Tearing a worker down left the send that was waiting on it stranded. The
rendezvous waiter stayed open, so a blocking bridge_send kept blocking and an
async one kept reporting PENDING until ASYNC_TIMEOUT_MS — thirty minutes —
even though the worker provably no longer existed and the delegation could
never complete.
Observed repeatedly this session: a task sitting at
{"phase":"pending","detail":"worker unknown"} long after I had personally
deleted the pane. The maddening part is that poll() already HAD the evidence —
it calls liveStatus() to build that detail string, gets back "unknown", and
reports PENDING anyway. It also never reached /metrics under any outcome, so a
stalled delegation was invisible to both the task view and the dashboard. The
only way I ever diagnosed one was reading the worker's pane over the herdr
socket by hand.
Fixed at the choke point rather than by guessing from status strings:
SessionManager.release() is the single path every teardown funnels through
(REST stop, MCP stop, idle-TTL reaper, recycle, shutdown drain), so it now
notifies a release listener with the terminalId, and Bridged.main wires that to
MessageService.abandon(). Abandon fails the open waiter with a real reason.
Deliberately NOT done by inferring "gone" from liveStatus(): that method
collapses a vanished pane, a wedged worker and a herdr hiccup into the same
"unknown" string, so acting on it would fail live delegations during a
transient blip. An explicit lifecycle signal cannot be ambiguous.
Notified before launcher.stop() so a blocked caller fails fast, and wrapped so
a listener failure can never prevent the teardown it is reacting to.
Resolving as a failure rather than letting it time out also means the outcome
is counted — a torn-down delegation now shows up as
sends_total{outcome="failed"} instead of nothing at all.
353 tests (was 346): abandon fails a waiting send / is a no-op with no waiter /
never clobbers a send the worker already answered, an abandoned async task
polls FAILED rather than PENDING, release notifies with the right terminal,
releasing an unknown pane notifies nobody, and a throwing listener does not
block teardown.
Verified live on the running daemon, reproducing the original scenario:
async send -> {"phase":"pending","detail":"worker working"}
DELETE the worker -> 204
poll -> {"phase":"failed","detail":"the worker session was
released before it replied"}
/metrics -> bridged_sends_total{outcome="failed"} 1
Previously that poll returned PENDING for thirty minutes and the counter stayed
empty.
NOT addressed here, and worth deciding separately: a worker that simply never
replies (rather than being released) still rides out the full 30-minute
ASYNC_TIMEOUT_MS. That is a policy question about long-running delegations, not
a correctness bug.
claude-bridge
A subscription-safe bridge that lets a primary Claude Code (Opus 4.8, on Pro/Max)
session drive a secondary Claude agent running a different model via its own
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL — without ever putting a proxy on the primary session.
Sibling of crush-bridge (which drives a headless
Crush worker on GX10 DeepSeek). claude-bridge keeps the worker a real Claude Code
process, so it inherits CLAUDE.md, hooks, skills, and MCP — just pointed at a
cheaper/local model.
Leading approach — herdr-centric message server (bridged)
A small always-on message server, bridged, controls
herdr (an agent multiplexer) over its Unix-socket API and exposes a
clean 2-way messaging API as an MCP server that both the primary and the workers mount —
one unified Claude setup and the sole communication gateway (REST/SSE stays for non-Claude
clients; any broker is bridged-internal, below the gateway).
herdr owns the PTYs, multiplexing, persistence, and agent-status events; bridged owns
policy (subscription boundary, session lifecycle, status-gated delivery) and the client
contract. The worker claude launches with ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://ollama.ltms.dev + a
bearer token; the primary Opus stays env-clean and calls bridged's MCP tools.
