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Author SHA1 Message Date
Dai Ha 3cbbc50923 audit: teardown/cleanup review of dev.ltms.fleet.session 2026-09-04 10:33:09 +07:00
36 changed files with 276 additions and 2559 deletions
+69
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@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
# Teardown/cleanup audit — dev.ltms.fleet.session
Scope: `SessionManager.java`, `GitWorktrees.java`, `SessionReaper.java`, `MemberSession.java`,
`Worktrees.java` (interface). Read-only; no code changed.
## Main finding
```
1. SessionManager.java:336-338
2. issue: the final worktree removal in release() is the one step in the whole method
that is not wrapped in try/catch. Every other cleanup step here (hasUncommitted check,
snapshot, listener notification) is defended because a `git` call can throw — exec()'s
own javadoc documents both a non-zero exit and its 30-second timeout as normal failure
modes, and every sibling worktrees.* call in this class is guarded against exactly that.
By the time this line runs, registry.remove(paneId) and handles.remove(paneId) have
already happened and launcher.stop(paneId) has already run, so if worktrees.remove()
throws here (e.g. `git worktree remove --force` times out on a stale lock file or a
slow/network filesystem, or exits non-zero), the exception escapes release() with no
way to retry: the paneId is already gone from the registry, so a second stop call is a
no-op and never re-attempts the removal. The worktree directory is now leaked forever,
invisible to `fleet_list`. The caller sees a stop failure — FleetMcp.stop() only catches
HerdrException, and FleetApp.stopMember() catches nothing — even though the session was
in fact fully torn down (pane stopped, deregistered, listeners notified).
3. fix: wrap the `worktrees.remove(...)` call at the end of release() in a try/catch that
logs a warning, matching the pattern already used for every other cleanup step in this
method (e.g. cleanupAfterAddFailure's own worktree/branch removal, or the dirty-check
catch above it).
4. severity: medium
```
## Secondary findings
```
1. SessionManager.java:503-514 (acquireWithWorktree's catch block)
2. issue: after worktrees.add() succeeds, if overlayParity(), shareWithGroup(), or
launcher.spawn() then throws, the catch block removes only the worktree
(worktrees.remove(repoRoot, path)) and never deletes the branch `git worktree add`
created. GitWorktrees.cleanupAfterAddFailure — the sibling cleanup for failures inside
add() itself — explicitly deletes the branch too, with a `-D` and a documented reason
("a branch that never finished provisioning has no session, no PR, nothing else
pointing at it"). That reasoning applies equally here, but this later catch block (the
one covering the three post-add() steps) omits it. Since spawn failures are a normal,
recurring event (this very branch already logs "spawn failed for profile=..."), this
leaks an orphan `worker/<slug>-<nonce>` branch in the shared repo on every such failure,
with nothing pointing at it once the (failed) session is never registered.
3. fix: after worktrees.remove(...) succeeds in this catch, also delete the branch with
`git branch -D branch` (best-effort, log-only on failure), matching
cleanupAfterAddFailure's own two-step cleanup.
4. severity: low
```
No other issue in this scope survived a read of every exit of `add()`, `remove()`,
`snapshot()`, `overlayParity()`, `shareWithGroup()`/`shareRootWithGroup()`, `release()`,
`reapIdle()`, `drainAll()`, and the `SessionReaper` loop. Two shapes I checked and ruled
out as not reachable / not defects:
- `release()`'s `worktrees.repoRoot(removed.cwd())` looked suspicious because `cwd` for a
worktree session is the worktree path itself, so `repoRoot` would equal `worktreePath` —
but I verified with a live git repo (`git --version` 2.53.0) that
`git -C <worktree> worktree remove --force <same worktree>` works correctly: git
resolves `-C` against the common git dir regardless of which linked worktree it's given,
so this is not a bug.
- `git worktree remove --force` on a worktree containing a nested `.git` directory: I
expected this to need a double `--force` per older git docs, but tested it live and a
single `--force` succeeds on git 2.53.0. Not a live failure mode on this stack.
The `if (x != null)` guard-in-catch shape from fleetd #274 (guard assigned only at the end)
does not recur elsewhere in this scope: every `catch` block that guards on a local now
assigns that local before the risky call it protects, not after.
+12 -33
View File
@@ -250,7 +250,9 @@ public final class Fleetd {
boolean clearAfterTurn = cfg.lifecycle() != null && cfg.lifecycle().clearAfterTurn();
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workers, new GitWorktrees(cfg.worktreeRoot(), cfg.worktreeGroup()),
System::nanoTime, contextCap, clearAfterTurn);
liveCountRef.set(profileName -> liveSessionCount(sessions.roster(), profileName));
liveCountRef.set(profileName -> (int) sessions.roster().stream()
.filter(s -> profileName.equals(s.profile()))
.count());
// CB-303 part 1: idle-ttl reaper — only when configured, defaults to disabled.
final SessionReaper reaper;
@@ -625,19 +627,6 @@ public final class Fleetd {
log.info("auth: loopback-trust (any loopback non-worker caller is the primary)");
}
// fleetd #297: named once and reused verbatim below for FleetApp's GET /profiles, rather than
// built a second time — two independently-constructed sources reading the SAME BackendQuarantine
// / BackendOutagePolicy would still be able to drift (e.g. a future edit to the credentialIdFor
// closure in only one of the two places), exactly the shape #284 was.
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource quarantineSource = new FleetMcp.QuarantineSource(profile -> {
var configured = config.get().profiles().get(profile);
return configured == null ? null : configured.effectiveCredentialId();
}, quarantine);
FleetMcp.OutageSource outageSource = new FleetMcp.OutageSource(profile -> {
var configured = config.get().profiles().get(profile);
return configured == null ? null : configured.effectiveCredentialId();
}, outagePolicy);
FleetMcp mcp = new FleetMcp(messages, workers, sessions, identity, presence,
primaryRegistry, callers, metrics, new FleetMcp.CapacitySource(profile -> liveCountRef.get().apply(profile),
profile -> {
@@ -649,9 +638,15 @@ public final class Fleetd {
return FleetHealthMonitor.coverage(health != null && health.isEnabled(),
health != null && health.notifications() != null && health.notifications().configured());
}),
quarantineSource,
new FleetMcp.QuarantineSource(profile -> {
var configured = config.get().profiles().get(profile);
return configured == null ? null : configured.effectiveCredentialId();
}, quarantine),
leadMailbox,
outageSource,
new FleetMcp.OutageSource(profile -> {
var configured = config.get().profiles().get(profile);
return configured == null ? null : configured.effectiveCredentialId();
}, outagePolicy),
new FleetMcp.LeadSeatSource(leadSeatLookup(() -> config.get().profiles(), leaders, leads)));
// CB-637: the receive half. Only constructed when a lead mailbox actually opened — with no
@@ -722,12 +717,9 @@ public final class Fleetd {
// GET /sessions must merge across both, or a down/unpolled member daemon is invisible.
// fleetd #111: live (re-read-per-request) memberCredentials view for GET /member-credentials —
// same hot-reload shape as the memberCredentials supplier passed to ClaudeCodeLauncher above.
// fleetd #297: quarantineSource/outageSource are the SAME instances passed to FleetMcp above —
// GET /profiles must report the identical quarantine/cool-off facts as fleet_profiles.
Javalin app = new FleetApp(herdr, memberHerdr, workers, sessions, messages, presence, mcp.servlet(),
callers, metrics, deliverable,
() -> MemberCredentialPolicyView.of(config.get().memberCredentials()),
quarantineSource, outageSource).build();
() -> MemberCredentialPolicyView.of(config.get().memberCredentials())).build();
app.start(cfg.bind().host(), cfg.bind().port());
log.info("fleetd listening on {}:{}, herdr socket {}",
cfg.bind().host(), cfg.bind().port(), socket);
@@ -867,19 +859,6 @@ public final class Fleetd {
.orElse(null);
}
/**
* Count sessions that occupy a profile's spawn capacity. A {@code BACKEND_ERROR} or
* {@code FAILED} session stays in the roster so {@code fleet_list} can show its failure, but a
* member that cannot accept another delivery does not use a seat.
*/
static int liveSessionCount(List<MemberSession> roster, String profileName) {
return (int) roster.stream()
.filter(session -> profileName.equals(session.profile()))
.filter(session -> session.state() != MemberSession.State.BACKEND_ERROR)
.filter(session -> session.state() != MemberSession.State.FAILED)
.count();
}
/**
* fleetd #248 / fleetd#201 Unit 5: factory for the production {@link BackendErrorSink} — the
* collaborator {@link CompletionResolver} notifies when a pane-scrape classification actually
@@ -236,15 +236,7 @@ public final class CallerResolver {
// loopback-trust: same-host callers that are not workers are the primary. A non-loopback
// caller is anonymous even here — and startup refuses that combination anyway
// (FleetConfig.validateAuthExposure), so this is defence in depth, not the control.
//
// fleetd #317: "not a worker" must not be conflated with "identity unresolved". The real
// primary is a real process — its pid resolves (c.resolved()), it just owns no herdr pane.
// A caller whose peer-PID lookup failed (LsofPeerPidLookup's -1 sentinel — on any failure,
// silently including "lsof found no match") has no such pid, and PaneLocator's own javadoc
// already names what happens if that case is handed the primary role: a worker→primary
// escalation. So an unresolved caller is refused (ANONYMOUS — the same clean, already-tested
// "authenticated as nothing" outcome used everywhere else in this method), never promoted.
return isLoopback(remoteAddr) && c.resolved() ? Principal.primary(c.pid()) : Principal.anonymous();
return isLoopback(remoteAddr) ? Principal.primary(c.pid()) : Principal.anonymous();
}
private boolean presentedTokenMatches(String authorizationHeader) {
@@ -270,15 +262,11 @@ public final class CallerResolver {
return token.isEmpty() ? null : token;
}
/**
* fleetd #305: delegates to {@link ConnectionIdentity#isLoopback}. This used to be a second,
* independent copy of the same rule, and the two drifted: this one accepted all of
* {@code 127.0.0.0/8}, {@code ConnectionIdentity}'s accepted only {@code 127.0.0.1}. A caller
* from {@code 127.0.0.2} therefore had its identity skipped (so it had no terminal) and was
* then read as loopback here — which under loopback-trust is the primary. Sharing the inputs
* would not have prevented that; only sharing the computation does.
*/
private static boolean isLoopback(String remoteAddr) {
return ConnectionIdentity.isLoopback(remoteAddr);
if (remoteAddr == null) {
return false;
}
return remoteAddr.equals("127.0.0.1") || remoteAddr.equals("::1")
|| remoteAddr.equals("0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1") || remoteAddr.startsWith("127.");
}
}
@@ -322,9 +322,8 @@ public record FleetConfig(
* statement that does not stop being true just because the profile was
* named directly. A negative value has no sane meaning (there is no
* "excluded" to degrade to below zero) and is refused at config load
* instead, naming the profile and the key. Live means a session that can
* receive another delivery. The roster keeps terminal {@code BACKEND_ERROR}
* and {@code FAILED} sessions for diagnostics, but they do not use capacity.
* instead, naming the profile and the key. Live means any session the
* registry still owns (acquired and not yet released), in any state.
* @param kind which peer launcher spawns this profile: {@code "claude-code"} (default —
* the {@link dev.ltms.fleet.member.ClaudeCodeLauncher}) or {@code "opencode"}.
* The {@code CompositePeerLauncher} routes {@code spawn}/reap by this value, so
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Objects;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
import java.util.concurrent.ScheduledExecutorService;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.function.BiConsumer;
@@ -29,14 +28,6 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
static final int MAX_FAIL_TARGET_ATTEMPTS = 3;
// CB-641: Match the injector's 60s readiness gate so health allows a full first boot.
static final long READINESS_GRACE_NANOS = TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(60);
/**
* fleetd #280: how long after a terminal transition to wait before the one bounded re-check
* fires. Must exceed the worst-case reverse-rendezvous {@code fleet_ask} window (55-115s, see
* {@code FleetMcp.ASK_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS} / {@code FleetApp.MAX_ASK_TIMEOUT_MS}) so that, if the
* target was genuinely {@code ASKING} when {@code state} was first observed, its own ask has had
* time to lapse (clearing {@code Task#question} back to {@code null}) before this fires.
*/
static final long ASK_LAPSE_RECHECK_DELAY_SECONDS = 120;
private final AgentControl agents;
private final Supplier<List<MemberSession>> roster;
@@ -47,16 +38,7 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
private final long workingSuspectAfterNanos;
private final BiConsumer<String, String> failTarget;
private final Map<String, HealthPrior> priors = new HashMap<>();
/**
* The live classification per member, and the only one of this class's three maps that more
* than one scheduler task touches. {@code tick} writes it (and prunes it to the roster);
* fleetd #280's delayed {@link #recheckTerminalTarget} reads it from its own separate scheduled
* task. Both run on the single-threaded scheduler {@code Fleetd} passes in today, so they are
* serialised — but nothing in this class enforces that, and an unsynchronised {@link HashMap}
* read racing a resize can spin a CPU forever rather than fail visibly. {@code priors} and
* {@code orphanStreaks} stay plain maps because {@code tick} is still their only toucher.
*/
private final Map<String, HealthState> states = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
private final Map<String, HealthState> states = new HashMap<>();
/**
* CB-643: consecutive ticks on which a target looked like an orphaned delegation. The fact
* {@link MessageService#hasOrphanedDelegation} reports is a true snapshot, but it can read true
@@ -189,7 +171,6 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
// member stayed terminal.
if (terminal(next)) {
failTerminalTarget(target, next);
scheduleTerminalRecheck(target, next);
}
}
@@ -210,48 +191,6 @@ public final class FleetHealthMonitor {
target, state, MAX_FAIL_TARGET_ATTEMPTS, last);
}
/**
* fleetd #280: schedule the one bounded, delayed follow-up for a terminal transition — never a
* per-tick retry (CB-580 rejected that shape; {@link #reportTransition} still fires
* {@link #failTerminalTarget} exactly once per transition, unconditionally on the tick loop).
* This is a single one-shot task, scheduled once per transition into GONE/NEVER_READY, so a
* member stuck terminal for the rest of its life gets exactly one extra attempt, not one per
* tick. See {@link #recheckTerminalTarget} for why the extra attempt is safe.
*/
private void scheduleTerminalRecheck(String target, HealthState state) {
if (scheduler.isShutdown()) return;
try {
scheduler.schedule(() -> recheckTerminalTarget(target, state),
ASK_LAPSE_RECHECK_DELAY_SECONDS, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.warn("fleet health: could not schedule terminal re-check for member={} state={}",
target, state, e);
}
}
/**
* fleetd #280: the delayed re-check {@link #scheduleTerminalRecheck} scheduled for one terminal
* transition. By now, a {@code fleet_ask} that was still open when {@code state} was first
* observed has had time to lapse on its own (see {@link #ASK_LAPSE_RECHECK_DELAY_SECONDS}),
* clearing {@code Task#question} back to {@code null} — which is exactly what
* {@link MessageService#abandon(String, String, boolean)}'s {@code sweepAsking=false} filter
* needs to finally match it. Calling {@link #failTerminalTarget} again is safe only because
* {@code sweepAsking} stays {@code false}: a task genuinely still {@code ASKING} is skipped
* exactly as it was on the very first attempt — this never fails a ticket whose ask has not yet
* lapsed.
*
* <p><strong>Guarded on "target is still classified {@code state}."</strong> Without this guard,
* a member that recovered (or was released and dropped from the roster) between the transition
* and this re-check would still take a blind {@code failTarget} call — reaching into whatever
* brand-new, unrelated turn it has since picked up and failing it too. {@link #states} already
* carries the live classification (updated every tick, pruned to the current roster on release),
* so a stale or recovered target simply reads as a mismatch here and this is a no-op.
*/
void recheckTerminalTarget(String target, HealthState state) {
if (states.get(target) != state) return;
failTerminalTarget(target, state);
}
private static boolean terminal(HealthState state) {
return state == HealthState.GONE || state == HealthState.NEVER_READY;
}
@@ -157,7 +157,6 @@ public final class Injector {
boolean awaitingCompletion; // a delivered message's turn is not yet known-complete
boolean turnObserved; // saw a real `working` sample since that delivery (turn ran)
int unknownSinceTurn; // consecutive `unknown` samples while a delegation is outstanding (CB-109)
int unknownSincePostTurn; // the same, for the post-turn housekeeping phase (fleetd #306)
int notReadySincePoll; // consecutive injectable samples a queued message waited on the readiness gate (CB-114)
boolean postTurnPending; // completion observed; adapter housekeeping has not started yet
boolean awaitingPostTurnPickup;
@@ -218,12 +217,10 @@ public final class Injector {
t.awaitingPickup = false;
t.injectableSincePickup = 0;
t.unknownSinceTurn = 0;
t.unknownSincePostTurn = 0;
t.notReadySincePoll = 0;
if (t.awaitingCompletion) t.turnObserved = true;
} else if (status.injectable()) { // IDLE or BLOCKED
t.unknownSinceTurn = 0;
t.unknownSincePostTurn = 0;
if (t.awaitingPostTurnPickup) {
if (++t.injectableSincePostTurnPickup >= PICKUP_GRACE_POLLS) {
t.awaitingPostTurnPickup = false;
@@ -318,24 +315,6 @@ public final class Injector {
t.unknownSinceTurn = 0;
turnFailed = true;
}
// fleetd #306: the same escape for the post-turn housekeeping phase. Four latches
// gate delivery (awaitingCompletion, postTurnPending, awaitingPostTurnPickup,
// postTurnObserved) and only the first had a way out of a sustained unknown streak —
// a gate that closed one direction only. The other two below are released here as
// well; postTurnPending needs no escape because it is cleared unconditionally on the
// line after the listener call that sets it.
//
// This does NOT set turnFailed. The delegated turn already completed and its waiter
// already resolved — what is outstanding is adapter housekeeping (the `/clear`).
// Reporting a turn failure here would drive SessionManager.onFailed on a session
// that genuinely finished its work, which is a worse lie than the wedge.
if ((t.awaitingPostTurnPickup || t.postTurnObserved)
&& ++t.unknownSincePostTurn >= TURN_STALL_GRACE_POLLS) {
t.awaitingPostTurnPickup = false;
t.postTurnObserved = false;
t.injectableSincePostTurnPickup = 0;
t.unknownSincePostTurn = 0;
}
}
// Reclaim the entry once the worker is fully quiescent (nothing queued, no pickup or
@@ -36,25 +36,6 @@ public final class ConnectionIdentity {
* primary / an off-host client) and its {@code pid} (or {@code -1} if not resolvable).
*/
public record Caller(String terminal, long pid) {
/**
* Whether the OS peer-PID lookup actually succeeded — {@code false} means {@code pid} is
* the {@code -1} sentinel, not a real process id, so this caller's identity could not be
* established at all. That is a different fact from a real pid that simply owns no worker
* pane (the primary's own connection): the primary is {@code resolved()} and has a
* {@code null terminal}; an unresolvable caller is {@code !resolved()} and also has a
* {@code null terminal}. The two look identical through {@link #terminal} alone, which is
* exactly how fleetd #317 happened — a failed {@code lsof} lookup and a genuine primary both
* fell through to {@code Principal.primary(...)}.
*
* <p>Centralised here, next to the sentinel it tests, for the same reason
* {@link ConnectionIdentity#isLoopback} is centralised rather than left for each caller to
* reimplement: a raw {@code pid > 0} check duplicated at every call site is precisely the
* "one rule, two copies" shape that let #305 drift.
*/
public boolean resolved() {
return pid > 0;
}
}
/** Resolve the caller's terminal and PID from one peer-PID lookup. */
@@ -79,30 +60,7 @@ public final class ConnectionIdentity {
return pid > 0 ? cwds.cwdForPid(pid) : null;
}
/**
* Whether {@code addr} is a same-host address, and therefore one whose peer PID is worth
* looking up. <strong>This is the one definition of loopback in the daemon</strong> —
* {@code CallerResolver} calls it rather than keeping its own, because the two used to differ
* and that difference was a privilege escalation (fleetd #305).
*
* <p>The whole of {@code 127.0.0.0/8} counts, not just {@code 127.0.0.1}. On Linux every
* address in that range is bound to {@code lo} by default, so a process can connect to
* {@code 127.0.0.1:8765} with a source address of {@code 127.0.0.2} — measured on the Linux
* fleet host, where binding that source succeeds.
*
* <p><strong>Being strict here does not make the daemon safer; it makes it unsafe.</strong>
* That reads backwards, so it is worth stating plainly. This predicate does not decide whether
* a caller is trusted — it decides whether the caller's identity is <em>resolved at all</em>.
* Returning false means {@link #resolve} answers "no terminal", and downstream a caller with no
* terminal is treated as the primary under loopback-trust. So every address excluded here is an
* address on which a worker silently becomes the lead. Widening a check normally weakens it;
* widening this one is what closes the hole.
*/
public static boolean isLoopback(String addr) {
if (addr == null) {
return false;
}
String a = addr.startsWith("::ffff:") ? addr.substring(7) : addr; // IPv4-mapped IPv6
return a.startsWith("127.") || "::1".equals(a) || "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1".equals(a);
private static boolean isLoopback(String addr) {
return "127.0.0.1".equals(addr) || "::1".equals(addr) || "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1".equals(addr);
}
}
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.BackendQuarantine;
import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.PlacementException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.SessionManager;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.MemberSession;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.ShuttingDownException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.WorktreeRequest;
import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.MemberRole;
import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.PeerLauncher;
@@ -258,7 +257,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
// Each handler is built once and wired to its fleet_* tool below.
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> sendHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_send", req.arguments()),
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.SEND,
str(req.arguments(), "sessionId"));
if (denied != null) return denied;
String caller = callerTerminal(exchange);
@@ -300,7 +299,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> replyHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
String self = callerTerminal(exchange);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_reply", req.arguments()), self);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.REPLY, self);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return reply(messages, self, str(req.arguments(), "content"));
};
@@ -308,13 +307,13 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> askHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
String self = callerTerminal(exchange);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_ask", req.arguments()), self);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.ASK, self);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return ask(messages, self, str(req.arguments(), "question"), timeoutMs(req.arguments()));
};
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> statusHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_status", req.arguments()), null);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.READ, null);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return status(messages, str(req.arguments(), "sessionId"));
};
@@ -323,7 +322,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
Map<String, Object> a = req.arguments();
String target = str(a, "target");
// The action depends on the ARGUMENTS, not on the tool name -- see pollAction.
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_poll", a), target);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, pollAction(target), target);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return poll(messages, str(a, "ticket"), target);
};
@@ -332,14 +331,14 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> ackHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
Map<String, Object> a = req.arguments();
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_ack", a), str(a, "target"));
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.DRAIN, str(a, "target"));
if (denied != null) return denied;
return ack(messages, str(a, "target"), str(a, "msgId"));
};
// Fleet management (CB-108): spawn/list/stop over ClaudeCodeLauncher.
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> spawnHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_spawn", req.arguments()), null);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.SPAWN, null);
if (denied != null) return denied;
String caller = callerTerminal(exchange);
// SPAWN is already auth-gated to PRIMARY (architects can never call it), but
@@ -356,7 +355,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
};
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> listHandler =
(exchange, _) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_list", Map.of()), null);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.READ, null);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return listFleet(workers, sessions, messages, capacity, healthCoverage, quarantine, outage,
leadSeats, callers == null ? Map.of() : callers.leads(),
@@ -366,19 +365,19 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> stopHandler =
(exchange, req) -> {
String paneId = str(req.arguments(), "paneId");
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_stop", req.arguments()), paneId);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.STOP, paneId);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return stop(sessions, paneId);
};
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> profilesHandler =
(exchange, _) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_profiles", Map.of()), null);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.READ, null);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return profiles(workers, quarantine, outage);
};
BiFunction<McpSyncServerExchange, McpSchema.CallToolRequest, McpSchema.CallToolResult> whoamiHandler =
(exchange, _) -> {
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_whoami", Map.of()), null);
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, Authz.Action.READ, null);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return whoami(principal(exchange), sessions);
};
@@ -755,25 +754,6 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
return isBlank(target) ? Authz.Action.READ : Authz.Action.DRAIN;
}
/**
* The action a registered tool handler actually hands to the authorization gate.
