The skill said SSH to fleet01 is denied, so every report wrote 'not
reachable' for that fleet's daemon facts. That is true only for the user
dai.ha. The host alias fleet01 maps to user ltms and key auth works.
Checked 2026-08-28 while measuring #185: ssh fleet01 connects, and ltms
has passwordless sudo there. So fleet01's PID, uptime, jar and /healthz
can be reported over SSH even though its REST port is unreachable.
The javadoc said a member cannot authenticate at all once memberCredentials
blocks SSH_AUTH_SOCK, "there is no private key file on this host, only an
ssh-agent socket". That is wrong, and it was written after looking only in
~/.ssh, which holds nothing but Include lines.
Measured: ssh -G git.ltms.dev resolves an IdentityFile under the shared-env
directory. That file exists, is readable by this user, and has no passphrase.
A live member with SSH_AUTH_SOCK blanked pushed to the forge over SSH.
The rewrite itself is unchanged and still worth having. Only its stated reason
was wrong: it routes a member through its own scoped token instead of the
operator's ssh identity, which is what makes a member's pushes attributable
and revocable. It is not what stands between a member and the forge.
The four log lines added with the worktree HTTPS rewrite echoed the origin
URL verbatim, and one of them echoed the ssh:// authority, which carries
user-info. An ssh authority is normally just git@, so in practice this
changes nothing -- but a remote URL is not obviously a credential channel,
and that is precisely why one has leaked here three times (#157, #182).
Redact at the log call, not after it surprises someone.
Git never consults a credential.helper for an SSH transport, so #177's helper was inert on this repo — whose origin is ssh://. Once allow-list policy blocks SSH_AUTH_SOCK, a member on an SSH origin cannot authenticate at all: there is no private key file on this host, only an agent socket.
A worktree-scoped `url.<https>.insteadOf <ssh>` gives the member HTTPS for fetch and push while the primary checkout keeps SSH untouched. Host and port are parsed from the origin, never hardcoded — a test with a synthetic host proves it. The scp-like shorthand is left alone deliberately, since its host:path split is defined by ssh_config aliases rather than URI syntax.
Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 986, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
The member credential scrub removes environment variables. It cannot remove a token written into git config inside the repo the member works in, so `git remote -v` handed a member a credential it was deliberately not given.
Provisioning now strips HTTPS user info from the origin before `git worktree add`, refuses the worktree if user info survives, and configures a per-worktree credential helper that reads WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN at call time. Nothing is persisted.
The helper emits BOTH username and password, and resets the inherited helper list first. An earlier revision emitted only `username=`, which made git fall through to the next helper — on a Mac that is osxkeychain, so a member would have authenticated with the operator's stored credential while every test passed and `git remote -v` looked clean. See #182.
`worktreeCredentialHelperCompletesWithoutUsingAnInheritedHelper` plants a synthetic operator helper in an isolated global config and proves the worktree helper wins. The worker confirmed it fails when the reset is removed. All credential tests pin GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL and GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM so they can neither read nor write real credentials.
Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 973, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
A turn that dies on a backend error produces the same working -> idle transition as a real one, just faster and with nothing on screen. The resolver accepted that as a completed turn and handed the caller HTTP 200 with an empty reply, so a lost turn and a successful empty answer were indistinguishable.
Now: an empty or unreadable scrape fails, naming the member; and a BUSY -> DONE inside MIN_TURN_NANOS (2s) fails as a crash signature.
One existing test encoded the bug — it asserted a failed scrape resolved as a success carrying "" — and has been inverted rather than worked around.
Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 973, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
`policy: allow-list` silently ignored every name an operator wrote under `allow:` unless a profile happened to carry it too, so turning the policy on would have blanked credentials working members depend on. Derivation now unions the operator's list.
`SSH_AUTH_SOCK` stays governed only by `sshAuthSock`, even when listed under `allow:` — it is a live handle to the operator's ssh-agent, not a value.
Adds one INFO line per allow-list spawn, `member credentials: allowed N of M`, emitted only after the shell gate so it can never report coverage on a path where the scrub does not run.
Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 976, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
No behaviour change. #154 supposed that ownership drains a whole queue into the in-memory `held` map, making `x-max-length` and per-message TTL decorative. Measurement says otherwise: `basicConsume` is manual-ack, `deliverCallback` acks only duplicates, and `basicQos` is set on the one shared channel before any consumer starts — so total `held` is bounded by the prefetch window across all targets.
Adds a fake-broker test that drives the real `own()` path and fails if receipt ever starts acking, plus a javadoc line naming the prefetch window at the point of first mention.
Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 971, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
CompletionResolver.resolve() used to hand the caller a successful "" reply whenever a
turn's scrape came back empty (whether the read failed, or genuinely produced nothing),
making a lost turn indistinguishable from a real empty answer. It also had no way to
tell a crashed backend's near-instant BUSY -> DONE transition apart from a genuine
completion.
Add MIN_TURN_NANOS (2s), a named floor below which a completed turn is treated as a
crash signature and failed rather than resolved as a reply. Fail on any empty scrape
(read failure or a clean-but-empty read) instead of resolving with "". Both failures
name the member and carry whatever is on the pane for context.
Thread an injectable LongSupplier clock through CompletionResolver (matching the
SessionManager/MessageService nowNanos pattern) so the floor is testable without a
real sleep.
The coverage line was logged before the zsh gate, so a non-zsh
spawn (where nothing is scrubbed — overlayBlockedCredentials is the
fallback instead) printed 'allowed N of M' as if the derived
allow-list scrub had run. Move the log after the gate so it only
fires on the path that actually generates the ZDOTDIR scrub; the
non-zsh fallback keeps logCredentialGap's WARN as its only signal.
Added a test proving no 'allowed N of M' line is emitted on the
non-zsh fallback, through the real HerdrPeerLauncher#spawn path.
Share one deliverability predicate between Injector and FleetApp, so the status endpoint reports the same answer the injector acts on instead of re-deriving it from one of that predicate's two inputs.
Verified by the lead in an independent worktree: Tests run: 971, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, BUILD SUCCESS.
MemberEnvAllowList.derive only ever looked at profile fields, so
memberCredentials.allow: was silently ignored under
policy: allow-list — turning the policy on would have blanked
credentials working members already depended on.
- derive(profiles, configuredAllow) unions memberCredentials.allow
into the derived set, with SSH_AUTH_SOCK explicitly excluded from
that union (it stays governed only by sshAuthSock: allow).
- HerdrPeerLauncher threads MemberCredentials.allowSet() into the
derivation instead of calling the profiles-only overload.
- Added a per-spawn INFO log 'member credentials: allowed N of M'
(N/M from the daemon's own env, the existing hostEnvNames proxy),
never logging a blocked name or a value.
CB-640 published the three message-layer facts and CB-641 wired the herdr
and time ones. This joins them, so every HealthSnapshot field now carries
real evidence and the NOT_YET_OBSERVED placeholder is gone. That constant
is what made 8 of the 9 fault states unreachable, GONE and NEVER_READY
included, which is why CB-580's failTarget never fired.
hasOrphanedDelegation is a true snapshot, but it can read true for one
tick during an ordinary race: an async ticket exists before its virtual
thread reaches rendezvous.open, so for that instant nothing is accepted or
queued behind it. decide maps the field straight to DELEGATION_ORPHANED
with no smoothing, so one racy read would log a fault that clears on the
next tick. The monitor now requires two consecutive observations. That
costs one interval on a real orphan and removes the false positive.
Two tests drive real ticks against a genuinely orphaned ticket (an
unanswered fleet_ask that lapsed back to PENDING), not the seam: one tick
reports nothing, two report once, and a single clean tick in between
resets the streak.
Also correct two config comments. paneProbeIntervalSeconds is parsed and
read by nothing, so its "minimum 60" note promised a floor that does not
exist.
970 tests green.
hasQueuedDelivery/hasStrandedReply/hasOrphanedDelegation surface three of the
message-layer facts FleetHealthMonitor needs but currently hardcodes to
NOT_YET_OBSERVED. Additive only — no existing public method's signature or
behavior changes.
scrubWritesAnAllowedNofMReport spawned /bin/zsh with no guard, so it
errored on the Gitea CI runner (Linux ARM64 container, no zsh) while
the two sibling zsh tests already skipped there via assumeTrue. Add the
same guard so CI skips instead of failing; the Mac build still runs it.
