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Author SHA1 Message Date
Dai Ha 6022aef612 fleetd #778: let an observer read its own ticket, never nudge a role to run a call it is refused
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Part 1: Authz.TASK_READ now grants an observer the ticket it created (a new
observerOwnsTicket classifier), via MessageService.ownsTicket(String, String)
(side-effect-free) and a new Authz.permits overload. fleet_status and
fleet_poll{target} (DRAIN) stay refused for an observer. REST and MCP share
the same gate.

Part 2: ReplyPushLoop no longer nudges a reply/question delegator to run
fleet_poll(target=...) or fleet_send(turnId=...) unless Authz would actually
grant that call to its role. FleetMcp.sendHandler asks Authz.permits(DRAIN)/
permits(ANSWER) once, eagerly, while the real Principal is in scope, and
threads the booleans through PrimaryRegistry.recordDelegation into the new
Delegation fields and nudgeMayDrainFor/nudgeMayAnswerFor accessors --
plain booleans, not a Role reference, so no new or widened edge crosses the
frozen auth<->mcp<->msg package-cycle baseline. ReplyPushLoop filters a
reply/question out of its pending set when the grant is false, falling back
to the durable inbox / the ask window lapsing, same as when no nudge target
is known at all. Log lines that called a non-lead nudge target "lead" now
say "nudge target".
2026-10-06 13:55:26 +02:00
13 changed files with 536 additions and 76 deletions
@@ -86,29 +86,52 @@ public final class Authz {
*/
public static final Predicate<String> NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET = target -> false;
/**
* The fail-closed classifier for an observer's {@code TASK_READ}: answers no for every
* ticket, so the grant is refused unless a caller supplies a real one. {@code
* MessageService#ownsTicket(String, String)} is the real one, so a ticket this classifier
* accepts is one that caller's own {@code fleet_send(wait:false)} actually created.
*/
public static final Predicate<String> NO_OBSERVER_OWNED_TICKET = ticket -> false;
/**
* Convenience form for a caller with no classifier to supply. Fails closed: a collaborator's
* or an observer's {@code SEND} is refused, as if no terminal were a configured lead,
* collaborator, or observer-reachable target — the same decision
* {@link #NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR} and {@link #NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET} give explicitly.
* Every other action's result is identical to the five-argument form's, since none of them
* consult either classifier.
* or an observer's {@code SEND}, and an observer's {@code TASK_READ}, are refused, as if no
* terminal were a configured lead, collaborator, or observer-reachable target, and no ticket
* were the caller's own — the same decision {@link #NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR},
* {@link #NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET} and {@link #NO_OBSERVER_OWNED_TICKET} give explicitly.
* Every other action's result is identical to the full form's, since none of them consult
* any of the three classifiers.
*
* <p>Its default classifiers deny every collaborator and every observer, so a caller
* enforcing authorization must use the five-argument form instead.
* enforcing authorization must use the full form instead.
*/
public static boolean permits(Principal caller, Action action, String targetSession) {
return permits(caller, action, targetSession, NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR, NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET);
return permits(caller, action, targetSession, NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR,
NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET, NO_OBSERVER_OWNED_TICKET);
}
/**
* As {@link #permits(Principal, Action, String)}, with a real classifier for a collaborator's
* {@code SEND}. An observer's {@code SEND} still fails closed ({@link #NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET}) —
* a caller enforcing both grants must use the five-argument form.
* {@code SEND}. An observer's {@code SEND} and {@code TASK_READ} still fail closed — a
* caller enforcing all three grants must use the full form.
*/
public static boolean permits(Principal caller, Action action, String targetSession,
Predicate<String> knownLeadOrCollaborator) {
return permits(caller, action, targetSession, knownLeadOrCollaborator, NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET);
return permits(caller, action, targetSession, knownLeadOrCollaborator,
NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET, NO_OBSERVER_OWNED_TICKET);
}
/**
* As {@link #permits(Principal, Action, String, Predicate)}, with a real classifier for an
* observer's {@code SEND} too. An observer's {@code TASK_READ} still fails closed — a caller
* enforcing all three grants must use the full form.
*/
public static boolean permits(Principal caller, Action action, String targetSession,
Predicate<String> knownLeadOrCollaborator,
Predicate<String> observerSendTarget) {
return permits(caller, action, targetSession, knownLeadOrCollaborator, observerSendTarget,
NO_OBSERVER_OWNED_TICKET);
}
/**
@@ -116,9 +139,10 @@ public final class Authz {
*
* @param targetSession the session id in the request path; only consulted for the
* worker-scoped actions ({@code REPLY}, {@code ASK},
* {@code INBOX}), for a collaborator's {@code SEND}, and for an
* observer's {@code SEND}, ignored otherwise, may be
* {@code null}
* {@code INBOX}), for a collaborator's {@code SEND}, for an
* observer's {@code SEND}, and — carrying a ticket id instead
* of a session id — for an observer's {@code TASK_READ},
* ignored otherwise, may be {@code null}
* @param knownLeadOrCollaborator whether a terminal is a configured lead or collaborator —
* consulted only for a collaborator's {@code SEND}, to confine
* it to another named peer and never a spawned member's
@@ -128,10 +152,16 @@ public final class Authz {
* consulted only for an observer's {@code SEND}, to confine it
* to a lead or another observer pane and never a collaborator,
* an architect, or a spawned member
* @param observerOwnsTicket whether {@code targetSession} (here, a ticket id) was created
* by this same caller — consulted only for an observer's
* {@code TASK_READ}, to confine it to a ticket its own
* {@code fleet_send(wait:false)} created, never another
* caller's
*/
public static boolean permits(Principal caller, Action action, String targetSession,
Predicate<String> knownLeadOrCollaborator,
Predicate<String> observerSendTarget) {
Predicate<String> observerSendTarget,
Predicate<String> observerOwnsTicket) {
if (caller == null || caller.isAnonymous()) {
return false; // authenticated as nothing ⇒ authorized for nothing
}
@@ -180,11 +210,15 @@ public final class Authz {
|| caller.isCollaborator() || caller.isObserver();
// Ticket polling and session status, open to every role READ is open to except a
// collaborator or an observer. MessageService compares a ticket's creator to the
// caller on every read as well, so dropping this gate would not expose another
// session's reply — it would move the refusal later and widen what a caller that
// never orchestrates can probe.
