.collaborators().forEach((name, collaborator) -> {
if (collaborator == null) {
return;
}
if (collaborator.tab() == null || collaborator.tab().isBlank()) {
bad.add("fleet.collaborators." + name + " has no tab: — a collaborator is "
+ "recognised purely by its tab, and carries no other field, so every "
+ "entry must name one.");
}
});
if (!bad.isEmpty()) {
throw new IllegalStateException("refusing to start: " + String.join(" ", bad));
}
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
if (!authorizationEnforced) {
return null; // AuthorizationMode.UNENFORCED: authorization not enforced (fleetd #518)
}
if (Authz.permits(caller, action, target)) {
if (Authz.permits(caller, action, target, Authz.NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR)) {
if (action != Authz.Action.READ && action != Authz.Action.TASK_READ) {
AuditLog.allowed(caller, action, target); // reads would drown the trail
}
@@ -1309,6 +1309,18 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
}
return text(json(m));
}
if (caller.isCollaborator()) {
// A collaborator's name is its slot in the collaborators: registry; sessionId is its
// pane so a peer knows where to reach it. No leader key: a collaborator is not a
// primary for authorization, unlike a lead.
if (caller.name() != null) {
m.put("collaborator", caller.name());
}
if (caller.terminal() != null) {
m.put("sessionId", caller.terminal());
}
return text(json(m));
}
if (!caller.isWorker()) {
// CB-530: which lead, once more than one pane is configured as one. `role` deliberately
// still reads "primary" — the fallback ladder in CLAUDE.md keys on it, and a lead IS a
@@ -266,6 +266,17 @@ public final class FleetApp {
return app;
}
/**
* The authorization decision behind {@link #allow}, taking the caller directly rather than
* pulling it from a servlet {@link Context} — unit-testable without fabricating a live
* request, the same reason {@code FleetMcp#denyFor} is split from {@code FleetMcp#deny}. The
* classifier is the same shared instance {@link #allow} would use, so a test calling this
* exercises the real production gate, not a test-supplied stand-in.
*/
static boolean permitsFor(Principal caller, Authz.Action action, String target) {
return Authz.permits(caller, action, target, Authz.NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR);
}
/**
* Gate a handler on the CB-505 authorization table. Returns {@code true} when the request may
* proceed; otherwise writes the error response and returns {@code false}.
@@ -279,7 +290,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
return true; // legacy: authorization not enforced
}
Principal caller = ctx.attribute(CALLER);
if (Authz.permits(caller, action, target)) {
if (permitsFor(caller, action, target)) {
if (action != Authz.Action.READ && action != Authz.Action.METRICS
&& action != Authz.Action.TASK_READ) {
AuditLog.allowed(caller, action, target); // reads would drown the trail
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ class AuthzTest {
private static final Principal ANON = Principal.anonymous();
private static final Principal ARCH_DESIGN = Principal.architect("lead-designer", "term_design", 400);
private static final Principal ARCH_OTHER = Principal.architect("reviewer", "term_review", 500);
private static final Principal COLLABORATOR = Principal.collaborator("ops", "term_collab", 600);
@Test
void anonymousIsAuthorizedForNothing() {
@@ -166,4 +167,87 @@ class AuthzTest {
assertFalse(Authz.isUnauthenticated(WORKER_A));
assertFalse(Authz.isUnauthenticated(PRIMARY));
}
// ── the collaborator matrix ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* {@code SEND} for a collaborator is the one grant that is conditional rather than fixed:
* flipping only the classifier's answer for the target flips only this outcome.
*/
@Test
void aCollaboratorMaySendOnlyWhenTheClassifierAcceptsTheTarget() {
assertTrue(Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, SEND, "term_lead", target -> true),
"the classifier accepting the target must grant SEND");
assertFalse(Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, SEND, "term_lead", target -> false),
"the classifier refusing the target must deny SEND");
assertFalse(Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, SEND, "term_lead"),
"the real production classifier recognises no terminal yet, so SEND is refused today");
}
/**
* Control for the test above: every other action's result for a collaborator does not move
* when the classifier does. Only {@code SEND} is wired to it.
*/
@Test
void theClassifierMovesOnlySendForACollaborator() {
for (Authz.Action a : Authz.Action.values()) {
if (a == SEND) {
continue;
}
assertEquals(
Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, a, "term_lead"),
Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, a, "term_lead", target -> true),
a + " must not depend on the classifier at all");
}
}
@Test
void aCollaboratorMayReadAndScrapeMetrics() {
assertTrue(Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, READ, null));
assertTrue(Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, METRICS, null));
}
@Test
void aCollaboratorMayReplyAndAskOnlyAsItsOwnPane() {
assertTrue(Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, REPLY, "term_collab"),
"its own pane is its own");
assertTrue(Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, ASK, "term_collab"));
assertFalse(Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, REPLY, "term_design"),
"a collaborator must not reply on another pane");
assertFalse(Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, REPLY, null),
"an absent target must not pass the own-session rule");
}
/**
* Every action denied to a collaborator, asserted denied even when the classifier would
* accept any target — proving none of these is actually gated on the classifier at all.
