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Dai Ha de026b8f8a #137 follow-up: document defect-1 and defect-2 reachability, drop unconstructible test
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 48s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m28s
Defect 1 (reply()'s askAnsweredAsyncTasks returning >1 candidate): confirmed
unreachable today. Documented why in three places — hasAsyncQuestion matches
any task with a stamped turnId (not just an open question), and answer()'s
clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, false) leaves that stamp in place until the
resumed turn's own future resolves — so a second task can never reach the
same eligible state while a first one holds it. Kept the defensive
inbox-fallback branch as defence in depth against that guarantee weakening,
per review instruction; no test seam added.

Defect 2 (abandon()'s broader `matching` filter applying a stranded reply to
more than one task): matching.size() >= 2 alone IS reachable (already
covered by abandonFailsEveryPendingAsyncTicketForTheReleasedTarget) and was
a real pre-fix bug (97f6c33's parent reused one drained reply for every
matching task). But hadStrandedReply == true together with matching.size()
>= 2, at the instant abandon() runs, is not constructible through the public
API: send() and answer() are the only two sites that ever hold a target's
session lock, and both open a Rendezvous waiter for that target as the first
thing they do while holding it — so "lock held" and "waiter open" are the
same fact throughout this class, and reply()'s fast path always resolves an
open waiter directly instead of stranding. A strand can only be created
while no task is accepted, and the moment the lock is next taken, that
acceptance clears the strand again before abandon() can observe both facts
together. Documented this in abandon()'s javadoc and removed the earlier
attempt at a deterministic test for the conjunction, whose apparent failure
was an invalid premise (the "accepted" task's own acceptance silently
cleared the strand it was meant to race against), not the fix being absent.
2026-08-31 23:17:50 +07:00
Dai Ha 97f6c33a45 #137: don't guess when a target has more than one open async task
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m4s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m17s
The CB-205-recovery fix in #205 assumed a target has at most one open
async task, with no guard. Fix three consequences:

- reply(): askAnsweredAsyncTask -> askAnsweredAsyncTasks (List). Exactly
  one candidate completes it (unchanged). Zero falls to the inbox
  (unchanged). More than one now ALSO falls to the inbox instead of
  picking an arbitrary ConcurrentHashMap iteration order, and logs a
  WARN naming the target and every candidate ticket.

- abandon(): a stranded reply now settles at most one matching task —
  the oldest by Task#createdNanos (a new field, the tiebreaker). Every
  other matching task keeps WORKER_FAILED, same as today.

- abandon(): if the chosen recovery task's complete() loses a race
  (another path resolved it first), the drained reply is republished
  to the inbox instead of being silently dropped.

Single-task behavior is unchanged; only the ambiguous case changes.
2026-08-31 22:46:23 +07:00
Dai Ha 7d4a4339c2 Merge branch 'worker/cb-137-ask-ticket-e7760c-2' of https://git.ltms.dev/fleet/fleetd into worker/cb137-ambiguous-task-4df3d8-4 2026-08-31 22:13:37 +07:00
Dai Ha a55079afbd #185: opt-in worktreeGroup, so a member running as another OS user can write its worktree
CI / contract (push) Successful in 50s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m39s
Stage 3 of #185. A provisioned worktree and the repo's git store are made
group-writable when worktreeGroup names an OS group; absent, nothing changes.
The share pass runs after overlayParity, not inside add(), because
overlayParity copies more files in after add() returns.

This isolates credentials, not the repository: a member in the group can
still write the operator's git objects and refs.
2026-08-31 21:47:03 +07:00
Dai Ha e18ad4723b Merge remote-tracking branch 'refs/remotes/origin/cb206' 2026-08-31 21:47:03 +07:00
Dai Ha 6de8ac8972 #206: read opencode session ids from opencode.db, and pin the read-only open
opencode migrated its session store from a JSON file tree to SQLite in
January. OpenCodeSessionDiscovery still scanned the frozen tree, so it
returned null for every member: agentSessionId was never known and
resumeSessionId silently did nothing for every opencode profile, through
57 member spawns, with nothing logging that the search found nothing.
2026-08-31 21:46:32 +07:00
Dai Ha a052975420 #206: pin the read-only open with a test that actually fails without it
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m18s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m44s
setReadOnly(true) is the whole thing keeping fleetd out of the operator's
live 841MB opencode.db, and no test failed when it was removed.

The obvious test does not work. Making the database file unwritable and
checking the read still succeeds passes either way, because SQLite silently
downgrades a read-write open of an unwritable file to read-only. I wrote that
test, watched it pass with the flag removed, and threw it away.

What works: extract a package-private openReadOnly(), then ask that connection
to INSERT and require the refusal. Watched red with the flag removed, green
with it restored.

Also switches the test's INSERT helper to a PreparedStatement -- hand-escaped
SQL in a test is a pattern that gets copied into main code.
2026-08-31 21:46:07 +07:00
Dai Ha 3743789e8d fleetd #206: read opencode session ids from opencode.db (SQLite), not the frozen JSON tree
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m5s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m44s
opencode migrated its session store to SQLite in January 2026; the JSON tree under
storage/session/<projectID>/ses_*.json stopped being written, so OpenCodeSessionDiscovery
returned null for every member forever, and fleet_spawn{resumeSessionId} was unreachable.

- Add org.xerial:sqlite-jdbc 3.53.4.0, opened read-only (SQLiteConfig.setReadOnly), so it
  never disturbs a live opencode process writing the WAL-mode database.
- Rewrite sessionIdForDirectory to run a parameterized SELECT ... WHERE directory = ?
  ORDER BY time_updated DESC LIMIT 1 against the session table. Still never throws: a
  missing database, a locked/corrupt one, or no matching row all return null.
- Log the silence that let this go unnoticed: WARN once per instance when opencode.db
  itself is missing (the layout moved again), DEBUG when it exists but no row matches
  yet (the normal interim answer right after a spawn).
- Replace the JSON-fixture tests with a synthetic-SQLite-db fixture; delete the tests
  that only proved the old JSON scan worked.
