4 changed files with 352 additions and 39 deletions
@@ -1000,8 +1000,8 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
     *
     * <p>CB-633: under {@code policy: allow-list} this overlay is NOT the control anymore — it is
     * applied before the login shell runs and a sourced file can (and did) undo it. The control is
-     * the ZDOTDIR scrub ({@link #applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy}); {@code known}/{@code allow}
-     * remain as reporting only via {@link #logCredentialGap}.
+     * the ZDOTDIR scrub ({@link #applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy}); {@code allow} adds explicit
+     * keeps to its derived base, while {@code known} remains reporting metadata.
     */
    private void applyMemberCredentialPolicy(Map<String, String> workerEnv) {
        FleetConfig.MemberCredentials creds = memberCredentials == null ? null : memberCredentials.get();
@@ -1010,8 +1010,8 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
        }
        if (!creds.isAllowList()) {
            overlayBlockedCredentials(workerEnv, creds);
+            logCredentialGap(creds, null);
        }
-        logCredentialGap(creds);
    }

    /** Put {@link #BLOCKED_CREDENTIAL_SENTINEL} over every blocked name in the pane-creation env map. */
@@ -1034,10 +1034,14 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
     * registration, or {@code null} when the policy does not apply.
     *
     * <p>The allow-list handed to the generator is the derived profile set ({@link
-     * MemberEnvAllowList#derive}) UNIONed with the exact keys of THIS launch's env map — names the
-     * daemon itself injects must survive its own control. {@code SSH_AUTH_SOCK} is added ONLY when
-     * the config explicitly allows it; by default it is absent, so the scrub blanks it like any
-     * other non-derived name.
+     * MemberEnvAllowList#derive}) UNIONed with {@code memberCredentials.allow} and the exact keys of
+     * THIS launch's env map. This lets the operator keep inherited variables by name without putting
+     * their values in config, and names the daemon itself injects survive its own control. {@code
+     * SSH_AUTH_SOCK} is EXCLUDED from that union and added ONLY when {@code
+     * memberCredentials.sshAuthSock: allow} — {@code sshAuthSock} is the sole control for that one
+     * name, so it cannot be widened back in by naming it on {@code allow:} too; a conflicting entry
+     * there gets a WARN ({@link #warnSshAuthSockConflict}) and loses. By default {@code
+     * SSH_AUTH_SOCK} is absent, so the scrub blanks it like any other non-derived name.
     */
    private Path applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy(FleetConfig.Profile cfg, Launch launch) {
        FleetConfig.MemberCredentials creds = memberCredentials == null ? null : memberCredentials.get();
@@ -1053,17 +1057,31 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
            // it), but strictly better than nothing.
            warnNonZsh(loginShell);
            overlayBlockedCredentials(launch.env(), creds);
-            logCredentialGap(creds);
+            // Nothing is scrubbed on this path — it is the CB-596 overlay only, which a sourced
+            // startup file can undo. Report the gap with the WARN wording (an inherited-unblocked
+            // exposure), not the allow-list INFO wording, which would falsely claim a scrub blanks it.
+            logCredentialGap(creds, null);
            return null;
        }
        Set<String> allowed = new java.util.TreeSet<>(MemberEnvAllowList.derive(profiles.values()));
+        for (String name : creds.allow()) {
+            // SSH_AUTH_SOCK is governed ONLY by sshAuthSock: below, never by allow: — an operator
+            // who writes both `sshAuthSock: block` and `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` on `allow:` means the block
+            // to win, not to be silently widened away by the second control.
+            if (!SSH_AUTH_SOCK.equals(name)) {
+                allowed.add(name);
+            }
+        }
        if (creds.sshAuthSockAllowed()) {
            allowed.add(SSH_AUTH_SOCK);
+        } else if (creds.allow().contains(SSH_AUTH_SOCK)) {
+            warnSshAuthSockConflict();
        } // blocked by default: absent from the set ⇒ blanked by the scrub like any other name
        allowed.addAll(launch.env().keySet());
+        logCredentialGap(creds, allowed);
        Path dir = EnvAllowListScrub.generate(Path.of(System.getProperty("java.io.tmpdir")), allowed);
        launch.env().put("ZDOTDIR", dir.toAbsolutePath().toString());
-        log.info("memberCredentials policy=allow-list: profile={} generated ZDOTDIR {} — derived "
+        log.info("memberCredentials policy=allow-list: profile={} generated ZDOTDIR {} — effective "
                        + "allow-list holds {} name(s); the pane reports allowed N of M at release",
                cfg.profile(), dir.getFileName(), allowed.size());
        return dir;
@@ -1072,6 +1090,23 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
    /** The operator ssh-agent handle — kept ONLY by explicit config decision, never by default. */
    private static final String SSH_AUTH_SOCK = "SSH_AUTH_SOCK";