The alias removal left bridge_* tool names in prose. Fix them:
- README no longer claims the old bridge_* names still answer (they were removed).
- pom + LeadTabScanner comments name fleet_* tools.
- FleetMcp comment no longer mentions the removed deprecated twin.
- docs/MCP-Contract.md and e2e swept bridge_* -> fleet_*; e2e ask files renamed.
The historical mcp__bridge__* mount-name note in CLAUDE.md is kept on purpose.
949 tests pass.
Two changes ship together here.
1. One shared herdr workspace. The lead and every worker now live in one
workspace called "fleet", so the operator sees one "session" with many
windows, not two. Before, the lead sat in a "leads" workspace and workers
in "bridged-workers", which read as two sessions. The lead is still told
apart from workers by its exact tab label ("lead: <name>"), so putting them
in one space is safe. LeadTabScanner keeps the exclude-by-label mechanism
for split layouts; Fleetd now passes an empty exclude set.
2. Rename the daemon from "bridged" to "fleetd" (the binary, config, scripts,
launchd/systemd units, module dir, and MCP mount).
- Module dir bridged/ -> fleetd/; jar finalName -> fleetd.jar.
- Log line, comments, docs, and CLAUDE.md updated to say fleetd.
- Scripts renamed: redeploy-bridged.sh -> redeploy-fleetd.sh,
bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh -> fleetd-launchd-wrapper.sh.
- Deploy units renamed: dev.ltms.bridged.plist -> dev.ltms.fleetd.plist,
bridged.service -> fleetd.service; launchd Label -> dev.ltms.fleetd.
- Config default bridged.yaml -> fleetd.yaml; the legacy bridged.yaml is
still read as a fallback, and still gitignored.
- MCP: drop the deprecated bridge_* tool twins; only fleet_* remain. The
server name is "fleet". The mount name in the local .mcp.json becomes
"fleet" (gitignored, not in this commit).
- Env var defaults BRIDGED_API_TOKEN -> FLEETD_API_TOKEN, fixture
BRIDGED_WORKER_TOKEN -> FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN.
Kept on purpose: the BRIDGED_MEMBER marker. Renaming it is a coupled change to
the credential-scrub security control (an operator secrets.sh may guard on it),
so it stays until that migration is done on its own.
Metrics were already fleet_* (CB-632); MetricNamesTest still guards that no
name says bridged_.
The canonical CLAUDE.md block and the wiki template stay byte-identical
(wiki working tree edited, committed to the wiki repo separately).
949 tests pass (mvn clean install). 4 fewer than before = the 4 removed
bridge_* alias tests.
- CB-634: deliver IDE guidance as an on-disk CLAUDE.local.md / opencode overlay,
pinned to the module dir, best-effort auto-open (opt-in per profile via ideMcpUrl).
- CB-636: per-profile autoCompactWindow -> --autocompact for claude-code,
provider.<p>.models.<m>.limit.context for opencode. Range-validated [100000,1000000].
- CB-637: cross-host lead-to-lead over a shared AMQP coordination vhost
(coordinator: block, fleet_send{coordId}, LeadMailbox + LeadCoordLoop).
952 unit tests + 5 LeadMailbox contract tests green. Live E2E verified on the Mac daemon.
The lead-to-lead wiring shipped with CB-635 in its comments, but CB-635 is
already the broker.uriEnv / unreachable-broker work. Relabel the mailbox +
fleet_send{coordId} + receive loop to CB-637 so a ticket number names one
feature. Add the cross-host peer-lead row to the primary intent->tool table
(kept byte-identical with the wiki template).
The sibling ticket landed the mechanism (LeadMailbox, LeadMessage, the
coordinator: config block) but nothing opened it, nothing sent through it, and
nothing read it. This is the wiring.
- LeadChannel: a small interface LeadMailbox now implements (publish/peek/ack
plus a selfCoordId() accessor). It exists so FleetMcp and the receive loop can
be tested with a fake instead of a live broker. LeadMailbox's AMQP logic is
untouched — the diff is the implements clause, four @Override marks and the
accessor.
