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Author SHA1 Message Date
Dai Ha a052975420 #206: pin the read-only open with a test that actually fails without it
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m18s
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m44s
setReadOnly(true) is the whole thing keeping fleetd out of the operator's
live 841MB opencode.db, and no test failed when it was removed.

The obvious test does not work. Making the database file unwritable and
checking the read still succeeds passes either way, because SQLite silently
downgrades a read-write open of an unwritable file to read-only. I wrote that
test, watched it pass with the flag removed, and threw it away.

What works: extract a package-private openReadOnly(), then ask that connection
to INSERT and require the refusal. Watched red with the flag removed, green
with it restored.

Also switches the test's INSERT helper to a PreparedStatement -- hand-escaped
SQL in a test is a pattern that gets copied into main code.
2026-08-31 21:46:07 +07:00
Dai Ha 3743789e8d fleetd #206: read opencode session ids from opencode.db (SQLite), not the frozen JSON tree
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m5s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m44s
opencode migrated its session store to SQLite in January 2026; the JSON tree under
storage/session/<projectID>/ses_*.json stopped being written, so OpenCodeSessionDiscovery
returned null for every member forever, and fleet_spawn{resumeSessionId} was unreachable.

- Add org.xerial:sqlite-jdbc 3.53.4.0, opened read-only (SQLiteConfig.setReadOnly), so it
  never disturbs a live opencode process writing the WAL-mode database.
- Rewrite sessionIdForDirectory to run a parameterized SELECT ... WHERE directory = ?
  ORDER BY time_updated DESC LIMIT 1 against the session table. Still never throws: a
  missing database, a locked/corrupt one, or no matching row all return null.
- Log the silence that let this go unnoticed: WARN once per instance when opencode.db
  itself is missing (the layout moved again), DEBUG when it exists but no row matches
  yet (the normal interim answer right after a spawn).
- Replace the JSON-fixture tests with a synthetic-SQLite-db fixture; delete the tests
  that only proved the old JSON scan worked.
2026-08-31 15:52:06 +07:00
Dai Ha 388aba7632 #137: an answered turn's reply completes its own ticket, instead of a false failure
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m12s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m17s
A wait:false delegation whose worker used fleet_ask ended with fleet_poll{ticket}
reporting 'the worker session was released before it replied' -- naming a
worktree, a branch and a snapshot commit, so it read as lost work. The worker had
in fact replied in full.

The ticket guessed the ask rendezvous detached the turn. The real cause is
narrower: answer() (behind fleet_send{turnId}) waits only for the lead's own
bounded MCP call window. A resumed turn doing real work -- edits, a build, a
push, a PR -- routinely outlives it. On timeout answer()'s finally closed the
waiter, so the worker's later fleet_reply found none and fell to the session
inbox, leaving the ticket's future unresolved until fleet_stop forced it FAILED.

reply() now looks for the async task parked on this exact answered turn and
completes it with the real reply. That is safe against completing the wrong
ticket: answer() calls clearAsyncQuestion(turnId, false), so the task keeps its
turnId and stays in asyncTasksByTurn, and hasAsyncQuestion therefore still makes
send() return BUSY for a second async send to that target. At most one candidate
task can exist per target.

abandon() keeps an independent check: if a reply was stranded, a released session
reports REPLIED with that text rather than a failure -- so the recovery hint that
implies lost work never prints once a reply exists.

Verified before merging: build green unpiped, and both new tests drive the full
delegation path (send async, ask, answer, reply, poll the ticket) rather than
handing a Reply to a sink, which is the trap this ticket called out.

Co-authored-by: fleetd worker <worker@ltms.dev>
2026-08-31 14:24:54 +07:00
Dai Ha ad587eafa3 #172: keep the broker URI, password and all, out of every member pane
CI / contract (push) Successful in 1m10s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m15s
broker.uriEnv names an environment variable holding amqp://user:password@host,
and it was reaching every member. Its name is not credential-shaped -- no TOKEN,
KEY or SECRET in it -- so every name-pattern heuristic missed it, and it sat on
neither credential list.

fleetd already knows the name: the operator wrote it in broker.uriEnv. So derive
the exclusion from the config rather than hoping an operator also remembers to
deny it. coordinator.uriEnv has the same shape and is excluded too; on this host
both resolve to the same variable.

Excluded even when the operator lists the name under memberCredentials.allow:,
following the SSH_AUTH_SOCK precedent. There is no override, because a member has
no legitimate use for the broker password.

Reviewer finding, recorded rather than overstated: this is only a hard guarantee
under policy: allow-list, where the ZDOTDIR scrub runs after the pane's shell has
sourced the operator's chain. Under deny-list the name is removed from the
pre-shell env only, and a login shell re-exports it. That is deny-list's existing
weakness rather than a regression here, but the javadoc now says so plainly
instead of implying a guarantee that path cannot give.

Co-authored-by: fleetd worker <worker@ltms.dev>
2026-08-31 14:21:48 +07:00
Dai Ha 08ce9aef11 #161: resolve a pane by process ancestry, closing a worker->primary escalation
CI / contract (push) Successful in 50s
CI / build (push) Successful in 1m52s
PaneLocator's javadoc always claimed it found 'the agent pane whose process
tree contains' a pid. It did not: paneOwnsPid matched only the pane's shell_pid
and its foreground_processes. A process a member spawned -- python3, curl, any
helper opening its own connection to 127.0.0.1:8765 -- matched no pane, so
CallerResolver fell through to loopback-trust and resolved it as the PRIMARY.
A member escalated to lead by shelling out.

terminalForPid now builds the caller's ancestor set once (bounded at 32
generations, with a cycle guard) and matches any ancestor against a pane's pids.
The set is reused across both herdr clients on the CB-185 two-daemon path.

This only ever ADDS matches, which is the safe direction: the failure mode of
the fix is a member correctly restricted, while the failure mode of the bug is a
member acting as the lead. The no-match case still returns null, so the lead --
which maps to a pane named by leaders: -- still resolves as primary.

Ancestry is walked through a new ParentResolver seam so the tests drive it from
a fake pid->parent map rather than spawning real processes.

