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Author SHA1 Message Date
Dai Ha bd2774b5f1 fleetd #155: refuse a member spawn under memberCredentials.policy=allow-list on a non-zsh shell
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m1s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m56s
The ZDOTDIR scrub that enforces policy=allow-list only runs on zsh. The daemon
already detected a non-zsh login shell (isZshShell/warnNonZsh, from #213), but
degraded to the weaker CB-596 overlay and spawned anyway — the exact "control
silently does nothing" defect this ticket is about. Now a non-zsh shell under
policy=allow-list refuses the spawn (IllegalArgumentException, naming the
shell), surfaced by FleetMcp.spawn's existing catch(IllegalArgumentException).
policy=deny-by-default is unaffected in substance (its overlay never depended
on the shell) but now also logs a one-time WARN naming the shell, since the
stronger allow-list control is unavailable there.

The worktreeRoot/worktreeGroup-missing degrade path under memberHerdrSocket
is untouched — that gap is fleetd #213's scope, not this one.
2026-09-03 13:13:23 +07:00
Dai Ha c4deef08be fleetd #249: withhold agentSessionId when the cwd is not a provisioned worktree
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m22s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m22s
A member spawned without a worktree inherits the lead's cwd, which holds
many old opencode session rows. sessionIdForDirectory picks the most
recently updated row for that directory, so a brand-new member - which
has not written its own row yet - resolves to somebody else's session.
Measured: a row three days old, from a different profile.

The damage was at the tool surface. fleet_list told the lead that
agentSessionId is the id to pass as resumeSessionId, so acting on it
would resume a stranger's conversation, with foreign context, and
nothing to distinguish that from a correct resume.

Fixed by refusing to answer rather than by making the heuristic smarter.
#234 already established the heuristic cannot be made reliable at that
layer, and its javadoc records why, so the SQL is untouched.

agentSessionId() now returns null for a non-provisioned cwd, and
spawn() refuses a resumeSessionId request for one outright, before
anything starts. isProvisionedWorktree moved to HerdrPeerLauncher so
both adapters share it. fleet_list and fleet_spawn descriptions no
longer describe the id as always safe to resume.

Verified rather than taken on trust:
- the refusal reaches the lead as a readable message, not a stack trace
  - FleetMcp.spawn already catches IllegalArgumentException and returns
  error(e.getMessage()).
- the message tells the lead to pass fleet_spawn{worktree:<slug>}, which
  is valid: worktree is typed string, 'true' or a ticket slug.
- 13 existing tests moved off a placeholder "/work/dir" onto a real
  provisioned-worktree fixture. They cover #175/#234 model-mismatch
  machinery and would otherwise have tripped the new gate incidentally.

Worker's mutation evidence, both reverted and diff-confirmed:
- gate at OpenCodeLauncher:812 -> if(false): RED at
  OpenCodeLauncherTest:448, expected <null> but was <ses_someone_elses>.
- resume refusal at OpenCodeLauncher:683 -> 'false &&': RED at
  OpenCodeLauncherTest:379, expected IllegalArgumentException.
Both 0 compile errors.

Closes #249. PR #253.
2026-09-03 12:55:29 +07:00
Dai Ha e897e5257b fleetd #114: delete the drifted tool catalogue, keep the flows, guard the names
CI / contract (push) Successful in 51s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m42s
docs/MCP-Contract.md was written 2026-07-14, before any MCP code existed,
and never caught up. CLAUDE.md points every session in the fleet at it.

Audited against the code today. The drift was not confined to the tool
table the ticket reported:

  section 3  still described the OLD identity rule - "any connection that
             does not map to a known worker is treated as a primary".
             That was a real privilege bug, fixed since by the ancestry
             walk in #161. The page still taught it.
  section 4  names port 8080 (the mount is 8765) and says the pom does
             not yet carry an MCP dependency.
  section 5  named fleet_read and fleet_cancel, which do not exist, and
             omitted fleet_poll, fleet_ack, fleet_profiles, fleet_whoami
             and fleet_list, which do.
  section 8  says turn_id where the code says turnId, and has no row for
             the exhausted outcome CB-578 added.
  sections
  9, 10, 11  pre-build planning: "new work" columns, open decisions long
             since decided, CB-1xx placeholders.

Every one of those is the same defect: a hand-maintained second copy of
something the code already states. So the copy is deleted rather than
corrected - correcting it just restarts the clock.

What survives is the flows and the status gating, because a flow is a
shape rather than a name, and shapes are what this page was ever good
for. They are rewritten with the names checked against the code, and
extended with what has been learned since: the ~60s cap on a blocking
send, the ~55s ask window, and the three ways the turn-done fallback
loses a report (clipped, echoed brief, slow member).

389 lines -> 188.

The names that remain are guarded. McpContractDocTest fails if the page
names a fleet_* tool FleetMcp does not register, and - because an empty
set is a subset of everything - a second test pins that both sides
actually found names, so the check cannot pass by checking nothing. A
third pins the "this is not the tool reference" sentence, which is the
fix itself: without it someone helpfully re-adds a tool table.

Mutation-tested both ways, 0 compile errors each: adding `fleet_read` to
the doc fails theDocNamesNoToolThatDoesNotExist ("names [fleet_read] ...
Checked 6 name(s)"); removing the disclaimer fails
theDocStillDisclaimsBeingTheToolReference.

All 5 mermaid diagrams render under mermaid-cli.

CLAUDE.md's pointer said "section 6 only" and now names the guard
instead. It is in the project addendum, so the canonical block is
untouched - verified still byte-identical with the wiki template.

REST is split out to #252: 14 routes, documented nowhere, and it IS a
supported operator surface - one of them drains on read.

1232 tests, 0 failures.
2026-09-03 12:52:12 +07:00
Dai Ha 2afa3652bb fleetd #249: withhold agentSessionId for a non-provisioned opencode cwd
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 54s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m52s
OpenCodeSessionDiscovery.sessionIdForDirectory keys on the worker's cwd, which
is reliable only when fleetd provisioned a unique git worktree for that
member. Without one (the default no-worktree spawn), the cwd is shared with
other sessions, and "most recently updated row for this directory" can pick a
stranger's session — fleet_list would then hand a lead an agentSessionId that
resumes someone else's conversation.

Move isProvisionedWorktree from ClaudeCodeLauncher to the shared
HerdrPeerLauncher base (both adapters need it now). OpenCodeLauncher.spawn now
refuses a resumeSessionId spawn outright when the target cwd is not a
provisioned worktree (fleetd can never verify or re-report that identity), and
SessionAwareHandle.agentSessionId() withholds the id — returns null rather
than guessing — for any member spawned without one, resumed or not. Corrected
fleet_list/fleet_spawn's tool descriptions, which previously implied
agentSessionId is always a safe resume handle.
2026-09-03 12:51:56 +07:00
Dai Ha 80092ff359 fleetd #247: stop writing a trust key Claude Code strips on every save
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m26s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m28s
seedTrustDialog wrote two keys into the shared .claude.json:
hasTrustDialogAccepted and hasCompletedProjectOnboarding. Only the first
one survives.

Measured live on 2026-09-03, minutes after a spawn seeded the file:

  hasTrustDialogAccepted:       28 of 28 project entries
  hasCompletedProjectOnboarding: 0 of 28 project entries

Our entry was written by the running jar and the key was already gone,
so it was written and then removed. It is absent from the 27 entries
Claude Code wrote for itself too, which says Claude Code normalises the
whole file when it saves and drops that key every time.

That reframes #247. I filed it as a race - a save landing between our
read and our ATOMIC_MOVE. It is not a race. The other writer removes
this key as its steady-state behaviour, with no window involved. So the
compare-and-swap retry proposed there would not have helped: it would
re-add a key that gets stripped again on the next save.

The seed's whole job is to stop the workspace-trust dialog blocking a
member (#149). The live probe reached idle with hasTrustDialogAccepted
alone, so the second key was never doing that job. Writing it only added
a contested key to a file two processes share, and made the next reader
think it mattered.

The atomic write and the lock stay. Both are still correct, both are
cheap, and hasTrustDialogAccepted is genuinely shared state.

The new assertion is assertFalse, not a deletion. Removing the old
assertion would leave nothing to stop someone re-adding the key later as
a plausible-looking completeness fix. Mutation-tested: restoring the
production line fails
seedTrustDialogWritesOnlyTheTrustFlagAndNotTheOnboardingKey:2198 with 0
compile errors.