case TASK_READ -> caller.isPrimary() || caller.isWorker() || caller.isArchitect();
// collaborator or an observer — with one exception: an observer may poll a ticket its
// own fleet_send(wait:false) created, confined by observerOwnsTicket. Session status
// is not ticket-scoped, so that call site supplies no real classifier here and an
// observer's TASK_READ on it stays refused. MessageService compares a ticket's
// creator to the caller on every read as well, so dropping this gate would not expose
// another session's reply — it would move the refusal later and widen what a caller
// that never orchestrates can probe.
case TASK_READ -> caller.isPrimary() || caller.isWorker() || caller.isArchitect()
|| (caller.isObserver() && observerOwnsTicket.test(targetSession));
// fleetd #421: reading held lead-to-lead mail is the primary's alone. An architect
// holds READ today (CB-548), so "not primary" must mean not-architect here too — this
@@ -51,10 +51,11 @@ public enum Role {
* configured lead, not a bound architect slot, not a configured collaborator tab. Unforgeable
* like a worker's — derived from the connection's pane, never from a request argument, and
* honoured regardless of auth mode. May {@code READ} and {@code METRICS}, {@code REPLY}/
* {@code ASK} only as its own pane, and {@code SEND} only to a target that would itself
* resolve as a lead ({@link #PRIMARY}) or as {@code OBSERVER}; may not {@code SPAWN}/
* {@code STOP}/{@code DRAIN}/{@code HANDOVER}, poll a ticket ({@code TASK_READ}), or reach the
* coordination broker ({@code COORD_SEND}/{@code COORD_READ}).
* {@code ASK} only as its own pane, {@code SEND} only to a target that would itself resolve
* as a lead ({@link #PRIMARY}) or as {@code OBSERVER}, and {@code TASK_READ} only a ticket its
* own {@code fleet_send(wait:false)} created; may not {@code SPAWN}/{@code STOP}/
* {@code DRAIN}/{@code HANDOVER}, read a session's status or another caller's ticket, or reach
* the coordination broker ({@code COORD_SEND}/{@code COORD_READ}).
*/
OBSERVER,
@@ -528,8 +528,13 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
// name would never match there anyway, but passing null for them keeps the intent
// explicit rather than relying on that lookup to filter it out.
String delegatorName = caller.isPrimary() ? caller.name() : null;
Runnable onAccepted = () ->
primaryRegistry.recordDelegation(target, callerTerminal, delegatorName);
// A nudge about this target must never tell its recipient to run a call Authz
// would refuse it — asked once, here, while the real Principal is still in
// scope, rather than re-derived from a bare terminal string later.
boolean mayDrainNudge = Authz.permits(caller, Authz.Action.DRAIN, target);
boolean mayAnswerNudge = Authz.permits(caller, Authz.Action.ANSWER, target);
Runnable onAccepted = () -> primaryRegistry.recordDelegation(target, callerTerminal,
delegatorName, mayDrainNudge, mayAnswerNudge);
// wait defaults to true (block for the reply); wait:false is fire-and-poll.
return Boolean.FALSE.equals(a.get("wait"))
? sendAsync(messages, target, content, onAccepted, workers.profiles(), caller)
@@ -574,10 +579,18 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
Map<String, Object> a = req.arguments();
String target = str(a, "target");
String coordId = str(a, "coordId");
String ticket = str(a, "ticket");
// The action depends on the ARGUMENTS, not on the tool name -- see pollAction.
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, toolAction("fleet_poll", a), target);
Authz.Action action = toolAction("fleet_poll", a);
// TASK_READ reads a ticket, not a DRAIN target -- the gate must see the
// ticket id, and an observer's grant is confined to a ticket it created.
String authzTarget = action == Authz.Action.TASK_READ ? ticket : target;
Predicate<String> observerOwnsTicket = action == Authz.Action.TASK_READ
? t -> messages.ownsTicket(t, principal(exchange).ownerKey())
: Authz.NO_OBSERVER_OWNED_TICKET;
McpSchema.CallToolResult denied = deny(exchange, action, authzTarget, observerOwnsTicket);
if (denied != null) return denied;
return poll(messages, leadChannel, str(a, "ticket"), target, coordId,
return poll(messages, leadChannel, ticket, target, coordId,
principal(exchange).ownerKey());
};
// CB-307 Increment 3: per-msgId ack (not needed in v1 but supported by the inbox).
@@ -745,6 +758,16 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
return denyFor(principal(exchange), action, target);
}
/**
* As {@link #deny(McpSyncServerExchange, Authz.Action, String)}, with a real classifier for
* an observer's {@code TASK_READ} — the only call site that can supply one is a ticket poll,
* which knows the ticket id and the caller's owner key.
*/
private McpSchema.CallToolResult deny(McpSyncServerExchange exchange, Authz.Action action,
String target, Predicate<String> observerOwnsTicket) {
return denyFor(principal(exchange), action, target, observerOwnsTicket);
}
/**
* The policy half of {@link #deny}: everything except pulling the caller out of the MCP
* exchange. Kept separate so the authorization decision — the actual control — is unit-testable
@@ -758,13 +781,22 @@ public final class FleetMcp {
* @return {@code null} when the call may proceed, or the error result to return when it may not
*/
McpSchema.CallToolResult denyFor(Principal caller, Authz.Action action, String target) {
return denyFor(caller, action, target, Authz.NO_OBSERVER_OWNED_TICKET);
}
/**
* As {@link #denyFor(Principal, Authz.Action, String)}, with a real classifier for an
* observer's {@code TASK_READ}.
