git reads info/exclude from the common dir for a linked worktree (only
info/sparse-checkout is per-worktree), so the entry written into
<common>/worktrees/<name>/info/exclude was never honoured and CLAUDE.local.md
showed as untracked -- at risk of being swept into a worker's PR. Derive the
common dir (<common>/worktrees/<name> -> <common>) and write there. Found by
dogfooding a real spawn on fleet01; the test now uses the real worktree layout
and asserts the entry lands in the common dir, not the per-worktree gitdir.
Move the IDE guidance text to PeerLauncher.ideOverlayText (shared by both
launchers). ClaudeCodeLauncher drops it from the reply-charter file and writes
CLAUDE.local.md into a provisioned worktree instead, gated on a .git FILE
(safety: never writes into the primary's real .git-DIRECTORY checkout) and
registers it in info/exclude. OpenCodeLauncher mounts the intellij server and
adds the rules file to the instructions array.
Adds `ideMcpUrl` to FleetConfig.Profile (default off). When set, the
Claude Code launcher mounts the IDE Index MCP as a second inline
--mcp-config server named `intellij`, and appends an IDE charter that
pins every ide_* call to the member's own worktree (spec.cwd()). The
charter order is role -> ide -> reply, one --append-system-prompt-file,
reply last (CB-618). The mount gate now fires on ideMcpUrl alone, not
only mcpUrl. ConfigRef treats an ideMcpUrl change as deferred, like the
other launch flags.
Never touches .mcp.json or CLAUDE.md — the mount and the rule arrive as
launch flags, so a project's own config is untouched.
Not yet done (see fleetd #162): the bridged-owned IDE lifecycle
(open on provision, close before worktree removal), and the opencode
adapter (separate ticket). fleetd.example.yaml documents ideMcpUrl and
fixes the stale parityOverlay default.
911 tests green.
An empty uriEnv no longer stops the daemon (#152), so the failure is quiet: bridged
starts, falls back to the in-memory reply inbox, and held reports stop surviving a
restart. --check is the only thing that says so before the fact. The var name is read
out of bridged.yaml so a renamed key cannot make the check lie.
#151: Broker gains uriEnv beside uri, taking the AMQP URI from an env var so
the password stays out of fleetd.yaml (same pattern as auth.tokenEnv). uriEnv
wins when set; isConfigured() treats a uriEnv naming an unset/blank variable
as unconfigured. A configured uriEnv is added to the startup required-secrets
report. Never logs the resolved URI (it carries the password).
#152: AmqpReplyInbox.open throwing at boot no longer stops the daemon. The
selection at the call site catches the failure and falls back to the in-memory
inbox for the process lifetime, warning loudly that durable cross-restart
delivery is off and logging the failed URI with credentials stripped.
Round 2 fixes the defect that mattered: the scrub lived in .zlogin only, and a
herdr pane is a login shell on macOS but a plain interactive one on Linux. It
would have protected nothing on the vhost it was built for, in silence.
Verified by the lead: 901 tests, 0 failures, mvn clean install green. Both new
tests mutation-checked -- unwiring the control fails one, reverting the scrub to
.zlogin alone fails the other while the login-shell test still passes.
NOT yet deployed: the running daemon still holds the old jar.
Six review findings, from the peer lead `vms` and a reviewer worker. The first
one is a real defect that would have shipped as a dead control.
1. The scrub only ran in a login shell. It lived in the generated `.zlogin`,
and zsh reads `.zlogin` only for a login shell. herdr does not open the same
kind of shell everywhere: measured on herdr 0.8.0, a macOS pane runs `-zsh`
(login) while a Linux pane runs a plain `/usr/bin/zsh`. So on the vhost this
was being built for, `.zlogin` never ran and every member kept the whole
secret store, in silence.
The scrub body now lives in a generated `scrub.zsh` that BOTH `.zshrc` and
`.zlogin` source, each after sourcing its own `$HOME` counterpart. Linux
runs the first, macOS runs both, and the second pass is not merely harmless
-- it re-scrubs anything the operator's `~/.zlogin` exported after `~/.zshrc`
had finished. Re-running is idempotent.
2. `INFRASTRUCTURE_PASSTHROUGH` listed names that are not infrastructure:
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN, GITEA_TOKEN, GITEA_HOST, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL,
ANTHROPIC_MODEL, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, OPENCODE_CONFIG, BRIDGED_MEMBER. I read
each injection point and confirmed every one of them reaches `launch.env()`
only when actually injected, so `allowed.addAll(launch.env().keySet())`
already covers the legitimate case. As static entries they were pure leak
surface: a host that happened to export ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN would have had
it passed straight through.