Co-authored-by: fleetd worker <worker@ltms.dev>
2026-08-31 14:15:39 +07:00
16 changed files with 635 additions and 317 deletions
-166
View File
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
# CB-137 / fleetd issue #137 — report
## Real root cause (not the hypothesis in the ticket)
I read `MessageService.java` and `Rendezvous.java` before changing anything. The mechanism is real,
but the exact place it happens is `MessageService.answer()`, not "the reply goes to the inbox on
purpose" in general.
1. A lead delegates with `fleet_send{wait:false}` → `sendAsync()` creates a `Task` and runs `send()`
on a background virtual thread with a 30-minute internal budget (`ASYNC_TIMEOUT_MS`).
2. The worker calls `fleet_ask`. That resolves the open rendezvous waiter with `Kind.QUESTION`, so
`send()` returns immediately and the `Task` is left open (its `future` stays unresolved — see the
comment in `sendAsync`'s lambda: "Keep the accepted owner until answer() finishes it").
3. The lead answers with `fleet_send{turnId, content}`. This calls `FleetMcp.answer()` →
`MessageService.answer(turnId, content, timeout)`. The `timeout` here is **not** the generous
30-minute async budget — it is the MCP tool's own bounded wait: `DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 25_000`,
clamped to at most `MAX_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000` (`FleetMcp.java:71-72,495,512`). This is the same
~60–120s window every blocking `fleet_send` call is capped at (documented elsewhere as "the
caller's own MCP client call timeout").
4. `answer()` opens a **fresh** rendezvous waiter for the worker session and blocks on it for at most
that window. If the worker's resumed turn takes longer than that to actually finish (very
plausible — the resumed turn can mean more edits, a build, a commit, a push, opening a PR), the
wait times out. On timeout, `answer()`'s `finally` block unconditionally calls
`rendezvous.close(workerSession, reply)`, **removing the waiter from the map**, and returns
`Outcome.TIMED_OUT_WORKING` to the lead.
5. The worker keeps working, unaware anything happened, and eventually calls `fleet_reply`. That
reaches `MessageService.reply(session, content)`, which tries `rendezvous.resolve(session,
content)` — but the waiter was already closed in step 4, so `resolve` returns `false`. `reply()`
then falls back to `inbox.publish(...)` and marks `strandedReplies.put(session, true)`
(CB-640 bookkeeping) — the reply is safely held, but **the async `Task`'s `future` is never
completed**.
6. `fleet_poll{ticket}` keeps returning `PENDING` forever (the `Task` never resolves) — until the
lead eventually calls `fleet_stop`. That fires `sessions.onRelease` → `messages.abandon(target,
reason)` (`Fleetd.java:481-497`), where `reason` is built with the exact text from the bug report
("the worker session was released before it replied; worktree=... branch=... snapshot=...",
`Fleetd.java:484-487`). `abandon()`'s loop finds the still-open `Task` (`question == null`, future
not done) and completes it as `WORKER_FAILED` with that misleading reason — even though the
worker's real reply is sitting, intact, in the inbox the whole time.
So: the reported behaviour is correct, and the specific trigger is `answer()`'s own bounded wait
being shorter than the worker's real resumed-turn time — not anything to do with the ~55s
`fleet_ask` window itself (that part, issue #61, is untouched).
## Fix
Two changes in `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/msg/MessageService.java`, both scoped to the
ticket/reply routing and the terminal-state text — `fleet_ask`'s own window and mechanics are
untouched.
**1. `reply()` — priority 1 (the ticket resolves with the real reply).**
Before falling back to the inbox, `reply()` now looks for an async `Task` that is specifically in the
"already answered but not yet resolved" state (`question == null`, `turnId != null` — set once
`answer()` has cleared the question but before anything completed the future, `!future.isDone()`).
If one exists for this `target`, the worker's reply completes that `Task`'s future directly as
`Outcome.REPLIED` with the real content, and the reply never touches the inbox at all. A task that
was never asked has `turnId == null` and can never match, so ordinary (no-`fleet_ask`) delegations
are unaffected — they already resolve through the pre-existing rendezvous fast path.
I chose this over leaving `answer()`'s own timeout behaviour untouched and instead keeping its
rendezvous waiter open in the background: that alternative works but reopens the "at most one
waiter per session" invariant (`Rendezvous.open` throws on a double-open) to a new class of races
with a fresh send arriving mid-window. The `send()` path already guards against sending into an
answered-but-still-resolving worker via `hasAsyncQuestion(target)` (checks `asyncTasksByTurn`,
which still holds the task until it resolves), so routing through `reply()` gets the same protection
without touching `answer()`'s waiter lifecycle at all — the smaller, safer diff.
**2. `abandon()` — priority 3 (required independently, "even if you fix (1)").**
Before marking any of a released target's still-open tasks `WORKER_FAILED`, `abandon()` now checks
`hasStrandedReply(target)` (the existing CB-640 fact — true whenever the *last* `reply()` for this
target fell through to the inbox). If true, it drains the inbox (`recoverStrandedReply`) and — if it
actually finds a message — completes the task as `REPLIED` with that real content instead of writing
the failure. This is deliberately a **separate** check from fix 1: fix 1 already prevents the
inbox-stranding from happening in the exact scenario this ticket describes, so by the time
`abandon()` runs the task is normally already resolved and `abandon()`'s `complete()` call is a
harmless no-op. This second check exists so that if some *other* future path ever strands a reply
in the inbox without resolving its ticket, `abandon()` still refuses to report a false failure —
"if a reply reached any sink for that turn, the terminal state is done," per the ticket. I verified
both are required by disabling each independently and confirming the two new tests fail (see below).
**Priority 4 (the snapshot/worktree hint).** Handled as a consequence of both fixes rather than a
separate branch: once a task resolves as `REPLIED` (via either fix), `abandon()` never calls
`new Reply(Outcome.WORKER_FAILED, reason)` for that task at all, so the "the worker session was
released before it replied; worktree=... branch=... snapshot=..." text is never constructed or
attached to that ticket's outcome. It still appears, correctly, for a task that never got a reply
(the existing `abandonFailsEveryPendingAsyncTicketForTheReleasedTarget` /
`anAbandonedAsyncTaskPollsAsFailedNotPending` tests still pass unchanged).
**Priority 2** was not needed — fix 1 makes `fleet_poll{ticket}` return the actual reply (the
higher-priority option), so I did not fall back to "the ticket merely resolves as done with no
content."
## Tests — driven through the real delegation path, not the reply sink directly
Both new tests in `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/msg/MessageServiceTest.java` go through
`sendAsync` → `injectDelivery` → `ask` → `answer` (with a short timeout, so it genuinely times out,
mirroring the ~25–120s real MCP-call bound vs. a longer resumed turn) → `reply` → `poll`/`abandon`.
No test constructs a `Reply` and hands it to a sink directly.
- `aReplyAfterAnswerTimesOutStillCompletesTheAsyncTicket` — asserts `fleet_poll{ticket}` (via
`messages.poll`) reaches `Phase.DONE` with the worker's actual reply text and
`replySource() == "reply"`, and that `hasStrandedReply(T)` stays `false` (proves the reply never
touched the inbox at all — fix 1 caught it).
- `fleetStopAfterAnOrphanedReplyDoesNotFailTheTicket` — same setup, then calls `abandon(T, "the
worker session was released before it replied")` (what `fleet_stop` triggers) and asserts it
returns `false` (no failure recorded) and the ticket still polls `DONE` with the real reply.
**Proof both fail without the change.** I temporarily short-circuited both new private methods
(`askAnsweredAsyncTask` → always `null`, `recoverStrandedReply` → always `null`) — i.e. disabled
both fixes — and ran just these two tests:
```
[ERROR] Tests run: 2, Failures: 2, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0
dev.ltms.fleet.msg.MessageServiceTest.aReplyAfterAnswerTimesOutStillCompletesTheAsyncTicket
org.opentest4j.AssertionFailedError: expected: <DONE> but was: <PENDING>
dev.ltms.fleet.msg.MessageServiceTest.fleetStopAfterAnOrphanedReplyDoesNotFailTheTicket
org.opentest4j.AssertionFailedError: a reply already arrived, so nothing here is a genuine failure
