Files
fleetd/README.md
T
kevin 9daf1ec5ba CB-5xx: Stage 5 hardening — auth, authz+audit, metrics, CI, supervision
Closes out single-host before the cross-host work. Sequenced BEFORE CB-308
deliberately: federation's own gating concern is the trust model, and it
inherits whatever identity shape lands here.

The finding this stage is built around: bridged had exactly ONE security
control, the loopback bind. ConnectionIdentity resolves a worker from its
connection (unforgeable), but every caller that was not a recognised worker
pane fell through to being treated as the PRIMARY -- the most privileged role
on the bus. Latent today; load-bearing the moment a bind widens.

CB-501 auth:
- Role/Principal/CallerResolver: connection identity first, bearer token
  second, ANONYMOUS third. Inverts the old default so absence of identity
  means nothing, not everything.
- Worker identity is never token-gated, so enabling auth cannot lock the
  fleet out of bridge_reply.
- Constant-time token compare (MessageDigest.isEqual).
- validateAuthExposure(): a non-loopback bind under loopback-trust now
  REFUSES TO START. Makes the dangerous config unrepresentable rather than
  merely documented.
- TLS terminates at a reverse proxy by design (D3), not in the JVM.

CB-505 authz + audit, enforced on BOTH entry paths:
- The docs describe MCP as "a thin adapter over the REST core"; at code level
  it is not. BridgeMcp calls MessageService directly, and /mcp is a raw
  servlet on Jetty's context handler that never traverses Javalin's before
  filter. Enforcing only at REST would have left /mcp open.
- Load-bearing rule is own-session-only: a worker may reply/ask only as
  itself. Structurally true over MCP already; over REST the session id in the
  URL path had simply been trusted.
- Audit: JSON lines to a dedicated appender, additivity=false. Never records
  message content -- this bus carries source and prompts.

CB-502 metrics: zero new dependencies. A ~150-line Prometheus text renderer
instead of the specced Micrometer, because this pom already hand-pins
jackson-annotations to reconcile Jackson 2/3, imports a Jetty BOM against
skew, and carries four accepted-CVE advisories -- and CLAUDE.md's mandated
dependency CVE gate could not be run (no JetBrains MCP server connected).
Instrumented at MessageService, the single funnel both surfaces share.

CB-503 CI: .gitea/workflows/ci.yml against the already-running Gitea runner.
Needs no contract-exclusion flag -- the pom's default-excludes profile
already sets excludedGroups=contract, so plain `mvn clean install` IS the
mock-socket surface. Provisions JDK 25 explicitly (runner default-jdk is older).

CB-504 supervision: launchd agent (the real target -- this host is macOS,
there is no systemd) plus a systemd unit for the Linux gateways CB-308 adds.
Ordering directives are advisory, so the actual fix is that startup now waits
up to 30s for the herdr socket and then serves degraded, instead of crashing
into a restart loop on a boot-order race.

Also fixes drift found while surveying:
- bridged.example.yaml documented spawn_ready_timeout_ms in snake_case; config
  binds via plain Jackson with ignoreUnknown, so uncommenting it would have
  been silently dropped and the default kept. Now camelCase, with a test that
  loads the shipped example and one that pins every documented knob's
  spelling -- no test had ever loaded that file.
- Added the 6 shipped-but-undocumented knobs (worktreeRoot, parityOverlay,
  gitTokenEnv, gitHostEnv, configDir, primary:).
- README "Next" listed bridge_ask and session lifecycle as upcoming; both
  shipped long ago.
- docs/CB-301-ext and docs/CB-402 status headers said "design"/"pre-
  implementation" for work already merged.

307 unit/acceptance tests green (was 266), mvn clean install BUILD SUCCESS.
Note: CLAUDE.md's per-file ide_diagnostics gate and the pom Mend.io CVE check
could not be run -- no JetBrains/intellij-index MCP server is connected this
session. mvn clean install is the only gate that ran.
2026-07-29 22:29:26 +07:00