* Keeping this choice beside the registered-tool inventory makes a new tool fail the coverage
* test until its action is pinned.
*/
static Authz.Action toolAction(String toolName, Map<String, Object> arguments) {
return switch (toolName) {
case "fleet_send" -> Authz.Action.SEND;
case "fleet_reply" -> Authz.Action.REPLY;
case "fleet_ask" -> Authz.Action.ASK;
case "fleet_status", "fleet_list", "fleet_profiles", "fleet_whoami" -> Authz.Action.READ;
case "fleet_poll" -> pollAction(str(arguments, "target"));
case "fleet_ack" -> Authz.Action.DRAIN;
case "fleet_spawn" -> Authz.Action.SPAWN;
case "fleet_stop" -> Authz.Action.STOP;
default -> throw new IllegalArgumentException("unregistered tool: " + toolName);
};
}
/** {@code fleet_poll}: check an async delegation by ticket, or drain a worker's inbox by target. */
static McpSchema.CallToolResult poll(MessageService messages, String ticket, String target) {
if (!isBlank(target)) {
@@ -814,12 +794,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
return error("fleet_reply is for workers only — could not identify the calling worker "
+ "from the connection");
}
// fleetd #302: isBlank, not == null, to match fleet_send's own guard above. MessageService
// .reply now REJECTS blank content, and this handler is a bare BiFunction with no try/catch
// around it — so a whitespace-only fleet_reply would leave here as an uncaught
// IllegalArgumentException instead of this clean tool error. Null and whitespace are the
// same mistake by the caller and must get the same answer.
if (isBlank(content)) {
if (content == null) {
return error("content is required");
}
messages.reply(callerTerminal, content);
@@ -963,10 +938,6 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
return text(json(memberView(member)));
} catch (GuardException e) {
return error("subscription boundary: " + e.getMessage());
} catch (ShuttingDownException e) {
// fleetd #308: the daemon's shutdown drain has already started — refuse loudly rather
// than register a session drainAll will never see again.
return error("shutting down: " + e.getMessage());
} catch (PlacementException e) {
// CB-599: no candidate had capacity (maxLoad, quarantine, or all-exhausted) — distinct
// from "profile does not exist" below.
@@ -1025,25 +996,6 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
* both maps at once when it is both exhaustion-quarantined AND cooling off.
*/
static McpSchema.CallToolResult profiles(PeerLauncher workers, QuarantineSource quarantine, OutageSource outage) {
return text(json(profilesView(workers, quarantine, outage)));
}
/**
* The body both front doors answer {@code profiles} with: the configured profile names, the
* default, and the two independent outage states — {@code quarantined} (the backend reported it
* out of capacity) and {@code coolingOff} (the credential threw repeated non-exhaustion backend
* errors). Each map is present only when at least one profile is in that state, and a profile
* can appear in both at once, because the two checks are separate.
*
* <p>fleetd #297: extracted so {@code fleet_profiles} and {@code GET /profiles} render from ONE
* body builder rather than two copies. Passing both doors the same {@link QuarantineSource} and
* {@link OutageSource} instances is necessary but not sufficient: with the loop written out
* twice, a later edit to the row shape — a renamed key, an added field — lands on one door and
* not the other, and the two then disagree about a live outage. That is exactly what fleetd
* #284 was, where one rule computed in two places was widened in only one and a single response
* contradicted itself. Shared inputs do not make duplicated computation safe.
*/
public static Map<String, Object> profilesView(PeerLauncher workers, QuarantineSource quarantine, OutageSource outage) {
Map<String, Object> result = new LinkedHashMap<>();
result.put("profiles", workers.profiles());
result.put("default", workers.defaultProfile() == null ? "" : workers.defaultProfile());
@@ -1075,7 +1027,7 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
if (!coolingOff.isEmpty()) {
result.put("coolingOff", coolingOff);
}
return result;
return text(json(result));
}
/**
@@ -1196,35 +1148,15 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
private static Map<String, Object> memberCapacityView(MemberSession session, Agent live,
MessageService messages, long nowNanos) {
Map<String, Object> row = SessionManager.rosterView(session, live);
boolean reclaimable = reclaimable(session, messages);
boolean open = messages != null && messages.hasAcceptedDelivery(session.terminalId());
boolean inbox = messages != null && messages.hasInboxMessage(session.terminalId());
boolean reclaimable = (session.state() == MemberSession.State.READY || session.state() == MemberSession.State.DONE)
&& !open && !inbox;
row.put("reclaimable", reclaimable);
row.put("idleForSeconds", reclaimable ? Math.max(0, (nowNanos - session.lastActivityAtNanos()) / 1_000_000_000L) : null);
return row;
}
/**
* The one definition of {@code reclaimable}: this member holds a spawn seat, and has no open
* bridge work, so stopping it gives the seat back. Both views in a single {@code fleet_list}
* response call it — the per-member flag in {@link #memberCapacityView} and the per-profile
* count in {@link #capacityView} — because two copies of this rule in one response is how the
* two numbers come to disagree.
*
* <p>fleetd #284: {@code BACKEND_ERROR} and {@code FAILED} are deliberately NOT reclaimable.
* The ticket asked for them to be, and that half of the ticket was wrong. Once
* {@code Fleetd.liveSessionCount} stopped counting a terminal session as live, that seat is
* ALREADY in {@code free}; counting it here too reports the same seat twice, and
* {@code free + reclaimable} then reads as more capacity than {@code maxLoad} allows. The dead
* session stays visible either way: its roster row still carries {@code state:
* "backend_error"} or {@code "failed"}, which is what tells the lead to stop it.
*/
static boolean reclaimable(MemberSession session, MessageService messages) {
boolean holdsSeat = session.state() == MemberSession.State.READY
|| session.state() == MemberSession.State.DONE;
return holdsSeat && (messages == null
|| (!messages.hasAcceptedDelivery(session.terminalId())
&& !messages.hasInboxMessage(session.terminalId())));
}
/**
* CB-583: {@code free} alone cannot tell a lead "busy, will free up" from "refusing, and
* nothing changes for N seconds" — those need different decisions. So a quarantined profile
@@ -1263,7 +1195,8 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
int live = liveCount.apply(profile);
int leadSeatCount = leadSeats.seatsFor().apply(profile);
int reclaimable = (int) roster.stream().filter(s -> profile.equals(s.profile()))
.filter(s -> reclaimable(s, messages))
.filter(s -> (s.state() == MemberSession.State.READY || s.state() == MemberSession.State.DONE))
.filter(s -> messages == null || (!messages.hasAcceptedDelivery(s.terminalId()) && !messages.hasInboxMessage(s.terminalId())))
.count();
Map<String, Object> row = new LinkedHashMap<>();
row.put("profile", profile); row.put("maxLoad", cap); row.put("live", live);
@@ -41,14 +41,6 @@ public final class LsofPeerPidLookup implements PeerPidLookup {
if (!p.waitFor(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS)) {
p.destroyForcibly();
}
if (found < 0) {
// fleetd #317: this is the silent path — lsof ran clean and simply reported no
// matching process (e.g. queried before the OS socket table settles). Previously
// this logged nothing at all, which is exactly why the escalation went unnoticed;
// the exception path below already logs. A caller now refused because of this is
// still refused (never promoted) — this line only makes the refusal diagnosable.
log.debug("lsof peer-pid lookup for port {} found no matching process", port);
}
return found;
} catch (Exception e) {
log.debug("lsof peer-pid lookup for port {} failed: {}", port, e.getMessage());
@@ -540,66 +540,16 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
* itself is still lost, because there is no OS-level compare-and-swap on a plain file, only this
* cooperative narrowing of the gap.
*
* <p><b>fleetd #285: refuses under {@code memberHerdrSocket} rather than writing somewhere the
* member cannot read.</b> Under {@code memberHerdrSocket:} the member pane runs as a
* <em>different OS user with its own {@code $HOME}</em> — the same reason {@link
* #writeCharterFile} routes the role/reply charter under {@code worktreeRoot} instead of
* {@code java.io.tmpdir} and refuses the spawn when it cannot. This method has no equivalent
* relocation available: unlike the charter (fleetd's own content, free to place anywhere and
* hand to the peer via an argv flag), {@code .claude.json} is a file Claude Code looks up for
* ITSELF at a fixed location — {@code CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.claude.json}, or else the member OS
* user's own {@code ~/.claude.json}, a path fleetd has no channel to learn. So when {@code
* configDir} is unset, there is no member-readable target to seed at all — writing the
* unqualified default would land in <em>fleetd's own</em> {@code ~/.claude.json} instead, the
* exact defect this fix closes, not a workable fallback. And even with {@code configDir} set,
* the file this method itself just wrote is {@code 0600} (owner-only — see {@link
* #copyPosixPermissionsIfPresent}), unreadable by a different-uid member unless shared with
* {@code worktreeGroup}, the same group {@link EnvAllowListScrub#shareWithGroup} already uses
* for the ZDOTDIR scrub (fleetd #213) and the charter file (fleetd #219/#222). So under {@code
* memberHerdrSocket} this method requires BOTH {@code configDir} and {@code worktreeGroup}
* before it ever touches a file, and refuses the spawn — naming exactly which one is missing —
* rather than silently corrupt fleetd's own home or hand the member an unreadable path. This
* mirrors {@link #writeCharterFile}'s "refuse, don't degrade" decision: a member spawned without
* a readable trust seed is not degraded, it sits on the interactive dialog forever and never
* calls {@code fleet_reply} — exactly the failure fleetd #149 exists to prevent, so trading it
* for "spawn something" is not worth it. When {@code configDir} and {@code worktreeGroup} are
* both present, the write proceeds exactly as below and the resulting file is additionally
* chgrp'd/chmod'd group-readable ({@code rw-r-----}) via {@link
* EnvAllowListScrub#shareFileWithGroup(Path, String)} so the member's OS user can actually
* open it — the
* directory itself (unlike {@code worktreeRoot} or the charter's per-spawn directory) is not
* fleetd-managed, so its own traversal permissions remain the operator's setup, same as they
* already must be for the member to read anything else fleetd points {@code CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR}
* at. With {@code memberHerdrSocket} ABSENT (today's only live mode) every branch below is
* byte-identical to before this fix.
*
* @param configDir the profile's {@code CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR} ({@code cfg.configDir()}), or
* {@code null}/blank to target the default {@code ~/.claude.json} — refused
* outright when {@code memberHerdrSocket} is configured, see above
* {@code null}/blank to target the default {@code ~/.claude.json}
* @param cwd the spawn's resolved working directory — the exact key Claude Code will look
* up for itself once it starts there
* @throws IllegalStateException when {@code memberHerdrSocket} is configured but {@code
* configDir} and/or {@code worktreeGroup} is not — the same
* refusal shape as {@link #writeCharterFile}
*/
private void seedTrustDialog(String configDir, String cwd) {
private static void seedTrustDialog(String configDir, String cwd) {
if (!isProvisionedWorktree(cwd)) {
return;
}
boolean unsetConfigDir = configDir == null || configDir.isBlank();
boolean memberHerdrSocket = memberHerdrSocketConfigured();
String group = memberHerdrSocket ? memberGroup() : null;
if (memberHerdrSocket && (unsetConfigDir || group == null)) {
throw new IllegalStateException("memberHerdrSocket is configured, so the workspace-trust "
+ "seed (.claude.json, which gates Claude Code's interactive trust dialog) must be "
+ "placed where the member's OS user can read it — configDir, shared via "
+ "worktreeGroup — but " + (unsetConfigDir ? "configDir" : "worktreeGroup")
+ " is not configured. Refusing to spawn rather than write fleetd's own default "
+ "'~/.claude.json' or hand the member a config file it cannot read: that member "
+ "would sit on the interactive trust dialog forever and never reach an "
+ "injectable state. Configure configDir on this profile and worktreeGroup on the "
+ "fleet to enable claude-code member spawns under memberHerdrSocket.");
}
Path target = unsetConfigDir
? Path.of(System.getProperty("user.home"), ".claude.json")
: Path.of(configDir, ".claude.json");
@@ -609,20 +559,18 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
// profile that simply forgot to set configDir gets no signal at all short of the
// operator noticing their own file changing. Say so loudly, every time it is about to
// happen, rather than only once ever: each occurrence is a live write to a real
// person's home config and deserves its own log line. (Reached only when
// memberHerdrSocket is absent — the block above already refused otherwise.)
// person's home config and deserves its own log line.
log.warn("seedTrustDialog: profile has no configDir set, so the workspace-trust seed "
+ "for cwd '{}' is about to write the operator's own default '{}' — set "
+ "configDir on this profile to target a per-member config file instead",
cwd, target);
}
synchronized (TRUST_JSON_LOCK) {
boolean written = false;
try {
if (target.getParent() != null) {
Files.createDirectories(target.getParent());
}
for (int attempt = 1; attempt <= MAX_TRUST_JSON_CAS_ATTEMPTS && !written; attempt++) {
for (int attempt = 1; attempt <= MAX_TRUST_JSON_CAS_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {
byte[] before = Files.isRegularFile(target) ? Files.readAllBytes(target) : null;
ObjectNode root = parseTrustJsonOrEmpty(before);
JsonNode projectsNode = root.get("projects");
@@ -663,39 +611,26 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
continue;
}
writeAtomically(target, newContent);
written = true;
}
if (!written) {
// fleetd #247: deliberately do NOT write here. A member that starts without the
// seed still starts — it may hit the trust dialog fleetd #149 describes and fail
// to reach an injectable state, but that failure is visible (herdr reports it,
// the spawn-readiness gate times out) and recoverable (retry the spawn). Writing
// our stale copy over whatever the other writer left would be silent and, if that
// other writer is the operator's own live session, could destroy real
// configuration — fail toward the recoverable outcome, not the silent one.
log.warn("seedTrustDialog: gave up seeding workspace-trust for cwd '{}' into '{}' "
+ "after {} attempts — another writer (most plausibly the operator's own "
+ "live Claude Code sharing this file) kept changing it faster than we "
+ "could re-read it, so nothing was written; the member may show the "
+ "trust dialog instead", cwd, target, MAX_TRUST_JSON_CAS_ATTEMPTS);
return;
}
// fleetd #247: deliberately do NOT write here. A member that starts without the
// seed still starts — it may hit the trust dialog fleetd #149 describes and fail to
// reach an injectable state, but that failure is visible (herdr reports it, the
// spawn-readiness gate times out) and recoverable (retry the spawn). Writing our
// stale copy over whatever the other writer left would be silent and, if that other
// writer is the operator's own live session, could destroy real configuration —
// fail toward the recoverable outcome, not the silent one.
log.warn("seedTrustDialog: gave up seeding workspace-trust for cwd '{}' into '{}' "
+ "after {} attempts — another writer (most plausibly the operator's own "
+ "live Claude Code sharing this file) kept changing it faster than we could "
+ "re-read it, so nothing was written; the member may show the trust dialog "
+ "instead", cwd, target, MAX_TRUST_JSON_CAS_ATTEMPTS);
} catch (Exception e) {
log.debug("cannot seed workspace-trust entry for cwd '{}' into '{}'", cwd, target, e);
return;
}
// fleetd #285: the write above lands as fleetd's own OS user; under memberHerdrSocket
// that is NOT the member's OS user, so without this the member still cannot read the
// file it exists to seed — a silent readiness timeout with the write looking "done".
// Deliberately OUTSIDE the swallow-all catch above: a group that fails to resolve here
// means the seed is unreadable despite a successful write, which must fail as loudly as
// writeCharterFile's own EnvAllowListScrub.shareWithGroup call already does.
if (written && memberHerdrSocket) {
EnvAllowListScrub.shareFileWithGroup(target, group);
}
}
}
/** Bound on {@link #seedTrustDialog}'s fleetd #247 compare-and-swap retry loop. */
private static final int MAX_TRUST_JSON_CAS_ATTEMPTS = 5;
@@ -181,33 +181,6 @@ public final class EnvAllowListScrub {
}
}
/**
* fleetd #285: share ONE file with {@code group}, read-only ({@code rw-r-----}) — the same
* per-file mode {@link #shareWithGroup} applies to a directory's entries, and the same error
* shapes, but without touching a parent directory. Used for a file fleetd writes into a
* directory it does NOT own — {@code configDir}'s own traversal permissions stay the
* operator's setup — where the directory-wide {@link #shareWithGroup} would be wrong.
*
* @throws UncheckedIOException when {@code group} does not resolve on this host, the
* filesystem has no POSIX group ownership, or a
* group-ownership/permission call is refused
*/
static void shareFileWithGroup(Path file, String group) {
try {
GroupPrincipal principal = file.getFileSystem().getUserPrincipalLookupService()
.lookupPrincipalByGroupName(group);
setGroupAndPermissions(file, principal, "rw-r-----");
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new UncheckedIOException("cannot share generated file " + file + " with group '"
+ group + "' — the group must exist, and the fleetd operator ("
+ System.getProperty("user.name") + ") must be a member of it", e);
} catch (UnsupportedOperationException e) {
throw new UncheckedIOException("cannot share generated file " + file + " with group '"
+ group + "' — this filesystem does not support POSIX group ownership",
new IOException(e));
}
}
private static void setGroupAndPermissions(Path path, GroupPrincipal group, String perms) throws IOException {
PosixFileAttributeView view = Files.getFileAttributeView(path, PosixFileAttributeView.class);
if (view == null) {
@@ -697,20 +697,7 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
if (paneId == null) {
throw new IllegalStateException("pane.split returned no pane — cannot start a peer");
}
Agent peer;
try {
peer = startUniquelyNamed(cfg, argv, paneId).agent();
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
// The peer never started — don't leave the pane we just created orphaned.
// Best-effort cleanup; never let it mask the real spawn failure.
try {
stop(paneId);
} catch (RuntimeException cleanup) {
log.warn("failed to close orphaned pane {} after spawn error: {}",
paneId, cleanup.getMessage());
}
throw e;
}
Agent peer = startUniquelyNamed(cfg, argv, paneId).agent();
log.info("{} started pane={} terminal={}", namePrefix, peer.paneId(), peer.terminalId());
return peer;
}
@@ -926,14 +913,9 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
* {@link #reapOrphanWorkers() orphan-reap} and spawn-gate-timeout paths, plus any caller that
* passes a pane directly, keep working without an owning id.
*
* <p>Resolves the tab from the pane <em>before</em> closing it. {@code agents.close} (the pane)
* is the one step whose failure means the teardown itself may not have happened: an already-gone
* pane (repeated DELETE, crashed peer) is treated as success, but any other failure propagates so
* a genuinely failed teardown is not reported as done. {@code spaces.closeTab} (fleetd #293) is
* different — by the time it runs the pane is already closed, so it is cosmetic workspace tidying
* rather than a real teardown failure, and a failure there is logged and never propagates, so it
* cannot mask the two cleanups below it ({@link #releaseZdotdir}, and the caller's worktree
* removal in {@code SessionManager.release}).
* <p>Resolves the tab from the pane <em>before</em> closing it. An already-gone pane/tab
* (repeated DELETE, crashed peer) is treated as success; any other failure propagates so a
* genuinely failed teardown is not reported as done.
*/
@Override
public void stop(String idOrPane) {
@@ -952,25 +934,7 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
log.debug("pane.close({}) ignored — already gone: {}", paneId, e.getMessage());
}
if (loc != null && loc.tabPaneCount() == 1) {
// fleetd #293: the pane above is already closed by this point, so a failing tab.close is
// cosmetic workspace tidying, not a real teardown failure — it must not mask the two
// cleanups below it (releaseZdotdir, and the caller's worktree removal). Unlike
// agents.close above, this is not narrowed to "already gone": any failure here, whatever
// its cause, is one we continue past, so we log it at WARN (not debug) with the tab id a
// person can go close by hand.
try {
spaces.closeTab(loc.tabId());
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
// Caught as RuntimeException, not HerdrException, to match releaseZdotdir's own
// guard five lines below. Today the two are the same set — HerdrCodec wraps every
// encode/decode failure and UnixSocketHerdrClient wraps every IOException, so
// HerdrException is all closeTab can actually throw. Narrowing to it anyway would
// leave this step guarded against the expected failure and bare against any other,
// which is the exact asymmetry fleetd #293 exists to remove. No behaviour change
// today; it stops a later change inside WorkspaceControl.closeTab reopening it.
log.warn("tab.close({}) failed — the pane is already torn down, so continuing; the "
+ "tab may need manual cleanup: {}", loc.tabId(), e.getMessage());
}
spaces.closeTab(loc.tabId());
} else if (loc != null) {
log.debug("not closing tab {} — it holds {} panes (not a dedicated peer tab)",
loc.tabId(), loc.tabPaneCount());
@@ -1009,8 +973,7 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
* that gap: it stops waiting immediately (never burns the rest of the timeout), runs the same
* teardown the timeout path below runs, and throws with a message that says the backend exited
* rather than that the pane was slow. Any other {@link HerdrException} still propagates
* unchanged — this gate does not interpret or recover from it, but it still closes the pane
* it opened before handing the exception to its caller.
* unchanged — this gate does not know how to recover from it.
*/
private void waitUntilInjectableOrThrow(String paneId) {
long start = nowMillis.getAsLong();
@@ -1024,15 +987,7 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
if (isAlreadyGone(e)) {
failFastOnGoneBackend(paneId, e, nowMillis.getAsLong() - start);
}
// This gate must not interpret an unrelated herdr error, but the caller does not
// receive paneId when spawn throws. Close the pane here before propagating e unchanged.
try {
stop(paneId);
} catch (RuntimeException cleanup) {
log.warn("failed to close orphaned pane {} after readiness-gate error: {}",
paneId, cleanup.getMessage());
}
throw e;
throw e; // any other herdr failure is not ours to interpret — let it propagate
}
lastStatus = sample.status();
if (lastStatus.injectable() || refinedInjectable(paneId, sample)) {
@@ -208,72 +208,18 @@ public final class AmqpReplyInbox implements ReplyInbox, AutoCloseable {
}
}
/**
* Release ownership of {@code target}: cancel its consumer, then nack-with-requeue every
* delivery still held for it instead of just dropping the local record.
*
* <p><strong>Cancelling a consumer does not requeue its in-flight deliveries.</strong> In AMQP,
* a delivery that was pushed to a consumer stays unacked, attached to the still-open
* {@link #channel}, until that channel or the connection closes — {@code basicCancel} alone does
* neither. So before this method existed with a requeue step, it dropped {@link #held}'s entries
* for {@code target} while the broker still considered them outstanding: never acked, never
* nacked, never requeued, and no longer reachable by {@link #peek} — permanently invisible. This
* is unlike {@link #handleRecovery} and {@link #close()}, whose bare {@code held.clear()} is
* correct because each has already made the broker requeue (a real connection drop, or
* {@code channel.close()} respectively) before clearing local state.
*
* <p><strong>Order: cancel first, then nack.</strong> A delivery tag stays valid for
* {@code basicNack} on this channel regardless of whether its consumer is still attached — only
* a channel/connection close invalidates it — so cancelling {@code target}'s consumer first does
* not risk the tags. Doing it the other way round does: nacking a delivery with {@code requeue}
* while its consumer is still active hands the message straight back to that <em>same</em>
* consumer the instant a prefetch slot frees up (confirmed against a real broker — see
* {@code AmqpReplyInboxContractTest.releaseCancelsConsumerAndRequeuesHeldDeliveryForRecovery}),
* which races this method's own {@code held.remove(target)}: the redelivery can land after the
* clear and leave a stale entry behind, so {@link #peek} is no longer reliably empty right after
* {@link #release}. Cancelling first closes that consumer, so the requeued message goes back to
* the queue for whichever consumer picks it up next (a later {@link #own}), not this one.