3. A missing `scrub-report.txt` at teardown was logged at debug. The report is
the only evidence the scrub ran at all. Its absence has an innocent reading
and a serious one, and we cannot tell them apart from the daemon -- so it is
now a WARN that says exactly that. Logging it at debug is how a control that
quietly stopped working stays unnoticed.
4. Nothing tested that the control was wired in. Deleting the single
`applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy(cfg, launch)` line left all 896 tests green
while turning the feature completely off -- the CB-586/CB-611 shape again.
`HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest` starts a real spawn and asserts on the
env that reached herdr. Mutation-checked: unwiring that line fails it.
5. `EnvAllowListScrubTest` now also runs `zsh -i` with no `-l`, which is the
Linux pane shape, so finding 1 is tested from a Mac. Mutation-checked:
putting the scrub back in `.zlogin` alone fails that test alone, while the
login-shell test still passes -- which is exactly the blind spot that let
the bug through.
6. Two ZDOTDIR leaks closed. A failed spawn has no pane id, so its directory
was never keyed for teardown; it is now removed on the way out. And
`deleteOnExit` covers a clean shutdown and nothing else, so `generate` now
reaps sibling directories older than 24h left by a killed daemon.
Also: `policy:` is lowercased with Locale.ROOT, and the `.zlogin`-only claim is
corrected in fleetd.example.yaml, FleetConfig and HerdrPeerLauncher.
901 tests, 0 failures, `mvn clean install` green.
Move member environment control out of the pane-creation env overlay
(defeated by any file the login shell sources) into a per-spawn ZDOTDIR
directory whose .zlogin runs LAST, after the operator's whole chain, and
blanks every exported variable not on an allow-list DERIVED from what the
launcher itself injects (profiles' tokenEnv/gitTokenEnv/gitHostEnv/env
keys + an infrastructure set) — never hand-typed.
- memberCredentials.policy: allow-list (deny-by-default/deny-list stay
default and unchanged); known:/allow: become reporting only under it.
- memberCredentials.sshAuthSock knob, blocked by default; allowing it is
an explicit decision (operator ssh-agent handle).
- Non-zsh login shell: loud WARN, protection off, fallback to the old
enumerated-name overlay.
- Scrub writes an 'allowed N of M' denominator report, read at teardown;
credential-shaped blanked names go to WARN (names only, never values).
- Equality test against a real login zsh from a clean parent: surviving
non-empty exports EQUAL baseline ∩ derived allow-list.
Every launcher writes the bridge's MCP server into the config it hands its peer,
and it named that server "bridge". So a member addressed its tools as
mcp__bridge__fleet_send while the tools themselves are already fleet_*. The
mount is named "fleet" now, and a member's tools are mcp__fleet__*.
The name was a bare literal in three files: ClaudeCodeLauncher and LeadLauncher
build a --mcp-config JSON string, OpenCodeLauncher writes an opencode.json node.
Three hand-written copies of one name is how a rename lands in two of them, so
the name is now one constant, PeerLauncher.MCP_MOUNT_NAME.
The mount name is local to the peer — it is the label its own client puts on the
server, and nothing in the daemon reads it back. Renaming it changes no wire
call.
Tests. Each launcher's test now asserts the mount is named fleet AND that
nothing writes "bridge"; the second half is the part that would have caught a
half-done rename. LeadLauncherTest never checked the name at all, only the URL,
so it gained the assertion rather than had one updated.
CLAUDE.md's role-detection ladder quoted mcp__bridge__* as the marker of a
spawned member. It names mcp__fleet__* now, and says that a member spawned
before this change still reports the old prefix. The portable block stays
byte-identical with the wiki template (wiki 569a917).
Build: cd bridged && mvn clean install, then read target/surefire-reports/*.xml
directly — 884 tests, 0 failures, 0 errors.
Unit 3 renamed bridged.example.yaml to fleetd.example.yaml and taught Fleetd to
read fleetd.yaml first. Two things it left behind.
bridged/.gitignore still ignored only bridged.yaml. An operator who follows the
new comment and copies the example to fleetd.yaml gets an untracked live config
holding tokens, and git offers to commit it. Both names are ignored now, because
both names work until the cutover.