*/
McpSchema.CallToolResult denyFor(Principal caller, Authz.Action action, String target,
Predicate<String> observerOwnsTicket) {
// The enforcement switch lives HERE rather than in the exchange-facing wrapper: any future
// tool that calls this directly must not be able to skip the gate by accident.
if (!authorizationEnforced) {
return null; // AuthorizationMode.UNENFORCED: authorization not enforced (fleetd #518)
}
if (Authz.permits(caller, action, target, callers.knownLeadOrCollaborator(),
callers.observerSendTarget())) {
callers.observerSendTarget(), observerOwnsTicket)) {
if (action != Authz.Action.READ && action != Authz.Action.TASK_READ) {
AuditLog.allowed(caller, action, target); // reads would drown the trail
}
@@ -48,8 +48,13 @@ public final class PrimaryRegistry {
*/
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, Delegation> leadByTarget = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/** A recorded delegator: the terminal learned from call traffic, and its name, if it has one. */
private record Delegation(String terminal, String name) {
/**
* A recorded delegator: the terminal learned from call traffic, its name if it has one, and
* whether a nudge may tell it to {@code fleet_poll(target=…)} or {@code fleet_send(turnId=…)}
* — the real authorization decision for this delegator's role, captured once by the caller at
* delegation time rather than re-derived from a bare terminal string later.
*/
private record Delegation(String terminal, String name, boolean mayDrainNudge, boolean mayAnswerNudge) {
}
/**
@@ -128,14 +133,28 @@ public final class PrimaryRegistry {
/**
* As {@link #recordDelegation(String, String)}, additionally recording the delegating lead's
* name when the caller carries one. See {@link #record(String, String)} for why the name
* matters.
* name when the caller carries one, and granting a nudge about this target everything a
* primary may be told to run. See {@link #record(String, String)} for why the name matters,
* and {@link #recordDelegation(String, String, String, boolean, boolean)} for why every other
* caller must supply its own, real grant instead of this default.
*/
public void recordDelegation(String target, String leadTerminal, String leadName) {
recordDelegation(target, leadTerminal, leadName, true, true);
}
/**
* As {@link #recordDelegation(String, String, String)}, with the delegating caller's own
* {@code DRAIN} and {@code ANSWER} grants — the real {@code Authz.permits} decision for its
* role, asked once by the caller at delegation time, since a terminal string alone cannot be
* resolved back to a role here. A nudge about this target must offer only what
* {@link #nudgeMayDrainFor(String)}/{@link #nudgeMayAnswerFor(String)} report back as true.
*/
public void recordDelegation(String target, String leadTerminal, String leadName,
boolean mayDrainNudge, boolean mayAnswerNudge) {
if (target == null || target.isBlank() || leadTerminal == null || leadTerminal.isBlank()) {
return;
}
leadByTarget.put(target, new Delegation(leadTerminal, blankToNull(leadName)));
leadByTarget.put(target, new Delegation(leadTerminal, blankToNull(leadName), mayDrainNudge, mayAnswerNudge));
}
/** Forget a worker's delegating lead — call on release, so a torn-down session leaks nothing. */
@@ -167,6 +186,32 @@ public final class PrimaryRegistry {
return currentPrimaryTerminal();
}
/**
* Whether a nudge about {@code target} may tell its recipient to {@code fleet_poll(target=…)}
* — present on exactly the same condition as {@link #nudgeTargetFor(String)}, carrying the
* grant recorded for a delegation, or {@code true} for the singleton primary fallback, which
* is always genuinely the primary.
*/
public Optional<Boolean> nudgeMayDrainFor(String target) {
Delegation delegation = target == null ? null : leadByTarget.get(target);
if (delegation != null) {
return Optional.of(delegation.mayDrainNudge());
}
return currentPrimaryTerminal().isPresent() ? Optional.of(true) : Optional.empty();
}
/**
* As {@link #nudgeMayDrainFor(String)}, for whether a nudge may tell its recipient to
* {@code fleet_send(turnId=…)}.
*/
public Optional<Boolean> nudgeMayAnswerFor(String target) {
Delegation delegation = target == null ? null : leadByTarget.get(target);
if (delegation != null) {
return Optional.of(delegation.mayAnswerNudge());
}
return currentPrimaryTerminal().isPresent() ? Optional.of(true) : Optional.empty();
}
/**
* The known primary terminal, or empty if not yet learned (and not pinned) — the raw value as
* it was recorded, with no attempt to resolve a named lead's current pane. Callers that need a
@@ -1492,6 +1492,16 @@ public final class MessageService {
|| Objects.equals(callerOwner, task.creatorOwner);
}
/**
* Whether {@code callerOwner} owns {@code ticket}, with no side effect — unlike
* {@link #poll(String, String)}, this never fires the ticket's collection hook. A ticket this
* daemon has never heard of is owned by nobody.
*/
public boolean ownsTicket(String ticket, String callerOwner) {
Task task = tasks.get(ticket);
return task != null && ownsTicket(task, callerOwner);
}
/**
* Test seam only — carries no production behaviour, and nothing in this class calls it;
* {@link #pruneTerminalTickets} still reads {@link Task#completedNanos} directly.
@@ -178,13 +178,20 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
pendingReplies.remove(target, owning);
continue;
}
// Never nudge a caller to run a DRAIN its own role could never perform -- the durable
// inbox stays the backstop for it, same as when no nudge target is known at all.
if (!owning.mayDrainNudge()) continue;
result.add(target);
}
return result;
}
/** A pending reply target: which lead to nudge, and how many nudges have named it so far. */
private record ReplyEntry(String lead, int nudgeCount) {
/**
* A pending reply target: which nudge target to notify, how many nudges have named it so
* far, and whether that nudge target's own role may actually run the
* {@code fleet_poll(target=…)} a reply nudge would tell it to run.
*/
private record ReplyEntry(String lead, int nudgeCount, boolean mayDrainNudge) {
}
/**
@@ -207,11 +214,12 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
/**
* An open question awaiting the lead's answer: which ticket it belongs to, which worker asked,
* which lead to nudge, the question text, and how many nudges have named it so far (CB-598 —
* tracked per question, not per lead per source).
* which lead to nudge, the question text, how many nudges have named it so far (CB-598 —
* tracked per question, not per lead per source), and whether that nudge target's own role may
* actually run the {@code fleet_send(turnId=…)} a question nudge would tell it to run.