1229 tests, 0 failures.
2026-09-03 12:41:20 +07:00
11 changed files with 643 additions and 491 deletions
+8 -5
View File
@@ -215,11 +215,14 @@ must obey belongs in the charter, not here.
reads the list with `git config --worktree --get-all fleet.neutralizedConfig`, and the
consequence with `git config --worktree --get fleet.neutralizedConfigNote`. Never brief a worker
to edit one of these files: the edit cannot be committed, and it will not tell you so.
- **Flows and the error model** — rendezvous, `fleet_ask`, detached delivery, turn-done fallback —
are diagrammed in `docs/MCP-Contract.md` **§6 only**. The rest of that page is a pre-build design
doc whose tool names, parameter names and REST paths never caught up with the code, so do not use
it as the tool reference (CB-609). Section 6 is kept out of this file because this file loads into
every session's context.
- **Flows and the error model** — rendezvous, `fleet_ask`, detached delivery, the turn-done
fallback and status gating — are diagrammed in `docs/MCP-Contract.md`. That page is now flows
only: its pre-build tool catalogue, parameter tables and REST paths were deleted rather than
corrected, because a hand-maintained second copy of the tool surface is what drifted for a month
while this line pointed every session at it (CB-609 / #114). **The live MCP schema is the tool
reference**, with the intent→tool table above as the short form. `McpContractDocTest` fails if
that page names a `fleet_*` tool the server does not register. The flows are kept out of this
file because this file loads into every session's context.
### Redeploying the daemon — the lead may do this (primary only)
+123 -324
View File
@@ -1,311 +1,162 @@
# MCP Contract — `fleetd`'s unified gateway
# MCP flows and error model — `fleetd`
> **Status: 🔴 HISTORICAL DESIGN — do NOT use as the tool reference.** Written 2026-07-14, before
> any MCP code existed. The system shipped and this page never caught up, so **its tool names,
> parameter names and REST paths are wrong today**. Audited 2026-08-17; the specific drift:
> **What this page is.** The **flows**: how a delegation, a clarification, a detached task and a
> silent member each travel through `fleetd`. These shapes are what shipped, and they are hard to
> read off the code because they span the MCP face, the rendezvous registry, the `Injector` and
> herdr.
>
> - **Tools it names that do not exist:** `fleet_read`, `fleet_cancel`.
> - **Shipped tools it omits:** `fleet_poll`, `fleet_ack`, `fleet_profiles`, `fleet_whoami`.
> - **Parameter names are wrong nearly everywhere** — it says `message`/`target`/`timeout_seconds`/
> `block` where the code takes `content`/`sessionId`/`timeoutMs`/`wait`; `text` where
> `fleet_reply` takes `content`; `target` where `fleet_stop` takes `paneId`.
> - **REST paths are wrong:** it says `POST /workers` and `DELETE /workers/{paneId}`; the daemon
> serves `POST /members` and `DELETE /members/{paneId}`.
> **What this page is NOT: a tool reference.** It deliberately holds no tool catalogue, no
> parameter tables and no REST paths. **The live MCP schema is the authority** — each tool's own
> description and parameters, as mounted — with the intent→tool table in `CLAUDE.md` as the short
> form.
>
> **The authoritative tool surface is the live MCP schema** (each tool's own description and
> parameters, as mounted), with the intent→tool table in `CLAUDE.md` as the short form. Both were
> checked against `mcp/FleetMcp.java` on 2026-08-17 and are accurate.
> That absence is the fix for fleetd #114 (CB-609), and it is worth stating why. This page used to
> carry a full tool catalogue written in July 2026, before any MCP code existed. The code shipped;
> the page did not follow. By August it named two tools that do not exist, omitted five that do,
> had the wrong name for nearly every parameter, pointed at REST paths the daemon does not serve,
> and — worst — still described an identity model (*"any connection that does not map to a known
> worker is treated as a primary"*) that was a real privilege bug, fixed since by the ancestry
> walk in fleetd #161. Every one of those errors is the same error: **a second, hand-maintained
> copy of something the code already states**. So the second copy is gone rather than corrected.
> Only the flows remain, because a flow is a shape rather than a name, and shapes are what this
> page was ever good for.
>
> What is still worth reading here is **§6 — the flows and the error model** (rendezvous,
> `fleet_ask`, detached delivery, the turn-done fallback). The shapes it describes are the ones
> that shipped; only the names around them drifted. Rewriting this page is tracked as **CB-609**.
`fleetd` is the **sole communication gateway** for every Claude session in the bridge. Both
the **primary** (Opus, on subscription) and every **worker** (off-subscription Claude Code)
mount the *same* MCP server with a single `claude mcp add` line, and talk only through its
tools. No Claude session ever addresses a broker, a peer, or the network directly.
This document defines every MCP tool that face must expose, who may call it, its blocking
semantics, and how it maps onto the code already in the tree.
> The names that do appear below are checked by `McpContractDocTest`, which fails if this page
> names a `fleet_*` tool the server does not register. That test is the whole reason it is safe to
> write a tool name here at all.
---
## 1. Design constraints (non-negotiable)
## 1. Rendezvous flows
These come from the project's core invariants and bound every decision below.
### 1.1 Delegation — happy path
1. **One server, both roles.** The primary and all workers mount an identical server. The
catalog must serve both, and `fleetd` must decide *who is calling* from the connection —
never from a caller-supplied argument that could be spoofed.
2. **Subscription-safe by construction.** No MCP tool ever reads, sets, or forwards
`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`. Mounting the bridge cannot move a session off subscription.
Enforced today by [`SubscriptionGuard`](1-Architecture).
3. **Blocking rendezvous, no busy-poll.** The primary consumes a worker's reply through a
*single* MCP call that `fleetd` holds open — never a cross-turn poll loop that would burn
subscription quota.
4. **Status-gated delivery.** Anything that puts text into a worker flows through the existing
[`Injector`](1-Architecture): delivered only when the worker is `idle`/`blocked`, at most
one message per turn.
5. **`fleetd` owns policy; herdr owns PTYs.** MCP tools express *intent*; `fleetd`
translates it into guard checks, rendezvous bookkeeping, and herdr `agent.*` calls.
---
## 2. Topology
Both faces live in the one daemon. The **north face** is MCP (this document); the **south
face** is the herdr Unix socket. REST/SSE remains only for non-Claude clients and dashboards.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
OPUS["Opus — primary<br/>(Claude Code, env CLEAN)<br/>MCP client"]
subgraph BD["fleetd — standalone daemon"]
MCP["MCP server (north face)<br/>fleet_send · fleet_reply<br/>fleet_ask · fleet_status · lifecycle"]
RDV["rendezvous registry<br/>(blocking-call waiters)"]
INJ["Injector + StatusPoller<br/>(status-gated writer)"]
SOCK["herdr socket client (south face)"]
MCP --> RDV
RDV --> INJ
INJ --> SOCK
MCP --> SOCK
end
HERDR["herdr<br/>panes · agent-status"]
W["worker claude pane<br/>ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL set<br/>MCP client"]
OPUS -->|"fleet_send (blocks)"| MCP
W -.->|"fleet_reply / fleet_ask"| MCP
SOCK -->|"agent.start · agent.send<br/>agent.get · pane.close"| HERDR
HERDR -->|"drives PTY"| W
classDef ext fill:#2b6cb0,stroke:#1a365d,color:#ffffff;
classDef core fill:#2f855a,stroke:#22543d,color:#ffffff;
class OPUS,W ext
class MCP,RDV,INJ,SOCK core
```
---
## 3. Identity & addressing
Because the same server is mounted by everyone, `fleetd` resolves the caller's role on every
request — this is the linchpin of the whole contract and has no code yet.
- **Workers are known.** `fleetd` spawns every worker
([`WorkerService`](1-Architecture)) and records its herdr session UUID / `terminal_id` on
the returned [`Agent`]. When a call arrives on a connection that maps to a known worker,
the caller is *that* worker — so **workers never pass a target**; routing is implicit.
- **The primary is "not a worker".** Any connection that does not map to a known worker is
treated as a primary. It addresses workers **explicitly** by `target` — a session UUID,
a `terminal_id`, or a friendly `profile` name.
- **Turn correlation.** A blocking `fleet_send` registers a *waiter* keyed by worker
identity. A worker's later `fleet_reply` / `fleet_ask` on the same identity resolves that
waiter. A `turn_id` is minted per exchange so a clarification round-trip
(§6.2) rejoins the right turn.
---
## 4. Transport
`fleetd` is a long-lived daemon serving **multiple** concurrent clients (one primary + N
workers), so a per-client stdio child is the wrong shape. The recommended transport is
**streamable-HTTP / SSE** on the same bind as the REST face:
```bash
# identical on primary and every worker
claude mcp add --transport http fleetd http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp
```
This adds an MCP-server dependency the pom does not yet carry. See [Open decisions](#10-open-decisions).
---
## 5. Tool catalog
| Tool | Caller | Blocks? | Backing (exists today?) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [`fleet_send`](#fleet_send) | primary | yes (default) | `Injector.enqueue` ✅ · rendezvous registry ❌ (CB-104) |
| [`fleet_reply`](#fleet_reply) | worker | no | rendezvous ❌ · pane injection via `Injector` ✅ |
| [`fleet_ask`](#fleet_ask) | worker | yes | reverse rendezvous ❌ |
| [`fleet_status`](#fleet_status) | either | no | `AgentControl.status` ✅ · `Injector.activeTargets` ✅ |
| [`fleet_spawn`](#lifecycle) | primary | no | `WorkerService.spawn` ✅ (`POST /workers`) |
| [`fleet_list`](#lifecycle) | either | no | `WorkerService.list` ✅ (`/agents`) |
| [`fleet_stop`](#lifecycle) | primary | no | `WorkerService.stop` ✅ (`DELETE /workers/{paneId}`) |
| [`fleet_read`](#fleet_read) | primary | no | `AgentControl.read` ✅ |
| [`fleet_cancel`](#fleet_cancel) | primary | no | — ❌ (future) |
### Core: delegation & rendezvous
#### `fleet_send`
*(primary → worker — the headline tool, CB-104)*
- **Params:** `message` (required); `target` (optional — defaults to the sole worker / default
profile); `timeout_seconds` (default 600); `block` (default `true`); `auto_spawn`
(default `true`); `turn_id` (optional — supplied when answering a worker's `fleet_ask`).
- **Blocking (`block:true`):** enqueue `message` via the `Injector`, then hold the call open
until exactly one of:
- worker calls `fleet_reply` → `{ outcome:"reply", text }`
- worker calls `fleet_ask` → `{ outcome:"question", text, turn_id }`
- worker's `agent_status` reaches done/idle with no reply → `{ outcome:"turn_done", text:<terminal tail> }`
- deadline elapses → `{ outcome:"timeout" }`
- worker gone → error `worker_gone`
- **Detached (`block:false`):** enqueue and return `{ outcome:"dispatched", dispatch_id }`
immediately. The eventual reply is injected into the primary's idle pane (§6.3), or drained
via `fleet_status` on a split-host primary.
#### `fleet_reply`
*(worker → primary)*
- **Params:** `text` (required); `final` (default `true`).
- **Behavior:** resolve the primary waiter registered against this worker with `text`. If no
waiter exists (detached delegation), `fleetd` **injects the primary's idle pane** instead.
Returns `{ delivered:true, mode:"resolved"|"injected" }`. No `target` — identity is implicit.
#### `fleet_ask`
*(worker → primary — the reverse rendezvous)*
- **Params:** `question` (required); `timeout_seconds`.
- **Behavior:** blocks the *worker's* call. Surfaces the question to the primary (resolving its
open `fleet_send` with `outcome:"question"`, or injecting its pane). When the primary
answers — a `fleet_send` carrying the matching `turn_id` — that unblocks this call and
returns `{ answer }` to the worker, which continues **in the same turn**.
### Worker lifecycle
<a id="lifecycle"></a>
Thin adapters over [`WorkerService`](1-Architecture) — parity with the existing REST routes.
- **`fleet_spawn`** — `{ profile? }` → worker view (`sessionId`, `terminalId`, `paneId`,
`status`). Guard-checked; a boundary breach returns error `subscription_boundary` (the
REST `403`).
- **`fleet_list`** — no params → all workers + `agent_status`. Read-only, either role.
- **`fleet_stop`** — `{ target }` → tears down the pane and its dedicated tab. Idempotent.
### Observability
#### `fleet_status`
*(either role — the README's 4th named tool)*
- **Params:** `target?`.
- **Behavior:** per-worker `agent_status`, queue depth (`Injector.activeTargets`), whether a
rendezvous is open, and ids. For the *calling* session it also reports/drains **pending
messages addressed to me** — the path a split-host primary's `Stop`-hook uses to wake and
collect replies without being injectable. Read-only, non-blocking.
#### `fleet_read`
*(primary)*
- **Params:** `target`; `source` ∈ `visible | recent | recent_unwrapped | detection`.
- **Behavior:** returns the worker's terminal text so the primary can peek at a *detached*
worker's progress. Adapter over `AgentControl.read`.
### Control (future)
#### `fleet_cancel`
*(primary)*
- **Params:** `target`. Interrupt the worker's current turn / abandon the rendezvous. No
