Dai Ha
710 lines
49 KiB
YAML
710 lines
49 KiB
YAML
# bridged configuration (example). Copy to bridged.yaml and adjust.
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#
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# bridged is the sole gateway between primary/worker Claude sessions and herdr.
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# It is NOT a Claude process and must never carry ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL.
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# REST + MCP listen address. Keep it on loopback unless you also switch auth.mode to `token`
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# below — bridged REFUSES TO START on a non-loopback bind under loopback-trust (see auth).
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bind:
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host: 127.0.0.1
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port: 8765
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# API authentication (CB-501). Governs how a caller that is NOT an on-host worker pane proves it
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# is the primary. Worker identity never depends on this: a loopback peer PID that maps to a herdr
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# pane is unforgeable and is always honoured, so turning auth on cannot lock the fleet out.
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#
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# mode: loopback-trust → DEFAULT, and the historical behaviour: any loopback caller that is not
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# a worker is the primary, no credential needed. Sound ONLY because the
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# OS refuses remote connections to a loopback socket.
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# mode: token → such a caller must send `Authorization: Bearer <token>`; without it it
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# is anonymous and authorized for nothing. REQUIRED for a non-loopback
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# bind — the daemon fails fast otherwise, because "unauthenticated ⇒
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# primary" on a reachable port would hand spawn/stop/send to anyone.
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# tokenEnv → host env var holding the token (never the literal value). Default
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# BRIDGED_API_TOKEN. Read only in token mode; empty ⇒ startup fails.
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#
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# TLS is deliberately NOT terminated in the daemon (CB-501 D3): run a reverse proxy in front and
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# let it own certificate lifecycle, e.g.
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# location / { proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8765; proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization; }
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# The broker link gets TLS from its own URI (amqps://…) — see `broker` below.
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# auth:
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# mode: token
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# tokenEnv: BRIDGED_API_TOKEN
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# Optional pinned primary terminal (CB-307). Names the herdr pane the PRIMARY itself runs in:
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# a caller whose connection maps to this pane resolves as the primary (no credential needed —
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# the pane mapping is as unforgeable as a worker's), and reply nudges are pushed to it.
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# REQUIRED when the primary runs inside a herdr pane — without it the pane match reads the
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# primary as a worker and refuses spawn/send/stop. Get the id from fleet_whoami; re-pin if
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# the primary moves panes.
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# primary:
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# terminal: term_0123456789abcd
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# pushReminders: 5 # max nudges before giving up (default 5)
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# pushBackoffMs: 15000 # delay between nudges (default 15000)
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# CB-530: MORE THAN ONE LEAD. `primary:` above is singular by construction — every other pane
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# resolves as a worker — which is right for one lead driving a fleet and wrong the moment two leads
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# (say a Claude lead and an opencode lead) work as peers: the second is silently demoted and refused
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# every orchestration call. List each lead's pane here and all of them resolve as leads.
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#
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# tab → the ONLY field identity depends on (CB-579); the exact label of the tab hosting the lead.
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# Label the tab yourself, or let bridged label one it launches — see `fleet.leaders:` below.
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# kind/model → descriptive; they document what runs in the pane and are echoed by fleet_whoami
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#
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# A lead's tab must already carry its label (or be launched by bridged, which labels it) — there is
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# no terminal id to paste in and nothing to re-pin when the session restarts: the tab survives, so
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# the same label resolves the same lead again on the next scan.
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# `fleet_whoami` reports `{"role":"primary","leader":"<name>"}`; role stays "primary" because a lead
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# IS a primary for authorization, so nothing that keys on the role breaks.
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#
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# KEEP `primary:` when adding leads: it still addresses the CB-307 push loop, which needs a single
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# destination for its nudges, and is a separate mechanism from lead identity — see `fleet.leaders:`.
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#
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# Leads are configured under `fleet.leaders:` — see THE FLEET further down.
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#
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# Two things stop the tab-name convention from becoming a way to claim leadership: the configured
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# member spaces are excluded from the scan, so nothing bridged places can land in a matching tab;
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# and startup REFUSES a `tabPrefix` that the fleet tabLabel template, or any per-profile `tabLabel`
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# override, also matches — so the two namespaces cannot overlap by accident. The label is a NAME,
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# never a capability: what a pane may do is decided by the role the daemon resolves for it.
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# CB-551: IDLE-LEAD HEARTBEAT — nudge the single lead back to work when it has been continuously
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# idle (no open fleet_send driving it) past the quiet period. The fleet is one lead + architects +
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# workers, so a lead that stalls is a single point of failure; the ReplyPushLoop only nudges when a
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# reply lands, and this timer catches the gap where nothing lands and the lead just sits idle.
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#
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# Opt-in on purpose — it SPENDS the operator's subscription on its own initiative (each nudge starts
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# a lead turn nobody asked for), so upgrading the daemon must never switch it on for you. Absent
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# block = feature off, exactly as before.