Three design docs still pointed readers at bridged.example.yaml, a file that no
longer exists under that name.
Part of #145 (CB-632). Doing this NOW, ahead of the rest of the path
renames, for one reason: the vms lead is about to wire a monitoring
dashboard to these series. Renaming a metric after a dashboard points at
it breaks continuity and silently leaves a dead panel. Renaming it before
costs nothing, so it goes first rather than at the cutover.
Nine series renamed, all declared in FleetMetrics.
Two real defects found while doing it:
- FleetApp had "bridged_auth_failures_total" written as a LITERAL
instead of using FleetMetrics.AUTH_FAILURES -- a second hand-written
copy of a name, which is how these drift. It now uses the constant,
so there is one source for that name again.
- Nothing guarded the prefix. One test does assert a wire name
(FleetAppAuthTest checks the real /metrics body for fleet_sessions),
which is good, but it covers one series out of nine. The literal
above was covered by nothing at all.
So this adds MetricNamesTest, which reads the constants reflectively
rather than listing them -- a test that lists the nine names is itself a
second hand-written copy, and would pass while a tenth went unchecked.
It asserts its own denominator too: "no name starts with bridged_" is
true of an empty set, so a sweep that found nothing would pass loudly.
Asserting the count of 9 makes a broken sweep fail instead.
Also renamed three herdr contract-test workspace labels, __bridged_* ->
__fleet_*. Those are throwaway workspaces created by ensureWorkspace, not
metrics, but they are the same word.
Verified: mvn clean install green, 52 classes, 881 tests, 0 failures.
Test count is up by 3 -- the new prefix, denominator and uniqueness
checks. No bridged_ string remains anywhere outside wiki/.
Part of #145 (CB-632). Documentation only, plus one internal literal.
Unit 1 renamed the package and classes, which left every doc describing
classes that no longer exist. This fixes the prose across README.md,
docs/ and bridged/docs/ -- 18 files.
Renamed: dev.ltms.bridged -> dev.ltms.fleet, the five class names, and
"bridged" where it names the daemon as a product rather than a path.
Also renamed two literals, because a doc that disagrees with the code is
worse than one that is out of date:
- bridged-local-noauth -> fleetd-local-noauth. A placeholder apiKey
OpenCodeLauncher sends when a profile resolves no token, to a local
endpoint that does not check it. No test asserts the old string.
- the vnd.ltms.bridged.* media type in the M4 design doc. It appears
in no Java file, so nothing implements it yet.
Deliberately NOT renamed, because each is still literally true today and
changes only at the cutover:
- paths: bridged/, bridged.yaml, bridged.example.yaml, bridged.jar,
.bridged-worktrees, deploy/dev.ltms.bridged.plist,
scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh, bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh
- bridged_* metric names -- renaming these after the monitoring is
wired would break dashboard continuity, so they move before it is
- bridge_* MCP tool names, which answer alongside fleet_* on purpose
- BRIDGED_* environment variables, read by a file outside this repo
Method note: perl, not sed. BSD sed has no \b and no lookaround, and a
word-boundary expression there fails silently. The prose replace uses
(?<![\w./-])bridged(?![\w./-]) so it cannot touch a path or an
identifier, then every remaining hit was read by hand.
Verified: mvn clean install green, 51 classes, 878 tests, 0 failures.
mcp/BridgeMcp is now mcp/FleetMcp. This line is in the project addendum,
not the canonical block, so the wiki template is untouched -- the sync
check still returns True.
Part of #145.
Part of #145 (CB-632), under epic #125.
The product is called fleet and the daemon is called fleetd, but the code
still said bridge everywhere. This renames the Java half:
package dev.ltms.bridged -> dev.ltms.fleet
Bridged -> Fleetd (the main class)
BridgedConfig -> FleetConfig
BridgeMcp -> FleetMcp
BridgedApp -> FleetApp
BridgedMetrics -> FleetMetrics
The package root is dev.ltms.fleet, not dev.ltms.fleetd. The trailing d
means daemon, which names a process, not a namespace.
What this commit deliberately does NOT change:
- The module directory stays bridged/, and <finalName> stays bridged.
The installed launchd plist names bridged/target/bridged.jar and its
KeepAlive is armed, so renaming the jar on its own strands a restart.
Both change at the cutover, together with the plist, in one step.
- The bridge_* MCP tool aliases. CB-622 shipped both names on purpose.