*
* <p><strong>Failure of the requeue is best-effort, not fatal.</strong> {@link #release} runs
* during teardown ({@code Fleetd} calls it right after {@code MessageService.abandon}), and a
* throw here would abort cleanups the caller depends on — the same argument fleetd #293 settled
* for {@code HerdrPeerLauncher.stop()}'s tab-close step. So a failed {@code basicNack} is logged
* at WARN, naming the target and delivery tag that leaked, and release proceeds; the delivery
* stays unacked on the broker rather than being silently dropped, so it is still recoverable by a
* later connection drop even though this release did not manage to requeue it immediately. A
* failed {@code basicCancel} still throws, unchanged from before this fix — that failure means
* the consumer may still be attached, so best-effort requeue is not attempted underneath it.
*/
@Override
public void release(String target) {
synchronized (channelLock) {
String tag = consumerTags.remove(target);
if (tag != null) {
try {
channel.basicCancel(tag);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("cannot cancel consumer for " + target, e);
}
held.remove(target); // stale delivery tags must not survive release
if (tag == null) {
return;
}
var perTarget = held.remove(target);
if (perTarget != null) {
synchronized (perTarget) {
for (Held h : perTarget.values()) {
try {
channel.basicNack(h.deliveryTag(), false, true); // requeue, don't drop
} catch (IOException | RuntimeException e) {
// Caught broadly (not just IOException) for the same reason #293 catches
// RuntimeException in HerdrPeerLauncher.stop(): best-effort teardown must
// not be guarded only against the expected failure and bare against any
// other. The message stays unacked on the broker either way — not lost,
// just not proactively requeued — until a connection drop frees it.
log.warn("release({}): could not requeue held delivery (msgId={}, tag={})"
+ " back to the broker — it stays unacked until a connection"
+ " drop frees it: {}",
target, h.message().msgId(), h.deliveryTag(), e.getMessage());
}
}
}
try {
channel.basicCancel(tag);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("cannot cancel consumer for " + target, e);
}
}
}
@@ -187,24 +187,6 @@ public final class MessageService {
private volatile Long completedNanos;
private volatile Reply question;
private volatile String turnId;
/**
* Set when this task's {@code fleet_ask} lapsed with no answer (fleetd #307):
* {@link #clearAsyncQuestion} then forgets {@link #turnId} (nulls it and drops the task from
* {@code asyncTasksByTurn}) so {@link #hasAsyncQuestion} stops reporting the target BUSY — a
* later {@code fleet_send} to it must be accepted, not refused. But the worker's turn is
* still genuinely live: it resumed on its own and will eventually call its real
* {@code fleet_reply}. Losing {@link #turnId} loses {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks}' only
* signal that such a reply belongs to this task, so that reply used to fall straight to the
* inbox and strand — {@code fleet_poll} stayed {@code PENDING} forever, later force-failed by
* {@link #abandon} with the misleading "session released before it replied". This flag is a
* second, independent signal that survives the forgetting: {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks}
* accepts it in place of a live {@link #turnId}, without ever re-adding the task to
* {@code asyncTasksByTurn} (so the BUSY release is untouched). Cleared implicitly once
* {@link #future} resolves — every match in {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks} already requires
* {@code !future.isDone()}, so a task that recovered (or was later failed by
* {@link #abandon}) can never match again regardless of this flag's value.
*/
private volatile boolean askTimedOut;
private Task(String ticket, String target, LongSupplier nowNanos) {
this.ticket = ticket;
@@ -413,55 +395,36 @@ public final class MessageService {
* {@link Rendezvous#resolveQuestion} must keep today's {@code NO_WAITER} behaviour — questions
* are interactive and must never be queued.
*
* <p><strong>Ambiguous match also falls to the inbox.</strong> {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks} can
* return more than one entry — a reachable state, not a hypothetical one (see its own javadoc:
* an {@code fleet_ask} that lapsed with no answer, fleetd #307, frees the target for a completely fresh
* delegation, which can itself go on to ask-and-lapse before the first worker's real reply
* arrives). Returning whichever candidate a {@code ConcurrentHashMap} iteration reaches first
* would let a genuine reply complete the <em>wrong</em> ticket — silently handing the lead
* something that reads like a correct answer to a delegation the worker never touched, which is
* worse than a failure because the lead acts on it. When more than one candidate exists, guessing
* is not safe: fall back to the inbox exactly as the zero-candidate case does, and let
* {@link #abandon} apply the eventual recovery deterministically instead.
* <p><strong>Ambiguous match also falls to the inbox.</strong> {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks}
* cannot actually return more than one entry today (see its own javadoc for why — in short,
* {@link #hasAsyncQuestion} keeps a target BUSY, so no second task can reach this state, for as
* long as an earlier one's {@code turnId} is still stamped). That is an emergent guarantee from
* two other facts, not one this method enforces, so this branch stays in as defence in depth
* rather than being removed as dead code: if it ever weakens, returning whichever candidate a
* {@code ConcurrentHashMap} iteration reaches first would let a genuine reply complete the
* <em>wrong</em> ticket — silently handing the lead something that reads like a correct answer to
* a delegation the worker never touched, which is worse than a failure because the lead acts on
* it. When more than one candidate exists, guessing is not safe: fall back to the inbox exactly
* as the zero-candidate case does, and let {@link #abandon} apply the eventual recovery
* deterministically instead.
*
* <p><strong>{@code content} is required (fleetd #302).</strong> Both doors that reach this
* method must reject a missing/blank reply the same way, so the check lives here rather than in
* either caller: {@code FleetMcp.reply} already refuses a {@code null} content before it ever
* calls this method (its own required-arg guard), and no test or production call site anywhere
* in the codebase relies on replying with empty content — confirmed by searching every call site
* of this method before adding the check, not assumed. Without this guard, a REST {@code
* POST /sessions/{id}/reply} whose body omits {@code content} (or a client library that maps a
* missing field to {@code ""}) used to reach {@link Rendezvous#resolve} with an empty string,
* silently completing the lead's blocking wait with nothing — indistinguishable from a worker
* that genuinely replied with nothing, which is worse than a loud failure because it destroys the
* information that the reply never arrived.
*
* @throws IllegalArgumentException if {@code content} is {@code null} or blank — the caller must
* report this as a client error (REST: 400 {@code bad_request}) rather than resolve
* anything
* @return always {@code true} — the reply resolved a live send, completed a parked ticket, or
* was queued
*/
public boolean reply(String session, String content) {
if (content == null || content.isBlank()) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("content is required");
}
if (rendezvous.resolve(session, content)) {
count(FleetMetrics.REPLIES, "path", "rendezvous");
return true; // a live send took it — unchanged fast path
}
// #137/fleetd #307: no live rendezvous waiter, but this may be the worker's real fleet_reply resuming
// a turn that either answer() (#137) or ask() (fleetd #307) already gave up waiting on:
// - answer()'s own bounded wait (the primary's fleet_send{turnId} call, capped well under a
// minute) can time out and close its waiter long before the worker — now actually resuming
// real work — finishes and replies.
// - ask()'s own wait for the primary can time out first, with the worker resuming on its own
// and finishing unanswered.
// Either way that reply used to have nowhere to land but the session inbox, leaving the async
// ticket's future unresolved forever: fleet_poll{ticket} stayed PENDING until fleet_stop's
// abandon() forced it FAILED with a misleading "session released before it replied" reason,
// even though the reply had, in fact, arrived. Completing the matching ticket directly here
// means fleet_poll{ticket} sees the real reply instead.
// #137: no live rendezvous waiter, but this may be the worker's real fleet_reply resuming a
// turn that {@link #answer} already gave up waiting on. answer()'s own bounded wait (the
// primary's fleet_send{turnId} call, capped well under a minute) can time out and close its
// waiter long before the worker — now actually resuming real work — finishes and replies. That
// reply used to have nowhere to land but the session inbox, leaving the async ticket's future
// unresolved forever: fleet_poll{ticket} stayed PENDING until fleet_stop's abandon() forced it
// FAILED with a misleading "session released before it replied" reason, even though the reply
// had, in fact, arrived. Completing the matching ticket directly here means fleet_poll{ticket}
// sees the real reply instead.
List<Task> candidates = askAnsweredAsyncTasks(session);
if (candidates.size() == 1) {
Task orphan = candidates.get(0);
@@ -492,42 +455,34 @@ public final class MessageService {
}
/**
* Every still-open async task on {@code target} whose worker is genuinely expected to send a
* real {@code fleet_reply} next with nothing left registered to catch it: either its
* {@code fleet_ask} was already answered — {@link Task#turnId} is stamped but {@link
* Task#question} was cleared by {@link #answer} — or its {@code fleet_ask} lapsed unanswered and
* {@link Task#askTimedOut} marks that (fleetd #307; {@link Task#turnId} is {@code null} by then, forgotten
* so the target is not left BUSY — see {@link Task#askTimedOut}'s own javadoc). Either way the
* task's future is not resolved yet. Empty if no such task exists, including the common case
* where {@code target}'s worker never used {@code fleet_ask} at all (a task that was never asked
* has both {@code turnId == null} and {@code askTimedOut == false}, so it can never match here and
* only ever completes through the ordinary rendezvous fast path in {@link #reply}).
* Every still-open async task on {@code target} whose {@code fleet_ask} was already answered —
* its {@link Task#turnId} is stamped but its {@link Task#question} was cleared by {@link #answer}
* — yet whose future is not resolved yet (#137). Empty if no such task exists, including the
* common case where {@code target}'s worker never used {@code fleet_ask} at all (a task that was
* never asked has {@code turnId == null}, so it can never match here and only ever completes
* through the ordinary rendezvous fast path in {@link #reply}).
*
* <p><strong>Can return more than one entry — reachable, not just defence in depth.</strong>
* {@link #send} refuses to open a waiter on {@code target} while {@link #hasAsyncQuestion} is
* true, and that check matches ANY task whose {@code turnId} is still stamped in
* {@code asyncTasksByTurn}. While a task's {@code turnId} stays stamped — {@link #answer} leaves
* it in place ({@code clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, false)}) until {@link #finishAsyncTask} removes
* the stamp and completes the future in the same call — no second task on the same target can
* reach an eligible state, because {@link #send} would refuse it as BUSY first. That single-task
* guarantee holds only for the {@code turnId}-stamped half of this method's match: an
* {@link Task#askTimedOut} task is, by construction, no longer stamped in {@code asyncTasksByTurn}
* (that is the whole point of forgetting {@code turnId} in {@link #clearAsyncQuestion}), so the
* target is free the moment one ask lapses. A fresh, independent {@code sendAsync} to the same
* target can then be dispatched, itself pause on {@code fleet_ask}, and itself time out — landing
* a second {@code askTimedOut} task on the very target the first one is still waiting to answer
* for. Two (or more) genuinely open tasks on one target is therefore a real, reachable state
* today, not a hypothetical: {@link #reply} treats it as unresolvable and falls back to the
* inbox rather than guess which task a reply belongs to (guessing wrong would hand the lead a
* plausible-looking answer to a delegation the worker never touched — worse than a failure,
* because the lead acts on it); {@link #abandon} instead picks the oldest deterministically (its
* own {@code matching} list has a different, wider match — see its javadoc).
* <p><strong>Returns at most one entry today — verified, not assumed.</strong> {@link #send}
* refuses to open a waiter on {@code target} while {@link #hasAsyncQuestion} is true, and that
* check matches ANY task whose {@code turnId} is still stamped in {@code asyncTasksByTurn} —
* not only while its question is still open. {@link #answer} deliberately leaves that stamp in
* place ({@code clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, false)}) until the resumed turn's own future actually
* resolves, at which point {@link #finishAsyncTask} both removes the stamp AND completes that
* task's future in the same call. So a second task can never reach "{@code turnId} stamped, future
* still open" — the exact pair this method matches on — while a first one already holds it: by
* the time the stamp is gone, so is the eligibility. This is an emergent property of those two
* facts holding together, not something this method (or its callers) enforces on its own — flip
* {@code forgetTurn} to {@code true} in that one {@link #answer} call and it silently stops being
* true, with nothing left to fail loudly. The callers below still handle "more than one" as
* defence in depth against exactly that, not because they exercise it today: {@link #reply}
* treats it as unresolvable and falls back to the inbox; {@link #abandon} would pick the oldest
* deterministically (its own {@code matching} list has no such guarantee — see its javadoc).
*/
private List<Task> askAnsweredAsyncTasks(String target) {
List<Task> candidates = new ArrayList<>();
for (Task task : tasks.values()) {
if (target.equals(task.target) && task.question == null && !task.future.isDone()
&& (task.turnId != null || task.askTimedOut)) {
if (target.equals(task.target) && task.question == null && task.turnId != null
&& !task.future.isDone()) {
candidates.add(task);
}
}
@@ -925,12 +880,6 @@ public final class MessageService {
return new AskResult(AskOutcome.ANSWERED, answer);
} catch (TimeoutException e) {
log.debug("fleet_ask from {} went unanswered in {}ms", workerSession, timeoutMillis);
// fleetd #307: mark the task BEFORE clearAsyncQuestion(forgetTurn=true) below drops it out of
// asyncTasksByTurn and nulls its turnId — that forgetting is deliberate and stays (it is
// what keeps the target from staying BUSY forever), but it would otherwise also erase
// askAnsweredAsyncTasks' only signal that the worker's eventual real fleet_reply still
// belongs to this task, stranding it in the inbox with a false "never replied" verdict.
markAskTimedOut(ticket.turnId());
clearAsyncQuestion(ticket.turnId(), true);
return new AskResult(AskOutcome.TIMED_OUT, null);
} catch (ExecutionException e) {
@@ -978,16 +927,7 @@ public final class MessageService {
}
try {
CompletableFuture<Rendezvous.Resolution> reply = rendezvous.open(workerSession);
// #282: mirror send()'s registration (:802) so a SECOND fleet_ask inside this same
// resumed turn can re-associate the async ticket with its new turnId via
// markAsyncQuestion — without this, that second ask has no Task to attach to, and
// markAsyncQuestion silently returns null.
Task task = asyncTasksByTurn.get(turnId);
if (task != null) {
asyncTasksByWaiter.put(reply, task);
}
if (!rendezvous.answerAsk(turnId, content)) {
asyncTasksByWaiter.remove(reply);
rendezvous.close(workerSession, reply);
return new Reply(Outcome.STALE_TURN, null); // lapsed between the lookup and the unblock
}
@@ -995,21 +935,7 @@ public final class MessageService {
try {
Rendezvous.Resolution r = reply.get(remainingMillis(deadlineNanos), TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS);
Reply result = new Reply(outcomeOf(r.kind()), r.text(), r.turnId());
// #282: this waiter can resolve with a FRESH question rather than a terminal reply —
// the worker chained a second fleet_ask before replying. Mirror sendAsync's own guard
// (:1000) and leave the ticket open (markAsyncQuestion above already re-armed it under
// the new turnId) instead of completing it here with a QUESTION "reply".
// Measured when #282 was merged: this guard is DEFENCE IN DEPTH, not the thing
// that makes the chained ask work. ask() calls markAsyncQuestion (:860) before
// resolveQuestion (:861), so by the time this thread wakes, the task has already
// moved to the new turnId and finishAsyncTask(oldTurnId, ...) finds nothing. Removing
// this guard alone leaves the test green. Keep it anyway: it mirrors sendAsync's
// sibling guard, and that sibling's own comment (:1017) warns the two orderings are
// not something to rely on. Do NOT delete it as dead code without re-checking that
// ordering, and do not treat it as the sole protection either.
if (result.outcome() != Outcome.QUESTION) {
finishAsyncTask(turnId, result);
}
finishAsyncTask(turnId, result);
return result;
} catch (TimeoutException e) {
// The worker resumed but hasn't replied yet — no completion fallback arms an answered
@@ -1022,7 +948,6 @@ public final class MessageService {
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
throw new IllegalStateException("interrupted awaiting reply from " + workerSession, e);
} finally {
asyncTasksByWaiter.remove(reply);
rendezvous.close(workerSession, reply);
}
} finally {
@@ -1181,37 +1106,13 @@ public final class MessageService {
private Task markAsyncQuestion(CompletableFuture<Rendezvous.Resolution> waiter, String text, String turnId) {
Task task = waiter == null ? null : asyncTasksByWaiter.get(waiter);
if (task != null) {
String previousTurnId = task.turnId;
task.question = new Reply(Outcome.QUESTION, text, turnId);
task.turnId = turnId;
asyncTasksByTurn.put(turnId, task);
// #282: a second fleet_ask in the same resumed turn re-arms an already-answered task
// (answer() re-registers it in asyncTasksByWaiter) under a FRESH turnId — drop the old
// key so asyncTasksByTurn does not keep growing by one stale entry per chained ask.
if (previousTurnId != null && !previousTurnId.equals(turnId)) {
asyncTasksByTurn.remove(previousTurnId, task);
}
}
return task;
}
/**
* Mark {@code turnId}'s task as having a {@code fleet_ask} that lapsed with no answer (fleetd #307), so
* {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks} still recognizes the worker's eventual real {@code fleet_reply}
* as belonging to it after {@link #clearAsyncQuestion}'s {@code forgetTurn=true} erases
* {@link Task#turnId} — see {@link Task#askTimedOut}. Must be called before that forgetting, while
* {@code turnId} can still resolve the task in {@code asyncTasksByTurn}; a lookup afterward would
* find nothing. Only when it matches the task's current turn — same guard as
* {@link #clearAsyncQuestion} — so a chained second {@code fleet_ask} (#282) that already moved
* the task to a fresh {@code turnId} cannot mark it for a turn that is no longer its own.
*/
private void markAskTimedOut(String turnId) {
Task task = asyncTasksByTurn.get(turnId);
if (task != null && turnId.equals(task.turnId)) {
task.askTimedOut = true;
}
}
/** Clear an answered or lapsed question, but only when it matches the ticket's current turn. */
private void clearAsyncQuestion(String turnId, boolean forgetTurn) {
// CB-582: tell the push loop first — like ticketCollected, a removal for a turnId it never
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.Principal;
import dev.ltms.fleet.guard.GuardException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.metrics.FleetMetrics;
import dev.ltms.fleet.metrics.Metrics;
import dev.ltms.fleet.mcp.FleetMcp;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.Agent;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.HerdrClient;
import dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.HerdrException;
@@ -19,7 +18,6 @@ import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.PeerUnreachableException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.PlacementException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.msg.MessageService;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.SessionManager;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.ShuttingDownException;
import dev.ltms.fleet.peer.MemberRole;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.MemberSession;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.WorktreeRequest;
@@ -49,22 +47,6 @@ import java.util.stream.Collectors;
*/
public final class FleetApp {
/** The authorization action the matching route handler hands to {@link #allow}. */
static Authz.Action routeAction(String route) {
return switch (route) {
case "GET /metrics" -> Authz.Action.METRICS;
case "POST /members" -> Authz.Action.SPAWN;
case "DELETE /members/{paneId}" -> Authz.Action.STOP;
case "POST /sessions/{id}/message" -> Authz.Action.SEND;
case "POST /sessions/{id}/reply" -> Authz.Action.REPLY;
case "GET /sessions/{id}/replies" -> Authz.Action.DRAIN;
case "POST /sessions/{id}/ask" -> Authz.Action.ASK;
case "GET /sessions", "GET /agents", "GET /members", "GET /profiles",
"GET /member-credentials", "GET /sessions/{id}/status", "GET /tasks/{ticket}" -> Authz.Action.READ;
default -> throw new IllegalArgumentException("route has no authorization gate: " + route);
};
}
/** Default blocking window for a message; kept under typical HTTP idle timeouts. */
private static final long DEFAULT_MESSAGE_TIMEOUT_MS = 25_000;
private static final long MAX_MESSAGE_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
@@ -88,12 +70,6 @@ public final class FleetApp {
// absent() (the honest "no policy configured" view) for every constructor that does not wire
// a real one, so existing legacy call sites keep building without knowing this field exists.
private final Supplier<MemberCredentialPolicyView> memberCredentials;
// fleetd #297: the SAME shared sources FleetMcp.profiles/fleet_profiles reads (BackendQuarantine
// and BackendOutagePolicy are each one instance for the whole daemon — see Fleetd wiring) so
// GET /profiles cannot drift from fleet_profiles about which profile is quarantined/cooling off.
// .none() (the honest "feature not wired" view) for every constructor that does not pass one.
private final FleetMcp.QuarantineSource quarantine;
private final FleetMcp.OutageSource outage;
private final ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
/**
@@ -154,23 +130,6 @@ public final class FleetApp {
MessageService messages, MemberPresence presence,
HttpServlet mcpServlet, CallerResolver auth, Metrics metrics,
Predicate<String> deliverable, Supplier<MemberCredentialPolicyView> memberCredentials) {
this(herdr, memberHerdr, workers, sessions, messages, presence, mcpServlet, auth, metrics,
deliverable, memberCredentials, FleetMcp.QuarantineSource.none(), FleetMcp.OutageSource.none());
}
/**
* @param quarantine the SAME {@link FleetMcp.QuarantineSource} instance passed to {@code
* FleetMcp} (fleetd #297), so {@code GET /profiles} reports the identical
* exhaustion-quarantine facts as {@code fleet_profiles} rather than a second,
* independently-computed copy
* @param outage the SAME {@link FleetMcp.OutageSource} instance passed to {@code FleetMcp} —
* see {@code quarantine}; a SEPARATE check from it, never merged in
*/
public FleetApp(HerdrClient herdr, HerdrClient memberHerdr, PeerLauncher workers, SessionManager sessions,
MessageService messages, MemberPresence presence,
HttpServlet mcpServlet, CallerResolver auth, Metrics metrics,
Predicate<String> deliverable, Supplier<MemberCredentialPolicyView> memberCredentials,
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource quarantine, FleetMcp.OutageSource outage) {
this.herdr = herdr;
this.memberHerdr = memberHerdr != null ? memberHerdr : herdr;
this.workers = workers;
@@ -181,8 +140,6 @@ public final class FleetApp {
this.auth = auth;
this.metrics = metrics;
this.memberCredentials = memberCredentials != null ? memberCredentials : MemberCredentialPolicyView::absent;
this.quarantine = quarantine != null ? quarantine : FleetMcp.QuarantineSource.none();
this.outage = outage != null ? outage : FleetMcp.OutageSource.none();
}
/** Wire routes onto a fresh, unstarted Javalin instance. Caller starts it. */
@@ -265,7 +222,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
/** Prometheus scrape endpoint (CB-502). */
private void metrics(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /metrics"), null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.METRICS, null)) {
return;
}
ctx.status(200).contentType("text/plain; version=0.0.4; charset=utf-8").result(metrics.render());
@@ -337,7 +294,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
* member workspace (they live on the member daemon only).
*/
private void sessions(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /sessions"), null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
return;
}
List<Map<String, Object>> out = new ArrayList<>();
@@ -362,76 +319,52 @@ public final class FleetApp {
/** Discovery: every agent herdr tracks, keyed by its Claude session UUID. */
private void agents(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /agents"), null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
return;
}
try {
ctx.status(200).json(Map.of("agents",
workers.list().stream().map(Agent.class::cast).map(FleetApp::view).toList()));
} catch (HerdrException e) {
// fleetd #297: workers.list() reaches herdr — a transport failure must land in the same
// {error, detail} envelope every other failure path here uses, not escape as a bare
// exception and leave Javalin's default handling to respond outside the JSON contract.
herdrError(ctx, e);
}
ctx.status(200).json(Map.of("agents",
workers.list().stream().map(Agent.class::cast).map(FleetApp::view).toList()));
}
/** CB-304: bridge-owned roster merged with live herdr status by paneId. */
private void listMembers(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /members"), null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
return;
}
try {
// CB-519: the registry key is a host-unique id, not the pane coordinate — join on terminal.