2026-08-31 15:52:06 +07:00
Dai Ha ee5f8b932b #137: complete an async ticket's own reply after answer() times out
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 49s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m44s
fleet_send{turnId} (MessageService.answer) blocks the primary only for its
own bounded MCP-call window (25s default, 120s max) — far shorter than a
worker's resumed turn can genuinely take. When that window expires, answer()
closes its rendezvous waiter, so the worker's eventual fleet_reply has no
live waiter to resolve and falls back to the session inbox. The async
ticket's future was never completed by that path, so fleet_poll{ticket}
stayed PENDING until fleet_stop's abandon() forced it FAILED with a
misleading "the worker session was released before it replied" reason,
even though the reply had genuinely arrived.

- MessageService.reply(): before falling to the inbox, look for the async
  task this exact turn belongs to (already answered — question cleared,
  turnId still stamped — but not yet resolved) and complete it directly
  with the real reply, so fleet_poll{ticket} returns it.
- MessageService.abandon(): defense in depth, independent of the above —
  never write a false WORKER_FAILED once a reply reached the inbox for
  this target; recover and use its real content instead.
- Two new tests drive the full delegation path (async send -> ask ->
  answer with a short timeout -> reply -> poll/abandon), not a reply sink
  directly; both fail with the fix disabled and pass with it restored.
2026-08-31 14:12:23 +07:00
7 changed files with 502 additions and 141 deletions
+166
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@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
# CB-137 / fleetd issue #137 — report
## Real root cause (not the hypothesis in the ticket)
I read `MessageService.java` and `Rendezvous.java` before changing anything. The mechanism is real,
but the exact place it happens is `MessageService.answer()`, not "the reply goes to the inbox on
purpose" in general.
1. A lead delegates with `fleet_send{wait:false}` → `sendAsync()` creates a `Task` and runs `send()`
on a background virtual thread with a 30-minute internal budget (`ASYNC_TIMEOUT_MS`).
2. The worker calls `fleet_ask`. That resolves the open rendezvous waiter with `Kind.QUESTION`, so
`send()` returns immediately and the `Task` is left open (its `future` stays unresolved — see the
comment in `sendAsync`'s lambda: "Keep the accepted owner until answer() finishes it").
3. The lead answers with `fleet_send{turnId, content}`. This calls `FleetMcp.answer()` →
`MessageService.answer(turnId, content, timeout)`. The `timeout` here is **not** the generous
30-minute async budget — it is the MCP tool's own bounded wait: `DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 25_000`,
clamped to at most `MAX_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000` (`FleetMcp.java:71-72,495,512`). This is the same
~60–120s window every blocking `fleet_send` call is capped at (documented elsewhere as "the
caller's own MCP client call timeout").
4. `answer()` opens a **fresh** rendezvous waiter for the worker session and blocks on it for at most
that window. If the worker's resumed turn takes longer than that to actually finish (very
plausible — the resumed turn can mean more edits, a build, a commit, a push, opening a PR), the
wait times out. On timeout, `answer()`'s `finally` block unconditionally calls
`rendezvous.close(workerSession, reply)`, **removing the waiter from the map**, and returns
`Outcome.TIMED_OUT_WORKING` to the lead.
5. The worker keeps working, unaware anything happened, and eventually calls `fleet_reply`. That
reaches `MessageService.reply(session, content)`, which tries `rendezvous.resolve(session,
content)` — but the waiter was already closed in step 4, so `resolve` returns `false`. `reply()`
then falls back to `inbox.publish(...)` and marks `strandedReplies.put(session, true)`
(CB-640 bookkeeping) — the reply is safely held, but **the async `Task`'s `future` is never
completed**.
6. `fleet_poll{ticket}` keeps returning `PENDING` forever (the `Task` never resolves) — until the
lead eventually calls `fleet_stop`. That fires `sessions.onRelease` → `messages.abandon(target,
reason)` (`Fleetd.java:481-497`), where `reason` is built with the exact text from the bug report
("the worker session was released before it replied; worktree=... branch=... snapshot=...",
`Fleetd.java:484-487`). `abandon()`'s loop finds the still-open `Task` (`question == null`, future
not done) and completes it as `WORKER_FAILED` with that misleading reason — even though the
worker's real reply is sitting, intact, in the inbox the whole time.
So: the reported behaviour is correct, and the specific trigger is `answer()`'s own bounded wait
being shorter than the worker's real resumed-turn time — not anything to do with the ~55s
`fleet_ask` window itself (that part, issue #61, is untouched).
## Fix
Two changes in `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/msg/MessageService.java`, both scoped to the
ticket/reply routing and the terminal-state text — `fleet_ask`'s own window and mechanics are
untouched.
**1. `reply()` — priority 1 (the ticket resolves with the real reply).**
Before falling back to the inbox, `reply()` now looks for an async `Task` that is specifically in the
"already answered but not yet resolved" state (`question == null`, `turnId != null` — set once
`answer()` has cleared the question but before anything completed the future, `!future.isDone()`).
If one exists for this `target`, the worker's reply completes that `Task`'s future directly as
`Outcome.REPLIED` with the real content, and the reply never touches the inbox at all. A task that
was never asked has `turnId == null` and can never match, so ordinary (no-`fleet_ask`) delegations
are unaffected — they already resolve through the pre-existing rendezvous fast path.
I chose this over leaving `answer()`'s own timeout behaviour untouched and instead keeping its
rendezvous waiter open in the background: that alternative works but reopens the "at most one
waiter per session" invariant (`Rendezvous.open` throws on a double-open) to a new class of races
with a fresh send arriving mid-window. The `send()` path already guards against sending into an
answered-but-still-resolving worker via `hasAsyncQuestion(target)` (checks `asyncTasksByTurn`,
which still holds the task until it resolves), so routing through `reply()` gets the same protection
without touching `answer()`'s waiter lifecycle at all — the smaller, safer diff.
**2. `abandon()` — priority 3 (required independently, "even if you fix (1)").**
Before marking any of a released target's still-open tasks `WORKER_FAILED`, `abandon()` now checks
`hasStrandedReply(target)` (the existing CB-640 fact — true whenever the *last* `reply()` for this
target fell through to the inbox). If true, it drains the inbox (`recoverStrandedReply`) and — if it
actually finds a message — completes the task as `REPLIED` with that real content instead of writing
the failure. This is deliberately a **separate** check from fix 1: fix 1 already prevents the
inbox-stranding from happening in the exact scenario this ticket describes, so by the time
`abandon()` runs the task is normally already resolved and `abandon()`'s `complete()` call is a
harmless no-op. This second check exists so that if some *other* future path ever strands a reply
in the inbox without resolving its ticket, `abandon()` still refuses to report a false failure —
"if a reply reached any sink for that turn, the terminal state is done," per the ticket. I verified
both are required by disabling each independently and confirming the two new tests fail (see below).