==> expected: <false> but was: <true>
```
This is the exact bug: the ticket stays `PENDING` forever, and `abandon()` reports `true` (a
failure) even though a reply had already arrived. I then restored both fixes (verified with
`grep -n "TEMP #137-proof"` finding nothing) and re-ran — both pass.
## Build
Ran from `fleetd/`, unpiped, full output read (not `| tail`):
```
mvn clean install
...
[INFO] Tests run: 1039, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0
[INFO] BUILD SUCCESS
[INFO] Total time: 36.315 s
```
Main was at 1037 tests; this branch adds the 2 new tests above → 1039, all green, `exit=0`.
## What I could NOT check
- No IDE tooling is mounted for me (worker), so no `ide_diagnostics`/IntelliJ inspection pass — only
`mvn clean install` (compiler + full test suite), as the worker procedure allows.
- I cannot restart the daemon or dogfood this live — I have no forge/daemon control. This is
unverified against a real herdr pane, a real MCP client's ~60s call cap, or a real worker session;
everything above is verified only through the JUnit fixture's simulated timing
(`FakeHerdr`/`injector.onStatus`/direct `messages.answer(...,150)` calls), not a live fleet.
A primary should still consider a short live dogfood (an async delegation that asks, gets answered,
and takes longer than ~2 minutes to reply) before calling this closed.
- I did not touch, and did not re-verify, the `fleet_ask` ~55s window itself (issue #61) — out of
scope per the brief.
## Scope note (not investigated further)
`answer()`'s nested/double-`fleet_ask` case (the worker asks a second question before ever
replying to the first answer) has some pre-existing behaviour around which `turnId` a `QUESTION`
resolution gets attributed to that I did not fully untangle — it predates this change, my fix does
not touch it, and it is unrelated to the reported defect. Flagging only; not investigated further.
## Handoff
- Branch: `worker/cb-137-ask-ticket-e7760c-2`
- Worktree root: `/Users/dai.ha/LTMS/.bridged-worktrees/734324-2`
- Files changed:
- `fleetd/src/main/java/dev/ltms/fleet/msg/MessageService.java`
- `fleetd/src/test/java/dev/ltms/fleet/msg/MessageServiceTest.java`
- `REPORT-cb137.md` (this file)
- Build: `Tests run: 1039, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0` / `BUILD SUCCESS` (verbatim above)
+18
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
<testcontainers.version>1.20.4</testcontainers.version>
<commons-compress.version>1.27.1</commons-compress.version>
<commons-lang3.version>3.18.0</commons-lang3.version>
<sqlite-jdbc.version>3.53.4.0</sqlite-jdbc.version>
</properties>
<!--
@@ -44,6 +45,12 @@
3.0-rc5; bumping Jackson 3 to the patched 3.2.x breaks the SDK (annotation mismatch).
Only the loopback /mcp endpoint parses this JSON, from trusted local Claude clients.
The 11.0.23 -> 11.0.25 bump did clear jetty CVE-2024-8184 (5.9) and CVE-2024-6763.
fleetd #206: org.xerial:sqlite-jdbc 3.53.4.0 (added for OpenCodeSessionDiscovery) — the
only known advisory against this artifact is CVE-2023-32697 (RCE via an attacker-controlled
JDBC URL), fixed in 3.41.2.2; 3.53.4.0 is well past that fix and OSV.dev reports no open
advisory against it. Checked via the OSV.dev API (no Mend.io/JetBrains IDE MCP mount
available from this worktree) on 2026-08-31.
-->
<!-- Force the latest patched Jetty 11.x across all Javalin-pulled Jetty modules (no version
@@ -123,6 +130,17 @@
<version>${amqp.version}</version>
</dependency>
<!-- fleetd #206: opencode moved its session store from a JSON tree to SQLite
(opencode.db). This is the JDBC driver OpenCodeSessionDiscovery uses to read it
read-only. Ships bundled native libraries (linux/mac/windows, several archs), so it
is a heavier jar than most deps here — see the pom's dependency-security note below
for the size/CVE tradeoff actually measured. -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.xerial</groupId>
<artifactId>sqlite-jdbc</artifactId>
<version>${sqlite-jdbc.version}</version>
</dependency>
<!-- Logging -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.slf4j</groupId>
@@ -177,14 +177,14 @@ public final class Fleetd {
claudeProfiles, cfg.effectiveDefaultProfile(), System::getenv,
cfg.spawnReadyTimeoutMs(), cfg.spawnReadyPollMs(),
() -> config.get().fleet(),
() -> config.get().memberCredentials()));
() -> config.get().memberCredentials(), null, config::get));
}
if (!opencodeProfiles.isEmpty()) {
adapters.add(new OpenCodeLauncher(router.memberAgents(), router.memberSpaces(),
opencodeProfiles, cfg.effectiveDefaultProfile(), System::getenv,
cfg.spawnReadyTimeoutMs(), cfg.spawnReadyPollMs(),
() -> config.get().fleet(),
() -> config.get().memberCredentials()));
() -> config.get().memberCredentials(), config::get));
}
AtomicReference<Function<String, Integer>> liveCountRef = new AtomicReference<>(_ -> 0);
// CB-578 stage B: one quarantine tracker for the whole daemon, shared between the launcher
@@ -2,8 +2,11 @@ package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.OptionalLong;
import java.util.Set;
/**
* Resolves which herdr pane a process belongs to — the herdr half of connection-based MCP
@@ -12,23 +15,46 @@ import java.util.Map;
* is calling without the worker sending anything spoofable.
*
* <p>herdr owns the PID→pane truth: {@code pane.process_info} reports each pane's {@code shell_pid}
* and foreground process PIDs. This scans agent panes; a spawn-time {@code pid→terminal} cache is
* the obvious optimization once wired into {@code ClaudeCodeLauncher}.
* and foreground process PIDs. A pid that is neither of those directly — e.g. a grandchild a
* worker spawned, such as a {@code python3} or {@code curl} helper that opens its own MCP
* connection — is resolved by walking its ancestry (via {@link ParentResolver}) up to the root and
* matching any ancestor against a pane's {@code shell_pid} or foreground pids (CB-161). Without
* this walk such a pid matches no pane, and the caller falls through to loopback-trust and is
* resolved as the primary — a worker→primary privilege escalation.
*
* <p>This scans agent panes; a spawn-time {@code pid→terminal} cache is the obvious optimization
* once wired into {@code ClaudeCodeLauncher}.
*
* <p>CB-185 split the fleet across two herdr daemons — lead operations on one, members on the
* other ({@code memberHerdrSocket}). A caller's pane can live on <em>either</em> daemon (a lead's
* MCP connection resolves against the lead daemon; a member's against the member daemon), so this
* must be able to search more than one client. {@link #PaneLocator(HerdrClient, HerdrClient)}
* searches the lead client first, then the member client, and collapses to a single scan when the
* two are the same object (the historical single-daemon deployment).
* two are the same object (the historical single-daemon deployment). The caller's ancestor set is
* computed once per {@link #terminalForPid} call and reused across every client searched — it
* does not depend on which daemon a pane happens to live on.
*/
public final class PaneLocator {
/**
* Bound on how many ancestor generations {@link #ancestorsOf} walks. This runs on every MCP
* call, so a cycle or a pathologically deep process tree must not hang identity resolution;
* 32 generations is far more than any real worker→helper process tree needs.
*/
private static final int MAX_ANCESTRY_DEPTH = 32;
private final List<HerdrClient> herdrs;
private final ParentResolver parentResolver;
/** Search only this client — the single-daemon deployment. */
public PaneLocator(HerdrClient herdr) {
this(herdr, ParentResolver.PROCESS_HANDLE);
}
/** Search only this client, resolving ancestry through {@code parentResolver} — for tests. */
public PaneLocator(HerdrClient herdr, ParentResolver parentResolver) {
this.herdrs = List.of(herdr);
this.parentResolver = parentResolver;
}
/**
@@ -37,7 +63,13 @@ public final class PaneLocator {
* collapses to one client and one scan, exactly {@link #PaneLocator(HerdrClient)}'s behaviour.
*/
public PaneLocator(HerdrClient lead, HerdrClient member) {
this(lead, member, ParentResolver.PROCESS_HANDLE);
}
/** Two-daemon deployment, resolving ancestry through {@code parentResolver} — for tests. */
public PaneLocator(HerdrClient lead, HerdrClient member, ParentResolver parentResolver) {
this.herdrs = lead == member ? List.of(lead) : List.of(lead, member);
this.parentResolver = parentResolver;
}
/**
@@ -49,8 +81,9 @@ public final class PaneLocator {
if (pid <= 0) {
return null;
}
Set<Long> ancestry = ancestorsOf(pid);
for (HerdrClient herdr : herdrs) {
String terminal = terminalForPid(herdr, pid);
String terminal = terminalForPid(herdr, ancestry);
if (terminal != null) {
return terminal;
}
@@ -58,28 +91,54 @@ public final class PaneLocator {