+    /** Guards {@link #warnSshAuthSockConflict} to one WARN per launcher instance, not one per spawn. */
+    private final AtomicBoolean sshAuthSockConflictWarned = new AtomicBoolean();
+
+    /**
+     * Defect fix: {@code SSH_AUTH_SOCK} named on {@code memberCredentials.allow} while
+     * {@code sshAuthSock} is not {@code allow} is a conflict between the two controls — say which
+     * one wins, once per launcher instance, without printing any value.
+     */
+    private void warnSshAuthSockConflict() {
+        if (sshAuthSockConflictWarned.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
+            log.warn("memberCredentials policy=allow-list: SSH_AUTH_SOCK is named on allow: but "
+                            + "sshAuthSock is not 'allow' — sshAuthSock: block wins and SSH_AUTH_SOCK "
+                            + "stays blocked. Remove it from allow: or set sshAuthSock: allow if the "
+                            + "member should keep it.");
+        }
+    }
+
    /**
     * CB-633: a non-zsh login shell means the allow-list control CANNOT run — say so once per
     * launcher instance, naming the shell, instead of failing silently.
@@ -1131,29 +1166,59 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
    private static final Pattern CREDENTIAL_SHAPED_NAME =
            Pattern.compile("(?i).*(TOKEN|SECRET|_KEY|APIKEY|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|AUTH).*");

-    /** Guards {@link #logCredentialGap} to one WARN per launcher instance, not one per spawn. */
-    private final AtomicBoolean credentialGapLogged = new AtomicBoolean();
+    /**
+     * Guards {@link #logCredentialGap}'s two report kinds separately — one flag per wording, not
+     * one shared flag — so an early INFO ("will be blanked by the scrub") on one spawn can never
+     * suppress a later, more serious WARN ("inherited UNBLOCKED") on another. {@code
+     * memberCredentials} is live-reloadable, so the policy really can change between spawns on the
+     * same launcher instance.
+     */
+    private final AtomicBoolean allowListGapLogged = new AtomicBoolean();
+
+    /** See {@link #allowListGapLogged} — the WARN-wording counterpart. */
+    private final AtomicBoolean unprotectedGapLogged = new AtomicBoolean();