**Priority 4 (the snapshot/worktree hint).** Handled as a consequence of both fixes rather than a
separate branch: once a task resolves as `REPLIED` (via either fix), `abandon()` never calls
`new Reply(Outcome.WORKER_FAILED, reason)` for that task at all, so the "the worker session was
released before it replied; worktree=... branch=... snapshot=..." text is never constructed or
attached to that ticket's outcome. It still appears, correctly, for a task that never got a reply
(the existing `abandonFailsEveryPendingAsyncTicketForTheReleasedTarget` /
`anAbandonedAsyncTaskPollsAsFailedNotPending` tests still pass unchanged).
**Priority 2** was not needed — fix 1 makes `fleet_poll{ticket}` return the actual reply (the
higher-priority option), so I did not fall back to "the ticket merely resolves as done with no
content."
## Tests — driven through the real delegation path, not the reply sink directly
Both new tests in `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/msg/MessageServiceTest.java` go through
`sendAsync` → `injectDelivery` → `ask` → `answer` (with a short timeout, so it genuinely times out,
mirroring the ~25–120s real MCP-call bound vs. a longer resumed turn) → `reply` → `poll`/`abandon`.
No test constructs a `Reply` and hands it to a sink directly.
- `aReplyAfterAnswerTimesOutStillCompletesTheAsyncTicket` — asserts `fleet_poll{ticket}` (via
`messages.poll`) reaches `Phase.DONE` with the worker's actual reply text and
`replySource() == "reply"`, and that `hasStrandedReply(T)` stays `false` (proves the reply never
touched the inbox at all — fix 1 caught it).
- `fleetStopAfterAnOrphanedReplyDoesNotFailTheTicket` — same setup, then calls `abandon(T, "the
worker session was released before it replied")` (what `fleet_stop` triggers) and asserts it
returns `false` (no failure recorded) and the ticket still polls `DONE` with the real reply.
**Proof both fail without the change.** I temporarily short-circuited both new private methods
(`askAnsweredAsyncTask` → always `null`, `recoverStrandedReply` → always `null`) — i.e. disabled
both fixes — and ran just these two tests:
```
[ERROR] Tests run: 2, Failures: 2, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0
dev.ltms.fleet.msg.MessageServiceTest.aReplyAfterAnswerTimesOutStillCompletesTheAsyncTicket
org.opentest4j.AssertionFailedError: expected: <DONE> but was: <PENDING>
dev.ltms.fleet.msg.MessageServiceTest.fleetStopAfterAnOrphanedReplyDoesNotFailTheTicket
org.opentest4j.AssertionFailedError: a reply already arrived, so nothing here is a genuine failure
==> expected: <false> but was: <true>
```
This is the exact bug: the ticket stays `PENDING` forever, and `abandon()` reports `true` (a
failure) even though a reply had already arrived. I then restored both fixes (verified with
`grep -n "TEMP #137-proof"` finding nothing) and re-ran — both pass.
## Build
Ran from `fleetd/`, unpiped, full output read (not `| tail`):
```
mvn clean install
...
[INFO] Tests run: 1039, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0
[INFO] BUILD SUCCESS
[INFO] Total time: 36.315 s
```
Main was at 1037 tests; this branch adds the 2 new tests above → 1039, all green, `exit=0`.
## What I could NOT check
- No IDE tooling is mounted for me (worker), so no `ide_diagnostics`/IntelliJ inspection pass — only
`mvn clean install` (compiler + full test suite), as the worker procedure allows.
- I cannot restart the daemon or dogfood this live — I have no forge/daemon control. This is
unverified against a real herdr pane, a real MCP client's ~60s call cap, or a real worker session;
everything above is verified only through the JUnit fixture's simulated timing
(`FakeHerdr`/`injector.onStatus`/direct `messages.answer(...,150)` calls), not a live fleet.
A primary should still consider a short live dogfood (an async delegation that asks, gets answered,
and takes longer than ~2 minutes to reply) before calling this closed.
- I did not touch, and did not re-verify, the `fleet_ask` ~55s window itself (issue #61) — out of
scope per the brief.
## Scope note (not investigated further)
`answer()`'s nested/double-`fleet_ask` case (the worker asks a second question before ever
replying to the first answer) has some pre-existing behaviour around which `turnId` a `QUESTION`
resolution gets attributed to that I did not fully untangle — it predates this change, my fix does
not touch it, and it is unrelated to the reported defect. Flagging only; not investigated further.
## Handoff
- Branch: `worker/cb-137-ask-ticket-e7760c-2`
- Worktree root: `/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/.bridged-worktrees/734324-2`
- Files changed:
- `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/msg/MessageService.java`
- `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/msg/MessageServiceTest.java`
- `REPORT-cb137.md` (this file)
- Build: `Tests run: 1039, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0` / `BUILD SUCCESS` (verbatim above)
+18
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@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
<testcontainers.version>1.20.4</testcontainers.version>
<commons-compress.version>1.27.1</commons-compress.version>
<commons-lang3.version>3.18.0</commons-lang3.version>
<sqlite-jdbc.version>3.53.4.0</sqlite-jdbc.version>
</properties>
<!--
@@ -44,6 +45,12 @@
3.0-rc5; bumping Jackson 3 to the patched 3.2.x breaks the SDK (annotation mismatch).
Only the loopback /mcp endpoint parses this JSON, from trusted local Claude clients.
The 11.0.23 -> 11.0.25 bump did clear jetty CVE-2024-8184 (5.9) and CVE-2024-6763.
fleetd #206: org.xerial:sqlite-jdbc 3.53.4.0 (added for OpenCodeSessionDiscovery) — the
only known advisory against this artifact is CVE-2023-32697 (RCE via an attacker-controlled
JDBC URL), fixed in 3.41.2.2; 3.53.4.0 is well past that fix and OSV.dev reports no open
advisory against it. Checked via the OSV.dev API (no Mend.io/JetBrains IDE MCP mount
available from this worktree) on 2026-08-31.