One test names a local variable viaBridge because it holds the result
of the deprecated call; the rename collided with it and the compiler
caught it. That variable is back.
- BRIDGED_* env var names, and bridged.yaml. Both are operator
contracts and need a read-both shim, which is a later unit.
Two things a plain search-and-replace would have missed:
- logback.xml and logback-test.xml name the package twice, once as a
turboFilter class= attribute. The compiler never checks those.
- BSD sed does not support \b. The word-boundary expression matched
nothing and said nothing, while the other ten in the same command
worked. Checked the leftovers instead of trusting the exit code.
Verified: mvn clean install green, 51 test classes, 878 tests, 0 failures
-- the same count as before the rename.
Adds the rename script for CB-624 (#128), with a read-only --check mode.
Two workers ran this ticket in parallel and were kept apart on purpose: one wrote the script, one inventoried the same rename read-only without seeing it. The inventory found three surfaces the script had missed, all verified on the live machine before being acted on: ~/.claude.json's projects key (trust state, enabledMcpjsonServers, allowedTools, lastSessionId), ~/.config/herdr/session.json, and the JetBrains recentProjects.xml / trusted-paths.xml pair in 2026.1 and 2026.2.
All three are report-only by decision, not by oversight, and the reason is written into the script header: ~/.claude.json is global config written by live sessions, herdr/session.json is live process state, and IntelliJ rewrites its own files when the project is reopened.
While adding them the author found a trap worth recording: JetBrains stores $USER_HOME$/LTMS/claude-bridge, not the absolute path, so a plain absolute-path grep reports 0 hits on files full of them. The script now counts both forms and says which form matched.
Every apply-mode branch is unexecuted. Running it moves the directory this system runs from and stops the daemon the workers talk through, so the script is well-reasoned, not proven. Its first real run is its test. Verified before merge: CI run 215 green on both jobs, bash -n passes. shellcheck is not installed on this machine, so it never ran.
--check gains section 6 counting ~/.claude.json (the projects entry keyed
by the old absolute path), ~/.config/herdr/session.json, and JetBrains
recentProjects.xml / trusted-paths.xml across every IntelliJIdea* version.
Apply mode's closing summary lists the same three with manual follow-ups.
None of the three is rewritten automatically, on purpose: ~/.claude.json
is global live Claude Code config, herdr session.json is live process
state, and JetBrains rewrites its own files when the project is reopened
at the new path. Header comment states the reason for each so it does not
read as an oversight.
JetBrains stores these paths as its $USER_HOME$ macro rather than a
literal absolute path, so the counter matches both forms and says which
form the hits used.
Renames ~/LTMS/claude-bridge -> ~/LTMS/fleetd as one auditable command,
modeled on redeploy-bridged.sh. --check reports every surface holding the
old absolute path (checkout files, launchd plist, Claude Code project
state, worktree .git pointers, running daemon). Apply mode stops the
daemon first (launchctl-aware), moves the checkout and the Claude Code
project-state slug dir derived from both paths, repairs worktree gitdir
pointers, rewrites bridged.yaml and the installed plist if they exist,
restarts, and verifies /healthz plus a fresh 'bridged listening' line
anchored to a pre-stop marker.
The contract job reaches the broker by network alias (AMQP_URI=amqp://guest:guest@rabbitmq:5672), so the host mapping 5672:5672 was never used. It only bound a port on the runner host, which made two concurrent runs collide and the service container fail to start.
Seen on 2026-08-22: run 209 (PR) contract=success and run 210 (the merge of that same code) contract=failure with every step, including checkout, marked cancelled. Both started at 22:08. Re-running 210 alone on the identical commit passed.
PR #139's own run 212 is green on both jobs with the mapping gone, which proves the alias path still works.
Also the worker-PR proof for CB-623 (#127): opened by the agent account against fleet/fleetd after the org transfer.
The repo moved lms/claude-bridge -> fleet/claude-bridge -> fleet/fleetd.
Gitea redirects hold, so most of this is not urgent, but one line was a
real break: the implementer skill posts a worker's PR to a hardcoded
repo path, so every worker PR would have gone to the old address.