*/
@Test
void aCollaboratorIsDeniedLifecycleCoordinationAndTicketPolling() {
for (Authz.Action a : new Authz.Action[]{SPAWN, STOP, DRAIN, HANDOVER, ANSWER, COORD_SEND,
COORD_READ, TASK_READ}) {
assertFalse(Authz.permits(COLLABORATOR, a, "term_lead", target -> true),
"a collaborator must not " + a + " even when the classifier accepts every target");
}
}
@Test
void aCollaboratorIsNotCountedAsPrimaryWorkerOrArchitect() {
assertFalse(COLLABORATOR.isPrimary());
assertFalse(COLLABORATOR.isWorker());
assertFalse(COLLABORATOR.isArchitect());
assertTrue(COLLABORATOR.isCollaborator());
}
/**
* A collaborator is never spawned, so it must not be enrolled in the presence map as an
* available member. Control: both a worker and an architect — which ARE spawned — still are.
*/
@Test
void isSpawnedMemberIsFalseForACollaboratorButTrueForAWorkerAndAnArchitect() {
assertFalse(COLLABORATOR.isSpawnedMember());
assertTrue(WORKER_A.isSpawnedMember());
assertTrue(ARCH_DESIGN.isSpawnedMember());
}
}
@@ -676,12 +676,8 @@ class FleetConfigTest {
assertEquals(5, hb.quietNudgeCap());
}
/**
* The hazard the guard exists for: fleetd writes worker tab labels and reads lead tab labels.
* Overlap the two and every worker it spawns is read back as a lead.
*/
@Test
void aLeadPrefixThatAProfileTabLabelOverrideAlsoMatchesRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir)
void aProfileTabLabelOverrideMatchingALeadTabRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir)
throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("collide.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
@@ -689,32 +685,33 @@ class FleetConfigTest {
port: 8080
profiles:
gx10:
tabLabel: "lead: {profile} #{n}"
tabLabel: "alpha"
fleet:
leaders:
opus:
tab: "lead: opus"
tabPrefix: "lead:"
tab: "alpha"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
IllegalStateException e =
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, cfg::validateLeadTabPrefixes);
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("gx10"), "the message must name the offending profile");
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("alpha"), "the message must name the offending label");
}
/** A bad fleet-wide template promotes every member, not one profile — so it is checked too. */
@Test
void aFleetTabLabelThatMatchesALeadPrefixRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
void aFleetTabLabelTemplateThatCanRenderAsALeadTabRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("collide-template.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
profiles:
pha: {}
fleet:
tabLabel: "lead: {role} {profile}"
tabLabel: "al{profile}"
leaders:
opus:
tab: "lead: opus"
tab: "alpha"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
@@ -723,12 +720,28 @@ class FleetConfigTest {
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("fleet.tabLabel"));
}
/**
* The point of making role the label's first field: {@code {role}} comes from a closed enum, so
* a generated label cannot begin with {@code "lead:"} however the fleet is configured.
*/
@Test
void theDefaultTabLabelCannotCollideWithTheDefaultLeadPrefix(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
void anExactFleetTabLabelCollisionRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("exact-tab-collision.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
tabLabel: "alpha"
leaders:
alpha:
tab: "alpha"
""");
IllegalStateException e = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class,
() -> FleetConfig.load(f).validateAll());
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("fleet.tabLabel"),
"the message must name the offending label");
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("alpha"), "the message must name the colliding lead tab");
}
@Test
void aFleetTabLabelTemplateThatCannotRenderAsALeadTabIsAllowed(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("ok.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
@@ -737,17 +750,13 @@ class FleetConfigTest {
gx10:
baseUrl: http://gx00.gw:8000
fleet:
tabLabel: "worker-{profile}"
leaders:
opus:
tab: "lead: opus"
tab: "alpha"
""");
assertDoesNotThrow(() -> FleetConfig.load(f).validateLeadTabPrefixes());
for (MemberRole role : MemberRole.values()) {
assertFalse(FleetConfig.Fleet.DEFAULT_TAB_LABEL
.replace("{role}", role.wireName()).startsWith("lead:"),
"no role renders a label that reads as a lead");
}
assertDoesNotThrow(() -> FleetConfig.load(f).validateAll());
}
@Test
@@ -765,6 +774,78 @@ class FleetConfigTest {
"a label that collides with a convention nobody reads is not a problem");
}
/**
* fleetd #677: identity is matched on a lead's exact {@code tab} alone, so two leads sharing
* one tab means only one of them is ever found — the guard must catch this independently of
* the member-template checks above.
*/
@Test
void twoLeadsSharingTheSameExactTabRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("shared-tab.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
leaders:
opus:
tab: "shared tab"
sonnet:
tab: "shared tab"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
IllegalStateException e =
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, cfg::validateLeadTabPrefixes);
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("opus"), "the message must name one offending lead");
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("sonnet"), "the message must name the other offending lead");
}
/**
* fleetd #693: the guard matches tabs case-insensitively, because
* {@code LeadTabScanner} keys its tab map on a lowercased label — two tabs differing only in
* case collide there too, and the guard must catch that independently of the exact-match case
* above.