-->
<!-- Force the latest patched Jetty 11.x across all Javalin-pulled Jetty modules (no version
@@ -123,6 +130,17 @@
<version>${amqp.version}</version>
</dependency>
<!-- fleetd #206: opencode moved its session store from a JSON tree to SQLite
(opencode.db). This is the JDBC driver OpenCodeSessionDiscovery uses to read it
read-only. Ships bundled native libraries (linux/mac/windows, several archs), so it
is a heavier jar than most deps here — see the pom's dependency-security note below
for the size/CVE tradeoff actually measured. -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.xerial</groupId>
<artifactId>sqlite-jdbc</artifactId>
<version>${sqlite-jdbc.version}</version>
</dependency>
<!-- Logging -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.slf4j</groupId>
@@ -1,58 +1,87 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.member;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import org.sqlite.SQLiteConfig;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.stream.Stream;
import java.sql.Connection;
import java.sql.PreparedStatement;
import java.sql.ResultSet;
import java.sql.SQLException;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean;
/**
* Resolves the opencode session id for a fleetd worker from opencode's on-disk storage — the
* only place this adapter touches opencode's private layout, and deliberately the <em>only</em>
* class that does.
*
* <p><strong>Why this is isolated behind one seam.</strong> The layout is version-coupled and not a
* stable contract: opencode writes one JSON file per session under
* {@code <storageRoot>/session/<projectID>/<ses_*.json>}, and each record carries a
* {@code "version"} field (e.g. {@code "1.1.31"}), so the exact directory shape, file naming, and
* field names can move between opencode releases. opencode also ships a headless HTTP server that
* may supersede file scanning entirely. Everything this adapter knows about that private storage —
* its shape, naming, and field names — lives here, so a layout change, or a switch to the HTTP
* server, changes exactly one class and nothing in {@link OpenCodeLauncher}.
* <p><strong>Why this is isolated behind one seam.</strong> The layout is version-coupled and not
* a stable contract: opencode persists its session state in a SQLite database at
* {@code <storageRoot>/opencode.db} (a {@code session} table, one row per session, keyed by id and
* carrying a {@code directory} column). That schema can move between opencode releases exactly
* like the JSON-file layout it replaced did (opencode migrated off a one-JSON-file-per-session
* tree under {@code <storageRoot>/storage/session/<projectID>/ses_*.json} in January 2026 — that
* tree is now a frozen migration artefact nothing writes, which is why this class no longer reads
* it). opencode also ships a headless HTTP server that may supersede both of these entirely.
* Everything this adapter knows about that private storage — its shape and column names — lives
* here, so a layout change, or a switch to the HTTP server, changes exactly one class and nothing
* in {@link OpenCodeLauncher}.
*
* <p>The determinism that makes this useful is structural, not a guess: every fleetd worker runs
* in its own unique git worktree, so the record's {@code directory} (its project root) equals the
* in its own unique git worktree, so the row's {@code directory} (its project root) equals the
* worker's cwd identifies <em>its</em> session unambiguously. We match on {@code directory} rather
* than diffing {@code opencode session list} before/after — that races under concurrent spawns, and
* the CLI listing does not even show the directory.
*
* <p>All reads are best-effort and never throw: a missing or unreadable storage root, a record that
* fails to parse, or a directory with no record yet all yield {@code null}, and the caller (the
* session handle) treats that as "identity not resolved yet" and retries later.
* <p>All reads are best-effort and never throw: a missing or unreadable database, a query that
* fails, or a directory with no row yet all yield {@code null}, and the caller (the session
* handle) treats that as "identity not resolved yet" and retries later. The database is opened
* read-only and never written to: opencode itself may be running and writing it concurrently (WAL
* mode), and this class must never disturb that.
*/
final class OpenCodeSessionDiscovery {
private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(OpenCodeSessionDiscovery.class);
private final Path storageRoot; // e.g. ~/.local/share/opencode (injectable for tests)
private final ObjectMapper json;
private final Path databasePath;
private final AtomicBoolean warnedMissingDatabase = new AtomicBoolean(false);
OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(Path storageRoot) {
this.storageRoot = storageRoot;
this.json = new ObjectMapper();
this.databasePath = storageRoot.resolve("opencode.db");
}
/**
* The opencode session id whose record references {@code directory} (the worker's cwd), or
* {@code null} when no record matches yet. When several records share the directory — e.g.
* repeated spawns into the same worktree — the <em>most recently modified</em> one wins: it is
* A connection to {@link #databasePath} opened with SQLite's {@code SQLITE_OPEN_READONLY}
* flag: it never creates the file, never writes, and never touches WAL or journal mode.
* opencode may be running and writing this database concurrently, and this class must never
* disturb it.
*
* <p>Package-private so a test can hold the connection and prove it refuses a write. That is
* the only way to pin this property: making the file unwritable does <em>not</em> work,
* because SQLite silently downgrades a read-write open of an unwritable file to read-only, so
* such a test passes whether or not the flag is set.
*/
Connection openReadOnly() throws SQLException {
SQLiteConfig config = new SQLiteConfig();
config.setReadOnly(true);
return config.createConnection("jdbc:sqlite:" + databasePath);
}
/**
* The opencode session id whose row references {@code directory} (the worker's cwd), or
* {@code null} when no row matches yet. When several rows share the directory — e.g. repeated
* spawns into the same worktree — the row with the highest {@code time_updated} wins: it is
* the session the pane most likely corresponds to.
*
* <p>Never throws: a missing {@code storageRoot}, an unreadable/malformed record, or a
* directory that has not been persisted yet all resolve to {@code null} rather than failing a
* spawn. A fleetd worker's session record is written lazily (when the session is first
* persisted), so {@code null} here is the normal answer right after the pane is ready, and the
* caller retries later.
* <p>Never throws: a missing {@code opencode.db}, a locked/unreadable database, a query
* failure, or a directory that has not been persisted yet all resolve to {@code null} rather
* than failing a spawn. A fleetd worker's session row is written lazily (when the session is
* first persisted), so {@code null} here is the normal answer right after the pane is ready,
* and the caller retries later.