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#
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# Three knobs, each with a default that errs on the side of not burning context:
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# idleAfterSeconds: 300 # how long the lead must stay idle before the FIRST nudge (default 300 —
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# # absorbs normal post-turn pauses; re-prompting every pause burns context)
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# backoffMs: 60000 # re-check cadence / spacing between nudges past the quiet period (default 60000)
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# quietNudgeCap: 3 # cap on consecutive nudges that find NOTHING pending, then it stops
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# # until real state appears (default 3 — never nag an empty fleet forever)
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# leadHeartbeat:
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# idleAfterSeconds: 300
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# backoffMs: 60000
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# quietNudgeCap: 3
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# Fleet health detection is dormant unless enabled (CB-573). It reads one whole-fleet agent list
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# per tick.
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# intervalSeconds → how often a tick runs (default 30). ENFORCED floor of 15: the code computes
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# Math.max(15, intervalSeconds), so a lower value is silently raised, not
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# rejected.
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# workingSuspectAfterSeconds, paneProbeIntervalSeconds → accepted and parsed, but NOT YET READ by
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# anything — the dormant monitor only consumes intervalSeconds today (CB-573
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# shipped ahead of the evidence publishers these two knobs are for). Setting
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# them changes nothing right now, and no minimum is enforced on either, because
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# nothing reads them to enforce one. They exist so a later build can start
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# honouring them without another config-shape change.
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# notifications.mode → "webhook" flips what fleet_list REPORTS (healthCoverage: "full" instead
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# of "detection-only") — it does NOT make bridged send any webhook call; no
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# delivery mechanism is implemented yet. Any other value, or omitting the
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# block, reports "detection-only".
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# health:
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# enabled: true
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# intervalSeconds: 30
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# workingSuspectAfterSeconds: 600
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# paneProbeIntervalSeconds: 60
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# notifications:
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# mode: disabled
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# herdr Unix socket. Omit to use the client default
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# (${HERDR_SOCKET_PATH:-~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock}).
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herdrSocket: ~/.config/herdr/herdr.sock
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# How member sessions are spawned. Define one or more named profiles (backends) under
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# `profiles`; each key is the profile name (also the ccs profile). A profile says only WHICH
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# BACKEND — model, CLI adapter, credentials, cost. It says nothing about what a member spawned on
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# it is for; that is the member's role, and roles live under `fleet:` below. Which profile an
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# unqualified spawn lands on comes from that role's pool, not from a global default.
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#
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# Shared knobs (placement/workspace) can be repeated per profile; they usually match.
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# placement: tab → each worker lands in its OWN tab in a dedicated worker space (default).
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# Use `pane` for the legacy behaviour (split the focused tab).
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# mcpUrl → bridged mounts the bridge MCP (--mcp-config, inline) + reply charter
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# (--append-system-prompt) as launch flags; nothing is written to the profile.
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# ideMcpUrl → opt-in (CB-634), default off. When set, bridged mounts the IDE Index MCP as a
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# second inline server named `intellij`, and adds an IDE charter that pins every
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# ide_* call to the member's own worktree. A URL, not a boolean — host and port
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# are host-specific. Set it only on a host where the IDE actually runs.
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# ideProjectDir → repo-relative module dir the IDE opens and the overlay pins (CB-634). Only read
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# when ideMcpUrl is set. This repo's Maven pom lives in `bridged/`, not at the
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# worktree root, so opening the root imports no module and ide_* resolves nothing;
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# set this to `bridged`. Omit for a repo whose project is the worktree root.
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# ideOpenCommand → host command that opens ideProjectDir in the IDE at spawn (CB-634 auto-open).
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# Only read when ideMcpUrl is set. `{dir}` is replaced with the absolute module
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# dir and the command runs through `/bin/sh -c`, so set env inline if needed —
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# e.g. `env DISPLAY=:10.0 idea {dir}`. Best-effort: a failure is logged, never
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# fails the spawn. Omit to open the member's module by hand. There is no close
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# half yet — an opened module stays open until the operator closes it.
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# autoCompactWindow → opt-in, default off. A bounded token window that forces a spawned member to
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# compact its context instead of running on the backend's own default and dying
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# mid-turn (losing its fleet_reply — the whole point of the turn — with it).
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# Validated at config load to [100000, 1000000] — the band Claude Code's own
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# --autocompact flag accepts.
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# CROSS-BACKEND SEMANTICS DIFFER: on claude-code this is a launch-time
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# `--autocompact <tokens>` flag — the member compacts AT this window. opencode
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# has no equivalent flag (it only forces `compaction.auto: true`, unconditionally,
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# already), so this is instead applied as the model's `limit.context` in the
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# generated opencode.json — the member compacts WITHIN this window, not exactly
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# at it — and only when this profile's `model:` is in `provider/model` form; if it
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# isn't, bridged logs a WARN naming the profile rather than silently doing nothing.
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# tokenEnv → host env var holding the worker's auth token (value never stored in config);
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# omit for a backend that needs no token (e.g. a local ollama).
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# cwd → pin this profile's working directory (CB-112). Omit to inherit the primary's
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# cwd on an MCP spawn, else the daemon's cwd — never $HOME. See
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# docs/Worker-Startup-and-Trust.md.
