Merge #438: let a lead read its own held peer mail, primary-only (fleetd #421)

fleet_poll{coordId} peeks this daemon's own held lead-to-lead mail and
returns full bodies without acking. New Authz.Action COORD_READ, primary
only — not the architect, which holds READ today. pollAction is now
argument-derived over both target and coordId.

heldView and HELD_PREVIEW_MAX_CHARS are untouched: fleet_list stays a
cheap always-safe scan, and the full read is a separately authorized call.

Verified by me, not taken from the report: merged tree builds 1562 green
(main 1555 + 7 new methods), 0 compile errors, no merge conflicts.
Mutation battery on lines the worker did NOT mutate, control 111 green:
  - COORD_READ widened to the architect  KILLED (AuthzTest + FleetMcpAuthzTest)
  - self-coord-id guard removed          KILLED (FleetMcpTest)
  - full body swapped for the preview    KILLED (FleetMcpTest)

The third mutation targets the ticket's own deliverable, and it is pinned.
Authz.permits has no default, so a new action is a compile error rather
than a silently unhandled case.

Follow-up filed as #439: fleet_list's coordinator row is still READ-gated,
so a worker sees peer coord-ids and 80-char previews of lead-to-lead
bodies. Pre-existing; the implementer flagged it and left it alone.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ the merge — and merging on a reviewer's word is delegating it by proxy.
 | Message a **peer lead** on this host | `fleet_send{sessionId: <their terminal>, content}` — `fleet_list` → `leads` reports it. Coordination only, **never** a task |
 | Message a **peer lead** on another daemon or host | `fleet_send{coordId: <their coord-id>, content}` — needs a `coordinator:` block; your own coord-id is in `fleet_list`. Coordination only, **never** a task |
 | Answer a peer lead that messaged you | `fleet_send{coordId}` — or `{sessionId}` if they are on this host. **Not** `fleet_reply`: it has no peer route and the publish is refused |
+| Read your own held lead-to-lead mail (no ack) | `fleet_poll{coordId: <your own coord-id, from fleet_list's coordinator.selfId>}` — primary-only; never acks, so `fleet_list`'s `held[]` still shows it after. `fleet_list`'s `held[]` gives only a truncated preview — this is the only way to read the full body |
 | Collect a held reply | `fleet_poll{target}` · then `fleet_ack{target, msgId}` |
 | Tear down a member | `fleet_stop{paneId}` |
 

fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/auth/Authz.java

@@ -30,6 +30,16 @@ public final class Authz {
         DRAIN,
         /** Read-only observation: status, roster, profiles, task polling. */
         READ,
+        /**
+         * Read (never ack) this daemon's own held lead-to-lead coordination mail (fleetd #421).
+         *
+         * <p>Deliberately <strong>not</strong> folded into {@link #READ}. {@code READ}'s grant
+         * rests on "the roster carries no secrets" (see its case below) — a lead-to-lead body is
+         * not the roster; it is where leads discuss host shapes, credentials and unmerged work.
+         * Mapping this to {@code READ} would let any worker read every peer lead's mail in full
+         * and would silently falsify that comment for every other {@code READ} caller.
+         */
+        COORD_READ,
         /** Scrape the metrics endpoint. */
         METRICS
     }
@@ -68,6 +78,11 @@ public final class Authz {
             // Observation is open to every authenticated role: a worker legitimately polls its own
             // status, and the roster carries no secrets.
             case READ, METRICS -> caller.isPrimary() || caller.isWorker() || caller.isArchitect();
+
+            // fleetd #421: reading held lead-to-lead mail is the primary's alone. An architect
+            // holds READ today (CB-548), so "not primary" must mean not-architect here too — this
+            // is coordination between leads, not observation of the roster.
+            case COORD_READ -> caller.isPrimary();
         };
     }
 

fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/mcp/FleetMcp.java

@@ -386,10 +386,11 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
                 (exchange, req) -> {
                     Map<String, Object> a = req.arguments();
                     String target = str(a, "target");
+                    String coordId = str(a, "coordId");
                     // The action depends on the ARGUMENTS, not on the tool name -- see pollAction.
                     McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_poll", a), target);
                     if (denied != null) return denied;
-                    return poll(messages, str(a, "ticket"), target);
+                    return poll(messages, leadChannel, str(a, "ticket"), target, coordId);
                 };
         // CB-307 Increment 3: per-msgId ack (not needed in v1 but supported by the inbox).
         // Acking removes a reply from the inbox, so it is a drain, not a read.
@@ -811,29 +812,42 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
 
     /**
      * Which authorization action a {@code fleet_poll} call needs, decided by its arguments
-     * (fleetd #272).
+     * (fleetd #272, widened by fleetd #421).
      *
-     * <p>{@code fleet_poll} is <strong>two operations behind one tool name</strong>. With {@code
-     * ticket} it observes an async delegation and changes nothing, which is a {@link
+     * <p>{@code fleet_poll} is now <strong>three operations behind one tool name</strong>. With
+     * {@code ticket} it observes an async delegation and changes nothing, which is a {@link
      * Authz.Action#READ}. With {@code target} it calls {@link MessageService#drainReplies} on that
      * session -- the replies are removed from the inbox and a second call returns nothing -- so it
      * is a {@link Authz.Action#DRAIN}, the same gate {@code fleet_ack} already uses for removing a
-     * single message, and the same one the REST path uses at {@code FleetApp.drainReplies}.
+     * single message, and the same one the REST path uses at {@code FleetApp.drainReplies}. With
+     * {@code coordId} it reads (never acks) this daemon's own held lead-to-lead mail, which is a
+     * {@link Authz.Action#COORD_READ} -- <strong>not</strong> {@code READ}, even though nothing is
+     * consumed: {@code READ}'s grant is open to every authenticated role on the premise that the
+     * roster carries no secrets, and a lead-to-lead body is not the roster. Mapping a non-destructive
+     * peer-mail read to {@code READ} would let any worker read every peer lead's mail in full.
      *
-     * <p>Until this method existed the handler passed a constant {@code READ} for both branches.
-     * {@code READ} is open to every authenticated role, so any worker could read a peer's id out of
-     * {@code fleet_list} and destroy the replies that peer had queued for the primary. The gate
-     * failed open, and it did so because the required action is a function of the arguments while
-     * the handler chose it before looking at them.
+     * <p>Before this method existed (fleetd #272) the handler passed a constant {@code READ} for
+     * both of the original branches. {@code READ} is open to every authenticated role, so any
+     * worker could read a peer's id out of {@code fleet_list} and destroy the replies that peer had
+     * queued for the primary. The gate failed open, and it did so because the required action is a
+     * function of the arguments while the handler chose it before looking at them.
      *
      * <p>The choice lives in this method, and not inline in the handler, so that a test can assert
      * the mapping the handler actually uses. {@code FleetMcpAuthzTest} already checked every
      * {@link Authz.Action} against every {@link Role} and passed throughout -- it tested the policy
      * table, which was correct, while the defect was in which action the caller handed it.
      *
-     * @param target the {@code target} argument of the call, or {@code null}/blank when absent
+     * <p>Checked first, and exclusively of {@code target}: a call naming {@code coordId} is reading
+     * a different inbox entirely (this daemon's own lead channel, never a worker's), so it takes
+     * priority over whatever {@code target} might also say.
+     *
+     * @param target  the {@code target} argument of the call, or {@code null}/blank when absent
+     * @param coordId the {@code coordId} argument of the call, or {@code null}/blank when absent
      */
-    static Authz.Action pollAction(String target) {
+    static Authz.Action pollAction(String target, String coordId) {
+        if (!isBlank(coordId)) {
+            return Authz.Action.COORD_READ;
+        }
         return isBlank(target) ? Authz.Action.READ : Authz.Action.DRAIN;
     }
 