- Fleetd.openLeadMailbox: opens this daemon's mailbox after the reply inbox is
selected, with the same env-injected seam selectReplyInbox uses. Every "off"
path returns null and the daemon still starts: no coordinator block (silent),
a uriEnv that does not resolve (INFO), a configured broker with no selfId
(WARN — a mailbox is named after the coord-id that owns it), or a broker that
refuses at boot (WARN, credentials stripped). Closed in the ordered shutdown
hook, after the loop that reads it has stopped.
- fleet_send{coordId}: publishes a LeadMessage(from=selfCoordId, to=coordId) to
the peer's mailbox and returns the broker-confirmed receipt. coordId is
mutually exclusive with sessionId/turnId and is rejected by name rather than
resolved by precedence. An unroutable/nacked/timed-out publish comes back as a
tool error naming the coordId, never a crash. The worker send/reply path is
not touched.
- LeadCoordLoop: the receive half. Each tick peeks the mailbox, resolves the
local lead pane, and — only at a turn boundary — injects "[lead <from>] <text>"
and acks. Anything not delivered stays unacked and is retried, so a message is
never dropped; one message per tick, so every delivery is gated on a status
read that already saw the previous one.
- fleet_list reports {selfId, configured} when coordination is on, so an
operator can find the coord-id a peer must use to reach them. Omitted
entirely when it is off.
Tests: 20 new hermetic tests (no broker) across routing, delivery and startup
selection. mvn clean install: Tests run: 944, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0
— BUILD SUCCESS.
Adds the broker-side mechanism for lead-to-lead messages across daemons/hosts
(unit 1 of 2): a LeadMessage envelope carrying from/to coord-ids, an
AMQP-backed LeadMailbox modeled closely on AmqpReplyInbox (consume-and-hold,
deferred manual ack, confirm-mode publish, recovery handling), and a new
optional coordinator: config block (separate vhost from broker:, leader
traffic only). Config parsing + accessors only — FleetMcp/Fleetd/Injector/
MessageService and the send path are untouched; wiring is a separate ticket.
Add opt-in Integer autoCompactWindow to FleetConfig.Profile (last field,
null/unset = today's behaviour). Validated at config load to [100000,
1000000] — the band Claude Code's own --autocompact flag accepts.
Claude Code: appends --autocompact <window> to argv (mirrors --model),
so it survives the ccs <profile> wrapper.
opencode: has no absolute compact-at-N knob (only compaction.auto/prune/
reserved/tail_turns/preserve_recent_tokens), so the window is applied as
the resolved model's own limit.context (+ a required limit.output:16384
default) in the generated opencode.json, merged via get-or-create nodes
so it does not clobber a custom-provider block. Only applies when model:
resolves to "provider/model"; otherwise logs a WARN naming the profile
rather than silently doing nothing.
Docs added to fleetd.example.yaml explaining the cross-backend semantics
difference (compacts AT the window vs. WITHIN it).
The overlay pinned project_path to the worktree root. For a repo whose Maven
module is a subdir (this repo's pom is in `bridged/`, not at the root), opening
the root imports no module and every ide_* call resolves nothing. Pin and open
the module dir instead.
Two new opt-in per-Profile keys, both read only when ideMcpUrl is set:
- ideProjectDir: repo-relative module dir the IDE opens and the overlay pins;
blank keeps the old worktree-root behaviour.
- ideOpenCommand: host command that opens that dir in the IDE at spawn, with
{dir} substituted and run through /bin/sh -c so env (e.g. DISPLAY) can be set
inline. Best-effort and non-fatal — a failure never fails the spawn. Blank
keeps the manual-open behaviour. No close half yet (deferred).
Shared helpers PeerLauncher.ideProjectPath / openInIde back both launchers.
The two Profile fields ride a back-compat constructor, so every existing call
site and YAML compiles and behaves unchanged.
Tests: overlay content pins the module dir when ideProjectDir is set;
ideProjectPath resolution; openInIde no-op on a blank command. 918 tests green.
git reads info/exclude from the common dir for a linked worktree (only
info/sparse-checkout is per-worktree), so the entry written into
<common>/worktrees/<name>/info/exclude was never honoured and CLAUDE.local.md
showed as untracked -- at risk of being swept into a worker's PR. Derive the
common dir (<common>/worktrees/<name> -> <common>) and write there. Found by
dogfooding a real spawn on fleet01; the test now uses the real worktree layout
and asserts the entry lands in the common dir, not the per-worktree gitdir.