*
* @param directory the worker's cwd, as resolved for this spawn
* @return the matching session id, or {@code null} if none is known yet
@@ -61,62 +90,31 @@ final class OpenCodeSessionDiscovery {
if (directory == null || directory.isBlank()) {
return null;
}
Path sessionRoot = storageRoot.resolve("session");
if (!Files.isDirectory(sessionRoot)) {
if (!Files.isRegularFile(databasePath)) {
if (warnedMissingDatabase.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
log.warn("opencode session database not found at {} — opencode's on-disk layout "
+ "may have moved again; session discovery will keep returning null",
databasePath);
}
return null;
}
String best = null;
long bestMtime = Long.MIN_VALUE;
try (Stream<Path> projectDirs = Files.list(sessionRoot)) {
for (Path projectDir : projectDirs.filter(Files::isDirectory).toList()) {
try (Stream<Path> records = Files.list(projectDir)) {
for (Path record : records.toList()) {
String id = matchId(record, directory);
if (id == null) {
continue;
}
long mtime = lastModifiedEpochMillis(record);
if (mtime > bestMtime) {
bestMtime = mtime;
best = id;
}
}
} catch (IOException ignored) {
// one project dir unreadable — skip it; another may still match
String sql = "SELECT id FROM session WHERE directory = ? ORDER BY time_updated DESC LIMIT 1";
try (Connection connection = openReadOnly();
PreparedStatement statement = connection.prepareStatement(sql)) {
statement.setString(1, directory);
try (ResultSet rows = statement.executeQuery()) {
if (rows.next()) {
return rows.getString("id");
}
}
} catch (IOException ignored) {
// storage root vanished or became unreadable — "no session known yet"
} catch (SQLException e) {
// Locked, corrupt, or otherwise unreadable — never fatal to a spawn. Not the
// "database moved" signal (the file exists), so this stays below WARN.
log.debug("opencode session database unreadable at {}: {}", databasePath, e.toString());
return null;
}
return best;
}
/**
* The record's session id when it references {@code directory}, else {@code null}. A record
* that is not JSON, lacks {@code id}/{@code directory}, or points at a different directory is
* simply not our session; a malformed one is skipped, never fatal.
*/
private String matchId(Path record, String directory) {
try {
JsonNode node = json.readTree(record.toFile());
JsonNode id = node == null ? null : node.get("id");
JsonNode dir = node == null ? null : node.get("directory");
if (id == null || dir == null || !directory.equals(dir.asText())) {
return null;
}
return id.asText();
} catch (IOException e) {
return null;
}
}
/** The record's last-modified epoch ms, or {@code Long.MIN_VALUE} if unreadable (never wins). */
private static long lastModifiedEpochMillis(Path record) {
try {
return Files.getLastModifiedTime(record).toMillis();
} catch (IOException e) {
return Long.MIN_VALUE;
}
log.debug("no opencode session row for directory (root={}, directory={})",
storageRoot, directory);
return null;
}
}
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import dev.ltms.fleet.metrics.Metrics;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.UUID;
import java.util.concurrent.CompletableFuture;
@@ -167,6 +168,12 @@ public final class MessageService {
private static final class Task {
private final String ticket;
private final String target;
/**
* When this task was created (#137 fix): the tiebreaker for which of several open tasks on
* one target gets a recovered reply in {@link #abandon} — the oldest, since it is the one
* that has been waiting longest.
*/
private final long createdNanos;
private final CompletableFuture<Reply> future = new CompletableFuture<>();
/**
* When {@link #future} resolved, or {@code null} while it is still pending — the clock
@@ -184,6 +191,7 @@ public final class MessageService {
private Task(String ticket, String target, LongSupplier nowNanos) {
this.ticket = ticket;
this.target = target;
this.createdNanos = nowNanos.getAsLong();
future.whenComplete((reply, ex) -> completedNanos = nowNanos.getAsLong());
}
}
@@ -375,6 +383,19 @@ public final class MessageService {
* {@link Rendezvous#resolveQuestion} must keep today's {@code NO_WAITER} behaviour — questions
* are interactive and must never be queued.
*
* <p><strong>Ambiguous match also falls to the inbox.</strong> {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks}
* cannot actually return more than one entry today (see its own javadoc for why — in short,
* {@link #hasAsyncQuestion} keeps a target BUSY, so no second task can reach this state, for as
* long as an earlier one's {@code turnId} is still stamped). That is an emergent guarantee from
* two other facts, not one this method enforces, so this branch stays in as defence in depth
* rather than being removed as dead code: if it ever weakens, returning whichever candidate a
* {@code ConcurrentHashMap} iteration reaches first would let a genuine reply complete the
* <em>wrong</em> ticket — silently handing the lead something that reads like a correct answer to
* a delegation the worker never touched, which is worse than a failure because the lead acts on
* it. When more than one candidate exists, guessing is not safe: fall back to the inbox exactly
* as the zero-candidate case does, and let {@link #abandon} apply the eventual recovery
* deterministically instead.
*
* @return always {@code true} — the reply resolved a live send, completed a parked ticket, or
* was queued
*/
@@ -392,13 +413,21 @@ public final class MessageService {
// FAILED with a misleading "session released before it replied" reason, even though the reply
// had, in fact, arrived. Completing the matching ticket directly here means fleet_poll{ticket}
// sees the real reply instead.
Task orphan = askAnsweredAsyncTask(session);
if (orphan != null && orphan.future.complete(new Reply(Outcome.REPLIED, content))) {
if (orphan.turnId != null) {
asyncTasksByTurn.remove(orphan.turnId, orphan);
List<Task> candidates = askAnsweredAsyncTasks(session);
if (candidates.size() == 1) {
Task orphan = candidates.get(0);
if (orphan.future.complete(new Reply(Outcome.REPLIED, content))) {
if (orphan.turnId != null) {
asyncTasksByTurn.remove(orphan.turnId, orphan);
}
count(FleetMetrics.REPLIES, "path", "async-recovered");
return true; // the ticket itself took it — no inbox stranding at all
}
count(FleetMetrics.REPLIES, "path", "async-recovered");
return true; // the ticket itself took it — no inbox stranding at all
} else if (candidates.size() > 1) {
List<String> tickets = candidates.stream().map(t -> t.ticket).toList();
log.warn("reply from {} matches {} open async tickets {} — cannot tell which one it "
+ "answers, queuing to the inbox instead of guessing", session, candidates.size(),
tickets);
}
inbox.publish(session, UUID.randomUUID().toString(), content);
// CB-640: record the stranding itself (not just the reply text) so fleet health can see a
@@ -414,21 +443,38 @@ public final class MessageService {
}
/**
* The still-open async task on {@code target} whose {@code fleet_ask} was already answered — its
* {@link Task#turnId} is stamped but its {@link Task#question} was cleared by {@link #answer} —
* yet whose future is not resolved yet (#137). {@code null} if no such task exists, including the
* Every still-open async task on {@code target} whose {@code fleet_ask} was already answered —
* its {@link Task#turnId} is stamped but its {@link Task#question} was cleared by {@link #answer}
* — yet whose future is not resolved yet (#137). Empty if no such task exists, including the
* common case where {@code target}'s worker never used {@code fleet_ask} at all (a task that was
* never asked has {@code turnId == null}, so it can never match here and only ever completes
* through the ordinary rendezvous fast path in {@link #reply}).