124 lines
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Markdown

# claude-bridge
A **subscription-safe bridge** that lets a primary **Claude Code (Opus 4.8, on Pro/Max)**
session drive a **secondary Claude agent running a different model** via its own
`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` — without ever putting a proxy on the primary session.
Sibling of [`crush-bridge`](https://git.ltms.dev/systems/vms) (which drives a headless
**Crush** worker on GX10 DeepSeek). `claude-bridge` keeps the worker a *real Claude Code
process*, so it inherits `CLAUDE.md`, hooks, skills, and MCP — just pointed at a
cheaper/local model.
## Leading approach — herdr-centric message server (`bridged`)
A small always-on message server, **`bridged`**, controls
[herdr](https://herdr.dev) (an agent multiplexer) over its Unix-socket API and exposes a
clean 2-way messaging API as an **MCP server that both the primary and the workers mount** —
one unified Claude setup and the **sole communication gateway** (REST/SSE stays for non-Claude
clients; any broker is `bridged`-internal, below the gateway).
herdr owns the PTYs, multiplexing, persistence, and **agent-status events**; `bridged` owns
policy (subscription boundary, session lifecycle, status-gated delivery) and the client
contract. The worker `claude` launches with `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://ollama.ltms.dev` + a
bearer token; the primary Opus stays env-clean and calls `bridged`'s MCP tools.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
OPUS["Opus — primary<br/>(Claude Code, env CLEAN)<br/>MCP client"]
subgraph BD["bridged — standalone daemon (not a claude process)"]
SRV["SERVER face<br/>MCP · REST/SSE · policy"]
CLI["CLIENT face<br/>status-gated injector · herdr socket"]
SRV --> CLI
end
HERDR["herdr<br/>panes · agent-status"]
W["worker claude pane<br/>ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL set<br/>MCP client"]
M["ollama.ltms.dev<br/>(worker model)"]
OPUS -->|"MCP bridge_send (blocks)"| SRV
W -.->|"MCP bridge_reply"| SRV
CLI -->|"Unix socket<br/>send_text · events.subscribe"| HERDR
HERDR -->|"drives PTY"| W
W -->|"inference"| M
classDef ext fill:#2b6cb0,stroke:#1a365d,color:#ffffff;
classDef core fill:#2f855a,stroke:#22543d,color:#ffffff;
class OPUS ext
class SRV,CLI,HERDR core
```
- **Subscription boundary:** the *primary* never sets `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` (stays on
Pro/Max). Only the *secondary* process is off-subscription — and `bridged` itself is a
plain daemon (no Anthropic quota), so it may poll/subscribe freely.
- **One gateway (unified MCP setup):** `bridged` is the **sole communication path** for every
Claude session. Primary and workers each mount it as an MCP server (one `claude mcp add`
line, same on both) and talk over MCP tools — `bridge_send` / `bridge_reply` /
`bridge_status` (with `bridge_ask` planned for the blocked-worker path). **No Claude session
ever addresses a broker, a peer, or the network
directly**; any queue is `bridged`-internal. MCP tool I/O never sets `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`, so
mounting the bridge is subscription-safe by construction.
- **How the primary consumes a reply:** a single **blocking MCP call** (`bridge_send`);
`bridged` holds it open until the worker calls `bridge_reply` or its turn hits
`agent_status=done`, then returns the reply as the tool result. No cross-turn busy-poll, so
no quota burn. SSE is an optional side-channel for humans/dashboards watching status.
- **Worker → primary** rides `bridged`'s **MCP rendezvous** — the reply resolves the primary's
blocking call (or, for detached work, `bridged` **injects the primary's idle pane** when it's
ready), so *no keystroke-into-primary and no broker are involved, even single-host*. The one
exception: a split-host primary that isn't a herdr pane wakes via its own `Stop`-hook, which
polls **`bridged`** (never a broker). See the wiki for the two topologies.
- **Different model per process** sidesteps Claude Code's lack of per-subagent provider
routing — the worker isn't a subagent, it's its own configured process.
- **AgentAPI** ([`coder/agentapi`](https://github.com/coder/agentapi)) is retained only as a
swappable *fallback injector* behind the same interface. See the wiki for the full
design, comparison, and rationale.
## Docs
Full design, setup, and operations live in the **[wiki](https://git.ltms.dev/lms/claude-bridge/wiki)**,
vendored here as a submodule under [`wiki/`](./wiki):
```bash
git clone --recurse-submodules ssh://git@git.ltms.dev:2224/lms/claude-bridge.git
# or, after a plain clone:
git submodule update --init
```
Edit docs in `wiki/`, then `cd wiki && git commit && git push` to publish them to the
Gitea wiki.
## Status
🟢 **Implemented & dogfooded** — the herdr-centric **`bridged`** message server is built and in
real use: an Opus primary delegates tasks to off-subscription workers that reply through the
bridge (code reviews delegated this way have produced committed bug fixes). Selected as the
primary approach 2026-07-11, superseding the AgentAPI plan (2026-07-08); AgentAPI retained as a
fallback injector.
**Shipped** (Java 25 · Maven · 266 unit/acceptance tests green; the live-herdr and broker contract
tests run separately via `mvn test -Pcontract`):
- **Core gateway** — herdr socket client (contract-tested vs live 0.7.0); guard-checked worker
spawn with `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` injected only into the worker's env; status-gated injector;
blocking `bridge_send` with reply rendezvous; MCP server as a thin adapter over the REST core.
- **MCP tools** — `bridge_send` / `bridge_reply` / `bridge_status` (messaging) and `bridge_spawn`
/ `bridge_list` / `bridge_stop` / `bridge_profiles` / `bridge_poll` (fleet). Caller identity is
connection-based (loopback peer PID → herdr pane), so the same mount serves primary and workers.
- **Delivery reliability** — completion fallback (a confirmed `working→idle` turn resolves a
send); async fire-and-poll (beats the caller's MCP call timeout for long tasks); and failure
detection for wedged (`unknown`), vanished, and never-ready workers so a send never hangs.
- **Fleet** — multiple worker profiles, each with an independent base_url guard check; workers
inherit the primary's working directory (never `$HOME`); a readiness gate holds delivery until
a worker's Claude has connected the bridge MCP (no paste lost into its boot window).
- **Blocked-worker path** — `bridge_ask` reverse rendezvous: a worker pauses its delegated turn to
ask the primary and resumes the *same* turn with the answer (CB-205).
- **Session lifecycle** — session manager with spawn/reuse/recycle, `idle_ttl` reaper, `context_cap`,
and graceful drain on shutdown (CB-301/CB-303); per-worker git worktrees on their own branch with
a config-parity overlay, so parallel implementers never stomp each other (CB-301-ext).
- **Reliable worker→primary delivery** — a durable `ReplyInbox` (in-memory by default, AMQP/LavinMQ
for cross-restart durability) holds a reply that arrives with no open send, and an active
status-gated push loop nudges the primary to drain it (CB-307).
- **Pluggable peers** — a `PeerLauncher` SPI with two in-tree adapters, `claude-code` and `opencode`,
routed by a `kind:` discriminator (CB-401/CB-402).
**Next** (see the [roadmap](wiki/8-Roadmap.md)) — Stage 5 hardening (auth/TLS, `/metrics`, CI,
service supervision, per-session authz + audit), then cross-host: CB-308 multi-host federation and
CB-500 multi-tier coordination.