Move the IDE guidance text to PeerLauncher.ideOverlayText (shared by both
launchers). ClaudeCodeLauncher drops it from the reply-charter file and writes
CLAUDE.local.md into a provisioned worktree instead, gated on a .git FILE
(safety: never writes into the primary's real .git-DIRECTORY checkout) and
registers it in info/exclude. OpenCodeLauncher mounts the intellij server and
adds the rules file to the instructions array.
Adds `ideMcpUrl` to FleetConfig.Profile (default off). When set, the
Claude Code launcher mounts the IDE Index MCP as a second inline
--mcp-config server named `intellij`, and appends an IDE charter that
pins every ide_* call to the member's own worktree (spec.cwd()). The
charter order is role -> ide -> reply, one --append-system-prompt-file,
reply last (CB-618). The mount gate now fires on ideMcpUrl alone, not
only mcpUrl. ConfigRef treats an ideMcpUrl change as deferred, like the
other launch flags.
Never touches .mcp.json or CLAUDE.md — the mount and the rule arrive as
launch flags, so a project's own config is untouched.
Not yet done (see fleetd #162): the bridged-owned IDE lifecycle
(open on provision, close before worktree removal), and the opencode
adapter (separate ticket). fleetd.example.yaml documents ideMcpUrl and
fixes the stale parityOverlay default.
911 tests green.
An empty uriEnv no longer stops the daemon (#152), so the failure is quiet: bridged
starts, falls back to the in-memory reply inbox, and held reports stop surviving a
restart. --check is the only thing that says so before the fact. The var name is read
out of bridged.yaml so a renamed key cannot make the check lie.
#151: Broker gains uriEnv beside uri, taking the AMQP URI from an env var so
the password stays out of fleetd.yaml (same pattern as auth.tokenEnv). uriEnv
wins when set; isConfigured() treats a uriEnv naming an unset/blank variable
as unconfigured. A configured uriEnv is added to the startup required-secrets
report. Never logs the resolved URI (it carries the password).
#152: AmqpReplyInbox.open throwing at boot no longer stops the daemon. The
selection at the call site catches the failure and falls back to the in-memory
inbox for the process lifetime, warning loudly that durable cross-restart
delivery is off and logging the failed URI with credentials stripped.
Round 2 fixes the defect that mattered: the scrub lived in .zlogin only, and a
herdr pane is a login shell on macOS but a plain interactive one on Linux. It
would have protected nothing on the vhost it was built for, in silence.
Verified by the lead: 901 tests, 0 failures, mvn clean install green. Both new
tests mutation-checked -- unwiring the control fails one, reverting the scrub to
.zlogin alone fails the other while the login-shell test still passes.
NOT yet deployed: the running daemon still holds the old jar.
Six review findings, from the peer lead `vms` and a reviewer worker. The first
one is a real defect that would have shipped as a dead control.
1. The scrub only ran in a login shell. It lived in the generated `.zlogin`,
and zsh reads `.zlogin` only for a login shell. herdr does not open the same
kind of shell everywhere: measured on herdr 0.8.0, a macOS pane runs `-zsh`
(login) while a Linux pane runs a plain `/usr/bin/zsh`. So on the vhost this
was being built for, `.zlogin` never ran and every member kept the whole
secret store, in silence.
The scrub body now lives in a generated `scrub.zsh` that BOTH `.zshrc` and
`.zlogin` source, each after sourcing its own `$HOME` counterpart. Linux
runs the first, macOS runs both, and the second pass is not merely harmless
-- it re-scrubs anything the operator's `~/.zlogin` exported after `~/.zshrc`
had finished. Re-running is idempotent.
2. `INFRASTRUCTURE_PASSTHROUGH` listed names that are not infrastructure:
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN, GITEA_TOKEN, GITEA_HOST, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL,
ANTHROPIC_MODEL, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, OPENCODE_CONFIG, BRIDGED_MEMBER. I read
each injection point and confirmed every one of them reaches `launch.env()`
only when actually injected, so `allowed.addAll(launch.env().keySet())`
already covers the legitimate case. As static entries they were pure leak
surface: a host that happened to export ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN would have had
it passed straight through.