*/
@Test
void twoLeadsSharingTheSameTabInDifferentCaseRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("shared-tab-case.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
leaders:
opus:
tab: "Shared Tab"
sonnet:
tab: "shared tab"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
IllegalStateException e =
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, cfg::validateLeadTabPrefixes);
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("opus"), "the message must name one offending lead");
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("sonnet"), "the message must name the other offending lead");
}
/** Control for {@link #twoLeadsSharingTheSameExactTabRefusesToStart}: distinct tabs load cleanly. */
@Test
void twoLeadsWithDistinctExactTabsAreAllowed(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("distinct-tabs.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
leaders:
opus:
tab: "opus tab"
sonnet:
tab: "sonnet tab"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
assertDoesNotThrow(cfg::validateLeadTabPrefixes);
}
// ── validatePanePlacementAgainstLeadTabs ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
@@ -919,6 +1000,273 @@ class FleetConfigTest {
"no primary.terminal pin ⇒ nothing registered, even with fleet.leaders configured");
}
// ── fleetd #669: the collaborators registry ────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* {@code Fleet} is {@code @JsonIgnoreProperties(ignoreUnknown = true)}, so a config naming
* {@code fleet.collaborators.<name>.tab} loads with no exception whether or not the key is
* ever read into the object model. Asserting only "no exception" would pass both before and
* after the real fix, so this asserts the parsed value is actually reachable from the loaded
* {@code FleetConfig} — the one thing a vacuous "no exception" test cannot tell apart.
*/
@Test
void collaboratorsBlockIsActuallyParsedNotSilentlyDropped(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("collaborators.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
collaborators:
reviewer-alex:
tab: "collab: alex"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
assertEquals("collab: alex", cfg.fleet().collaborators().get("reviewer-alex").tab());
}
/** A collaborator carries no field other than {@code tab}, so a blank one is meaningless. */
@Test
void aCollaboratorWithNoTabRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("useless-collaborator.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
collaborators:
ghost: {}
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
IllegalStateException e = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, cfg::validateMembers);
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("ghost"), "the message must name the useless entry");
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("tab:"), "the message must say what is missing");
}
/** Control for {@link #aCollaboratorWithNoTabRefusesToStart}: a named tab loads cleanly. */
@Test
void aCollaboratorWithATabIsAllowed(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("named-collaborator.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
collaborators:
reviewer-alex:
tab: "collab: alex"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
assertDoesNotThrow(cfg::validateMembers);
}
/**
* fleetd #669: the fleet-wide {@code tabLabel} template can render as a collaborator tab, the
* same hazard {@link #aFleetTabLabelTemplateThatCanRenderAsALeadTabRefusesToStart} covers on
* the lead side. Drives the fleet-wide branch directly, with no profile override involved.
*/
@Test
void aFleetTabLabelTemplateThatCanRenderAsACollaboratorTabRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir)
throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("collide-template-collaborator.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
tabLabel: "al{profile}"
collaborators:
alex:
tab: "alpha"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
IllegalStateException e =
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, cfg::validateLeadTabPrefixes);
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("fleet.tabLabel"));
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("alex"), "the message must name the offending collaborator");
}
/**
* fleetd #669: a member tabLabel that can render as a configured collaborator tab is the same
* hazard as the lead case above — a member labelled that way is read back as the collaborator.
*/
@Test
void aProfileTabLabelOverrideMatchingACollaboratorTabRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir)
throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("collide-collaborator.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
profiles:
gx10:
tabLabel: "collab-tab"
fleet:
collaborators:
alex:
tab: "collab-tab"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
IllegalStateException e =
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, cfg::validateLeadTabPrefixes);
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("gx10"), "the message must name the offending profile");
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("collab-tab"), "the message must name the offending label");
}
/** Control: a profile tabLabel that cannot render as the collaborator tab is allowed. */
@Test
void aProfileTabLabelThatCannotRenderAsACollaboratorTabIsAllowed(@TempDir Path dir)
throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("ok-collaborator.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
profiles:
gx10:
tabLabel: "worker-{profile}"
fleet:
collaborators:
alex:
tab: "collab-tab"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
assertDoesNotThrow(cfg::validateLeadTabPrefixes);
}
/** fleetd #669: identity is matched on a collaborator's exact tab, so two sharing one are unreachable. */
@Test
void twoCollaboratorsSharingTheSameExactTabRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("shared-collaborator-tab.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
collaborators:
alex:
tab: "shared tab"
sam:
tab: "Shared Tab"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
IllegalStateException e =
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, cfg::validateLeadTabPrefixes);
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("alex"), "the message must name one offending collaborator");
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("sam"), "the message must name the other offending collaborator");
}
/** Control for {@link #twoCollaboratorsSharingTheSameExactTabRefusesToStart}: distinct tabs load cleanly. */
@Test
void twoCollaboratorsWithDistinctExactTabsAreAllowed(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("distinct-collaborator-tabs.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
collaborators:
alex:
tab: "alex tab"
sam:
tab: "sam tab"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
assertDoesNotThrow(cfg::validateLeadTabPrefixes);
}
/**
* fleetd #669: a collaborator tab equal to a lead tab crosses a privilege boundary — the worst
* of the three new collisions, since only one of the two identities is ever found.
*/
@Test
void aCollaboratorTabEqualToALeadTabRefusesToStart(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("lead-collaborator-collision.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
leaders:
opus:
tab: "shared tab"
collaborators:
alex:
tab: "Shared Tab"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
IllegalStateException e =
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, cfg::validateLeadTabPrefixes);
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("opus"), "the message must name the offending lead");
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("alex"), "the message must name the offending collaborator");
}
/** Control for {@link #aCollaboratorTabEqualToALeadTabRefusesToStart}: distinct tabs load cleanly. */
@Test
void aLeadAndACollaboratorWithDistinctTabsAreAllowed(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("lead-collaborator-ok.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
leaders:
opus:
tab: "lead tab"
collaborators:
alex:
tab: "collab tab"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
assertDoesNotThrow(cfg::validateLeadTabPrefixes);
}
/**
* fleetd #669: a pane-placed member can land in a collaborator's labelled tab exactly as it
* can land in a lead's — {@code validatePanePlacementAgainstLeadTabs()} must fire even when
* {@code fleet.leaders} is empty, which is the early-return the brief flagged as the bug.