Map<String, Agent> live = workers.list().stream()
.map(Agent.class::cast)
.filter(a -> a.terminalId() != null)
.collect(Collectors.toMap(Agent::terminalId, Function.identity(), (_, b) -> b));
// fleetd #209: this REST roster reports agentSessionId via SessionManager.rosterView, so it
// uses the resolving roster read (caller-driven, not a timer) rather than the plain one.
List<Map<String, Object>> out = sessions.rosterResolved().stream()
.map(s -> SessionManager.rosterView(s, live.get(s.terminalId())))
.toList();
Map<String, Object> body = new LinkedHashMap<>();
// fleetd #199: the endpoint became /members in the CB-634 rename but the body key stayed
// "workers", so a caller that read "members" saw an empty fleet and reported no members at
// all. "members" is the canonical key; "workers" stays as a deprecated alias so an existing
// REST consumer keeps working — the out-of-band path a lead falls back to when its MCP mount
// drops reads this endpoint. Drop the alias once nothing reads it.
body.put("members", out);
body.put("workers", out);
// CB-586: operator visibility for the refs/wip snapshot store without shelling into the
// repo — how many snapshot refs exist and roughly what they cost. Present only once a
// worktree session has established the repo, so a never-snapshotted fleet reports nothing.
sessions.wipRefs().ifPresent(st -> body.put("wipRefs",
Map.of("count", st.count(), "costBytes", st.costBytes())));
ctx.status(200).json(body);
} catch (HerdrException e) {
// fleetd #297: same reasoning as agents() above — this is the out-of-band roster a lead
// falls back to when its MCP mount drops, so it must stay inside the JSON error contract
// exactly when herdr is briefly unreachable, not escape as a bare exception.
herdrError(ctx, e);
}
// CB-519: the registry key is a host-unique id, not the pane coordinate — join on terminal.
Map<String, Agent> live = workers.list().stream()
.map(Agent.class::cast)
.filter(a -> a.terminalId() != null)
.collect(Collectors.toMap(Agent::terminalId, Function.identity(), (_, b) -> b));
// fleetd #209: this REST roster reports agentSessionId via SessionManager.rosterView, so it
// uses the resolving roster read (caller-driven, not a timer) rather than the plain one.
List<Map<String, Object>> out = sessions.rosterResolved().stream()
.map(s -> SessionManager.rosterView(s, live.get(s.terminalId())))
.toList();
Map<String, Object> body = new LinkedHashMap<>();
// fleetd #199: the endpoint became /members in the CB-634 rename but the body key stayed
// "workers", so a caller that read "members" saw an empty fleet and reported no members at
// all. "members" is the canonical key; "workers" stays as a deprecated alias so an existing
// REST consumer keeps working — the out-of-band path a lead falls back to when its MCP mount
// drops reads this endpoint. Drop the alias once nothing reads it.
body.put("members", out);
body.put("workers", out);
// CB-586: operator visibility for the refs/wip snapshot store without shelling into the
// repo — how many snapshot refs exist and roughly what they cost. Present only once a
// worktree session has established the repo, so a never-snapshotted fleet reports nothing.
sessions.wipRefs().ifPresent(st -> body.put("wipRefs",
Map.of("count", st.count(), "costBytes", st.costBytes())));
ctx.status(200).json(body);
}
/**
* The configured worker profiles, which one a no-argument spawn uses, and (fleetd #297) the two
* outage states {@code fleet_profiles} already reports: {@code quarantined} (CB-578 stage B —
* the backend reported it out of capacity) and {@code coolingOff} (fleetd #201 Unit 5 — the
* credential threw repeated non-exhaustion backend errors). Both are read from the SAME shared
* {@link FleetMcp.QuarantineSource}/{@link FleetMcp.OutageSource} instances {@code FleetMcp}
* reads, never recomputed, so the two doors cannot disagree about which profile is down and why.
* Independent checks, so a profile can appear in both maps at once; each map is present only
* when at least one profile is in that state.
*/
/** The configured worker profiles and which one a no-argument spawn uses. */
private void profiles(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /profiles"), null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
return;
}
// fleetd #297: ONE body builder, shared with fleet_profiles. Handing both doors the same
// QuarantineSource/OutageSource instances stops them reading different facts; rendering
// through the same method stops them reporting those facts differently. Both are needed.
ctx.status(200).json(FleetMcp.profilesView(workers, quarantine, outage));
ctx.status(200).json(Map.of(
"profiles", workers.profiles(),
"default", workers.defaultProfile() == null ? "" : workers.defaultProfile()));
}
/**
@@ -443,7 +376,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
* name list, which is exactly what let the list drift silently behind the real policy.
*/
private void memberCredentials(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /member-credentials"), null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
return;
}
MemberCredentialPolicyView view = memberCredentials.get();
@@ -463,7 +396,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
* the subscription boundary, 400 for an unknown profile.
*/
private void spawnMember(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("POST /members"), null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.SPAWN, null)) {
return;
}
String role = ctx.queryParam("role");
@@ -502,11 +435,6 @@ public final class FleetApp {
ctx.status(201).json(view(member));
} catch (GuardException e) {
ctx.status(403).json(Map.of("error", "subscription_boundary", "detail", e.getMessage()));
} catch (ShuttingDownException e) {
// fleetd #308: the daemon's shutdown drain has already started — 503, not a bare 500,
// so this reads the same as PlacementException below: valid request, refused because
// of a transient daemon state rather than a bad argument.
ctx.status(503).json(Map.of("error", "shutting_down", "detail", e.getMessage()));
} catch (PlacementException e) {
// CB-599: no candidate had capacity (maxLoad, quarantine, or all-exhausted) — a benign,
// likely-transient refusal, distinct from "profile does not exist" below. 503: the
@@ -516,12 +444,6 @@ public final class FleetApp {
ctx.status(400).json(Map.of("error", "unknown_profile", "detail", e.getMessage()));
} catch (PeerUnreachableException e) {
ctx.status(502).json(Map.of("error", "spawn_timeout", "detail", e.getMessage()));
} catch (HerdrException e) {
// fleetd #304: not every herdr failure on the spawn path is a readiness timeout, so
// PeerUnreachableException above does not cover this. Without this catch the exception
// escapes to Javalin's default 500, while fleet_spawn reports the same failure as a
// clean named error (FleetMcp.spawn) — the #297 one-door-guarded shape.
herdrError(ctx, e);
}
}
@@ -542,29 +464,13 @@ public final class FleetApp {
return (s == null || s.isBlank()) ? null : s;
}
/**
* Tear a worker down by pane id.
*
* <p>fleetd #304: the {@code HerdrException} catch is not cosmetic. {@code release} deregisters
* the session, notifies the release listener and preserves a dirty worktree <em>before</em> it
* calls {@code launcher.stop}, so a throw from that stop arrives after the teardown the caller
* asked for has already happened. Letting it escape gave Javalin's default 500, which tells the
* caller to retry — and the retry finds nothing in the registry, reaches the same stop, and
* throws again, so it can never succeed. {@code herdrError} instead answers 404 ("the pane is
* gone, stop retrying") or 502 ("herdr is upstream and broken, a retry may help"), matching what
* {@code fleet_stop} reports for the same failure.
*/
/** Tear a worker down by pane id. */
private void stopMember(Context ctx) {
String paneId = ctx.pathParam("paneId");
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("DELETE /members/{paneId}"), paneId)) {
return;
}
try {
sessions.release(paneId);
} catch (HerdrException e) {
herdrError(ctx, e);
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.STOP, paneId)) {
return;
}
sessions.release(paneId);
ctx.status(204);
}
@@ -576,7 +482,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
*/
private void sendMessage(Context ctx) {
String id = ctx.pathParam("id");
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/message"), id)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.SEND, id)) {
return;
}
String content;
@@ -663,7 +569,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
*/
private void askMessage(Context ctx) {
String id = ctx.pathParam("id");
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/ask"), id)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.ASK, id)) {
return;
}
String question;
@@ -702,7 +608,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
// The rule that matters: a worker may reply only as itself. Over MCP this was already true
// structurally (identity comes from the connection, never an argument); over REST the path
// id was simply trusted, so this is where the invariant actually gets enforced.
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/reply"), id)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.REPLY, id)) {
return;
}
String content;
@@ -712,19 +618,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
ctx.status(400).json(Map.of("error", "bad_request", "detail", "body must be JSON"));
return;
}
// fleetd #302: content is required. `.path("content").asText("")` above turns a missing key
// into "" rather than throwing, so without this check an empty/blank reply used to reach
// messages.reply(...) and silently resolve the lead's waiter — the same class of bug as the
// sibling "content is required" guards on sendMessage/askMessage below, except this one wrote
// a WRONG value instead of failing loudly. The check lives in MessageService.reply so both
// this door and FleetMcp.reply inherit the same rule; this catch only translates it into the
// {error, detail} envelope this file uses everywhere else.
try {
messages.reply(id, content);
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
ctx.status(400).json(Map.of("error", "bad_request", "detail", e.getMessage()));
return;
}
messages.reply(id, content);
ctx.status(200).json(Map.of("sessionId", id, "delivered", true));
}
@@ -735,7 +629,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
*/
private void drainReplies(Context ctx) {
String id = ctx.pathParam("id");
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /sessions/{id}/replies"), id)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.DRAIN, id)) {
return;
}
var replies = messages.drainReplies(id);
@@ -753,7 +647,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
*/
private void sessionStatus(Context ctx) {
String id = ctx.pathParam("id");
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /sessions/{id}/status"), id)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, id)) {
return;
}
try {
@@ -778,7 +672,7 @@ public final class FleetApp {
/** Poll an async (wait:false) delegation by ticket. 404 for an unknown/expired ticket. */
private void taskStatus(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /tasks/{ticket}"), null)) {
if (!allow(ctx, Authz.Action.READ, null)) {
return;
}
MessageService.TaskView v = messages.poll(ctx.pathParam("ticket"));
@@ -93,9 +93,6 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
/** OS group name for {@link #shareWithGroup} (fleetd #185 stage 3); {@code null} ⇒ feature off. */
private final String group;
private final Consumer<String> afterWorktreeAdded;
/** How the initial {@code git worktree add} command runs. Package-private test seam for an
* interrupted command after Git has made worktree state. */
private final Function<String[], String> worktreeAddRunner;
/** How {@link #shareWithGroup}'s processes (git config / chgrp / chmod / find) actually run.
* Defaults to the real {@link #exec(String...)}. Package-private test seam so a unit test can
* prove "no group configured ⇒ zero processes spawned" and inspect exactly what a configured
@@ -135,13 +132,7 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
/** Test seam combining a configurable {@code group} with {@link #afterWorktreeAdded}. */
GitWorktrees(String configuredRoot, String group, Consumer<String> afterWorktreeAdded) {
this(configuredRoot, group, afterWorktreeAdded, null, null);
}
/** Test seam for changing how {@link #shareWithGroup}'s processes run. */
GitWorktrees(String configuredRoot, String group, Consumer<String> afterWorktreeAdded,
Function<String[], String> shareGroupRunner) {
this(configuredRoot, group, afterWorktreeAdded, shareGroupRunner, null);
this(configuredRoot, group, afterWorktreeAdded, null);
}
/**
@@ -150,15 +141,13 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
* exactly what commands a configured group runs, without a real second OS user/group.
*
* @param shareGroupRunner {@code null} ⇒ the real {@link #exec(String...)}.
* @param worktreeAddRunner {@code null} ⇒ the real {@link #exec(String...)}.
*/
GitWorktrees(String configuredRoot, String group, Consumer<String> afterWorktreeAdded,
Function<String[], String> shareGroupRunner, Function<String[], String> worktreeAddRunner) {
Function<String[], String> shareGroupRunner) {
this.configuredRoot = configuredRoot;
this.group = (group == null || group.isBlank()) ? null : group;
this.afterWorktreeAdded = afterWorktreeAdded == null ? _ -> {} : afterWorktreeAdded;
this.shareGroupRunner = shareGroupRunner != null ? shareGroupRunner : this::exec;
this.worktreeAddRunner = worktreeAddRunner != null ? worktreeAddRunner : this::exec;
}
@Override
@@ -177,8 +166,8 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
String wt = path.toAbsolutePath().toString();
log.info("adding worktree branch={} path={} base={}", branch, wt, base);
removeUserInfoFromHttpsOrigin(repoRoot);
exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "worktree", "add", wt, "-b", branch, base);
try {
worktreeAddRunner.apply(new String[] {"git", "-C", repoRoot, "worktree", "add", wt, "-b", branch, base});
afterWorktreeAdded.accept(wt);
requireCredentialFreeHttpsOrigin(wt);
configureEnvironmentCredentialHelper(repoRoot, wt);
@@ -192,11 +181,10 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
}
/**
* {@code git worktree add} may have created the worktree and its branch by the time it, or any
* later step through {@link #isolateToolSurface}, throws. This includes
* {@code add()} has already created the worktree and its branch by the time any step from
* {@link #afterWorktreeAdded} through {@link #isolateToolSurface} can throw — including
* {@link #requireCredentialFreeHttpsOrigin}, an intended security refusal, not only an IO
* accident. A Git-reported {@code worktree add} failure usually creates nothing, but an
* interrupted command can leave partial state. Without cleanup, {@code add()} never returns, so its caller
* accident. Without this, {@code add()} never returns, so its caller
* ({@code SessionManager#acquireWithWorktree}) never receives a path to register or clean up:
* its local {@code path} stays null, the {@code if (path != null)} guard in its own catch block
* never runs, and the worktree directory and branch leak on disk forever with nothing tracking
@@ -216,10 +204,6 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
* used in {@code SessionManager#acquireWithWorktree}'s own catch block.
*/
private void cleanupAfterAddFailure(String repoRoot, String worktreePath, String branch, RuntimeException original) {
if (!Files.exists(Path.of(worktreePath))) {
log.debug("provisioning failed before worktree {} existed; nothing to clean up", worktreePath);
return;
}
log.warn("provisioning failed for branch={} path={}: {} — cleaning up before rethrowing",
branch, worktreePath, original.getMessage());
try {
@@ -229,18 +213,13 @@ public final class GitWorktrees implements Worktrees {
worktreePath, cleanup.getMessage());
}
try {
deleteBranch(repoRoot, branch);
exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "branch", "-D", branch);
} catch (RuntimeException cleanup) {
log.warn("failed to remove leaked branch {} after provisioning error: {}",
branch, cleanup.getMessage());
}
}
@Override
public void deleteBranch(String repoRoot, String branch) {
exec("git", "-C", repoRoot, "branch", "-D", branch);
}
/**
* A linked worktree shares its primary checkout's git config. Remove HTTPS user info before
* adding one, so a credential accidentally embedded in that config cannot reach the member.
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import java.util.Optional;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong;
import java.util.function.Consumer;
import java.util.function.LongSupplier;
@@ -62,8 +61,6 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
private final LongSupplier nowNanos;
private final int contextCap;
private final boolean clearAfterTurn;
/** Null in production; test seam for the interval before an idle session's conditional release. */
private final Consumer<MemberSession> beforeIdleRelease;
private volatile MemberLifecycle memberLifecycle = MemberLifecycle.NONE;
/**
* CB-586: the repo root the fleet actually works in, remembered the first time a worktree
@@ -74,16 +71,6 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
*/
private volatile String fleetRepoRoot;
/**
* fleetd #308: flips true the instant {@link #drainAll} starts, before its registry snapshot
* is even taken — so a spawn already in flight sees the refusal as early as a plain flag can
* make it. This alone cannot close the race completely: a caller that read {@code false} just
* before the flip can still land in the registry after the snapshot. {@link #drainAll}'s
* post-loop sweep is what catches that straggler; the two mechanisms are deliberately paired,
* see {@link #drainAll}'s javadoc.
*/
private final AtomicBoolean draining = new AtomicBoolean(false);
/** CB-520: notified with a terminalId on every acquire; no-op until wired. */
private final List<Consumer<String>> acquireListeners = new java.util.concurrent.CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
/** CB-516: notified with a {@link ReleaseDetail} on every release; no-op until wired. */
@@ -115,23 +102,13 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
}
public SessionManager(PeerLauncher launcher, Worktrees worktrees, LongSupplier nowNanos,
int contextCap, boolean clearAfterTurn) {
this(launcher, worktrees, nowNanos, contextCap, clearAfterTurn, null);
}
/**
* Package-private constructor for a deterministic reap/delivery race test. Production callers
* use the constructor above, whose null hook adds no callback or lock to an ordinary reap.
*/
SessionManager(PeerLauncher launcher, Worktrees worktrees, LongSupplier nowNanos,
int contextCap, boolean clearAfterTurn, Consumer<MemberSession> beforeIdleRelease) {
int contextCap, boolean clearAfterTurn) {
this.launcher = launcher;
this.worktrees = worktrees;
this.presence = new PresenceFleet(this);
this.nowNanos = nowNanos;
this.contextCap = contextCap;
this.clearAfterTurn = clearAfterTurn;
this.beforeIdleRelease = beforeIdleRelease;
}
/**
@@ -204,14 +181,6 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
public MemberSession acquire(String profile, MemberRole role, String requestedCwd, String callerCwd,
String ownerTerminal, WorktreeRequest wt,
String sessionName, String resumeSessionId) {
// fleetd #308: refuse before anything else runs — no slot reservation, no launcher spawn —
// so a caller learns the daemon is going down instead of getting a session drainAll will
// never see again. Checked here because every other acquire(...) overload delegates to
// this one, so this is the single point every spawn path passes through.
if (draining.get()) {
throw new ShuttingDownException("fleetd is shutting down; refusing to spawn a session "
+ "the shutdown drain would never see");
}
MemberRole memberRole = (role == null) ? MemberRole.DEV : role;
requireResumeCapability(profile, resumeSessionId);
// CB-619 / fleetd #123: an explicit profile bypasses placement (CompositePeerLauncher only
@@ -303,32 +272,10 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
*/
private void release(String paneId, ReleaseCause cause) {
MemberSession removed = registry.remove(paneId);
releaseRemoved(paneId, removed, handles.remove(paneId), cause);
}
/**
* Tear a session down only while {@code expected} is still its registry value. A lifecycle
* transition replaces the immutable record, so this prevents a reap based on an old READY or
* DONE record from stopping a worker that delivery has made BUSY.
*/
private boolean releaseIfCurrent(MemberSession expected, ReleaseCause cause) {
if (!registry.remove(expected.paneId(), expected)) {
// A lifecycle transition replaced the record between the caller's check and this remove.
// Log it: this race is by definition unobservable otherwise, and a reaper that silently
// declines to reap is the hardest kind of behaviour to diagnose after the fact.
log.debug("skipping reap of pane={}: its registry record changed after the idle check "
+ "(most likely a delivery made it BUSY)", expected.paneId());
return false;
}
releaseRemoved(expected.paneId(), expected, handles.remove(expected.paneId()), cause);
return true;
}
private void releaseRemoved(String paneId, MemberSession removed, PeerHandle removedHandle,
ReleaseCause cause) {
// fleetd #209: remove right alongside the registry entry so a released session's handle is
// never leaked — but keep the local reference below, so the id can still be resolved for
// the ReleaseDetail this teardown notifies with.
PeerHandle removedHandle = handles.remove(paneId);
boolean preserveWorktree = cause == ReleaseCause.SHUTDOWN;
String snapshotRef = null;
if (removed != null) {
@@ -387,20 +334,7 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
// slot that no longer appears in the roster and can never be reclaimed.
launcher.stop(paneId);
if (removed != null && !preserveWorktree && removed.worktree() != null) {
// fleetd #283: this is the one cleanup step in this method that used to be bare. By the
// time it runs, the registry entry, the retained handle, and the pane are all already
// gone — so a throw here (a stale index lock, a slow filesystem, `remove`'s own 30s exec
// timeout) must not escape release(): there is no retry path (a second stop on this
// paneId is a no-op), and the caller would otherwise see a "failed stop" for a session
// that is in fact fully torn down. Log and swallow, matching every sibling step above.
try {
worktrees.remove(worktrees.repoRoot(removed.cwd()), removed.worktree());
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.warn("failed to remove worktree {} for pane={} terminal={} after release: the "
+ "pane is already stopped and the session already deregistered, so this is "
+ "not retryable — the directory must be reclaimed manually: {}",
removed.worktree(), paneId, removed.terminalId(), e.toString());
}
worktrees.remove(worktrees.repoRoot(removed.cwd()), removed.worktree());
}
}
@@ -570,26 +504,11 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
log.warn("spawn failed for profile={} role={} branch={} path={}: {}",
preResolvedProfile, memberRole, branch, path, e.getMessage());
if (path != null) {
// fleetd #283: this catch covers every failure AFTER worktrees.add() returned —
// overlayParity, shareWithGroup, launcher.spawn itself — so by this point `branch`
// was actually created in git. #274 fixed the sibling failure INSIDE add() by having
// GitWorktrees.cleanupAfterAddFailure delete both the worktree and the branch it
// provisioned; this path removed only the worktree and left the branch orphaned. A
// spawn failure here is routine (a quarantined credential, a backend refusal), so
// every occurrence leaked a `worker/<slug>-<nonce>` branch nothing ever pointed at
// again. Reuse the same Worktrees.deleteBranch GitWorktrees already has, rather than
// a second copy of the git command. Best-effort and log-only, like the worktree
// removal right above it — neither cleanup step may mask the original exception.
try {
worktrees.remove(repoRoot, path);
} catch (RuntimeException cleanup) {
log.warn("failed to clean up worktree {} after spawn error: {}", path, cleanup.getMessage());
}
try {
worktrees.deleteBranch(repoRoot, branch);
} catch (RuntimeException cleanup) {
log.warn("failed to clean up branch {} after spawn error: {}", branch, cleanup.getMessage());
}
}
throw e;
}
@@ -899,18 +818,14 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
}
long idleNanos = now - s.lastActivityAtNanos();
if (idleNanos > idleTtlNanos) {
log.debug("reaping idle session terminal={} pane={}: idle {}s exceeds the {}s ttl",
s.terminalId(), s.paneId(), TimeUnit.NANOSECONDS.toSeconds(idleNanos),
TimeUnit.NANOSECONDS.toSeconds(idleTtlNanos));
// CB-581: one session that fails to release must not abort the whole reaping pass —
// match drainAll's per-session try/catch so the rest of the roster still gets reaped.
try {
if (beforeIdleRelease != null) {
beforeIdleRelease.accept(s);
}
if (releaseIfCurrent(s, ReleaseCause.COMPLETED)) {
log.debug("reaping idle session terminal={} pane={}: idle {}s exceeds the {}s ttl",
s.terminalId(), s.paneId(), TimeUnit.NANOSECONDS.toSeconds(idleNanos),
TimeUnit.NANOSECONDS.toSeconds(idleTtlNanos));
reaped++;
}
release(s.paneId());
reaped++;
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.warn("reap failed for pane={} terminal={} worktree={}; continuing with "
+ "remaining sessions", s.paneId(), s.terminalId(), s.worktree(), e);
@@ -921,60 +836,20 @@ public final class SessionManager implements TurnListener {
}
/**
* Gracefully drain all registered sessions on daemon shutdown. Non-busy sessions are released
* immediately; a {@code BUSY} one is polled until it leaves {@code BUSY}, then released
* regardless. A failure releasing one session is logged and does not abort the rest.
*
* <p>{@code timeoutNanos} is a budget for the WHOLE drain, not a grace period per session: the
* deadline is taken once, before the loop. So the first BUSY session can spend all of it, and a
* later BUSY one is then released with no wait at all. That is deliberate. This drain is only
* one phase of shutdown — {@code Fleetd} closes the message service, the push loop, the
* heartbeat, MCP and the router after it — and the whole sequence has to finish inside
* launchd's exit window. A per-session grace would let N busy members drain for N * the
* timeout, overrun that window, and get the daemon SIGKILLed part-way through; the members not
* yet reached would then get no clean release, no preserved-worktree log, and no snapshot.