backing code yet.
---
## 6. Rendezvous flows
### 6.1 Delegation — happy path
One blocking call, zero polls.
One blocking call, zero polls. The lead's call is held open by `fleetd` until the member answers.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant P as Primary (Opus)
participant B as fleetd (MCP + Injector)
participant P as "Lead (primary)"
participant B as "fleetd (MCP + Injector)"
participant H as herdr
participant W as Worker (Claude)
participant W as "Member"
P->>B: fleet_send("do X", target=w) — blocks
B->>B: register waiter(w)
B->>H: agent.send(w, "do X") (idle window)
H-->>W: prompt injected
W->>W: works the turn
W->>B: fleet_reply("result")
B->>B: resolve waiter(w)
B-->>P: { outcome:"reply", text:"result" }
P->>B: "fleet_send{sessionId, content} — blocks"
B->>B: "register waiter(sessionId)"
B->>H: "agent.send — only in an injectable window"
H-->>W: "prompt injected"
W->>W: "works the turn"
W->>B: "fleet_reply{content}"
B->>B: "resolve waiter"
B-->>P: "{ outcome: reply }"
```
### 6.2 Clarification — reverse rendezvous (`fleet_ask`)
**The cap that matters:** a blocking `fleet_send` is bounded by the *caller's own* MCP client
timeout, about 60 seconds — not by the task. Anything slower than that must use the detached flow
in §1.3, or the lead's call returns while the member is still working.
The worker pauses mid-turn to ask; the primary answers; the worker resumes in the same turn.
### 1.2 Clarification — reverse rendezvous
The member pauses mid-turn to ask, the lead answers, and the member resumes **the same turn** with
its context intact.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant P as Primary
participant P as "Lead"
participant B as fleetd
participant W as Worker
participant W as "Member"
P->>B: fleet_send("do X", target=w) — blocks
B-->>W: "do X" (injected)
W->>B: fleet_ask("which config?") — worker blocks
B-->>P: { outcome:"question", text:"which config?", turn_id }
P->>B: fleet_send("config.yaml", target=w, turn_id) — blocks again
B-->>W: resolve fleet_ask → { answer:"config.yaml" }
W->>W: resumes same turn
W->>B: fleet_reply("done")
B-->>P: { outcome:"reply", text:"done" }
P->>B: "fleet_send{sessionId, content} — blocks"
B-->>W: "content injected"
W->>B: "fleet_ask{question} — member blocks"
B-->>P: "{ outcome: question, turnId }"
P->>B: "fleet_send{turnId, content} — answers THIS turn"
B-->>W: "fleet_ask returns the answer"
W->>W: "resumes the same turn"
W->>B: "fleet_reply{content}"
B-->>P: "{ outcome: reply }"
```
### 6.3 Detached delegation — pane injection
**Answer with `turnId`, never `sessionId`.** A `sessionId` send starts a new turn; it does not
resolve the waiting `fleet_ask`.
The primary does not block; the reply arrives later in its idle pane.
**The window is about 55 seconds and no nudge extends it.** So never brief a member to "ask me":
decide before delegating, or give the member an explicit default to fall back on.
### 1.3 Detached delegation — the lead does not block
The lead gets a ticket immediately and collects the answer later. This is the flow for any real
task, because of the ~60s cap in §1.1.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant P as Primary
participant P as "Lead"
participant B as fleetd
participant W as Worker
participant W as "Member"
P->>B: fleet_send("do X", target=w, block=false)
B-->>P: { outcome:"dispatched", dispatch_id }
P->>P: continues its own work
W->>B: fleet_reply("result")
Note over B: no waiter → detached path
B->>B: Injector.enqueue(primary_pane, "result")
B-->>P: injected into idle pane (status-gated)
P->>B: "fleet_send{sessionId, content, wait:false}"
B-->>P: "accepted — ticket"
P->>P: "continues its own work"
W->>B: "fleet_reply{content}"
Note over B: "no waiter is blocked — the reply is held"
B->>B: "nudge the lead's own pane (status-gated)"
P->>B: "fleet_poll{ticket}"
B-->>P: "the member's report"
P->>B: "fleet_ack{target, msgId}"
```
### 6.4 Uncooperative worker — turn-done fallback
A terminal ticket nudges the lead's pane by itself, so a detached task does not need watching. The
nudge needs an injectable lead pane and is capped, so it is a convenience rather than a guarantee.
A worker that never calls `fleet_reply` still returns a result: `fleetd` reads its terminal
tail when the turn completes.
### 1.4 The member never replies — turn-done fallback
A member that ends its turn without `fleet_reply` still produces something: `fleetd` reads its
pane tail. This is a **fallback, not a channel** — it is lossy in three separate ways, and every
one of them has produced a wrong answer in practice.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant P as Primary
participant P as "Lead"
participant B as fleetd
participant W as Worker
participant W as "Member"
P->>B: fleet_send("do X", target=w) — blocks
B-->>W: "do X" (injected)
W->>W: works, never calls fleet_reply
B->>B: StatusPoller sees agent_status → idle/done
B->>B: AgentControl.read(w, "recent")
B-->>P: { outcome:"turn_done", text:<terminal tail> }
P->>B: "fleet_send — blocks or detaches"
B-->>W: "content injected"
W->>W: "works, never calls fleet_reply"
B->>B: "StatusPoller sees the turn end"
B->>B: "read the pane tail"
B->>B: "classify: exhausted? echoed brief? real report?"
B-->>P: "{ outcome: turn_done } or a named failure"
```
The three ways it goes wrong, and what each looks like now:
| What happened | What the lead used to get | What it gets today |
|---|---|---|
| The report is longer than the scrape window | The **end** silently cut off | Still clipped, but marked partial |
| The member never started — spent credential | The lead's **own brief** echoed back as a report | A named failure: backend exhausted |
| The member is simply slow | A tail of work in progress | Unchanged — read it as a hint, not a result |
The echoed-brief case is the one to remember: it reads as a long, on-topic report with nothing in
it from the member. It is suppressed now, but the general rule stands — **check the member's
worktree with `git log` before believing a report you did not watch arrive.**
---
## 7. Status gating
## 2. Status gating
Delivery only happens in a safe window. This is the state machine the `Injector` already
enforces via `AgentStatus.injectable()`; MCP `fleet_send` is simply its producer.
Delivery only happens in a safe window. `fleet_send` is a producer for the `Injector`, which
already enforces this through `AgentStatus.injectable()`.
```mermaid
stateDiagram-v2
[*] --> IDLE
IDLE --> WORKING: message delivered / picks up
WORKING --> IDLE: turn done
WORKING --> BLOCKED: awaits input
BLOCKED --> WORKING: input delivered
IDLE --> UNKNOWN: detection glitch
BLOCKED --> UNKNOWN: detection glitch
UNKNOWN --> IDLE: re-detected
IDLE --> WORKING: "message delivered, picked up"
WORKING --> IDLE: "turn done"
WORKING --> BLOCKED: "awaits input"
BLOCKED --> WORKING: "input delivered"
IDLE --> UNKNOWN: "detection glitch"
BLOCKED --> UNKNOWN: "detection glitch"
UNKNOWN --> IDLE: "re-detected"
note right of IDLE
injectable — deliver head of FIFO
@@ -321,69 +172,17 @@ stateDiagram-v2
end note
```
At most one message is delivered per turn: after a send the `Injector` waits for a `WORKING`
pickup before delivering the next, with a `PICKUP_GRACE_POLLS` fallback for turns faster than
the poll interval. A herdr `events.subscribe` stream can later replace the sampling without
touching this state machine.
**At most one message per turn.** After a send, the `Injector` waits for a `WORKING` pickup before
delivering the next, with a grace-poll fallback for turns that finish faster than the poll
interval.
---
Two consequences a lead feels directly:
## 8. Error model
- **A second send to a busy member never lands.** It reports as queued and times out. The member
is fine; the message simply waits, and then restarts the member when it next goes idle.
- **A spawned member is not deliverable until it has mounted the MCP.** Until then a send waits on
that gate for about 60 seconds and then fails without ever reaching the pane.
| Condition | `fleet_send` result | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Worker replies | `{ outcome:"reply" }` | normal |
| Worker asks | `{ outcome:"question", turn_id }` | answer with `fleet_send(turn_id)` |
| Turn ends, no reply | `{ outcome:"turn_done" }` | terminal tail as text |
| Deadline elapsed | `{ outcome:"timeout" }` | message may still be queued/delivered |
| Worker vanished | error `worker_gone` | `Injector.drop` fails the queued future |
| Guard breach on spawn | error `subscription_boundary` | REST `403` parity |
| Delivery failed at herdr | error, message dropped | poisoned message not left blocking the FIFO |
`fleet_reply` from a worker with no open waiter is **not** an error — it falls through to
detached pane injection (§6.3).
---
## 9. Mapping to existing code
The MCP face is a thin adapter layer; nearly every capability already exists behind the REST
seam. Only the **rendezvous registry** and the **caller-identity resolver** are new.
| MCP tool | Existing collaborator | New work |
|---|---|---|
| `fleet_send` | `Injector.enqueue`, `AgentControl.send` | waiter registry, timeout, outcome mux (CB-104) |
| `fleet_reply` / `fleet_ask` | `Injector` (pane injection) | reverse rendezvous, identity resolver |
| `fleet_status` | `AgentControl.status`, `Injector.activeTargets` | pending-drain projection |
| `fleet_spawn` / `list` / `stop` | `WorkerService.{spawn,list,stop}` | MCP adapter only |
| `fleet_read` | `AgentControl.read` | MCP adapter only |
Because the REST routes in `FleetApp` already exercise the collaborators, MCP tools are
validated by **parity** against those routes, not by re-testing behavior.
---
## 10. Open decisions
1. **`fleet_ask` direction.** This page defines it as *worker-asks-primary* (a genuine reverse
channel, matching the "inject the primary's pane" language). The alternative — a synonym for
a blocking primary→worker send — is weaker and produces different plumbing. **Recommend
worker-asks-primary.**
2. **Detached delivery shape.** A `block:false` param on `fleet_send` (keeps the catalog
small) vs. a separate `fleet_dispatch` tool. **Recommend the param.**
3. **Auto-spawn on send.** `fleet_send` provisions a worker per profile when none exists
(simplest primary UX) vs. requiring an explicit `fleet_spawn` first. **Recommend
auto-spawn, defaulting on.**
4. **Transport & SDK.** Streamable-HTTP/SSE co-located with the REST bind (recommended) vs.
stdio. Requires choosing a Java MCP server SDK and adding it to the pom.
---
## 11. Implementation staging
- **CB-104** — blocking `fleet_send` + rendezvous registry + caller-identity resolver
(the producer that finally drives the inert `StatusPoller`).
- **CB-1xx** — `fleet_reply` / `fleet_ask` reverse rendezvous + detached pane injection.
- **CB-1xx** — lifecycle + observability adapters (`fleet_spawn/list/stop/status/read`).
- **CB-1xx** — transport wiring + `claude mcp add` docs; parity tests vs. REST.
- **Later** — `fleet_cancel`; swap `StatusPoller` for herdr `events.subscribe`.
`UNKNOWN` is deliberately neither injectable nor a pickup. A pane whose status cannot be read is
not a pane that is safe to write to — see fleetd #176 for what happens when a gate treats an
unreadable pane as a ready one.
@@ -92,9 +92,15 @@ import java.util.regex.PatternSyntaxException;
* fleetd's own process, so fleetd's own {@code $SHELL} says nothing about what
* that pane runs. There is no channel to ask herdr for another user's shell, so
* this must be told, never guessed. {@code null}/blank (or a value not ending
* in {@code zsh}) is treated the same as "not zsh": the {@code
* memberCredentials.policy: allow-list} ZDOTDIR scrub is skipped in favour of
* the CB-596 sentinel overlay — a degraded control, never a refusal to spawn.
* in {@code zsh}) is treated the same as "not zsh". fleetd #155: what that means
* now depends on {@code memberCredentials.policy}. Under {@code deny-by-default}
* it stays a degraded control, never a refusal to spawn — the pane-creation
* overlay is unaffected by shell type, so the spawn proceeds with a WARN naming
* the shell. Under {@code allow-list} the spawn is REFUSED instead: that policy's
* whole point is a control a sourced file cannot undo, so silently falling back
* to the weaker overlay would be the same "control silently does nothing" defect
* #155 exists to remove — configure this field (or move the account to zsh, or
* switch policy back to {@code deny-by-default}) to unblock the spawn.
* When {@code memberHerdrSocket} is NOT configured this field is never
* consulted at all; fleetd keeps reading its own {@code $SHELL}, exactly as
* before this field existed.
@@ -1253,7 +1253,11 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
+ "worktree:<ticket-slug> to provision an isolated git worktree. Pass resumeSessionId "
+ "to relaunch onto a prior conversation instead of starting cold — this requires an "
+ "explicit profile whose backend supports it (fleet_list shows agentSessionId for "
+ "resumable members), and is refused otherwise rather than silently starting fresh. "
+ "resumable members; it is absent for a member fleetd cannot reliably re-identify, "
+ "e.g. an opencode member spawned without a worktree), and is refused otherwise "
+ "rather than silently starting fresh. For an opencode profile, resumeSessionId "
+ "itself also requires worktree:true/<slug> on THIS spawn — without one fleetd can "
+ "never re-verify which conversation it actually resumed (fleetd #249). "