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# configDir → CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR for the worker, so it inherits that profile's
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# skills/MCP/hooks. Omit to leave the worker on the host default.
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# parityOverlay → repo-relative paths copied primary→worktree so a worker in a provisioned
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# worktree sees the same local config (CB-301-ext). Omit for the default set:
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# [.env, .envrc]. (.claude/settings.local.json is NOT in the default — it
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# pre-approves IDE/tool grants a member must not hold ambiently; CB-525/CB-634.)
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#
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# Do NOT add .mcp.json (CB-525). A worker's tools are whatever its launcher
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# mounts — the bridge, and nothing else. Replicating the primary's MCP config
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# handed a worker the primary's IDE servers, which are bound to the primary's
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# checkout, so its navigation returned paths OUTSIDE its own worktree: one
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# worker made all 59 of its edits in the primary tree while compiling its
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# worktree, and every build it ran was of code that did not contain them.
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# bridged neutralizes a provisioned worktree's .mcp.json for this reason;
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# listing it here would copy the primary's back over that.
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# gitTokenEnv → host env var holding the git-forge API token. When set, its value is injected
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# as GITEA_TOKEN so the worker can open its OWN PR at checkpoint (CB-302).
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# Opt-in by design — omit and the worker gets no PR-create grant (push over
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# SSH is unaffected). The token value itself is never stored in this file.
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# gitHostEnv → host env var holding the forge host (default GITEA_HOST). Injected as
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# GITEA_HOST *only* alongside a resolved gitTokenEnv.
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# exhaustedPattern → regex matched against a completion-fallback scrape (CB-578 stage A) to
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# classify a turn that ended with no fleet_reply as the backend having
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# refused on a subscription usage limit, rather than a real answer. Opt-in —
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# omit and this profile's completion fallback behaves exactly as before.
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# Every backend words its refusal differently, so this is config, never a
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# vendor string baked into bridged itself.
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# DEFERRED: compiled once into a startup pattern map — editing it needs a
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# daemon restart, same as this profile's model/baseUrl/argv.
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# credentialId → CB-578 stage B: the credential this profile quarantines WITH when a
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# BACKEND_EXHAUSTED classification fires. Two profiles that set the SAME
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# credentialId share one quarantine — the case this exists for is two models
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# on one account (e.g. sol and terra both billing one OpenAI credential): an
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# exhaustion on either one must lock out both, or the fleet just walks onto
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# the same dead account under the sibling's name. Opt-in — omit and this
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# profile quarantines alone, under its own name, exactly as if the field did
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# not exist. Cooldown length is the top-level quarantineCooldownSeconds below.
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# HOT: read live at every spawn/exhaustion check — no restart needed.
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# env → extra environment for this profile's workers, as a literal key/value map
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# (CB-511). Use it to give workers a toolchain.
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#
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# A worker's environment does NOT come from your shell. bridged hands herdr an
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# explicit env map and herdr merges it into ITS OWN process env — so before
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# CB-511 a worker inherited whatever PATH the herdr server happened to be
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# started with, which on a long-lived herdr can predate your toolchain entirely
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# and leave workers unable to run `mvn` or `java` at all.
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# bridged now propagates ITS OWN PATH to every worker by default; set `env:`
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# only to override that or add more (JAVA_HOME, …). Since the default is the
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# daemon's PATH, make sure the daemon is started with a good one — see the PATH
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# lines in deploy/dev.ltms.fleet.plist and deploy/bridged.service.
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#
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# Adapter-owned variables always win over `env:`: ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL and the
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# rest of the ANTHROPIC_*/CLAUDE_* wiring are applied after it, so an `env:`
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# entry cannot repoint a worker past the SubscriptionGuard — which is checked
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# against `baseUrl` alone.
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# Put `defaultMode: "auto"` in each ccs profile so the worker runs autonomously.
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profiles:
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gx10: # ccs profile name (NOT a hostname)
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kind: claude-code # which adapter spawns this profile (default; may omit)
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baseUrl: http://gx01.gw:8000 # the vLLM host this profile targets (gx00.gw / gx01.gw)
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model: coder
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placement: tab
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workspace: bridged-workers
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# tabLabel: an optional per-profile override; the fleet template usually covers it
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mcpUrl: http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp
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tokenEnv: BRIDGED_WORKER_TOKEN
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argv: ["ccs", "gx10"]
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# weight: relative selection weight for automatic placement (weighted, round-robin, and
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# fixed's fallback walk). Absent defaults to 1.0. An explicit 0 or negative value means
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# "never auto-select this profile" (CB-554) — it stays reachable via an explicit
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# `fleet_spawn{profile:"gx10"}`, which bypasses placement entirely; only automatic
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# selection skips it.
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weight: 0.5
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# maxLoad: max live workers on this profile. Omit for unlimited. An explicit 0 (CB-585) caps
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# the profile at zero live members — it is excluded from automatic placement and an explicit
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# `fleet_spawn{profile:"gx10"}` against it is refused too; a cap holds even when the profile
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# is named directly. Negative is refused at config load — there is no sane meaning for it.