* Cutting one turn short is the cheaper failure, and it is not silent: an abandoned BUSY
* session is preserved, snapshotted, and logged at WARN by {@code logPreservedForShutdown}.
* Gracefully drain all registered sessions on daemon shutdown. For each session that is
* {@code BUSY}, poll up to {@code timeoutNanos} for it to leave {@code BUSY}, then release it
* regardless. Non-busy sessions are released immediately. A failure releasing one session is
* logged and does not abort the rest.
*
* <p>CB-544: this is a {@link ReleaseCause#SHUTDOWN} release — the worker's pane is stopped
* (the process must end) but its worktree is preserved and its path logged. Shutdown is never
* a reason to delete a worker's only copy of its uncommitted work. A session still {@code BUSY}
* when the timeout expired is abandoned mid-turn and logged loudly so an operator can find its
* kept worktree.
*
* <p>fleetd #308: {@code roster()} is a one-shot snapshot (see its javadoc), and nothing used
* to stop a new session from registering after it was taken — {@link #acquire} stayed open for
* as long as this drain waited on a {@code BUSY} session, up to the whole {@code timeoutNanos}
* budget. Two things close that window, deliberately paired because neither alone is complete:
* {@link #draining} is flipped true before the snapshot is even taken, so {@link #acquire}
* refuses (invariant 3: loudly, via {@link ShuttingDownException}) as much of the window as a
* plain flag can close; and the sweep below re-reads the registry once the initial snapshot has
* fully drained and drains whatever a straggler — a caller that read the flag as {@code false}
* a moment before it flipped — still managed to register. The sweep shares the same
* {@code deadline} rather than getting its own: {@code timeoutNanos} is a budget for the WHOLE
* drain (see above), and a straggler must not buy the drain more time than the flag it lost the
* race against would have. In the ordinary case the sweep finds nothing and costs one empty
* {@link #roster()} call.
*/
void drainAll(long timeoutNanos) {
long deadline = System.nanoTime() + timeoutNanos;
draining.set(true);
drainSnapshot(roster(), deadline);
List<MemberSession> stragglers = roster();
if (!stragglers.isEmpty()) {
log.warn("drain sweep found {} session(s) registered after the drain snapshot was "
+ "taken (raced past the shutdown guard); draining them too", stragglers.size());
drainSnapshot(stragglers, deadline);
}
}
/**
* Drain exactly the sessions in {@code snapshot}, waiting out a {@code BUSY} one against the
* shared whole-drain {@code deadline} before releasing it. Shared by {@link #drainAll}'s main
* pass and its post-loop straggler sweep (fleetd #308) so both honor the same one budget.
*/
private void drainSnapshot(List<MemberSession> snapshot, long deadline) {
for (MemberSession s : snapshot) {
for (MemberSession s : roster()) {
try {
if (s.state() == MemberSession.State.BUSY) {
while (System.nanoTime() < deadline) {
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.session;
/**
* Thrown by {@link SessionManager#acquire} when a spawn is requested after the daemon's shutdown
* drain has already begun (fleetd #308).
*
* <p>{@link SessionManager#drainAll} snapshots the registry once and tears down exactly what is
* in that snapshot. A session registered after the snapshot is invisible to the drain loop: its
* pane is left running and its worktree is never preserved, and nothing else ever reclaims
* either — the daemon's in-memory registry dies with the process. Refusing the spawn here,
* loudly, is what stops that session from ever being created in the first place, rather than
* silently handing the caller a session the daemon can no longer manage.
*/
public final class ShuttingDownException extends RuntimeException {
public ShuttingDownException(String message) {
super(message);
}
}
@@ -11,15 +11,6 @@ public interface Worktrees {
/** git -C <repoRoot> worktree remove --force <path>. Idempotent (already-gone tolerated). */
void remove(String repoRoot, String worktreePath);
/**
* git -C {@code repoRoot} branch -D {@code branch}. Force-deletes a branch that has no other
* owner — used only on the failed-provisioning path (fleetd #274, #283), never on a normal
* release: {@link SessionManager#release} deliberately leaves a released session's branch
* behind so a lead can still recover the work, and this method must never be called from
* that path.
*/
void deleteBranch(String repoRoot, String branch);
/**
* True when the worktree holds uncommitted changes the bridge cannot see: tracked
* modifications, staged files, or untracked files. {@code git status --porcelain} is the
@@ -226,44 +226,4 @@ class FleetdBackendErrorSinkTest {
assertTrue(remaining.isPresent(), "two distinct targets must start a cool-off");
assertEquals(1, leadClient.sendCount());
}
@Test
@DisplayName("a backend-error session no longer blocks the real maxLoad spawn gate")
void backendErrorSessionDoesNotBlockFreshSpawnAtMaxLoad() {
SessionManager sessions = capacityLimitedSessions();
MemberSession failed = sessions.acquire("terra", null, null, null);
assertTrue(sessions.onBackendError(failed.terminalId(), "backend exited"));
MemberSession fresh = sessions.acquire("terra", null, null, null);
assertEquals("terra", fresh.profile(), "the real maxLoad gate grants a fresh spawn after a backend error");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("a failed session no longer blocks the real maxLoad spawn gate")
void failedSessionDoesNotBlockFreshSpawnAtMaxLoad() {
SessionManager sessions = capacityLimitedSessions();
MemberSession failed = sessions.acquire("terra", null, null, null);
sessions.onTurnFailed(failed.terminalId());
MemberSession fresh = sessions.acquire("terra", null, null, null);
assertEquals("terra", fresh.profile(), "the real maxLoad gate grants a fresh spawn after a failed turn");
}
private static SessionManager capacityLimitedSessions() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FleetConfig.Profile profile = new FleetConfig.Profile("terra", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder",
null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN", List.of("claude"), "tab", "fleetd-workers",
"w #{n}", null, null, null, null, null, null, null, 1.0f, 1);
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles = Map.of("terra", profile);
ClaudeCodeLauncher adapter = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), profiles, "terra", _ -> "tok");
AtomicReference<SessionManager> sessionsRef = new AtomicReference<>();
CompositePeerLauncher workers = new CompositePeerLauncher(List.of(adapter), "terra", profiles,
PlacementPolicies.fixed(), name -> Fleetd.liveSessionCount(sessionsRef.get().roster(), name));
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workers);
sessionsRef.set(sessions);
return sessions;
}
}
@@ -103,54 +103,6 @@ class CallerResolverTest {
assertEquals(Role.PRIMARY, p.role(), "the historical behaviour, now an explicit choice");
}
// ── fleetd #317: an unresolvable caller must never be promoted to the primary ──────────────────
// #305 closed the trigger where a resolved pid matched no pane *and* had no ancestry walk to
// save it. This is the other trigger PaneLocator's javadoc names: the pid never resolves at
// all — LsofPeerPidLookup returns -1 on any failure, including (silently) "lsof found no
// match" — so there is no candidate pid for an ancestry walk to even attempt.
/**
* The failing-without-the-fix case. Before #317's fix, {@code c.terminal() == null} was the
* only test in the loopback-trust fallback, and an unresolved pid produces exactly that same
* {@code null} terminal as a genuine primary — so this caller was handed
* {@code Principal.primary(...)}, a real worker's failed lookup becoming indistinguishable from
* the lead.
*/
@Test
void aFailedPeerPidLookupIsRefusedNotPromotedToPrimary() {
ConnectionIdentity unresolved = new ConnectionIdentity(new PaneLocator(herdr), _ -> -1);
Principal p = new CallerResolver(unresolved).resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555, null);
assertEquals(Role.ANONYMOUS, p.role(),
"an unresolvable caller must never be silently promoted to the primary");
}
/**
* The companion invariant #317 must not break: a caller whose lookup genuinely succeeded, and
* who simply owns no herdr pane — the real primary's own connection — is still the primary.
* This is {@link #loopbackTrustTreatsANonWorkerLoopbackCallerAsThePrimary} pinned again here,
* named for #317 and placed next to the test it must be distinguished from: same {@code null}
* terminal, opposite verdict, because {@code Caller.resolved()} tells them apart.
*/
@Test
void aRealPidThatOwnsNoPaneIsStillThePrimaryNotRefused() {
Principal p = new CallerResolver(nonWorkerIdentity()).resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555, null);
assertEquals(Role.PRIMARY, p.role());
}
/** #317 point 4: token mode never consults {@code c.pid()}, so a failed lookup must not change it. */
@Test
void tokenModeIsUndisturbedByAnUnresolvedLookup() {
ConnectionIdentity unresolved = new ConnectionIdentity(new PaneLocator(herdr), _ -> -1);
CallerResolver r = new CallerResolver(unresolved, true, "s3cret");
assertEquals(Role.ANONYMOUS, r.resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555, null).role(),
"no credential is still just ANONYMOUS, as before #317 — unchanged by the lookup failing");
assertEquals(Role.PRIMARY, r.resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555, "Bearer s3cret").role(),
"a valid token still authenticates the primary even though the peer-pid lookup failed");
}
@Test
void tokenModeRefusesANonWorkerCallerThatPresentsNoToken() {
Principal p = new CallerResolver(nonWorkerIdentity(), true, "s3cret")
@@ -461,29 +413,4 @@ class CallerResolverTest {
assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> new CallerResolver(id, true, null));
assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> new CallerResolver(id, true, " "));
}
@Test
void aWorkerOnAnyLoopbackSourceAddressIsStillAWorkerNotThePrimary() {
// fleetd #305: the escalation. ConnectionIdentity used to accept only 127.0.0.1, so a
// worker connecting from 127.0.0.2 resolved to no terminal, and this resolver's own
// (wider) loopback check then made it the PRIMARY — granting spawn, stop, send and drain.
// Measured on the Linux fleet host: binding a source of 127.0.0.2 succeeds there, so the
// path is real and not theoretical.
CallerResolver r = new CallerResolver(workerIdentity(), false, null);
for (String src : new String[]{"127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2", "127.1.2.3", "::ffff:127.0.0.2"}) {
Principal p = r.resolve(src, 55555, null);
assertEquals(Role.WORKER, p.role(), "a worker must stay a worker from source " + src);
assertEquals("term_a", p.terminal(), "worker terminal from source " + src);
}
}
@Test
void aNonWorkerOnAnyLoopbackSourceAddressIsStillThePrimary() {
// The other direction of the same fix: widening the identity check must not demote a
// legitimate same-host primary that happens to connect from another 127.* address.
CallerResolver r = new CallerResolver(nonWorkerIdentity(), false, null);
for (String src : new String[]{"127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2", "::ffff:127.0.0.1"}) {
assertEquals(Role.PRIMARY, r.resolve(src, 55555, null).role(), "source " + src);
}
}
}
@@ -24,9 +24,7 @@ import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.CompletableFuture;
import java.util.concurrent.Executors;
import java.util.concurrent.ScheduledFuture;
import java.util.concurrent.ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong;
@@ -436,120 +434,4 @@ class FleetHealthMonitorTest {
logger.detachAppender(appender);
}
}
// --- fleetd #280: a GONE/NEVER_READY guess whose fleet_ask lapses AFTER the first sweep must
// still be swept, without ever reaching into a target that has since recovered or left the
// roster. See FleetHealthMonitor.recheckTerminalTarget's javadoc for the full reachability chain.
@Test void terminalTransitionSchedulesExactlyOneDelayedRecheck() {
ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor scheduler = new ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor(1);
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitor(new FakeHerdr(),
List.of(member("term_a", MemberSession.State.BUSY, 0, 0)), scheduler, () -> 1, 600,
(_, _) -> { });
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
// Driven via reportTransition directly (not tick()), so the queue holds only the recheck.
assertEquals(1, scheduler.getQueue().size());
ScheduledFuture<?> scheduled = (ScheduledFuture<?>) scheduler.getQueue().peek();
assertTrue(scheduled.getDelay(TimeUnit.SECONDS) > 100,
"the delay must clear the worst-case fleet_ask lapse window (up to 115s)");
// An unchanged tick must not queue a second one (CB-580's fire-once rule extends to this).
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(1, scheduler.getQueue().size());
monitor.stop();
}
@Test void recheckIsANoOpOnceTheTargetHasRecovered() {
RecordingFailTarget failTarget = new RecordingFailTarget();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitorWith(failTarget);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(1, failTarget.calls.size());
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.IDLE); // recovered before the recheck fired
monitor.recheckTerminalTarget("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(1, failTarget.calls.size(), "a recovered target must not be reached into again");
monitor.stop();
}
@Test void recheckIsANoOpForATargetItNeverObserved() {
// Mirrors "left the roster": tick() prunes states.keySet() to the current roster on release
// (see FleetHealthMonitor.tick), so a target this monitor never recorded is the same case.
RecordingFailTarget failTarget = new RecordingFailTarget();
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = monitorWith(failTarget);
monitor.recheckTerminalTarget("term_never_seen", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(0, failTarget.calls.size(), "an untracked/released target must not be reached into");
monitor.stop();
}
/**
* The scenario from the ticket, end to end, driven through the real {@link MessageService}: a
* target's ask is still genuinely open when health first observes GONE (sweep must skip it,
* exactly as {@code abandonDoesNotFailAnAsyncTicketWaitingForAnAnswer} pins), the ask then lapses
* on its own, an unchanged tick still must not refire, and only the delayed recheck sweeps the
* now-lapsed ticket to FAILED.
*/
@Test void delayedRecheckSweepsATicketWhoseAskLapsedAfterGoneWasFirstObserved() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().withAgent("worker", "term_a", "pane-term_a", "tab_a")
.readText("$ prompt");
AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
Rendezvous rendezvous = new Rendezvous();
Injector injector = new Injector(agents);
InMemoryReplyInbox inbox = new InMemoryReplyInbox();
inbox.own("term_a");
MessageService messages = new MessageService(agents, injector, rendezvous, inbox);
FleetHealthMonitor monitor = new FleetHealthMonitor(agents,
() -> List.of(member("term_a", MemberSession.State.READY, 0, 0)), messages,
new ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor(1), () -> 1, 60, 600, messages::abandon);
String ticket = messages.sendAsync("term_a", "task that asks");
long deadline = System.currentTimeMillis() + 2000;
while (!rendezvous.isWaiting("term_a") && System.currentTimeMillis() < deadline) {
Thread.sleep(5);
}
assertTrue(rendezvous.isWaiting("term_a"), "the async send should have opened its waiter");
injector.onStatus("term_a", AgentStatus.IDLE); // deliver the task
injector.onStatus("term_a", AgentStatus.WORKING); // the worker picks it up
// The worker asks, with a short timeout so its own fleet_ask lapses quickly in test time.
CompletableFuture<MessageService.AskResult> ask = CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(
() -> messages.ask("term_a", "which config?", 200));
awaitPhase(messages, ticket, MessageService.Phase.ASKING);
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.ASKING, messages.poll(ticket).phase(),
"the first sweep must not fail a ticket that is still genuinely being asked");
// The worker's own fleet_ask now lapses on its own — task.question clears to null.
assertEquals(MessageService.AskOutcome.TIMED_OUT, ask.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS).outcome());
// An unchanged tick still must not refire (CB-580).
monitor.reportTransition("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.PENDING, messages.poll(ticket).phase());
// The delayed recheck scheduled for the original transition finally sweeps it.
monitor.recheckTerminalTarget("term_a", HealthState.GONE);
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.FAILED, messages.poll(ticket).phase());
monitor.stop();
}
private static MessageService.TaskView awaitPhase(MessageService messages, String ticket,
MessageService.Phase phase) throws InterruptedException {
long deadline = System.currentTimeMillis() + 2000;
MessageService.TaskView view;
do {
view = messages.poll(ticket);
if (view.phase() == phase) {
return view;
}
Thread.sleep(5);
} while (System.currentTimeMillis() < deadline);
assertEquals(phase, view.phase());
return view;
}
}
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
import java.util.concurrent.CopyOnWriteArrayList;
/**
@@ -40,12 +39,8 @@ public final class FakeHerdr implements HerdrClient {
private final Map<String, List<String>> extraTabs = new LinkedHashMap<>();
private int agentNameTakenFor = 0;
private int agentPaneBusyFor = 0;
private String agentStartErrorCode = null;
private int workerTabPaneCount = 1;
private String paneCloseErrorCode = null;
private final Map<String, String> paneCloseErrorCodeFor = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
private String tabCloseErrorCode = null;
private final Map<String, String> tabCloseErrorCodeFor = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
private String agentSendErrorCode = null;
private boolean noPanes = false;
private volatile String agentStatus = "idle"; // steady-state agent.get status
@@ -85,56 +80,18 @@ public final class FakeHerdr implements HerdrClient {
return this;
}
/** Make every {@code agent.start} call fail with this herdr error code. */
public FakeHerdr agentStartFailsWith(String code) {
this.agentStartErrorCode = code;
return this;
}
/** Make the worker tab (w9:t2) report this many panes in {@code tab.list} (default 1). */
public FakeHerdr withWorkerTabPaneCount(int n) {
this.workerTabPaneCount = n;
return this;
}
/** Make {@code pane.close} fail with this herdr error code, for every pane. */
/** Make {@code pane.close} fail with this herdr error code. */
public FakeHerdr paneCloseFailsWith(String code) {
this.paneCloseErrorCode = code;
return this;
}
/**
* Make {@code pane.close} fail with this herdr error code, but only for the given {@code
* pane_id} — every other pane's {@code pane.close} still succeeds. Unlike {@link
* #paneCloseFailsWith}, which fails every call regardless of which pane it targets, this lets a
* test reap/release several sessions at once and make exactly one of them fail to stop, so the
* others' teardown can be asserted to proceed normally (fleetd #290).
*/
public FakeHerdr paneCloseFailsForPane(String paneId, String code) {
this.paneCloseErrorCodeFor.put(paneId, code);
return this;
}
/** Make {@code tab.close} fail with this herdr error code, for every tab. */
public FakeHerdr tabCloseFailsWith(String code) {
this.tabCloseErrorCode = code;
return this;
}
/**
* Make {@code tab.close} fail with this herdr error code, but only for the given {@code
* tab_id} — every other tab's {@code tab.close} still succeeds. The {@code tab.close}
* counterpart to {@link #paneCloseFailsForPane} (fleetd #290): lets a test make exactly one
* session's tab teardown fail while proving the rest of {@code stop()} — {@code
* releaseZdotdir}, and the caller's worktree removal — still runs (fleetd #293). Named "ForTab"
* rather than "ForPane" (unlike its sibling) because {@code tab.close} keys on {@code tab_id},
* not a pane id.
*/
public FakeHerdr tabCloseFailsForTab(String tabId, String code) {
this.tabCloseErrorCodeFor.put(tabId, code);
return this;
}
/**
* Make {@code pane.list} report no panes at all — models a second herdr daemon (CB-185) that
* simply does not host the pane a {@link PaneLocator} is searching for.
@@ -318,10 +275,6 @@ public final class FakeHerdr implements HerdrClient {
+ required + "`", "invalid_request", null);
}
}
if (agentStartErrorCode != null) {
throw new HerdrException("herdr error [" + agentStartErrorCode + "]: agent.start failed",
agentStartErrorCode, null);
}
long starts = calls.stream().filter(c -> c.method().equals("agent.start")).count();
if (starts <= agentPaneBusyFor) {
throw new HerdrException(
@@ -385,17 +338,7 @@ public final class FakeHerdr implements HerdrClient {
.formatted(workerTabPaneCount,
seeded.isEmpty() ? "" : "," + String.join(",", seeded)));
}
case "tab.close" -> {
Object tabIdParam = params instanceof Map<?, ?> m ? m.get("tab_id") : null;
String perTabCode = tabIdParam == null ? null
: tabCloseErrorCodeFor.get(String.valueOf(tabIdParam));
String code = perTabCode != null ? perTabCode : tabCloseErrorCode;
if (code != null) {
throw new HerdrException("herdr error [" + code + "]: tab.close failed",
code, null);
}
yield mapper.readTree("{\"type\":\"ok\"}");
}
case "tab.close" -> mapper.readTree("{\"type\":\"ok\"}");
case "pane.get" -> mapper.readTree("""
{"type":"pane_info","pane":{"pane_id":"w9:pW","workspace_id":"w9",
"tab_id":"w9:t2","agent_status":"idle"}}""");
@@ -417,13 +360,9 @@ public final class FakeHerdr implements HerdrClient {
"foreground_processes":[]}}""");
}
case "pane.close" -> {
Object paneIdParam = params instanceof Map<?, ?> m ? m.get("pane_id") : null;
String perPaneCode = paneIdParam == null ? null
: paneCloseErrorCodeFor.get(String.valueOf(paneIdParam));
String code = perPaneCode != null ? perPaneCode : paneCloseErrorCode;
if (code != null) {
throw new HerdrException("herdr error [" + code + "]: pane.close failed",
code, null);
if (paneCloseErrorCode != null) {
throw new HerdrException("herdr error [" + paneCloseErrorCode + "]: pane.close failed",
paneCloseErrorCode, null);
}
yield mapper.readTree("{\"type\":\"ok\"}");
}
@@ -297,68 +297,6 @@ class InjectorTest {
assertTrue(inj.activeTargets().isEmpty(), "the wedged target is reclaimed, not polled forever");
}
/** A listener whose post-turn housekeeping always starts, as SessionManager's does with clearAfterTurn on. */
private static final class PostTurnListener implements TurnListener {
@Override public void onTurnComplete(String target) { }
@Override public boolean hasPostTurnAction(String target) { return true; }
@Override public boolean onTurnCompleteWithPostAction(String target) { return true; }
}
@Test
void aWorkerThatWedgesInUnknownAwaitingPostTurnPickupIsReleased() {
// fleetd #306: the post-turn phase had no way out of a sustained unknown streak, so the
// pickup latch stayed set, the target was polled forever, and every later message to it was
// blocked by the delivery gate — while the session still looked healthy.
Captor cap = new Captor();
Injector inj = new Injector(new AgentControl(herdr), new PostTurnListener());
inj.enqueue(T, "task", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE); // deliver
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.WORKING); // turn starts
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE); // turn completes; housekeeping dispatched
for (int i = 0; i < STALL_SAMPLES; i++) inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.UNKNOWN); // then wedges
assertTrue(inj.activeTargets().isEmpty(),
"a target wedged awaiting post-turn pickup must be reclaimed, not polled forever");
assertEquals(List.of(), cap.failed,
"the delegated turn already completed — a stuck /clear must not be reported as a failed turn");
}
@Test
void aWorkerThatWedgesInUnknownAfterPickingUpTheResetIsReleased() {
// The sibling latch. postTurnObserved is set when the reset is seen picked up (WORKING) and
// is cleared only on a later injectable sample, so a wedge right after pickup sticks too.
Captor cap = new Captor();
Injector inj = new Injector(new AgentControl(herdr), new PostTurnListener());
inj.enqueue(T, "task", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.WORKING);
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE); // turn complete; reset dispatched
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.WORKING); // reset picked up -> postTurnObserved
for (int i = 0; i < STALL_SAMPLES; i++) inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.UNKNOWN);
assertTrue(inj.activeTargets().isEmpty(), "a wedge after reset pickup must also be reclaimed");
assertEquals(List.of(), cap.failed, "still not a turn failure");
}
@Test
void aBriefUnknownDuringPostTurnHousekeepingDoesNotDropTheLatch() {
// The other direction: the escape must not fire on a glitch, or the queued next delegation
// would overtake housekeeping that is still running.
