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27 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ltms 01adc841fa Merge #523: test the policy probe's parsing guards (fleetd #519)
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Adjudicated and verified by me, not taken from the PR body.

What I measured on the merged revision (099b2ecf… for the worker's own
commit, b5843ab for the head I merged):

* 5 test functions defined, 5 invoked; suite exit 0, "PASS: probe member
  credentials guards"
* bash -n rc=0 on both scripts under /bin/bash 3.2.57 and bash 5.3.9
* two mutations killed, each proven applied two ways (mutant present AND
  original gone), restored byte-identical, with a green control after each:
  - dropping the empty-parse special case -> FAIL: empty parser output
    count: missing policy parser (jq) returned 0 field(s)
  - arity threshold 5 -> 0 -> FAIL: short parser output status

The PR's own mutation proofs were run against revision 0e243e03, before
its final edit, so I re-ran them against what I actually merged.

Two things I fixed at the gate rather than sending back:

* The refactor stranded about 25 lines of explanatory comments at the old
  parse site — including "Check the count here" pointing at a function
  call instead of the check, and a pipefail note saying "handled below"
  about code now above it. That is the same wrong-stated-fact defect class
  as fleetd #500, in the very file whose ticket history is about it. Moved
  each block above the code it explains.
* Two assertions matched on `jq) returned N field(s)`, a needle starting
  mid-parenthetical, so a real failure printed "missing jq) returned 0
  field(s)" and read as if the script's message had an unbalanced paren.
  Widened to `policy parser (jq) returned N field(s)`, which also pins
  that the refusal names the parser it used.

Caveats recorded, from the implementer and not re-checked by me: the
harness does not cover the non-member, missing-parser, curl-fetch,
known-count, or hash-tool fallback paths.

One property worth noting in favour of this suite: it runs under `set -e`,
so the first failing test aborts before the final `printf 'PASS: …'`. That
PASS line is reachable only from the fully successful path.
2026-09-12 06:59:02 +02:00
Dai Ha b5843ab43f fleetd #519 review fix: widen two needles to the whole parenthetical
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Both arity assertions matched on `jq) returned N field(s)` — a needle
that starts in the middle of the script's `(parser name)` parenthetical.
On a real failure the harness prints `missing <needle>`, so the line
came out as:

  FAIL: empty parser output count: missing jq) returned 0 field(s)

which reads as if the script's own message had an unbalanced paren. It
does not; the needle was just sliced. Matching on
`policy parser (jq) returned N field(s)` makes the failure readable and
also pins that the refusal names the parser it used, which the narrower
needle did not.

make_jq() PATH-prefixes a fake jq, so `_PARSER_NAME` is deterministically
"jq" in both tests; the wider needle cannot flake on a host without jq.

Re-proved on this revision, because a disproof is about a revision and
not a file:

* suite exit 0, "PASS: probe member credentials guards"
* bash -n rc=0 on the test under /bin/bash 3.2.57 and bash 5.3.9
* dropping the empty-parse special case -> FAIL: empty parser output
  count: missing policy parser (jq) returned 0 field(s)
* arity threshold 5 -> 0 -> FAIL: short parser output status
* script restored byte-identical after each, green control after both
2026-09-12 11:50:11 +07:00
Dai Ha 5b1e13ca3d fleetd #519 review fix: move the parser comments with the code they explain
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PR #523 extracted parse_policy_fields() but left about 25 lines of
explanatory comments at the old parse site in main(). That is the same
defect class as fleetd #500 itself — a stated fact that no longer
matches the code next to it — in the very file whose ticket history is
about it.

Three blocks moved, no code touched:

* "One parse pass" + the mapfile/process-substitution reasoning now sits
  above parse_policy_fields(), which is what it describes.
* The arity-check block now sits inside the function, directly above
  `if (( ${#_FIELDS[@]} < 5 ))`. At the old site it said "the slice just
  below this" and "every line below this expects", both pointing at a
  function call rather than the check. Reworded to name main() and its
  slice explicitly.
* The pipefail note said the parser failure was "handled below"; the
  handling is now above it, in the function.

The call site keeps a three-line pointer saying where the reasoning went.