    /**
-     * CB-596 criterion 4: a credential-shaped host env var name on neither {@code known} nor
-     * {@code allow} is not silently allowed — it is reported. {@link #hostEnvNames} enumerates the
+     * CB-596 criterion 4: report credential-shaped host env var names that the active policy does
+     * not classify. Callers that pass a non-null {@code effectiveAllowed} are reporting against a
+     * kept-name set a scrub will actually enforce — an absent name gets an INFO stating that the
+     * scrub will blank it, because that is the control working rather than an exposure. Every
+     * other caller — deny-by-default, and an allow-list spawn whose scrub could not run (non-zsh
+     * login shell, falls back to the overlay) — passes {@code null} and gets the original WARN,
+     * because in both cases a gap name is inherited unblocked. {@link #hostEnvNames} enumerates the
     * daemon's own environment (see that field's javadoc for why the daemon's env is read rather
-     * than the spawned pane's, which the daemon has no channel to inspect at spawn time); this logs
-     * every such NAME, at WARN, at most once per launcher instance — never a value, a prefix of a
-     * value, or a hash of a value, so the log itself cannot leak anything.
+     * than the spawned pane's). This logs names only, at most once per launcher instance per report
+     * kind — never a value, a prefix of a value, or a hash of a value, so the log itself cannot
+     * leak anything.
     */
-    private void logCredentialGap(FleetConfig.MemberCredentials creds) {
-        Set<String> covered = new HashSet<>(creds.known());
-        covered.addAll(creds.allow());
+    private void logCredentialGap(FleetConfig.MemberCredentials creds, Set<String> effectiveAllowed) {
+        Set<String> covered = effectiveAllowed == null
+                ? new HashSet<>(creds.known()) : effectiveAllowed;
+        if (effectiveAllowed == null) {
+            covered.addAll(creds.allow());
+        }
        List<String> gap = hostEnvNames.get().stream()
                .filter(name -> CREDENTIAL_SHAPED_NAME.matcher(name).matches())
-                .filter(name -> !covered.contains(name))
+                .filter(name -> effectiveAllowed == null
+                        ? !covered.contains(name) : !MemberEnvAllowList.keeps(covered, name))
                .sorted()
                .toList();
        if (gap.isEmpty()) {
            return;
        }
-        if (credentialGapLogged.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
+        // effectiveAllowed != null means a derived allow-list set was actually computed (the
+        // scrub will run against it) — that is the INFO case. A null effectiveAllowed means no
+        // scrub protects this spawn (deny-by-default, or an allow-list spawn that fell back to
+        // the overlay-only path because the login shell is not zsh) — that is the WARN case.
+        // See #allowListGapLogged for why the two kinds use separate guards.
+        if (effectiveAllowed != null) {
+            if (allowListGapLogged.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
+                log.info("memberCredentials allow-list: {} credential-shaped host env var name(s) "
+                                + "are not kept and will be blanked by the scrub — {}. Add any name "
+                                + "a member legitimately needs to memberCredentials.allow.",
+                        gap.size(), gap);
+            }
+        } else if (unprotectedGapLogged.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
            log.warn("memberCredentials gap: {} credential-shaped env var name(s) are on neither "
                            + "known: nor allow: — every member pane inherits them UNBLOCKED — {}. "
                            + "Add each to memberCredentials.known (blocked by default) or .allow "
@@ -7,14 +7,16 @@ import java.util.Set;
 import java.util.TreeSet;

 /**
- * CB-633: the set of environment variable NAMES a spawned member is allowed to keep under
- * {@code memberCredentials.policy: allow-list} — DERIVED from what the launcher itself injects,
- * never hand-typed.
+ * CB-633: the base set of environment variable NAMES a spawned member is allowed to keep under
+ * {@code memberCredentials.policy: allow-list}. This class derives the base from what the launcher
+ * itself injects. The launcher then adds the operator's explicitly named {@code
+ * memberCredentials.allow} keeps and the exact keys of this launch's env map.
 *
- * <p>A hand-typed allow-list is the defect this class exists to prevent: a name an operator forgets
- * to type is a credential that passes through to every member, and a profile added to config later
- * would silently break spawns whose scrub did not know its names. Derivation closes both ends. The
- * kept-name set is the union of:
+ * <p>A hand-typed list that <em>replaces</em> derivation is the defect this class exists to prevent:
+ * a profile added to config later would silently break spawns whose scrub did not know its names.
+ * An explicit list that only adds keeps is safe because adding a name can only widen the set; it
+ * cannot make another spawn lose a name that derivation already kept. The derived base is the union
+ * of:
 *
 * <ul>
 *   <li>every configured {@link FleetConfig.Profile profile}'s {@code gitTokenEnv},
@@ -26,11 +28,11 @@ import java.util.TreeSet;
 *       or the agent binary genuinely needs to function.</li>
 * </ul>
 *
- * <p>Because the union spans EVERY profile (not just the one spawning), adding a new profile can
- * only ever widen the list — it cannot break another spawn's scrub. And because the launcher also
- * unions in the exact keys of each spawn's own env map at generation time (see {@code
- * HerdrPeerLauncher}), anything the daemon deliberately injects for THIS spawn survives its own
- * control.
+ * <p>Because the base spans EVERY profile (not just the one spawning), adding a new profile can only
+ * ever widen the list — it cannot break another spawn's scrub. The launcher then adds the operator's
+ * explicit keeps and the exact keys of each spawn's own env map at generation time (see {@code
+ * HerdrPeerLauncher}), so member binaries can keep named inherited variables without putting their
+ * secret values in config, and anything the daemon injects for THIS spawn survives its own control.
 *
 * <p>{@code SSH_AUTH_SOCK} is deliberately NOT here. It is a handle to the operator's ssh-agent — a
 * member holding it can sign with the operator's keys — so keeping it is a config decision
@@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
     * {@code System.getenv()} so the test is deterministic.
     */
    @Test
-    void aCredentialShapedNameOnNeitherListIsLoggedAsAGap() {
+    void denyByDefaultKeepsTheExactCredentialGapWarn() {
        FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
        FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
                "ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
@@ -1045,16 +1045,104 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
            logger.detachAppender(appender);
        }

