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Author SHA1 Message Date
ltms 12cff28abb Merge #438: let a lead read its own held peer mail, primary-only (fleetd #421)
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m15s
CI / build (push) Successful in 2m6s
fleet_poll{coordId} peeks this daemon's own held lead-to-lead mail and
returns full bodies without acking. New Authz.Action COORD_READ, primary
only — not the architect, which holds READ today. pollAction is now
argument-derived over both target and coordId.

heldView and HELD_PREVIEW_MAX_CHARS are untouched: fleet_list stays a
cheap always-safe scan, and the full read is a separately authorized call.

Verified by me, not taken from the report: merged tree builds 1562 green
(main 1555 + 7 new methods), 0 compile errors, no merge conflicts.
Mutation battery on lines the worker did NOT mutate, control 111 green:
  - COORD_READ widened to the architect  KILLED (AuthzTest + FleetMcpAuthzTest)
  - self-coord-id guard removed          KILLED (FleetMcpTest)
  - full body swapped for the preview    KILLED (FleetMcpTest)

The third mutation targets the ticket's own deliverable, and it is pinned.
Authz.permits has no default, so a new action is a compile error rather
than a silently unhandled case.

Follow-up filed as #439: fleet_list's coordinator row is still READ-gated,
so a worker sees peer coord-ids and 80-char previews of lead-to-lead
bodies. Pre-existing; the implementer flagged it and left it alone.
2026-09-10 09:08:17 +02:00
Dai Ha 77a6a7142e Merge main into #421 branch (brings #434 model-gate observability and #436 fixed-placement cap)
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 58s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m48s
2026-09-10 14:06:34 +07:00
Dai Ha 1e9b2c9b7e fleetd #421: let a lead peek its own held peer mail, primary-only
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m27s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m36s
fleet_list truncated held lead-to-lead messages to an 80-char preview with
no way to read the full body, and fleet_poll{target} drained the wrong
inbox (a worker's reply queue, not the coordinator mailbox) -- it silently
returned []. fleet_ack would have destroyed the message unread.

Add a non-destructive read: fleet_poll{coordId} peeks (never acks) this
daemon's own held mail via LeadChannel.peek(). The coordId must equal the
caller's own selfCoordId -- passing a peer's id is refused with a reason,
instead of repeating the original silent-[] confusion.

This is authorization-sensitive: mapping it to the existing READ action
would let any worker read every peer lead's mail in full. READ's openness
rests on "the roster carries no secrets" (Authz.java), which does not hold
for lead-to-lead coordination bodies. Added Authz.Action.COORD_READ,
primary-only (not even the architect, which holds READ today), and made
pollAction's signature depend on both target and coordId so every call
site states explicitly what it passes.

Also fixes fleet_list's "pending: 0" trap: mailbox.pending only counts
broker-ready messages, so a healthy held mailbox reads as empty. Added
heldCount/heldDurable beside held[] so the durability fact isn't implied
only by reading the code.

Mutation-tested: pollAction's COORD_READ->READ mapping, the peek->ack
substitution, the 80-char preview cap widened to 81, and the Authz case
widened to include caller.isWorker() -- each breaks exactly its matching
test and nothing else. The first attempt at the preview-cap test used a
homogeneous "x"*200 body, which a widened cap slipped through unnoticed
(contains() found a shifted match); replaced with a sentinel character at
index 80 to actually pin the boundary.

Updates CLAUDE.md's intent->tool table for fleet_poll's new coordId
semantics, per this repo's own "prompt is part of the product" rule.
wiki/ is a submodule and not committable from a worker's worktree --
wiki-bound content is in the PR body instead.
2026-09-10 13:54:50 +07:00
ltms 5d422f85fa Merge #436: make fixed placement honour maxLoad (fleetd #435)
CI / contract (push) Successful in 48s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m37s
fixed was the one automatic policy that ignored maxLoad, and it is the
default for an absent placement: key. It now gates on the same shared
atCap predicate weighted and round-robin use, and falls through to the
next candidate rather than refusing.

Verified here: 1555 tests green (main was 1548, +7 new methods), 0
compile errors. Mutation battery, control 113 green:
  - atCap boundary >= -> >        KILLED (15 tests, across all 3 policies)
  - drop cap check in fixed walk  KILLED (3 tests)
  - weightExcluded -> false       KILLED (2 pre-existing tests)

Neither live host is affected today: both run placement: weighted (Mac
fleetd.yaml:210, fleet01 fleetd.yaml:172), and weighted already skipped
at-cap candidates via PlacementPolicyUtil.available. This aligns fixed
with the other policies and with maxLoad's documented contract.
2026-09-10 08:54:18 +02:00
Dai Ha ed2027b202 fleetd #435: make FixedPlacementPolicy honor maxLoad
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 45s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m54s
FixedPlacementPolicy (the default placement policy) never consulted
maxLoad, so an at-cap default was chosen anyway on every unqualified
spawn -- the cap was advisory, not enforced, for the one policy every
config uses by default. weighted/round-robin already gated on it via
PlacementPolicyUtil.available().

Extract the "at cap" predicate into PlacementPolicyUtil.atCap(ctx, c)
so all three policies share one definition, and consult it at both of
FixedPlacementPolicy's filter sites (the default fast path and the
candidate walk), mirroring the existing weightExcluded pattern. An
at-cap default now falls through to the next candidate instead of
refusing the spawn -- only when every candidate is unusable does the
policy still throw, naming the cap in the message. Update the class
javadoc (five exceptions -> six) and the reason-priority comments to
match CompositePeerLauncher's explicit-spawn order (quarantine,
cooling off, max load, model-off).
2026-09-10 13:46:06 +07:00
ltms 6b7caba248 Merge #434: make the model gate's own state observable
CI / contract (push) Successful in 47s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m49s
Verified in the worker's tree at 7fd914d: 1544 tests green (base 1535 + 9),
0 compile errors, unpiped mvn clean install. merge-tree against f8b0d42 reports
no conflicts and the two sides share no files.

Read all four production diffs. The design is right: one ModelGateState record
carrying both "armed" and "off" from a single models0() read, so the startup
log line, fleet_profiles' modelGateArmed and the spawn gate cannot disagree —
the fleetd #404 lesson applied properly. disabledModels() now delegates to it
rather than being a second independent read.

Mutated the two subtlest lines, with a control in the same script and the
changed line echoed back with its number:

- modelGateState(): sentinel identity check replaced by the naive
  "m.offIds().isEmpty()" -> 2 failures. FleetProfilesModelGateStateTest
  .modelsBlockWithNothingOffReportsGateArmedAndZeroOff:86 and
  CompositePeerLauncherTest.modelGateStateIsHotReloadedThroughARealConfigRef
  :1519, both "expected: <true> but was: <false>". So the one state this
  ticket exists to expose — a block present with nothing off — is pinned.
- notConfigured() returning a non-empty off set, breaking the invariant the
  record's javadoc states but does not enforce -> 3 failures, including
  disabledModelsIsEmptyWithNoModelsConfigured:1581. So the invariant is
  observable even though the constructor does not check it.

Control run unmutated: 1544 green.