*/
@Test
void aPanePlacedProfileWithACollaboratorTabRefusesToStartEvenWithNoLeaders(@TempDir Path dir)
throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("pane-hazard-collaborator.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
profiles:
gx10:
placement: pane
fleet:
collaborators:
alex:
tab: "collab: alex"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = FleetConfig.load(f);
IllegalStateException e = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class,
cfg::validatePanePlacementAgainstLeadTabs);
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("gx10"), "the message must name the offending profile");
}
/** Control: a pane-placed profile with no lead or collaborator tab configured is allowed. */
@Test
void aPanePlacedProfileWithNoLeaderOrCollaboratorTabIsAllowed(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("pane-no-tab-at-all.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
profiles:
gx10:
placement: pane
fleet:
collaborators:
alex: {}
""");
assertDoesNotThrow(() -> FleetConfig.load(f).validatePanePlacementAgainstLeadTabs(),
"a collaborator with no tab feeds nothing into the scanner, so pane placement is safe");
}
// ── CB-548: the architects registry ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
@@ -1191,6 +1539,60 @@ class FleetConfigTest {
assertEquals(Set.of("sonnet"), cfg.fleet().pool(MemberRole.REVIEWER).keySet());
}
/**
* A duplicated name in {@code fleet.collaborators} is refused at parse time, like any other
* {@code fleet:} pool. See {@link #duplicateSlotNamesInOnePoolAreRejectedAtParseTime}.
*/
@Test
void duplicateCollaboratorNamesAreRejectedAtParseTime(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("collaborator-dup.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
fleet:
collaborators:
alex:
tab: "collab: alex"
alex:
tab: "collab: alex, second"
""");
IllegalStateException e =
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, () -> FleetConfig.load(f));
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("alex"),
"the refusal names the duplicated entry, was: " + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("fleet.collaborators"),
"the refusal names the pool the duplicate is in, was: " + e.getMessage());
}
/**
* Control for {@link #duplicateCollaboratorNamesAreRejectedAtParseTime}: the same name reused
* across the collaborators registry and a member role pool is the role × profile matrix doing
* its job in the other pool, not a mistake — only a repeat within one pool loses an entry.
*/
@Test
void theSameNameInCollaboratorsAndAnotherPoolIsNotADuplicate(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("collaborator-cross-pool.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, """
bind:
port: 8080
profiles:
sonnet:
baseUrl: http://gx10.gw:8000
fleet:
architects:
alex:
profile: sonnet
collaborators:
alex:
tab: "collab: alex"
""");
FleetConfig cfg = assertDoesNotThrow(() -> FleetConfig.load(f));
assertEquals(Set.of("alex"), cfg.fleet().pool(MemberRole.ARCHITECT).keySet());
assertEquals(Set.of("alex"), cfg.fleet().collaborators().keySet());
}
@Test
void duplicateKeysOutsideTheFleetPoolsAreUnaffected(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
// The duplicate check is scoped to the fleet pools — a duplicate elsewhere is not this
@@ -17,63 +17,21 @@ import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* The gap this class exists to close: mutation testing on the fleetd ticket "central allow-list
* of usable models" found that although {@link FleetConfig#validateModels()}'s own logic was well
* pinned, nothing proved either real caller ({@code Fleetd.main} and {@link ConfigRef#reload()})
* still invoked it — deleting the call site left the full suite green (1478/0/0/0). A follow-up
* measurement (same technique — remove one call site, run the suite, not read the code) found the
* SAME gap for all five of {@link FleetConfig}'s other validators at startup, and for four of the
* six inside {@link ConfigRef#reload()}. This is a class of gap, not one line's mistake: every one
* of those thirteen tests called the validator itself directly, never the real caller that was
* supposed to.
* Tests the reflective validator sweep and {@link FleetConfig#validateAll()} reachability.
*
* <p>The fix replaces the six individual {@code cfg.validateXxx()} calls at each of the two real
* call sites with one {@link FleetConfig#validateAll()}, which reaches every validator by
* reflection rather than by a hand-maintained list of names. A hand-maintained list of six names
* would have exactly the defect it replaces: the seventh validator someone adds next month has no
* reason to be added to it, and nothing would say so. This class proves TWO separate claims, and
* keeps them separate on purpose:
*
* <ol>
* <li>{@link #theSweepMechanismIsGenericNotHardcodedToFleetConfigsSixNames()} and its neighbours
* prove the reflective sweep itself ({@link FleetConfig#invokeAllValidators}) is a general
* mechanism — it runs whatever public, no-arg, void {@code validateXxx()} methods a class
* happens to declare today, including a class with more of them than {@link FleetConfig}
* has right now. This is the proof that a future, real seventh validator on {@link
* FleetConfig} would be swept automatically, without needing to add a real (unwanted)
* seventh validator just to exercise the claim.</li>
* <li>{@link #validateAllReachesEveryOneOfTodaysRealValidators()} proves {@link
* FleetConfig#validateAll()} itself is wired to that same generic mechanism and genuinely
* reaches every one of today's real validators — reusing the exact minimal failing
* configurations {@code FleetConfigTest} already established for each one directly, plus a
* dedicated fixture for {@link FleetConfig#validateLeadRollover()}, which no other test
* drives through {@code validateAll()} — so a single call to {@code validateAll()} is shown
* to reproduce every one of those failures.</li>
* </ol>
*
* <p>Together with the direct-{@code Fleetd.main}-invocation tests in {@code
* FleetdStartupValidationTest} (which prove the real startup call site still calls {@code
* validateAll()}) and the {@code ConfigRefTest} reload tests (which prove the same for {@link
* ConfigRef#reload()}), removing {@code cfg.validateAll();} from either real call site now fails
* a test in this module.