Injector inj = new Injector(new AgentControl(herdr), new PostTurnListener());
inj.enqueue(T, "first", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
inj.enqueue(T, "second", TestTurnTokens.inert(T));
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE);
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.WORKING);
inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.IDLE); // first completes; reset dispatched
for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++) inj.onStatus(T, AgentStatus.UNKNOWN); // well under the grace
assertFalse(inj.activeTargets().isEmpty(), "a brief glitch must not release the post-turn latch");
assertEquals(List.of("first"), sent(), "the queued delegation must not overtake housekeeping");
}
@Test
void aTransientUnknownGlitchNeitherFailsNorBlocksCompletion() {
Captor cap = new Captor();
@@ -20,17 +20,6 @@ class ConnectionIdentityTest {
assertEquals("term_a", with(_ -> FakeHerdr.WORKER_PID).callerTerminal("127.0.0.1", 55555));
}
@Test
void resolvesWorkerFromAnyLoopbackSourceAddressNotJust127001() {
// fleetd #305. On Linux the whole 127.0.0.0/8 is bound to lo, so a worker can connect with
// a source address of 127.0.0.2. If identity resolution skips that address the caller has
// no terminal, and a caller with no terminal is the primary under loopback-trust — so this
// must resolve the worker, not null.
assertEquals("term_a", with(_ -> FakeHerdr.WORKER_PID).callerTerminal("127.0.0.2", 55555));
assertEquals("term_a", with(_ -> FakeHerdr.WORKER_PID).callerTerminal("127.1.2.3", 55555));
assertEquals("term_a", with(_ -> FakeHerdr.WORKER_PID).callerTerminal("::ffff:127.0.0.2", 55555));
}
@Test
void nullForOffHostCaller() {
// A non-loopback peer can't be an on-host worker → treat as primary/unknown.
@@ -43,22 +32,6 @@ class ConnectionIdentityTest {
assertNull(with(_ -> 999_999).callerTerminal("127.0.0.1", 55555));
}
@Test
void callerIsUnresolvedWhenThePeerPidLookupFails() {
// fleetd #317: LsofPeerPidLookup returns -1 on any failure — a fork error, or (silently)
// simply no matching lsof line. Caller.resolved() is the one place that sentinel is tested.
ConnectionIdentity.Caller c = with(_ -> -1).resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555);
assertFalse(c.resolved(), "a -1 pid means the lookup failed, not that this pid owns no pane");
}
@Test
void callerIsResolvedWhenThePidIsRealEvenThoughItOwnsNoPane() {
// The primary's own connection: a real, lsof-found pid that just isn't a worker pane. This
// must read as "resolved" — the distinction #317 turns on.
ConnectionIdentity.Caller c = with(_ -> 999_999).resolve("127.0.0.1", 55555);
assertTrue(c.resolved());
}
@Test
void resolvesTheCallersPidAndCwd() {
// CB-112: the primary maps to no pane, but its PID and cwd are still readable.
@@ -24,13 +24,8 @@ import io.modelcontextprotocol.spec.McpSchema;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
@@ -49,9 +44,6 @@ import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
*/
class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
private static final Path MCP_SOURCE = Path.of("src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/mcp/FleetMcp.java");
private static final Pattern TOOL_REGISTRATION = Pattern.compile("tool\\(\\\"(fleet_[a-z_]+)\\\"");
private final FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
private final AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
private Metrics metrics;
@@ -209,42 +201,6 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
"a blank target is an absent target");
}
@Test
void everyRegisteredToolHasItsHandlerActionPinned() {
Set<String> registered = toolsTheServerRegisters();
assertTrue(registered.size() >= 10,
"scraped only " + registered.size() + " tool registrations from FleetMcp (" + registered
+ "); the server registers eleven, so the tool(\"…\") scrape has stopped matching");
registered.forEach(tool -> assertDoesNotThrow(() -> FleetMcp.toolAction(tool, Map.of()),
() -> tool + " is registered but has no pinned authorization action"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.SEND, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_send", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.REPLY, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_reply", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.ASK, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_ask", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_status", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_ack", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.SPAWN, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_spawn", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_list", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.STOP, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_stop", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_profiles", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_whoami", Map.of()));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_poll", Map.of("ticket", "task")));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetMcp.toolAction("fleet_poll", Map.of("target", "term_b")));
}
private static Set<String> toolsTheServerRegisters() {
try {
Matcher matcher = TOOL_REGISTRATION.matcher(Files.readString(MCP_SOURCE));
Set<String> tools = new LinkedHashSet<>();
while (matcher.find()) {
tools.add(matcher.group(1));
}
return tools;
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new AssertionError("could not scrape FleetMcp tool registrations", e);
}
}
@Test
void aWorkerMayNotDrainAnotherSessionsInboxByPolling() {
FleetMcp m = mcp(true);
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.EnumSet;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.CompletableFuture;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
@@ -189,7 +188,7 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
}
@Test
void unansweredAsyncAskReturnsTheTicketToPendingThenAWorkersLateReplyStillCompletesIt() throws Exception {
void unansweredAsyncAskReturnsTheTicketToPending() throws Exception {
McpSchema.CallToolResult accepted = FleetMcp.sendAsync(messages, "term_a", "do it", null, Set.of());
String ticket = textOf(accepted).substring(textOf(accepted).indexOf("ticket=") + "ticket=".length()).trim();
@@ -203,15 +202,8 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
assertTrue(textOf(ask).contains("no answer"), textOf(ask));
assertTrue(textOf(FleetMcp.poll(messages, ticket, null)).startsWith("[pending"));
// fleetd #307: the worker resumed on its own after the primary never answered, and its real
// fleet_reply must complete its OWN async ticket — not strand in the inbox with
// fleet_poll{ticket} stuck PENDING forever and later force-failed with a false "session
// released before it replied" reason. This used to land in the inbox instead (see the old
// assertion this replaced: messages.drainReplies("term_a").getFirst()...) — that was the bug.
FleetMcp.reply(messages, "term_a", "finished after timeout");
assertEquals("finished after timeout", textOf(FleetMcp.poll(messages, ticket, null)));
assertTrue(messages.drainReplies("term_a").isEmpty(),
"the reply completed its own ticket directly and never touched the inbox");
assertEquals("finished after timeout", messages.drainReplies("term_a").getFirst().content());
}
@Test
@@ -333,26 +325,6 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
assertEquals("orphan", drained.getFirst().content());
}
@Test
void replyWithBlankContentIsACleanToolErrorNotAnUncaughtException() {
// fleetd #302: MessageService.reply now REJECTS blank content by throwing. fleet_reply's
// handler is a bare BiFunction with no try/catch around it, so if this guard only checked
// `== null` (as it did), a whitespace-only reply would leave the handler as an uncaught
// IllegalArgumentException instead of a tool error the caller can read. Null and whitespace
// are the same caller mistake and must get the same answer — the sibling fleet_send guard
// has always used isBlank for exactly this reason.
for (String blank : new String[] {null, "", " ", "\n\t"}) {
McpSchema.CallToolResult res = assertDoesNotThrow(
() -> FleetMcp.reply(messages, "term_a", blank),
"blank content must be refused as a tool error, never thrown out of the handler");
assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, res.isError(), "blank content is an error result");
assertTrue(textOf(res).contains("content is required"),
"the error names the missing argument: " + textOf(res));
}
assertEquals(0, messages.drainReplies("term_a").size(),
"a refused reply must not reach the inbox");
}
@Test
void bridgePollWithTargetDrainsReplies() {
// A reply with no open send queues it in the inbox.
@@ -632,60 +604,6 @@ class FleetMcpTest {
assertTrue(out.contains("\"reclaimable\":0"), out);
}
/**
* fleetd #284: {@code reclaimable} has exactly one definition, and this pins it over EVERY
* {@link MemberSession.State} — so a state added later cannot slip through unconsidered. Both
* views in a {@code fleet_list} response call {@link FleetMcp#reclaimable}, so they cannot
* drift apart.
*
* <p>{@code BACKEND_ERROR} and {@code FAILED} are NOT reclaimable on purpose. The ticket asked
* for them to be; that half of the ticket was wrong. Their seat is already out of
* {@code live}, so it is already in {@code free} — counting it here too would report the same
* seat twice.
*/
@Test
void onlyReadyAndDoneSessionsAreReclaimable() {
Set<MemberSession.State> expected = EnumSet.of(MemberSession.State.READY, MemberSession.State.DONE);
for (MemberSession.State state : MemberSession.State.values()) {
MemberSession session = new MemberSession("p1", "term1", "ltms-local", null,
"/tmp", null, 0L, 0L, 0, state, null, null);
assertEquals(expected.contains(state), FleetMcp.reclaimable(session, null),
"state " + state + " must " + (expected.contains(state) ? "" : "not ")
+ "count as reclaimable");
}
}
/**
* fleetd #284, the operator-visible half. {@code liveCount} here is the value the real counter
* ({@code Fleetd.liveSessionCount}, proven against the actual spawn gate in
* {@code FleetdBackendErrorSinkTest}) produces for this roster: 0, because both sessions are
* terminal. What this test pins is what {@code fleet_list} says around it — the two seats show
* up once, in {@code free}, and are NOT counted a second time as {@code reclaimable}; neither
* is any member row; and both dead sessions are still listed so the lead can see why.
*/
@Test
void terminalFailureSessionsFreeTheirSeatWithoutBeingCountedReclaimable() {
FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workerService(h, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw")));
MemberSession backendError = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, null, null);
MemberSession failed = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, null, null);
assertTrue(sessions.onBackendError(backendError.terminalId(), "backend exited"));
sessions.onTurnFailed(failed.terminalId());
String out = textOf(FleetMcp.listFleet(workerService(h, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw")),
sessions, null, new FleetMcp.CapacitySource(profile -> 0, profile -> 2,
() -> Set.of("ltms-local"), () -> 0), new FleetMcp.HealthCoverageSource(() -> "off"),
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource.none(), Map.of(), ""));
assertTrue(out.contains("\"free\":2"), "both seats are back: " + out);
assertTrue(out.contains("\"reclaimable\":0"),
"the freed seats must not be counted a second time as reclaimable: " + out);
assertFalse(out.contains("\"reclaimable\":true"),
"no member row may claim a seat the profile count says is not held: " + out);
assertTrue(out.contains("\"state\":\"backend_error\""), "the dead session stays visible: " + out);
assertTrue(out.contains("\"state\":\"failed\""), "the failed session stays visible: " + out);
}
@Test
void inertCapacitySourceOmitsCapacityBlock() {
FakeHerdr h = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -925,71 +925,6 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
assertTrue(herdr.called("pane.close"), "stop via handle.id() must close the pane");
}
/** A tab-placement launcher with {@code memberCredentials policy=allow-list} under a zsh shell — the
* combination that makes {@link HerdrPeerLauncher#spawn} generate a real ZDOTDIR, so {@code
* releaseZdotdir}'s effect (the directory's deletion) is observable from a test. */
private ClaudeCodeLauncher serviceWithAllowList(FakeHerdr herdr) {
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
List.of("ccs", "ltms-local"), "tab", "fleetd-workers",
"worker: {profile} #{n}", null, null, null);
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> creds = () -> new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(
FleetConfig.MemberCredentials.POLICY_ALLOW_LIST, List.of(), List.of(), null);
Function<String, String> env = name -> "SHELL".equals(name) ? "/bin/zsh" : null;
return new ClaudeCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(),
env, 0, System::currentTimeMillis, () -> { }, null, creds);
}
/**
* fleetd #293: {@code stop()} used to run {@code spaces.closeTab} bare — any non-{@code
* *_not_found} herdr error propagated straight out of {@code stop()}, skipping {@code
* releaseZdotdir} entirely (the pane was already closed by that point, so the tab-close failure
* is cosmetic, not a real teardown failure). Proves both halves of the fix: {@code stop()} no
* longer throws for this failure, and {@code releaseZdotdir} still runs — observed here by the
* generated ZDOTDIR actually being deleted, since {@code releaseZdotdir}'s last line is {@code
* EnvAllowListScrub.deleteRecursively(dir)}.
*/
@Test
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
void stopStillReleasesZdotdirWhenCloseTabFailsWithANonNotFoundCode() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
ClaudeCodeLauncher svc = serviceWithAllowList(herdr);
PeerHandle handle = svc.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null));
Map<String, Object> tabCreateParams = (Map<String, Object>) herdr.lastCall("tab.create").params();
Map<String, String> tabEnv = (Map<String, String>) tabCreateParams.get("env");
String zdotdir = tabEnv.get("ZDOTDIR");
assertNotNull(zdotdir, "policy=allow-list under a zsh shell must have generated a ZDOTDIR: " + tabEnv);
Path dir = Path.of(zdotdir);
assertTrue(Files.isDirectory(dir), "the generated ZDOTDIR must exist before stop(): " + dir);
herdr.tabCloseFailsForTab("w9:t2", "internal_error");
Logger logger = (Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(HerdrPeerLauncher.class);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.start();
logger.addAppender(appender);
try {
assertDoesNotThrow(() -> svc.stop(handle.id()),
"fleetd #293: a failing tab.close is cosmetic — it must not propagate out of stop()");
} finally {
logger.detachAppender(appender);
}
assertTrue(herdr.called("tab.close"), "tab.close was still attempted");
assertFalse(Files.exists(dir),
"releaseZdotdir must still run and delete the generated ZDOTDIR despite the tab.close "
+ "failure: " + dir);
String warn = appender.list.stream()
.filter(e -> e.getLevel().equals(Level.WARN))
.map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage)
.filter(m -> m.contains("tab.close") && m.contains("w9:t2"))
.findFirst()
.orElse(null);
assertNotNull(warn, "the failing tab.close must be logged at WARN naming the tab id — a "
+ "silently swallowed failure with no message is not an improvement. Log lines: "
+ appender.list.stream().map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage).toList());
}
// --- CB-519: host-unique id, decoupled from the pane coordinate ------------------------------
@Test
@@ -1165,8 +1100,7 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
@Test
void spawnLetsAnUnrelatedHerdrErrorPropagateUnchanged() {
// Fix 1 must only special-case a "*_not_found" answer. Any other herdr failure keeps
// propagating as-is — this gate does not know how to recover from it. The pane still needs
// closing because spawn throws before it can return the pane id to a caller that could stop it.
// propagating as-is — this gate does not know how to recover from it.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
herdr.agentStatus("unknown");
herdr.agentGetFailsWithAfter(0, "internal_error");
@@ -1183,27 +1117,8 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
() -> svc.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null)));
assertEquals("internal_error", ex.code());
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCount(herdr, "w9:pRoot_1"),
"the unchanged error leaves spawn without a pane id, so this gate closes its orphaned pane");
}
@Test
void panePlacementClosesTheSplitPaneWhenAgentStartFails() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().agentStartFailsWith("internal_error");
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
List.of("claude"), "pane", "fleetd-workers", "w #{n}", null, null, null);
ClaudeCodeLauncher svc = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(
new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(), _ -> null);
dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.HerdrException ex = assertThrows(
dev.ltms.fleet.herdr.HerdrException.class,
() -> svc.spawn(new SpawnRequest(null, null, null)));
assertEquals("internal_error", ex.code(), "agent.start failure propagates unchanged");
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCount(herdr, "w1:pSplit"),
"the pane split for a peer that never starts is closed instead of left orphaned");
assertEquals(0, paneCloseCount(herdr, "w9:pRoot_1"),
"an error this gate does not recognize is not this gate's teardown to run");
}
// --- fleetd #176 fix 2: corroborated UNKNOWN refinement --------------------------------------
@@ -2827,126 +2742,4 @@ class ClaudeCodeLauncherTest {
"a WARN naming the cwd must fire when the profile sets no configDir: "
+ appender.list.stream().map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage).toList());
}
// --- fleetd #285: seedTrustDialog under memberHerdrSocket --------------------------------------
//
// seedTrustDialog gated only on isProvisionedWorktree(cwd) and, being static, could not see
// memberHerdrSocketConfigured() at all — unlike its sibling writeCharterFile one method below,
// which already refuses the spawn when it cannot place the charter where a different-uid member
// can read it. Under memberHerdrSocket + configDir unset, seedTrustDialog wrote fleetd's OWN
// ~/.claude.json (the operator's real file) while believing it was seeding the member's. The fix
// makes the method an instance method so it can see memberHerdrSocketConfigured(), and applies
// the same "refuse, don't silently write somewhere wrong" rule writeCharterFile already uses.
@Test
void seedTrustDialogUnderMemberHerdrSocketSharesTheFileWithTheConfiguredGroup(
@TempDir Path configDir, @TempDir Path worktree, @TempDir Path worktreeRoot) throws Exception {
markAsProvisionedWorktree(worktree);
String group = currentUserGroup();
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
// trustProfile always sets a bridge mcpUrl, so a reply charter is generated too, which
// means writeCharterFile ALSO runs under memberHerdrSocket and needs its own worktreeRoot —
// pass one so this test isolates the trust-seed behaviour instead of tripping that refusal.
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = trustProfile(configDir.toString(), worktree.toString());
serviceWithConfig(herdr, cfg, () -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket(worktreeRoot.toString(), group)).spawn();
Path claudeJson = configDir.resolve(".claude.json");
assertTrue(Files.exists(claudeJson), "still seeded into <configDir>/.claude.json under memberHerdrSocket");
JsonNode project = new ObjectMapper().readTree(claudeJson.toFile())
.path("projects").path(worktree.toString());
assertTrue(project.path("hasTrustDialogAccepted").asBoolean(false));
assertEquals("rw-r-----", PosixFilePermissions.toString(Files.getPosixFilePermissions(claudeJson)),
"under memberHerdrSocket the file must be shared group-readable, mirroring the "
+ "charter file's own per-file mode (fleetd #222) — a 0600 file (Claude "
+ "Code's own default) is unreadable by the member's different OS user");
String actualGroup = Files.getFileAttributeView(claudeJson, PosixFileAttributeView.class)
.readAttributes().group().getName();
assertEquals(group, actualGroup, "the file must be chgrp'd to the configured worktreeGroup");
}
/**
* The bug itself: {@code memberHerdrSocket} configured, {@code configDir} unset. Before the fix
* this wrote fleetd's own default {@code ~/.claude.json} (here redirected to {@code fakeHome} so
* a reintroduced bug still cannot touch the real operator file); after the fix it must refuse the
* spawn instead, naming {@code configDir} as the missing key, before the member is ever started.
*/
@Test
void seedTrustDialogUnderMemberHerdrSocketRefusesWhenConfigDirUnset(
@TempDir Path fakeHome, @TempDir Path worktree) throws Exception {
markAsProvisionedWorktree(worktree);
String originalHome = System.getProperty("user.home");
System.setProperty("user.home", fakeHome.toString());
try {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = trustProfile(null, worktree.toString());
ClaudeCodeLauncher launcher = serviceWithConfig(herdr, cfg,
() -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket(null, "some-group"));
IllegalStateException ex = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, launcher::spawn,
"memberHerdrSocket + no configDir must refuse the spawn, not write fleetd's own "
+ "default ~/.claude.json");
assertTrue(ex.getMessage().contains("configDir"),
"the refusal must name the missing config key — got: " + ex.getMessage());
assertFalse(Files.exists(fakeHome.resolve(".claude.json")),
"nothing may be written to fleetd's own default home — this is the exact fleetd "
+ "#285 defect: writing the operator's own home instead of the member's");
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.start"),
"the spawn must be refused BEFORE the member is ever started — got calls: " + herdr.calls);
} finally {
System.setProperty("user.home", originalHome);
}
}
/**
* {@code configDir} alone is not enough — without {@code worktreeGroup} the file fleetd writes
* stays {@code 0600} and the member's different OS user still cannot read it, so this must also
* refuse, naming {@code worktreeGroup} this time.
*/
@Test
void seedTrustDialogUnderMemberHerdrSocketRefusesWhenWorktreeGroupUnset(
@TempDir Path configDir, @TempDir Path worktree) throws Exception {
markAsProvisionedWorktree(worktree);
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = trustProfile(configDir.toString(), worktree.toString());
ClaudeCodeLauncher launcher = serviceWithConfig(herdr, cfg,
() -> configWithMemberHerdrSocket(null, null));
IllegalStateException ex = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, launcher::spawn,
"memberHerdrSocket + no worktreeGroup must refuse the spawn, not write an unreadable file");
assertTrue(ex.getMessage().contains("worktreeGroup"),
"configDir alone is not enough — got: " + ex.getMessage());
assertFalse(Files.exists(configDir.resolve(".claude.json")),
"nothing may be written when the file cannot be shared with the member's group");
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.start"),
"the spawn must be refused BEFORE the member is ever started");
}
/**
* Regression proof: with {@code memberHerdrSocket} ABSENT — even given a LIVE, non-null {@code
* config} supplier (not merely {@code config == null}, which every other seedTrustDialog test in
* this file already exercises) — the write must stay byte-identical to before this fix: existing
* {@code 0600} permissions preserved, no chgrp/chmod attempted. This is the proof the ticket asks
* for: the path the whole live fleet uses today is unchanged by this fix.
*/
@Test
void seedTrustDialogPreservesExisting0600PermissionsWhenMemberHerdrSocketAbsentEvenWithALiveConfigSupplier(
@TempDir Path configDir, @TempDir Path worktree) throws Exception {
markAsProvisionedWorktree(worktree);
Path claudeJson = configDir.resolve(".claude.json");
Files.writeString(claudeJson, "{}");
assumeTrue(Files.getFileAttributeView(claudeJson, PosixFileAttributeView.class) != null,
"no POSIX permissions on this filesystem — skipping rather than failing");
Files.setPosixFilePermissions(claudeJson, PosixFilePermissions.fromString("rw-------"));
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = trustProfile(configDir.toString(), worktree.toString());
FleetConfig config = new FleetConfig(null, null, null, Map.of(), null, null, null, null, null,
null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null).withDefaults();
serviceWithConfig(herdr, cfg, () -> config).spawn();
assertEquals("rw-------", PosixFilePermissions.toString(Files.getPosixFilePermissions(claudeJson)),
"with memberHerdrSocket absent — even given a live config supplier — the seed must "
+ "stay byte-identical to before this fix: no chgrp/chmod attempted");
}
}
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ class AmqpReplyInboxContractTest {
}
@Test
void releaseCancelsConsumerAndRequeuesHeldDeliveryForRecovery() throws Exception {
void releaseCancelsConsumerAndClearsHeld() throws Exception {
String target = "worker-release-" + System.nanoTime();
try (AmqpReplyInbox inbox = AmqpReplyInbox.open(uri())) {
inbox.own(target);
@@ -164,22 +164,6 @@ class AmqpReplyInboxContractTest {
inbox.release(target);
assertTrue(inbox.peek(target).isEmpty(),
"release clears the local held snapshot");
// fleetd #298: release() must not just drop the local record — the broker delivery was
// never acked, so cancelling the consumer alone leaves it unacked-but-orphaned on the
// still-open channel unless release() nacks it back with requeue=true. Prove the message
// is genuinely recoverable, not merely absent from peek: re-own the same target and
// confirm the broker redelivers it to the fresh consumer.
inbox.own(target);
List<ReplyInbox.InboxMessage> recovered = awaitPeek(inbox, target);
assertEquals(1, recovered.size(),
"a reply held (but undrained) at release() time must still be recoverable — "
+ "release() must requeue it, not silently drop it while the broker still "
+ "considers it outstanding");
assertEquals("m1", recovered.getFirst().msgId());
assertEquals("release me", recovered.getFirst().content());
inbox.ack(target, "m1");
}
}
@@ -957,76 +957,6 @@ class MessageServiceTest {
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.DONE, awaitTicketPhase(next, MessageService.Phase.DONE).phase());
}
/**
* fleetd #307: a worker's {@code fleet_ask} can time out because the primary never answers —
* distinct from {@link #aReplyAfterAnswerTimesOutStillCompletesTheAsyncTicket}, where the
* primary DID answer and only its own bounded wait for the resumed turn expired.