+        String expected = "memberCredentials gap: 1 credential-shaped env var name(s) are on neither "
+                + "known: nor allow: — every member pane inherits them UNBLOCKED — "
+                + "[A_BRAND_NEW_SECRET_TOKEN]. Add each to memberCredentials.known (blocked by default) "
+                + "or .allow (if a member legitimately needs it).";
        assertTrue(appender.list.stream().anyMatch(e ->
-                        e.getFormattedMessage().contains("memberCredentials gap")
-                                && e.getFormattedMessage().contains("A_BRAND_NEW_SECRET_TOKEN")),
-                "the gap must name the unrecognized credential-shaped var, never a value");
+                        e.getLevel() == ch.qos.logback.classic.Level.WARN
+                                && e.getFormattedMessage().equals(expected)),
+                "deny-by-default must keep the exact existing WARN text");
+        assertNotNull(startEnv(herdr).get("GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN"),
+                "deny-by-default must still overlay a known blocked credential");
        assertFalse(appender.list.stream().anyMatch(e -> e.getFormattedMessage().contains("PATH")),
                "PATH/HOME are not credential-shaped and must not be reported as a gap");
        assertFalse(appender.list.stream().anyMatch(e -> e.getFormattedMessage().contains("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN")),
                "a name already on allow: is covered, not a gap");
    }