Follow-up on me, not a merge blocker: fleet_profiles gains an operator-visible
field, so this needs a wiki/11-Features.md entry. Workers cannot commit the
wiki submodule, so I am adding it.
2026-09-10 08:32:54 +02:00
Dai Ha f8b0d42a5c fleetd #431 follow-up: profileForSlot's javadoc named a caller that does not exist
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m28s
CI / build (push) Failing after 1m53s
The javadoc said "what the spawn lifecycle reads". Nothing in src/main calls
profileForSlot at all, in either the ".profileForSlot(" or the
"::profileForSlot" form. My own #431 ticket text repeated that sentence as a
fact and ranked the three accessors by it, and the #432 worker copied it into
the test file's comment and one assertion message. Corrected in all three
places; the ticket correction is posted on #431.

What the spawn lifecycle actually reads for an architect's profile is the
SlotReservation that reserve() returns — SessionManager.java:225,
"reservation == null ? profile : reservation.profile()".

The corrected ranking, measured rather than read off the javadoc:
- nameForSlot is wired, at CallerResolver.java:137 (method reference, which is
  why a ".nameForSlot(" grep missed it)
- isSlot is reached through bind, called at MemberRegistry.java:235 and :376
- profileForSlot has no caller at all

Prose only. No behaviour change.
2026-09-10 13:25:19 +07:00
ltms d1e7d71eee Merge #432: pin profileForSlot, isSlot and nameForSlot against a live reload
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m29s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m34s
Verified in my own tree at a196d34: 1539 tests green, 0 compile errors, 0 files
changed under src/main (test-only, as reported).

Mutated two halves the worker's own proof did not cover, with a control in the
same script and the changed line echoed back each time:

- roleForSlot returning ARCHITECT for any configured slot (flatten is
  role-blind) -> 2 failures, incl. CallerResolverTest
  .aBoundNonArchitectSlotStillResolvesAsAWorker:454. So the role-blind flatten
  cannot grant ARCHITECT through a non-architect pool; that was already pinned.
- nameForSlot parsing the key suffix instead of reading config -> 1 failure,
  MemberRegistryLiveTest.nameForSlotReflectsANameChangedByReload:255. The new
  test has teeth beyond the freeze the worker ran.

Control run unmutated: green.

The ticket's severity ranking was wrong and I corrected it on #431. profileForSlot
has no caller in src/main in either the "." or "::" form, so its javadoc ("what
the spawn lifecycle reads") names a caller that does not exist; nameForSlot is
wired at CallerResolver.java:137; isSlot is reached through bind, at :235 and
:376. A follow-up commit fixes the test prose that repeated my claim.
2026-09-10 08:24:26 +02:00
Dai Ha a196d34455 fleetd #431: pin profileForSlot, isSlot and nameForSlot against a live reload
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 49s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 2m7s
#424 made MemberRegistry.slots() re-read fleet: on every call, but only
roleForSlot was tested against a real reload. profileForSlot, isSlot and
nameForSlot all have the same live-read line and none was pinned — proved by
freezing each to a construction-time snapshot and watching the full suite
stay green.

Adds 4 tests to MemberRegistryLiveTest, each driving a real ConfigRef.reload()
against a @TempDir config file (never two frozen registries compared in
memory, which would test the constructor instead of the reload):
- profileForSlotReflectsAProfileChangedByReload
- isSlotStopsReportingASlotRemovedByReload / isSlotStartsReportingASlotAddedByReload
- nameForSlotReflectsANameChangedByReload