Checked myself, on this revision:

* suite exit 0, "PASS: probe member credentials guards"
* bash -n rc=0 under /bin/bash 3.2.57 and bash 5.3.9
* two mutations killed, each proven applied two ways (mutant present AND
  original gone), restored byte-identical, green control after each:
  - dropping the empty-parse special case -> FAIL: empty parser output
    count
  - arity threshold 5 -> 0 -> FAIL: short parser output status
2026-09-12 11:47:16 +07:00
Dai Ha a5ad7c6561 fleetd #519: test policy probe guards
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2026-09-12 11:30:35 +07:00
Dai Ha 3833d8e52b fleetd #517: pin the drain-gate abort branch and jar_id's absent case
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Two mutation-testing survivors in scripts/redeploy-fleetd.sh: a source-text
test pins what a message SAYS but never whether the branch that prints it is
REACHED.

- Extract the drain-gate abort decision into drain_gate_refusal(do_build,
  staged_path), a pure function the suite can call directly for all four
  build/staged combinations. The existing source-text grep test is kept
  alongside it (it catches a re-wording; the new tests catch a dead branch).
- Extend jar_id's test to cover the missing-file path (both the no-argument
  default and an explicit path), which the #511 test never exercised.
2026-09-12 11:23:37 +07:00
ltms b37def9238 Merge #516: the probe refuses with three distinct messages, each naming its own cause (fleetd #500)
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2026-09-12 06:09:50 +02:00
Dai Ha d59ece6dec fleetd #500: stop a wrong-interpreter or failed-parse reading a policy as empty
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probe-member-credentials.sh used mapfile < <(producer) to parse the fetched policy. That
hides a producer failure three ways: mapfile is bash 4+ and missing on macOS's /bin/bash
3.2, a process substitution's exit status is never propagated to mapfile, and the
downstream reads (":-" defaults and a slice) never fire set -u on a short or unset array.
All three converge on the same "0 known names" refusal, which blames the policy for a
failure that is actually the interpreter or the parser.

Three distinct guards, each closing one cause with its own message:
- a BASH_VERSINFO gate at the top refuses outright on bash < 4 (exit 3)
- the parser's output is captured via command substitution instead of mapfile < <(...),
  so a non-zero jq/python3 exit is caught at the call while the fact still exists (exit 4)
- an arity check before the field slice refuses a parse that exits 0 but returns fewer
  than 5 fields (exit 5)

The existing "0 known names" guard is now honest: by the time it fires, the three causes
above are already ruled out, so it really does mean the policy has 0 known names.
2026-09-12 10:58:16 +07:00
Dai Ha 6e23bf8309 fleetd #511: fix wrong --no-build wording in drain-gate abort, pin jar_id() default
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The drain-gate abort message told the operator a rerun "with or without
--no-build" would finish the restart. That is wrong: by the time this
message can fire, stage_built_jar has already moved the jar off $JAR, so
--no-build hits require_no_build_jar's own refusal. Reworded to say the
rerun must NOT use --no-build, and why: the built jar is no longer at the
live path that --no-build requires.

Also added a test pinning jar_id()'s no-argument default (reports $JAR,
the live path) and its explicit-argument behavior (reports that path
instead), per fleetd #511 item 2. Not adding a test for the JAR_STAGED rm
-f at line 578 (fleetd #511 documents it as an equivalent mutant — mvn
clean install deletes target/ on the next line regardless).
2026-09-12 10:56:32 +07:00
Dai Ha 979adf82eb fleetd #493: never build into the path a running daemon holds
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redeploy-fleetd.sh's build step wrote straight into fleetd/target/fleetd.jar
via `mvn clean install` while the OLD daemon was still running from that
exact path. A JVM loads classes lazily, so a class the daemon had not
touched yet could be read from a jar already replaced or removed -- the
failure landed on the shutdown drain (NoClassDefFoundError, exit 143,
looks clean).

Stage the freshly built jar at target/fleetd-new.jar (stage_built_jar),
confirm the OLD pid has actually exited (wait_for_daemon_exit, extracted
from the existing wait loop), and only then swap it into the live path
(swap_staged_jar) -- strictly after the wait, strictly before start. A
failed swap dies without starting. --no-build and --check keep their
existing, truthful behavior (require_no_build_jar; jar_id still reads
the live path by default). A leftover staged jar from an interrupted
run is wiped before the next build. The build still runs before
anything is stopped, so a failed build still never takes the fleet down.

