A live probe showed every spawned member carried the admin GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN: 108 environment variables in a member's pane against 99 in the primary's. The operator's rule is that only the leader and architects may use it; everyone else uses WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN. We were not enforcing that at all. The cause is invisible from inside the launcher. baseEnv builds a fresh map holding only PATH and the profile's env:, so a member looks like it gets a small explicit environment. That map is an OVERLAY: WorkspaceControl.createTab/splitPane send only the keys it contains, and herdr spawns the pane from its own login-shell environment, so every key we never mention passes straight through — admin token included. The fix puts a non-blank sentinel over the key in baseEnv, applied AFTER the profile's env: so no profile, present or future, can restore the real token by naming it in config. One place, every adapter, including peer kinds not yet written — deliberately not a per-profile bridged.yaml entry, which is the silent-default shape this repo has shipped nine times. A non-blank sentinel rather than the empty string, on purpose: whether an empty overlay value overrides an inherited variable or is skipped as blank cannot be settled from this repo, because herdr's merge happens in an external process. baseEnv's own PATH seeding (CB-511) already relies on a non-blank value replacing an inherited one, so this reuses the shape that is demonstrated to work rather than the one that is merely plausible. CB-302's repo-scoped GITEA_TOKEN grant is untouched — a worker can still open its own PR. The subscription boundary was checked and is unaffected: the primary's pane carries no ANTHROPIC_* at all, so nothing is inherited there. Closes gitea #77. Live verification follows separately: the daemon must be redeployed before this reaches any pane.
claude-bridge
A subscription-safe bridge that lets a primary Claude Code (Opus 4.8, on Pro/Max)
session drive a secondary Claude agent running a different model via its own
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL — without ever putting a proxy on the primary session.
Sibling of crush-bridge (which drives a headless
Crush worker on GX10 DeepSeek). claude-bridge keeps the worker a real Claude Code
process, so it inherits CLAUDE.md, hooks, skills, and MCP — just pointed at a
cheaper/local model.
Leading approach — herdr-centric message server (bridged)
A small always-on message server, bridged, controls
herdr (an agent multiplexer) over its Unix-socket API and exposes a
clean 2-way messaging API as an MCP server that both the primary and the workers mount —
one unified Claude setup and the sole communication gateway (REST/SSE stays for non-Claude
clients; any broker is bridged-internal, below the gateway).
herdr owns the PTYs, multiplexing, persistence, and agent-status events; bridged owns
policy (subscription boundary, session lifecycle, status-gated delivery) and the client
contract. The worker claude launches with ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://ollama.ltms.dev + a
bearer token; the primary Opus stays env-clean and calls bridged's MCP tools.
flowchart LR
OPUS["Opus — primary<br/>(Claude Code, env CLEAN)<br/>MCP client"]
subgraph BD["bridged — standalone daemon (not a claude process)"]
SRV["SERVER face<br/>MCP · REST/SSE · policy"]
CLI["CLIENT face<br/>status-gated injector · herdr socket"]
SRV --> CLI
end
HERDR["herdr<br/>panes · agent-status"]
W["worker claude pane<br/>ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL set<br/>MCP client"]
M["ollama.ltms.dev<br/>(worker model)"]
OPUS -->|"MCP bridge_send (blocks)"| SRV
W -.->|"MCP bridge_reply"| SRV
CLI -->|"Unix socket<br/>send_text · events.subscribe"| HERDR
HERDR -->|"drives PTY"| W
W -->|"inference"| M
classDef ext fill:#2b6cb0,stroke:#1a365d,color:#ffffff;
classDef core fill:#2f855a,stroke:#22543d,color:#ffffff;
class OPUS ext
class SRV,CLI,HERDR core
- Subscription boundary: the primary never sets
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL(stays on Pro/Max). Only the secondary process is off-subscription — andbridgeditself is a plain daemon (no Anthropic quota), so it may poll/subscribe freely. - One gateway (unified MCP setup):
bridgedis the sole communication path for every Claude session. Primary and workers each mount it as an MCP server (oneclaude mcp addline, same on both) and talk over MCP tools —bridge_send/bridge_reply/bridge_status(withbridge_askplanned for the blocked-worker path). No Claude session ever addresses a broker, a peer, or the network directly; any queue isbridged-internal. MCP tool I/O never setsANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, so mounting the bridge is subscription-safe by construction. - How the primary consumes a reply: a single blocking MCP call (
bridge_send);bridgedholds it open until the worker callsbridge_replyor its turn hitsagent_status=done, then returns the reply as the tool result. No cross-turn busy-poll, so no quota burn. SSE is an optional side-channel for humans/dashboards watching status. - Worker → primary rides
bridged's MCP rendezvous — the reply resolves the primary's blocking call (or, for detached work,bridgedinjects the primary's idle pane when it's ready), so no keystroke-into-primary and no broker are involved, even single-host. The one exception: a split-host primary that isn't a herdr pane wakes via its ownStop-hook, which pollsbridged(never a broker). See the wiki for the two topologies. - Different model per process sidesteps Claude Code's lack of per-subagent provider routing — the worker isn't a subagent, it's its own configured process.