*
* <p><b>What is NOT pinned, measured rather than assumed.</b> Reverting {@link
* FleetConfig#validateAll()} to a hardcoded list of today's method calls leaves the whole
* suite green. Nothing ties {@code validateAll()} to
* the generic sweep — claim 1 proves {@link FleetConfig#invokeAllValidators} is generic, and claim
* 2 proves {@code validateAll()} reaches today's validators, and a hardcoded list satisfies both. So the
* reflective sweep is a convenience, not the guarantee. The guarantee is {@link
* #fleetConfigDeclaresExactlyTheseValidatorsToday()}: it fails the moment any validator is added
* or removed, which forces whoever changes the set to look at this file.
* <p>{@link #theSweepRunsEveryValidateMethodOnAnUnrelatedClass()} and its neighbours
* prove that {@link FleetConfig#invokeAllValidators} runs each public, no-arg, void
* {@code validateXxx()} method on its target. {@link #fleetConfigDeclaresExactlyTheseValidatorsToday()}
* is the canary for the validator set. {@link #validateAllReachesEveryOneOfTodaysRealValidators()}
* is the reachability check for that set.
*/
class FleetConfigValidateAllTest {
// ── Claim 1: the reflective sweep is a general mechanism, not six names in disguise ──────────
// ── Claim 1: the reflective sweep is a general mechanism ─────────────────────────────────────
/**
* A throwaway fixture class, unrelated to {@link FleetConfig} in every way except shape: three
* public, no-arg, void methods named {@code validateXxx}. Proves the sweep works on ANY class
* with this shape, not on something special-cased to {@link FleetConfig}.
* Fixture with public, no-arg, void methods named {@code validateXxx}. It proves the sweep uses
* the target's method shape rather than special handling for {@link FleetConfig}.
*/
static class ThreeValidators {
final List<String> ran = new ArrayList<>();
@@ -92,7 +50,7 @@ class FleetConfigValidateAllTest {
}
@Test
void theSweepMechanismIsGenericNotHardcodedToFleetConfigsSixNames() {
void theSweepRunsEveryValidateMethodOnAnUnrelatedClass() {
ThreeValidators target = new ThreeValidators();
FleetConfig.invokeAllValidators(target);
assertEquals(List.of("validateAlpha", "validateBeta", "validateGamma"), target.ran,
@@ -102,12 +60,8 @@ class FleetConfigValidateAllTest {
}
/**
* The core of the "self-maintaining" requirement: the exact same class shape as {@link
* ThreeValidators}, plus one more method — standing in for "a developer adds a validator next
* month". Nothing about the sweep changes to pick it up; the new method is invoked purely
* because it exists and matches the shape. This is what makes adding a seventh real validator
* to {@link FleetConfig} safe without touching {@link FleetConfig#validateAll()} or either
* call site — there is no "wire it in" step left to forget.
* Fixture with an added valid method. It proves the sweep reaches a method because it matches
* the validator shape.
*/
static class FourValidators {
final List<String> ran = new ArrayList<>();
@@ -135,7 +89,7 @@ class FleetConfigValidateAllTest {
FleetConfig.invokeAllValidators(target);
assertEquals(List.of("validateAlpha", "validateBeta", "validateDelta", "validateGamma"),
sorted(target.ran),
"the fourth method must be reached automatically — proving a class can grow the "
"the added method must be reached automatically — proving a class can grow the "
+ "set of things it validates with no change to the sweep itself");
}
@@ -297,16 +251,16 @@ class FleetConfigValidateAllTest {
port: 8765
""", "auth.mode: token");
// validateLeadTabPrefixes: a fleet-wide tabLabel that starts with a lead's own tabPrefix.
// validateLeadTabPrefixes: a fleet-wide tabLabel that equals a lead tab.
assertValidateAllRefuses(dir, "lead-tab-prefixes.yaml", """
bind:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 8765
fleet:
tabLabel: "lead: {role} {profile}"
tabLabel: "alpha"
leaders:
opus:
tab: "lead: opus"
tab: "alpha"
""", "fleet.tabLabel");
// validateSubscriptionProfiles: subscription: true with env: reseating ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL.