+ "sessionName gives the member a display name in its own UI when the backend supports "
+ "one. Returns the member's sessionId (use with fleet_send) and paneId (use with "
+ "fleet_stop).",
@@ -1264,7 +1268,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
"worktree", Map.of("type", "string", "description", "'true' or a ticket slug — requests an isolated git worktree"),
"ticket", stringProp("Ticket slug when worktree:true"),
"sessionName", stringProp("Logical display name for the member's own session, when its backend supports one"),
"resumeSessionId", stringProp("A prior member's agentSessionId (from fleet_list) to resume — requires an explicit profile that supports it")),
"resumeSessionId", stringProp("A prior member's agentSessionId (from fleet_list) to resume — requires an explicit profile that supports it, and (for opencode) a worktree on this spawn too")),
List.of()));
}
@@ -1285,9 +1289,14 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
+ "discover a peer lead without being told its address. 'members' are the "
+ "sessions delegated to — each with sessionId, paneId, role (architect/dev/"
+ "reviewer), profile (the backend it runs on), state, optional "
+ "worktree/branch/owner/agentSessionId (the id to pass as fleet_spawn's "
+ "resumeSessionId to relaunch onto that same conversation, when the backend "
+ "supports it), and live herdr status. An empty 'members' "
+ "worktree/branch/owner/agentSessionId, and live herdr status. agentSessionId, "
+ "when present, is the id to pass as fleet_spawn's resumeSessionId to relaunch "
+ "onto that same conversation. It is ABSENT — not a guess — for a member fleetd "
+ "cannot reliably re-identify: some backends (e.g. opencode) resolve it from the "
+ "member's working directory, which only uniquely identifies a member when it "
+ "was spawned into its own fleetd-provisioned worktree (worktree:true/<slug>); a "
+ "member spawned without one shares its directory with others and never reports "
+ "an id, however long it runs (fleetd #249). An empty 'members' "
+ "means no members are spawned; it says nothing about peers. When capacity "
+ "facts are configured, a 'capacity' row per profile also reports free: 0 for "
+ "a quarantined profile's credential (see fleet_profiles), whatever its "
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
* <p><b>Additive, not a rewrite.</b> {@code .claude.json} is large (tens of KB, dozens of
* projects) and Claude Code itself rewrites it while running, so this reads the file as a JSON
* tree (missing or unreadable → treated as an empty object) and changes only
* {@code projects.<cwd>.hasTrustDialogAccepted} / {@code .hasCompletedProjectOnboarding} —
* {@code projects.<cwd>.hasTrustDialogAccepted} (that key alone — see fleetd #247) —
* every other top-level key and every other project entry is written back untouched. Only the
* one project entry for {@code cwd} is replaced/created; an existing entry for a DIFFERENT cwd
* (or the operator's own project history) is never touched.
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
* peer that starts without the seed still starts; it just may hit the dialog fleetd #149
* describes.
*
* <p><b>Gated to a provisioned worktree</b> ({@link #isProvisionedWorktree}) — see that
* <p><b>Gated to a provisioned worktree</b> ({@link HerdrPeerLauncher#isProvisionedWorktree}) — see that
* method's javadoc for the incident that made this gate mandatory, not optional: this must
* never run against a real checkout or an un-configured fallback cwd, only the exact
* always-fresh-directory population fleetd #149 describes.
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
* sibling-temp-file + {@code ATOMIC_MOVE}, never a truncate-in-place) so a crash mid-write or a
* concurrent reader never observes a half-written file, and through {@link #TRUST_JSON_LOCK} so
* two concurrent spawns' entries both survive instead of the second write silently discarding
* the first. Both exist because of a real incident: see {@link #isProvisionedWorktree}'s javadoc
* the first. Both exist because of a real incident: see {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#isProvisionedWorktree}'s javadoc
* and {@link #writeAtomically}'s javadoc.
*
* @param configDir the profile's {@code CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR} ({@code cfg.configDir()}), or
@@ -558,8 +558,18 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
if (!(projectNode instanceof ObjectNode)) {
projects.set(cwd, project);
}
// fleetd #247: ONLY hasTrustDialogAccepted. We used to write
// hasCompletedProjectOnboarding beside it; do not put it back. Measured on
// 2026-09-03, minutes after a live spawn seeded this file: 28 of 28 project
// entries carried hasTrustDialogAccepted and 0 of 28 carried the onboarding key
// — including the 27 entries Claude Code wrote for itself. Claude Code
// normalises the whole file when it saves and drops that key every time, so
// writing it achieved nothing except making the next reader think it mattered.
// The member reached idle with the trust flag alone, which is the only outcome
// this seed exists for. If a future Claude Code needs the second flag the
// symptom returns as the trust dialog fleetd #149 describes — re-measure then,
// do not restore it on a guess.
project.put("hasTrustDialogAccepted", true);
project.put("hasCompletedProjectOnboarding", true);
writeAtomically(target, TRUST_JSON.writerWithDefaultPrettyPrinter().writeValueAsString(root));
} catch (Exception e) {
log.debug("cannot seed workspace-trust entry for cwd '{}' into '{}'", cwd, target, e);
@@ -578,7 +588,7 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
* <p><b>fleetd #149 incident.</b> The original implementation used
* {@code Files.writeString(target, content)} directly, which truncates {@code target} in place
* before writing the replacement bytes. Combined with an ungated {@code cwd} (see
* {@link #isProvisionedWorktree}'s javadoc), a mutation-testing run hit that truncation window
* {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#isProvisionedWorktree}'s javadoc), a mutation-testing run hit that truncation window
* against the operator's real {@code ~/.claude.json} and left it at 178 bytes. The gate closes
* <em>which file</em> this can ever target; this closes <em>how</em> the target is written, so
* that even a legitimate write against a real, live, concurrently-read {@code .claude.json}
@@ -628,32 +638,6 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
}
}
/**
* Whether {@code cwd} is a fleetd-provisioned git worktree — signalled the same way
* {@link #writeIdeOverlay} already gates on: a {@code .git} that is a <strong>regular
* file</strong> holding a {@code gitdir:} pointer, as opposed to a real checkout's {@code .git}
* <strong>directory</strong>. {@code null}/blank never qualifies.
*
* <p>Shared by every write that must land only in a worktree fleetd itself created for a
* member — never in a real checkout, an arbitrary configured directory, or (see the incident
* below) the daemon's own fallback cwd.
*
* <p><b>fleetd #149 incident.</b> {@link #seedTrustDialog} originally ran unconditionally on
* any non-blank {@code cwd}. Most of this launcher's OWN tests spawn a profile with no
* {@code cwd} configured, so the base class's {@code resolveCwd} falls through to the real
* {@code user.dir} — and with no {@code configDir} either (also the common case in this
* file's fixtures), the seed's target falls through the same way to the real
* {@code ~/.claude.json}. Running this repo's own test suite corrupted the operator's actual
* config file (it shrank from ~72 KB to a single seeded entry) the first time a mutation
* happened to make the write non-additive. Gating both cwd-targeted writes on "this is a
* worktree fleetd provisioned" — exactly the population fleetd #149 describes
* ({@code worktree: true} always lands in a brand-new directory) — makes that class of write
* impossible against a real checkout or an untouched fallback cwd, in production or in tests.
*/
private static boolean isProvisionedWorktree(String cwd) {
return cwd != null && !cwd.isBlank() && Files.isRegularFile(Path.of(cwd, ".git"));
}
/** {@code s}, or {@code null} when {@code s} is null/blank — the charter-presence test used above. */
private static String nonBlank(String s) {
return (s == null || s.isBlank()) ? null : s;
@@ -184,7 +184,11 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
*/
private final ConcurrentMap<String, Path> zdotdirByPane = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/** Guards {@link #warnNonZsh} to one WARN per launcher instance, not one per spawn. */
/**
* Guards {@link #warnNonZsh} to one WARN per launcher instance, not one per spawn. fleetd #155:
* only the {@code policy: deny-by-default} path still warns on a non-zsh shell — the {@code
* policy: allow-list} path refuses the spawn instead (see {@link #applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy}).
*/
private final AtomicBoolean nonZshShellWarned = new AtomicBoolean();
/** Live config provides URI environment names that must never enter member panes. */
private final Supplier<FleetConfig> config;
@@ -358,6 +362,42 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
return Files.isRegularFile(candidate) ? candidate : null;
}
/**
* Whether {@code cwd} is a fleetd-provisioned git worktree — signalled the same way
* {@code ClaudeCodeLauncher#writeIdeOverlay} already gates on: a {@code .git} that is a
* <strong>regular file</strong> holding a {@code gitdir:} pointer, as opposed to a real
* checkout's {@code .git} <strong>directory</strong>. {@code null}/blank never qualifies.
*
* <p>Shared by every write (and, since fleetd #249, every identity read) that must land only
* in a worktree fleetd itself created for a member — never in a real checkout, an arbitrary
* configured directory, or (see the incident below) the daemon's own fallback cwd. Package-
* private (not {@code protected}) on purpose: {@link ClaudeCodeLauncher} and
* {@link OpenCodeLauncher} both call it, and same-package visibility is enough — no subclass
* outside this package needs it.
*
* <p><b>fleetd #149 incident.</b> {@code ClaudeCodeLauncher#seedTrustDialog} originally ran
* unconditionally on any non-blank {@code cwd}. Most of that launcher's OWN tests spawn a
* profile with no {@code cwd} configured, so the base class's {@code resolveCwd} falls
* through to the real {@code user.dir} — and with no {@code configDir} either (also the
* common case in that file's fixtures), the seed's target falls through the same way to the
* real {@code ~/.claude.json}. Running this repo's own test suite corrupted the operator's
* actual config file (it shrank from ~72 KB to a single seeded entry) the first time a
* mutation happened to make the write non-additive. Gating both cwd-targeted writes on "this
* is a worktree fleetd provisioned" — exactly the population fleetd #149 describes
* ({@code worktree: true} always lands in a brand-new directory) — makes that class of write
* impossible against a real checkout or an untouched fallback cwd, in production or in tests.
*
* <p><b>fleetd #249.</b> The same reasoning extends to a READ: {@code
* OpenCodeSessionDiscovery#sessionIdForDirectory} keys on {@code directory}, a heuristic that
* is only reliable when the directory is unique to this member — i.e., exactly the population
* this gate identifies. {@link OpenCodeLauncher} uses it to withhold {@code agentSessionId()}
* (report absence rather than a guess) and to refuse a {@code resumeSessionId} spawn that
* cannot be resolved reliably going forward.
*/
static boolean isProvisionedWorktree(String cwd) {
return cwd != null && !cwd.isBlank() && Files.isRegularFile(Path.of(cwd, ".git"));
}
// --- profile surface -----------------------------------------------------------------------
/** The configured peer profile names (what {@code spawn(profile)} accepts). */
@@ -1219,6 +1259,11 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
if (!creds.isAllowList()) {
overlayBlockedCredentials(workerEnv, creds);
logCredentialGap(creds, null);
// fleetd #155: this overlay itself does not depend on the shell (it lands in the
// pane-creation env map before any shell runs), so the spawn is never refused here —
// only policy=allow-list's ZDOTDIR scrub needs a login shell to run at all. Still worth
// telling the operator: the stronger post-shell control is unavailable on this shell.
warnNonZsh(memberLoginShell());
}
}
@@ -1271,10 +1316,16 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
* dev.ltms.fleet.session.Worktrees#shareWithGroup} already uses, reused rather than
* inventing a second group key. Either one missing means the scrub cannot be guaranteed
* reachable by the member, which is the same "cannot guarantee the scrub runs" case as a
* non-zsh shell, so it gets the identical fallback.</li>
* non-zsh shell — that one still gets the fallback (see fleetd #155's javadoc note below
* on why a missing worktreeRoot/worktreeGroup is a different defect, out of that ticket's
* scope).</li>
* </ul>
* In every branch: never refuse to spawn. A degraded credential control must not become an
* outage for an opt-in feature.
* fleetd #155: the one exception to "never refuse to spawn" is a non-zsh login shell, right
* below. The operator asked for {@code policy: allow-list} specifically — its whole point is a
* control a sourced file cannot undo — so silently degrading to the weaker overlay is exactly