* {@code ask()}'s timeout path deliberately forgets the task's {@code turnId} (so
* {@code hasAsyncQuestion} stops reporting the target BUSY — see
* {@code unansweredAsyncQuestionReturnsTheTicketToPendingAndReleasesItsTarget} above), which used
* to also erase the one signal {@code askAnsweredAsyncTasks} needed to recognize the worker's
* eventual real {@code fleet_reply}. That reply then had nowhere to land but the inbox, and
* {@code fleet_poll{ticket}} stayed PENDING forever — later force-failed with the false reason
* "session released before it replied", even though the worker had, in fact, replied.
*/
@Test
void aReplyAfterAnAskTimeoutStillCompletesTheAsyncTicket() throws Exception {
String ticket = messages.sendAsync(T, "task that asks then finishes alone");
awaitWaiting();
injectDelivery();
assertEquals(MessageService.AskOutcome.TIMED_OUT,
messages.ask(T, "which config?", 200).outcome());
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.PENDING, messages.poll(ticket).phase(),
"only the question wait ended; the delegated turn may still finish");
// The worker keeps working past the timeout and only now calls fleet_reply — with no live
// rendezvous waiter open (ask()'s timeout already closed it) and no new send() having
// reopened one for this target.
assertTrue(messages.reply(T, "PR opened: https://example/pulls/42"));
MessageService.TaskView done = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.DONE);
assertEquals("PR opened: https://example/pulls/42", done.reply(),
"fleet_poll{ticket} must return the worker's real reply, not stay pending forever");
assertEquals("reply", done.replySource());
assertFalse(messages.hasStrandedReply(T),
"the reply completed its own ticket directly and never touched the inbox");
}
/**
* fleetd #307's ambiguity guard: an ask timeout frees its target ({@code hasAsyncQuestion}
* becomes false the instant it lapses — proven above), so a second, independent delegation can
* be dispatched to the same target and itself go on to ask-and-lapse before the first worker's
* real reply ever arrives. Two open tasks are then both eligible candidates on one target with
* no live waiter to disambiguate them. A reply arriving now must not guess which one it answers
* — guessing wrong would hand the lead a plausible-looking answer to a delegation the worker
* never touched, worse than a failure because the lead acts on it — so it must fall back to the
* inbox exactly as the zero-candidate case does.
*/
@Test
void twoAskTimedOutTicketsOnOneTargetFallBackToTheInboxRatherThanGuess() throws Exception {
String ticket1 = messages.sendAsync(T, "first task that asks");
awaitWaiting();
injectDelivery();
assertEquals(MessageService.AskOutcome.TIMED_OUT, messages.ask(T, "Q1?", 200).outcome());
String ticket2 = messages.sendAsync(T, "second task that asks");
awaitWaiting();
injectDelivery();
assertEquals(MessageService.AskOutcome.TIMED_OUT, messages.ask(T, "Q2?", 200).outcome());
assertTrue(messages.reply(T, "which task does this answer?"));
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.PENDING, messages.poll(ticket1).phase(),
"an ambiguous reply must not guess ticket1");
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.PENDING, messages.poll(ticket2).phase(),
"an ambiguous reply must not guess ticket2");
assertTrue(messages.hasStrandedReply(T));
var drained = messages.drainReplies(T);
assertEquals(1, drained.size());
assertEquals("which task does this answer?", drained.get(0).content());
}
@Test
void asyncQuestionBelongsToTheTaskThatOwnsItsForwardWaiter() throws Exception {
String first = messages.sendAsync(T, "first task");
@@ -1045,64 +975,6 @@ class MessageServiceTest {
assertEquals(MessageService.Outcome.REPLIED, answer.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS).outcome());
}
/**
* fleetd #282: a worker that chains a SECOND {@code fleet_ask} inside the same resumed turn —
* before it ever calls {@code fleet_reply} — used to kill its own async ticket. {@code answer()}
* opens a fresh forward waiter but (unlike {@code send()}) never registered it in
* {@code asyncTasksByWaiter}, so the second ask's {@code markAsyncQuestion} found no {@code Task}
* to re-associate. That waiter still resolved with the second {@code QUESTION} once the worker
* asked again, and {@code answer()} completed the ticket's future with that QUESTION "reply"
* unconditionally — so {@code fleet_poll} reported FAILED while the worker was still alive and
* the primary was mid-conversation with it.
*
* <p>Driven entirely through {@code MessageService}'s public API (sendAsync/ask/answer/poll) —
* never by reaching into {@link Rendezvous} or the task maps directly, so this test cannot pass
* for a reason unrelated to the real bug.
*/
@Test
void secondFleetAskInTheSameResumedTurnDoesNotKillTheAsyncTicket() throws Exception {
String ticket = messages.sendAsync(T, "task that asks twice");
awaitWaiting();
// The worker's first fleet_ask.
CompletableFuture<MessageService.AskResult> ask1 =
CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(() -> messages.ask(T, "Q1", 5000));
MessageService.TaskView asking1 = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.ASKING);
assertEquals("Q1", asking1.reply());
// The primary answers it — answer() resumes the turn and blocks for what comes next.
CompletableFuture<MessageService.Reply> answer1 = CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(
() -> messages.answer(asking1.turnId(), "a1", 5000));
assertEquals("a1", ask1.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS).answer());
// Still in the SAME resumed turn — before replying — the worker asks again.
CompletableFuture<MessageService.AskResult> ask2 =
CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(() -> messages.ask(T, "Q2", 5000));
// answer1's own call unblocks with the second QUESTION (documented QUESTION-chaining
// behaviour — see FleetMcp.answer's javadoc: "Answer it by calling fleet_send again with
// turnId=..."). The bug: this used to also kill the async ticket in the process.
MessageService.Reply firstAnswerResult = answer1.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
assertEquals(MessageService.Outcome.QUESTION, firstAnswerResult.outcome());
String turnId2 = firstAnswerResult.turnId();
MessageService.TaskView asking2 = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.ASKING);
assertEquals("Q2", asking2.reply(),
"the ticket must surface the SECOND question, not be dead/FAILED");
assertEquals(turnId2, asking2.turnId());
// The primary answers the second question; the worker finally sends its real fleet_reply.
CompletableFuture<MessageService.Reply> answer2 = CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(
() -> messages.answer(turnId2, "a2", 5000));
assertEquals("a2", ask2.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS).answer());
awaitWaiting();
assertTrue(rendezvous.resolve(T, "done"));
assertEquals(MessageService.Outcome.REPLIED, answer2.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS).outcome());
MessageService.TaskView done = awaitTicketPhase(ticket, MessageService.Phase.DONE);
assertEquals("done", done.reply());
}
// --- CB-582: fleet_status pendingAsk() ------------------------------------------------------
@Test
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.rest;
import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.CallerResolver;
import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.Authz;
import dev.ltms.fleet.auth.MemberRegistry;
import dev.ltms.fleet.config.FleetConfig;
import dev.ltms.fleet.guard.SubscriptionGuard;
@@ -26,15 +25,8 @@ import java.net.URI;
import java.net.http.HttpClient;
import java.net.http.HttpRequest;
import java.net.http.HttpResponse;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.Locale;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import java.util.stream.Collectors;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
@@ -44,10 +36,6 @@ import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
*/
class FleetAppAuthTest {
private static final Path REST_SOURCE = Path.of("src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/rest/FleetApp.java");
private static final Pattern ROUTE_REGISTRATION =
Pattern.compile("app\\.(get|post|delete|put|patch)\\(\\s*\"([^\"]+)\"");
private final HttpClient http = HttpClient.newHttpClient();
private Javalin app;
private Metrics metrics;
@@ -104,49 +92,6 @@ class FleetAppAuthTest {
return http.send(b.build(), HttpResponse.BodyHandlers.ofString());
}
@Test
void everyRegisteredRouteHasItsHandlerActionPinned() {
Set<String> registered = routesTheServerRegisters();
assertTrue(registered.size() >= 15,
"scraped only " + registered.size() + " route registrations from FleetApp (" + registered
+ "); the app.<verb>(\"…\") scrape has stopped matching");
// Liveness must work before credentials can be checked, so this route is deliberately open.
assertTrue(registered.remove("GET /healthz"), "GET /healthz must stay an explicit ungated exception");
registered.forEach(route -> assertDoesNotThrow(() -> FleetApp.routeAction(route),
() -> route + " is registered but has no pinned authorization action"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.METRICS, FleetApp.routeAction("GET /metrics"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.SPAWN, FleetApp.routeAction("POST /members"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.STOP, FleetApp.routeAction("DELETE /members/{paneId}"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.SEND, FleetApp.routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/message"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.REPLY, FleetApp.routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/reply"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.DRAIN, FleetApp.routeAction("GET /sessions/{id}/replies"));
assertEquals(Authz.Action.ASK, FleetApp.routeAction("POST /sessions/{id}/ask"));
for (String route : Set.of("GET /sessions", "GET /agents", "GET /members", "GET /profiles",
"GET /member-credentials", "GET /sessions/{id}/status", "GET /tasks/{ticket}")) {
assertEquals(Authz.Action.READ, FleetApp.routeAction(route), route);
}
assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> FleetApp.routeAction("GET /healthz"));
}
private static Set<String> routesTheServerRegisters() {
try {
String source = Files.readString(REST_SOURCE).lines()
.filter(line -> {
String stripped = line.stripLeading();
return !(stripped.startsWith("//") || stripped.startsWith("*") || stripped.startsWith("/*"));
})
.collect(Collectors.joining("\n"));
Matcher matcher = ROUTE_REGISTRATION.matcher(source);
Set<String> routes = new LinkedHashSet<>();
while (matcher.find()) {
routes.add(matcher.group(1).toUpperCase(Locale.ROOT) + " " + matcher.group(2));
}
return routes;
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new AssertionError("could not scrape FleetApp route registrations", e);
}
}
// --- loopback-trust: the caller is the primary -------------------------------------------
@Test
@@ -19,10 +19,6 @@ import dev.ltms.fleet.session.SessionManager;
import dev.ltms.fleet.session.Worktrees;
import dev.ltms.fleet.member.ClaudeCodeLauncher;
import dev.ltms.fleet.member.CompositePeerLauncher;
import dev.ltms.fleet.member.MemberCredentialPolicyView;
import dev.ltms.fleet.mcp.FleetMcp;
import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.BackendOutagePolicy;
import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.BackendQuarantine;
import dev.ltms.fleet.placement.PlacementPolicies;
import io.javalin.Javalin;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
@@ -36,7 +32,6 @@ import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.UUID;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.function.Predicate;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
@@ -75,19 +70,6 @@ class FleetAppTest {
private int start(FakeHerdr herdr, String workerBaseUrl, Set<String> allow, String placement,
Worktrees worktrees, Predicate<String> deliverable) {
return start(herdr, workerBaseUrl, allow, placement, worktrees, deliverable,
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource.none(), FleetMcp.OutageSource.none());
}
/**
* fleetd #297: same wiring as above, plus the two SAME shared sources {@code GET /profiles}
* must read — lets a test prove the quarantined/coolingOff facts it reports come from a real
* {@link dev.ltms.fleet.placement.BackendQuarantine}/{@link
* dev.ltms.fleet.placement.BackendOutagePolicy}, exactly like {@code fleet_profiles}'s own tests.
*/
private int start(FakeHerdr herdr, String workerBaseUrl, Set<String> allow, String placement,
Worktrees worktrees, Predicate<String> deliverable,
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource quarantine, FleetMcp.OutageSource outage) {
FleetConfig.Profile wcfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", workerBaseUrl, "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN", null,
placement, "fleet", "worker: {profile} #{n}", null, null, null);
@@ -108,9 +90,8 @@ class FleetAppTest {
// it directly so the inbox contract holds for those endpoints.
inbox.own("term_a");
MessageService messages = new MessageService(agents, injector, rendezvous, inbox);
app = new FleetApp(herdr, herdr, workers, sessions, messages, this.presence, null,
null, null, id -> this.presence.isPresent(id) || deliverable.test(id),
MemberCredentialPolicyView::absent, quarantine, outage)
app = new FleetApp(herdr, workers, sessions, messages, this.presence, null,
null, null, id -> this.presence.isPresent(id) || deliverable.test(id))
.build().start("127.0.0.1", 0);
return app.port();
}
@@ -183,22 +164,6 @@ class FleetAppTest {
assertEquals("idle", agents.get(0).get("status").asText());
}
/**
* fleetd #297 gap 1: {@code workers.list()} reaches herdr, and a transport failure there must
* land in the same {@code {error, detail}} envelope every other failure path in this file uses
* (see {@code herdrError}), not escape as a bare exception outside the JSON contract.
*/
@Test
void agentsMapsAHerdrFailureToTheJsonErrorEnvelope() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr down = new FakeHerdr().healthy(false);
int port = start(down, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"));
HttpResponse<String> res = req(port, "GET", "/agents");
assertEquals(502, res.statusCode(), res.body());
JsonNode body = mapper.readTree(res.body());
assertEquals("herdr_error", body.get("error").asText());
assertTrue(body.has("detail"), res.body());
}
@Test
void spawnWorkerLandsInOwnTabInWorkerSpaceAndInjectsBaseUrl() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -238,42 +203,6 @@ class FleetAppTest {
JsonNode body = mapper.readTree(req(port, "GET", "/profiles").body());
assertEquals("ltms-local", body.get("default").asText());
assertEquals("ltms-local", body.get("profiles").get(0).asText());
assertFalse(body.has("quarantined"), "nothing is quarantined, so the key is omitted: " + body);
assertFalse(body.has("coolingOff"), "nothing is cooling off, so the key is omitted: " + body);
}
/**
* fleetd #297 gap 2: {@code GET /profiles} must report the same two outage states {@code
* fleet_profiles} does — CB-578 stage B exhaustion quarantine and fleetd #201 Unit 5 cool-off —
* reading the SAME shared {@link BackendQuarantine}/{@link BackendOutagePolicy} instances rather
* than recomputing them. The two checks are independent, and this profile is deliberately put in
* both states at once, matching {@code FleetMcpTest}'s own coverage of that overlap.
*/
@Test
void profilesReportsQuarantineAndCoolingOffFromTheSameSharedSources() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
BackendQuarantine quarantine = new BackendQuarantine(() -> 0L, TimeUnit.MINUTES.toNanos(30));
quarantine.quarantine("shared-openai");
FleetMcp.QuarantineSource quarantineSource = new FleetMcp.QuarantineSource(
profile -> "ltms-local".equals(profile) ? "shared-openai" : null, quarantine);
BackendOutagePolicy outagePolicy = new BackendOutagePolicy(() -> 0L);
outagePolicy.record("shared-openai", "t1", "API Error: rate limited");
outagePolicy.record("shared-openai", "t2", "API Error: rate limited"); // 2nd distinct target starts the incident
FleetMcp.OutageSource outageSource = new FleetMcp.OutageSource(
profile -> "ltms-local".equals(profile) ? "shared-openai" : null, outagePolicy);
int port = start(herdr, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"), "tab", new GitWorktrees(),
ignored -> false, quarantineSource, outageSource);
JsonNode body = mapper.readTree(req(port, "GET", "/profiles").body());
assertTrue(body.has("quarantined"), body.toString());
assertEquals("shared-openai",
body.get("quarantined").get("ltms-local").get("credentialId").asText());
assertEquals(1800,
body.get("quarantined").get("ltms-local").get("quarantinedForSeconds").asLong());
assertTrue(body.has("coolingOff"), body.toString());
assertEquals("shared-openai",
body.get("coolingOff").get("ltms-local").get("credentialId").asText());
assertEquals(60, body.get("coolingOff").get("ltms-local").get("coolingOffForSeconds").asLong());
}
@Test
@@ -310,23 +239,6 @@ class FleetAppTest {
"liveStatus is unknown when herdr has no matching pane");
}
/**
* fleetd #297 gap 1: same reasoning as {@code agentsMapsAHerdrFailureToTheJsonErrorEnvelope} —
* {@code GET /members} is the endpoint's own comment names as "the out-of-band path a lead falls
* back to when its MCP mount drops", so it must stay inside the {@code {error, detail}} envelope
* exactly when herdr is briefly unreachable.
*/
@Test
void membersMapsAHerdrFailureToTheJsonErrorEnvelope() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr down = new FakeHerdr().healthy(false);
int port = start(down, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"));
HttpResponse<String> res = req(port, "GET", "/members");
assertEquals(502, res.statusCode(), res.body());
JsonNode body = mapper.readTree(res.body());
assertEquals("herdr_error", body.get("error").asText());
assertTrue(body.has("detail"), res.body());
}
@Test
void spawnWithACwdParamRootsTheWorkerThere() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -415,11 +327,7 @@ class FleetAppTest {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().agentNameTakenTimes(99);
int port = start(herdr, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"));
// fleetd #304: 502, not Javalin's default 500 — the herdr failure is named, and the body
// carries herdr's own message, matching what fleet_spawn reports for the same failure.
HttpResponse<String> res = req(port, "POST", "/members");
assertEquals(502, res.statusCode());
assertEquals("herdr_error", mapper.readTree(res.body()).get("error").asText());
assertEquals(500, req(port, "POST", "/members").statusCode());
assertTrue(herdr.called("tab.create"), "a tab was created before the failed start");
assertEquals("w9:t2", params(herdr, "tab.close").get("tab_id"), "orphaned tab must be closed");
}
@@ -536,53 +444,6 @@ class FleetAppTest {
assertEquals("orphan", body.get("replies").get(0).get("content").asText());
}
@Test
void replyWithMissingContentIsRejectedAndDoesNotResolveTheWaiter() throws Exception {
// fleetd #302: `.path("content").asText("")` used to turn a missing "content" key into an
// empty string that reached rendezvous.resolve, silently completing the lead's blocking wait
// with nothing. Prove the fix two ways: the bad call is rejected with 400, AND the real send
// it would have wrongly resolved is still open afterwards — a real reply completes it.
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr().agentStatus("idle");
int port = start(herdr, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"));
var send = java.util.concurrent.CompletableFuture.supplyAsync(() -> {
try { return postMessage(port, "{\"content\":\"review this\",\"timeoutMs\":4000}"); }
catch (Exception e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); }
});
Thread.sleep(200); // let the background send open its rendezvous waiter
HttpResponse<String> badReply = postJson(port, "/sessions/term_a/reply", "{}");
assertEquals(400, badReply.statusCode());
JsonNode err = mapper.readTree(badReply.body());
assertEquals("bad_request", err.get("error").asText());
assertTrue(err.has("detail"));
// The waiter must still be open — a real reply now completes the ORIGINAL send.
HttpResponse<String> goodReply = postJson(port, "/sessions/term_a/reply", "{\"content\":\"LGTM ship it\"}");
assertEquals(200, goodReply.statusCode());
HttpResponse<String> res = send.get(6, java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit.SECONDS);
assertEquals(200, res.statusCode());
assertEquals("LGTM ship it", mapper.readTree(res.body()).get("reply").asText());
}
@Test
void replyWithEmptyOrWhitespaceContentIsRejectedSameAsMissing() throws Exception {
// fleetd #302 sibling case: present-but-blank content is treated the same as a missing key —
// FleetMcp's own required-content guard (fleet_reply's "content is required") makes no
// distinction between the two either, so diverging here would be a new asymmetry.
int port = startHealthy();
HttpResponse<String> empty = postJson(port, "/sessions/term_a/reply", "{\"content\":\"\"}");
assertEquals(400, empty.statusCode());
assertEquals("bad_request", mapper.readTree(empty.body()).get("error").asText());
HttpResponse<String> whitespace = postJson(port, "/sessions/term_a/reply", "{\"content\":\" \"}");
assertEquals(400, whitespace.statusCode());
assertEquals("bad_request", mapper.readTree(whitespace.body()).get("error").asText());
}
@Test
void drainRepliesReturnsEmptyForNoReplies() throws Exception {
int port = startHealthy();
@@ -737,12 +598,7 @@ class FleetAppTest {
int port = start(herdr, "http://gx00.gw:8000", Set.of("gx00.gw"));
// A genuine teardown failure must surface, not be reported as a successful 204.
// fleetd #304: it surfaces as a named 502 rather than Javalin's default 500. The property
// this test guards is "not 204" and the herdr detail reaching the caller — a bare 500 gave
// the body "Server Error" and said nothing about herdr.
HttpResponse<String> res = req(port, "DELETE", "/members/w9:pW");
assertEquals(502, res.statusCode());
assertEquals("herdr_error", mapper.readTree(res.body()).get("error").asText());
assertEquals(500, req(port, "DELETE", "/members/w9:pW").statusCode());
assertFalse(herdr.called("tab.close"), "tab is not removed when the pane close failed");
}
@@ -755,5 +611,4 @@ class FleetAppTest {
assertEquals(204, req(port, "DELETE", "/members/w9:pW").statusCode());
assertTrue(herdr.called("tab.close"));
}
}
@@ -17,9 +17,6 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
public record RemoveCall(String repoRoot, String worktreePath) {
}
public record DeleteBranchCall(String repoRoot, String branch) {
}
public record OverlayCall(String repoRoot, String worktreePath,
List<String> requested, List<String> copied, List<String> skipWorktree) {
}
@@ -38,7 +35,6 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
private final List<AddCall> addCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private final List<RemoveCall> removeCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private final List<DeleteBranchCall> deleteBranchCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private final List<OverlayCall> overlayCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private final List<RepoRootCall> repoRootCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
private final List<SnapshotCall> snapshotCalls = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
@@ -55,8 +51,6 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
private final AtomicLong snapshotSeq = new AtomicLong();
private volatile RuntimeException addFailure;
private volatile RuntimeException snapshotFailure;
private volatile RuntimeException removeFailure;
private volatile RuntimeException overlayFailure;
private volatile boolean dirty = false;
private volatile String repoRoot = "/repo";
private volatile String prefix = "/worktrees";
@@ -104,21 +98,6 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
return this;
}
/** Make subsequent {@link #remove} calls throw (fleetd #283: a stale index lock, a slow
* filesystem, or {@code remove}'s own 30s exec timeout escaping the last, previously bare,
* step of {@link SessionManager#release}). */
public FakeWorktrees failRemove(String message) {
this.removeFailure = new WorktreeException(message);
return this;
}
/** Make subsequent {@link #overlayParity} calls throw (simulates a post-{@code add()} spawn
* failure — fleetd #283 defect 2 — so the {@code acquireWithWorktree} catch runs). */
public FakeWorktrees failOverlay(String message) {
this.overlayFailure = new WorktreeException(message);
return this;
}
/** Configure the value returned by {@link #wipRefs}. */
public FakeWorktrees withWipRefs(WipRefStats stats) {
this.wipRefs = stats;
@@ -153,14 +132,6 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
@Override
public void remove(String repoRoot, String worktreePath) {
removeCalls.add(new RemoveCall(repoRoot, worktreePath));
if (removeFailure != null) {
throw removeFailure;
}
}
@Override
public void deleteBranch(String repoRoot, String branch) {
deleteBranchCalls.add(new DeleteBranchCall(repoRoot, branch));
}
@Override
@@ -175,9 +146,6 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
@Override
public void overlayParity(String repoRoot, String worktreePath, List<String> overlay) {
if (overlayFailure != null) {
throw overlayFailure;
}
List<String> copied = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
List<String> skipped = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
for (String rel : overlay) {
@@ -250,14 +218,6 @@ public final class FakeWorktrees implements Worktrees {
return removeCalls.isEmpty() ? null : removeCalls.getLast();
}
public List<DeleteBranchCall> deleteBranchCalls() {
return List.copyOf(deleteBranchCalls);
}
public DeleteBranchCall lastDeleteBranch() {
return deleteBranchCalls.isEmpty() ? null : deleteBranchCalls.getLast();
}
public OverlayCall lastOverlay() {
return overlayCalls.isEmpty() ? null : overlayCalls.getLast();
}
@@ -403,52 +403,6 @@ class GitWorktreesTest {
assertTrue(heads.isBlank(), "the branch leaked after a post-creation step threw:\n" + heads);
}
/**
* fleetd #309. The add runner is a narrow seam for the case where Git has created state but
* the caller then kills the process. The runner first performs the real add in this throwaway
* repo, then throws the same kind of exception that {@link GitWorktrees#exec} uses for a timeout.