return null;
}
private static String terminalForPid(HerdrClient herdr, long pid) {
/**
* {@code pid} itself plus its ancestor chain, walked through {@link #parentResolver} up to
* {@link #MAX_ANCESTRY_DEPTH} generations or pid 1, whichever comes first. A vanished ancestor
* ({@link ParentResolver#parentOf} returning empty) ends the walk without error — it just means
* the chain is shorter than the bound. A cycle in a fake resolver is caught by the "already
* seen" check and also ends the walk, so this can never loop.
*/
private Set<Long> ancestorsOf(long pid) {
Set<Long> ancestry = new LinkedHashSet<>();
long current = pid;
for (int depth = 0; depth < MAX_ANCESTRY_DEPTH; depth++) {
if (current <= 0 || !ancestry.add(current)) {
break; // vanished/invalid pid, or a cycle back to a pid already recorded
}
if (current == 1) {
break; // reached the root of the process tree
}
OptionalLong parent = parentResolver.parentOf(current);
if (parent.isEmpty()) {
break; // vanished ancestor — not an error, just the end of the chain
}
current = parent.getAsLong();
}
return ancestry;
}
private static String terminalForPid(HerdrClient herdr, Set<Long> ancestry) {
for (JsonNode pane : herdr.call("pane.list", Map.of()).path("panes")) {
String paneId = pane.path("pane_id").asText(null);
if (paneId != null && paneOwnsPid(herdr, paneId, pid)) {
if (paneId != null && paneOwnsAnyOf(herdr, paneId, ancestry)) {
return pane.path("terminal_id").asText(null);
}
}
return null;
}
private static boolean paneOwnsPid(HerdrClient herdr, String paneId, long pid) {
private static boolean paneOwnsAnyOf(HerdrClient herdr, String paneId, Set<Long> ancestry) {
JsonNode info;
try {
info = herdr.call("pane.process_info", Map.of("pane_id", paneId)).path("process_info");
} catch (HerdrException e) {
return false; // pane vanished mid-scan — just skip it
}
if (info.path("shell_pid").asLong(-1) == pid) {
if (ancestry.contains(info.path("shell_pid").asLong(-1))) {
return true;
}
for (JsonNode p : info.path("foreground_processes")) {
if (p.path("pid").asLong(-1) == pid) {
if (ancestry.contains(p.path("pid").asLong(-1))) {
return true;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import java.util.OptionalLong;
/**
* Resolves a pid's parent pid — the seam {@link PaneLocator} walks a process's ancestry through,
* so its tests can drive the walk from a fake pid→parent map instead of spawning real processes.
*
* <p>{@link #PROCESS_HANDLE} is the production implementation, backed by {@link ProcessHandle}.
*/
public interface ParentResolver {
/** The parent pid of {@code pid}, or empty if {@code pid} is gone or has no known parent. */
OptionalLong parentOf(long pid);
/** Production resolver: asks the JVM's {@link ProcessHandle} view of the OS process tree. */
ParentResolver PROCESS_HANDLE = pid -> ProcessHandle.of(pid)
.flatMap(ProcessHandle::parent)
.map(parent -> OptionalLong.of(parent.pid()))
.orElse(OptionalLong.empty());
}
@@ -94,13 +94,26 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
public ClaudeCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces, SubscriptionGuard guard,
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs,
Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs,
Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
this(agents, spaces, guard, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs, spawnReadyPollMs,
fleet, memberCredentials, null, null);
}
/** Production constructor, plus the live config for URI environment exclusions. */
public ClaudeCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces, SubscriptionGuard guard,
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs,
Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials,
Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames,
Supplier<FleetConfig> config) {
this(agents, spaces, guard, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
System::currentTimeMillis, () -> sleepUninterruptibly(spawnReadyPollMs),
fleet, memberCredentials);
fleet, memberCredentials, hostEnvNames, config);
}
/**
@@ -153,10 +166,22 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper,
Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
this(agents, spaces, guard, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper,
fleet, memberCredentials, null, null);
}
/** Full testability constructor, plus the live config for URI environment exclusions. */
public ClaudeCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces, SubscriptionGuard guard,
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env, long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper, Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials,
Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames,
Supplier<FleetConfig> config) {
super(NAME_PREFIX, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, fleet, memberCredentials);
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, fleet, memberCredentials, hostEnvNames, config);
this.guard = guard;
}
@@ -174,7 +199,7 @@ public final class ClaudeCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials,
Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames) {
super(NAME_PREFIX, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, fleet, memberCredentials, hostEnvNames);
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, fleet, memberCredentials, hostEnvNames, null);
this.guard = guard;
}
@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
/** Guards {@link #warnNonZsh} to one WARN per launcher instance, not one per spawn. */
private final AtomicBoolean nonZshShellWarned = new AtomicBoolean();
/** Live config provides URI environment names that must never enter member panes. */
private final Supplier<FleetConfig> config;
/**
* @param namePrefix label prefix for this peer kind (drives naming and reap)
@@ -238,8 +240,19 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper,
Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials,
Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames) {
this(namePrefix, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis,
sleeper, fleet, memberCredentials, hostEnvNames, null);
}
/** As above, plus the live full config for secret-bearing URI environment names. */
protected HerdrPeerLauncher(String namePrefix, AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env, long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper, Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials,
Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames) {
Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames, Supplier<FleetConfig> config) {
this.fleet = fleet;
this.namePrefix = namePrefix;
this.agents = agents;
@@ -252,6 +265,7 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
this.sleeper = sleeper;
this.memberCredentials = memberCredentials;
this.hostEnvNames = hostEnvNames != null ? hostEnvNames : () -> System.getenv().keySet();
this.config = config;
}
// --- adapter seams -------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1028,9 +1042,11 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
}
/** Put {@link #BLOCKED_CREDENTIAL_SENTINEL} over every blocked name in the pane-creation env map. */
private static void overlayBlockedCredentials(Map<String, String> workerEnv,
FleetConfig.MemberCredentials creds) {
for (String name : creds.blockedSet()) {
private void overlayBlockedCredentials(Map<String, String> workerEnv,
FleetConfig.MemberCredentials creds) {
Set<String> blocked = new java.util.TreeSet<>(creds.blockedSet());
blocked.addAll(brokerUriEnvNames());
for (String name : blocked) {
workerEnv.put(name, BLOCKED_CREDENTIAL_SENTINEL);
}
}
@@ -1097,15 +1113,21 @@ public abstract class HerdrPeerLauncher implements PeerLauncher {
* ssh-agent handle when explicitly allowed, and the exact keys of THIS launch's own env map.
*/
private Set<String> derivedAllowedNames(FleetConfig.MemberCredentials creds, Launch launch) {
Set<String> brokerUriEnvNames = brokerUriEnvNames();
Set<String> allowed = new java.util.TreeSet<>(
MemberEnvAllowList.derive(profiles.values(), creds.allowSet()));
MemberEnvAllowList.derive(profiles.values(), creds.allowSet(), brokerUriEnvNames));
if (creds.sshAuthSockAllowed()) {
allowed.add(SSH_AUTH_SOCK);
} // blocked by default: absent from the set ⇒ blanked by the scrub like any other name
allowed.addAll(launch.env().keySet());
allowed.removeAll(brokerUriEnvNames);
return allowed;
}
private Set<String> brokerUriEnvNames() {
return MemberEnvAllowList.brokerUriEnvNames(config == null ? null : config.get());
}
/**
* CB-633 follow-up: one INFO line per allow-list spawn WHOSE SCRUB ACTUALLY RUNS, so an operator
* can read a single log line and know the scrub ran and how much of the visible environment it