No production change. profileForSlot has no call site anywhere in src/main
yet, so there is no spawn-lifecycle seam to drive the test through beyond the
accessor itself.
2026-09-10 13:06:56 +07:00
12 changed files with 579 additions and 64 deletions
+1
View File
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ the merge — and merging on a reviewer's word is delegating it by proxy.
| Message a **peer lead** on this host | `fleet_send{sessionId: <their terminal>, content}` — `fleet_list` → `leads` reports it. Coordination only, **never** a task |
| Message a **peer lead** on another daemon or host | `fleet_send{coordId: <their coord-id>, content}` — needs a `coordinator:` block; your own coord-id is in `fleet_list`. Coordination only, **never** a task |
| Answer a peer lead that messaged you | `fleet_send{coordId}` — or `{sessionId}` if they are on this host. **Not** `fleet_reply`: it has no peer route and the publish is refused |
| Read your own held lead-to-lead mail (no ack) | `fleet_poll{coordId: <your own coord-id, from fleet_list's coordinator.selfId>}` — primary-only; never acks, so `fleet_list`'s `held[]` still shows it after. `fleet_list`'s `held[]` gives only a truncated preview — this is the only way to read the full body |
| Collect a held reply | `fleet_poll{target}` · then `fleet_ack{target, msgId}` |
| Tear down a member | `fleet_stop{paneId}` |
@@ -30,6 +30,16 @@ public final class Authz {
DRAIN,
/** Read-only observation: status, roster, profiles, task polling. */
READ,
/**
* Read (never ack) this daemon's own held lead-to-lead coordination mail (fleetd #421).
*
* <p>Deliberately <strong>not</strong> folded into {@link #READ}. {@code READ}'s grant
* rests on "the roster carries no secrets" (see its case below) — a lead-to-lead body is
* not the roster; it is where leads discuss host shapes, credentials and unmerged work.
* Mapping this to {@code READ} would let any worker read every peer lead's mail in full
* and would silently falsify that comment for every other {@code READ} caller.
*/
COORD_READ,
/** Scrape the metrics endpoint. */
METRICS
}
@@ -68,6 +78,11 @@ public final class Authz {
// Observation is open to every authenticated role: a worker legitimately polls its own
// status, and the roster carries no secrets.
case READ, METRICS -> caller.isPrimary() || caller.isWorker() || caller.isArchitect();
// fleetd #421: reading held lead-to-lead mail is the primary's alone. An architect
// holds READ today (CB-548), so "not primary" must mean not-architect here too — this
// is coordination between leads, not observation of the roster.
case COORD_READ -> caller.isPrimary();
};
}
@@ -177,7 +177,15 @@ public final class MemberRegistry implements MemberLifecycle {
}
/**
* The strong-model profile a slot runs under — what the spawn lifecycle reads.
* The strong-model profile a slot runs under, as of this call.
*
* <p>Nothing in {@code src/main} calls this (fleetd #431 — grepped both the {@code
* .profileForSlot(} and the {@code ::profileForSlot} form). This javadoc used to say "what the
* spawn lifecycle reads", and that seam does not exist: the spawn lifecycle takes its profile
* from the {@link MemberLifecycle.SlotReservation} that {@code reserve} returns, never from
* here. Kept and pinned rather than deleted because it is the natural accessor for that seam
* if one is added; live for the same reason as {@link #roleForSlot}, so a reload cannot leave
* it answering for the old config.
*
* @return the slot's configured {@code profile}, or {@code null} if the slot is unknown or
* declares none
@@ -386,10 +386,11 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
(exchange, req) -> {
Map<String, Object> a = req.arguments();
String target = str(a, "target");
String coordId = str(a, "coordId");
// The action depends on the ARGUMENTS, not on the tool name -- see pollAction.
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_poll", a), target);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return poll(messages, str(a, "ticket"), target);
return poll(messages, leadChannel, str(a, "ticket"), target, coordId);
};
// CB-307 Increment 3: per-msgId ack (not needed in v1 but supported by the inbox).
// Acking removes a reply from the inbox, so it is a drain, not a read.
@@ -811,29 +812,42 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
/**
* Which authorization action a {@code fleet_poll} call needs, decided by its arguments
* (fleetd #272).
* (fleetd #272, widened by fleetd #421).
*
* <p>{@code fleet_poll} is <strong>two operations behind one tool name</strong>. With {@code
* ticket} it observes an async delegation and changes nothing, which is a {@link
* <p>{@code fleet_poll} is now <strong>three operations behind one tool name</strong>. With
* {@code ticket} it observes an async delegation and changes nothing, which is a {@link
* Authz.Action#READ}. With {@code target} it calls {@link MessageService#drainReplies} on that
* session -- the replies are removed from the inbox and a second call returns nothing -- so it
* is a {@link Authz.Action#DRAIN}, the same gate {@code fleet_ack} already uses for removing a
* single message, and the same one the REST path uses at {@code FleetApp.drainReplies}.
* single message, and the same one the REST path uses at {@code FleetApp.drainReplies}. With
* {@code coordId} it reads (never acks) this daemon's own held lead-to-lead mail, which is a
* {@link Authz.Action#COORD_READ} -- <strong>not</strong> {@code READ}, even though nothing is
* consumed: {@code READ}'s grant is open to every authenticated role on the premise that the
* roster carries no secrets, and a lead-to-lead body is not the roster. Mapping a non-destructive
* peer-mail read to {@code READ} would let any worker read every peer lead's mail in full.
*
* <p>Until this method existed the handler passed a constant {@code READ} for both branches.
* {@code READ} is open to every authenticated role, so any worker could read a peer's id out of
* {@code fleet_list} and destroy the replies that peer had queued for the primary. The gate
* failed open, and it did so because the required action is a function of the arguments while
* the handler chose it before looking at them.
* <p>Before this method existed (fleetd #272) the handler passed a constant {@code READ} for
* both of the original branches. {@code READ} is open to every authenticated role, so any
* worker could read a peer's id out of {@code fleet_list} and destroy the replies that peer had
* queued for the primary. The gate failed open, and it did so because the required action is a
* function of the arguments while the handler chose it before looking at them.
*
* <p>The choice lives in this method, and not inline in the handler, so that a test can assert
* the mapping the handler actually uses. {@code FleetMcpAuthzTest} already checked every
* {@link Authz.Action} against every {@link Role} and passed throughout -- it tested the policy
* table, which was correct, while the defect was in which action the caller handed it.
*
* @param target the {@code target} argument of the call, or {@code null}/blank when absent
* <p>Checked first, and exclusively of {@code target}: a call naming {@code coordId} is reading
* a different inbox entirely (this daemon's own lead channel, never a worker's), so it takes
* priority over whatever {@code target} might also say.
*
* @param target the {@code target} argument of the call, or {@code null}/blank when absent
* @param coordId the {@code coordId} argument of the call, or {@code null}/blank when absent
*/
static Authz.Action pollAction(String target) {
static Authz.Action pollAction(String target, String coordId) {
if (!isBlank(coordId)) {
return Authz.Action.COORD_READ;
}
return isBlank(target) ? Authz.Action.READ : Authz.Action.DRAIN;
}
@@ -848,7 +862,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
case "fleet_reply" -> Authz.Action.REPLY;
case "fleet_ask" -> Authz.Action.ASK;
case "fleet_status", "fleet_list", "fleet_profiles", "fleet_whoami" -> Authz.Action.READ;
case "fleet_poll" -> pollAction(str(arguments, "target"));
case "fleet_poll" -> pollAction(str(arguments, "target"), str(arguments, "coordId"));
case "fleet_ack" -> Authz.Action.DRAIN;
case "fleet_spawn" -> Authz.Action.SPAWN;
