Verified independently in my own worktree at the pushed head 7c34e8f, not taken
from the worker's report. CI run 1781: success.
The shape is the one #528 asked for and the one #526 arrived at: refuse_drain_gate
composes the message via drain_gate_refusal AND calls die itself, and the main
flow calls it unconditionally at :710. No guard is left in the main flow to
remove, invert or bypass on its own.
My measurements:
test functions defined / invoked 49 / 49 (was 44/44; +5)
bash -n, /bin/bash 3.2.57 rc=0 on both files
bash -n, env bash 5.3.9 rc=0 on both files
clean control exit 0, 0 lines matching ^FAIL:, 256 bytes
Two mutations, both killed, each by a differently named failure:
call site deleted (the item-1 mutation: :710 replaced by a flat
die "aborted — nothing changed")
-> exit 1, 1 ^FAIL: line, 87 bytes
FAIL: could not find the main flow's refuse_drain_gate call site in redeploy-fleetd.sh
refuse_drain_gate stops consulting the predicate (its body's
die "$(drain_gate_refusal ...)" replaced by a flat message)
-> exit 1, 1 ^FAIL: line
FAIL: refuse_drain_gate build-ran+staged-present die message does not name the staged jar
The first cell is the point of the ticket. Before this change the same mutation
gave exit 0, zero FAIL lines and output byte-identical to a clean run at 256
bytes. It now exits 1 and names the missing call site. Each mutation was proven
applied with a uniquely tagged marker plus a second, different search string,
with a control against a pristine copy showing the exact inverse (1/0 mutated,
0/1 pristine), and the function definition confirmed still present so the
mutation targeted the call and not the function. Restored byte-identical to
0e5a99a22c9c65f72960d8f179ca5299307889e06bc42131f098a513e7b97bd6 and the final
control is green.
Needle uniqueness checked, because this is where it could have gone wrong:
grep -cF 'refuse_drain_gate "$DO_BUILD" "$JAR_STAGED"' on the production script
returns 1, at :710, the real call site. The worker hit the self-match trap while
writing the comment above refuse_drain_gate — their first draft quoted the
call-site string literally, which would have let the source-text test match the
comment instead of the call — caught it themselves, and reworded so the comment
cannot become a second match. That is the same trap that cost me a false pass on
a probe earlier today, and catching it unprompted is the better half of this PR.
The dead-check sweep came back as a real negative, with the reasoning shown
rather than asserted: of the five scripts under set -e with pipefail, every
pipe-into-assignment already carries || true or || echo, and the remaining two
scripts have no pipe-into-assignment at all. probe-member-credentials.sh and
deploy/herdr-inner.sh correctly excluded for not having set -e. No live
instances.
One inaccuracy in the report, in the report only: it abbreviates the restored
hash as "0e5a99a2...78f0a", and that tail does not occur in the actual hash,
which ends b97bd6. I hashed the committed file myself and confirmed the restore
matched, so the file is right and only the quoted abbreviation is wrong. Flagged
because an abbreviated hash that nobody can match against anything is worse than
no hash.
wait_for_daemon_exit's call site (item 2) stays open as the ticket scoped it —
source-text pinned only, "partially pinned, not audited". The seven untested
main-flow decisions are untouched; the worker correctly notes it changed the body
of one of those if blocks while leaving the guard condition itself untested, as
instructed.
claude-bridge
A subscription-safe bridge that lets a primary Claude Code (Opus 4.8, on Pro/Max)
session drive a secondary Claude agent running a different model via its own
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL — without ever putting a proxy on the primary session.
Sibling of crush-bridge (which drives a headless
Crush worker on GX10 DeepSeek). claude-bridge keeps the worker a real Claude Code
process, so it inherits CLAUDE.md, hooks, skills, and MCP — just pointed at a
cheaper/local model.
Leading approach — herdr-centric message server (fleetd)
A small always-on message server, fleetd, controls
herdr (an agent multiplexer) over its Unix-socket API and exposes a
clean 2-way messaging API as an MCP server that both the primary and the workers mount —
one unified Claude setup and the sole communication gateway (REST/SSE stays for non-Claude
clients; any broker is fleetd-internal, below the gateway).
herdr owns the PTYs, multiplexing, persistence, and agent-status events; fleetd owns
policy (subscription boundary, session lifecycle, status-gated delivery) and the client
contract. A Claude member launches with ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL pointed at the gateway,
https://llm.ltms.dev/anthropic, plus a bearer token; the lead stays env-clean and calls
fleetd's MCP tools. See the wiki's 13 User Guide to run it.