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maxLoad: 2
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# subscription: true
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# THE KNOB THAT DECIDES WHO PAYS (CB-539). Default false. When true, this profile's members
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# run on the OPERATOR'S OWN Claude subscription instead of a metered endpoint — every spawn
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# bills your plan and eats your usage limit. Off-subscription is the whole point of this
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# daemon, so treat `true` as a deliberate exception, not a convenience.
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#
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# What changes when it is set (ClaudeCodeLauncher):
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# - no ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL and no ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN are injected — the member inherits
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# the operator's own Claude Code auth, which is exactly why it bills the plan;
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# - SubscriptionGuard never vets it, because there is no baseUrl to vet;
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# - no token is required, so `tokenEnv` is irrelevant here.
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#
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# MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with `baseUrl` — setting both is refused at config load (CB-542). On the
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# subscription path no guard would vet the URL, so allowing both would be a way around the
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# guard rather than a configuration.
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#
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# GOTCHA 1 — it is invisible to the startup secret check. `Fleetd.reportRequiredSecrets`
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# skips subscription profiles on purpose (they need no token), so a boot log that reports
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# every secret as fine says nothing about these profiles.
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#
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# GOTCHA 2 — `maxLoad` is the ONLY throttle you have here. There is no metering, no budget
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# and no refusal on cost; the cap on live members is the single thing standing between a
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# fan-out and your monthly limit. Set it deliberately and keep it small.
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# gitTokenEnv: GITEA_TOKEN # opt-in: let this profile's workers open their own PR (CB-302)
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# gitHostEnv: GITEA_HOST # defaults to GITEA_HOST; injected only with gitTokenEnv
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# exhaustedPattern: "usage limit has been reached" # opt-in: classify a usage-limit refusal (CB-578)
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# credentialId: shared-openai # opt-in: quarantine together with every other profile sharing this id (CB-578)
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# configDir: /Users/me/.ccs/instances/gx10 # CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR — inherit that profile's skills/MCP
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# cwd: /Users/me/src/myrepo # pin the working dir; omit to inherit the primary's
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# parityOverlay: [".env", ".envrc"] # the default; never add .mcp.json or .claude/settings.local.json — see above
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# ideMcpUrl: http://127.0.0.1:29170/index-mcp/streamable-http # opt-in (CB-634): IDE code intelligence, pinned to the worktree
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# ideProjectDir: bridged # CB-634: module dir the IDE opens + the overlay pins (this repo's pom is in bridged/)
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# ideOpenCommand: env DISPLAY=:10.0 idea {dir} # CB-634 auto-open: opens {dir} in the IDE at spawn; omit to open by hand
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# autoCompactWindow: 250000 # opt-in: bound member context; claude-code compacts AT this, opencode within it (model limit.context)
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gx11: # a second backend, so `placement: weighted` has a choice
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baseUrl: http://gx01.gw:8000 # self-hosted; ccs handles the model + token
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placement: tab
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workspace: bridged-workers
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# tabLabel: an optional per-profile override; the fleet template usually covers it
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mcpUrl: http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp
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argv: ["ccs", "gx11"]
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weight: 0.5
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maxLoad: 2
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# Pin an auto-compact window BELOW the served model's context ceiling. The global
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# ~/.claude/settings.json value is shared by every ccs instance and the primary, so the
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# per-profile override belongs here. Equal to the ceiling means auto-compact never fires
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# before the server rejects the prompt, which kills a worker mid-turn (CB-523).
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env:
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CLAUDE_CODE_AUTO_COMPACT_WINDOW: "280000"
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# CB-402: a second coding-agent kind, proving the PeerLauncher SPI is provider-neutral.
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# opencode is provider-agnostic and uses NONE of Claude's private seams: no ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL /
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# SubscriptionGuard (so it needs no `guard` host entry), no --mcp-config / --append-system-prompt.
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# The bridge MCP + reply charter mount via a generated OPENCODE_CONFIG file, and the model is a
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# `provider/model` selector. Placement, tabs, cwd, and the readiness gate are shared with Claude.
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#
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# Dogfood-verified 2026-07-29 against opencode 1.18.5 (spawn → readiness gate → fleet_send →
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# structured fleet_reply → teardown). The `opencode/*-free` models run on opencode's own gateway
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# and need NO credentials — check `opencode models` for the current free list, since the names
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# change. That also makes the worker off-subscription by construction.
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# opencode-free:
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# kind: opencode
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# model: opencode/north-mini-code-free # `provider/model` selector, injected as `-m`
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# placement: tab
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# workspace: bridged-workers
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# tabLabel: "opencode: {profile} #{n}"
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# mcpUrl: http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp
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# argv: ["opencode"]
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#
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# CB-508: point an opencode profile at your OWN OpenAI-compatible endpoint (local vLLM, llama.cpp,
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# LM Studio, TGI…) instead of opencode's gateway. Setting `baseUrl` on a `kind: opencode` profile
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# makes the bridge emit a custom `provider` block into the generated opencode.json — opencode has
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# no ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL seam, so this is how the endpoint is pinned.