@@ -40,8 +40,9 @@ import java.util.TreeSet;
* operator's own explicit list. Before this, {@code policy: allow-list} silently ignored every name
* an operator wrote under {@code allow:} unless a profile happened to carry it too, which meant
* turning the policy on could blank credentials working members already depended on. {@code
* SSH_AUTH_SOCK} is the one exception: even when the operator lists it under {@code allow:}, it is
* excluded here and added back ONLY by the caller when {@code sshAuthSock: allow} is explicitly set
* SSH_AUTH_SOCK} and configured broker URI environment names are exceptions: even when the operator
* lists them under {@code allow:}, they are excluded here. {@code SSH_AUTH_SOCK} is added back ONLY
* by the caller when {@code sshAuthSock: allow} is explicitly set
* (see {@link #SSH_AUTH_SOCK}'s javadoc) — it is a live handle to the operator's own ssh-agent, not
* a value, so treating it like any other allow-listed name would hand a member every key the
* operator's agent holds the moment they typed the name under {@code allow:} for an unrelated
@@ -106,6 +107,16 @@ public final class MemberEnvAllowList {
* run-to-run.
*/
public static Set<String> derive(Collection<FleetConfig.Profile> profiles, Set<String> configuredAllow) {
return derive(profiles, configuredAllow, Set.of());
}
/**
* As {@link #derive(Collection, Set)}, while excluding names that fleetd knows carry credentials.
* A configured broker URI contains its AMQP password inline, so it must never reach a member,
* even when an operator put its variable name in {@code memberCredentials.allow:}.
*/
public static Set<String> derive(Collection<FleetConfig.Profile> profiles, Set<String> configuredAllow,
Set<String> excludedNames) {
Set<String> derived = new TreeSet<>(INFRASTRUCTURE_PASSTHROUGH);
if (profiles != null) {
for (FleetConfig.Profile p : profiles) {
@@ -124,9 +135,37 @@ public final class MemberEnvAllowList {
}
}
}
if (excludedNames != null) {
derived.removeAll(excludedNames);
}
return Set.copyOf(derived);
}
/**
* The host environment names whose values are AMQP URIs with inline passwords. Both broker
* connections belong to fleetd, never to a member pane. Blank and absent configuration changes
* nothing.
*
* <p><b>How strong this exclusion is depends on the policy, and the difference matters.</b>
* Under {@code policy: allow-list} it is enforced by the generated ZDOTDIR scrub, which runs
* AFTER the pane's shell has sourced the operator's chain — so a login shell that re-exports the
* name is still blanked. Under the deny-list policy there is no scrub: the name is only removed
* from the pre-shell env map, and a login shell that sources the operator's secret store
* re-exports it. That is the long-standing weakness of deny-list (a sourced file can undo it),
* not something this exclusion introduces, but it means deny-list deployments do NOT get this
* guarantee. The same caveat applies to the non-zsh path, which has no scrub at all — see
* {@code HerdrPeerLauncher#applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy}.
*/
public static Set<String> brokerUriEnvNames(FleetConfig config) {
if (config == null) {
return Set.of();
}
Set<String> names = new TreeSet<>();
addUriEnvIfPresent(names, config.broker());
addUriEnvIfPresent(names, config.coordinator());
return Set.copyOf(names);
}
/**
* Whether {@code name} survives the scrub when {@code allowedNames} is the derived set: an exact
* match, or an infrastructure-prefixed name ({@code LC_*}). Prefix rules live ONLY here and in
@@ -146,4 +185,16 @@ public final class MemberEnvAllowList {
into.add(name);
}
}
private static void addUriEnvIfPresent(Set<String> into, FleetConfig.Broker broker) {
if (broker != null && broker.hasUriEnv()) {
into.add(broker.uriEnv());
}
}
private static void addUriEnvIfPresent(Set<String> into, FleetConfig.Coordinator coordinator) {
if (coordinator != null && coordinator.hasUriEnv()) {
into.add(coordinator.uriEnv());
}
}
}
@@ -116,12 +116,23 @@ public final class OpenCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
public OpenCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env,
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs,
Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs,
Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
this(agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs, spawnReadyPollMs,
fleet, memberCredentials, null);
}
/** Production constructor, plus the live config for URI environment exclusions. */
public OpenCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env, long spawnReadyTimeoutMs, long spawnReadyPollMs,
Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials,
Supplier<FleetConfig> config) {
this(agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
System::currentTimeMillis, () -> sleepUninterruptibly(spawnReadyPollMs),
defaultConfigRoot(), defaultDiscoveryRoot(), fleet, memberCredentials);
defaultConfigRoot(), defaultDiscoveryRoot(), fleet, memberCredentials, config);
}
/**
@@ -182,8 +193,20 @@ public final class OpenCodeLauncher extends HerdrPeerLauncher {
Path configRoot, Path discoveryRoot,
Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials) {
this(agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env, spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper,
configRoot, discoveryRoot, fleet, memberCredentials, null);
}
/** Full testability constructor, plus the live config for URI environment exclusions. */
public OpenCodeLauncher(AgentControl agents, WorkspaceControl spaces,
Map<String, FleetConfig.Profile> profiles, String defaultProfile,
Function<String, String> env, long spawnReadyTimeoutMs,
LongSupplier nowMillis, Runnable sleeper, Path configRoot, Path discoveryRoot,
Supplier<FleetConfig.Fleet> fleet,
Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> memberCredentials,
Supplier<FleetConfig> config) {
super(NAME_PREFIX, agents, spaces, profiles, defaultProfile, env,
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, fleet, memberCredentials);
spawnReadyTimeoutMs, nowMillis, sleeper, fleet, memberCredentials, null, config);
this.configRoot = configRoot;
this.discovery = new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(discoveryRoot);
}
@@ -1,58 +1,87 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.member;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import org.sqlite.SQLiteConfig;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.stream.Stream;
import java.sql.Connection;
import java.sql.PreparedStatement;
import java.sql.ResultSet;
import java.sql.SQLException;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean;
/**
* Resolves the opencode session id for a fleetd worker from opencode's on-disk storage — the
* only place this adapter touches opencode's private layout, and deliberately the <em>only</em>
* class that does.
*
* <p><strong>Why this is isolated behind one seam.</strong> The layout is version-coupled and not a
* stable contract: opencode writes one JSON file per session under
* {@code <storageRoot>/session/<projectID>/<ses_*.json>}, and each record carries a
* {@code "version"} field (e.g. {@code "1.1.31"}), so the exact directory shape, file naming, and
* field names can move between opencode releases. opencode also ships a headless HTTP server that
* may supersede file scanning entirely. Everything this adapter knows about that private storage —
* its shape, naming, and field names — lives here, so a layout change, or a switch to the HTTP
* server, changes exactly one class and nothing in {@link OpenCodeLauncher}.
* <p><strong>Why this is isolated behind one seam.</strong> The layout is version-coupled and not
* a stable contract: opencode persists its session state in a SQLite database at
* {@code <storageRoot>/opencode.db} (a {@code session} table, one row per session, keyed by id and
* carrying a {@code directory} column). That schema can move between opencode releases exactly
* like the JSON-file layout it replaced did (opencode migrated off a one-JSON-file-per-session
* tree under {@code <storageRoot>/storage/session/<projectID>/ses_*.json} in January 2026 — that
* tree is now a frozen migration artefact nothing writes, which is why this class no longer reads
* it). opencode also ships a headless HTTP server that may supersede both of these entirely.
* Everything this adapter knows about that private storage — its shape and column names — lives
* here, so a layout change, or a switch to the HTTP server, changes exactly one class and nothing
* in {@link OpenCodeLauncher}.
*
* <p>The determinism that makes this useful is structural, not a guess: every fleetd worker runs
* in its own unique git worktree, so the record's {@code directory} (its project root) equals the