* the "silently does nothing" failure this ticket exists to remove. Every other branch in this
* method (worktreeRoot/worktreeGroup missing) keeps the old "degrade, never refuse" behaviour;
* that gap is real but is fleetd #213's scope, not this one.
*/
private Path applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy(FleetConfig.Profile cfg, Launch launch) {
FleetConfig.MemberCredentials creds = memberCredentials == null ? null : memberCredentials.get();
@@ -1288,20 +1339,21 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
// must not even be called on this path, only the explicit memberLoginShell: config can
// answer it. With memberHerdrSocket absent, nothing here changes: fleetd's own $SHELL is
// still the input, exactly as before this fix.
String loginShell = memberHerdrSocket ? configuredMemberLoginShell() : resolveEnv("SHELL");
String loginShell = memberLoginShell();
boolean zsh = isZshShell(loginShell);
if (!zsh) {
// A non-zsh login shell ignores ZDOTDIR entirely: NO scrub would run, so pretending
// otherwise would be worse than saying so. Warn loudly and fall back to the CB-596
// sentinel overlay over the enumerated known: names — weaker (a sourced file can undo
// it), but strictly better than nothing. Deliberately no "allowed N of M" line here: the
// scrub this count describes does not run on this path, so printing it would tell an
// operator that a fraction of names were blocked when the real number blocked is zero.
// logCredentialGap's WARN (below) is the only signal for this path.
warnNonZsh(loginShell);
overlayBlockedCredentials(launch.env(), creds);
logCredentialGap(creds, null);
return null;
// fleetd #155: a non-zsh login shell ignores ZDOTDIR entirely — NO scrub would run. The
// operator explicitly asked for policy=allow-list's blocking control, so degrading to
// the weaker CB-596 overlay and spawning anyway would be the same "control silently does
// nothing" defect this ticket exists to close. Refuse instead — the caller (FleetMcp.spawn)
// catches IllegalArgumentException and surfaces the message to the operator.
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"memberCredentials policy=allow-list requires the member's login shell to be "
+ "zsh, so the ZDOTDIR scrub can run after it — refusing to spawn under "
+ "login shell '" + (loginShell == null ? "<unset>" : loginShell)
+ "'. Configure memberLoginShell: as a zsh path (only read when "
+ "memberHerdrSocket is set), move the member's OS account onto zsh, or "
+ "set memberCredentials.policy: deny-by-default instead.");
}
Path parentDir;
String group = null;
@@ -1356,6 +1408,20 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
return cfg == null ? null : cfg.memberLoginShell();
}
/**
* fleetd #155: the member pane's login shell, using the same {@code memberHerdrSocket} routing
* {@link #applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy} already used — fleetd's own {@code $SHELL} decides it
* when {@code memberHerdrSocket} is absent (today's only mode); the configured {@code
* memberLoginShell:} decides it otherwise, since fleetd's own {@code $SHELL} names a different
* user's shell once member panes run under a different OS user. Shared by both {@link
* #applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy} (allow-list: refuses on non-zsh) and {@link
* #applyMemberCredentialPolicy} (deny-by-default: warns on non-zsh) so the two policies agree on
* what "the member's shell" means.
*/
private String memberLoginShell() {
return memberHerdrSocketConfigured() ? configuredMemberLoginShell() : resolveEnv("SHELL");
}
/**
* fleetd #213: {@code worktreeRoot}, as the ZDOTDIR scrub's parent directory under {@code
* memberHerdrSocket}, or {@code null} when unconfigured — the same "cannot guarantee the scrub
@@ -1440,15 +1506,23 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
private static final String SSH_AUTH_SOCK = MemberEnvAllowList.SSH_AUTH_SOCK;
/**
* CB-633: a non-zsh login shell means the allow-list control CANNOT run — say so once per
* launcher instance, naming the shell, instead of failing silently.
* fleetd #155: called ONLY from the {@code policy: deny-by-default} branch of {@link
* #applyMemberCredentialPolicy} — under {@code policy: allow-list}, a non-zsh shell now REFUSES
* the spawn instead (see {@link #applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy}), since that policy's whole
* point is a control a sourced file cannot undo. deny-by-default's own overlay does not depend
* on the shell (it lands in the pane-creation env map before any shell runs), so this is a
* heads-up, not a defect report: say once per launcher instance, naming the shell, that the
* stronger allow-list control is unavailable here — never silently.
*/
private void warnNonZsh(String shell) {
if (isZshShell(shell)) {
return;
}
if (nonZshShellWarned.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
log.warn("memberCredentials policy=allow-list: member login shell '{}' is NOT zsh — "
+ "ZDOTDIR scrubbing cannot run, so members' inherited environment is "
+ "UNPROTECTED beyond the enumerated known: fallback. Move herdr onto a "
+ "zsh account or switch policy back to deny-by-default.",
log.warn("memberCredentials policy=deny-by-default: member login shell '{}' is NOT zsh — "
+ "the pane-creation credential overlay still applies here (it does not "
+ "depend on the shell), but policy=allow-list's stronger post-shell "
+ "ZDOTDIR scrub is unavailable on this shell.",
shell == null ? "<unset>" : shell);
}
}
@@ -672,13 +672,29 @@ public final class OpenCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
/** Add lazy on-disk session discovery to the base handle. */
@Override
public PeerHandle spawn(SpawnRequest req) {
String cwd = effectiveCwd(req);
// fleetd #249: refuse rather than silently resume into unverifiable territory. opencode's
// `-s <id>` flag itself resumes precisely — the resolved id is what fails, not the resume —
// but resolvedSessionId() below can never confirm (or later re-report) this handle's own
// identity without a fleetd-provisioned worktree (isProvisionedWorktree(cwd)), because the
// directory is shared and sessionIdForDirectory's "most recently updated row" heuristic can
// pick a sibling's session. Refusing here, before anything spawns, beats letting the member
// start and only then discovering fleetd can never again verify who it actually is.
if (req.resumeSessionId() != null && !req.resumeSessionId().isBlank()
&& !isProvisionedWorktree(cwd)) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("resumeSessionId requires a fleetd-provisioned "
+ "worktree for an opencode profile — without one, this member's cwd is shared "
+ "with other sessions, so fleetd can never reliably confirm (now or later) which "
+ "conversation it is actually running (fleetd #249). Pass fleet_spawn{worktree:"
+ "<ticket-slug>} to resume this member.");
}
PeerHandle inner = super.spawn(req);
// fleetd #175: the same profile config buildLaunch resolved for this spawn (requireProfile
// is deterministic on req.profileName(), so re-resolving here costs a map lookup, not a
// second decision) — SessionAwareHandle needs cfg.model() to know what THIS session should
// be running.
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = requireProfile(req.profileName());
return new SessionAwareHandle(inner, discovery, effectiveCwd(req), cfg,
return new SessionAwareHandle(inner, discovery, cwd, cfg,
this::memberHerdrSocketConfigured, discoveryUnavailableWarned, exhaustionSink);
}
@@ -718,6 +734,17 @@ public final class OpenCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
* the directory right now."
*/
private final AtomicReference<String> resolvedSessionId = new AtomicReference<>();
/**
* fleetd #249: whether {@link #cwd} is a fleetd-provisioned git worktree
* ({@link HerdrPeerLauncher#isProvisionedWorktree}), computed once at spawn time since
* {@code cwd} never changes for this handle. When {@code false} the directory is shared
* with other sessions (the default no-worktree spawn inherits the lead's own cwd), so
* {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery#sessionIdForDirectory}'s "most recently updated row for
* this directory" heuristic can and does pick another session's row — see that class's
* javadoc. {@link #agentSessionId()} refuses to guess in that case: it reports absent
* rather than a possibly-foreign id.
*/
private final boolean worktreeProvisioned;
SessionAwareHandle(PeerHandle delegate, OpenCodeSessionDiscovery discovery, String cwd,
FleetConfig.Profile cfg,
@@ -731,6 +758,7 @@ public final class OpenCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
this.discoveryUnavailable = discoveryUnavailable;
this.discoveryUnavailableWarned = discoveryUnavailableWarned;
this.exhaustionSink = exhaustionSink;
this.worktreeProvisioned = isProvisionedWorktree(cwd);
}
@Override
@@ -760,6 +788,9 @@ public final class OpenCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
// built from (see OpenCodeLauncher#defaultDiscoveryRoot's javadoc for the full
// reasoning). Scanning fleetd's own $HOME under that config would only ever find "no
// row" and read as "resume unsupported" — declare it unavailable instead, once, loudly.
// Checked before the fleetd #249 worktree gate below: this OS-user mismatch makes
// discovery unusable regardless of whether cwd happens to be a provisioned worktree, so
// it earns the one-time WARN either way.
if (discoveryUnavailable.getAsBoolean()) {
if (discoveryUnavailableWarned.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
log.warn("opencode session discovery unavailable: memberHerdrSocket is "
@@ -771,6 +802,16 @@ public final class OpenCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
}
return null;
}
// fleetd #249: cwd is shared with other sessions unless fleetd itself provisioned this
// worktree, and sessionIdForDirectory's directory-keyed heuristic cannot tell this
// member's row apart from a sibling's in that case (measured: a three-day-old row from
// a different profile). Refuse to guess — absent is the honest answer, and it is what
// this codebase already returns elsewhere for absent evidence (fleetd #175's UNKNOWN).
// No WARN here: unlike discoveryUnavailable above, this is the ordinary, expected shape
// of the large majority of spawns (no worktree requested), not a configuration gap.
if (!worktreeProvisioned) {
return null;
}
// fleetd #234: once resolved, stay resolved. Re-deriving from `directory` on every call
// would let this handle's identity drift to a sibling session that later shares the
// same cwd and writes a newer row — see resolvedSessionId's javadoc.
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.mcp;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* fleetd #114 (CB-609): the guard that lets {@code docs/MCP-Contract.md} name a tool at all.
*
* <p>That page was written in July 2026, before any MCP code existed, and then did not follow the
* code. By August it named two tools that had never been built, omitted five that shipped, had the
* wrong name for nearly every parameter, and still described a caller-identity rule that was a
* privilege bug by then. Nothing failed, because nothing checked it — and {@code CLAUDE.md} sends
* every session in the fleet to that page.
*
* <p>The fix was to delete the tool catalogue rather than correct it: a hand-maintained second copy
* of the tool surface is the defect, not the particular errors it had accumulated. What survives is
* the flows, which are shapes rather than names. But the flows still have to say {@code fleet_send}
* somewhere to be readable, and that is exactly the sentence that rots. This test is what makes it
* safe to write.
*
* <p><b>It checks source text, not behaviour.</b> It reads the Markdown and reads {@link FleetMcp}'s
* source, and it only catches a name in the doc that the server does not register. It cannot catch a
* flow that describes the wrong order, or a parameter name in prose — those are not name-shaped. The
* doc's own header carries that caveat for its readers.
*/
class McpContractDocTest {
/** Tests run with the module directory as cwd, so the repo-root doc is one level up. */
private static final Path DOC = Path.of("../docs/MCP-Contract.md");
private static final Path MCP_SOURCE = Path.of("src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/mcp/FleetMcp.java");
private static Set<String> matches(Path file, String regex) throws Exception {
Matcher m = Pattern.compile(regex).matcher(Files.readString(file));
Set<String> found = new LinkedHashSet<>();
while (m.find()) {
found.add(m.group(1));
}
return found;
}
/** Every {@code fleet_*} the doc mentions, in prose or in a diagram. */
private static Set<String> toolsNamedInTheDoc() throws Exception {
return matches(DOC, "(fleet_[a-z_]+)");
}
/** Every tool {@link FleetMcp} actually registers, read from its {@code tool("…")} calls. */
private static Set<String> toolsTheServerRegisters() throws Exception {
return matches(MCP_SOURCE, "tool\\(\"(fleet_[a-z_]+)\"");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("[SOURCE TEXT] every fleet_* tool named in MCP-Contract.md is one the server registers")
void theDocNamesNoToolThatDoesNotExist() throws Exception {
Set<String> registered = toolsTheServerRegisters();
Set<String> named = toolsNamedInTheDoc();
Set<String> unknown = new LinkedHashSet<>(named);
unknown.removeAll(registered);
assertTrue(unknown.isEmpty(),
"docs/MCP-Contract.md names " + unknown + ", which FleetMcp does not register. "