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# baseUrl → a bare host:port gets `/v1` appended (where these servers mount the API); a URL that
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# already has a path is used verbatim, so a custom mount point still works.
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# model → MUST be "<provider>/<model>". The provider half names the generated block; the model
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# half must match an id the server reports at /v1/models. One field drives both the
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# declaration and the `-m` flag, so they cannot drift apart. A bare model name with a
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# baseUrl set is rejected at spawn rather than silently using the default gateway.
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# tokenEnv → optional; its value becomes the provider apiKey. Most local servers ignore the key,
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# so a placeholder is used when unset (the AI SDK still requires a non-empty one).
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# NOTE: no `guard` entry is needed even with a baseUrl set. The SubscriptionGuard exists to stop a
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# worker borrowing the primary's Anthropic subscription, and an opencode process has no Anthropic
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# credential path at all.
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# opencode-local:
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# kind: opencode
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# baseUrl: http://127.0.0.1:8000
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# model: local-vllm/deepseek-v4-flash
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# placement: tab
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# workspace: bridged-workers
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# tabLabel: "opencode: {profile} #{n}"
|
|
# mcpUrl: http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp
|
|
# argv: ["opencode"]
|
|
# How an unqualified spawn chooses a profile: fixed (default, reproduces pre-CB-518 behaviour),
|
|
# round-robin, or weighted. Omitting this key is a strict no-op for existing configs.
|
|
#
|
|
# `weighted` IS NOT "cheapest first" — read this before you set weights (CB-589).
|
|
# It is smooth weighted round-robin: it spreads spawns across EVERY profile that has a free slot,
|
|
# in weight ratio. It has no idea which profile costs money. So with local:10 / paid:2 you do not
|
|
# get "use local, overflow to paid" — you get roughly one spawn in six going to the paid profile
|
|
# while the local box still has a free slot.
|
|
#
|
|
# There is a sharper second effect. The policy's running score map lives for the daemon's whole
|
|
# life. While a profile is at maxLoad it is filtered out and its score FREEZES, so the paid
|
|
# profiles keep accumulating against it. When the local slot frees up it returns with a stale
|
|
# score and can LOSE the next pick — a paid spawn while the free box sits idle.
|
|
#
|
|
# Until a real cost-first policy exists, the workaround is to make the ratio decisive rather than
|
|
# proportional: give the free profile a weight so large that it wins every pick it is eligible
|
|
# for, and paid profiles only ever take genuine overflow. On this host that is local weight 100
|
|
# against paid weights of ~1.
|
|
#
|
|
# The gotcha with that workaround: it expresses a PREFERENCE ORDER through a RATIO knob. Add a
|
|
# future profile at weight 150 and it silently outranks the free box, with nothing to warn you.
|
|
# Re-check the weights whenever you add a profile.
|
|
placement: weighted
|
|
|
|
# How long a credential sits out after a BACKEND_EXHAUSTED classification (CB-578 stage B), in
|
|
# seconds, before a spawn may land on it again. Applies to every profile's effective credential
|
|
# (its own name, or its credentialId if set above) — there is no per-profile override. Default
|
|
# 1800 (30 minutes) when omitted or non-positive.
|
|
# DEFERRED: baked once into the BackendQuarantine built at startup — a running quarantine keeps
|
|
# its original cooldown regardless; a new value only applies to a quarantine that starts after a
|
|
# restart. Editing this needs a daemon restart to take effect.
|
|
# quarantineCooldownSeconds: 1800
|
|
|
|
# Re-read this file without restarting the daemon (CB-559). Off unless you add this block, so an
|
|
# upgraded bridged keeps the old behaviour: the file is read once at boot and never again.
|
|
# enabled → turn the watch on. bridged checks the file's modified time on a timer and
|
|
# reloads when it moves.
|
|
# intervalSeconds → how often to check (default 10). One `stat` per tick, so this is cheap.
|
|
#
|
|
# Not every key can move under a running daemon, and the difference is about what already exists
|
|
# when the reload happens — not about how important the key is:
|
|
# HOT → takes effect on the next spawn: the whole `fleet:` block (every role pool,
|
|
# `charters`, and `tabLabel`), `placement:`, and an existing profile's weight / maxLoad
|
|
# / credentialId. Those are hot because the placement policy (and, for credentialId,
|
|
# the CB-578 stage B quarantine check) reads them through a supplier — being config is
|
|
# not by itself enough to make a key hot.
|
|
# EXCEPT `fleet.leaders`: Fleetd.main reads it once at startup to build the lead tab
|
|
# scanner and launcher, and neither is rebuilt on reload. A changed/added/removed
|
|
# `fleet.leaders` entry is silently accepted — the reload reports "config reloaded"
|
|