@@ -848,7 +862,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
             case "fleet_reply" -> Authz.Action.REPLY;
             case "fleet_ask" -> Authz.Action.ASK;
             case "fleet_status", "fleet_list", "fleet_profiles", "fleet_whoami" -> Authz.Action.READ;
-            case "fleet_poll" -> pollAction(str(arguments, "target"));
+            case "fleet_poll" -> pollAction(str(arguments, "target"), str(arguments, "coordId"));
             case "fleet_ack" -> Authz.Action.DRAIN;
             case "fleet_spawn" -> Authz.Action.SPAWN;
             case "fleet_stop" -> Authz.Action.STOP;
@@ -858,6 +872,21 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
 
     /** {@code fleet_poll}: check an async delegation by ticket, or drain a worker's inbox by target. */
     static McpSchema.CallToolResult poll(MessageService messages, String ticket, String target) {
+        return poll(messages, null, ticket, target, null);
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * As above, plus (fleetd #421) a held-peer-mail read when {@code coordId} is present: returns
+     * this daemon's own held lead-to-lead messages, in full, without acking them. Checked first and
+     * exclusively of {@code ticket}/{@code target} — see {@link #pollAction}'s javadoc for why this
+     * is a different inbox (this daemon's own {@link LeadChannel}) that authorizes differently
+     * ({@link Authz.Action#COORD_READ}, primary-only) from either of the original two branches.
+     */
+    static McpSchema.CallToolResult poll(MessageService messages, LeadChannel leadChannel, String ticket,
+                                         String target, String coordId) {
+        if (!isBlank(coordId)) {
+            return pollHeldPeerMail(leadChannel, coordId);
+        }
         if (!isBlank(target)) {
             var replies = messages.drainReplies(target);
             if (replies.isEmpty()) {
@@ -885,6 +914,46 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
         };
     }
 