+ "Checked " + named.size() + " name(s) in the doc against " + registered.size()
+ " registered tool(s): " + registered + ". This is the fleetd #114 defect "
+ "recurring — the doc named fleet_read and fleet_cancel for weeks after the "
+ "code shipped without them. Either fix the name or drop it from the page; do "
+ "NOT weaken this test.");
}
/**
* The denominator guard. The check above passes trivially if the doc stops naming any tool at
* all — an empty set is a subset of everything. A checker that can silently check nothing is the
* fleetd #113 shape, so this pins that the doc really is still describing the flows, and that
* the registration scrape really did find the server's tools.
*/
@Test
@DisplayName("[SOURCE TEXT] the doc/server name check is not vacuous — both sides found names")
void theCheckActuallyHasSomethingToCheck() throws Exception {
Set<String> registered = toolsTheServerRegisters();
Set<String> named = toolsNamedInTheDoc();
assertTrue(registered.size() >= 10,
"scraped only " + registered.size() + " tool registrations from FleetMcp (" + registered
+ "); the server registers eleven, so the tool(\"…\") scrape has stopped matching "
+ "and the check above is now vacuous");
assertTrue(named.size() >= 4,
"docs/MCP-Contract.md names only " + named.size() + " fleet_* tool(s) (" + named + "). "
+ "The flows describe delegation, clarification, detached delivery and the "
+ "turn-done fallback, so it should name several. Too few means the page has been "
+ "gutted and this test is guarding nothing.");
}
/**
* fleetd #114's actual lesson. The catalogue was deleted on purpose; a well-meaning "let me just
* document the tools here" restores the exact second copy that drifted for a month.
*/
@Test
@DisplayName("[SOURCE TEXT] MCP-Contract.md still says it is not the tool reference")
void theDocStillDisclaimsBeingTheToolReference() throws Exception {
String doc = Files.readString(DOC);
assertTrue(doc.contains("**What this page is NOT: a tool reference.**"),
"docs/MCP-Contract.md must keep saying it is not the tool reference. That sentence is "
+ "the fix for fleetd #114: the page carried a hand-maintained tool catalogue that "
+ "drifted from the code for a month while CLAUDE.md pointed every session at it.");
assertEquals(0, countTables(doc.substring(0, doc.indexOf("## 1. Rendezvous flows"))),
"the header of docs/MCP-Contract.md must not grow a tool/parameter table — that is the "
+ "second copy fleetd #114 deleted");
}
private static int countTables(String markdown) {
return (int) markdown.lines().filter(l -> l.strip().startsWith("|")).count();
}
}
@@ -1409,14 +1409,16 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
}
/**
* CB-633 follow-up (#192): the mirror of the zsh test above. On a non-zsh login shell {@code
* ZDOTDIR} is ignored, so no scrub ever runs — the report must keep the WARN wording (a name here
* really is inherited unblocked) rather than claiming a scrub protects it. This is the trap PR
* #174 fell into the other direction: keying the wording on the shell, not on {@code
* creds.isAllowList()}, is what keeps this branch correct.
* fleetd #155 (was CB-633 follow-up (#192) "allowListPolicyOnNonZshKeepsTheWarnWording"): on a
* non-zsh login shell {@code ZDOTDIR} is ignored, so no scrub could ever run there. Before #155
* the launcher degraded to the weaker overlay and spawned anyway; that is exactly the "control
* silently does nothing" failure #155 exists to close, since {@code policy: allow-list} is the
* operator explicitly asking for a control a sourced file cannot undo. Now the spawn is REFUSED
* instead — this test asserts the refusal, naming the shell, on the real spawn path ({@link
* ClaudeCodeLauncher#spawn}), not merely on the launcher method that computes it.
*/
@Test
void allowListPolicyOnNonZshKeepsTheWarnWording() {
void allowListPolicyOnNonZshRefusesTheSpawn() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
@@ -1430,27 +1432,12 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
0, System::currentTimeMillis, () -> {}, null, () -> creds,
() -> Set.of("AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN", "A_BRAND_NEW_SECRET_TOKEN"));
Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(HerdrPeerLauncher.class);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.start();
logger.addAppender(appender);
try {
svc.spawn();
} finally {
logger.detachAppender(appender);
}
IllegalArgumentException e = assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, svc::spawn,
"policy=allow-list on a non-zsh shell must refuse the spawn, not silently degrade "
+ "to the weaker overlay");
assertTrue(appender.list.stream().anyMatch(e ->
e.getFormattedMessage().contains("memberCredentials gap")
&& e.getFormattedMessage().contains("UNBLOCKED")
&& e.getFormattedMessage().contains("A_BRAND_NEW_SECRET_TOKEN")),
"no scrub runs on a non-zsh shell, so the WARN wording must be kept — got: "
+ appender.list.stream().map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage).toList());
assertFalse(appender.list.stream().anyMatch(e ->
e.getFormattedMessage().contains("memberCredentials gap")
&& e.getFormattedMessage().toLowerCase(java.util.Locale.ROOT).contains("scrub")),
"nothing is scrubbed on this path, so the report must not claim otherwise — got: "
+ appender.list.stream().map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage).toList());
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("allow-list") && e.getMessage().contains("/bin/bash"),
"the refusal must name the policy and the actual shell, got: " + e.getMessage());
}
/**
@@ -2159,8 +2146,7 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
}
JsonNode root = new ObjectMapper().readTree(claudeJson.toFile());
JsonNode project = root.path("projects").path(worktree.toString());
seededBeforeStart.set(project.path("hasTrustDialogAccepted").asBoolean(false)
&& project.path("hasCompletedProjectOnboarding").asBoolean(false));
seededBeforeStart.set(project.path("hasTrustDialogAccepted").asBoolean(false));
} catch (IOException e) {
seededBeforeStart.set(false);
}
@@ -2178,7 +2164,7 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
}
@Test
void seedTrustDialogWritesBothTrustFlagsForTheResolvedCwd(
void seedTrustDialogWritesOnlyTheTrustFlagAndNotTheOnboardingKey(
@TempDir Path configDir, @TempDir Path worktree) throws Exception {
markAsProvisionedWorktree(worktree);
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -2192,7 +2178,13 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
JsonNode project = new ObjectMapper().readTree(claudeJson.toFile())
.path("projects").path(worktree.toString());
assertTrue(project.path("hasTrustDialogAccepted").asBoolean(false));
assertTrue(project.path("hasCompletedProjectOnboarding").asBoolean(false));
// fleetd #247: the onboarding key must NOT be written. Claude Code strips it on every
// save (measured: 0 of 28 live entries had it, including its own), so writing it only
// adds a contested key to a file two processes share. This assertion is the guard that
// stops it coming back as a plausible-looking "completeness" fix.
assertFalse(project.has("hasCompletedProjectOnboarding"),
"hasCompletedProjectOnboarding must not be written — Claude Code drops it on "
+ "every save, and the member reaches idle on hasTrustDialogAccepted alone");
}
/**
@@ -2238,7 +2230,6 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
JsonNode mine = root.path("projects").path(worktree.toString());
assertTrue(mine.path("hasTrustDialogAccepted").asBoolean(false));
assertTrue(mine.path("hasCompletedProjectOnboarding").asBoolean(false));
}
/**
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import java.util.function.Supplier;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNotNull;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assumptions.assumeTrue;
@@ -99,18 +100,26 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
}
/**
* A non-zsh shell cannot read {@code ZDOTDIR} at all. The launcher must fall back rather than
* generate a directory nothing will ever read — a directory that would look like protection.
* fleetd #155: a non-zsh shell cannot read {@code ZDOTDIR} at all, so under {@code
* policy: allow-list} — the policy the operator picked specifically for a control a sourced file
* cannot undo — the launcher must REFUSE the spawn rather than silently generate a directory
* nothing will ever read (protection theatre) or fall back to the weaker overlay (exactly the
* "control silently does nothing" defect this ticket exists to close). Real path: through {@link
* HerdrPeerLauncher#spawn}, the method the daemon actually calls.
*/
@Test
void aNonZshShellGeneratesNothingAndFallsBack() {
void aNonZshShellUnderAllowListPolicyRefusesTheSpawn() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, allowList(), "/bin/bash");
launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
IllegalArgumentException e = assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class,
() -> launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV)),
"policy=allow-list on a non-zsh shell must refuse the spawn, not silently degrade");
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("allow-list") && e.getMessage().contains("/bin/bash"),
"the refusal must name the policy and the actual shell, got: " + e.getMessage());
assertFalse(launcher.env.containsKey("ZDOTDIR"),
"bash ignores ZDOTDIR; setting it would be protection theatre");
"a refused spawn must not have generated (or wired in) a scrub directory: " + launcher.env);
}
private static Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> allowList() {
@@ -246,11 +255,14 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
* "allowed N of M" line — which describes what the scrub does — must not be printed there either.
* Before this fix the line was logged BEFORE the zsh gate, so a non-zsh host printed e.g.
* "allowed 1 of 3" while blocking nothing at all, telling an operator a control ran when it did
* not. Real path: goes through {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#spawn}, same as the sibling test above,
* with the shell fixed to bash so the fallback branch is the one exercised.
* not. fleetd #155: the spawn itself is now refused on this path (see {@code
* aNonZshShellUnderAllowListPolicyRefusesTheSpawn}) rather than falling back — this test's own
* concern still holds under the refusal: the "allowed N of M" line describes a scrub that never
* ran here, so it must still never appear. Real path: goes through {@link
* HerdrPeerLauncher#spawn}, same as the sibling test above, with the shell fixed to bash.
*/
@Test
void noAllowedCountLineIsEmittedOnTheNonZshFallbackPath() {
void noAllowedCountLineIsEmittedOnTheNonZshRefusalPath() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
Set<String> hostEnvNames = Set.of(INJECTED, "SOME_UNRELATED_NAME", "ANOTHER_UNRELATED_NAME");
WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, allowList(), "/bin/bash", () -> hostEnvNames);
@@ -262,7 +274,9 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
appender.start();
logger.addAppender(appender);
try {
launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class,
() -> launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV)),
"policy=allow-list on a non-zsh shell must refuse the spawn");
} finally {
logger.detachAppender(appender);
logger.setLevel(original);
@@ -310,13 +324,20 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
* different OS user — {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#hostEnvNames} describes fleetd's own process, not
* that user's. Neither "inherits them UNBLOCKED" nor "scrub blanks them" is evidence-backed
* there, so neither may print; the single unknown-environment WARN must, naming the config key.
*
* <p>fleetd #155: {@code memberLoginShell} is now given explicitly as zsh, so the spawn reaches
* this WARN through the (still-degrading, not refusing) missing-{@code worktreeRoot}/{@code
* worktreeGroup} fallback rather than through the zsh gate, which now refuses instead of falling
* back — see {@code aNonZshShellUnderAllowListPolicyRefusesTheSpawn}. This test's own concern
* (the unknown-environment WARN) is orthogonal to which fallback reached {@code
* logCredentialGap}, so it still holds.
*/
@Test
void gapDetectorReportsUnknownInsteadOfAConclusionWhenMemberHerdrSocketIsConfigured() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
Set<String> hostEnvNames = Set.of("FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN", "SOME_UNKNOWN_SECRET_TOKEN");
WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, allowList(), "/bin/zsh", () -> hostEnvNames,
() -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket("/tmp/other-user-herdr.sock"));
() -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket("/tmp/other-user-herdr.sock", "/bin/zsh"));
List<String> messages = spawnAndCaptureLogs(launcher);
@@ -340,8 +361,9 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
void theUnknownEnvironmentWarnFiresOnceNotOncePerSpawn() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
Set<String> hostEnvNames = Set.of("FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN", "SOME_UNKNOWN_SECRET_TOKEN");
// fleetd #155: memberLoginShell given explicitly as zsh — see the sibling test above for why.
WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, allowList(), "/bin/zsh", () -> hostEnvNames,
() -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket("/tmp/other-user-herdr.sock"));