case "fleet_stop" -> Authz.Action.STOP;
@@ -858,6 +872,21 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
/** {@code fleet_poll}: check an async delegation by ticket, or drain a worker's inbox by target. */
static McpSchema.CallToolResult poll(MessageService messages, String ticket, String target) {
return poll(messages, null, ticket, target, null);
}
/**
* As above, plus (fleetd #421) a held-peer-mail read when {@code coordId} is present: returns
* this daemon's own held lead-to-lead messages, in full, without acking them. Checked first and
* exclusively of {@code ticket}/{@code target} — see {@link #pollAction}'s javadoc for why this
* is a different inbox (this daemon's own {@link LeadChannel}) that authorizes differently
* ({@link Authz.Action#COORD_READ}, primary-only) from either of the original two branches.
*/
static McpSchema.CallToolResult poll(MessageService messages, LeadChannel leadChannel, String ticket,
String target, String coordId) {
if (!isBlank(coordId)) {
return pollHeldPeerMail(leadChannel, coordId);
}
if (!isBlank(target)) {
var replies = messages.drainReplies(target);
if (replies.isEmpty()) {
@@ -885,6 +914,46 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
};
}
/**
* fleetd #421: a lead's own held lead-to-lead mail, read without consuming it.
*
* <p>{@link LeadChannel#peek} is non-destructive, so calling this twice returns the same
* bodies, and {@code fleet_list}'s {@code coordinator.held[]} is unaffected — this adds a
* read, it never acks. Never let this short-circuit the delivery contract: {@code
* LeadCoordLoop}'s javadoc explains why a message must stay unacked until actually delivered,
* and that is unchanged here.
*
* <p>{@code coordId} must be THIS daemon's own coord-id ({@code fleet_list}'s
* {@code coordinator.selfId}) — there is no route here to read a PEER's outbound mail, only
* your own inbound mail. Requiring the caller to echo its own id catches the exact confusion
* that opened fleetd #421: the original failed attempt passed a PEER's id ("fleet01") as
* {@code fleet_poll}'s {@code target}, expecting to read that peer's messages, and got the same
* silent {@code []} as a genuinely empty worker inbox. This refuses the same mistake here with a
* reason, instead of a second silent wrong answer.
*/
static McpSchema.CallToolResult pollHeldPeerMail(LeadChannel leadChannel, String coordId) {
if (leadChannel == null) {
return error("lead coordination is not configured (no coordinator: block) — there is "
+ "no held peer mail to read.");
}
String selfId = leadChannel.selfCoordId();
if (!coordId.equals(selfId)) {
return error("coordId \"" + coordId + "\" is not this daemon's own coord-id (\"" + selfId
+ "\"). fleet_poll reads only YOUR OWN held mail — pass your own coordId "
+ "(fleet_list's coordinator.selfId), not a peer's.");
}
return text(json(leadChannel.peek().stream().map(FleetMcp::heldMailView).toList()));
}
/** The full body of one held lead-to-lead message — never truncated, unlike {@link #heldView}. */
private static Map<String, Object> heldMailView(LeadMessage m) {
Map<String, Object> row = new LinkedHashMap<>();
row.put("msgId", m.msgId());
row.put("from", m.from());
row.put("content", m.content());
return row;
}
/**
* {@code fleet_reply}: the worker returns its structured answer, resolving the awaiting send
* or — when no send is open — queueing the reply in the inbox for later drain (CB-307).
@@ -1323,6 +1392,16 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
* counts, it can never make {@code fleet_list} itself slow or fail. {@code held} comes from
* {@link LeadChannel#peek}, a pure in-memory read with no broker round trip, so it is never
* subject to that bound.
*
* <p><strong>fleetd #421: {@code heldCount}/{@code heldDurable} fix the "pending: 0" trap.</strong>
* {@code mailbox.pending} counts only broker-<em>ready</em> messages; a held message is already
* an unacked delivery sitting with this consumer, so the normal, healthy state of a blocked lead
* is {@code "pending": 0} next to a non-empty {@code held[]} — which invites the false reading
* "these are only in memory, a restart will lose them". They are not: {@code LeadMailbox}
* consumes with manual ack, so held mail is a durable broker delivery. {@code heldCount} is the
* honest second number beside {@code pending} ({@code held.size()}, not left for the reader to
* count the array), and {@code heldDurable} states the fact in words rather than leaving
* {@code pending} as the only number next to {@code held[]}.
*/
private static Map<String, Object> coordinatorView(CoordinationSource coordination) {
LeadChannel channel = coordination.leadChannel();
@@ -1330,11 +1409,14 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
return null;
}
String selfId = channel.selfCoordId();
List<LeadMessage> held = channel.peek();
Map<String, Object> row = new LinkedHashMap<>();
row.put("selfId", selfId);
row.put("configured", true);
row.put("mailbox", mailboxView(probe(channel, selfId)));
row.put("held", channel.peek().stream().map(FleetMcp::heldView).toList());
row.put("heldCount", held.size());
row.put("heldDurable", true);
row.put("held", held.stream().map(FleetMcp::heldView).toList());
row.put("peers", coordination.peers().stream().map(p -> peerView(channel, p)).toList());
return row;
}
@@ -1663,10 +1745,18 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
"Check an async delegation (a fleet_send with wait:false) by its ticket: "
+ "pending, done (with the worker's reply), or failed. When target (a worker "
+ "session id) is present instead of ticket, drain that worker's inbox of "
+ "replies delivered when no send was open.",
+ "replies delivered when no send was open. When coordId is present instead, "
+ "read (never consume) your own held lead-to-lead mail — primary-only.",
objectSchema(Map.of(
"ticket", stringProp("The ticket returned by fleet_send wait:false"),
"target", stringProp("Worker session id to drain pending replies from (optional)")),
"target", stringProp("Worker session id to drain pending replies from (optional)"),
"coordId", stringProp("Your own coord-id (fleet_list's coordinator.selfId) — "
+ "reads every message currently held[] for you in full, without "
+ "acking. Read twice, get the same bodies both times; fleet_list's "
+ "held[] still reports them afterward. Primary-only, and this can "
+ "read only YOUR OWN mailbox — there is no route to a peer's outbound "
+ "mail, so passing a peer's coordId here is refused rather than "
+ "silently returning the wrong thing (or nothing).")),
List.of()));
}
@@ -5,14 +5,12 @@ import java.util.List;
/**
* Backward-compatible placement: an unqualified spawn always resolves to the configured default
* profile, exactly as {@code CompositePeerLauncher} did before CB-518. This ignores caps
* ({@code maxLoad}) so that a pre-existing config behaves identically after upgrade — capacity
* gating for automatic placement is deliberately out of scope for {@code fixed}, exactly as it
* always has been. Reachability is a narrower exception (fleetd #315, below): a profile is never
* checked for reachability up front, only skipped once it has already failed in <em>this same</em>
* spawn call's retry loop — see the unreachable case below.
* profile, exactly as {@code CompositePeerLauncher} did before CB-518. Reachability is a narrower
* exception (fleetd #315, below): a profile is never checked for reachability up front, only
* skipped once it has already failed in <em>this same</em> spawn call's retry loop — see the
* unreachable case below.
*
* <p>Five exceptions walk past the default instead of returning it unconditionally:
* <p>Six exceptions walk past the default instead of returning it unconditionally:
* <ul>
* <li>Quarantine (CB-578 stage B): a quarantined default is a credential that just refused on
* a usage limit, not a transient capacity or reachability concern.
@@ -20,14 +18,24 @@ import java.util.List;
* ({@code BackendOutagePolicy}) — a separate, shorter-lived source from quarantine. When a
* profile is both quarantined and cooling off, only the quarantine reason is reported
* (exhaustion takes priority), matching {@code CompositePeerLauncher}'s explicit-spawn order.
* <li>At cap (fleetd #435): a profile whose live count has reached its {@code maxLoad}