* in its own unique git worktree, so the row's {@code directory} (its project root) equals the
* worker's cwd identifies <em>its</em> session unambiguously. We match on {@code directory} rather
* than diffing {@code opencode session list} before/after — that races under concurrent spawns, and
* the CLI listing does not even show the directory.
*
* <p>All reads are best-effort and never throw: a missing or unreadable storage root, a record that
* fails to parse, or a directory with no record yet all yield {@code null}, and the caller (the
* session handle) treats that as "identity not resolved yet" and retries later.
* <p>All reads are best-effort and never throw: a missing or unreadable database, a query that
* fails, or a directory with no row yet all yield {@code null}, and the caller (the session
* handle) treats that as "identity not resolved yet" and retries later. The database is opened
* read-only and never written to: opencode itself may be running and writing it concurrently (WAL
* mode), and this class must never disturb that.
*/
final class OpenCodeSessionDiscovery {
private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(OpenCodeSessionDiscovery.class);
private final Path storageRoot; // e.g. ~/.local/share/opencode (injectable for tests)
private final ObjectMapper json;
private final Path databasePath;
private final AtomicBoolean warnedMissingDatabase = new AtomicBoolean(false);
OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(Path storageRoot) {
this.storageRoot = storageRoot;
this.json = new ObjectMapper();
this.databasePath = storageRoot.resolve("opencode.db");
}
/**
* The opencode session id whose record references {@code directory} (the worker's cwd), or
* {@code null} when no record matches yet. When several records share the directory — e.g.
* repeated spawns into the same worktree — the <em>most recently modified</em> one wins: it is
* A connection to {@link #databasePath} opened with SQLite's {@code SQLITE_OPEN_READONLY}
* flag: it never creates the file, never writes, and never touches WAL or journal mode.
* opencode may be running and writing this database concurrently, and this class must never
* disturb it.
*
* <p>Package-private so a test can hold the connection and prove it refuses a write. That is
* the only way to pin this property: making the file unwritable does <em>not</em> work,
* because SQLite silently downgrades a read-write open of an unwritable file to read-only, so
* such a test passes whether or not the flag is set.
*/
Connection openReadOnly() throws SQLException {
SQLiteConfig config = new SQLiteConfig();
config.setReadOnly(true);
return config.createConnection("jdbc:sqlite:" + databasePath);
}
/**
* The opencode session id whose row references {@code directory} (the worker's cwd), or
* {@code null} when no row matches yet. When several rows share the directory — e.g. repeated
* spawns into the same worktree — the row with the highest {@code time_updated} wins: it is
* the session the pane most likely corresponds to.
*
* <p>Never throws: a missing {@code storageRoot}, an unreadable/malformed record, or a
* directory that has not been persisted yet all resolve to {@code null} rather than failing a
* spawn. A fleetd worker's session record is written lazily (when the session is first
* persisted), so {@code null} here is the normal answer right after the pane is ready, and the
* caller retries later.
* <p>Never throws: a missing {@code opencode.db}, a locked/unreadable database, a query
* failure, or a directory that has not been persisted yet all resolve to {@code null} rather
* than failing a spawn. A fleetd worker's session row is written lazily (when the session is
* first persisted), so {@code null} here is the normal answer right after the pane is ready,
* and the caller retries later.
*
* @param directory the worker's cwd, as resolved for this spawn
* @return the matching session id, or {@code null} if none is known yet
@@ -61,62 +90,31 @@ final class OpenCodeSessionDiscovery {
if (directory == null || directory.isBlank()) {
return null;
}
Path sessionRoot = storageRoot.resolve("session");
if (!Files.isDirectory(sessionRoot)) {
if (!Files.isRegularFile(databasePath)) {
if (warnedMissingDatabase.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
log.warn("opencode session database not found at {} — opencode's on-disk layout "
+ "may have moved again; session discovery will keep returning null",
databasePath);
}
return null;
}
String best = null;
long bestMtime = Long.MIN_VALUE;
try (Stream<Path> projectDirs = Files.list(sessionRoot)) {
for (Path projectDir : projectDirs.filter(Files::isDirectory).toList()) {
try (Stream<Path> records = Files.list(projectDir)) {
for (Path record : records.toList()) {
String id = matchId(record, directory);
if (id == null) {
continue;
}
long mtime = lastModifiedEpochMillis(record);
if (mtime > bestMtime) {
bestMtime = mtime;
best = id;
}
}
} catch (IOException ignored) {
// one project dir unreadable — skip it; another may still match
String sql = "SELECT id FROM session WHERE directory = ? ORDER BY time_updated DESC LIMIT 1";
try (Connection connection = openReadOnly();
PreparedStatement statement = connection.prepareStatement(sql)) {
statement.setString(1, directory);
try (ResultSet rows = statement.executeQuery()) {
if (rows.next()) {
return rows.getString("id");
}
}
} catch (IOException ignored) {
// storage root vanished or became unreadable — "no session known yet"
} catch (SQLException e) {
// Locked, corrupt, or otherwise unreadable — never fatal to a spawn. Not the
// "database moved" signal (the file exists), so this stays below WARN.
log.debug("opencode session database unreadable at {}: {}", databasePath, e.toString());
return null;
}
return best;
}
/**
* The record's session id when it references {@code directory}, else {@code null}. A record
* that is not JSON, lacks {@code id}/{@code directory}, or points at a different directory is
* simply not our session; a malformed one is skipped, never fatal.
*/
private String matchId(Path record, String directory) {
try {
JsonNode node = json.readTree(record.toFile());
JsonNode id = node == null ? null : node.get("id");
JsonNode dir = node == null ? null : node.get("directory");
if (id == null || dir == null || !directory.equals(dir.asText())) {
return null;
}
return id.asText();
} catch (IOException e) {
return null;
}
}
/** The record's last-modified epoch ms, or {@code Long.MIN_VALUE} if unreadable (never wins). */
private static long lastModifiedEpochMillis(Path record) {
try {
return Files.getLastModifiedTime(record).toMillis();
} catch (IOException e) {
return Long.MIN_VALUE;
}
log.debug("no opencode session row for directory (root={}, directory={})",
storageRoot, directory);
return null;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.OptionalLong;
/**
* Fake {@link ParentResolver} backed by an explicit pid→parent map — lets {@link PaneLocatorTest}
* drive {@link PaneLocator}'s ancestry walk (grandchild pids, cycles) without spawning real OS
* processes.
*/
final class FakeParentResolver implements ParentResolver {
private final Map<Long, Long> parents = new HashMap<>();
/** {@code pid}'s parent is {@code parentPid}. A pid with no entry here has no known parent. */
FakeParentResolver parent(long pid, long parentPid) {
parents.put(pid, parentPid);
return this;
}
@Override
public OptionalLong parentOf(long pid) {
Long parent = parents.get(pid);
return parent == null ? OptionalLong.empty() : OptionalLong.of(parent);
}
}
@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
package dev.ltms.fleet.herdr;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/** Unit tests for PID → pane resolution (the herdr half of connection-based MCP identity). */
@@ -63,4 +67,123 @@ class PaneLocatorTest {
long paneListCalls = shared.calls.stream().filter(c -> c.method().equals("pane.list")).count();
assertEquals(1, paneListCalls, "same-object lead/member must scan exactly once, not twice");
}
// --- ancestry walk (CB-161: grandchild pids matched no pane, resolving as primary) --------
@Test
void stillResolvesAPidThatIsExactlyThePaneShellPid() {
// Regression: a pid with no parent chain at all — no ancestry walk is needed to match it.
OnePaneHerdr pane = new OnePaneHerdr("term_x", "pX", 5000, 6000);
PaneLocator loc = new PaneLocator(pane, new FakeParentResolver());
assertEquals("term_x", loc.terminalForPid(5000));
}
@Test
void stillResolvesAPidThatIsExactlyAForegroundPid() {
// Regression: same as above, but matching via the foreground-processes list.
OnePaneHerdr pane = new OnePaneHerdr("term_x", "pX", 5000, 6000);
PaneLocator loc = new PaneLocator(pane, new FakeParentResolver());
assertEquals("term_x", loc.terminalForPid(6000));
}
@Test