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
private static final Principal WORKER_A = Principal.worker("term_a", 200);
private static final Principal ANON = Principal.anonymous();
private static final Principal ARCH_DESIGN = Principal.architect("lead-designer", "term_design", 400);
private static final Principal COLLABORATOR = Principal.collaborator("ops", "term_collab", 600);
// --- the table, enforced on THIS path too ---------------------------------------------------
@@ -226,6 +227,19 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
"the caller IS authenticated — it is just not the right role");
}
/**
* {@code denyFor} passes the real production classifier, not a test-supplied one — no
* terminal is recognised as a configured lead or collaborator, so a collaborator's SEND is
* refused over MCP.
*/
@Test
void aCollaboratorMayNotSendOverMcpWithTheRealProductionClassifier() {
FleetMcp m = mcp(true);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = m.denyFor(COLLABORATOR, Authz.Action.SEND, "term_lead");
assertNotNull(denied, "no terminal is recognised as a lead or collaborator yet");
assertTrue(denied.isError());
}
@Test
void theLegacyConstructorLeavesTheGateOpen() {
// The 22 pre-existing FleetMcpTest cases rely on no authorization being enforced.
@@ -1837,6 +1837,32 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
assertTrue(out.contains("\"sessionId\":\"term_design\""), out);
}
/**
* A collaborator reports its own role and name, never the {@code leader} key a lead gets —
* {@code role} already reads {@code "collaborator"}, so a {@code leader} key alongside it
* would be self-contradicting. Control: the same call shape fed a named lead must still carry
* {@code leader}, so this is not passing because the key stopped being emitted for everyone.
*/
@Test
void whoamiReportsACollaboratorWithNoLeaderKeyButALeadStillGetsOne() {
FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(h, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"));
McpSchema.CallToolResult collabRes = FleetMcp.whoami(
Principal.collaborator("ops", "term_collab", 700), sessions);
assertNotEquals(Boolean.TRUE, collabRes.isError());
String collabOut = textOf(collabRes);
assertTrue(collabOut.contains("\"role\":\"collaborator\""), collabOut);
assertTrue(collabOut.contains("\"collaborator\":\"ops\""), collabOut);
assertTrue(collabOut.contains("\"sessionId\":\"term_collab\""), collabOut);
assertFalse(collabOut.contains("leader"), collabOut);
McpSchema.CallToolResult leadRes = FleetMcp.whoami(
Principal.leader("opus", "term_lead", 100), sessions);
String leadOut = textOf(leadRes);
assertTrue(leadOut.contains("\"leader\":\"opus\""), leadOut);
}
/**
* CB-548: an architect SEND delegates as its own pane (recording the per-target delegation) but
* must NEVER become the legacy singleton "primary" fallback — the per-target map does not cure
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.CallerResolver;
import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.Authz;
import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.MemberRegistry;
import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.Principal;
import dev.ltms.fleet.config.FleetConfig;
import dev.ltms.fleet.guard.SubscriptionGuard;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.AgentControl;
@@ -202,6 +203,18 @@ class FleetAppAuthTest {
}
}
/**
* {@code permitsFor} is the exact decision {@link FleetApp#allow} makes, passing the real
* production classifier rather than a test-supplied one — no terminal is recognised as a
* configured lead or collaborator, so a collaborator's SEND is refused through the REST gate.
*/
@Test
void aCollaboratorMayNotSendOverRestWithTheRealProductionClassifier() {
Principal collaborator = Principal.collaborator("ops", "term_collab", 700);
assertFalse(FleetApp.permitsFor(collaborator, Authz.Action.SEND, "term_lead"),
"no terminal is recognised as a lead or collaborator yet");
}
// --- loopback-trust: the caller is the primary -------------------------------------------
@Test
+22 -5
View File
@@ -213,6 +213,17 @@ map_masked_lines() {
done < "$file"
}
# Masks every `scheme://user:pass@host` userinfo on one line of text, replacing just that
# userinfo with `<redacted>` and leaving the rest of the line untouched, byte for byte. The
# pattern stops at the first `/`, whitespace, or `@` reached after `://` — a URI's userinfo
# component cannot contain any of those three characters — so a URI with no userinfo, followed
# later on the same line by an unrelated `@`, never matches. The `g` flag matters: a line can
# carry more than one URI. Shared by every caller that prints a line which may hold a
# credentialed URI, so the bound lives in exactly one place.
mask_url_userinfo() {
printf '%s\n' "$1" | sed -E 's#://[^@/[:space:]]*@#://<redacted>@#g'
}
redact() {
local old_file="$1" new_file="$2"
local line prefix content indent lead key old_line=0 new_line=0 in_hunk=0
@@ -270,7 +281,7 @@ redact() {
continue
fi
fi
printf '%s\n' "$line" | sed -E 's#://[^@]*@#://<redacted>@#g'
mask_url_userinfo "$line"
done
[ "$saved_nocasematch" = 1 ] || shopt -u nocasematch
}
@@ -580,6 +591,12 @@ install_candidate() {
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- the report path
#
# Masks basic-auth userinfo (scheme://user:pass@host) in a daemon verdict line before it reaches
# the terminal.
mask_verdict_userinfo() {
mask_url_userinfo "$1"