+    @Test
+    void allowListReportsAnUnkeptCredentialAsBlankedWithoutSayingUnblocked() {
+        FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
+        FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
+                "ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
+                List.of("claude"), "tab", "fleetd-workers", "worker: {profile} #{n}", null, null, null);
+        FleetConfig.MemberCredentials creds = new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(
+                FleetConfig.MemberCredentials.POLICY_ALLOW_LIST, List.of(), List.of(), null);
+        ClaudeCodeLauncher svc = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
+                new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(),
+                name -> "SHELL".equals(name) ? "/bin/zsh" : null,
+                0, System::currentTimeMillis, () -> {}, null, () -> creds,
+                () -> Set.of("PATH", "HOME", "A_BRAND_NEW_SECRET_TOKEN"));
+
+        Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(HerdrPeerLauncher.class);
+        ch.qos.logback.classic.Level original = logger.getLevel();
+        logger.setLevel(ch.qos.logback.classic.Level.INFO);
+        ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
+        appender.start();
+        logger.addAppender(appender);
+        try {
+            svc.spawn();
+        } finally {
+            logger.detachAppender(appender);
+            logger.setLevel(original);
+        }
+
+        ILoggingEvent gap = appender.list.stream()
+                .filter(e -> e.getFormattedMessage().contains("A_BRAND_NEW_SECRET_TOKEN"))
+                .findFirst().orElseThrow(() -> new AssertionError("allow-list must report the blanked name"));
+        assertEquals(ch.qos.logback.classic.Level.INFO, gap.getLevel(),
+                "a scrubbed credential name is the allow-list control working, not a WARN");
+        assertTrue(gap.getFormattedMessage().contains("will be blanked by the scrub"));
+        assertFalse(gap.getFormattedMessage().contains("UNBLOCKED"),
+                "the allow-list report must not claim that a blanked name is exposed");
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Defect fix: {@code memberCredentials} is live-reloadable, so the policy really can change
+     * between spawns on the SAME launcher instance. An earlier INFO gap report (allow-list) must
+     * not permanently suppress a later, more serious WARN gap report (deny-by-default) — the two
+     * report kinds need separate guards, not one shared flag.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void anEarlierInfoGapDoesNotSuppressALaterWarnGapOnTheSameLauncher() {
+        FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
+        FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
+                "ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
+                List.of("claude"), "tab", "fleetd-workers", "worker: {profile} #{n}", null, null, null);
+        AtomicReference<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> creds = new AtomicReference<>(
+                new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(
+                        FleetConfig.MemberCredentials.POLICY_ALLOW_LIST, List.of(), List.of(), null));
+        ClaudeCodeLauncher svc = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
+                new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(),
+                name -> "SHELL".equals(name) ? "/bin/zsh" : null,
+                0, System::currentTimeMillis, () -> {}, null, creds::get,
+                () -> Set.of("PATH", "HOME", "A_BRAND_NEW_SECRET_TOKEN"));
+
+        Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(HerdrPeerLauncher.class);
+        ch.qos.logback.classic.Level original = logger.getLevel();
+        logger.setLevel(ch.qos.logback.classic.Level.INFO);
+        ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
+        appender.start();
+        logger.addAppender(appender);
+        try {
+            svc.spawn(); // allow-list: logs the INFO gap report first
+            creds.set(new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(
+                    FleetConfig.MemberCredentials.POLICY_DENY_BY_DEFAULT, List.of(), List.of(), null));
+            svc.spawn(); // deny-by-default: must still log its own WARN gap report
+        } finally {
+            logger.detachAppender(appender);
+            logger.setLevel(original);
+        }
+
+        assertTrue(appender.list.stream().anyMatch(e ->
+                        e.getLevel() == ch.qos.logback.classic.Level.WARN
+                                && e.getFormattedMessage().contains("A_BRAND_NEW_SECRET_TOKEN")
+                                && e.getFormattedMessage().contains("UNBLOCKED")),
+                "a prior INFO gap report must not suppress a later WARN gap report on the same "
+                        + "launcher instance");
+    }
+
    /**
     * The half of CB-592 that can actually survive the pane's login shell. BRIDGED_MEMBER is a name
     * secrets.sh never exports, so nothing overwrites it — measured: GITEA_TOKEN is injected the
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 package dev.ltms.fleet.member;

+import ch.qos.logback.classic.Logger;
+import ch.qos.logback.classic.spi.ILoggingEvent;
+import ch.qos.logback.core.read.ListAppender;
 import dev.ltms.fleet.config.FleetConfig;
 import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.AgentControl;
 import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.FakeHerdr;
@@ -8,7 +11,10 @@ import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.Capability;
 import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.MemberRole;
 import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.SpawnRequest;
 import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir;
+import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;

+import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
 import java.nio.file.Files;
 import java.nio.file.Path;
 import java.util.HashMap;
@@ -21,6 +27,7 @@ import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
 import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
 import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNotNull;
 import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assumptions.assumeTrue;

 /**
 * CB-633: proves the allow-list scrub is actually WIRED INTO the spawn path — not merely that its
@@ -43,6 +50,8 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {

    /** A name the daemon itself injects — it must survive its own scrub, so it must be allowed. */
    private static final String INJECTED = "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL";
+    private static final String OPERATOR_KEEP = "CONTEXT7_TOKEN";
+    private static final String UNLISTED_CREDENTIAL = "A_BRAND_NEW_SECRET_TOKEN";

    @Test
    void spawningUnderAllowListPolicyGivesThePaneAGeneratedZdotdir() {
@@ -74,6 +83,43 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
                        + "), or the daemon's own configuration is blanked by its own control");
    }

