diff --git a/11-Features.md b/11-Features.md
index d0d05a3..449f688 100644
--- a/11-Features.md
+++ b/11-Features.md
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ six weeks, and the table alone will not carry it.
 | [Durable reply inbox](#durable-reply-inbox) | `broker:` | CB-307 | `msg/AmqpReplyInbox` |
 | [Set a member's auto-compact window](#set-a-members-auto-compact-window) | per-profile `autoCompactWindow:` | CB-636 | `member/ClaudeCodeLauncher`, `member/OpenCodeLauncher` |
 | [Leads on different hosts talk over a shared broker](#leads-on-different-hosts-talk-over-a-shared-broker) | `coordinator:` | CB-637 | `msg/LeadMailbox`, `msg/LeadCoordLoop` |
+| [Draining an inbox is lead-only, on both entry paths](#draining-an-inbox-is-lead-only-on-both-entry-paths) | (always on, with `auth:`) | #272 | `mcp/FleetMcp.pollAction` |
 | [Broker password out of the config](#broker-password-out-of-the-config) | `broker.uriEnv:` | CB-635 | `config/FleetConfig` |
 | [An unreachable broker does not stop the daemon](#an-unreachable-broker-does-not-stop-the-daemon) | (always on) | CB-635 | `Fleetd.selectReplyInbox` |
 | [Reject overlapping rendezvous](#reject-overlapping-rendezvous) | automatic | CB-548 | `msg/Rendezvous` |
@@ -430,6 +431,30 @@ real task's runtime. Without a durable inbox, a reply arriving after that window
 writing into someone else's broker. Also see the known hole: an async ticket that times out while
 the session is still BUSY currently discards the later completion rather than parking it.
 
+## Draining an inbox is lead-only, on both entry paths
+
+**What.** `fleet_poll{target}` empties that session's reply inbox — the replies are removed and a
+second call returns nothing. It is therefore gated as a drain, exactly like `fleet_ack`, and only
+the primary may call it. `fleet_poll{ticket}` is unaffected: it observes an async delegation and
+changes nothing, so a worker or an architect may still poll a ticket it owns.
+
+**On.** Always on, whenever authorization is enforced (an `auth:` block / a real `CallerResolver`).
+Nothing to configure.
+
+**Why.** Until fleetd #272 the MCP handler passed a constant `READ` for both branches, and `READ` is
+open to every authenticated role. Any worker could read a peer's `sessionId` out of `fleet_list` and
+destroy the replies that peer had queued for the primary — an unrecoverable loss, since a drained
+reply is gone. The REST path had always checked `DRAIN`, and the wiki had always described the tool
+as lead-only; the MCP gate was the one that disagreed.
+
+**Gotcha.** An **architect** cannot drain either, even though it may `fleet_send`. That is
+deliberate and matches `fleet_ack`: delegating is not a lifecycle right. If an architect delegates
+with `wait:false` it still polls its own **ticket**, which is the branch that stayed open.
+
+The general rule this came from is worth keeping: when one tool name covers two operations, the gate
+belongs **inside** the branch that picks between them, not above it. `fleet_poll` was the only
+handler in the server with that shape — the other ten were audited and are correct.
+
 ## Broker password out of the config
 
 **What.** `broker.uriEnv:` names an environment variable that holds the AMQP URI, instead of writing
@@ -2542,11 +2567,24 @@ that made it unknowable. One WARN per launcher, not per spawn.
 this path is byte-identical to before, pinned by a test.
 
 **Why it exists.** The detector enumerates **fleetd's own** environment, on the assumption that the
-member pane's login shell exports the same set. Under `memberHerdrSocket:` the pane belongs to a
-different OS user, with a different `$HOME` and a different secret store, so that assumption is
-simply false. The old output would then report on the wrong process — and could call a gap clean
-while the member user exported something dangerous. There is no channel to read another user's
-environment, so the honest answer is the only correct one.
+member pane's login shell exports the same set. Under `memberHerdrSocket:` panes are routed to a
+second herdr, and **fleetd has no channel to confirm what OS user that herdr runs as** — it may be
+the same user or a different one, with a different `$HOME` and a different secret store. Either way
+the assumption is no longer something fleetd can check, so the old output was reporting on a process
+it could not see, and could call a gap clean while the member exported something dangerous. There is
+no channel to read another user's environment, so "unknown" is the only honest answer.
+
+Note the shape of that sentence: the fix is *not* "the member runs as a different user". Saying that
+would be the same mistake pointing the other way — fleetd cannot confirm a different uid any more
+than it can confirm the same one (fleetd #269). What changed is the **claim**, from a false
+certainty to an accurate unknown.
+
+**The count line beside it says whose environment it counted.** The INFO line
+`member credentials: allowed N of M` reads as a statement about the member's pane, and under
+`memberHerdrSocket:` it is not one — the counts come from fleetd's own process. Since fleetd #276 the
+line says so in place, because the caveat used to live only in a javadoc the operator reading
+`fleetd.out` never sees. The counts themselves are unchanged and still real. With
+`memberHerdrSocket:` absent the wording is byte-identical to before.
 
 **The gotcha: this fixes the report, not the control.** Two related defects in the same area are
 open under **#213** — the ZDOTDIR scrub decides whether it can run by reading *fleetd's* `$SHELL`,