.claude/skills/implementer/SKILL.md the worker PR endpoint (functional)
.gitmodules wiki submodule URL
CLAUDE.md + wiki/7-Use-Cases.md the canonical block, kept byte-identical
README.md clone command and wiki link
deploy/bridged.service Documentation=
plugin/.claude-plugin/plugin.json homepage + repository
docs/*.md issue and wiki links
The wiki is not a separate repo. /repos/lms/claude-bridge.wiki returns 404
and lms owned no .wiki entity, so the wiki moved with the repo; both the old
and the new wiki SSH URLs resolve to the same sha. Ticket step 4 assumed a
second transfer that does not exist.
The eleven tool names become fleet_* throughout the portable block. The
fallback ladder keeps mcp__bridge__* unchanged and that is deliberate: both
launchers still mount the server as "bridge", so a spawned member really
does see that prefix. Renaming the mount is a separate surface CB-622 did
not touch.
Separately, a pre-existing defect: the ladder quoted the reply charter as
"You are an off-subscription worker in the claude-bridge fleet", while
REPLY_CHARTER says "You are a spawned member in the claude-bridge fleet".
A member matching that quote found nothing, so the ladder's first rung
could never fire. Now quoted verbatim.
wiki/7-Use-Cases.md is advanced to the matching template commit; the sync
check prints in sync: True.
1. opencode.json — mount key bridged -> fleetd. Unit C could not do this:
the file is neutralized by the worktree overlay, so every worker sees a
stub and correctly reported it held no mount key. Tracked as CB-628.
2. e2e/bridge_ask_transcript.md keeps its name. It is a dated record of a
run on 2026-07-16 that really did call bridge_ask, and its first line
says so. The harness now writes fleet_ask_transcript.md for new runs;
its header already says 'Live fleet_ask', so the two now agree.
3. docs/MCP-Contract.md line 20 — the historical banner describes section
6, and section 6 now says fleet_ask.
Lead-verified: 27 .md files, 165 occurrences, no wiki/, no CLAUDE.md. The docs/MCP-Contract.md boundary held exactly — every hunk falls in 223-286, inside section 6 (210-293). The transcript rename is reverted by the lead in a follow-up: that file is a dated record of a run that really did call bridge_ask.
Lead-verified: 9 files, +68/-68, nothing under wiki/, root .mcp.json untouched. The worker's opencode.json finding was correct about its worktree and led to CB-628 (#134); the tracked file is fixed separately by the lead.
Lead-verified: both names reach the same handler instance; warn-once uses a per-name Set, not a numeric sentinel; Authz keys on an action enum so the deprecated names keep their authorization. 878 tests green in a local integration with #132, #133 and the lead's opencode.json fix. Live MCP verification is still outstanding and is the lead's step after redeploy.
fleet_* is now the documented tool name for all eleven MCP tools; each
bridge_* twin is registered against the exact same handler (no logic
duplication) and its description leads with a DEPRECATED notice. A
bridge_* call logs one WARN naming the old and new name, once per name
for the life of the process (a Set, not a numeric sentinel).
REPLY_CHARTER in HerdrPeerLauncher now tells a spawned member to call
fleet_reply — the one rule that must survive with no repo checkout.
All other bridge_* string literals across mcp/, Javadoc, and tests were
renamed to fleet_* for consistency with the new documented name.
Rename the eleven MCP tool names (bridge_ack/ask/list/poll/profiles/reply/
send/spawn/status/stop/whoami) to their fleet_* names across the Markdown
documentation. fleet_* is written as the normal name; one deprecation note
in README.md says bridge_* still works for one release.
docs/MCP-Contract.md is renamed only inside section 6 (lines 210-293):
sections 1-5 and 7-11 are stale pre-build design text (CB-609) and are
deliberately left with old names so dead text does not look maintained.
Also renames e2e/bridge_ask_transcript.md to e2e/fleet_ask_transcript.md
to match its content. CLAUDE.md, wiki/, plugin/skills/setup/SKILL.md and
.claude/skills/port-to-opencode/SKILL.md are owned by other units and are
untouched.
Two defects in CB-617 that only a live spawn could find. Both were shipped
green: every test passed because every test read the argv we built, and none
ran the binary that has to accept it.
1. Claude Code refuses to start when both --append-system-prompt and
--append-system-prompt-file are on the command line:
Error: Cannot use both --append-system-prompt and
--append-system-prompt-file. Please use only one.
CB-617 put the role charter on the file flag and left the reply charter on
the inline flag, so every Claude-profile spawn with a role charter died at
launch. The pane exited on its own and bridged reported it as
spawn_timeout ("did not reach injectable state within 20000ms"), which
hides the real cause.