flowchart LR
OPUS["Opus — primary<br/>(Claude Code, env CLEAN)<br/>MCP client"]
subgraph BD["bridged — standalone daemon (not a claude process)"]
SRV["SERVER face<br/>MCP · REST/SSE · policy"]
CLI["CLIENT face<br/>status-gated injector · herdr socket"]
SRV --> CLI
end
HERDR["herdr<br/>panes · agent-status"]
W["worker claude pane<br/>ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL set<br/>MCP client"]
M["ollama.ltms.dev<br/>(worker model)"]
OPUS -->|"MCP bridge_send (blocks)"| SRV
W -.->|"MCP bridge_reply"| SRV
CLI -->|"Unix socket<br/>send_text · events.subscribe"| HERDR
HERDR -->|"drives PTY"| W
W -->|"inference"| M
classDef ext fill:#2b6cb0,stroke:#1a365d,color:#ffffff;
classDef core fill:#2f855a,stroke:#22543d,color:#ffffff;
class OPUS ext
class SRV,CLI,HERDR core
- Subscription boundary: the primary never sets
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL(stays on Pro/Max). Only the secondary process is off-subscription — andbridgeditself is a plain daemon (no Anthropic quota), so it may poll/subscribe freely. - One gateway (unified MCP setup):
bridgedis the sole communication path for every Claude session. Primary and workers each mount it as an MCP server (oneclaude mcp addline, same on both) and talk over MCP tools —bridge_send/bridge_reply/bridge_status(withbridge_askplanned for the blocked-worker path). No Claude session ever addresses a broker, a peer, or the network directly; any queue isbridged-internal. MCP tool I/O never setsANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, so mounting the bridge is subscription-safe by construction. - How the primary consumes a reply: a single blocking MCP call (
bridge_send);bridgedholds it open until the worker callsbridge_replyor its turn hitsagent_status=done, then returns the reply as the tool result. No cross-turn busy-poll, so no quota burn. SSE is an optional side-channel for humans/dashboards watching status. - Worker → primary rides
bridged's MCP rendezvous — the reply resolves the primary's blocking call (or, for detached work,bridgedinjects the primary's idle pane when it's ready), so no keystroke-into-primary and no broker are involved, even single-host. The one exception: a split-host primary that isn't a herdr pane wakes via its ownStop-hook, which pollsbridged(never a broker). See the wiki for the two topologies. - Different model per process sidesteps Claude Code's lack of per-subagent provider routing — the worker isn't a subagent, it's its own configured process.
- AgentAPI (
coder/agentapi) is retained only as a swappable fallback injector behind the same interface. See the wiki for the full design, comparison, and rationale.
Docs
Full design, setup, and operations live in the wiki,
vendored here as a submodule under wiki/:
git clone --recurse-submodules ssh://git@git.ltms.dev:2224/lms/claude-bridge.git
# or, after a plain clone:
git submodule update --init
Edit docs in wiki/, then cd wiki && git commit && git push to publish them to the
Gitea wiki.
Status
🟢 Implemented & dogfooded — the herdr-centric bridged message server is built and in
real use: an Opus primary delegates tasks to off-subscription workers that reply through the
bridge (code reviews delegated this way have produced committed bug fixes). Selected as the
primary approach 2026-07-11, superseding the AgentAPI plan (2026-07-08); AgentAPI retained as a
fallback injector.
Shipped (Java 25 · Maven · 266 unit/acceptance tests green; the live-herdr and broker contract
tests run separately via mvn test -Pcontract):
- Core gateway — herdr socket client (contract-tested vs live 0.7.0); guard-checked worker
spawn with
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URLinjected only into the worker's env; status-gated injector; blockingbridge_sendwith reply rendezvous; MCP server as a thin adapter over the REST core. - MCP tools —
bridge_send/bridge_reply/bridge_status(messaging) andbridge_spawn/bridge_list/bridge_stop/bridge_profiles/bridge_poll(fleet). Caller identity is connection-based (loopback peer PID → herdr pane), so the same mount serves primary and workers. - Delivery reliability — completion fallback (a confirmed
working→idleturn resolves a send); async fire-and-poll (beats the caller's MCP call timeout for long tasks); and failure detection for wedged (unknown), vanished, and never-ready workers so a send never hangs. - Fleet — multiple worker profiles, each with an independent base_url guard check; workers
inherit the primary's working directory (never
$HOME); a readiness gate holds delivery until a worker's Claude has connected the bridge MCP (no paste lost into its boot window). - Blocked-worker path —
bridge_askreverse rendezvous: a worker pauses its delegated turn to ask the primary and resumes the same turn with the answer (CB-205). - Session lifecycle — session manager with spawn/reuse/recycle,
idle_ttlreaper,context_cap, and graceful drain on shutdown (CB-301/CB-303); per-worker git worktrees on their own branch with a config-parity overlay, so parallel implementers never stomp each other (CB-301-ext). - Reliable worker→primary delivery — a durable
ReplyInbox(in-memory by default, AMQP/LavinMQ for cross-restart durability) holds a reply that arrives with no open send, and an active status-gated push loop nudges the primary to drain it (CB-307). - Pluggable peers — a
PeerLauncherSPI with two in-tree adapters,claude-codeandopencode, routed by akind:discriminator (CB-401/CB-402).
Next (see the roadmap) — Stage 5 hardening (auth/TLS, /metrics, CI,
service supervision, per-session authz + audit), then cross-host: CB-308 multi-host federation and
CB-500 multi-tier coordination.