*/
private record PendingQuestion(String turnId, String ticket, String target, String lead,
String question, int nudgeCount) {
String question, int nudgeCount, boolean mayAnswerNudge) {
}
private record IncidentLead(String incidentId, String lead) {
@@ -229,7 +237,11 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
/** Questions still open for {@code lead}, snapshotted fresh for one tick. */
private List<PendingQuestion> pendingQuestionsFor(String lead) {
return pendingQuestions.values().stream().filter(q -> lead.equals(q.lead())).toList();
// Never nudge a caller to run an ANSWER its own role could never perform -- the 55-second
// ask window lapses on its own, same as when no nudge target is known at all.
return pendingQuestions.values().stream()
.filter(q -> lead.equals(q.lead()) && q.mayAnswerNudge())
.toList();
}
/** Question turnIds still open for {@code lead} — a plain snapshot for race comparison. */
@@ -385,7 +397,7 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
boolean hasIncidentWork = !pendingIncidentKeysFor(lead).isEmpty();
boolean hasUnmappedTargetWork = !pendingUnmappedTargetKeysFor(lead).isEmpty();
if (!hasReplyWork && !hasTicketWork && !hasQuestionWork && !hasIncidentWork && !hasUnmappedTargetWork) {
log.debug("push: nothing pending for lead {}, stopping reminder", lead);
log.debug("push: nothing pending for nudge target {}, stopping reminder", lead);
return Action.STOP;
}
boolean replyEligible = hasReplyWork && replyReminderCount < maxReminders;
@@ -394,7 +406,7 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
boolean incidentEligible = hasIncidentWork && incidentReminderCount < maxReminders;
boolean unmappedTargetEligible = hasUnmappedTargetWork && unmappedTargetReminderCount < maxReminders;
if (!replyEligible && !ticketEligible && !questionEligible && !incidentEligible && !unmappedTargetEligible) {
log.debug("push: reminder cap ({}) reached for lead {} on every source with pending work, stopping",
log.debug("push: reminder cap ({}) reached for nudge target {} on every source with pending work, stopping",
maxReminders, lead);
countNudge("exhausted");
return Action.STOP;
@@ -403,15 +415,15 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
try {
status = agents.status(lead);
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.debug("push: status check failed for lead {}, will retry", lead, e);
log.debug("push: status check failed for nudge target {}, will retry", lead, e);
return Action.WAIT_BUSY;
}
if (!status.injectable()) {
log.debug("push: lead {} is {} (not injectable), waiting", lead, status);
log.debug("push: nudge target {} is {} (not injectable), waiting", lead, status);
return Action.WAIT_BUSY;
}
if (!promptBox.clearToSubmit(lead)) {
log.debug("push: lead {} has unsubmitted text in its prompt box, waiting", lead);
log.debug("push: nudge target {} has unsubmitted text in its prompt box, waiting", lead);
return Action.WAIT_BUSY;
}
return Action.INJECT;
@@ -466,14 +478,14 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
if (lead.isEmpty() || isLive(lead.get())) {
return lead;
}
log.debug("push: lead {} delegated to for {} is no longer live, forgetting the stale binding "
log.debug("push: nudge target {} delegated to for {} is no longer live, forgetting the stale binding "
+ "and falling back", lead.get(), target);
primaryRegistry.forgetDelegation(target);
Optional<String> fallback = primaryRegistry.nudgeTargetFor(target);
if (fallback.isEmpty() || isLive(fallback.get())) {
return fallback;
}
log.debug("push: fallback lead {} for {} is also not live, skipping this tick", fallback.get(), target);
log.debug("push: fallback nudge target {} for {} is also not live, skipping this tick", fallback.get(), target);
return Optional.empty();
}
@@ -496,9 +508,9 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
boolean gone = e instanceof HerdrException he && "agent_not_found".equals(he.code());
if (gone) {
log.debug("push: lead {} no longer exists ({})", lead, e.toString());
log.debug("push: nudge target {} no longer exists ({})", lead, e.toString());
} else {
log.debug("push: liveness check for lead {} was inconclusive ({}); treating as live "
log.debug("push: liveness check for nudge target {} was inconclusive ({}); treating as live "
+ "rather than risk destroying a live binding", lead, e.toString());
}
return !gone;
@@ -517,11 +529,12 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
public void onReplyQueued(String target) {
var lead = resolveLiveLead(target);
if (lead.isEmpty()) {
log.debug("push: no lead is known to be waiting on {}, skipping reminder", target);
log.debug("push: no nudge target is known to be waiting on {}, skipping reminder", target);
return;
}
boolean mayDrainNudge = primaryRegistry.nudgeMayDrainFor(target).orElse(false);
pendingReplies.compute(target, (t, existing) ->
new ReplyEntry(lead.get(), existing == null ? 0 : existing.nudgeCount()));
new ReplyEntry(lead.get(), existing == null ? 0 : existing.nudgeCount(), mayDrainNudge));
startOrCoalesce(lead.get());
}
@@ -545,7 +558,7 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
public void onTicketTerminal(String ticket, String target, boolean failed) {
var lead = resolveLiveLead(target);
if (lead.isEmpty()) {
log.debug("push: no lead is known to be waiting on ticket {} (target {}), skipping nudge",
log.debug("push: no nudge target is known to be waiting on ticket {} (target {}), skipping nudge",
ticket, target);
return;
}
@@ -580,11 +593,13 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
public void onQuestionOpened(String ticket, String target, String turnId, String question) {
var lead = resolveLiveLead(target);
if (lead.isEmpty()) {
log.debug("push: no lead is known to be waiting on {}'s question (turnId {}), skipping nudge",
log.debug("push: no nudge target is known to be waiting on {}'s question (turnId {}), skipping nudge",
target, turnId);
return;
}
