diff --git a/11-Features.md b/11-Features.md
index 85ca712..71d4640 100644
--- a/11-Features.md
+++ b/11-Features.md
@@ -3569,3 +3569,77 @@ failed underneath it.
 knob. If either ask ceiling (`FleetMcp`'s or the REST face's, both 115 seconds today) is ever raised
 past it, this delay must be raised with it, or the re-check fires while the question is still open,
 finds nothing to sweep, and the single attempt is spent.
+
+## The REST face reports what the MCP face reports
+
+**What.** `GET /profiles` now carries the two backend outage states that `fleet_profiles` has always
+reported: `quarantined` (the backend said it is out of capacity) and `coolingOff` (that credential
+threw repeated non-exhaustion errors). Each names the `credentialId` and the seconds remaining. The
+two checks are independent, so a profile can appear in both maps at once, and each map is present
+only when at least one profile is in that state. Separately, `GET /agents` and `GET /members` now
+map a herdr transport failure into the same `{error, detail}` envelope every other route uses,
+instead of letting it escape as a bare 500.
+
+**On.** Always on. Nothing to configure.
+
+**Why it exists.** REST is the door a lead falls back to when its MCP mount drops — `listMembers`
+says so in its own comment. So the weaker door was weakest exactly when it was load-bearing. A lead
+on the fallback during an outage could not tell "busy, frees in 40 seconds" from "broken", and a
+monitoring client that parses the JSON error envelope broke at the moment it was asking why the
+fleet looked unreachable. Neither gap ever caused a wrong spawn: a REST spawn goes through the same
+placement gate, so a refusal was still a refusal. These were visibility gaps, not state defects.
+
+**One thing to know for maintenance.** Both doors render the profiles body from **one** method,
+`FleetMcp.profilesView`, and are handed the **same** `BackendQuarantine`/`BackendOutagePolicy`
+instances. Both halves are needed and neither is sufficient. Sharing the instances stops the doors
+reading different facts; sharing the builder stops them reporting those facts differently. The first
+version of this change shared the instances and copied the loop into `FleetApp`, which is the fleetd
+#284 shape — one rule in two places, where the next edit lands on one and not the other. If you add
+a field to that body, add it in `profilesView` and both doors get it.
+
+## A released reply goes back to the broker instead of being dropped
+
+**What.** When a member's session is torn down, `AmqpReplyInbox.release` now cancels that target's
+consumer and then nacks every delivery it still holds **with requeue**, so an undrained reply stays
+recoverable. Before, it dropped its local record and left the message unacked on a still-open
+channel — invisible to `fleet_poll` and `peek`, and freed only when the whole AMQP connection
+happened to drop.
+
+**On.** Always on, for the durable (AMQP) inbox. The in-memory inbox is unaffected and correctly
+still drops on release, because it is soft state with no broker behind it.
+
+**Why it exists.** This was silent loss of the one artefact the bridge exists to carry. The path was
+ordinary: a member replies with no live waiter, so the reply is held; the lead sends that target a
+fresh task, which clears the stranded-reply *flag* but never drains the actual entry; the session is
+later stopped, so the teardown skips recovery because the flag says there is nothing to recover, and
+then drops the entry. The lead sees a member that finished and reported nothing, with no way to tell
+that from a member that genuinely never replied.
+
+**One thing to know for maintenance.** The order is cancel first, then nack — not the reverse. A
+nack-with-requeue while the consumer is still attached hands the message straight back to that same
+consumer as soon as a prefetch slot frees, racing `release`'s own cleanup and leaving a stale entry.
+A delivery tag stays valid for `basicNack` on an open channel whether or not its consumer is
+attached, so cancelling first costs nothing. This was found against a real broker, not by reading
+the code, and it is why `AmqpReplyInboxContractTest` needs Docker.
+
+## A failed spawn no longer leaves a live pane behind
+
+**What.** Two spawn-side exits created a pane and left it running when the spawn failed: the
+readiness gate propagated an unrelated herdr error without teardown, and pane placement never closed
+the pane it had just split when the peer failed to start. Both now close the pane, best-effort, and
+still hand the caller the original exception unchanged.
+
+**On.** Always on.
+
+**Why it exists.** Nothing downstream could clean these up. `SessionManager.acquire` never learns the
+pane id — `spawn` throws before it returns one — so its failure path removed the worktree and the
+branch and could do nothing about the pane. The result was a live backend process with a deleted
+working directory, absent from `fleet_list`, holding a real backend seat that nothing decremented.
+The pane-placement leak was the worse of the two: with no named agent started, the orphan reaper
+cannot see it either, so no restart ever reclaimed it.
+
+**One thing to know for maintenance.** The readiness gate still refuses to *interpret* an error it
+does not recognise — it rethrows it unchanged, and a test pins that. Closing the pane and converting
+the exception are different things, and only the first was missing. Do not "simplify" this by
+mapping the error to `PeerUnreachableException`; that reintroduces the exact behaviour #176 wrote
+`failFastOnGoneBackend` to keep distinct.