+    /**
+     * fleetd #421: a lead's own held lead-to-lead mail, read without consuming it.
+     *
+     * <p>{@link LeadChannel#peek} is non-destructive, so calling this twice returns the same
+     * bodies, and {@code fleet_list}'s {@code coordinator.held[]} is unaffected — this adds a
+     * read, it never acks. Never let this short-circuit the delivery contract: {@code
+     * LeadCoordLoop}'s javadoc explains why a message must stay unacked until actually delivered,
+     * and that is unchanged here.
+     *
+     * <p>{@code coordId} must be THIS daemon's own coord-id ({@code fleet_list}'s
+     * {@code coordinator.selfId}) — there is no route here to read a PEER's outbound mail, only
+     * your own inbound mail. Requiring the caller to echo its own id catches the exact confusion
+     * that opened fleetd #421: the original failed attempt passed a PEER's id ("fleet01") as
+     * {@code fleet_poll}'s {@code target}, expecting to read that peer's messages, and got the same
+     * silent {@code []} as a genuinely empty worker inbox. This refuses the same mistake here with a
+     * reason, instead of a second silent wrong answer.
+     */
+    static McpSchema.CallToolResult pollHeldPeerMail(LeadChannel leadChannel, String coordId) {
+        if (leadChannel == null) {
+            return error("lead coordination is not configured (no coordinator: block) — there is "
+                    + "no held peer mail to read.");
+        }
+        String selfId = leadChannel.selfCoordId();
+        if (!coordId.equals(selfId)) {
+            return error("coordId \"" + coordId + "\" is not this daemon's own coord-id (\"" + selfId
+                    + "\"). fleet_poll reads only YOUR OWN held mail — pass your own coordId "
+                    + "(fleet_list's coordinator.selfId), not a peer's.");
+        }
+        return text(json(leadChannel.peek().stream().map(FleetMcp::heldMailView).toList()));
+    }
+
+    /** The full body of one held lead-to-lead message — never truncated, unlike {@link #heldView}. */
+    private static Map<String, Object> heldMailView(LeadMessage m) {
+        Map<String, Object> row = new LinkedHashMap<>();
+        row.put("msgId", m.msgId());
+        row.put("from", m.from());
+        row.put("content", m.content());
+        return row;
+    }
+
     /**
      * {@code fleet_reply}: the worker returns its structured answer, resolving the awaiting send
      * or — when no send is open — queueing the reply in the inbox for later drain (CB-307).
@@ -1323,6 +1392,16 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
      * counts, it can never make {@code fleet_list} itself slow or fail. {@code held} comes from
      * {@link LeadChannel#peek}, a pure in-memory read with no broker round trip, so it is never
      * subject to that bound.
+     *
+     * <p><strong>fleetd #421: {@code heldCount}/{@code heldDurable} fix the "pending: 0" trap.</strong>
+     * {@code mailbox.pending} counts only broker-<em>ready</em> messages; a held message is already
+     * an unacked delivery sitting with this consumer, so the normal, healthy state of a blocked lead
+     * is {@code "pending": 0} next to a non-empty {@code held[]} — which invites the false reading
+     * "these are only in memory, a restart will lose them". They are not: {@code LeadMailbox}
+     * consumes with manual ack, so held mail is a durable broker delivery. {@code heldCount} is the
+     * honest second number beside {@code pending} ({@code held.size()}, not left for the reader to
+     * count the array), and {@code heldDurable} states the fact in words rather than leaving
+     * {@code pending} as the only number next to {@code held[]}.
      */
     private static Map<String, Object> coordinatorView(CoordinationSource coordination) {
         LeadChannel channel = coordination.leadChannel();
@@ -1330,11 +1409,14 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
             return null;
         }
         String selfId = channel.selfCoordId();
+        List<LeadMessage> held = channel.peek();
         Map<String, Object> row = new LinkedHashMap<>();
         row.put("selfId", selfId);
         row.put("configured", true);
         row.put("mailbox", mailboxView(probe(channel, selfId)));
-        row.put("held", channel.peek().stream().map(FleetMcp::heldView).toList());
+        row.put("heldCount", held.size());
+        row.put("heldDurable", true);
+        row.put("held", held.stream().map(FleetMcp::heldView).toList());
         row.put("peers", coordination.peers().stream().map(p -> peerView(channel, p)).toList());
         return row;
     }
@@ -1663,10 +1745,18 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
                 "Check an async delegation (a fleet_send with wait:false) by its ticket: "
                         + "pending, done (with the worker's reply), or failed. When target (a worker "
                         + "session id) is present instead of ticket, drain that worker's inbox of "
-                        + "replies delivered when no send was open.",
+                        + "replies delivered when no send was open. When coordId is present instead, "
+                        + "read (never consume) your own held lead-to-lead mail — primary-only.",
                 objectSchema(Map.of(
                         "ticket", stringProp("The ticket returned by fleet_send wait:false"),
-                        "target", stringProp("Worker session id to drain pending replies from (optional)")),
+                        "target", stringProp("Worker session id to drain pending replies from (optional)"),
+                        "coordId", stringProp("Your own coord-id (fleet_list's coordinator.selfId) — "
+                                + "reads every message currently held[] for you in full, without "
+                                + "acking. Read twice, get the same bodies both times; fleet_list's "
+                                + "held[] still reports them afterward. Primary-only, and this can "
+                                + "read only YOUR OWN mailbox — there is no route to a peer's outbound "
+                                + "mail, so passing a peer's coordId here is refused rather than "
+                                + "silently returning the wrong thing (or nothing).")),
                         List.of()));
     }
 

fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/auth/AuthzTest.java

@@ -113,6 +113,20 @@ class AuthzTest {
         assertTrue(Authz.permits(WORKER_A, METRICS, null));
     }
 