+    /** Explicit operator keeps widen the derived base, but all other exported names stay blocked. */
+    @Test
+    void operatorKeepSurvivesWhileAnUnlistedCredentialIsBlanked(@TempDir Path home) throws Exception {
+        Path zsh = Path.of("/bin/zsh");
+        assumeTrue(Files.isExecutable(zsh), "/bin/zsh not present — nothing to prove here");
+        FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
+        WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, allowList(List.of(OPERATOR_KEEP)));
+
+        var spawned = launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
+        try {
+            Path zdotdir = Path.of(launcher.env.get("ZDOTDIR"));
+            ProcessBuilder probe = new ProcessBuilder(zsh.toString(), "-i", "-c",
+                    "[[ -n \"$" + OPERATOR_KEEP + "\" ]] && print -r -- kept || print -r -- missing; "
+                            + "[[ -z \"$" + UNLISTED_CREDENTIAL
+                            + "\" ]] && print -r -- blanked || print -r -- leaked");
+            probe.environment().clear();
+            probe.environment().putAll(Map.of(
+                    "HOME", home.toString(),
+                    "PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin",
+                    "SHELL", zsh.toString(),
+                    "ZDOTDIR", zdotdir.toString(),
+                    OPERATOR_KEEP, "needed-by-member-binary",
+                    UNLISTED_CREDENTIAL, "must-not-survive"));
+            probe.redirectError(ProcessBuilder.Redirect.DISCARD);
+
+            Process process = probe.start();
+            String output = new String(process.getInputStream().readAllBytes(), StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
+            assertTrue(process.waitFor(60, java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit.SECONDS),
+                    "the zsh scrub probe did not exit within 60 seconds");
+            assertEquals(0, process.exitValue(), "the zsh scrub probe must exit cleanly");
+            assertEquals("kept\nblanked\n", output,
+                    "memberCredentials.allow must add a keep, while an unlisted credential stays blanked");
+        } finally {
+            launcher.stop(spawned.id());
+        }
+    }
+
    /** The default policy must not generate anything — an upgrade changes nothing until asked. */
    @Test
    void spawningUnderTheDefaultPolicyGeneratesNoZdotdir() {
@@ -103,9 +149,116 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
                "bash ignores ZDOTDIR; setting it would be protection theatre");
    }