pendingQuestions.put(turnId, new PendingQuestion(turnId, ticket, target, lead.get(), question, 0));
boolean mayAnswerNudge = primaryRegistry.nudgeMayAnswerFor(target).orElse(false);
pendingQuestions.put(turnId,
new PendingQuestion(turnId, ticket, target, lead.get(), question, 0, mayAnswerNudge));
startOrCoalesce(lead.get());
}
@@ -608,7 +623,7 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
for (String target : targets) {
var lead = resolveLiveLead(target);
if (lead.isEmpty()) {
log.warn("push: backend incident {} has no known lead for target {}", incidentId, target);
log.warn("push: backend incident {} has no known nudge target for worker {}", incidentId, target);
continue;
}
targetsByLead.computeIfAbsent(lead.get(), _ -> new ArrayList<>()).add(target);
@@ -644,10 +659,10 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
/** Start a reminder schedule for {@code lead}, or join the one already running. */
private void startOrCoalesce(String lead) {
if (activeLeads.putIfAbsent(lead, Boolean.TRUE) != null) {
log.debug("push: reminder loop already active for lead {}, work coalesced in", lead);
log.debug("push: reminder loop already active for nudge target {}, work coalesced in", lead);
return;
}
log.debug("push: starting reminder loop for lead {}", lead);
log.debug("push: starting reminder loop for nudge target {}", lead);
scheduleNext(lead);
}
@@ -752,11 +767,11 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
|| pendingIncidentKeysFor(lead).stream().anyMatch(i -> !incidentsBefore.contains(i))
|| pendingUnmappedTargetKeysFor(lead).stream().anyMatch(i -> !unmappedTargetsBefore.contains(i));
if (racedIn && activeLeads.putIfAbsent(lead, Boolean.TRUE) == null) {
log.debug("push: new work for lead {} raced the reminder loop's stop — restarting", lead);
log.debug("push: new work for nudge target {} raced the reminder loop's stop — restarting", lead);
scheduleNext(lead);
return;
}
log.debug("push: reminder loop ended for lead {}", lead);
log.debug("push: reminder loop ended for nudge target {}", lead);
}
/** Send one combined nudge covering everything currently pending for {@code lead}. */
@@ -773,13 +788,13 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
List<PendingUnmappedTarget> unmappedTargets = pendingUnmappedTargetsFor(lead);
if (replyTargets.isEmpty() && tickets.isEmpty() && questions.isEmpty() && incidents.isEmpty()
&& unmappedTargets.isEmpty()) {
log.debug("push: pending work for lead {} drained before the nudge could be sent", lead);
log.debug("push: pending work for nudge target {} drained before the nudge could be sent", lead);
return;
}
String nudge = formatNudge(replyTargets, tickets, questions, incidents, unmappedTargets);
try {
agents.send(lead, nudge);
log.debug("push: nudge sent to lead {} (reply {}/{}, ticket {}/{}, question {}/{}; "
log.debug("push: nudge sent to nudge target {} (reply {}/{}, ticket {}/{}, question {}/{}; "
+ "{} reply target(s), {} ticket(s), {} question(s))",
lead, replyReminderCount + 1, maxReminders, ticketReminderCount + 1, maxReminders,
questionReminderCount + 1, maxReminders,
@@ -796,7 +811,7 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
}
}
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
log.warn("push: failed to nudge lead {} (reply {}/{}, ticket {}/{}, question {}/{}): {}",
log.warn("push: failed to nudge target {} (reply {}/{}, ticket {}/{}, question {}/{}): {}",
lead, replyReminderCount + 1, maxReminders, ticketReminderCount + 1, maxReminders,
questionReminderCount + 1, maxReminders, e.toString());
}
@@ -814,7 +829,8 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
List<PendingQuestion> questions, List<PendingIncident> incidents,
List<PendingUnmappedTarget> unmappedTargets) {
for (String target : replyTargets) {
pendingReplies.computeIfPresent(target, (t, e) -> new ReplyEntry(e.lead(), e.nudgeCount() + 1));
pendingReplies.computeIfPresent(target,
(t, e) -> new ReplyEntry(e.lead(), e.nudgeCount() + 1, e.mayDrainNudge()));
}
for (PendingTicket ticket : tickets) {
pendingTickets.computeIfPresent(ticket.ticket(),
@@ -823,7 +839,7 @@ public final class ReplyPushLoop {
for (PendingQuestion question : questions) {
pendingQuestions.computeIfPresent(question.turnId(), (id, e) ->
new PendingQuestion(e.turnId(), e.ticket(), e.target(), e.lead(), e.question(),
e.nudgeCount() + 1));
e.nudgeCount() + 1, e.mayAnswerNudge()));
}
for (PendingIncident incident : incidents) {
pendingIncidents.computeIfPresent(incident.key(), (id, e) -> new PendingIncident(e.key(),
@@ -293,6 +293,20 @@ public final class FleetApp {
return Authz.permits(caller, action, target, knownLeadOrCollaborator, observerSendTarget);
}
/**
* As {@link #permitsFor(Principal, Authz.Action, String, Predicate, Predicate)}, also
* threading the classifier an observer's {@code TASK_READ} is checked against; pass a real
* {@code MessageService#ownsTicket(String, String)}-backed predicate to exercise the real
* production gate for a ticket poll, as {@link #allow} does.
*/
static boolean permitsFor(Principal caller, Authz.Action action, String target,
Predicate<String> knownLeadOrCollaborator,
Predicate<String> observerSendTarget,
Predicate<String> observerOwnsTicket) {
return Authz.permits(caller, action, target, knownLeadOrCollaborator, observerSendTarget,
observerOwnsTicket);
}
/**
* Gate a handler on the CB-505 authorization table. Returns {@code true} when the request may
* proceed; otherwise writes the error response and returns {@code false}.
@@ -302,11 +316,22 @@ public final class FleetApp {
* yours" (a worker reaching for another worker's session, or for orchestration).
*/
private boolean allow(Context ctx, Authz.Action action, String target) {
return allow(ctx, action, target, Authz.NO_OBSERVER_OWNED_TICKET);
}
/**
* As {@link #allow(Context, Authz.Action, String)}, with a real classifier for an observer's
* {@code TASK_READ} — the only call site that can supply one is a ticket poll, which knows the
* ticket id and the caller's owner key.