* ({@link PlacementPolicyUtil#atCap}) — a documented, unconditional capacity limit (see
* {@code FleetConfig.Profile#maxLoad}), so {@code fixed} must gate on it exactly as {@code
* weighted}/{@code round-robin} already do via {@link PlacementPolicyUtil#available}. Before
* this fix {@code fixed} built its own {@link PlacementCandidate} for the default with {@code
* maxLoad} forced to {@code null}, so a capped default was chosen anyway on every unqualified
* spawn — the cap was advisory, not enforced, for the one placement policy every config uses
* by default. Reported only when quarantine and cooling off are both absent, matching {@code
* CompositePeerLauncher}'s explicit-spawn check order (quarantine, then cooling off, then max
* load, then model-off).
* <li>Model off (fleetd #422): a profile whose {@code model:} the operator has turned off in
* {@code models.allow:} — an operator decision, never a backend-reported outage, so it is a
* FOURTH, independent source from both quarantine and cooling off (never merged with either),
* exactly as {@code CompositePeerLauncher.enforceModelEnabled} and {@link
* PlacementPolicyUtil#available} treat it. When a profile is model-off <em>and</em> quarantined
* or cooling off, only the quarantine/cooling-off reason is reported — those still take
* priority, matching {@code CompositePeerLauncher}'s explicit-spawn check order (quarantine,
* then cooling off, then max load, then model-off).
* fifth, independent source from quarantine, cooling off, and at-cap (never merged with any
* of them), exactly as {@code CompositePeerLauncher.enforceModelEnabled} and {@link
* PlacementPolicyUtil#available} treat it. When a profile is model-off <em>and</em> quarantined,
* cooling off, or at cap, only the higher-priority reason is reported, matching {@code
* CompositePeerLauncher}'s explicit-spawn check order (quarantine, then cooling off, then max
* load, then model-off).
* <li>Unreachable (fleetd #315): {@code CompositePeerLauncher.spawn} retries a failed candidate
* on the next one and rebuilds the {@link PlacementContext} so {@code ctx.unreachable()}
* names every profile that already failed with {@code PeerUnreachableException} in this same
@@ -40,10 +48,10 @@ import java.util.List;
* {@code weighted}/{@code round-robin} skip it — an explicit {@code fleet_spawn} naming
* the profile is unaffected, only this automatic fallback walk.
* </ul>
* A fleet where nothing is ever quarantined, cooling off, model-off, unreachable, or weight-0 never
* exercises any of these paths, so today's behaviour is unchanged — in particular, the very first
* selection of a spawn call always sees an empty {@code unreachable} set, so the first choice is
* untouched.
* A fleet where nothing is ever quarantined, cooling off, at cap, model-off, unreachable, or
* weight-0 never exercises any of these paths, so today's behaviour is unchanged — in particular,
* the very first selection of a spawn call always sees an empty {@code unreachable} set, so the
* first choice is untouched.
*/
final class FixedPlacementPolicy implements PlacementPolicy {
@@ -51,13 +59,14 @@ final class FixedPlacementPolicy implements PlacementPolicy {
public PlacementCandidate select(PlacementContext ctx) {
String d = ctx.defaultProfile();
if (d != null && !d.isBlank() && !ctx.quarantined().contains(d) && !ctx.coolingOff().contains(d)
&& !ctx.modelOff().contains(d) && !ctx.unreachable().contains(d) && !weightExcluded(ctx, d)) {
&& !ctx.modelOff().contains(d) && !ctx.unreachable().contains(d) && !weightExcluded(ctx, d)
&& !capExcluded(ctx, d)) {
return new PlacementCandidate(d, null, 1.0f, null);
}
for (PlacementCandidate c : ctx.candidates()) {
if (!ctx.quarantined().contains(c.profile()) && !ctx.coolingOff().contains(c.profile())
&& !ctx.modelOff().contains(c.profile()) && !ctx.unreachable().contains(c.profile())
&& !c.excluded()) {
&& !c.excluded() && !PlacementPolicyUtil.atCap(ctx, c)) {
return new PlacementCandidate(c.profile(), null, c.weight(), c.maxLoad());
}
}
@@ -66,14 +75,18 @@ final class FixedPlacementPolicy implements PlacementPolicy {
// Exhaustion quarantine takes priority: reported only when quarantine is absent, so the
// message never claims "cooling off" for a profile that is really backend-exhausted.
boolean dCoolingOff = !dQuarantined && ctx.coolingOff().contains(d);
// fleetd #422: model-off is a fourth, independent source (an operator decision) — but
// quarantine/cooling-off still take priority when more than one applies, matching
// fleetd #435: at-cap sits between cooling off and model-off, matching
// CompositePeerLauncher's explicit-spawn check order (quarantine, cooling off, max load,
// then model-off) — reported only when quarantine/cooling-off are both absent.
boolean dAtCap = !dQuarantined && !dCoolingOff && capExcluded(ctx, d);
// fleetd #422: model-off is a fifth, independent source (an operator decision) — but
// quarantine/cooling-off/at-cap still take priority when more than one applies, matching
// CompositePeerLauncher's explicit-spawn check order (quarantine, cooling off, max load,
// then model-off).
boolean dModelOff = !dQuarantined && !dCoolingOff && ctx.modelOff().contains(d);
boolean dModelOff = !dQuarantined && !dCoolingOff && !dAtCap && ctx.modelOff().contains(d);
boolean dUnreachable = ctx.unreachable().contains(d);
boolean dWeightExcluded = weightExcluded(ctx, d);
if (dQuarantined || dCoolingOff || dModelOff || dUnreachable || dWeightExcluded) {
if (dQuarantined || dCoolingOff || dAtCap || dModelOff || dUnreachable || dWeightExcluded) {
List<String> reasons = new ArrayList<>();
if (dQuarantined) {
reasons.add("is quarantined (backend exhausted)");
@@ -81,6 +94,11 @@ final class FixedPlacementPolicy implements PlacementPolicy {
if (dCoolingOff) {
reasons.add("is cooling off after repeated backend errors");
}
if (dAtCap) {
PlacementCandidate c = candidateFor(ctx, d);
int live = ctx.liveCount().apply(d);
reasons.add("is at maxLoad (" + live + " live >= " + c.maxLoad() + " cap)");
}
if (dModelOff) {
reasons.add("names a model the operator has turned off in models.allow");
}
@@ -96,18 +114,38 @@ final class FixedPlacementPolicy implements PlacementPolicy {
}
if (!ctx.candidates().isEmpty()) {
throw new PlacementException("all worker profiles are excluded from automatic "
+ "selection (quarantined, cooling off, model-off, unreachable, or weight-0)");
+ "selection (quarantined, cooling off, at cap, model-off, unreachable, or weight-0)");
}
throw new PlacementException("no worker profiles configured");
}
/** Whether {@code profile} carries {@code weight <= 0} (CB-554) among {@code ctx}'s candidates. */
private static boolean weightExcluded(PlacementContext ctx, String profile) {
PlacementCandidate c = candidateFor(ctx, profile);
return c != null && c.excluded();
}
/**
* Whether {@code profile} has reached its {@code maxLoad} cap (fleetd #435), using the shared
* {@link PlacementPolicyUtil#atCap} definition — the same one {@code weighted}/{@code
* round-robin} already consult via {@link PlacementPolicyUtil#available}. Looked up by name,
* the same way {@link #weightExcluded} is: the default fast path above builds its own {@link
* PlacementCandidate} with {@code maxLoad} forced to {@code null} (it carries no cap of its
* own), so the candidate actually configured for {@code profile} has to be found in {@code
* ctx.candidates()} first.
*/
private static boolean capExcluded(PlacementContext ctx, String profile) {
PlacementCandidate c = candidateFor(ctx, profile);
return c != null && PlacementPolicyUtil.atCap(ctx, c);
}
/** The configured candidate named {@code profile} in {@code ctx}, or {@code null} if none. */
private static PlacementCandidate candidateFor(PlacementContext ctx, String profile) {
for (PlacementCandidate c : ctx.candidates()) {
if (c.profile().equals(profile)) {
return c.excluded();
return c;
}
}
return false;
return null;
}
}
@@ -11,14 +11,29 @@ final class PlacementPolicyUtil {
private PlacementPolicyUtil() {
}
/**
* True when {@code c} has reached its {@code maxLoad} cap: {@code liveCount(c.profile()) >=
* c.maxLoad()}. A {@code null} maxLoad means unlimited, so it is never at cap.
*