3. A missing `scrub-report.txt` at teardown was logged at debug. The report is
the only evidence the scrub ran at all. Its absence has an innocent reading
and a serious one, and we cannot tell them apart from the daemon -- so it is
now a WARN that says exactly that. Logging it at debug is how a control that
quietly stopped working stays unnoticed.
4. Nothing tested that the control was wired in. Deleting the single
`applyEnvironmentAllowListPolicy(cfg, launch)` line left all 896 tests green
while turning the feature completely off -- the CB-586/CB-611 shape again.
`HerdrPeerLauncherAllowListWiringTest` starts a real spawn and asserts on the
env that reached herdr. Mutation-checked: unwiring that line fails it.
5. `EnvAllowListScrubTest` now also runs `zsh -i` with no `-l`, which is the
Linux pane shape, so finding 1 is tested from a Mac. Mutation-checked:
putting the scrub back in `.zlogin` alone fails that test alone, while the
login-shell test still passes -- which is exactly the blind spot that let
the bug through.
6. Two ZDOTDIR leaks closed. A failed spawn has no pane id, so its directory
was never keyed for teardown; it is now removed on the way out. And
`deleteOnExit` covers a clean shutdown and nothing else, so `generate` now
reaps sibling directories older than 24h left by a killed daemon.
Also: `policy:` is lowercased with Locale.ROOT, and the `.zlogin`-only claim is
corrected in fleetd.example.yaml, FleetConfig and HerdrPeerLauncher.
901 tests, 0 failures, `mvn clean install` green.
Move member environment control out of the pane-creation env overlay
(defeated by any file the login shell sources) into a per-spawn ZDOTDIR
directory whose .zlogin runs LAST, after the operator's whole chain, and
blanks every exported variable not on an allow-list DERIVED from what the
launcher itself injects (profiles' tokenEnv/gitTokenEnv/gitHostEnv/env
keys + an infrastructure set) — never hand-typed.
- memberCredentials.policy: allow-list (deny-by-default/deny-list stay
default and unchanged); known:/allow: become reporting only under it.
- memberCredentials.sshAuthSock knob, blocked by default; allowing it is
an explicit decision (operator ssh-agent handle).
- Non-zsh login shell: loud WARN, protection off, fallback to the old
enumerated-name overlay.
- Scrub writes an 'allowed N of M' denominator report, read at teardown;
credential-shaped blanked names go to WARN (names only, never values).
- Equality test against a real login zsh from a clean parent: surviving
non-empty exports EQUAL baseline ∩ derived allow-list.
Every launcher writes the bridge's MCP server into the config it hands its peer,
and it named that server "bridge". So a member addressed its tools as
mcp__bridge__fleet_send while the tools themselves are already fleet_*. The
mount is named "fleet" now, and a member's tools are mcp__fleet__*.
The name was a bare literal in three files: ClaudeCodeLauncher and LeadLauncher
build a --mcp-config JSON string, OpenCodeLauncher writes an opencode.json node.
Three hand-written copies of one name is how a rename lands in two of them, so
the name is now one constant, PeerLauncher.MCP_MOUNT_NAME.
The mount name is local to the peer — it is the label its own client puts on the
server, and nothing in the daemon reads it back. Renaming it changes no wire
call.
Tests. Each launcher's test now asserts the mount is named fleet AND that
nothing writes "bridge"; the second half is the part that would have caught a
half-done rename. LeadLauncherTest never checked the name at all, only the URL,
so it gained the assertion rather than had one updated.
CLAUDE.md's role-detection ladder quoted mcp__bridge__* as the marker of a
spawned member. It names mcp__fleet__* now, and says that a member spawned
before this change still reports the old prefix. The portable block stays
byte-identical with the wiki template (wiki 569a917).
Build: cd bridged && mvn clean install, then read target/surefire-reports/*.xml
directly — 884 tests, 0 failures, 0 errors.
Ha Trong Dai
Dai Ha
ltms