*/
private boolean allow(Context ctx, Authz.Action action, String target,
Predicate<String> observerOwnsTicket) {
if (auth == null) {
return true; // legacy: authorization not enforced
}
Principal caller = ctx.attribute(CALLER);
if (permitsFor(caller, action, target, auth.knownLeadOrCollaborator(), auth.observerSendTarget())) {
if (permitsFor(caller, action, target, auth.knownLeadOrCollaborator(), auth.observerSendTarget(),
observerOwnsTicket)) {
if (action != Authz.Action.READ && action != Authz.Action.METRICS
&& action != Authz.Action.TASK_READ) {
AuditLog.allowed(caller, action, target); // reads would drown the trail
@@ -928,11 +953,15 @@ public final class FleetApp {
/** Poll an async (wait:false) delegation by ticket. 404 for an unknown/expired ticket. */
private void taskStatus(Context ctx) {
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /tasks/{ticket}"), null)) {
String ticket = ctx.pathParam("ticket");
Principal caller = ctx.attribute(CALLER);
String callerOwner = caller == null ? null : caller.ownerKey();
// The gate must see the ticket id, not a literal null -- an observer's grant is confined
// to a ticket its own caller created.
if (!allow(ctx, routeAction("GET /tasks/{ticket}"), ticket, t -> messages.ownsTicket(t, callerOwner))) {
return;
}
Principal caller = ctx.attribute(CALLER);
MessageService.TaskView v = messages.poll(ctx.pathParam("ticket"), caller == null ? null : caller.ownerKey());
MessageService.TaskView v = messages.poll(ticket, callerOwner);
if (v == null) {
ctx.status(404).json(Map.of("error", "unknown_ticket", "detail", "no such task (or it has expired)"));
return;
@@ -310,17 +310,17 @@ class AuthzTest {
}
/**
* Every action beyond READ/METRICS/REPLY/ASK/INBOX/SEND, asserted denied for an observer —
* including {@code TASK_READ}, which is the entire point of this role: an unconfigured pane
* must not be able to poll a ticket or read another session's status. The exempt set is the
* three only-as-itself actions plus the two open reads. {@code SEND} is excluded here and
* given its own matrix below, since — unlike every action in this loop — its grant is
* conditional on the target, not fixed.
* Every action beyond READ/METRICS/REPLY/ASK/INBOX/SEND, asserted denied for an observer.
* The exempt set is the three only-as-itself actions plus the two open reads. {@code SEND}
* and {@code TASK_READ} are excluded here and given their own matrices below, since — unlike
* every action in this loop — each one's grant is conditional on more than the caller's role
* alone.
*/
@Test
void anObserverIsDeniedEverythingBeyondReadMetricsReplyAskInboxAndSend() {
void anObserverIsDeniedEverythingBeyondReadMetricsReplyAskInboxSendAndTaskRead() {
for (Authz.Action a : Authz.Action.values()) {
if (a == READ || a == METRICS || a == REPLY || a == ASK || a == INBOX || a == SEND) {
if (a == READ || a == METRICS || a == REPLY || a == ASK || a == INBOX || a == SEND
|| a == TASK_READ) {
continue;
}
assertFalse(Authz.permits(OBSERVER, a, "term_observer", target -> true),
@@ -328,6 +328,49 @@ class AuthzTest {
}
}
/**
* {@code TASK_READ} is conditional for an observer, not fixed: it may poll a ticket its own
* {@code fleet_send(wait:false)} created, confined by {@code observerOwnsTicket}, and nothing
* else — a session's status is not ticket-scoped, so no call site can ever supply a predicate
* that grants it, and the 3-/4-/5-argument convenience forms stay fail-closed for it too.
*/
@Test
void anObserverMayTaskReadOnlyATicketTheClassifierSaysItOwns() {
assertTrue(Authz.permits(OBSERVER, TASK_READ, "own-ticket", Authz.NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR,
Authz.NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET, target -> true),
"the classifier accepting the ticket as the caller's own must grant TASK_READ");
assertFalse(Authz.permits(OBSERVER, TASK_READ, "someone_elses_ticket",
Authz.NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR, Authz.NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET, target -> false),
"the classifier refusing the ticket must deny TASK_READ");
assertFalse(Authz.permits(OBSERVER, TASK_READ, "own-ticket"),
"the three-argument convenience form fails closed, so TASK_READ is refused without "
+ "a real classifier");
assertFalse(Authz.permits(OBSERVER, TASK_READ, "own-ticket", Authz.NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR),
"the four-argument form still fails closed for TASK_READ");
assertFalse(Authz.permits(OBSERVER, TASK_READ, "own-ticket", Authz.NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR,
Authz.NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET),
"the five-argument form still fails closed for TASK_READ, since it supplies no "
+ "observerOwnsTicket classifier either");
}
/**
* Control for the test above: every other action's result for an observer does not move when
* the ticket-ownership classifier does. Only {@code TASK_READ} is wired to it.
*/
@Test
void theTicketOwnershipClassifierMovesOnlyTaskReadForAnObserver() {
for (Authz.Action a : Authz.Action.values()) {
if (a == TASK_READ) {
continue;
}
assertEquals(
Authz.permits(OBSERVER, a, "term_observer"),
Authz.permits(OBSERVER, a, "term_observer", Authz.NO_KNOWN_LEAD_OR_COLLABORATOR,
Authz.NO_OBSERVER_SEND_TARGET, target -> true),
a + " must not depend on the ticket-ownership classifier at all");
}
}
@Test
void anObserverIsNotCountedAsAnyOtherRole() {
assertFalse(OBSERVER.isPrimary());
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
private final AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
private Metrics metrics;
private FleetMcp mcp;
private MessageService messages;
@AfterEach
void close() {
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")), Map.of(cfg.profile(), cfg), cfg.profile(),
_ -> "tok");
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workers, new FakeWorktrees());
MessageService messages = new MessageService(agents, new Injector(agents), new Rendezvous(),
messages = new MessageService(agents, new Injector(agents), new Rendezvous(),
new InMemoryReplyInbox());
ConnectionIdentity identity = new ConnectionIdentity(new PaneLocator(herdr), _ -> 999_999);
metrics = FleetMetrics.create(sessions, new InMemoryReplyInbox());
@@ -346,6 +347,37 @@ class FleetMcpAuthzTest {
assertNotNull(m.denyFor(OBSERVER, Authz.Action.COORD_SEND, null));
}
/**
* An observer may read a ticket its own {@code fleet_send(wait:false)} created, never one
* another caller created — exercised against the real {@link MessageService#ownsTicket}, not
* a stand-in classifier.