* <p>Extracted as the single shared definition of "at cap" (fleetd #435): before this fix it
* was computed inline in both {@link #available} and {@link #emptyException}, and {@code
* FixedPlacementPolicy} — not a caller of either — quietly kept its own {@code select} free of
* any cap check at all, so a capped default profile was chosen anyway under the default
* placement policy. Every automatic policy must call this, not re-derive it.
*/
static boolean atCap(PlacementContext ctx, PlacementCandidate c) {
Integer cap = c.maxLoad();
return cap != null && ctx.liveCount().apply(c.profile()) >= cap;
}
/**
* Candidates that are not weight-excluded (CB-554: explicit {@code weight <= 0}, checked
* first because it is a static config choice rather than transient state), not
* known-unreachable, not quarantined (CB-578 stage B), not cooling off after repeated backend
* errors (fleetd #201 Unit 5 — a separate, shorter-lived source from quarantine), not naming a
* model the operator has turned off (fleetd #422 — a third, independent source: an operator
* decision, never a backend-reported outage), and have not reached their maxLoad. A {@code
* null} maxLoad means unlimited.
* decision, never a backend-reported outage), and have not reached their maxLoad (see {@link
* #atCap}). A {@code null} maxLoad means unlimited.
*/
static List<PlacementCandidate> available(PlacementContext ctx) {
List<PlacementCandidate> out = new ArrayList<>();
@@ -26,16 +41,10 @@ final class PlacementPolicyUtil {
if (c.excluded() || ctx.unreachable().contains(c.profile())
|| ctx.quarantined().contains(c.profile())
|| ctx.coolingOff().contains(c.profile())
|| ctx.modelOff().contains(c.profile())) {
|| ctx.modelOff().contains(c.profile())
|| atCap(ctx, c)) {
continue;
}
Integer cap = c.maxLoad();
if (cap != null) {
int live = ctx.liveCount().apply(c.profile());
if (live >= cap) {
continue;
}
}
out.add(c);
}
return out;
@@ -59,7 +68,6 @@ final class PlacementPolicyUtil {
int coolingOff = 0;
int modelOff = 0;
for (PlacementCandidate c : ctx.candidates()) {
Integer cap = c.maxLoad();
if (c.excluded()) {
weightExcluded++;
} else if (ctx.quarantined().contains(c.profile())) {
@@ -70,7 +78,7 @@ final class PlacementPolicyUtil {
modelOff++;
} else if (ctx.unreachable().contains(c.profile())) {
unreachable++;
} else if (cap != null && ctx.liveCount().apply(c.profile()) >= cap) {
} else if (atCap(ctx, c)) {
atCap++;
}
}
@@ -113,6 +113,20 @@ class AuthzTest {
assertTrue(Authz.permits(WORKER_A, METRICS, null));
}
/**
* fleetd #421 — unlike READ (the case above), COORD_READ (a lead's own held peer mail) is the
* primary's alone. A worker or an architect reading it would disclose lead-to-lead
* coordination bodies, not the secret-free roster READ is open about.
*/
@Test
void coordReadIsThePrimarysAloneNotAWidenedRead() {
assertTrue(Authz.permits(PRIMARY, COORD_READ, null));
assertFalse(Authz.permits(WORKER_A, COORD_READ, null),
"a worker must not read held lead-to-lead mail");
assertFalse(Authz.permits(ARCH_DESIGN, COORD_READ, null),
"an architect holds READ today, but not-primary must mean not-architect here too");
}
@Test
void unauthenticatedIsDistinguishedFromMerelyForbidden() {
// Drives the 401-vs-403 split: a missing credential is fixable by the caller, a wrong role
@@ -69,6 +69,22 @@ class MemberRegistryLiveTest {
profile: sonnet
""";
/** Same slot name ({@code designer}) as {@link #WITH_SONNET_SLOT}, repointed to a different profile. */
private static final String WITH_OPUS_SLOT = """
fleet:
architects:
designer:
profile: opus
""";
/** Same profile ({@code sonnet}) as {@link #WITH_SONNET_SLOT}, but the pool key is renamed. */
private static final String WITH_RENAMED_SLOT = """
fleet:
architects:
architect-lead:
profile: sonnet
""";
private static ConfigRef refFor(Path f) {
return new ConfigRef(f, FleetConfig.load(f));
}
@@ -155,6 +171,93 @@ class MemberRegistryLiveTest {
"a slot added by reload must be reservable with no restart");
}
// ── profileForSlot, isSlot and nameForSlot are live too (fleetd #431) ─────────────────────────
// #424 pinned roleForSlot against a live reload but left these three untested — proved by
// mutating each to read a snapshot flattened once at construction: the full suite stayed green
// for all three.
//
// The three differ in how much production behaviour depends on them, and the ticket first got
// this ranking wrong. nameForSlot is wired: CallerResolver passes members::nameForSlot, next to
// members::roleForSlot. isSlot is reached through bind, which calls it to refuse an unknown
// slot. profileForSlot has NO caller in src/main at all — grepped both the ".profileForSlot("
// and the "::profileForSlot" form — so there is no seam to drive its test through beyond the
// accessor itself, and its own javadoc ("what the spawn lifecycle reads") describes a caller
// that does not exist. These tests pin the accessors as they are; whether profileForSlot should
// be wired or deleted is a separate question.
@Test
void profileForSlotReflectsAProfileChangedByReload(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml(WITH_SONNET_SLOT));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
MemberRegistry registry = MemberRegistry.live(() -> ref.get().fleet());
assertEquals("sonnet", registry.profileForSlot("architect:designer"),
"the slot's profile before the reload");
Files.writeString(f, yaml(WITH_OPUS_SLOT));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied(), "the reload must actually take effect: " + out.summary());
assertEquals("opus", registry.profileForSlot("architect:designer"),
"repointing the slot to a different profile must take effect with no restart");
}
@Test
void isSlotStopsReportingASlotRemovedByReload(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml(WITH_SONNET_SLOT));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
MemberRegistry registry = MemberRegistry.live(() -> ref.get().fleet());
assertTrue(registry.isSlot("architect:designer"), "the slot is configured before the reload");
Files.writeString(f, yaml(WITHOUT_ARCHITECT_SLOTS));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied(), "the reload must actually take effect: " + out.summary());
assertFalse(registry.isSlot("architect:designer"),
"removing the slot from config must make isSlot say so on the very next call, "
+ "with no restart");
}
@Test
void isSlotStartsReportingASlotAddedByReload(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml(WITHOUT_ARCHITECT_SLOTS));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
MemberRegistry registry = MemberRegistry.live(() -> ref.get().fleet());
assertFalse(registry.isSlot("architect:designer"), "no architect slot is configured yet");
Files.writeString(f, yaml(WITH_SONNET_SLOT));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied(), "the reload must actually take effect: " + out.summary());
assertTrue(registry.isSlot("architect:designer"),
"a slot added by reload must be visible to isSlot with no restart");
}
@Test
void nameForSlotReflectsANameChangedByReload(@TempDir Path dir) throws Exception {
Path f = dir.resolve("fleetd.yaml");
Files.writeString(f, yaml(WITH_SONNET_SLOT));
ConfigRef ref = refFor(f);
MemberRegistry registry = MemberRegistry.live(() -> ref.get().fleet());
assertEquals("designer", registry.nameForSlot("architect:designer"),
"the configured name before the reload");
Files.writeString(f, yaml(WITH_RENAMED_SLOT));
ConfigRef.Outcome out = ref.reload();
assertTrue(out.applied(), "the reload must actually take effect: " + out.summary());
assertNull(registry.nameForSlot("architect:designer"),
"the old key no longer names a configured slot — it was renamed away by the reload");
assertEquals("architect-lead", registry.nameForSlot("architect:architect-lead"),
"the new name must be visible under its new qualified key with no restart");
}
// ── a bound architect is demoted, but the binding itself is not touched (fleetd #424) ───────
// The lead's corrected ruling: the PRIVILEGE a slot grants is revoked on the bound session's
// very next request, but the terminalToSlot BINDING itself is untouched by a reload — dropping
@@ -201,14 +201,34 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
*/
@Test
void pollingByTargetIsADrainAndPollingByTicketIsARead() {
assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b"),
assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b", null),
"poll by target removes the replies — that is a drain, not an observation");
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.pollAction(null),
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.pollAction(null, null),
"poll by ticket changes nothing");
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.pollAction(" "),
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.pollAction(" ", null),
"a blank target is an absent target");
}
/**
* fleetd #421: a coordId branch is a THIRD operation behind fleet_poll's one name, and it must
* map to {@link Authz.Action#COORD_READ} — never {@link Authz.Action#READ}, even though this
* branch also consumes nothing. READ's grant is open to every authenticated role on the premise
* that the roster carries no secrets; a lead-to-lead body is not the roster, so folding this
* branch into READ would let any worker read every peer lead's mail in full. coordId also takes
* priority over target when both happen to be present — it addresses a different inbox entirely.
*/
@Test
void pollingByCoordIdIsACoordReadNeverAPlainRead() {
assertEquals(Authz.Action.COORD_READ, FleetMcp.pollAction(null, "mac-opus"),
"reading held peer mail must not be mapped to the everyone-readable READ action");
assertEquals(Authz.Action.COORD_READ, FleetMcp.pollAction(" ", "mac-opus"),
"a blank target must not fall through to READ/DRAIN when coordId is present");
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.pollAction(null, " "),
"a blank coordId is an absent coordId, same as target/ticket");
assertEquals(Authz.Action.COORD_READ, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b", "mac-opus"),
"coordId takes priority over target — this is a different inbox, not a drain");
}
@Test
void everyRegisteredToolHasItsHandlerActionPinned() {
Set<String> registered = toolsTheServerRegisters();
@@ -230,6 +250,8 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_whoami", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_poll", Map.of("ticket", "task")));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_poll", Map.of("target", "term_b")));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.COORD_READ,
FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_poll", Map.of("coordId", "mac-opus")));
}
private static Set<String> toolsTheServerRegisters() {
@@ -249,11 +271,11 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
void aWorkerMayNotDrainAnotherSessionsInboxByPolling() {
FleetMcp m = mcp(true);
assertNotNull(m.denyFor(WORKER_A, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b"), "term_b"),
assertNotNull(m.denyFor(WORKER_A, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b", null), "term_b"),
"a worker draining a peer's inbox would destroy replies queued for the primary");
assertNotNull(m.denyFor(ARCH_DESIGN, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b"), "term_b"),
assertNotNull(m.denyFor(ARCH_DESIGN, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b", null), "term_b"),
"an architect has no lifecycle rights either — same gate as fleet_ack");
assertNull(m.denyFor(PRIMARY, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b"), "term_b"),
assertNull(m.denyFor(PRIMARY, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b", null), "term_b"),
"collecting a held reply is the primary's job");
}
@@ -265,11 +287,33 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
void pollingAnOwnTicketStaysOpenToWorkersAndArchitects() {
FleetMcp m = mcp(true);
assertNull(m.denyFor(WORKER_A, FleetMcp.pollAction(null), null));
assertNull(m.denyFor(ARCH_DESIGN, FleetMcp.pollAction(null), null),
assertNull(m.denyFor(WORKER_A, FleetMcp.pollAction(null, null), null));
assertNull(m.denyFor(ARCH_DESIGN, FleetMcp.pollAction(null, null), null),
"an architect delegates with wait:false, so it must be able to poll its ticket");
}
/**
* fleetd #421 acceptance: the whole ticket, pinned at the policy-table layer. A worker must be
* refused the coordId branch, the primary must be allowed, and (CB-548) an architect — which
* holds READ today — must be refused too, because "not primary" means not-architect here.
*/
@Test
void aWorkerAndAnArchitectMayNotReadHeldPeerMailOnlyThePrimaryMay() {
FleetMcp m = mcp(true);
Authz.Action coordRead = FleetMcp.pollAction(null, "mac-opus");
McpSchema.CallToolResult workerDenied = m.denyFor(WORKER_A, coordRead, null);
assertNotNull(workerDenied, "a worker must not read held lead-to-lead mail");
assertTrue(workerDenied.isError());
McpSchema.CallToolResult archDenied = m.denyFor(ARCH_DESIGN, coordRead, null);
assertNotNull(archDenied, "an architect holds READ today, but not-primary must mean "
+ "not-architect here too");
assertTrue(archDenied.isError());
assertNull(m.denyFor(PRIMARY, coordRead, null), "reading its own held mail is the primary's job");
}
// --- identity reconstruction from the transport context ------------------------------------
@Test
@@ -680,7 +680,11 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
void listReportsHeldMessagesWithATruncatedPreviewNeverTheFullBody() {
FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workerService(h, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw")));
String longContent = "x".repeat(200);
// A homogeneous "x".repeat(200) body would not pin the exact 80-char boundary: a preview
// widened by one (81 chars) still CONTAINS "x".repeat(80) + "…" as a substring one position
// later, because every character is 'x'. Put a sentinel ("Y") exactly at index 80 — the
// first character a widened cap would leak — so any preview past 80 chars is caught.
String longContent = "x".repeat(80) + "Y" + "z".repeat(119);
FakeLeadChannel channel = new FakeLeadChannel("mac-opus")
.hold(new LeadMessage("m1", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", longContent));
@@ -694,9 +698,87 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
assertTrue(out.contains("\"msgId\":\"m1\""), out);
assertTrue(out.contains("\"from\":\"fleet01-lead\""), out);
assertFalse(out.contains(longContent), "fleet_list must never dump a held message's full body: " + out);
assertFalse(out.contains("Y"),
"the sentinel at index 80 must never appear — a preview past 80 chars leaked it: " + out);
assertTrue(out.contains("x".repeat(80) + "…"), "expected an 80-char preview with an ellipsis: " + out);
}
/**
* fleetd #421: {@code mailbox.pending} counts only broker-ready messages, so a blocked lead's
* normal, healthy state is {@code "pending": 0} next to a non-empty {@code held[]} — which
* invites the false reading that held mail is in-memory-only. {@code heldCount}/{@code
* heldDurable} put an honest second number and fact beside {@code pending} instead of leaving it
* as the only one.
*/
@Test
void listReportsAnHonestHeldCountAndDurabilityNotJustPendingZero() {
FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workerService(h, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw")));
FakeLeadChannel channel = new FakeLeadChannel("mac-opus")
.withMailbox("mac-opus", LeadChannel.MailboxState.exists("mac-opus", 0, 1))
.hold(new LeadMessage("m1", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", "one"))
.hold(new LeadMessage("m2", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", "two"))
.hold(new LeadMessage("m3", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", "three"));
McpSchema.CallToolResult res = FleetMcp.listFleet(
workerService(h, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw")), sessions, null,
FleetMcp.CapacitySource.none(), new FleetMcp.HealthCoverageSource(() -> "off"),
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource.none(), Map.of(), "",
new FleetMcp.CoordinationSource(channel, List.of()));
String out = textOf(res);
assertTrue(out.contains("\"pending\":0"), out);
assertTrue(out.contains("\"heldCount\":3"),
"the honest count beside pending: 0 — three messages really are held: " + out);
assertTrue(out.contains("\"heldDurable\":true"),
"must state the durability fact, not leave pending as the only number next to held[]: " + out);
}
// ── fleetd #421: a lead reads (never consumes) its own held peer mail ──────────────────────
@Test
void pollWithCoordIdReturnsTheFullBodyWithoutAckingAndLeavesItHeld() {