Also fixed: the drain-gate abort message ("aborted -- nothing changed")
now names the staged jar when one exists, since staging already moves
the freshly built jar off the live path before that prompt runs.

Adds unit tests for stage_built_jar, swap_staged_jar, require_no_build_jar,
wait_for_daemon_exit, and a source-order test proving swap sits after the
wait and before start (sourcing stops before the main flow ever runs, so
the ordering itself can only be checked by reading the script's own call
sites).
2026-09-12 10:35:19 +07:00
Dai Ha 599419f9e6 fleetd #492 follow-up: carry the unclear detail across detect_supervisor's subshell boundary
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b17f37a set SUPERVISOR_UNCLEAR_DETAIL as a global inside detect_supervisor, but the real call
site invokes it as $(detect_supervisor) — a subshell — so that global died with the subshell and
the die() message's ${VAR:-fallback} silently masked the loss with generic text.

- detect_supervisor now packs kind and detail onto its one stdout line (joined by the ASCII unit
  separator byte, $SUPERVISOR_DETAIL_SEP), the only channel that survives $( ). The real call site
  unpacks both with in-shell parameter expansion — no extra subshell.
- Dropped the ${SUPERVISOR_UNCLEAR_DETAIL:-...} fallback at the die() message: under set -u, a
  missing detail now fails loudly instead of silently defaulting (same defect class as #497).
- Added a constraints comment block above detect_supervisor for future callers: stdout-only,
  no ${VAR:-default} papering over a lost value, and every case on the return value needs an
  explicit *) arm.
- Added *) arms to the three `case "$SUPERVISOR_KIND"` switches (report/stop/start): report warns
  and continues (display-only), stop/start die naming the value (they act on it).
- Rewrote the "unclear" test to go through the real call-site shape ($(detect_supervisor) then
  the same split), not a hand-constructed value, and tightened its final assertion to check for
  the actual detail text rather than $SYSTEMD_UNIT alone (the die() boilerplate names the unit
  either way, so that check could pass on a lost value).
2026-09-12 09:58:45 +07:00
Dai Ha b17f37a683 fleetd #492 follow-up: detect_supervisor must never read "could not tell" as "none"
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Two situations were silently landing in the "none" answer, which
require_drivable_supervisor accepts and the script then falls back to a raw
kill + nohup — exactly the wrong move when a supervisor actually IS present:

- installed-but-not-loaded, on either supervisor. `systemctl --user is-active`
  answers "no" for activating/deactivating/failed and while an auto-restart is
  pending too, and every one of those is a host that IS under systemd (or
  launchd) and about to act again. `*_installed` already knew this; it was
  only ever consulted for a warning line, never by the decision itself.
- a systemd probe that could not answer at all (e.g. systemctl cannot reach
  the user bus over a non-lingering ssh session) looked identical to a clean
  negative, because both probes redirected stderr straight to /dev/null.

detect_supervisor now returns a fifth answer, "unclear", for both cases.
systemd_loaded/systemd_installed capture systemctl's exit status and stderr
separately and set their own *_ERRORED flag only on a real tool failure
(non-zero exit WITH stderr), never on a clean negative. "none" now means only:
neither supervisor installed, neither loaded, neither probe errored.
require_drivable_supervisor die()s on "unclear" exactly like it already does
on "ambiguous", naming the specific supervisor and reason via the new
SUPERVISOR_UNCLEAR_DETAIL global.