# with nothing in the deferred list — but has NO effect until you restart. Treat it
|
|
# as deferred in practice, even though today's reload output does not say so.
|
|
# DEFERRED → accepted into the new config, but the wiring built at startup keeps the old value
|
|
# until you restart: `lifecycle:`, `leadHeartbeat:`, `guard:`, `worktreeRoot:`,
|
|
# `spawnReadyTimeoutMs` / `spawnReadyPollMs`, `quarantineCooldownSeconds` (CB-578
|
|
# stage B — baked once into the quarantine tracker built at startup), ADDING or
|
|
# REMOVING a profile (a new backend needs its own launcher, and launchers are built
|
|
# once), AND an existing profile's launch settings — model, baseUrl, argv, env,
|
|
# configDir, mcpUrl, tabLabel, exhaustedPattern. The launcher takes a copy of
|
|
# `profiles:` at startup and resolves every spawn out of that copy, so those never
|
|
# reach a launch until you restart. The reload logs them by name rather than
|
|
# pretending they applied.
|
|
# COLD → cannot change at all: `bind:`, `herdrSocket:`, `broker:` and `auth:`. The socket is
|
|
# bound, the broker connection is open, and the auth mode decides who may reach the
|
|
# port that is already listening.
|
|
#
|
|
# A changed COLD key refuses the WHOLE reload — not the hot half applied and the cold half warned
|
|
# about. A half-applied reload would leave the daemon matching no file on disk, which is the worst
|
|
# thing a reload can do to an operator debugging one. A file that fails to parse or fails a startup
|
|
# validator is refused the same way, and the running config stays live.
|
|
# configReload:
|
|
# enabled: true
|
|
# intervalSeconds: 10
|
|
|
|
# THE FLEET (CB-557) — who the daemon may run, and under which role. This one block replaced four
|
|
# older keys: `leaders:`, `members:`, `leadScan:` and `defaultProfile:`.
|
|
#
|
|
# A member is anything a lead spawns, and every member has two INDEPENDENT attributes:
|
|
# role — which contract: architect, dev or reviewer. It picks the launch charter, the role
|
|
# file, the playbook skill and the authz row.
|
|
# profile — which backend: one of the `profiles:` keys above (model, CLI adapter, cost).
|
|
# They vary on their own. A reviewer may run on the same profile as the dev whose diff it reads,
|
|
# which is why the two cannot be one field.
|
|
#
|
|
# The ROLE IS THE CONTAINING KEY, not a `role:` field. That is not only tidier: a misspelled role
|
|
# used to parse into a member with no contract at all, while a misspelled pool name here simply
|
|
# declares nothing.
|
|
#
|
|
# Each pool lists the profiles that role MAY run on — these are pools, not identities. That is also
|
|
# what replaced `defaultProfile:`: an unqualified spawn names a role, and that role's pool supplies
|
|
# the candidates, in definition order. A dev and a reviewer staying anonymous is exactly compatible
|
|
# with being listed here; the entry key just names the entry.
|
|
fleet:
|
|
# Optional launch-charter text, keyed only by the singular role wire names: architect, dev,
|
|
# reviewer. Changes are HOT and reach the next spawn without a daemon restart. Do not put secrets
|
|
# here: a later launch step writes this text to a world-readable temp file, and ${ENV} interpolation
|
|
# is deliberately not supported.
|
|
charters:
|
|
architect: |-
|
|
You are an architect in this fleet. You refine work before anyone builds it:
|
|
scope, acceptance criteria, risks, and a unit split. You read the repo and
|
|
write analysis. You never commit production code and never open a PR.
|
|
A design task is worked by two architects. Design alone first, then exchange
|
|
and say plainly where you disagree. Do not concede just to agree.
|
|
dev: |-
|
|
You implement the one unit you were given, and nothing else. You test it,
|
|
commit it, and open your own pull request. You never merge.
|
|
reviewer: |-
|
|
You review the diff you were given. You report bugs, risks and missing tests.
|
|
You do not change code.
|
|
|
|
# Optional. Template for a member tab's label; {role}, {profile}, {model} and {n} are substituted.
|
|
# {n} counts per role+profile, so `dev: sonnet #2` really is the second sonnet dev. Because {role}
|
|
# comes from a closed enum, a generated label can never begin with a lead's tabPrefix.
|
|
# tabLabel: "{role}: {profile} #{n}"
|
|
|
|
# Panes that orchestrate rather than are orchestrated. A lead may now be CREATED as well as
|
|
# recognised: give it a `profile:` and the daemon launches the shortfall when fewer than
|
|
# `instances` are live. Omit `profile:` and it is recognise-only, as before.
|
|
#
|
|
# `tab:` (CB-579) is REQUIRED and is the only field identity depends on — the exact label of the
|
|
# tab hosting the lead, matched case-insensitively. Label the tab yourself and put that same
|
|
# string here, and the pane is recognised on the next rescan. Reopen the tab later, or the session
|
|
# inside it restarts — the terminal id changes; the tab, and its label, do not, so no config edit
|
|
# follows a restart.
|
|
#
|
|
# A lead the daemon launches is labelled BY the daemon with this same `tab:` value, so it is found
|
|
# by the same scan. A lead counts as live only when herdr also reports a running agent in that
|
|
# tab — a label left behind by a session that died does not block the relaunch, and a tab that is
|
|
# gone entirely drops out of the next scan rather than being remembered forever.
|
|
#
|
|
# An auto-launched lead is NOT a member: it gets no worker reply charter, is never registered with
|
|
# the session lifecycle (the idle reaper would kill your orchestrator), and stays on the
|
|
# subscription — ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL/AUTH_TOKEN are stripped from its env whatever the profile says.