*
* <p><strong>Returns at most one entry today — verified, not assumed.</strong> {@link #send}
* refuses to open a waiter on {@code target} while {@link #hasAsyncQuestion} is true, and that
* check matches ANY task whose {@code turnId} is still stamped in {@code asyncTasksByTurn} —
* not only while its question is still open. {@link #answer} deliberately leaves that stamp in
* place ({@code clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, false)}) until the resumed turn's own future actually
* resolves, at which point {@link #finishAsyncTask} both removes the stamp AND completes that
* task's future in the same call. So a second task can never reach "{@code turnId} stamped, future
* still open" — the exact pair this method matches on — while a first one already holds it: by
* the time the stamp is gone, so is the eligibility. This is an emergent property of those two
* facts holding together, not something this method (or its callers) enforces on its own — flip
* {@code forgetTurn} to {@code true} in that one {@link #answer} call and it silently stops being
* true, with nothing left to fail loudly. The callers below still handle "more than one" as
* defence in depth against exactly that, not because they exercise it today: {@link #reply}
* treats it as unresolvable and falls back to the inbox; {@link #abandon} would pick the oldest
* deterministically (its own {@code matching} list has no such guarantee — see its javadoc).
*/
private Task askAnsweredAsyncTask(String target) {
private List<Task> askAnsweredAsyncTasks(String target) {
List<Task> candidates = new ArrayList<>();
for (Task task : tasks.values()) {
if (target.equals(task.target) && task.question == null && task.turnId != null
&& !task.future.isDone()) {
return task;
candidates.add(task);
}
}
return null;
return candidates;
}
/** Record a counter sample when a registry is wired; a no-op in unit tests. */
@@ -473,16 +519,55 @@ public final class MessageService {
* outcome is counted, so a torn-down delegation stops being invisible to {@code /metrics}.
*
* <p><strong>#137 defence in depth.</strong> {@link #reply} already hands a worker's real
* {@code fleet_reply} straight to the async ticket it belongs to whenever one is still parked
* waiting for it (see {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTask}), so by the time a session is released its
* tasks are normally already resolved — this loop's {@code complete} calls are then harmless
* no-ops (a {@link CompletableFuture} can only resolve once). But should some other path someday
* strand a reply in the inbox without completing its ticket, checking
* {@code fleet_reply} straight to the async ticket it belongs to whenever exactly one is still
* parked waiting for it (see {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks}), so by the time a session is
* released its tasks are normally already resolved — this loop's {@code complete} calls are then
* harmless no-ops (a {@link CompletableFuture} can only resolve once). But should some other path
* someday strand a reply in the inbox without completing its ticket, checking
* {@link #hasStrandedReply(String)} here — before ever writing a failure — means a torn-down
* session whose worker in fact replied is still reported {@code REPLIED} with that reply's own
* text, never the misleading "the worker session was released before it replied" (which also
* means the snapshot/worktree recovery hint that follows it never prints once a reply exists).
*
* <p><strong>At most one task gets the recovered reply — and here, unlike {@link #reply}'s
* {@link #askAnsweredAsyncTasks}, {@code matching.size() >= 2} alone is reachable today.</strong>
* This method's {@code matching} filter has no {@code turnId != null} requirement, so it matches
* any plain (never-asked) open task too — and {@link #sendAsync} does not limit a target to one
* of those: a second {@code fleet_send{wait:false}} at a target that is still busy returns its own
* ticket immediately and simply parks its {@link #send} behind the target's session lock for up
* to {@link #ASYNC_TIMEOUT_MS}, exactly as {@code abandonFailsEveryPendingAsyncTicketForTheReleasedTarget}
* already proves. Before this fix, the loop below drained the strand once and then reused that
* same {@code Reply} for <em>every</em> task it walked past — so two open tasks really did both
* complete {@code REPLIED} with the same text (see the pre-fix loop in commit 97f6c33's parent).
* A stranded reply is one worker answer, so it can settle at most one open task on this target —
* never every open task, and never a guess. When more than one task is still open here, the
* recovered reply goes to the <em>oldest</em> (lowest {@link Task#createdNanos}) — it has been
* waiting longest, so it is the one most likely to be what the reply actually answers. Every
* other open task keeps the ordinary {@code WORKER_FAILED} path it would take without a stranded
* reply at all.
*
* <p><strong>{@code matching.size() >= 2} together with {@code hadStrandedReply} is a different
* question, and today it is defence in depth rather than a path this codebase's public API can
* drive.</strong> This class has exactly two sites that ever acquire a target's entry in
* {@code sessionLocks} — {@link #send} and {@link #answer} — and both open a {@link Rendezvous}
* waiter for that same target as the very first thing they do after acquiring the lock, then hold
* lock and waiter together for the rest of their critical section ({@link #send} also clears
* {@link #strandedReplies} right there, the instant it opens its waiter — before it ever enqueues
* delivery). So "the session lock is held" and "a live waiter is open for it" are the same fact
* throughout this class, and {@link #reply}'s fast path always resolves a currently-open waiter
* directly rather than stranding. The two facts this method wants therefore cannot be produced
* side by side: while the lock is held, a real reply resolves the open waiter directly and never
* reaches {@link #strandedReplies}; the instant the lock is free, any parked matching task's own
* {@link #send} that is scheduled next wins it and, by opening its waiter, clears the strand again
* before this method ever runs. There is no way to hold that lock open-but-unaccepted from outside
* {@link #send}/{@link #answer} to freeze a window in between. Constructing both facts at once
* through {@code sendAsync}/{@code reply}/{@code ask}/{@code answer} would need a race against
* virtual-thread scheduling, not a deterministic sequence — so the oldest-wins code below stays as
* defence in depth against a regression to that mechanism (e.g. clearing {@link #strandedReplies}
* on a narrower condition than "any acceptance"), not because today's test suite exercises the
* conjunction. {@code matching.size() >= 2} alone, without a strand, is exactly what
* {@code abandonFailsEveryPendingAsyncTicketForTheReleasedTarget} already covers.