Tests: 4 new cases (systemd/launchd installed-but-not-loaded, a real
systemd_loaded run through a systemctl stub that errors on stderr, and the
die() refusal for "unclear" naming the unit). All 3 new guards were verified
by mutation: each was removed from the real script, the suite caught it (a
new FAIL line naming the exact broken assertion), then the file was restored
byte-identically and the suite went green again.
2026-09-12 09:23:21 +07:00
Dai Ha dcd505286f fleetd #492: teach redeploy-fleetd.sh systemd --user as a third supervisor
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launchd, systemd --user, and unsupervised are three different answers, not two.
Refuse (die) rather than fall through to kill+nohup when a supervisor is
detected that this script cannot drive (e.g. both signals fire at once), and
add a post-restart check that fails the run if more than one fleetd process
is alive. detect_supervisor()/require_drivable_supervisor()/
count_daemon_pids()/assert_single_daemon() are pure, overridable functions so
scripts/test-redeploy-fleetd.sh can exercise them without a real launchd or
systemd.
2026-09-12 09:00:59 +07:00
Dai Ha 09159f2857 Classify named AMQP recovery errors
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2026-09-05 06:05:52 +07:00
Dai Ha 0241e0d3a8 Keep unattributed AMQP errors loud
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2026-09-05 05:36:53 +07:00
Dai Ha e4973eb8a4 Classify recovered AMQP redeploy errors
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2026-09-05 05:29:53 +07:00
Dai Ha 51f7b0a3ca fleetd #111: probe reads the live memberCredentials policy, no hardcoded name list
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 1m24s
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 2m22s
scripts/probe-member-credentials.sh carried its own hand-maintained NAMES array
(31 names, recorded 2026-08-16), so a name added later to fleetd.yaml's
memberCredentials.known was never checked and the probe still exited 0 with a
clean-looking table. Same drift shape as #114's tool catalogue.

- New dev.ltms.fleet.member.MemberCredentialPolicyView: the single place that
  turns a MemberCredentials policy into names + counts (never a value). Reused
  by Fleetd.reportMemberCredentialsGap (startup log line) and by the new
  GET /member-credentials REST endpoint (FleetApp), so the two can no longer
  drift apart the way the probe and the policy did.
- FleetApp gains one route + handler + a Supplier<MemberCredentialPolicyView>
  constructor param (legacy constructors default to ::absent, so existing call
  sites are unaffected).
- probe-member-credentials.sh now fetches its name list from
  GET /member-credentials instead of carrying one. No local fallback: an
  unreachable daemon, an empty/absent policy, or a knownCount/known[] length
  mismatch all refuse with a non-zero exit rather than silently checking zero
  names. Prints "policy contains N; this run checked N" so the two numbers are
  visibly equal.
2026-09-03 13:21:35 +07:00
Dai Ha 2e138a199b CB-634: one shared "fleet" workspace + rename bridged -> fleetd cutover
Two changes ship together here.

1. One shared herdr workspace. The lead and every worker now live in one
   workspace called "fleet", so the operator sees one "session" with many
   windows, not two. Before, the lead sat in a "leads" workspace and workers
   in "bridged-workers", which read as two sessions. The lead is still told
   apart from workers by its exact tab label ("lead: <name>"), so putting them
   in one space is safe. LeadTabScanner keeps the exclude-by-label mechanism
   for split layouts; Fleetd now passes an empty exclude set.

2. Rename the daemon from "bridged" to "fleetd" (the binary, config, scripts,
   launchd/systemd units, module dir, and MCP mount).
   - Module dir bridged/ -> fleetd/; jar finalName -> fleetd.jar.
   - Log line, comments, docs, and CLAUDE.md updated to say fleetd.
   - Scripts renamed: redeploy-bridged.sh -> redeploy-fleetd.sh,
     bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh -> fleetd-launchd-wrapper.sh.
   - Deploy units renamed: dev.ltms.bridged.plist -> dev.ltms.fleetd.plist,
     bridged.service -> fleetd.service; launchd Label -> dev.ltms.fleetd.
   - Config default bridged.yaml -> fleetd.yaml; the legacy bridged.yaml is
     still read as a fallback, and still gitignored.
   - MCP: drop the deprecated bridge_* tool twins; only fleet_* remain. The
     server name is "fleet". The mount name in the local .mcp.json becomes
     "fleet" (gitignored, not in this commit).
   - Env var defaults BRIDGED_API_TOKEN -> FLEETD_API_TOKEN, fixture
     BRIDGED_WORKER_TOKEN -> FLEETD_WORKER_TOKEN.