- AgentAPI (
coder/agentapi) is retained only as a swappable fallback injector behind the same interface. See the wiki for the full design, comparison, and rationale.
Docs
Full design, setup, and operations live in the wiki,
vendored here as a submodule under wiki/:
git clone --recurse-submodules ssh://git@git.ltms.dev:2224/lms/claude-bridge.git
# or, after a plain clone:
git submodule update --init
Edit docs in wiki/, then cd wiki && git commit && git push to publish them to the
Gitea wiki.
Status
🟢 Implemented & dogfooded — the herdr-centric bridged message server is built and in
real use: an Opus primary delegates tasks to off-subscription workers that reply through the
bridge (code reviews delegated this way have produced committed bug fixes). Selected as the
primary approach 2026-07-11, superseding the AgentAPI plan (2026-07-08); AgentAPI retained as a
fallback injector.
Shipped (Java 25 · Maven · 266 unit/acceptance tests green; the live-herdr and broker contract
tests run separately via mvn test -Pcontract):
- Core gateway — herdr socket client (contract-tested vs live 0.7.0); guard-checked worker
spawn with
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URLinjected only into the worker's env; status-gated injector; blockingbridge_sendwith reply rendezvous; MCP server as a thin adapter over the REST core. - MCP tools —
bridge_send/bridge_reply/bridge_status(messaging) andbridge_spawn/bridge_list/bridge_stop/bridge_profiles/bridge_poll(fleet). Caller identity is connection-based (loopback peer PID → herdr pane), so the same mount serves primary and workers. - Delivery reliability — completion fallback (a confirmed
working→idleturn resolves a send); async fire-and-poll (beats the caller's MCP call timeout for long tasks); and failure detection for wedged (unknown), vanished, and never-ready workers so a send never hangs. - Fleet — multiple worker profiles, each with an independent base_url guard check; workers
inherit the primary's working directory (never
$HOME); a readiness gate holds delivery until a worker's Claude has connected the bridge MCP (no paste lost into its boot window). - Blocked-worker path —
bridge_askreverse rendezvous: a worker pauses its delegated turn to ask the primary and resumes the same turn with the answer (CB-205). - Session lifecycle — session manager with spawn/reuse/recycle,
idle_ttlreaper,context_cap, and graceful drain on shutdown (CB-301/CB-303); per-worker git worktrees on their own branch with a config-parity overlay, so parallel implementers never stomp each other (CB-301-ext). - Reliable worker→primary delivery — a durable
ReplyInbox(in-memory by default, AMQP/LavinMQ for cross-restart durability) holds a reply that arrives with no open send, and an active status-gated push loop nudges the primary to drain it (CB-307). - Pluggable peers — a
PeerLauncherSPI with two in-tree adapters,claude-codeandopencode, routed by akind:discriminator (CB-401/CB-402).
Next (see the roadmap) — Stage 5 hardening (auth/TLS, /metrics, CI,
service supervision, per-session authz + audit), then cross-host: CB-308 multi-host federation and
CB-500 multi-tier coordination.