|
|
#
|
|
# GET THE `tab:` VALUE RIGHT. A pane that does not match any configured `tab:` (a typo, a renamed
|
|
# tab, a pane no entry names at all) is not recognised as a lead — it resolves as an ordinary
|
|
# WORKER instead, silently, and every orchestration call it makes (spawn/stop/send/drain) is
|
|
# refused. There is no error at startup for this: an unmatched pane is simply not a lead. If your
|
|
# primary suddenly can't spawn or send, check this section first.
|
|
# leaders:
|
|
# opus-5.0:
|
|
# profile: opus # omit to never create this lead, only recognise it
|
|
# instances: 1 # desired live count; only the shortfall is launched. 0 = off
|
|
# tab: "lead: opus-5.0" # REQUIRED — the exact tab label this lead lives in
|
|
# tabPrefix: "lead:" # only used to guard against a worker tabLabel colliding with
|
|
# # this convention at startup; plays no part in matching a lead
|
|
# scanIntervalSeconds: 10 # rescan cadence, and the worst case before a new tab is seen
|
|
# workspace: leads # where a launched lead's tab is created (default "leads").
|
|
# # MUST NOT be a member workspace — those are excluded from the
|
|
# # scan, so a lead placed in one is never found again.
|
|
# cwd: /path/to/repo # the launched lead's working directory (default: bridged's own)
|
|
# kind: claude # descriptive; reported by fleet_whoami
|
|
# gpt-sol-5.6:
|
|
# tab: "lead: gpt-sol-5.6"
|
|
# kind: opencode
|
|
# model: openai/gpt-5.6-terra
|
|
|
|
# architects:
|
|
# architect-1:
|
|
# profile: opus # a strong model, on the operator's subscription
|
|
# architect-2:
|
|
# profile: sol # a different vendor on purpose — two architects that share a
|
|
# # model share its blind spots
|
|
developers:
|
|
gx10:
|
|
profile: gx10
|
|
# reviewers:
|
|
# gx10:
|
|
# profile: gx10 # the same backend may serve two roles; that is the point
|
|
|
|
# Subscription boundary. A worker's base_url host MUST be one of these; the primary
|
|
# must carry none. Every profile above must have its host listed here.
|
|
guard:
|
|
offSubscriptionHosts:
|
|
- gx00.gw
|
|
- gx01.gw
|
|
|
|
# Member credential policy (CB-596, gitea issue #82). A herdr pane runs a LOGIN shell, and that
|
|
# shell re-sources the operator's own secret store — so a spawned member inherits every credential
|
|
# the operator's shell holds, not just the ones bridged means to give it. Measured on this host:
|
|
# 31 credential names, all set, with only ONE (GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN) blocked before this — and that
|
|
# block was a single name hardcoded in HerdrPeerLauncher.java, not driven by this file. This block
|
|
# replaces that hardcoded shadow with a config-driven list of names.
|
|
#
|
|
# ROUND-2 CORRECTION, measured live: the pane-creation env overlay below (applied at tab.create /
|
|
# pane.split, BEFORE the pane's login shell runs) does NOT survive that login shell for any name
|
|
# secrets.sh actually exports — the shell re-exports it afterwards and overwrites the sentinel.
|
|
# Proof: GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN comes back blocked only because secrets.sh itself carries a guarded
|
|
# export (`[ -n "${BRIDGED_MEMBER:-}" ] || export GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN=...`) — that guard, not this