flowchart LR
OPUS["Opus — primary<br/>(Claude Code, env CLEAN)<br/>MCP client"]
subgraph BD["fleetd — standalone daemon (not a claude process)"]
SRV["SERVER face<br/>MCP · REST/SSE · policy"]
CLI["CLIENT face<br/>status-gated injector · herdr socket"]
SRV --> CLI
end
HERDR["herdr<br/>panes · agent-status"]
W["worker claude pane<br/>ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL set<br/>MCP client"]
M["llm.ltms.dev<br/>(the one gateway)"]
OPUS -->|"MCP fleet_send (blocks)"| SRV
W -.->|"MCP fleet_reply"| SRV
CLI -->|"Unix socket<br/>send_text · events.subscribe"| HERDR
HERDR -->|"drives PTY"| W
W -->|"inference"| M
classDef ext fill:#2b6cb0,stroke:#1a365d,color:#ffffff;
classDef core fill:#2f855a,stroke:#22543d,color:#ffffff;
class OPUS ext
class SRV,CLI,HERDR core
- Subscription boundary: the primary never sets
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL(stays on Pro/Max). Only the secondary process is off-subscription — andfleetditself is a plain daemon (no Anthropic quota), so it may poll/subscribe freely. - One gateway (unified MCP setup):
fleetdis the sole communication path for every Claude session. Primary and workers each mount it as an MCP server (oneclaude mcp addline, same on both) and talk over MCP tools —fleet_send/fleet_reply/fleet_status(withfleet_askplanned for the blocked-worker path). No Claude session ever addresses a broker, a peer, or the network directly; any queue isfleetd-internal. MCP tool I/O never setsANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, so mounting the bridge is subscription-safe by construction. Tool naming: the tools arefleet_*(renamed frombridge_*in CB-622). The oldbridge_*names were removed in CB-634 — onlyfleet_*answers now. - How the primary consumes a reply: a single blocking MCP call (
fleet_send);fleetdholds it open until the worker callsfleet_replyor its turn hitsagent_status=done, then returns the reply as the tool result. No cross-turn busy-poll, so no quota burn. SSE is an optional side-channel for humans/dashboards watching status. - Worker → primary rides
fleetd's MCP rendezvous — the reply resolves the primary's blocking call (or, for detached work,fleetdinjects the primary's idle pane when it's ready), so no keystroke-into-primary and no broker are involved, even single-host. The one exception: a split-host primary that isn't a herdr pane wakes via its ownStop-hook, which pollsfleetd(never a broker). See the wiki for the two topologies. - Different model per process sidesteps Claude Code's lack of per-subagent provider routing — the worker isn't a subagent, it's its own configured process.
- AgentAPI (
coder/agentapi) is retained only as a swappable fallback injector behind the same interface. See the wiki for the full design, comparison, and rationale.
Docs
Full design, setup, and operations live in the wiki,
vendored here as a submodule under wiki/:
git clone --recurse-submodules ssh://git@git.ltms.dev:2224/fleet/fleetd.git
# or, after a plain clone:
git submodule update --init
Edit docs in wiki/, then cd wiki && git commit && git push to publish them to the
Gitea wiki.
Status
🟢 Implemented & dogfooded — the herdr-centric fleetd message server is built and in
real use: an Opus primary delegates tasks to off-subscription workers that reply through the
bridge (code reviews delegated this way have produced committed bug fixes). Selected as the
primary approach 2026-07-11, superseding the AgentAPI plan (2026-07-08); AgentAPI retained as a
fallback injector.
Shipped (Java 25 · Maven · 266 unit/acceptance tests green; the live-herdr and broker contract
tests run separately via mvn test -Pcontract):
- Core gateway — herdr socket client (contract-tested vs live 0.7.0); guard-checked worker
spawn with
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URLinjected only into the worker's env; status-gated injector; blockingfleet_sendwith reply rendezvous; MCP server as a thin adapter over the REST core. - MCP tools —
fleet_send/fleet_reply/fleet_status(messaging) andfleet_spawn/fleet_list/fleet_stop/fleet_profiles/fleet_poll(fleet). Caller identity is connection-based (loopback peer PID → herdr pane), so the same mount serves primary and workers. - Delivery reliability — completion fallback (a confirmed
working→idleturn resolves a send); async fire-and-poll (beats the caller's MCP call timeout for long tasks); and failure detection for wedged (unknown), vanished, and never-ready workers so a send never hangs. - Fleet — multiple worker profiles, each with an independent base_url guard check; workers
inherit the primary's working directory (never
$HOME); a readiness gate holds delivery until a worker's Claude has connected the bridge MCP (no paste lost into its boot window). - Blocked-worker path —
fleet_askreverse rendezvous: a worker pauses its delegated turn to ask the primary and resumes the same turn with the answer (CB-205). - Session lifecycle — session manager with spawn/reuse/recycle,
idle_ttlreaper,context_cap, and graceful drain on shutdown (CB-301/CB-303); per-worker git worktrees on their own branch with a config-parity overlay, so parallel implementers never stomp each other (CB-301-ext). - Reliable worker→primary delivery — a durable
ReplyInbox(in-memory by default, AMQP/LavinMQ for cross-restart durability) holds a reply that arrives with no open send, and an active status-gated push loop nudges the primary to drain it (CB-307). - Pluggable peers — a
PeerLauncherSPI with two in-tree adapters,claude-codeandopencode, routed by akind:discriminator (CB-401/CB-402).
Next (see the roadmap) — Stage 5 hardening (auth/TLS, /metrics, CI,
service supervision, per-session authz + audit), then cross-host: CB-308 multi-host federation and
CB-500 multi-tier coordination.