*/
@Test
void anObserverMayTaskReadATicketItCreatedButNotOneAnotherCallerCreated() {
FleetMcp m = mcp(true);
String ownTicket = messages.sendAsync("term_a", "do it", null, OBSERVER);
String othersTicket = messages.sendAsync("term_a", "do it too", null, WORKER_A);
assertNull(m.denyFor(OBSERVER, Authz.Action.TASK_READ, ownTicket,
t -> messages.ownsTicket(t, OBSERVER.ownerKey())),
"an observer must read a ticket its own send created");
assertNotNull(m.denyFor(OBSERVER, Authz.Action.TASK_READ, othersTicket,
t -> messages.ownsTicket(t, OBSERVER.ownerKey())),
"an observer must not read a ticket a different caller created");
}
/**
* {@code fleet_status} stays refused for an observer even once {@code TASK_READ} opens: it is
* not ticket-scoped, so no call site supplies a real {@code observerOwnsTicket} classifier,
* and the default 3-argument {@code denyFor} fails closed.
*/
@Test
void anObserverMayNotReadSessionStatusEvenAfterTaskReadOpensForTickets() {
FleetMcp m = mcp(true);
assertNotNull(m.denyFor(OBSERVER, Authz.Action.TASK_READ, "term_a"),
"a session id is not a ticket the caller could ever own");
}
@Test
void theLegacyConstructorLeavesTheGateOpen() {
// The 22 pre-existing FleetMcpTest cases rely on no authorization being enforced.
@@ -266,4 +266,61 @@ class PrimaryRegistryTest {
assertEquals("term_opus_after_roll", reg.nudgeTargetFor("term_never_seen").orElseThrow());
}
// ── fleetd #778: a nudge must offer only what the delegator's own role may run ──────────────
@Test
void theShortDelegationOverloadsGrantEverythingAPrimaryMayRun() {
var reg = new PrimaryRegistry(null);
reg.recordDelegation("term_worker", "term_lead");
assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, reg.nudgeMayDrainFor("term_worker").orElseThrow());
assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, reg.nudgeMayAnswerFor("term_worker").orElseThrow());
}
@Test
void theFullOverloadCarriesTheCallersOwnGrants() {
var reg = new PrimaryRegistry(null);
reg.recordDelegation("term_worker", "term_observer", "observer-name", false, false);
assertEquals(Boolean.FALSE, reg.nudgeMayDrainFor("term_worker").orElseThrow());
assertEquals(Boolean.FALSE, reg.nudgeMayAnswerFor("term_worker").orElseThrow());
}
@Test
void theTwoGrantsAreIndependent() {
var reg = new PrimaryRegistry(null);
reg.recordDelegation("term_worker", "term_architect", "architect-name", false, true);
assertEquals(Boolean.FALSE, reg.nudgeMayDrainFor("term_worker").orElseThrow(),
"an architect may not DRAIN");
assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, reg.nudgeMayAnswerFor("term_worker").orElseThrow(),
"an architect may ANSWER");
}
@Test
void theSingletonPrimaryFallbackIsAlwaysGrantedEverything() {
var reg = new PrimaryRegistry("term_pinned");
assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, reg.nudgeMayDrainFor("term_never_seen").orElseThrow());
assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, reg.nudgeMayAnswerFor("term_never_seen").orElseThrow());
}
@Test
void withNoDelegationAndNoPrimaryTheGrantsAreUnknown() {
var reg = new PrimaryRegistry(null);
assertTrue(reg.nudgeMayDrainFor("term_never_seen").isEmpty());
assertTrue(reg.nudgeMayAnswerFor("term_never_seen").isEmpty());
}
@Test
void forgettingADelegationForgetsItsGrantsToo() {
var reg = new PrimaryRegistry(null);
reg.recordDelegation("term_worker", "term_observer", "observer-name", false, false);
reg.forgetDelegation("term_worker");
assertTrue(reg.nudgeMayDrainFor("term_worker").isEmpty());
assertTrue(reg.nudgeMayAnswerFor("term_worker").isEmpty());
}
}
@@ -1034,6 +1034,27 @@ class MessageServiceTest {
assertEquals("forbidden: this ticket was created by a different session", refused.detail());
}
/**
* {@link MessageService#ownsTicket(String, String)} is the side-effect-free ownership check
* the authorization gate consults ahead of {@link MessageService#poll(String, String)}, which
* also fires the ticket's collection hook. Read-only: polling the same ticket afterwards still
* sees it, which {@link #theOneArgPollOverloadBypassesOwnershipEntirely} nearby does not
* guarantee for every overload.
*/
@Test
void publicOwnsTicketIsASideEffectFreeOwnershipCheck() {
Principal lead = Principal.leader("opus", "term_lead", 1);
String ticket = messages.sendAsync(T, "long task", null, lead);
assertTrue(messages.ownsTicket(ticket, lead.ownerKey()));
assertFalse(messages.ownsTicket(ticket, Principal.anonymous().ownerKey()));
assertFalse(messages.ownsTicket("no-such-ticket", lead.ownerKey()),
"a ticket this daemon never heard of is owned by nobody");
assertEquals(MessageService.Phase.PENDING, messages.poll(ticket, lead.ownerKey()).phase(),
"the ownership check must not have consumed or altered the ticket");
}
@Test
void architectOwnershipUsesTerminalRatherThanSlot() {
Principal oldArchitect = Principal.architect("opus", "term_OLD", 1);
@@ -339,6 +339,85 @@ class ReplyPushLoopTest {
assertEquals(0, rec.promptTargets().size(), "nobody live was found, so nothing was ever sent");
}
// --- fleetd #778: never nudge a delegator to run a call its own role is refused -------------
@Test
void onReplyQueuedNeverNudgesADelegatorThatMayNotRunDrain() throws Exception {
var rec = recordingClient();
agents = new AgentControl(rec);
inbox.publish(WORKER, "m1", "hello");
registry.recordDelegation(WORKER, OTHER_PRIMARY, "observer", false, false);
loop(1, 50).onReplyQueued(WORKER);
Thread.sleep(200);
assertEquals(0, rec.sendCount(),
"a delegator whose role cannot run fleet_poll(target=...) must never be nudged to run it");
}
@Test
void onReplyQueuedStillNudgesADelegatorThatMayRunDrain() throws Exception {
var rec = recordingClient();
agents = new AgentControl(rec);
inbox.publish(WORKER, "m1", "hello");
registry.recordDelegation(WORKER, OTHER_PRIMARY, "lead", true, true);
loop(1, 50).onReplyQueued(WORKER);
assertTrue(rec.sendLatch.await(3, TimeUnit.SECONDS));
String nudge = rec.sentParams().getFirst().getValue().toString();
assertTrue(nudge.contains("fleet_poll(target=" + WORKER + ")"),
"a delegator that may run DRAIN must still be nudged about it: " + nudge);
}
@Test
void onQuestionOpenedNeverNudgesADelegatorThatMayNotRunAnswer() throws Exception {
var rec = recordingClient();
agents = new AgentControl(rec);
registry.recordDelegation(WORKER, OTHER_PRIMARY, "observer", false, false);
loop(1, 50).onQuestionOpened("task-1", WORKER, "term_worker#1", "which config?");
Thread.sleep(200);
assertEquals(0, rec.sendCount(),
"a delegator whose role cannot run fleet_send(turnId=...) must never be nudged to run it");
}
@Test
void onQuestionOpenedStillNudgesADelegatorThatMayRunAnswer() throws Exception {
var rec = recordingClient();
agents = new AgentControl(rec);
registry.recordDelegation(WORKER, OTHER_PRIMARY, "architect", false, true);
loop(1, 50).onQuestionOpened("task-1", WORKER, "term_worker#1", "which config?");
assertTrue(rec.sendLatch.await(3, TimeUnit.SECONDS));
String nudge = rec.sentParams().getFirst().getValue().toString();
assertTrue(nudge.contains("fleet_send(turnId="),
"an architect may run ANSWER, so the nudge must still name it: " + nudge);
}
/**
* A delegator barred from DRAIN can still have a ticket genuinely pending for it — tickets are
* out of this unit's scope (fleetd #778 Part 1 already makes a ticket nudge correct for an
* observer). The reply half must still be suppressed even though the ticket half fires.