void resolvesAGrandchildPidTwoLevelsBelowTheShellPid() {
// The bug: a helper process a worker spawns (python3, curl, ...) is a grandchild of the
// pane's shell — not the shell_pid and not a foreground pid directly. Before the fix,
// paneOwnsPid only checked direct pid equality, so this pid matched no pane and the
// caller fell through to loopback-trust as the primary.
OnePaneHerdr pane = new OnePaneHerdr("term_x", "pX", 5000, 6000);
FakeParentResolver parents = new FakeParentResolver()
.parent(7002, 7001) // grandchild -> child
.parent(7001, 5000); // child -> shell (the pane's shell_pid)
PaneLocator loc = new PaneLocator(pane, parents);
assertEquals("term_x", loc.terminalForPid(7002));
}
@Test
void nullForAPidWhoseAncestryMatchesNoPane() {
// Must not break the other direction: a pid that truly belongs to nothing here (e.g. the
// real primary) must still resolve to null. Resolving everything to a worker would demote
// the actual lead and refuse every orchestration call.
OnePaneHerdr pane = new OnePaneHerdr("term_x", "pX", 5000, 6000);
FakeParentResolver parents = new FakeParentResolver()
.parent(9002, 9001)
.parent(9001, 9000); // chain never reaches 5000 or 6000
PaneLocator loc = new PaneLocator(pane, parents);
assertNull(loc.terminalForPid(9002));
}
@Test
void ancestryWalkTerminatesOnACycleInsteadOfHanging() {
// A fake (or corrupted) parent map that cycles must not hang identity resolution, which
// runs on every MCP call. The walk must still terminate and correctly resolve to null.
OnePaneHerdr pane = new OnePaneHerdr("term_x", "pX", 5000, 6000);
FakeParentResolver parents = new FakeParentResolver()
.parent(100, 101)
.parent(101, 100); // cycle, never reaches the pane's pids
PaneLocator loc = new PaneLocator(pane, parents);
assertNull(loc.terminalForPid(100));
}
@Test
void ancestrySetIsComputedOnceAcrossBothClientsInTheTwoDaemonConstructor() {
// CB-185: the two-daemon constructor searches lead then member. The ancestor set is
// per-caller, not per-client — it must be walked once and reused, not recomputed for
// each client searched.
OnePaneHerdr pane = new OnePaneHerdr("term_x", "pX", 5000, 6000);
FakeParentResolver parents = new FakeParentResolver()
.parent(7002, 7001)
.parent(7001, 5000);
AtomicInteger calls = new AtomicInteger();
ParentResolver counting = pid -> {
calls.incrementAndGet();
return parents.parentOf(pid);
};
HerdrClient noPanes = new FakeHerdr().withNoPanes();
PaneLocator two = new PaneLocator(noPanes, pane, counting);
assertEquals("term_x", two.terminalForPid(7002));
assertEquals(3, calls.get(), "ancestry must be walked once (3 lookups: 7002, 7001, 5000), "
+ "not re-walked per herdr client");
}
/** Minimal single-pane {@link HerdrClient} fake, purpose-built for the ancestry tests above. */
private static final class OnePaneHerdr implements HerdrClient {
private final ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
private final String terminalId;
private final String paneId;
private final long shellPid;
private final long foregroundPid;
OnePaneHerdr(String terminalId, String paneId, long shellPid, long foregroundPid) {
this.terminalId = terminalId;
this.paneId = paneId;
this.shellPid = shellPid;
this.foregroundPid = foregroundPid;
}
@Override
public JsonNode call(String method, Object params) {
try {
return switch (method) {
case "pane.list" -> mapper.readTree(("""
{"type":"pane_list","panes":[
{"pane_id":"%s","terminal_id":"%s","workspace_id":"w1","tab_id":"w1:t1","agent":"claude"}]}""")
.formatted(paneId, terminalId));
case "pane.process_info" -> mapper.readTree(("""
{"type":"pane_process_info","process_info":{"pane_id":"%s","shell_pid":%d,
"foreground_processes":[{"pid":%d,"name":"node","argv0":"claude"}]}}""")
.formatted(paneId, shellPid, foregroundPid));
default -> throw new HerdrException("OnePaneHerdr has no canned response for " + method);
};
} catch (HerdrException e) {
throw e;
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new HerdrException("OnePaneHerdr decode failed for " + method, e);
}
}
@Override
public void close() {
}
}
}
@@ -161,6 +161,34 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
+ "it under allow: — sshAuthSock is unset here, so it defaults to block");
}
@Test
void brokerUriEnvStaysBlockedWhenListedInMemberCredentialsAllow() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr,
allowListWithAllow(List.of("BROKER_CONNECTION_URI")), "/bin/zsh", null,
() -> config("BROKER_CONNECTION_URI"));
launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
Path dir = Path.of(launcher.env.get("ZDOTDIR"));
assertFalse(readAll(dir.resolve(EnvAllowListScrub.SCRUB_FILE)).contains("'BROKER_CONNECTION_URI'"),
"broker.uriEnv must not reach a member even when listed in memberCredentials.allow:");
}
@Test
void brokerUriEnvIsDeniedUnderTheDenyListPolicyEvenWhenAllowed() {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
WiringLauncher launcher = new WiringLauncher(herdr,
() -> new FleetConfig.MemberCredentials(null, List.of("BROKER_CONNECTION_URI"), List.of(), null),
"/bin/bash", null,
() -> config("BROKER_CONNECTION_URI"));
launcher.spawn(new SpawnRequest("test", null, null, null, null, MemberRole.DEV));
assertEquals("blocked-by-fleetd-cb596-see-gitea-issue-82", launcher.env.get("BROKER_CONNECTION_URI"),
"the deny-list overlay must deny broker.uriEnv even when allow: names it");
}
/**
* CB-633 follow-up criterion 3: on every allow-list spawn the daemon logs one INFO line, shaped
* "member credentials: allowed N of M", with real counts — not constants. Real path: the count
@@ -260,15 +288,24 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
/** Plus an injectable {@code hostEnvNames} source, for the "allowed N of M" log line test. */
WiringLauncher(FakeHerdr herdr, Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> creds, String shell,
Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames) {
Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames) {
this(herdr, creds, shell, hostEnvNames, null);
}
WiringLauncher(FakeHerdr herdr, Supplier<FleetConfig.MemberCredentials> creds, String shell,
Supplier<Set<String>> hostEnvNames, Supplier<FleetConfig> config) {
super("test", new AgentControl(herdr), new WorkspaceControl(herdr),
Map.of("test", profile()), "test",
name -> "SHELL".equals(name) ? shell : null,
0, () -> 0L, () -> { }, null, creds, hostEnvNames);
0, () -> 0L, () -> { }, null, creds, hostEnvNames, config);
}
@Override
protected Launch buildLaunch(FleetConfig.Profile cfg, LaunchSpec spec) {
Map<String, String> launchEnv = baseEnv(cfg);
launchEnv.putAll(env);
env.clear();
env.putAll(launchEnv);
return new Launch(env, List.of("test"));
}
@@ -278,6 +315,12 @@ class HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest {
}
}
private static FleetConfig config(String brokerUriEnv) {
return new FleetConfig(null, null, null, Map.of(), null, null, null, null, null,
new FleetConfig.Broker(null, brokerUriEnv, null), null, null, null, null, null,
null, null, null, null, null).withDefaults();
}
/** The generated directory is a temp directory; make sure the test does not leave a pile. */
@Test
void theGeneratedDirectoryIsRemovedWhenThePaneIsStopped() {
@@ -121,6 +121,34 @@ class MemberEnvAllowListTest {
assertTrue(derived.contains("OTHER_NAME"), "other allow: names are unaffected");
}
@Test
void configuredBrokerAndCoordinatorUriEnvNamesAreExcludedEvenWhenAllowed() {
FleetConfig config = config("BROKER_CONNECTION_URI", "COORDINATOR_CONNECTION_URI");
Set<String> excluded = MemberEnvAllowList.brokerUriEnvNames(config);
Set<String> derived = MemberEnvAllowList.derive(List.of(),
Set.of("BROKER_CONNECTION_URI", "COORDINATOR_CONNECTION_URI", "OTHER_NAME"), excluded);
assertFalse(derived.contains("BROKER_CONNECTION_URI"),
"broker.uriEnv is secret-bearing and must not ride in on allow:");
assertFalse(derived.contains("COORDINATOR_CONNECTION_URI"),
"coordinator.uriEnv has the same inline-password shape");
assertTrue(derived.contains("OTHER_NAME"), "unrelated allow: entries are unaffected");
}
@Test
void absentOrBlankBrokerUriEnvAddsNoExclusions() {
assertTrue(MemberEnvAllowList.brokerUriEnvNames(config(null, null)).isEmpty());
assertTrue(MemberEnvAllowList.brokerUriEnvNames(config(" ", "")).isEmpty());
}
private static FleetConfig config(String brokerUriEnv, String coordinatorUriEnv) {
return new FleetConfig(null, null, null, Map.of(), null, null, null, null, null,
new FleetConfig.Broker(null, brokerUriEnv, null), null, null, null, null, null,
null, null, null, null,
new FleetConfig.Coordinator(null, coordinatorUriEnv, null, null)).withDefaults();
}
/** {@code LC_*} categories are infrastructure by prefix; everything else needs an exact match. */
@Test
void keepsMatchesExactlyPlusTheLocalePrefixRule() {
@@ -334,8 +334,7 @@ class OpenCodeLauncherTest {