Both charters now go in the one file, role charter first and reply charter
last — last is where the reply rule must sit, because it is the rule that
must survive. A member with only a reply charter keeps the proven inline
flag, which is also the only form that reaches a member with no repo
checkout.
2. A Claude Code agent definition needs `name:` in its frontmatter. Ours had
only `description:`, so the files were skipped and --agent architect failed
with "not found. Available agents: claude, Explore, ...". Added to all
three. The OpenCode files take their name from the filename and are
unchanged.
Checked on this host, in this repo, with the real binary:
claude --model claude-sonnet-5 --agent architect \
--append-system-prompt-file /tmp/combined.md -p '...'
-> ROLEOK, REPLYOK, yes
so the agent definition, the role charter and the reply charter all compose.
The updated test now asserts the constraint that actually binds: with a role
charter present, --append-system-prompt must be absent, and the file must open
with the role charter and end with the reply charter.
874 tests pass.
herdr refused to shell-encode a multi-line inline --append-system-prompt
argument (invalid_agent_argument), which broke any Claude Code profile with
a configured multi-line fleet.charters.<role>. Split delivery: the role
charter now writes to a temp file and mounts via
--append-system-prompt-file; the one-line REPLY_CHARTER keeps its inline
--append-system-prompt delivery, since it must reach a member with no repo
checkout. Also pass --agent <role> when a role's agent-definition file
exists under the worker's cwd (.claude/agents/<role>.md for claude-code,
.opencode/agent/<role>.md for opencode); absent either file, nothing extra
is added and the member still spawns.
The base's LaunchSpec now carries roleCharter/replyCharter/cwd alongside
the existing composed charter field, so CharterReceipt keeps fingerprinting
the same composed text it always did -- unchanged, since the digest covers
the full logical charter content regardless of how it is delivered.
A page audit found the dead host still named in four places outside the wiki.
ollama.ltms.dev no longer exists; the one front door is llm.ltms.dev, and the
path differs by backend - /anthropic for claude-code, /v1 for opencode.
Anyone following README.md today points a member at nothing.
README.md also now links the new wiki chapter 13, the operator guide, since
the README's own next step used to be the never-written Setup page.
Not touched: SubscriptionGuard.java:14 still names ollama.ltms.dev, but only
in a javadoc line describing the Stage-1 example allowlist. It is a comment
about history, not a live default, so it stays until that class is next
edited for its own reasons.
profiles.<name>.subscription is read in five places (BridgedConfig record +
isSubscription + validateSubscriptionProfiles, ClaudeCodeLauncher, and the
startup secret check that deliberately skips it) and was in bridged.example.yaml
nowhere. bridged.yaml is gitignored, so the example is the only place an operator
can learn a key exists - which meant a fresh host had no way to discover the one
switch that moves cost onto the operator's own subscription. Two profiles here
have it set.
Documents what changes when it is true, that it is mutually exclusive with
baseUrl and refused at load, that the startup secret check skips such profiles
so a clean secrets report says nothing about them, and that maxLoad is the only
throttle against the operator's plan - there is no metering or budget refusal.
94 config tests pass; the example still loads.
The instruction surface named a parameter the tool refuses. bridge_ack requires
target and msgId (BridgeMcp.java:1001) and errors with 'target and msgId are
required' otherwise, but step 5 of the primary procedure said bridge_ack{ticket,
msgId}. The table two sections below it was already correct, so the file
contradicted itself and the wrong half was in the numbered steps a lead follows.
The same line is fixed in the byte-identical wiki template.
docs/MCP-Contract.md still opened with 'Greenfield - no MCP code exists yet' and
CLAUDE.md pointed every session at it. Audited against BridgeMcp.java: it names
two tools that do not exist, omits four that do, gets nearly every parameter name
wrong, and uses /workers paths the daemon does not serve. Its status banner now
says so and names the live schema as the authority; CLAUDE.md's pointer is
narrowed to section 6, which is the part that did survive. Rewrite is CB-609.
Replaces CB-592's single hardcoded GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN shadow with a
memberCredentials: block: policy + allow + known, validated at config load
in the shape CB-606 established.
What this does and does not do, because the distinction matters:
IT DOES enumerate, report and validate. No credential name is hardcoded in
Java any more. An unrecognised policy: refuses at load. A credential-shaped
env var on neither known: nor allow: is named in a WARN. An absent block
warns loudly at startup, because absence now blocks nothing at all and there
is no hardcoded fallback left.