}
# Prints the literal command the operator (or a test) can run to restore the backup by hand — the
# absolute path to THIS script plus the overrides actually in force, so it works from any cwd.
restore_command_line() {
@@ -599,8 +616,8 @@ restore_and_confirm() {
ok "restored from $backup"
if wait_for_verdict "$LOG" "$mark2" "$WAIT_SECONDS"; then
case "$VERDICT_KIND" in
refused) warn "the RESTORE was also refused by the daemon: $VERDICT_LINE" ;;
*) ok "restore confirmed: $VERDICT_LINE" ;;
refused) warn "the RESTORE was also refused by the daemon: $(mask_verdict_userinfo "$VERDICT_LINE")" ;;
*) ok "restore confirmed: $(mask_verdict_userinfo "$VERDICT_LINE")" ;;
esac
else
warn "the restore is on disk, but no confirming verdict line appeared within ${WAIT_SECONDS}s"
@@ -616,7 +633,7 @@ report_outcome() {
say "waiting for the daemon's verdict (up to ${WAIT_SECONDS}s)"
if wait_for_verdict "$LOG" "$mark" "$WAIT_SECONDS"; then
kind="$VERDICT_KIND"; line="$VERDICT_LINE"
kind="$VERDICT_KIND"; line="$(mask_verdict_userinfo "$VERDICT_LINE")"
else
kind="none"
fi
@@ -673,7 +690,7 @@ check_mode() {
local verdict
verdict="$(last_verdict_line "$LOG")"
if [ -n "$verdict" ]; then
ok "last verdict in log: $verdict"
ok "last verdict in log: $(mask_verdict_userinfo "$verdict")"
else
warn "no reload verdict line found in $LOG"
fi
+131
View File
@@ -233,6 +233,66 @@ test_redaction_holds() {
assert_contains "weight" "$RUN_OUTPUT" "a diff must have been demonstrably printed at all"
}
# redact()'s key-name filter only inspects the KEY, so a diff line whose key does not match
# TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PASSPHRASE|CREDENTIAL|URI|_KEY still reaches the final userinfo
# sed even when its VALUE holds a credentialed URI. "note" is not a sensitive key name, so this
# line must fall all the way through to that sed, not the earlier whole-value branch. The
# trailing prose on both sides of the userinfo is a positive control: it proves the line reached
# the userinfo sed (which touches only the userinfo) rather than the earlier branch (which would
# have replaced the whole value with a bare "<redacted>" and dropped the prose).
test_diff_line_userinfo_is_masked_with_positive_control() {
local dir
dir="$(new_fixture)"
start_run "$dir" 5 --set '.profiles.sonnet.note=see amqp://alice:wonderland@rabbit.local:5672/vhost for details'
sleep 1
printf 'config reloaded\n' >> "$dir/fleetd.out"
collect_run "$dir"
assert_equals 0 "$RUN_RC" "diff-userinfo-case reload exit code"
assert_not_contains "alice:wonderland" "$RUN_OUTPUT" "the userinfo must never reach the output"
assert_contains "amqp://<redacted>@rabbit.local:5672/vhost" "$RUN_OUTPUT" \
"the userinfo must be MASKED, not deleted — the rest of the value must survive"
assert_contains "note:" "$RUN_OUTPUT" "the key name must still reach the output"
assert_contains "see " "$RUN_OUTPUT" "prose BEFORE the userinfo must still reach the output"
assert_contains "for details" "$RUN_OUTPUT" "prose AFTER the userinfo must still reach the output"
}
# A diff line can hold a URL with no userinfo, followed later on the same line by an unrelated @
# (free text in a string value, for example an email address). The line must pass through the
# userinfo sed byte for byte: the match must stop at the end of the URL and must not treat the
# later @ as a second userinfo delimiter.
test_diff_line_uri_without_userinfo_survives_a_later_at_sign() {
local dir
dir="$(new_fixture)"
start_run "$dir" 5 --set '.profiles.sonnet.note2=see https://docs.local/guide and mail ops@example.com'
sleep 1
printf 'config reloaded\n' >> "$dir/fleetd.out"
collect_run "$dir"
assert_equals 0 "$RUN_RC" "diff-no-userinfo-with-later-at-sign reload exit code"
assert_contains "note2: see https://docs.local/guide and mail ops@example.com" "$RUN_OUTPUT" \
"a URL with no userinfo plus a later @ on the same line must pass through byte for byte"
}
# Two credentialed URIs on one diff line must both be masked — the g flag matters.
test_diff_line_masks_multiple_userinfo_with_g_flag() {
local dir
dir="$(new_fixture)"
start_run "$dir" 5 --set '.profiles.sonnet.note3=amqp://u1:p1@host1/vhost1 and amqp://u2:p2@host2/vhost2'
sleep 1
printf 'config reloaded\n' >> "$dir/fleetd.out"
collect_run "$dir"
assert_equals 0 "$RUN_RC" "diff-two-userinfo-on-one-line reload exit code"
assert_not_contains "u1:p1" "$RUN_OUTPUT" "the first userinfo must never reach the output"
assert_not_contains "u2:p2" "$RUN_OUTPUT" "the second userinfo must never reach the output"
assert_contains "amqp://<redacted>@host1/vhost1" "$RUN_OUTPUT" "the first URI must be masked"
assert_contains "amqp://<redacted>@host2/vhost2" "$RUN_OUTPUT" "the second URI must be masked"
}
# ------------------------------------------------------- acceptance criterion 9: forgotten value
# `--set .a.b=` is a plausible typo (the value simply forgotten), and it must be refused outright
# rather than silently nulling the field — a null numeric field falls back to its default, which
@@ -629,6 +689,65 @@ test_refusal_shape_from_parse_failure_wording_is_recognised() {
assert_equals 4 "$RUN_RC" "the parse-failure refusal shape must also exit 4, not be read as silence"