+    /**
+     * fleetd #421 — unlike READ (the case above), COORD_READ (a lead's own held peer mail) is the
+     * primary's alone. A worker or an architect reading it would disclose lead-to-lead
+     * coordination bodies, not the secret-free roster READ is open about.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void coordReadIsThePrimarysAloneNotAWidenedRead() {
+        assertTrue(Authz.permits(PRIMARY, COORD_READ, null));
+        assertFalse(Authz.permits(WORKER_A, COORD_READ, null),
+                "a worker must not read held lead-to-lead mail");
+        assertFalse(Authz.permits(ARCH_DESIGN, COORD_READ, null),
+                "an architect holds READ today, but not-primary must mean not-architect here too");
+    }
+
     @Test
     void unauthenticatedIsDistinguishedFromMerelyForbidden() {
         // Drives the 401-vs-403 split: a missing credential is fixable by the caller, a wrong role

fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/mcp/FleetMcpAuthzTest.java

@@ -201,14 +201,34 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
      */
     @Test
     void pollingByTargetIsADrainAndPollingByTicketIsARead() {
-        assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b"),
+        assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b", null),
                 "poll by target removes the replies — that is a drain, not an observation");
-        assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.pollAction(null),
+        assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.pollAction(null, null),
                 "poll by ticket changes nothing");
-        assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.pollAction("  "),
+        assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.pollAction("  ", null),
                 "a blank target is an absent target");
     }
 
+    /**
+     * fleetd #421: a coordId branch is a THIRD operation behind fleet_poll's one name, and it must
+     * map to {@link Authz.Action#COORD_READ} — never {@link Authz.Action#READ}, even though this
+     * branch also consumes nothing. READ's grant is open to every authenticated role on the premise
+     * that the roster carries no secrets; a lead-to-lead body is not the roster, so folding this
+     * branch into READ would let any worker read every peer lead's mail in full. coordId also takes
+     * priority over target when both happen to be present — it addresses a different inbox entirely.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void pollingByCoordIdIsACoordReadNeverAPlainRead() {
+        assertEquals(Authz.Action.COORD_READ, FleetMcp.pollAction(null, "mac-opus"),
+                "reading held peer mail must not be mapped to the everyone-readable READ action");
+        assertEquals(Authz.Action.COORD_READ, FleetMcp.pollAction("  ", "mac-opus"),
+                "a blank target must not fall through to READ/DRAIN when coordId is present");
+        assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.pollAction(null, "  "),
+                "a blank coordId is an absent coordId, same as target/ticket");
+        assertEquals(Authz.Action.COORD_READ, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b", "mac-opus"),
+                "coordId takes priority over target — this is a different inbox, not a drain");
+    }
+
     @Test
     void everyRegisteredToolHasItsHandlerActionPinned() {
         Set<String> registered = toolsTheServerRegisters();
@@ -230,6 +250,8 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
         assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_whoami", Map.of()));
         assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_poll", Map.of("ticket", "task")));
         assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_poll", Map.of("target", "term_b")));
+        assertEquals(Authz.Action.COORD_READ,
+                FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_poll", Map.of("coordId", "mac-opus")));
     }
 
     private static Set<String> toolsTheServerRegisters() {
@@ -249,11 +271,11 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
     void aWorkerMayNotDrainAnotherSessionsInboxByPolling() {
         FleetMcp m = mcp(true);
 
-        assertNotNull(m.denyFor(WORKER_A, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b"), "term_b"),
+        assertNotNull(m.denyFor(WORKER_A, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b", null), "term_b"),
                 "a worker draining a peer's inbox would destroy replies queued for the primary");
-        assertNotNull(m.denyFor(ARCH_DESIGN, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b"), "term_b"),
+        assertNotNull(m.denyFor(ARCH_DESIGN, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b", null), "term_b"),
                 "an architect has no lifecycle rights either — same gate as fleet_ack");
-        assertNull(m.denyFor(PRIMARY, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b"), "term_b"),
+        assertNull(m.denyFor(PRIMARY, FleetMcp.pollAction("term_b", null), "term_b"),
                 "collecting a held reply is the primary's job");
     }
 