*/
@Test
void aForbiddenReplyNudgeIsSuppressedWhileAnEligibleTicketStillFires() throws Exception {
var rec = recordingClient();
agents = new AgentControl(rec);
inbox.publish(WORKER, "m1", "hello");
registry.recordDelegation(WORKER, OTHER_PRIMARY, "observer", false, false);
var loop = loop(1, 300); // wide backoff so both calls land before the first tick fires
loop.onReplyQueued(WORKER);
loop.onTicketTerminal("task-1", WORKER, false);
assertTrue(rec.sendLatch.await(3, TimeUnit.SECONDS));
String nudge = rec.sentParams().getFirst().getValue().toString();
assertFalse(nudge.contains("fleet_poll(target=" + WORKER + ")"),
"the reply half is forbidden for this delegator and must never be named: " + nudge);
}
// --- nudge format --------------------------------------------------------------------------
@Test
@@ -285,6 +285,67 @@ class FleetAppAuthTest {
}
}
/**
* An observer may read a ticket its own {@code fleet_send(wait:false)} created, over the REST
* route and not only the unit-level classifier — and still not a ticket a different caller
* created, even another observer pane's.
*/
@Test
void restPollLetsAnObserverReadItsOwnTicketButNotAnothersOverRest() throws Exception {
FakeHerdr herdr = new FakeHerdr();
AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
Injector injector = new Injector(agents);
MessageService messages = new MessageService(agents, injector, new Rendezvous());
Javalin observerApp = startOnSharedServiceAsObserver(messages, herdr, 9001L); // -> term_shell
Javalin otherObserverApp = startOnSharedServiceAsObserver(messages, herdr, FakeHerdr.WORKER_PID); // -> term_a
try {
Principal observer = Principal.observer("term_shell", 9001);
String ticket = messages.sendAsync("term_a", "long task", null, observer);
HttpResponse<String> own = send(observerApp.port(), "GET", "/tasks/" + ticket, null, null);
assertEquals(200, own.statusCode());
assertFalse(own.body().contains("forbidden"),
"the observer that created the ticket must read it: " + own.body());
// Unlike a worker's or the primary's mismatched ticket (refused by MessageService's own
// ownership check, inside a 200 response), a different observer is refused at the
// authorization gate itself, since its grant is conditional on the classifier -- so
// this is a 403, never reaching poll().
HttpResponse<String> other = send(otherObserverApp.port(), "GET", "/tasks/" + ticket, null, null);
assertEquals(403, other.statusCode(), other.body());
assertFalse(other.body().contains("\"reply\""),
"a refusal must never carry reply text: " + other.body());
} finally {
observerApp.stop();
otherObserverApp.stop();
}
}
/**
* As {@link #startOnSharedService(MessageService, FakeHerdr, long)}, but resolves every
* connecting pane to the unconfigured-pane {@link Role#OBSERVER} floor instead of a spawned
* worker — no lead, collaborator, or member map claims it.
*/
private Javalin startOnSharedServiceAsObserver(MessageService messages, FakeHerdr herdr, long pid) {
FleetConfig.Profile wcfg = new FleetConfig.Profile(
"ltms-local", "http://gx00.gw:8000", "coder", null, "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN", null,
"tab", "fleetd-workers", "worker: {profile} #{n}", null, null, null);
AgentControl agents = new AgentControl(herdr);
ClaudeCodeLauncher workers = new ClaudeCodeLauncher(
agents, new WorkspaceControl(herdr), new SubscriptionGuard(Set.of("gx00.gw")),
Map.of(wcfg.profile(), wcfg), wcfg.profile(),
k -> "FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN".equals(k) ? "tok-abc" : null);
SessionManager sessions = new SessionManager(workers, new FakeWorktrees());
ConnectionIdentity identity = new ConnectionIdentity(new PaneLocator(herdr), _ -> pid);
CallerResolver callers = CallerResolver.withLeadsAndMembers(identity, false, null,
Map::of, new MemberRegistry(null), t -> null, Map::of);
Metrics appMetrics = FleetMetrics.create(sessions, new dev.ltms.fleet.msg.InMemoryReplyInbox());
return new FleetApp(herdr, workers, sessions, messages, sessions.asPresence(), null,
callers, appMetrics).build().start("127.0.0.1", 0);
}
/**
* {@code POST /sessions/{id}/message} with {@code wait:false} must record the creating
* caller's own terminal on the ticket it returns, so that caller can still poll its own