assertNull(handle.agentSessionId(), "no record yet → null, not a spawn-time block");
// Once the record appears (here: same cwd), lazy discovery resolves it — the handle's
// session id matches its own worktree, not another's.
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "p1", "ses_a.json",
"ses_resolved", "/work/dir", 1000L);
OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest.writeRecord(discRoot, "ses_resolved", "/work/dir", 1000L);
assertEquals("ses_resolved", handle.agentSessionId(),
"agentSessionId() re-scans and picks up a record that has since been written");
}
@@ -5,68 +5,89 @@ import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.nio.file.attribute.FileTime;
import java.sql.Connection;
import java.sql.DriverManager;
import java.sql.PreparedStatement;
import java.sql.SQLException;
import java.sql.Statement;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery} matches an opencode session record by the worker's cwd (its
* {@code directory}) against opencode's on-disk storage. These tests populate a TEMP storage root
* themselves — never the operator's real {@code ~/.local/share/opencode}.
* {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery} matches an opencode session row by the worker's cwd (its
* {@code directory}) against opencode's {@code opencode.db} SQLite database. These tests build a
* SYNTHETIC database themselves, in a JUnit temp directory — never the operator's real
* {@code ~/.local/share/opencode/opencode.db}, which a live opencode process may be writing.
*/
class OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest {
/**
* Write a session record {@code {"id":..., "directory":...}} under
* {@code <root>/session/<projectID>/<fileName>} and stamp it with a known last-modified time,
* so "most recently modified wins" is deterministic. Static so the launcher test can reuse it.
* Create {@code <root>/opencode.db} with a minimal {@code session} table (just the columns
* {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery} reads: {@code id}, {@code directory}, {@code time_updated})
* and insert one row. Static so {@link OpenCodeLauncherTest} can reuse it.
*/
static void writeRecord(Path root, String projectId, String fileName, String id,
String directory, long lastModifiedEpochMillis) throws Exception {
Path dir = root.resolve("session").resolve(projectId);
Files.createDirectories(dir);
Path file = dir.resolve(fileName);
Files.writeString(file, "{\"id\":\"" + id + "\",\"directory\":\"" + directory
+ "\",\"projectID\":\"" + projectId + "\",\"version\":\"1.1.31\"}");
Files.setLastModifiedTime(file, FileTime.fromMillis(lastModifiedEpochMillis));
static void writeRecord(Path root, String id, String directory, long timeUpdated) throws Exception {
Path db = root.resolve("opencode.db");
try (Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:sqlite:" + db)) {
try (Statement statement = connection.createStatement()) {
statement.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS session ("
+ "id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, directory TEXT, time_updated INTEGER)");
}
// Bound parameters, not string interpolation: the class under test uses a
// PreparedStatement, and a hand-escaped INSERT here is a pattern someone copies out.
try (PreparedStatement insert = connection.prepareStatement(
"INSERT INTO session (id, directory, time_updated) VALUES (?, ?, ?)")) {
insert.setString(1, id);
insert.setString(2, directory);
insert.setLong(3, timeUpdated);
insert.executeUpdate();
}
}
}
@Test
void findsTheRecordWhoseDirectoryEqualsTheCwd(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "p1", "ses_a.json", "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "p2", "ses_b.json", "ses_bbb", "/w/b", 2000L);
void findsTheRowWhoseDirectoryEqualsTheCwd(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "ses_bbb", "/w/b", 2000L);
assertEquals("ses_bbb", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/b"),
"the record whose directory equals the cwd is the one found");
"the row whose directory equals the cwd is the one found");
assertEquals("ses_aaa", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"));
}
@Test
void aNonMatchingDirectoryYieldsNullRatherThanAMismatch(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "p1", "ses_a.json", "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/other"),
"no record for this cwd yet → null, not a wrong session");
"no row for this cwd yet → null, not a wrong session");
}
@Test
void prefersTheMostRecentlyModifiedRecordWhenSeveralMatch(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "p1", "old.json", "ses_old", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "p2", "new.json", "ses_new", "/w/a", 5000L);
void prefersTheMostRecentlyUpdatedRowWhenSeveralMatch(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "ses_old", "/w/a", 1000L);
writeRecord(root, "ses_new", "/w/a", 5000L);
assertEquals("ses_new", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"),
"the freshest record for the cwd wins");
"the row with the highest time_updated for the cwd wins");
}
@Test
void aMissingOrEmptyStorageRootYieldsNullWithoutThrowing(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
// Missing: no session dir at all under the root.
void aMissingDatabaseYieldsNullWithoutThrowing(@TempDir Path root) {
// No opencode.db at all under the root.
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"));
}
// Present but empty: a session dir with nothing in it produces no match, not a throw.
Path emptyRoot = root.resolve("empty");
Files.createDirectories(emptyRoot.resolve("session"));
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(emptyRoot).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"));
@Test
void anEmptyDatabaseYieldsNullWithoutThrowing(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
Path db = root.resolve("opencode.db");
try (Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:sqlite:" + db);
Statement statement = connection.createStatement()) {
statement.execute("CREATE TABLE session (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, directory TEXT, "
+ "time_updated INTEGER)");
}
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"));
}
@Test
@@ -76,15 +97,41 @@ class OpenCodeSessionDiscoveryTest {
assertNull(discovery.sessionIdForDirectory(" "));
}
/**
* The one line standing between fleetd and writing the operator's live {@code opencode.db} —
* 841MB, with a running opencode writing it — is {@code config.setReadOnly(true)} in
* {@link OpenCodeSessionDiscovery#openReadOnly()}. Delete it and every other test in this class
* still passes, so this is the test that guards it.
*
* <p>It asks the connection to write, and requires a refusal. The obvious alternative — make
* the database file unwritable and check the read still works — proves nothing: SQLite silently
* downgrades a read-write open of an unwritable file to read-only, so that test passes either
* way. It was tried and watched pass with the flag removed.
*/
@Test
void aMalformedRecordIsSkippedRatherThanFatal(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
// A record that fails to parse must not abort the scan of its siblings.
Path dir = root.resolve("session").resolve("p1");
Files.createDirectories(dir);
Files.writeString(dir.resolve("broken.json"), "{not valid json");
writeRecord(root, "p1", "good.json", "ses_good", "/w/a", 1000L);
void theDatabaseIsOpenedReadOnly(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
writeRecord(root, "ses_aaa", "/w/a", 1000L);
assertEquals("ses_good", new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"),
"an unreadable record is skipped; a later valid one still matches");
try (Connection connection = new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).openReadOnly();
Statement statement = connection.createStatement()) {
SQLException refused = assertThrows(SQLException.class,
() -> statement.executeUpdate("INSERT INTO session (id, directory, time_updated) "
+ "VALUES ('ses_zzz', '/w/z', 1)"),
"the connection must REFUSE a write — opencode is writing this database live");
assertTrue(refused.getMessage().toLowerCase().contains("readonly")
|| refused.getMessage().toLowerCase().contains("read-only"),
"the refusal must be about read-only, not some other error: " + refused.getMessage());
}
}
@Test
void aCorruptDatabaseFileYieldsNullWithoutThrowing(@TempDir Path root) throws Exception {
// A file at opencode.db that is not a SQLite database at all — the open/query must fail
// safe, never fatal to a spawn.
Path db = root.resolve("opencode.db");
Files.writeString(db, "this is not a sqlite database");
assertNull(new OpenCodeSessionDiscovery(root).sessionIdForDirectory("/w/a"),
"an unreadable database resolves to null, not an exception");
}
}