@@ -265,11 +287,33 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
     void pollingAnOwnTicketStaysOpenToWorkersAndArchitects() {
         FleetMcp m = mcp(true);
 
-        assertNull(m.denyFor(WORKER_A, FleetMcp.pollAction(null), null));
-        assertNull(m.denyFor(ARCH_DESIGN, FleetMcp.pollAction(null), null),
+        assertNull(m.denyFor(WORKER_A, FleetMcp.pollAction(null, null), null));
+        assertNull(m.denyFor(ARCH_DESIGN, FleetMcp.pollAction(null, null), null),
                 "an architect delegates with wait:false, so it must be able to poll its ticket");
     }
 
+    /**
+     * fleetd #421 acceptance: the whole ticket, pinned at the policy-table layer. A worker must be
+     * refused the coordId branch, the primary must be allowed, and (CB-548) an architect — which
+     * holds READ today — must be refused too, because "not primary" means not-architect here.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void aWorkerAndAnArchitectMayNotReadHeldPeerMailOnlyThePrimaryMay() {
+        FleetMcp m = mcp(true);
+        Authz.Action coordRead = FleetMcp.pollAction(null, "mac-opus");
+
+        McpSchema.CallToolResult workerDenied = m.denyFor(WORKER_A, coordRead, null);
+        assertNotNull(workerDenied, "a worker must not read held lead-to-lead mail");
+        assertTrue(workerDenied.isError());
+
+        McpSchema.CallToolResult archDenied = m.denyFor(ARCH_DESIGN, coordRead, null);
+        assertNotNull(archDenied, "an architect holds READ today, but not-primary must mean "
+                + "not-architect here too");
+        assertTrue(archDenied.isError());
+
+        assertNull(m.denyFor(PRIMARY, coordRead, null), "reading its own held mail is the primary's job");
+    }
+
     // --- identity reconstruction from the transport context ------------------------------------
 
     @Test

fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/mcp/FleetMcpTest.java

@@ -680,7 +680,11 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
     void listReportsHeldMessagesWithATruncatedPreviewNeverTheFullBody() {
         FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
         SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workerService(h, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw")));
-        String longContent = "x".repeat(200);
+        // A homogeneous "x".repeat(200) body would not pin the exact 80-char boundary: a preview
+        // widened by one (81 chars) still CONTAINS "x".repeat(80) + "…" as a substring one position
+        // later, because every character is 'x'. Put a sentinel ("Y") exactly at index 80 — the
+        // first character a widened cap would leak — so any preview past 80 chars is caught.
+        String longContent = "x".repeat(80) + "Y" + "z".repeat(119);
         FakeLeadChannel channel = new FakeLeadChannel("mac-opus")
                 .hold(new LeadMessage("m1", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", longContent));
 
@@ -694,9 +698,87 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
         assertTrue(out.contains("\"msgId\":\"m1\""), out);
         assertTrue(out.contains("\"from\":\"fleet01-lead\""), out);
         assertFalse(out.contains(longContent), "fleet_list must never dump a held message's full body: " + out);
+        assertFalse(out.contains("Y"),
+                "the sentinel at index 80 must never appear — a preview past 80 chars leaked it: " + out);
         assertTrue(out.contains("x".repeat(80) + "…"), "expected an 80-char preview with an ellipsis: " + out);
     }
 