IT DOES NOT, on its own, block anything the login shell re-exports. The env
overlay is applied at pane creation and the pane's login shell runs after it.
An exec-time fix was attempted and has no seam: herdr protocol 19's
agent.start takes a fixed kind plus trailing CLI args, with no env map and no
argv[0] control. The enforcement therefore lives in the operator's secrets.sh,
which sets BRIDGED_MEMBER-guarded sentinels for the 29 blocked names.
Verified by me, not taken on report: my own unpiped mvn clean install gives
870 tests, BUILD SUCCESS; loading the live gitignored bridged.yaml with the
new code yields 34 known / 5 allow / 29 blocked with an empty intersection;
and that blocked set diffs clean against the secrets.sh block, so the two
lists agree today.
herdr protocol 19's agent.start takes a fixed `kind` (herdr resolves the
executable) plus trailing CLI args for that binary; only tab.create/pane.split
accept an env map, and that IS the round-1 pane-creation overlay already
shipped. There is no argv/env control point that runs after the pane's login
shell and before the agent process starts, so the proposed `env NAME=value ...`
argv prefix cannot be implemented against this API. Documented the finding and
corrected bridged.example.yaml's round-1 comments, which had overclaimed that
the overlay survives the login shell.
Kept everything else: added a startup WARN (Bridged.reportMemberCredentialsGap)
when memberCredentials: is absent or its known: list is empty, so CB-592's
protection loss is never silent, mirroring CB-594's reportRequiredSecrets.
Replaces CB-592's single hardcoded GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN shadow in HerdrPeerLauncher
with BridgedConfig.MemberCredentials (memberCredentials: policy/allow/known).
Every known name not also allowed is overlaid with a sentinel; an unrecognized
policy value refuses at load; a credential-shaped host env var on neither list
is logged as a gap (name only, never a value). bridged.yaml is gitignored, so
the 31 measured names + 4-name allowlist ship as a commented block in
bridged.example.yaml for the operator to apply live.
SessionReaper.lastWipSweepNanos started at Long.MIN_VALUE as a "never swept
yet" sentinel. That sentinel cannot be compared by subtraction. nanoTime() is
positive on this platform, so `now - Long.MIN_VALUE` wraps to a large negative
number, the gate `delta < WIP_SWEEP_INTERVAL_NANOS` reads it as "swept moments
ago", and the method returns before the assignment that would have fixed the
field. The sweep never ran once, for the life of the process, and nothing in
the log said so.
Measured:
System.nanoTime() = 31305820625625 (positive)
now - Long.MIN_VALUE = -9223340731034150183
interval (6h in nanos) = 21600000000000
gate 'delta < interval' -> true => returns early, every iteration, forever
Fix: a separate `sweptOnce` boolean holds "never yet", so the subtraction only
runs once both operands come from nanoTime. The first pass always sweeps — a
restart is a fine moment for it, the 24h age floor keeps it safe, and the
feature becomes observable right after a redeploy instead of six hours later.
The existing tests all passed because they call SessionManager.sweepWipRefs
directly, which walks around the gate. The new test asserts through the reaper
loop instead: it spawns a worktree session, starts the reaper, and requires a
real prune call at the seam with the 24h floor intact. Removing the fix makes
it fail with "it never reached the seam".
860 tests, mvn clean install, BUILD SUCCESS.
A refs/wip snapshot ref is deleted only when both hold: its commit's tree is
already reachable from main, and it is older than 24h. Reachability is the safety
floor — a snapshot exists because the work was committed nowhere else, so an
unreachable one is the last copy and is never swept. Every deletion logs the ref
and the sha.
/members gains wipRefs{count,costBytes} so the growth is visible.
Verified against real git, not only the fakes: a recoverable+old ref is deleted,
a recoverable+young one survives the age floor, and the last copy survives. A repo
with no main deletes nothing, and a repo with no snapshots is a clean no-op.
Closes#67
The prompt is part of the product: CB-582 changed what bridge_status returns, so
the primary's step 5 was no longer the whole truth.
The second half matters more than the first. A nudge makes a lead more likely to
notice an ask; it does not widen the ~55s window, which is bounded by the
WORKER's own MCP client timeout, not by anything the daemon chooses. Without that
sentence a lead reads 'the ask now nudges me' as 'asking works now' and briefs a
worker to ask — which is the failure CB-582 was filed about.