+    /**
+     * Defect fix: under {@code policy: allow-list} with a non-zsh login shell, nothing is
+     * scrubbed — the overlay-only fallback is the whole protection. The gap must still be
+     * reported, and with the deny-by-default WARN wording ("inherited UNBLOCKED"), never the
+     * allow-list INFO wording ("will be blanked by the scrub"), because nothing is scrubbed here.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void nonZshAllowListFallbackStillReportsTheGapAsAWarn() {
+        FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
+        WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, allowList(), "/bin/bash",
+                () -> Set.of("PATH", "HOME", UNLISTED_CREDENTIAL));
+
+        Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(HerdrPeerLauncher.class);
+        ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
+        appender.start();
+        logger.addAppender(appender);
+        try {
+            launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
+        } finally {
+            logger.detachAppender(appender);
+        }
+
+        ILoggingEvent gap = appender.list.stream()
+                .filter(e -> e.getFormattedMessage().contains(UNLISTED_CREDENTIAL))
+                .findFirst().orElseThrow(() -> new AssertionError(
+                        "the non-zsh allow-list fallback must still report the credential gap"));
+        assertEquals(ch.qos.logback.classic.Level.WARN, gap.getLevel(),
+                "nothing is scrubbed on this path, so the report must use the WARN wording, not "
+                        + "the allow-list INFO wording");
+        assertTrue(gap.getFormattedMessage().contains("UNBLOCKED"),
+                "the fallback path scrubs nothing, so the wording must say so");
+        assertFalse(gap.getFormattedMessage().contains("will be blanked by the scrub"),
+                "nothing is scrubbed on this path — that wording would be false here");
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * The live operator config has {@code SSH_AUTH_SOCK} on BOTH {@code allow:} AND
+     * {@code sshAuthSock: block}. Defect fix: {@code sshAuthSock: block} must win — the allow:
+     * entry must not silently widen the derived allow-list to include it.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void sshAuthSockBlockWinsOverAnAllowListEntry(@TempDir Path home) throws Exception {
+        Path zsh = Path.of("/bin/zsh");
+        assumeTrue(Files.isExecutable(zsh), "/bin/zsh not present");
+        FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
+        Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> live = () -> new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(
+                FleetConfig.MemberCredentials.POLICY_ALLOW_LIST,
+                List.of("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN", "WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN", "CONTEXT7_TOKEN", "GITEA_HOST",
+                        "OPENCODE_AUTOMODE_MODEL", "SSH_AUTH_SOCK", "CLAUDE_CODE_MESSAGING_TOKEN"),
+                List.of(), "block");
+        WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, live);
+        var spawned = launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
+        try {
+            Path zdotdir = Path.of(launcher.env.get("ZDOTDIR"));
+            ProcessBuilder probe = new ProcessBuilder(zsh.toString(), "-i", "-c",
+                    "[[ -n \"$SSH_AUTH_SOCK\" ]] && print -r -- LEAKED || print -r -- blanked");
+            probe.environment().clear();
+            probe.environment().putAll(Map.of(
+                    "HOME", home.toString(), "PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin", "SHELL", zsh.toString(),
+                    "ZDOTDIR", zdotdir.toString(), "SSH_AUTH_SOCK", "/tmp/agent.sock"));
+            probe.redirectError(ProcessBuilder.Redirect.DISCARD);
+            Process pr = probe.start();
+            String out = new String(pr.getInputStream().readAllBytes(), StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
+            pr.waitFor(60, java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit.SECONDS);
+            assertEquals("blanked\n", out, "sshAuthSock: block must win over allow:");
+        } finally {
+            launcher.stop(spawned.id());
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Mirror of {@link #sshAuthSockBlockWinsOverAnAllowListEntry}: with {@code sshAuthSock: allow}
+     * (no conflict with {@code allow:}), {@code SSH_AUTH_SOCK} IS kept. Without this case, a fix
+     * that simply deletes {@code SSH_AUTH_SOCK} everywhere would also pass the block test.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void sshAuthSockAllowKeepsTheVariable(@TempDir Path home) throws Exception {
+        Path zsh = Path.of("/bin/zsh");
+        assumeTrue(Files.isExecutable(zsh), "/bin/zsh not present");
+        FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
+        Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> creds = () -> new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(
+                FleetConfig.MemberCredentials.POLICY_ALLOW_LIST,
+                List.of("SSH_AUTH_SOCK"), List.of(), "allow");
+        WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, creds);
+        var spawned = launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
+        try {
+            Path zdotdir = Path.of(launcher.env.get("ZDOTDIR"));
+            ProcessBuilder probe = new ProcessBuilder(zsh.toString(), "-i", "-c",
+                    "[[ -n \"$SSH_AUTH_SOCK\" ]] && print -r -- kept || print -r -- blanked");
+            probe.environment().clear();
+            probe.environment().putAll(Map.of(
+                    "HOME", home.toString(), "PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin", "SHELL", zsh.toString(),
+                    "ZDOTDIR", zdotdir.toString(), "SSH_AUTH_SOCK", "/tmp/agent.sock"));
+            probe.redirectError(ProcessBuilder.Redirect.DISCARD);
+            Process pr = probe.start();
+            String out = new String(pr.getInputStream().readAllBytes(), StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
+            pr.waitFor(60, java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit.SECONDS);
+            assertEquals("kept\n", out, "sshAuthSock: allow must keep SSH_AUTH_SOCK");
+        } finally {
+            launcher.stop(spawned.id());
+        }
+    }
+
    private static Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> allowList() {
+        return allowList(List.of());
+    }
+
+    private static Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> allowList(List<String> allow) {
        return () -> new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(
-                FleetConfig.MemberCredentials.POLICY_ALLOW_LIST, List.of(), List.of(), null);
+                FleetConfig.MemberCredentials.POLICY_ALLOW_LIST, allow, List.of(), null);
    }

    private static String readAll(Path p) {
@@ -134,10 +287,15 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
        }

        WiringLauncher(FakeHerdr herdr, Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> creds, String shell) {
+            this(herdr, creds, shell, null);
+        }
+
+        WiringLauncher(FakeHerdr herdr, Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> creds, String shell,
+                       Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames) {
            super("test", new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
                    Map.of("test", profile()), "test",
                    name -> "SHELL".equals(name) ? shell : null,
-                    0, () -> 0L, () -> { }, null, creds);
+                    0, () -> 0L, () -> { }, null, creds, hostEnvNames);
        }

        @Override