Kept on purpose: the BRIDGED_MEMBER marker. Renaming it is a coupled change to
the credential-scrub security control (an operator secrets.sh may guard on it),
so it stays until that migration is done on its own.

Metrics were already fleet_* (CB-632); MetricNamesTest still guards that no
name says bridged_.

The canonical CLAUDE.md block and the wiki template stay byte-identical
(wiki working tree edited, committed to the wiki repo separately).

949 tests pass (mvn clean install). 4 fewer than before = the 4 removed
bridge_* alias tests.
2026-08-25 04:01:08 +02:00
Dai Ha 3f4ac2b24e CB-635: --check reports whether broker.uriEnv resolves in a login shell
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An empty uriEnv no longer stops the daemon (#152), so the failure is quiet: bridged
starts, falls back to the in-memory reply inbox, and held reports stop surviving a
restart. --check is the only thing that says so before the fact. The var name is read
out of bridged.yaml so a renamed key cannot make the check lie.
2026-08-23 14:03:08 +02:00
Dai Ha 51bdec22e7 CB-624: report three more rename surfaces as report-only
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CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m14s
--check gains section 6 counting ~/.claude.json (the projects entry keyed
by the old absolute path), ~/.config/herdr/session.json, and JetBrains
recentProjects.xml / trusted-paths.xml across every IntelliJIdea* version.
Apply mode's closing summary lists the same three with manual follow-ups.

None of the three is rewritten automatically, on purpose: ~/.claude.json
is global live Claude Code config, herdr session.json is live process
state, and JetBrains rewrites its own files when the project is reopened
at the new path. Header comment states the reason for each so it does not
read as an oversight.

JetBrains stores these paths as its $USER_HOME$ macro rather than a
literal absolute path, so the counter matches both forms and says which
form the hits used.
2026-08-23 06:07:16 +02:00
Dai Ha d43f670285 CB-624: add scripts/rename-checkout.sh to rename the checkout safely
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Renames ~/LTMS/claude-bridge -> ~/LTMS/fleetd as one auditable command,
modeled on redeploy-bridged.sh. --check reports every surface holding the
old absolute path (checkout files, launchd plist, Claude Code project
state, worktree .git pointers, running daemon). Apply mode stops the
daemon first (launchctl-aware), moves the checkout and the Claude Code
project-state slug dir derived from both paths, repairs worktree gitdir
pointers, rewrites bridged.yaml and the installed plist if they exist,
restarts, and verifies /healthz plus a fresh 'bridged listening' line
anchored to a pre-stop marker.
2026-08-23 05:55:04 +02:00
Dai Ha 03473a286b CB-622: rename bridge_* tools to fleet_* in scripts, e2e tests and config; mount name bridged -> fleetd
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 58s
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2026-08-22 21:49:15 +02:00
Dai Ha 837fed7690 CB-596: the credential probe, as one auditable command
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Issue #82 step 1 is a measurement, and the classifier refuses an ad-hoc pipeline
that enumerates credential names inside a member — correctly. This is the seam:
one file the operator reads once and then runs, instead of approving a shell
pipeline they have to take on trust.

It never prints a credential value or any part of one. #82's criterion 1 asked
for a 6-character prefix; this prints a truncated SHA-256 instead. A prefix of a
short secret is most of the secret and would end up pasted into a ticket, while
the hash answers every question the prefix was for — is it set, is it the same
value as over there, is it the CB-592 sentinel.

Refuses to run unless BRIDGED_MEMBER=1, since the finding is what a MEMBER holds;
--allow-outside-member takes the comparison reading and labels it as such.