FakeLeadChannel channel = new FakeLeadChannel("mac-opus")
.hold(new LeadMessage("m1", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", "x".repeat(200)));
McpSchema.CallToolResult first = FleetMcp.poll(messages, channel, null, null, "mac-opus");
assertNotEquals(Boolean.TRUE, first.isError(), textOf(first));
String out1 = textOf(first);
assertTrue(out1.contains("\"msgId\":\"m1\""), out1);
assertTrue(out1.contains("\"from\":\"fleet01-lead\""), out1);
assertTrue(out1.contains("\"content\":\"" + "x".repeat(200) + "\""),
"the coordId route must return the FULL body, unlike fleet_list's preview: " + out1);
// Read again: identical bodies, and nothing was acked — peek() still holds it.
McpSchema.CallToolResult second = FleetMcp.poll(messages, channel, null, null, "mac-opus");
assertEquals(out1, textOf(second), "peek is non-destructive — reading twice must return the same bodies");
assertTrue(channel.acked().isEmpty(), "a read must never ack — that is the whole point of the ticket");
assertEquals(1, channel.peek().size(), "the message must still be held after being read");
}
@Test
void pollWithCoordIdRefusesAPeersCoordIdInsteadOfReturningTheWrongMailOrNothing() {
FakeLeadChannel channel = new FakeLeadChannel("mac-opus")
.hold(new LeadMessage("m1", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", "secret coordination body"));
// The ORIGINAL fleetd #421 confusion: passing a PEER's id where a self-address was meant.
McpSchema.CallToolResult res = FleetMcp.poll(messages, channel, null, null, "fleet01-lead");
assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, res.isError());
String out = textOf(res);
assertFalse(out.contains("secret coordination body"),
"a refused read must never leak the body it refused to return: " + out);
assertTrue(out.contains("mac-opus"), "the error must name this daemon's own coordId: " + out);
}
@Test
void pollWithCoordIdErrorsHonestlyWhenLeadCoordinationIsNotConfigured() {
McpSchema.CallToolResult res = FleetMcp.poll(messages, null, null, null, "mac-opus");
assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, res.isError());
assertTrue(textOf(res).toLowerCase().contains("coordinat"), textOf(res));
}
@Test
void listReportsEachDeclaredPeersLiveReachability() {
FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -536,6 +536,31 @@ class CompositePeerLauncherTest {
assertEquals("claude", h.profile(), "the returned handle carries the resolved default profile");
}
/**
* fleetd #435: {@code FixedPlacementPolicy} — the default placement policy every config uses
* unless {@code placement:} is set — never consulted {@code maxLoad}, so an unqualified spawn
* (a blank profile, the normal delegation path) landed on a capped default anyway. Measured on
* 7667727: a single dev profile at {@code maxLoad: 1} with 1 live, under {@code fixed()},
* returned "SPAWNED on profile=a". This test goes through {@code CompositePeerLauncher.spawn}
* with a blank profile, not the policy in isolation, so it proves the caller actually reaches
* the fixed default's new cap check rather than only the {@code select} method.
*/
@Test
void fixedPolicyGatesDefaultProfileAtMaxLoadOnUnqualifiedSpawn() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles = ordered(
"a", stubWorker("a", 1.0f, 1),
"b", stubWorker("b", 1.0f, null));
StubLauncher adapter = new StubLauncher("claude", herdr, profiles, "a", Set.of());
CompositePeerLauncher composite = new CompositePeerLauncher(
List.of(adapter), "a", profiles, PlacementPolicies.fixed(), name -> "a".equals(name) ? 1 : 0);
PeerHandle h = composite.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null));
assertEquals("b", h.profile(),
"the default profile a is at maxLoad, so fixed placement must fall through to b");
assertEquals(0, adapter.spawnCount("a"), "a is never spawned — it is already at cap");
}
@Test
void weightedPolicyGatesProfileAtMaxLoad() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -461,6 +461,93 @@ class PlacementPolicyTest {
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("weight 0"), e.getMessage());
}
// --- fleetd #435: FixedPlacementPolicy must consult maxLoad too, at BOTH filter sites -------
/**
* The default-profile fast path must skip a capped default. Measured on 7667727 before this
* fix: a single dev profile at {@code maxLoad: 1} with 1 live, under {@code fixed()}, still
* returned "SPAWNED on profile=a" — the cap was advisory for every unqualified spawn.
*/
@Test
void fixedSkipsCappedDefault() {
PlacementPolicy policy = PlacementPolicies.fixed();
PlacementContext ctx = new PlacementContext("b",
List.of(PlacementCandidate.profile("a", 1.0f, null),
PlacementCandidate.profile("b", 1.0f, 1)),
name -> "b".equals(name) ? 1 : 0, Set.of(), Set.of(), Set.of());
assertEquals("a", policy.select(ctx).profile(),
"the default 'b' is at its maxLoad cap, so fixed falls through to the free candidate 'a'");
}
/**
* The fallback walk must skip a capped candidate too — exercised independently of the
* default-profile fast path by using no default at all, so this is the only filter that runs.
*/
@Test
void fixedFallbackWalkSkipsCappedCandidate() {
PlacementPolicy policy = PlacementPolicies.fixed();
PlacementContext ctx = new PlacementContext(null,
List.of(PlacementCandidate.profile("a", 1.0f, 1),
PlacementCandidate.profile("b", 1.0f, null)),
name -> "a".equals(name) ? 1 : 0, Set.of(), Set.of(), Set.of());
assertEquals("b", policy.select(ctx).profile(),
"candidate 'a' is at its maxLoad cap, so the fallback walk skips it and picks 'b'");
}
@Test
void fixedThrowsWhenDefaultAndEveryCandidateAtCap() {
PlacementPolicy policy = PlacementPolicies.fixed();
PlacementContext ctx = new PlacementContext("b",
List.of(PlacementCandidate.profile("a", 1.0f, 1),
PlacementCandidate.profile("b", 1.0f, 1)),
_ -> 1, Set.of(), Set.of(), Set.of());
PlacementException e = assertThrows(PlacementException.class, () -> policy.select(ctx));
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("maxLoad"), "message names the cap: " + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("1 cap"), "message names the cap value: " + e.getMessage());
assertFalse(e.getMessage().contains("quarantined"), "must not read like quarantine: " + e.getMessage());
assertFalse(e.getMessage().contains("turned off"), "must not read like model-off: " + e.getMessage());
}
/** The mirror: an uncapped default is still chosen, so the new term cannot exclude everything. */
@Test
void fixedStillReturnsUncappedDefault() {
PlacementPolicy policy = PlacementPolicies.fixed();
PlacementContext ctx = new PlacementContext("b",
List.of(PlacementCandidate.profile("a", 1.0f, null),
PlacementCandidate.profile("b", 1.0f, null)),
noSessions(), Set.of(), Set.of(), Set.of());
assertEquals("b", policy.select(ctx).profile(), "an uncapped default is returned unconditionally");
}
/** CB-585: an explicit {@code maxLoad: 0} on the default caps it at zero live members. */
@Test
void fixedSkipsMaxLoadZeroDefaultEvenWithZeroLiveWorkers() {
PlacementPolicy policy = PlacementPolicies.fixed();
PlacementContext ctx = new PlacementContext("b",
List.of(PlacementCandidate.profile("a", 1.0f, null),
PlacementCandidate.profile("b", 1.0f, 0)),
_ -> 0, Set.of(), Set.of(), Set.of());
assertEquals("a", policy.select(ctx).profile(),
"the default 'b' has maxLoad 0, so it is already at its cap with nobody live");
}
/**
* Quarantine still wins when a profile is both quarantined and at cap (mirrors {@code
* fixedReportsQuarantineNotModelOffWhenBothApply}'s priority over model-off).
*/
@Test
void fixedReportsQuarantineNotAtCapWhenBothApply() {
PlacementPolicy policy = PlacementPolicies.fixed();
PlacementContext ctx = new PlacementContext("b",
List.of(PlacementCandidate.profile("a", 1.0f, 1),
PlacementCandidate.profile("b", 1.0f, 1)),
_ -> 1, Set.of(), Set.of("a", "b"), Set.of());
PlacementException e = assertThrows(PlacementException.class, () -> policy.select(ctx));
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("quarantined"), e.getMessage());
assertFalse(e.getMessage().contains("maxLoad"),
"quarantine takes priority over at-cap in the message: " + e.getMessage());
}
@Test
void unknownPolicyNameThrows() {
assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> PlacementPolicies.fromName("random"));