}
# A verdict line carrying a credentialed URI has its userinfo masked, with a positive control
# proving the rest of the line still reaches the output unchanged.
test_verdict_userinfo_is_masked_with_positive_control() {
local dir
dir="$(new_fixture)"
start_run "$dir" 5 --set '.profiles.sonnet.weight=4'
sleep 1
printf 'config reload from %s refused, keeping the running config: refusing to start: malformed pattern — profiles.local.errorPattern ("amqp://user:hunter2@host/vhost"): Unclosed character class near index 8\n' \
"$dir/fleetd.yaml" >> "$dir/fleetd.out"
collect_run "$dir"
assert_equals 4 "$RUN_RC" "refusal-with-userinfo exit code"
assert_not_contains "user:hunter2" "$RUN_OUTPUT" "the userinfo must never reach the output"
assert_contains "amqp://<redacted>@host/vhost" "$RUN_OUTPUT" \
"the userinfo must be MASKED, not deleted — the rest of the quoted value must survive"
# Positive control: the diagnostic prose on both sides of the userinfo must still reach the
# output. Without this, a mutant that drops the whole verdict line would pass identically.
assert_contains "malformed pattern" "$RUN_OUTPUT" "prose BEFORE the userinfo must still reach the output"
assert_contains "Unclosed character class near index 8" "$RUN_OUTPUT" \
"prose AFTER the userinfo must still reach the output"
}
# An ordinary refusal line quotes the offending pattern, not a credential, and must survive byte
# for byte: the rewrite is scoped to userinfo only, and the quoted pattern is the detail an
# operator needs to fix the refusal.
test_ordinary_refusal_line_passes_through_unchanged() {
local dir real_line
dir="$(new_fixture)"
real_line="config reload from $dir/fleetd.yaml refused, keeping the running config: refusing to start: malformed pattern — profiles.local.errorPattern (\"[unclosed\"): Unclosed character class near index 8"
start_run "$dir" 5 --set '.profiles.sonnet.weight=4'
sleep 1
printf '%s\n' "$real_line" >> "$dir/fleetd.out"
collect_run "$dir"
assert_equals 4 "$RUN_RC" "ordinary refusal exit code"
assert_contains "$real_line" "$RUN_OUTPUT" \
"an ordinary refusal with no userinfo must pass through byte for byte, unchanged"
}
# A verdict line can hold a URI with NO userinfo and a later, unrelated @ further on in the same
# line (an email address in diagnostic prose, for example). The rewrite must stop at the end of
# the URI and must not treat the later @ as a second userinfo delimiter.
test_uri_without_userinfo_survives_a_later_at_sign() {
local dir real_line
dir="$(new_fixture)"
real_line="config reload from $dir/fleetd.yaml refused, keeping the running config: broker.uri amqp://broker.local/vhost unreachable, contact ops@example.com"
start_run "$dir" 5 --set '.profiles.sonnet.weight=4'
sleep 1
printf '%s\n' "$real_line" >> "$dir/fleetd.out"
collect_run "$dir"
assert_equals 4 "$RUN_RC" "no-userinfo-with-later-at-sign exit code"
assert_contains "$real_line" "$RUN_OUTPUT" \
"a URI with no userinfo plus a later @ in the same line must pass through byte for byte"
}
# --set runs yq over the whole candidate. It warns when that changes more lines than the requested
# pairs, but a simple file with only the intended changed line must stay quiet.
new_fixture_reformat_sensitive() {
@@ -694,6 +813,12 @@ echo "== acceptance criterion 6: the marker works =="
test_marker_skips_lines_before_it
echo "== acceptance criterion 7 (+13: redaction is proven to have run) =="
test_redaction_holds
echo "== fleetd #692: a diff line's userinfo is masked, rest of the value survives =="
test_diff_line_userinfo_is_masked_with_positive_control
echo "== fleetd #692: a diff line's URI with no userinfo survives a later @ in the line =="
test_diff_line_uri_without_userinfo_survives_a_later_at_sign
echo "== fleetd #692: two userinfo URIs on one diff line are both masked =="
test_diff_line_masks_multiple_userinfo_with_g_flag
echo "== acceptance criterion 9: a forgotten value refuses and installs nothing =="
test_forgotten_value_refuses_and_installs_nothing
echo "== acceptance criterion 10: an explicit clear writes a bare null =="
@@ -720,6 +845,12 @@ echo "== extra: --check is read-only and always exits 0 =="
test_check_is_read_only_and_exits_zero
echo "== extra: the parse-failure refusal shape is also recognised =="
test_refusal_shape_from_parse_failure_wording_is_recognised
echo "== verdict-redaction criteria 2+3: verdict userinfo is masked, rest of line survives =="
test_verdict_userinfo_is_masked_with_positive_control
echo "== verdict-redaction criterion 4: an ordinary refusal passes through unchanged =="
test_ordinary_refusal_line_passes_through_unchanged
echo "== fleetd #638: a URI with no userinfo survives a later @ in the same line =="
test_uri_without_userinfo_survives_a_later_at_sign
echo "== acceptance criterion 17: --set warns about yq formatting churn =="
test_set_warns_when_yq_reformats_extra_lines
echo "== acceptance criterion 18: --set stays quiet without formatting churn =="