() -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket("/tmp/other-user-herdr.sock", "/bin/zsh"));
Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(HerdrPeerLauncher.class);
Level original = logger.getLevel();
@@ -389,42 +411,44 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
}
/**
* fleetd #213 defect 1, acceptance criterion 1: {@code memberHerdrSocket} configured and {@code
* memberLoginShell} configured as non-zsh must fall back to the sentinel overlay exactly like a
* non-zsh {@code $SHELL} does today — and the "generated ZDOTDIR" INFO must not appear, since no
* scrub actually runs. The WiringLauncher's own {@code env("SHELL")} is deliberately set to
* {@code /bin/zsh} — the OPPOSITE of what {@code memberLoginShell} says — so a launcher that
* (incorrectly) fell back to fleetd's own {@code $SHELL} here would wrongly pass the gate and
* fail this test.
* fleetd #213 defect 1, acceptance criterion 1 — updated by fleetd #155: {@code
* memberHerdrSocket} configured and {@code memberLoginShell} configured as non-zsh must now
* REFUSE the spawn (not fall back to the sentinel overlay — see {@code
* aNonZshShellUnderAllowListPolicyRefusesTheSpawn}'s javadoc for why). The WiringLauncher's own
* {@code env("SHELL")} is deliberately set to {@code /bin/zsh} — the OPPOSITE of what {@code
* memberLoginShell} says — so a launcher that (incorrectly) fell back to fleetd's own {@code
* $SHELL} here would wrongly pass the gate and fail this test.
*/
@Test
void memberHerdrSocketWithNonZshMemberLoginShellFallsBackToTheOverlay() {
void memberHerdrSocketWithNonZshMemberLoginShellRefusesTheSpawn() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, allowListWithKnown(List.of("SOME_TOKEN")),
"/bin/zsh", null,
() -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket("/tmp/other-user-herdr.sock", "/bin/bash"));
List<String> messages = spawnAndCaptureLogs(launcher);
IllegalArgumentException e = assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class,
() -> launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV)),
"a non-zsh configured memberLoginShell under policy=allow-list must refuse the spawn");
assertEquals("blocked-by-fleetd-cb596-see-gitea-issue-82", launcher.env.get("SOME_TOKEN"),
"a non-zsh memberLoginShell must fall back to the CB-596 sentinel overlay, exactly "
+ "like a non-zsh $SHELL does when memberHerdrSocket is absent");
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("/bin/bash"),
"the refusal must name the configured memberLoginShell, got: " + e.getMessage());
assertFalse(launcher.env.containsKey("SOME_TOKEN"),
"a refused spawn must not have touched the pane env at all: " + launcher.env);
assertFalse(launcher.env.containsKey("ZDOTDIR"),
"no scrub directory may be generated when the configured member login shell is not zsh");
assertFalse(messages.stream().anyMatch(m -> m.contains("generated ZDOTDIR")),
"the 'generated ZDOTDIR' INFO must not appear when the scrub never runs — got: " + messages);
}
/**
* fleetd #213 defect 1, acceptance criterion 2: {@code memberHerdrSocket} configured and NO
* {@code memberLoginShell} configured must fall back exactly like criterion 1 above — AND
* fleetd's own {@code $SHELL} must never even be consulted (not merely "not decisive"). The
* fixture's {@code env} function reports {@code /bin/zsh} for {@code SHELL} — a value that would
* WRONGLY pass the zsh gate if the fix regressed to reading it — while flagging whether it was
* ever asked for at all, so this test fails loudly on either kind of regression.
* fleetd #213 defect 1, acceptance criterion 2 — updated by fleetd #155: {@code
* memberHerdrSocket} configured and NO {@code memberLoginShell} configured must now REFUSE the
* spawn exactly like criterion 1 above — AND fleetd's own {@code $SHELL} must never even be
* consulted (not merely "not decisive"). The fixture's {@code env} function reports {@code
* /bin/zsh} for {@code SHELL} — a value that would WRONGLY pass the zsh gate if the fix
* regressed to reading it — while flagging whether it was ever asked for at all, so this test
* fails loudly on either kind of regression.
*/
@Test
void memberHerdrSocketWithNoMemberLoginShellFallsBackAndNeverConsultsFleetdsOwnShell() {
void memberHerdrSocketWithNoMemberLoginShellRefusesAndNeverConsultsFleetdsOwnShell() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
AtomicBoolean shellQueried = new AtomicBoolean(false);
Function<String, String> env = name -> {
@@ -437,15 +461,18 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr, allowListWithKnown(List.of("SOME_TOKEN")), env,
() -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket("/tmp/other-user-herdr.sock", null));
List<String> messages = spawnAndCaptureLogs(launcher);
assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class,
() -> launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV)),
"no configured memberLoginShell under policy=allow-list must refuse the spawn, same "
+ "as an explicit non-zsh one");
assertFalse(shellQueried.get(), "fleetd's own $SHELL must never be consulted once "
+ "memberHerdrSocket is configured — only memberLoginShell: may decide the gate");
assertEquals("blocked-by-fleetd-cb596-see-gitea-issue-82", launcher.env.get("SOME_TOKEN"),
"no memberLoginShell configured must fall back to the sentinel overlay, same as a "
assertFalse(launcher.env.containsKey("SOME_TOKEN"),
"a refused spawn must not have touched the pane env at all, same as a "
+ "configured non-zsh shell");
assertFalse(messages.stream().anyMatch(m -> m.contains("generated ZDOTDIR")),
"no scrub may run without a configured memberLoginShell — got: " + messages);
assertFalse(launcher.env.containsKey("ZDOTDIR"),
"no scrub may run without a configured memberLoginShell");
}
/**
@@ -700,7 +727,8 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
/**
* fleetd #213: as above, plus {@code worktreeRoot:}/{@code worktreeGroup:} — both required for
* the ZDOTDIR scrub to run at all once {@code memberHerdrSocket} is configured; either missing
* falls back to the sentinel overlay, same as a non-zsh {@code memberLoginShell}.
* falls back to the sentinel overlay (fleetd #155 left this branch alone — it is not a shell
* problem, so it is not this ticket's refusal).
*/
private static FleetConfig configWithMemberHerdrSocketRootAndGroup(String memberHerdrSocket,
String memberLoginShell, String worktreeRoot, String worktreeGroup) {
@@ -323,11 +323,39 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
// --- CB-547: resume + post-hoc session discovery --------------------------------------------
/**
* Give {@code dir} the exact signature {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#isProvisionedWorktree} checks
* for: a {@code .git} REGULAR FILE, never a directory. Content is never parsed by that gate, so
* any {@code gitdir:} pointer is fine. Mirrors {@code ClaudeCodeLauncherTest}'s helper of the
* same shape (fleetd #249).
*/
private static void markAsProvisionedWorktree(Path dir) throws IOException {
Files.writeString(dir.resolve(".git"), "gitdir: /tmp/not-a-real-gitdir");
}
/**
* A fresh subdirectory of {@code configRoot}, marked as a provisioned worktree (fleetd #249),
* for tests that predate this gate and stood in a bare {@code "/work/dir"} string as their
* member's cwd — a directory that never existed on disk and, post-#249, would never pass
* {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#isProvisionedWorktree} either. Those tests are about the model
* mismatch / late-resolve machinery (fleetd #175/#234/#209), not about the worktree gate
* itself, so they need a cwd the gate accepts without changing what each test demonstrates.
*/
private static String provisionedWorkDir(Path configRoot) throws IOException {
Path dir = Files.createDirectories(configRoot.resolve("work-dir"));
markAsProvisionedWorktree(dir);
return dir.toString();
}
@Test
void aResumeSpawnPassesTheSessionIdAsDashS(@TempDir Path root) {
void aResumeSpawnIntoAProvisionedWorktreePassesTheSessionIdAsDashS(@TempDir Path root,
@TempDir Path worktree)
throws Exception {
markAsProvisionedWorktree(worktree);
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
service(herdr, root, opencodeCfg("google/gemini-2.5-pro", null, null))
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null, null, "ses_41b79fc90ffeI9E8uZv6VprUn2"));
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, worktree.toString(), null, null,
"ses_41b79fc90ffeI9E8uZv6VprUn2"));
List<String> args = startArgs(herdr);
int s = args.indexOf("-s");
@@ -336,6 +364,27 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
"the resume target id follows -s");
}
/**
* fleetd #249 acceptance criterion 3: without a fleetd-provisioned worktree, the member's cwd
* is shared with other sessions, so fleetd can never reliably confirm (now or later via {@link
* OpenCodeSessionDiscovery}) which conversation it is actually running. Refuse the spawn itself
* rather than silently launching opencode's {@code -s <id>} into unverifiable territory.
*/
@Test
void aResumeSpawnWithoutAProvisionedWorktreeIsRefused(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
OpenCodeLauncher launcher = service(herdr, root,
opencodeCfg("google/gemini-2.5-pro", null, null));
IllegalArgumentException e = assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () ->
launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null, null,
"ses_41b79fc90ffeI9E8uZv6VprUn2")));
assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("worktree"), e.getMessage());
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.start"),
"the refusal must happen before anything spawns — no pane, no process");
}
@Test
void aFreshSpawnCarriesNoSessionFlag(@TempDir Path root) {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -348,25 +397,59 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void theHandleDiscoversTheSessionIdForTheWorkersCwdOnlyAfterItAppears(@TempDir Path root,
@TempDir Path discRoot)
@TempDir Path discRoot,
@TempDir Path worktree)
throws Exception {
markAsProvisionedWorktree(worktree);
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
OpenCodeLauncher launcher = new OpenCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr),
new WorkspaceControl(herdr), Map.of("gemini", opencodeCfg(null, null, null)),
"gemini", _ -> null, 0, System::currentTimeMillis, () -> { }, root, discRoot);
PeerHandle handle = launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, "/work/dir", null));
PeerHandle handle = launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, worktree.toString(), null));
// opencode writes the record only when the session is first persisted — the instant the
// pane is ready it does not exist, so agentSessionId() is null (never a spawn failure).
assertNull(handle.agentSessionId(), "no record yet → null, not a spawn-time block");
// Once the record appears (here: same cwd), lazy discovery resolves it — the handle's
// session id matches its own worktree, not another's.
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_resolved", "/work/dir", 1000L);
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_resolved", worktree.toString(), 1000L);
assertEquals("ses_resolved", handle.agentSessionId(),
"agentSessionId() re-scans and picks up a record that has since been written");
}
/**
* fleetd #249 acceptance criterion 1, exercised through the real caller path (the handle
* {@code fleet_list} actually reads), not {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery} directly. Without a
* fleetd-provisioned worktree the member's cwd is shared — the default no-worktree spawn
* inherits the lead's own long-lived cwd — so even once a matching row appears (here:
* simulating another profile's session that happens to share the directory) the handle must
* report absence rather than guess. Measured real-world case (2026-09-03): the row it would
* otherwise pick was three days old and belonged to a different profile.
*/
@Test
void theHandleNeverReportsAnIdForANonProvisionedCwdEvenAfterARowAppears(@TempDir Path root,
@TempDir Path discRoot)
throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
OpenCodeLauncher launcher = new OpenCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr),
new WorkspaceControl(herdr), Map.of("gemini", opencodeCfg(null, null, null)),
"gemini", _ -> null, 0, System::currentTimeMillis, () -> { }, root, discRoot);
// No markAsProvisionedWorktree — this cwd has no .git file, the shared-cwd shape a
// no-worktree spawn (or a real checkout) actually has.
String sharedCwd = root.resolve("shared-cwd").toString();
PeerHandle handle = launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, sharedCwd, null));
assertNull(handle.agentSessionId(), "no record yet → null, same as the provisioned case");
// A row for this exact directory now appears — e.g. a sibling member, or a stale session
// from days earlier, sharing the same unprovisioned cwd.
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_someone_elses", sharedCwd, 1000L);
assertNull(handle.agentSessionId(),
"a non-provisioned cwd must NEVER report an id, even once a row for it exists — "
+ "the row could belong to any other session sharing this directory");
}
@Test
void foreignWorkerMatchesOpencodePrefixButNotClaude() {
String nonce = "abc123";
@@ -920,6 +1003,7 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void theRealSessionManagerLateResolvePathCatchesAModelMismatch(@TempDir Path configRoot,
@TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