+    /**
+     * fleetd #421: {@code mailbox.pending} counts only broker-ready messages, so a blocked lead's
+     * normal, healthy state is {@code "pending": 0} next to a non-empty {@code held[]} — which
+     * invites the false reading that held mail is in-memory-only. {@code heldCount}/{@code
+     * heldDurable} put an honest second number and fact beside {@code pending} instead of leaving it
+     * as the only one.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void listReportsAnHonestHeldCountAndDurabilityNotJustPendingZero() {
+        FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
+        SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workerService(h, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw")));
+        FakeLeadChannel channel = new FakeLeadChannel("mac-opus")
+                .withMailbox("mac-opus", LeadChannel.MailboxState.exists("mac-opus", 0, 1))
+                .hold(new LeadMessage("m1", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", "one"))
+                .hold(new LeadMessage("m2", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", "two"))
+                .hold(new LeadMessage("m3", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", "three"));
+
+        McpSchema.CallToolResult res = FleetMcp.listFleet(
+                workerService(h, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw")), sessions, null,
+                FleetMcp.CapacitySource.none(), new FleetMcp.HealthCoverageSource(() -> "off"),
+                FleetMcp.QuarantineSource.none(), Map.of(), "",
+                new FleetMcp.CoordinationSource(channel, List.of()));
+
+        String out = textOf(res);
+        assertTrue(out.contains("\"pending\":0"), out);
+        assertTrue(out.contains("\"heldCount\":3"),
+                "the honest count beside pending: 0 — three messages really are held: " + out);
+        assertTrue(out.contains("\"heldDurable\":true"),
+                "must state the durability fact, not leave pending as the only number next to held[]: " + out);
+    }
+
+    // ── fleetd #421: a lead reads (never consumes) its own held peer mail ──────────────────────
+
+    @Test
+    void pollWithCoordIdReturnsTheFullBodyWithoutAckingAndLeavesItHeld() {
+        FakeLeadChannel channel = new FakeLeadChannel("mac-opus")
+                .hold(new LeadMessage("m1", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", "x".repeat(200)));
+
+        McpSchema.CallToolResult first = FleetMcp.poll(messages, channel, null, null, "mac-opus");
+        assertNotEquals(Boolean.TRUE, first.isError(), textOf(first));
+        String out1 = textOf(first);
+        assertTrue(out1.contains("\"msgId\":\"m1\""), out1);
+        assertTrue(out1.contains("\"from\":\"fleet01-lead\""), out1);
+        assertTrue(out1.contains("\"content\":\"" + "x".repeat(200) + "\""),
+                "the coordId route must return the FULL body, unlike fleet_list's preview: " + out1);
+
+        // Read again: identical bodies, and nothing was acked — peek() still holds it.
+        McpSchema.CallToolResult second = FleetMcp.poll(messages, channel, null, null, "mac-opus");
+        assertEquals(out1, textOf(second), "peek is non-destructive — reading twice must return the same bodies");
+        assertTrue(channel.acked().isEmpty(), "a read must never ack — that is the whole point of the ticket");
+        assertEquals(1, channel.peek().size(), "the message must still be held after being read");
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void pollWithCoordIdRefusesAPeersCoordIdInsteadOfReturningTheWrongMailOrNothing() {
+        FakeLeadChannel channel = new FakeLeadChannel("mac-opus")
+                .hold(new LeadMessage("m1", "fleet01-lead", "mac-opus", "secret coordination body"));
+
+        // The ORIGINAL fleetd #421 confusion: passing a PEER's id where a self-address was meant.
+        McpSchema.CallToolResult res = FleetMcp.poll(messages, channel, null, null, "fleet01-lead");
+
+        assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, res.isError());
+        String out = textOf(res);
+        assertFalse(out.contains("secret coordination body"),
+                "a refused read must never leak the body it refused to return: " + out);
+        assertTrue(out.contains("mac-opus"), "the error must name this daemon's own coordId: " + out);
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void pollWithCoordIdErrorsHonestlyWhenLeadCoordinationIsNotConfigured() {
+        McpSchema.CallToolResult res = FleetMcp.poll(messages, null, null, null, "mac-opus");
+
+        assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, res.isError());
+        assertTrue(textOf(res).toLowerCase().contains("coordinat"), textOf(res));
+    }
+
     @Test
     void listReportsEachDeclaredPeersLiveReachability() {
         FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();