I have not run the reading path. That is the operator's call, which is the whole
point of the ticket.
2026-08-16 19:01:42 +02:00
Dai Ha cec48832be CB-600: make it safe to install the launchd agent
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- redeploy-bridged.sh now refuses (not warns) a supervised restart when
  its computed log path disagrees with the loaded plist's StandardOutPath
  — otherwise every post-restart check reads the wrong file and can
  report a clean restart while the daemon crash-loops. The check is a
  pure, testable function; the script gained a source-for-test guard so
  it can be exercised without installing the agent or touching launchd.
- a failed 'launchctl load' after a successful 'unload' now retries once
  and, on ultimate failure, tells the operator the agent is stopped AND
  disabled plus the exact recovery command, instead of leaving that
  silently worse than the pre-redeploy state.
- the plist documents honestly that the crash loop launchd retries is
  unbounded (ThrottleInterval only paces it), and what actually stops it.
- fixed the requiredSecretEnvVars javadoc: the auth.tokenEnv startup
  throw is ~370 lines below its call site, not a few lines above it, and
  only fires in auth.mode: token.
2026-08-16 18:08:58 +02:00
Dai Ha 3ba6d6784c CB-594: make supervision and a working fleet possible at the same time
CI / contract (pull_request) Successful in 44s
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Adds scripts/bridged-launchd-wrapper.sh so the launchd-run daemon still gets
WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN/AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN by execing through a login shell (launchd
never sources secrets.sh itself). bridged now logs at startup which required
token env vars (derived from each profile's tokenEnv/gitTokenEnv, not a
hand-written list) resolved or are MISSING, by name only. Fills in the real
paths in deploy/dev.ltms.bridged.plist for this host and points it at the
wrapper. scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh now detects a loaded launchd agent and
uses launchctl unload/load instead of a raw kill+nohup, because a bare
SIGTERM exits this JVM at 143 (measured) which KeepAlive.SuccessfulExit=false
reads as a crash and would race the script's own restart; --check reports
installed/loaded state and stays read-only.
2026-08-16 17:13:17 +02:00
Dai Ha f0095bf8b2 CB-591: plan the move onto the LLM/MCP gateway, and check AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
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The gateway (llm.ltms.dev) replaced Bifrost on 2026-08-15 and serves an Anthropic
surface and an OpenAI surface, so both member kinds can point at it. The plan is in
docs/CB-591-Gateway-Migration.md; gitea #76 tracks the work.

The opencode half needs no code: OpenCodeLauncher already pins an OpenAI-compatible
endpoint (CB-508), so baseUrl + tokenEnv + provider/model is a config change. That
matters more than it looks — every opencode member today is sol or terra, and both sit
on one OpenAI account via credentialId: openai-shared, so an exhaustion on either locks
out both. A gateway-backed opencode profile is free and off that credential, which
retires a single point of failure rather than only adding capacity.

Also extends the redeploy script's --check to AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN. A profile's tokenEnv is
resolved from the DAEMON's own environment by HerdrPeerLauncher.resolveEnv, so a token
added to secrets.sh after the daemon started is simply absent: the launcher injects an
empty token and the gateway answers 401, long after the restart and with nothing tying
the two together. That is the same trap as WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN, and it gets the same
login-shell check that never prints the value.
2026-08-15 17:06:31 +02:00
Dai Ha 5fe02b7c98 Fix redeploy script reporting failure on a successful restart
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Found by running it. The script launched the daemon with a relative jar path
(cwd is bridged/) but detected it with an absolute one, so pgrep never matched.
The daemon restarted correctly and booted clean, and the script still failed
with 'no process appeared' — the worst shape of bug for a deploy tool, because
it invites a second restart on a daemon that is already healthy.

Detection now matches both path forms, and the launch uses the absolute path so
ps names which checkout is running.
2026-08-15 15:18:44 +02:00
Dai Ha a1052f4fd1 Add scripts/redeploy-bridged.sh so the lead can deploy in one command
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The lead already owned the redeploy, but the command classifier refuses a bare
kill on the daemon, so in practice every deploy still needed the operator to
approve a stop and a start by hand. A single script is the seam that fixes
that: the operator allow-lists one auditable command instead of two ad-hoc
ones.

It also stops the procedure from living only in a checklist people read after
things go wrong. It builds before it stops anything, so a failed build never
leaves the fleet down; waits for the old process to exit instead of assuming;
polls /healthz; and anchors its log checks to a line marker taken before the
restart, so old errors cannot be misread as new ones.

The check with no log line anywhere in the daemon is the reason --check exists:
bridged inherits WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN from the shell that starts it, and starting
from a non-login shell empties it. The daemon boots fine, healthz is green, and
the failure only appears later as workers that cannot open a PR. --check tests
whether the name resolves and never prints the value.
2026-08-15 15:14:21 +02:00