// xf's real shape (fleetd #175): weight:80, model "opencode/nemotron-3-ultra-free", no
// credentialId — the profile that actually escaped the fleet's accounting.
@@ -929,7 +1013,7 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
OpenCodeLauncher launcher = serviceWithSink(herdr, configRoot, discRoot, cfg, sink);
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(launcher);
MemberSession acquired = sessions.acquire(cfg.profile(), "/work/dir", null, null);
MemberSession acquired = sessions.acquire(cfg.profile(), workDir, null, null);
// Real late-resolve path, driven BEFORE opencode has written its session row — same shape
// as production the instant a pane goes ready.
@@ -940,7 +1024,7 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
// opencode writes its row late, running gpt-5.6-sol (a PAID credential) instead of the
// withdrawn free model the profile actually asked for — the exact fleetd #175 scenario.
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", "/work/dir", 1000L,
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"gpt-5.6-sol\",\"providerID\":\"openai\"}");
// Drive the SAME real late-resolve path again: sessions.get() -> resolveAgentSessionId ->
@@ -959,12 +1043,13 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void aProviderPrefixedModelMatchingBothIdAndProviderIsNotAMismatch(@TempDir Path configRoot,
@TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
List<String> exhausted = new ArrayList<>();
ExhaustionSink sink = (target, reason, profile) -> exhausted.add(reason);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfg("openai/gpt-5.6-terra", null, null);
PeerHandle handle = serviceWithSink(new FakeHerdr(), configRoot, discRoot, cfg, sink)
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, "/work/dir", null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", "/work/dir", 1000L,
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, workDir, null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"gpt-5.6-terra\",\"providerID\":\"openai\"}");
assertEquals("ses_x", handle.agentSessionId());
@@ -975,12 +1060,13 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void aGxProviderPrefixedModelMatchingBothIdAndProviderIsNotAMismatch(@TempDir Path configRoot,
@TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
List<String> exhausted = new ArrayList<>();
ExhaustionSink sink = (target, reason, profile) -> exhausted.add(reason);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfg("gx/deepseek-v4-flash", null, null);
PeerHandle handle = serviceWithSink(new FakeHerdr(), configRoot, discRoot, cfg, sink)
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, "/work/dir", null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", "/work/dir", 1000L,
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, workDir, null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"deepseek-v4-flash\",\"providerID\":\"gx\"}");
assertEquals("ses_x", handle.agentSessionId());
@@ -997,12 +1083,13 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void aMissingProviderIdInTheEvidenceIsUnknownNotAMismatchWhenTheIdMatches(
@TempDir Path configRoot, @TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
List<String> exhausted = new ArrayList<>();
ExhaustionSink sink = (target, reason, profile) -> exhausted.add(reason);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfg("openai/gpt-5.6-terra", null, null);
PeerHandle handle = serviceWithSink(new FakeHerdr(), configRoot, discRoot, cfg, sink)
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, "/work/dir", null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", "/work/dir", 1000L,
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, workDir, null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"gpt-5.6-terra\"}");
assertEquals("ses_x", handle.agentSessionId());
@@ -1018,12 +1105,13 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void aMissingProviderIdInTheEvidenceStillCatchesARealIdMismatch(
@TempDir Path configRoot, @TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
List<String> exhausted = new ArrayList<>();
ExhaustionSink sink = (target, reason, profile) -> exhausted.add(reason);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfg("openai/gpt-5.6-terra", null, null);
PeerHandle handle = serviceWithSink(new FakeHerdr(), configRoot, discRoot, cfg, sink)
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, "/work/dir", null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", "/work/dir", 1000L,
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, workDir, null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"gpt-5.6-sol\"}");
assertEquals("ses_x", handle.agentSessionId());
@@ -1042,12 +1130,13 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void aBareModelWithNoProviderPrefixMatchesOnIdAloneAndIsNotAMismatch(@TempDir Path configRoot,
@TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
List<String> exhausted = new ArrayList<>();
ExhaustionSink sink = (target, reason, profile) -> exhausted.add(reason);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfg("deepseek-v4-flash", null, null);
PeerHandle handle = serviceWithSink(new FakeHerdr(), configRoot, discRoot, cfg, sink)
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, "/work/dir", null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", "/work/dir", 1000L,
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, workDir, null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"deepseek-v4-flash\",\"providerID\":\"gx\"}");
assertEquals("ses_x", handle.agentSessionId());
@@ -1064,6 +1153,7 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void aRealIdMismatchLogsAnErrorNamingBothModelsAndQuarantinesThroughTheSink(
@TempDir Path configRoot, @TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
List<String> exhausted = new ArrayList<>();
ExhaustionSink sink = (target, reason, profile) -> exhausted.add(target + "|" + reason);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfg("opencode/nemotron-3-ultra-free", null, null);
@@ -1075,8 +1165,8 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
PeerHandle handle;
try {
handle = serviceWithSink(new FakeHerdr(), configRoot, discRoot, cfg, sink)
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, "/work/dir", null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", "/work/dir", 1000L,
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, workDir, null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"gpt-5.6-sol\",\"providerID\":\"openai\"}");
assertEquals("ses_x", handle.agentSessionId());
} finally {
@@ -1111,11 +1201,12 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void unknownOrUnparseableModelEvidenceNeverQuarantines(@TempDir Path configRoot,
@TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
List<String> exhausted = new ArrayList<>();
ExhaustionSink sink = (target, reason, profile) -> exhausted.add(reason);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfg("openai/gpt-5.6-terra", null, null);
PeerHandle handle = serviceWithSink(new FakeHerdr(), configRoot, discRoot, cfg, sink)
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, "/work/dir", null));
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, workDir, null));
// No row yet at all.
assertNull(handle.agentSessionId());
@@ -1137,12 +1228,13 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void aProfileWithNoConfiguredModelIsNeverCheckedForAMismatch(@TempDir Path configRoot,
@TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
List<String> exhausted = new ArrayList<>();
ExhaustionSink sink = (target, reason, profile) -> exhausted.add(reason);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfg(null, null, null);
PeerHandle handle = serviceWithSink(new FakeHerdr(), configRoot, discRoot, cfg, sink)
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, "/work/dir", null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", "/work/dir", 1000L,
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, workDir, null));
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"anything-at-all\",\"providerID\":\"anyone\"}");
assertEquals("ses_x", handle.agentSessionId());
@@ -1166,21 +1258,22 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void modelCheckReadsTheResolvedSessionsOwnRowNotWhateverIsNewestInTheSharedDirectory(
@TempDir Path configRoot, @TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
List<String> exhausted = new ArrayList<>();
ExhaustionSink sink = (target, reason, profile) -> exhausted.add(reason);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfg("openai/gpt-5.6-terra", null, null);
PeerHandle handle = serviceWithSink(new FakeHerdr(), configRoot, discRoot, cfg, sink)
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, "/work/dir", null));
.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, workDir, null));
// Our own session's row, correctly matching the profile's requested model.
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_ours", "/work/dir", 1000L,
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_ours", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"gpt-5.6-terra\",\"providerID\":\"openai\"}");
assertEquals("ses_ours", handle.agentSessionId(), "resolves to our own session");
assertTrue(exhausted.isEmpty(), "matching model → no mismatch on first resolve: " + exhausted);
// A sibling member, spawned later into the SAME shared directory (no worktree, fleetd
// #234's default), writes a newer row running a totally different model.
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_sibling", "/work/dir", 9000L,
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_sibling", workDir, 9000L,
"{\"id\":\"deepseek-v4-flash\",\"providerID\":\"gx\"}");
assertEquals("ses_ours", handle.agentSessionId(),
@@ -1212,6 +1305,7 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void aSpawnTimeModelMismatchActuallyQuarantinesTheCredentialThroughTheRealAcquirePath(
@TempDir Path configRoot, @TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfgWithCredential(
"terra", "opencode/nemotron-3-ultra-free", "openai-shared");
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles = Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg);
@@ -1232,14 +1326,14 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
// The mismatching row exists BEFORE the spawn — reproducing fleetd #234's exact timing:
// opencode's session table already carries evidence by the moment acquire() first asks.
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", "/work/dir", 1000L,
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"gpt-5.6-sol\",\"providerID\":\"openai\"}");
assertFalse(quarantine.isQuarantined("openai-shared"), "nothing quarantined before the spawn");
// The real production entrypoint: acquire() builds the MemberSession by calling
// handle.agentSessionId() BEFORE registry.put() runs.
MemberSession acquired = sessions.acquire(cfg.profile(), "/work/dir", null, null);
MemberSession acquired = sessions.acquire(cfg.profile(), workDir, null, null);
assertEquals("ses_x", acquired.agentSessionId(), "the id itself still resolves correctly");
assertTrue(quarantine.isQuarantined("openai-shared"),
@@ -1258,6 +1352,7 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void aRosterOnlySinkSilentlyDropsTheSpawnTimeQuarantine(@TempDir Path configRoot,
@TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfgWithCredential(
"terra", "opencode/nemotron-3-ultra-free", "openai-shared");
BackendQuarantine quarantine = new BackendQuarantine(() -> 0L, TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(1800));
@@ -1270,10 +1365,10 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
OpenCodeLauncher launcher = serviceWithSink(herdr, configRoot, discRoot, cfg, rosterOnlySink);
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(launcher);
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", "/work/dir", 1000L,
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"gpt-5.6-sol\",\"providerID\":\"openai\"}");
MemberSession acquired = sessions.acquire(cfg.profile(), "/work/dir", null, null);
MemberSession acquired = sessions.acquire(cfg.profile(), workDir, null, null);
assertEquals("ses_x", acquired.agentSessionId(), "the id itself still resolves correctly");
assertFalse(quarantine.isQuarantined("openai-shared"),
@@ -1301,6 +1396,7 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void theSpawnTimeQuarantineSurvivesTheFleetdStyleForwardingHop(@TempDir Path configRoot,
@TempDir Path discRoot) throws Exception {
String workDir = provisionedWorkDir(configRoot);
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = opencodeCfgWithCredential(
"terra", "opencode/nemotron-3-ultra-free", "openai-shared");
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles = Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg);
@@ -1332,12 +1428,12 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
};
exhaustionSinkRef.set(realSink);
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", "/work/dir", 1000L,
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_x", workDir, 1000L,
"{\"id\":\"gpt-5.6-sol\",\"providerID\":\"openai\"}");
assertFalse(quarantine.isQuarantined("openai-shared"), "nothing quarantined before the spawn");
MemberSession acquired = sessions.acquire(cfg.profile(), "/work/dir", null, null);
MemberSession acquired = sessions.acquire(cfg.profile(), workDir, null, null);
assertEquals("ses_x", acquired.agentSessionId(), "the id itself still resolves correctly");
assertTrue(quarantine.isQuarantined("openai-shared"),