*
* @return true if a live waiter or an async task was failed (never true for one recovered as a
* reply — see the note above)
*/
@@ -494,21 +579,39 @@ public final class MessageService {
CompletableFuture<Rendezvous.Resolution> waiter = rendezvous.currentWaiter(target);
boolean failed = waiter != null && !waiter.isDone() && rendezvous.resolveFailure(waiter, reason);
boolean asyncFailed = false;
Reply recovered = null; // lazily drained at most once, only if a task actually needs it
List<Task> matching = new ArrayList<>();
for (Task task : tasks.values()) {
if (!target.equals(task.target) || task.question != null || task.future.isDone()) {
continue;
if (target.equals(task.target) && task.question == null && !task.future.isDone()) {
matching.add(task);
}
if (hadStrandedReply && recovered == null) {
recovered = recoverStrandedReply(target);
}
Task recoveryTask = null;
if (hadStrandedReply && !matching.isEmpty()) {
recoveryTask = matching.get(0);
for (Task candidate : matching) {
if (candidate.createdNanos < recoveryTask.createdNanos) {
recoveryTask = candidate;
}
}
Reply outcome = recovered != null ? recovered : new Reply(Outcome.WORKER_FAILED, reason);
}
Reply recovered = recoveryTask != null ? recoverStrandedReply(target) : null;
for (Task task : matching) {
boolean isRecovery = task == recoveryTask && recovered != null;
Reply outcome = isRecovery ? recovered : new Reply(Outcome.WORKER_FAILED, reason);
if (task.future.complete(outcome)) {
if (outcome.outcome() == Outcome.WORKER_FAILED) {
asyncFailed = true;
} else if (task.turnId != null) {
asyncTasksByTurn.remove(task.turnId, task);
}
} else if (isRecovery) {
// The recovered reply was already drained out of the inbox, but this task resolved
// through another path (e.g. a concurrent reply() or a second abandon() racing this
// one) between us choosing it and completing it here. Put the reply back rather than
// lose it silently — it may still belong to some other still-open task, or the next
// caller that drains this target's inbox.
inbox.publish(target, UUID.randomUUID().toString(), recovered.text());
}
}
if (failed) {
@@ -523,6 +626,10 @@ public final class MessageService {
* stranding fact raced away, e.g. a lead's own {@code fleet_poll} on the raw session already
* drained it first). When more than one message is queued, only the newest is the worker's actual
* final answer ({@link #drainReplies} returns them oldest-first).
*
* <p>This does drain (removes the messages from the inbox) before the caller knows whether the
* task it is recovering for will actually accept them — {@link #abandon} is the one that puts a
* reply back if its {@code complete} call turns out to lose the race.
*/
private Reply recoverStrandedReply(String target) {
var messages = drainReplies(target);
@@ -334,8 +334,7 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
assertNull(handle.agentSessionId(), "no record yet → null, not a spawn-time block");
// Once the record appears (here: same cwd), lazy discovery resolves it — the handle's
// session id matches its own worktree, not another's.
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "p1", "ses_a.json",
"ses_resolved", "/work/dir", 1000L);
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_resolved", "/work/dir", 1000L);
assertEquals("ses_resolved", handle.agentSessionId(),
"agentSessionId() re-scans and picks up a record that has since been written");
}
@@ -5,68 +5,89 @@ import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.nio.file.attribute.FileTime;
import java.sql.Connection;
import java.sql.DriverManager;
import java.sql.PreparedStatement;
import java.sql.SQLException;
import java.sql.Statement;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery} matches an opencode session record by the worker's cwd (its
* {@code directory}) against opencode's on-disk storage. These tests populate a TEMP storage root
* themselves — never the operator's real {@code ~/.local/share/opencode}.
* {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery} matches an opencode session row by the worker's cwd (its
* {@code directory}) against opencode's {@code opencode.db} SQLite database. These tests build a
* SYNTHETIC database themselves, in a JUnit temp directory — never the operator's real
* {@code ~/.local/share/opencode/opencode.db}, which a live opencode process may be writing.
*/
class OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest {
/**
* Write a session record {@code {"id":..., "directory":...}} under
* {@code <root>/session/<projectID>/<fileName>} and stamp it with a known last-modified time,
* so "most recently modified wins" is deterministic. Static so the launcher test can reuse it.
* Create {@code <root>/opencode.db} with a minimal {@code session} table (just the columns
* {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery} reads: {@code id}, {@code directory}, {@code time_updated})
* and insert one row. Static so {@link OpenCodeLauncherTest} can reuse it.
*/
static void writeRecord(Path root, String projectId, String fileName, String id,
String directory, long lastModifiedEpochMillis) throws Exception {
Path dir = root.resolve("session").resolve(projectId);
Files.createDirectories(dir);
Path file = dir.resolve(fileName);
Files.writeString(file, "{\"id\":\"" + id + "\",\"directory\":\"" + directory
+ "\",\"projectID\":\"" + projectId + "\",\"version\":\"1.1.31\"}");
Files.setLastModifiedTime(file, FileTime.fromMillis(lastModifiedEpochMillis));
static void writeRecord(Path root, String id, String directory, long timeUpdated) throws Exception {
Path db = root.resolve("opencode.db");
try (Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:sqlite:" + db)) {
try (Statement statement = connection.createStatement()) {
statement.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS session ("
+ "id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, directory TEXT, time_updated INTEGER)");
}
// Bound parameters, not string interpolation: the class under test uses a
// PreparedStatement, and a hand-escaped INSERT here is a pattern someone copies out.
