Merge #264: sshAuthSock is not a control, and the config now says so (#184)

This commit is contained in:
Dai Ha
2026-09-03 16:41:52 +07:00
+9 -7
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@@ -676,13 +676,15 @@ guard:
# every name here NOT also in `allow` is overlaid with a non-secret sentinel value before
# the pane's login shell runs — real protection only for names that shell does not itself
# re-export (see the ROUND-2 CORRECTION note above). Under allow-list: reporting only.
# sshAuthSock → whether SSH_AUTH_SOCK may pass through under allow-list ("allow") or must be
# blanked like any other non-derived name ("block", the default). This is a decision you
# have to make explicitly: SSH_AUTH_SOCK is a handle to YOUR ssh-agent, and a member
# holding it can sign with your keys — it sits in no secret file and looks like no
# credential, which is why it slipped past three earlier tickets (gitea #110). Blocking
# it breaks git over SSH inside members (push/fetch authenticate as you); use HTTPS
# remotes or scoped deploy keys instead of allowing it lightly.
# sshAuthSock → whether SSH_AUTH_SOCK may pass through under allow-list ("allow") or is omitted
# from the member environment ("block", the default). Blocking it only omits the
# inherited ssh-agent path. It discourages automatic use of the operator's agent.
# It does not deny same-user access to that socket. It also does not block SSH keys that
# are readable on disk. Git over SSH may still work from inside a member. Keep the block:
# it is correct and costs nothing, but it is not a control. A member runs as the same OS
# user as the lead. Inside one uid, ordinary Unix permissions provide no meaningful
# confidentiality boundary. A real boundary needs a different OS user or OS-level
# confinement, such as a container or VM. That is the open question in fleetd #184.
#
# HOT-RELOADABLE the same way `fleet:` is (CB-559): read fresh on every spawn, so editing this list
# and reloading config (or restarting) changes what the NEXT spawn inherits; already-running members