* This proves the failure path cleans both real Git objects without waiting for a slow checkout.
*/
@Test
void addCleansUpWhenTheWorktreeAddRunnerFailsAfterCreatingState(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
String branch = "cb-309-timeout";
WorktreeException timeout = new WorktreeException("command timed out: synthetic git worktree add");
AtomicReference<String> createdPath = new AtomicReference<>();
GitWorktrees worktrees = new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString(), null, null, null, command -> {
createdPath.set(command[5]);
try {
git(repo, "worktree", "add", command[5], "-b", command[7], command[8]);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new AssertionError("test setup could not create the worktree", e);
}
throw timeout;
});
WorktreeException thrown = assertThrows(WorktreeException.class,
() -> worktrees.add(repo.toString(), branch, "HEAD"));
assertSame(timeout, thrown, "cleanup must not replace the add failure");
assertNotNull(createdPath.get(), "the add runner must receive the worktree path");
assertFalse(Files.exists(Path.of(createdPath.get())),
"the worktree directory leaked after the add runner failed");
assertFalse(refExists(repo, "refs/heads/" + branch), "the branch leaked after the add runner failed");
}
/** An ordinary Git refusal must not delete the existing branch or log a cleanup warning. */
@Test
void addFailureBeforeCreatingAWorktreeIsQuiet(@TempDir Path tmp) throws Exception {
Path repo = initRepo(tmp.resolve("repo"));
String branch = "already-exists";
git(repo, "branch", branch);
assertThrows(WorktreeException.class, () -> new GitWorktrees(tmp.resolve("wts").toString())
.add(repo.toString(), branch, "HEAD"));
assertTrue(refExists(repo, "refs/heads/" + branch), "the existing branch must remain");
assertTrue(capturedMessages().isEmpty(), "an ordinary Git refusal logged a warning: " + capturedMessages());
}
// ---- CB-189: broader remote-URL coverage — every remote, both fetch and push URLs, any
// non-SSH scheme. Reporting only, additive to the origin/https strip-and-refuse tests above. ----
@@ -26,12 +26,7 @@ import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.CountDownLatch;
import java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService;
import java.util.concurrent.Executors;
import java.util.concurrent.Future;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger;
import java.util.function.LongSupplier;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
@@ -79,7 +74,6 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
*/
private static final class RecordingWorktrees implements Worktrees {
private final List<String> removeCalls = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
private final List<String> deleteBranchCalls = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
private final List<String> snapshotCalls = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
private final java.util.Set<String> failRemoveFor = new java.util.HashSet<>();
private volatile boolean dirty = false;
@@ -120,11 +114,6 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
removeCalls.add(worktreePath);
}
@Override
public void deleteBranch(String repoRoot, String branch) {
deleteBranchCalls.add(branch);
}
@Override
public boolean hasUncommitted(String worktreePath) {
if (hasUncommittedFailure != null) {
@@ -169,10 +158,6 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
return List.copyOf(removeCalls);
}
List<String> deleteBranchCalls() {
return List.copyOf(deleteBranchCalls);
}
List<String> snapshotCalls() {
return List.copyOf(snapshotCalls);
}
@@ -183,19 +168,14 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
}
private SessionManager sessionManager(FakeHerdr herdr, LongSupplier clock, int contextCap,
boolean clearAfterTurn) {
return sessionManager(herdr, clock, contextCap, clearAfterTurn, null);
}
private SessionManager sessionManager(FakeHerdr herdr, LongSupplier clock, int contextCap,
boolean clearAfterTurn, java.util.function.Consumer<MemberSession> hook) {
boolean clearAfterTurn) {
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
List.of("ccs", "ltms-local"), "tab", "fleetd-workers",
"worker: {profile} #{n}", null, null, null);
ClaudeCodeLauncher workers = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(), _ -> null);
return new SessionManager(workers, new GitWorktrees(), clock, contextCap, clearAfterTurn, hook);
return new SessionManager(workers, new GitWorktrees(), clock, contextCap, clearAfterTurn);
}
@Test
@@ -680,24 +660,6 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
"BUSY session remains");
}
@Test
void reapIdleDoesNotReleaseSessionDeliveredAfterItsEligibilityCheck() {
long[] clock = {0};
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
SessionManager[] manager = new SessionManager[1];
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr, () -> clock[0], 0, false,
session -> manager[0].onDelivered(session.terminalId(), TestTurnTokens.inert(session.terminalId())));
manager[0] = sessions;
MemberSession session = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller", "term_primary");
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(session.terminalId());
clock[0] = 11;
assertEquals(0, sessions.reapIdle(10), "delivery replaces the idle snapshot before release");
assertEquals(MemberSession.State.BUSY, sessions.get(session.paneId()).orElseThrow().state(),
"a just-delivered session stays registered and busy");
assertFalse(herdr.called("pane.close"), "the busy session pane is not stopped");
}
@Test
void doneSessionPastIdleTtlIsReaped() {
long[] clock = {0};
@@ -852,186 +814,6 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
.count();
}
// --- fleetd #308: a spawn accepted while the shutdown drain is running must not orphan ---
@Test
void acquireRefusesANewSpawnOnceDrainAllHasStarted() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr);
sessions.drainAll(TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS.toNanos(50)); // empty roster — returns immediately,
// but the shutdown guard it flips must stay tripped for the life of the process.
ShuttingDownException e = assertThrows(ShuttingDownException.class,
() -> sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller", "term_primary"),
"a spawn requested after the drain has begun must be refused loudly (invariant 3), "
+ "not silently registered into a registry the drain will never revisit");
assertNotNull(e.getMessage());
assertFalse(e.getMessage().isBlank(), "the refusal must say why, not just that it failed");
assertTrue(sessions.roster().isEmpty(), "the refused spawn must never reach the registry");
}
/**
* fleetd #308: the guard above closes most of the shutdown-race window, but it cannot close
* all of it — a caller that already passed the {@code draining} check before {@code drainAll}
* flips it can still be mid-{@code launcher.spawn()} (a real herdr round trip, not
* instantaneous) when {@code drainAll} takes its registry snapshot. This test forces exactly
* that interleaving with a launcher double that blocks the second {@code spawn()} call and the
* first {@code stop()} call until released, then proves the post-loop sweep in {@code
* drainAll} still finds and tears down the straggler that lands in the registry afterward.
*/
@Test
void drainAllSweepsAStragglerThatRegisteredAfterTheInitialSnapshot() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FleetConfig.Profile cfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN",
List.of("ccs", "ltms-local"), "tab", "fleetd-workers",
"worker: {profile} #{n}", null, null, null);
ClaudeCodeLauncher delegate = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(), _ -> null);
RaceLauncher race = new RaceLauncher(delegate);
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(race);
// Registered normally, before the drain starts — the first spawn call, never blocked.
MemberSession ready = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", "/ready", "/caller", "ownerR");
ExecutorService exec = Executors.newFixedThreadPool(2);
try {
// The straggler's acquire() reads `draining == false` (checked before this call ever
// touches the launcher) and then blocks inside its own spawn() — the second spawn call.
Future<MemberSession> straggler = exec.submit(() ->
sessions.acquire("ltms-local", "/late", "/caller", "ownerLate"));
assertTrue(race.enteredSecondSpawn.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS),
"the straggler must have passed the shutdown guard and reached spawn() before "
+ "drainAll ever runs");
assertEquals(1, sessions.roster().size(),
"the straggler is still inside spawn() — not registered yet");
// drainAll flips `draining`, snapshots the registry (only `ready` is in it), and starts
// releasing that snapshot — its first release() call stops `ready`'s pane, which this
// launcher double blocks on so the interleaving below is deterministic, not a timing bet.
Future<?> drain = exec.submit(() -> sessions.drainAll(TimeUnit.SECONDS.toNanos(5)));
assertTrue(race.enteredFirstStop.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS),
"drainAll must be stopping the ready session's pane — proof its initial "
+ "registry snapshot has already been taken");
// Only now does the straggler's spawn complete and register — strictly after the
// snapshot drainAll's main pass is working from.
race.releaseSecondSpawn.countDown();
MemberSession registered = straggler.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
// Let drainAll finish releasing `ready`; it then re-checks the registry and must find
// (and drain) the straggler that just landed in it.
race.releaseFirstStop.countDown();
drain.get(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
assertTrue(sessions.roster().isEmpty(),
"the post-loop sweep must drain the straggler too, not just the initial snapshot");
assertNotNull(registered.paneId());
long paneCloseCalls = herdr.calls.stream().filter(c -> "pane.close".equals(c.method())).count();
assertEquals(2, paneCloseCalls,
"both ready's pane AND the straggler's pane must actually be stopped — a pane "
+ "left running is exactly the orphan this ticket is about");
} finally {
exec.shutdownNow();
}
}
/**
* Delegates every call while blocking the SECOND {@code spawn()} call and the FIRST
* {@code stop()} call until the test releases them — used to force the fleetd #308 race
* deterministically instead of betting on real thread-scheduling timing.
*/
private static final class RaceLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
private final PeerLauncher delegate;
private final AtomicInteger spawnCalls = new AtomicInteger();
private final AtomicInteger stopCalls = new AtomicInteger();
final CountDownLatch enteredSecondSpawn = new CountDownLatch(1);
final CountDownLatch releaseSecondSpawn = new CountDownLatch(1);
final CountDownLatch enteredFirstStop = new CountDownLatch(1);
final CountDownLatch releaseFirstStop = new CountDownLatch(1);
RaceLauncher(PeerLauncher delegate) {
this.delegate = delegate;
}
private static void awaitOrFail(CountDownLatch latch) {
try {
if (!latch.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS)) {
throw new AssertionError("RaceLauncher latch timed out");
}
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
throw new AssertionError("RaceLauncher latch interrupted", e);
}
}
@Override
public Set<Capability> capabilities() {
return delegate.capabilities();
}
@Override
public Set<Capability> capabilitiesFor(String profileName) {
return delegate.capabilitiesFor(profileName);
}
@Override
public PeerHandle spawn(SpawnRequest req) {
if (spawnCalls.incrementAndGet() == 2) {
enteredSecondSpawn.countDown();
awaitOrFail(releaseSecondSpawn);
}
return delegate.spawn(req);
}
@Override
public Set<String> profiles() {
return delegate.profiles();
}
@Override
public String defaultProfile() {
return delegate.defaultProfile();
}
@Override
public String effectiveCwd(SpawnRequest req) {
return delegate.effectiveCwd(req);
}
@Override
public List<String> parityOverlay(String profileName) {
return delegate.parityOverlay(profileName);
}
@Override
public List<?> list() {
return delegate.list();
}
@Override
public int reapOrphanWorkers() {
return delegate.reapOrphanWorkers();
}
@Override
public void stop(String id) {
if (stopCalls.incrementAndGet() == 1) {
enteredFirstStop.countDown();
awaitOrFail(releaseFirstStop);
}
delegate.stop(id);
}
@Override
public boolean clearContext(String id) {
return delegate.clearContext(id);
}
}
private static List<String> promptTexts(FakeHerdr herdr) {
return herdr.calls.stream()
.filter(c -> "agent.prompt".equals(c.method()))
@@ -1207,21 +989,8 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
+ "dirty check threw");
}
/**
* fleetd #283 defect 1 changed this test's own premise, so its assertions are updated along
* with the production fix. Before #283, the middle session's worktree-removal failure escaped
* {@code release()} uncaught, and this test proved {@code reapIdle}'s own per-session try/catch
* (CB-581) kept the rest of the pass going regardless. Now that {@code release()} itself catches
* a worktree-removal failure (matching every sibling cleanup step in that method) and only logs
* a WARN, {@code release()} no longer throws for this reason — so all three idle sessions are
* released and counted, and the middle one's removal failure is now visible only as the WARN
* {@code release()} itself logs, not as a reap-loop catch. {@code reapIdle}'s own guard (for a
* failure {@code release()} still cannot swallow, e.g. from {@code launcher.stop}) is untouched
* by this ticket. This test no longer exercises that guard — reaching it now needs a failure
* that #283 does not catch inside {@code release()} itself.
*/
@Test
void reapIdleCountsAllThreeSessionsWhenOnlyItsWorktreeRemovalFails() {
void reapIdleSurvivesOneSessionThatFailsToRelease() {
long[] clock = {0};
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
RecordingWorktrees worktrees = new RecordingWorktrees();
@@ -1235,8 +1004,8 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(a.terminalId());
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(b.terminalId());
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(c.terminalId());
// The middle session's worktree removal fails — fleetd #283 makes release() catch and log
// this itself, so it no longer propagates out of release() at all.
// The middle session's worktree removal fails — release() propagates that, so this is the
// one call reapIdle's per-session guard must survive without skipping the rest of the pass.
worktrees.failRemoveFor(b.worktree());
LoggerContext ctx = (LoggerContext) LoggerFactory.getILoggerFactory();
@@ -1257,16 +1026,14 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
.map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage)
.filter(m -> m.contains(b.paneId()))
.findFirst()
.orElse("no worktree-removal-failure WARN logged");
.orElse("no reap-failure WARN logged");
assertTrue(warn.contains(b.terminalId()), "the WARN names the failed session's terminal: " + warn);
assertTrue(warn.contains(b.worktree()), "the WARN names the failed session's worktree: " + warn);
} finally {
sessionLog.detachAppender(appender);
}
assertEquals(3, reaped,
"fleetd #283: release() no longer throws for a worktree-removal failure, so reapIdle "
+ "counts all three idle sessions as reaped");
assertEquals(2, reaped, "the middle session's failure is logged, not counted as reaped");
assertTrue(sessions.get(a.paneId()).isEmpty(), "the first session is still released");
assertTrue(sessions.get(c.paneId()).isEmpty(), "the third session is still released");
assertTrue(sessions.get(b.paneId()).isEmpty(),
@@ -1277,79 +1044,6 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCallsFor(herdr, "w9:pRoot_3"), "the third pane is stopped");
}
/**
* fleetd #290: the #283 fix above closed the one trigger this suite used for {@code
* reapIdle}'s own per-session try/catch (CB-581) — a worktree-removal failure is now caught
* and logged inside {@code release()} itself, so it never reaches {@code reapIdle}'s guard at
* all. This test restores coverage of that guard using the trigger the ticket names: {@code
* release()} calls {@code launcher.stop(paneId)} with no try/catch around it, so a failing
* {@code pane.close} propagates straight out of {@code release()} uncaught. {@link
* FakeHerdr#paneCloseFailsForPane} (added for this ticket) makes exactly the middle session's
* stop fail, while the other two still succeed, so this proves {@code reapIdle} keeps reaping
* the rest of the roster rather than aborting the whole pass.
*/
@Test
void reapIdleSurvivesOneSessionWhoseLauncherStopFails() {
long[] clock = {0};
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
RecordingWorktrees worktrees = new RecordingWorktrees();
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr, worktrees, () -> clock[0]);
MemberSession a = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-290a", null));
MemberSession b = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-290b", null));
MemberSession c = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-290c", null));
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(a.terminalId());
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(b.terminalId());
sessions.asPresence().markPresent(c.terminalId());
// Only the middle session's herdr pane fails to close — a and c stop normally. This is the
// trigger reapIdle's own guard is for, now that #283 closed the worktree-removal trigger.
herdr.paneCloseFailsForPane("w9:pRoot_2", "internal_error");
LoggerContext ctx = (LoggerContext) LoggerFactory.getILoggerFactory();
ch.qos.logback.classic.Logger sessionLog =
(ch.qos.logback.classic.Logger) LoggerFactory.getLogger(SessionManager.class);
ListAppender<ILoggingEvent> appender = new ListAppender<>();
appender.setContext(ctx);
appender.start();
sessionLog.addAppender(appender);
sessionLog.setLevel(Level.WARN);
int reaped;
try {
clock[0] = 100;
reaped = sessions.reapIdle(10);
String warn = appender.list.stream()
.filter(e -> e.getLevel().equals(Level.WARN))
.map(ILoggingEvent::getFormattedMessage)
.filter(m -> m.contains("reap failed") && m.contains(b.paneId()))
.findFirst()
.orElse("no reap-failed WARN logged for the failing session");
assertTrue(warn.contains(b.terminalId()), "the WARN names the failed session's terminal: " + warn);
} finally {
sessionLog.detachAppender(appender);
}
assertEquals(2, reaped,
"the middle session's launcher.stop failure is not counted as reaped, but must not "
+ "abort reaping the other two");
assertTrue(sessions.get(a.paneId()).isEmpty(), "the first session is still released");
assertTrue(sessions.get(c.paneId()).isEmpty(),
"the third session is still reached and released — proves the pass did not abort "
+ "when the middle session's release() threw");
assertTrue(sessions.get(b.paneId()).isEmpty(),
"the middle session is still deregistered — release() removes it from the registry "
+ "before launcher.stop() runs, regardless of whether stop() then throws");
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCallsFor(herdr, "w9:pRoot_1"), "the first pane is stopped");
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCallsFor(herdr, "w9:pRoot_2"),
"the middle pane's stop was attempted, even though it failed");
assertEquals(1, paneCloseCallsFor(herdr, "w9:pRoot_3"), "the third pane is stopped");
assertEquals(List.of(a.worktree(), c.worktree()), worktrees.removeCalls().stream().sorted().toList(),
"the middle session's worktree removal never runs — release() throws before reaching "
+ "it — while the other two, unaffected, still have theirs removed");
}
@Test
void unchangedRegressionCleanCompletedReleaseStillRemovesTheWorktree() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -1364,41 +1058,6 @@ class SessionManagerTest {
"COMPLETED release of a clean worktree still removes it");
}
/**
* fleetd #293: {@code HerdrPeerLauncher.stop()} used to run {@code spaces.closeTab} bare — a
* failing {@code tab.close} (any code other than {@code *_not_found}) propagated straight out
* of {@code stop()}. {@code SessionManager.release} calls {@code launcher.stop(paneId)} with
* no try/catch (fleetd #283 wrapped the WORKTREE-removal step further down, not this one), so
* the throw happened <em>before</em> that worktree-removal step ever ran — and by then {@code
* registry.remove(paneId)} had already run, so a second {@code stop} is a no-op: the worktree
* leaked with no retry path. The pane itself is already closed by the time {@code tab.close}
* runs, so its failure is cosmetic workspace tidying, not a real teardown failure. The fix
* wraps {@code closeTab} inside {@code stop()} so it no longer throws for this reason; this
* test proves both halves at once: {@code release()} does not throw, and it still removes the
* worktree.
*/
@Test
void releaseStillRemovesTheWorktreeWhenCloseTabFails() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
RecordingWorktrees worktrees = new RecordingWorktrees();
SessionManager sessions = sessionManager(herdr, worktrees);
MemberSession s = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-293a", null));
// FakeHerdr's pane.get always answers with tab_id "w9:t2" for a tab-placement spawn.
herdr.tabCloseFailsForTab("w9:t2", "internal_error");
assertDoesNotThrow(() -> sessions.release(s.paneId()),
"a failing tab.close is cosmetic (the pane is already closed by then) — it must not "
+ "propagate out of release()");
assertTrue(herdr.called("tab.close"), "tab.close was still attempted");
assertEquals(List.of(s.worktree()), worktrees.removeCalls(),
"release() must still remove the worktree even though tab.close failed — this is "
+ "the leak fleetd #293 reports: before the fix, release() never reached this "
+ "step at all");
assertTrue(sessions.get(s.paneId()).isEmpty(), "the session is still deregistered");
}
@Test
void unchangedRegressionDirtyCompletedReleaseStillPreservesTheWorktree() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
@@ -212,41 +212,9 @@ class WorktreeSessionManagerTest {
assertEquals("/repo", remove.repoRoot());
assertEquals(s.worktree(), remove.worktreePath());
// The fake records no branch-delete calls because Worktrees.remove only removes the checkout.
assertTrue(worktrees.deleteBranchCalls().isEmpty(),
"a normal release must NEVER delete the branch — it is the worker's only recoverable "
+ "copy of committed work, and only the failed-provisioning path may remove it");
assertTrue(sessions.get(paneId).isEmpty(), "released session is no longer retrievable");
}
/**
* fleetd #283 defect 1. Every other cleanup step in {@code release()} is wrapped in try/catch,
* because {@code exec()} can throw on a non-zero exit or its own 30s timeout — this was the one
* step left bare. By the time it runs, the registry entry, the retained handle, and the pane are
* all already gone, so a throw here used to escape {@code release()} after the session was
* already fully torn down: a second stop on the same paneId is a no-op (nothing left to find),
* so there was no retry path, and the caller saw a failed stop for a session that was in fact
* gone. This test makes the worktree removal throw and asserts release() still completes with
* the pane stopped and the registry clean.
*/
@Test
void releaseCompletesAndStopsPaneEvenWhenWorktreeRemovalThrows() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FakeWorktrees worktrees = new FakeWorktrees().withRepoRoot("/repo").withPrefix("/wt")
.failRemove("stale index lock");
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workerService(herdr), worktrees);
MemberSession s = sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-283-1", null));
String paneId = s.paneId();
sessions.release(paneId); // must not throw
assertTrue(herdr.called("pane.close"), "the pane is still stopped despite the removal failure");
assertEquals(1, worktrees.removeCalls().size(), "worktree removal was still attempted");
assertTrue(sessions.get(paneId).isEmpty(),
"the session is deregistered regardless of the removal failure");
assertEquals(0, sessions.size(), "the registry is left clean");
}
/**
* CB-576. A normal {@code COMPLETED} release whose worktree holds uncommitted work must NOT
* remove it — {@code --force} would destroy the worker's only copy. The bridge cannot see
@@ -384,39 +352,6 @@ class WorktreeSessionManagerTest {
assertEquals(0, sessions.size(), "failed acquire leaves no registry entry");
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.start"), "spawn is never reached when add fails");
assertTrue(worktrees.removeCalls().isEmpty(), "no worktree was added, so none is removed");
assertTrue(worktrees.deleteBranchCalls().isEmpty(),
"add() itself never created the branch in git, so there is nothing to delete");
}
/**
* fleetd #283 defect 2. {@code acquireWithWorktree}'s catch covers every failure AFTER
* {@code worktrees.add()} returns — {@code overlayParity}, {@code shareWithGroup},
* {@code launcher.spawn} itself — so by the time it runs, {@code branch} was actually created in
* git. It removed only the worktree and forgot the branch, leaking a {@code worker/<slug>-<nonce>}
* branch on every routine spawn failure (a quarantined credential, a backend refusal). This test
* makes {@code overlayParity} (a post-add() step) throw and asserts the branch is deleted, the
* same way #274 already does for the sibling failure inside {@code add()} itself.
*/
@Test
void spawnFailureAfterAddDeletesTheOrphanedBranch() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
FakeWorktrees worktrees = new FakeWorktrees().withRepoRoot("/repo").withPrefix("/wt")
.failOverlay("overlayParity failed");
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workerService(herdr), worktrees);
assertThrows(WorktreeException.class, () ->
sessions.acquire("ltms-local", null, "/caller/proj", null,
new WorktreeRequest("cb-283-2", null)));
assertEquals(0, sessions.size(), "failed acquire leaves no registry entry");
assertFalse(herdr.called("agent.start"), "spawn is never reached when overlayParity fails");
assertEquals(1, worktrees.removeCalls().size(), "the worktree checkout is still removed");
assertEquals(1, worktrees.deleteBranchCalls().size(),
"the orphaned branch that add() actually created must also be deleted");
FakeWorktrees.DeleteBranchCall del = worktrees.lastDeleteBranch();
assertEquals("/repo", del.repoRoot());
FakeWorktrees.AddCall add = worktrees.lastAdd();
assertEquals(add.branch(), del.branch(), "the branch deleted is the exact one add() created");
}
@Test