try (PreparedStatement insert = connection.prepareStatement(
"INSERT INTO session (id, directory, time_updated) VALUES (?, ?, ?)")) {
insert.setString(1, id);
insert.setString(2, directory);
insert.setLong(3, timeUpdated);
insert.executeUpdate();
}
}
}
@Test
void findsTheRecordWhoseDirectoryEqualsTheCwd(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "p1", "ses_a.json", "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "p2", "ses_b.json", "ses_bbb", "/w/b", 2000L);
void findsTheRowWhoseDirectoryEqualsTheCwd(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "ses_bbb", "/w/b", 2000L);
assertEquals("ses_bbb", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/b"),
"the record whose directory equals the cwd is the one found");
"the row whose directory equals the cwd is the one found");
assertEquals("ses_aaa", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"));
}
@Test
void aNonMatchingDirectoryYieldsNullRatherThanAMismatch(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "p1", "ses_a.json", "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/other"),
"no record for this cwd yet → null, not a wrong session");
"no row for this cwd yet → null, not a wrong session");
}
@Test
void prefersTheMostRecentlyModifiedRecordWhenSeveralMatch(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "p1", "old.json", "ses_old", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "p2", "new.json", "ses_new", "/w/a", 5000L);
void prefersTheMostRecentlyUpdatedRowWhenSeveralMatch(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "ses_old", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "ses_new", "/w/a", 5000L);
assertEquals("ses_new", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"),
"the freshest record for the cwd wins");
"the row with the highest time_updated for the cwd wins");
}
@Test
void aMissingOrEmptyStorageRootYieldsNullWithoutThrowing(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
// Missing: no session dir at all under the root.
void aMissingDatabaseYieldsNullWithoutThrowing(@TempDir Path root) {
// No opencode.db at all under the root.
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"));
}
// Present but empty: a session dir with nothing in it produces no match, not a throw.
Path emptyRoot = root.resolve("empty");
Files.createDirectories(emptyRoot.resolve("session"));
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(emptyRoot).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"));
@Test
void anEmptyDatabaseYieldsNullWithoutThrowing(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
Path db = root.resolve("opencode.db");
try (Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:sqlite:" + db);
Statement statement = connection.createStatement()) {
statement.execute("CREATE TABLE session (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, directory TEXT, "
+ "time_updated INTEGER)");
}
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"));
}
@Test
@@ -76,15 +97,41 @@ class OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest {
assertNull(discovery.sessionIdForDirectory(" "));
}
/**
* The one line standing between fleetd and writing the operator's live {@code opencode.db} —
* 841MB, with a running opencode writing it — is {@code config.setReadOnly(true)} in
* {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery#openReadOnly()}. Delete it and every other test in this class
* still passes, so this is the test that guards it.
*
* <p>It asks the connection to write, and requires a refusal. The obvious alternative — make
* the database file unwritable and check the read still works — proves nothing: SQLite silently
* downgrades a read-write open of an unwritable file to read-only, so that test passes either
* way. It was tried and watched pass with the flag removed.
*/
@Test
void aMalformedRecordIsSkippedRatherThanFatal(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
// A record that fails to parse must not abort the scan of its siblings.
Path dir = root.resolve("session").resolve("p1");
Files.createDirectories(dir);
Files.writeString(dir.resolve("broken.json"), "{not valid json");
writeRecord(root, "p1", "good.json", "ses_good", "/w/a", 1000L);
void theDatabaseIsOpenedReadOnly(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
assertEquals("ses_good", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"),
"an unreadable record is skipped; a later valid one still matches");
try (Connection connection = new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).openReadOnly();
Statement statement = connection.createStatement()) {
SQLException refused = assertThrows(SQLException.class,
() -> statement.executeUpdate("INSERT INTO session (id, directory, time_updated) "
+ "VALUES ('ses_zzz', '/w/z', 1)"),
"the connection must REFUSE a write — opencode is writing this database live");
assertTrue(refused.getMessage().toLowerCase().contains("readonly")
|| refused.getMessage().toLowerCase().contains("read-only"),
"the refusal must be about read-only, not some other error: " + refused.getMessage());
}
}
@Test
void aCorruptDatabaseFileYieldsNullWithoutThrowing(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
// A file at opencode.db that is not a SQLite database at all — the open/query must fail
// safe, never fatal to a spawn.
Path db = root.resolve("opencode.db");
Files.writeString(db, "this is not a sqlite database");
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"),
"an unreadable database resolves to null, not an exception");
}
}
@@ -688,6 +688,32 @@ class MessageServiceTest {
assertFailedTicket(third, "agent target term_a not found");
}
// --- #137 follow-up: abandon() must not guess when more than one task is open ---------------
//
// A test combining a genuine stranded reply (hasStrandedReply(T)==true) with two simultaneously
// open matching tasks was attempted here and removed after investigation showed the combination
// is not reachable through the public API today, not merely hard to time right:
//
// This class has exactly two call sites that ever hold a target's entry in the session-lock map
// (send() and answer()), and both open a Rendezvous waiter for that same target as the first thing
// they do after acquiring the lock, holding lock and waiter together for their whole critical
// section. So "the lock is held" and "a live waiter is open" are the same fact throughout this
// class. reply()'s fast path always resolves a currently-open waiter directly instead of
// stranding — so a strand can only be created while NO task is accepted (lock free), and the
// instant the lock is next taken (by any parked matching task's own send(), the moment it is
// scheduled), that acceptance clears strandedReplies again (see send()'s CB-640 comment) before
// abandon() can ever observe both facts together. Confirmed empirically too: an earlier version of
// this test stranded a reply, then created an "accepted" task (awaitWaiting()) followed by a
// "parked" one — and the accepted task's own acceptance silently cleared the strand it was
// supposed to be racing against, so the parked task came back WORKER_FAILED instead of DONE, not
// because the fix was missing but because the test's premise could not be constructed.
//
// The reachable half — matching.size() >= 2 alone, no strand — is exactly what
// abandonFailsEveryPendingAsyncTicketForTheReleasedTarget already covers (all fail, none guess).
// The oldest-wins code in abandon() stays as defence in depth (see its own javadoc) against a
// regression that would make the conjunction reachable, e.g. clearing strandedReplies on a
// narrower condition than "any acceptance" — not because this suite exercises it today.
@Test
void abandonDoesNotFailAnAsyncTicketWaitingForAnAnswer() throws Exception {
String ticket = messages.sendAsync(T, "task that asks");