|
|
# file, is what wins. No other name in `known` below has a matching guard in secrets.sh yet (1
|
|
# guard measured against 33 export lines there). So today this block's overlay is REAL protection
|
|
# only for a name secrets.sh does not export, or a peer kind whose pane never runs a login shell —
|
|
# for everything secrets.sh exports and guards, the guard in secrets.sh (out of scope for this
|
|
# ticket) is what actually blocks it, not this list. An exec-time fix (winning after the login
|
|
# shell finishes, before the agent process starts) was attempted and found to have no seam in the
|
|
# current herdr protocol — AgentControl.start takes a fixed `kind` (herdr resolves the executable)
|
|
# plus trailing CLI args for that binary, not an arbitrary argv or an env map; only tab.create /
|
|
# pane.split accept `env`, and that is this same pane-creation overlay. See gitea #82 for the open
|
|
# design question this leaves.
|
|
#
|
|
# DENY-BY-DEFAULT, NOT A DENY-LIST. A deny-list (name the bad ones, let everything else through) is
|
|
# silently wrong the moment the operator's store gains a new secret — nothing would ever report it.
|
|
# Deny-by-default inverts that: `known` bounds the blast radius to names actually enumerated below,
|
|
# and EVERY one of them is blocked UNLESS it is also in `allow`. Omitting this block entirely (the
|
|
# shipped default) blocks NOTHING — unlike most optional blocks in this file, absence here is a real
|
|
# gap, not a safe "feature off". A name that is neither `known` nor `allow`-ed is not silently let
|
|
# through either: the daemon logs a WARN naming any credential-shaped env var it finds on neither
|
|
# list (never its value), so a secret added to the store later does not go unnoticed forever.
|
|
#
|
|
# policy → "deny-by-default" (the default; also accepted spelled "deny-list") overlays each
|
|
# known-but-not-allowed name BEFORE the pane's login shell runs — real protection only
|
|
# where that shell does not re-export the name (see ROUND-2 CORRECTION above). An
|
|
# unrecognized value refuses to start, naming it.
|
|
# policy → "allow-list" (CB-633) moves the control to a per-spawn ZDOTDIR directory the daemon
|
|
# generates and passes through tab.create's env map. Each generated startup file sources
|
|
# its ~/ counterpart FIRST and then runs the scrub, so the scrub happens after the
|
|
# operator's whole chain and no sourced file can undo it.
|
|
# The scrub is sourced from BOTH the generated .zshrc and the generated .zlogin, because
|
|
# herdr does not open the same kind of shell everywhere: macOS panes run a LOGIN zsh (so
|
|
# .zlogin runs), Linux panes run a plain interactive zsh (so .zlogin never runs at all).
|
|
# A scrub in .zlogin alone would be a control that silently does nothing on Linux.
|
|
# The allow-list is DERIVED, never typed:
|
|
# every profile's tokenEnv/gitTokenEnv/gitHostEnv values and env-map keys, plus an
|
|
# infrastructure set (PATH HOME SHELL TERM LANG LC_* TMPDIR USER LOGNAME PWD SHLVL EDITOR
|
|
# PAGER JAVA_HOME XDG_* ZDOTDIR), plus whatever keys this spawn's own env overlay carries.
|
|
# Adding a profile can therefore only widen the list, never break another spawn's scrub.
|
|
# Under this policy `known`/`allow` below become REPORTING ONLY — they feed the gap WARN,
|
|
# they are no longer a control. If the member's login shell is NOT zsh, the daemon logs a
|
|
# loud WARN saying protection is off and falls back to deny-by-default's overlay.
|
|
# Each pane writes a scrub-report.txt naming how many variables it kept of how many it
|
|
# saw; the daemon logs that "allowed N of M" line when the pane stops. If the report is
|
|
# MISSING the daemon logs a WARN instead — the scrub cannot then be confirmed to have
|
|
# run, and a silently-dead control is exactly what this policy exists to prevent.
|
|
# allow → credential names a member legitimately needs. Under deny-by-default, left OUT of the
|
|
# pane's env overlay entirely, so the value the pane's own (login) shell exports passes
|
|
# through untouched. Under allow-list: reporting only.
|
|
# known → every credential name the operator's store is known to export. Under deny-by-default,
|
|
# every name here NOT also in `allow` is overlaid with a non-secret sentinel value before
|
|
# the pane's login shell runs — real protection only for names that shell does not itself
|
|
# re-export (see the ROUND-2 CORRECTION note above). Under allow-list: reporting only.
|
|
# sshAuthSock → whether SSH_AUTH_SOCK may pass through under allow-list ("allow") or must be
|
|
# blanked like any other non-derived name ("block", the default). This is a decision you
|
|
# have to make explicitly: SSH_AUTH_SOCK is a handle to YOUR ssh-agent, and a member
|
|
# holding it can sign with your keys — it sits in no secret file and looks like no
|
|
# credential, which is why it slipped past three earlier tickets (gitea #110). Blocking
|
|
# it breaks git over SSH inside members (push/fetch authenticate as you); use HTTPS
|
|
# remotes or scoped deploy keys instead of allowing it lightly.
|
|
#
|
|
# HOT-RELOADABLE the same way `fleet:` is (CB-559): read fresh on every spawn, so editing this list
|
|
# and reloading config (or restarting) changes what the NEXT spawn inherits; already-running members
|
|
# are unaffected either way.
|
|
# memberCredentials:
|
|
# policy: deny-by-default # or "deny-list", or "allow-list" (CB-633) — see above
|
|
# sshAuthSock: block # allow-list only; see the sshAuthSock note above
|
|
# allow:
|
|
# - AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN # named in a profile's tokenEnv (local/gx) — a member reaching the
|
|
# # gateway is by design, not a leak
|
|
# - WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN # the repo-scoped forge token a member needs to open its own PR (CB-302)
|
|
# - CONTEXT7_TOKEN # already decided as allowed by CB-593
|
|
# - GITEA_HOST # not a credential — a hostname, paired with the forge token above
|
|
# known:
|
|
# - AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN
|
|
# - BESZEL_ADMIN_EMAIL
|
|
# - BESZEL_ADMIN_PASSWORD
|
|
# - BESZEL_HUB_URL
|
|
# - BESZEL_KEY
|
|
# - BESZEL_UNIVERSAL_TOKEN
|
|
# - BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN
|
|
# - CF_ACCOUNT_ID
|
|
# - CF_API_TOKEN
|
|
# - CF_USER_TOKEN
|
|
# - CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN
|
|
# - CONFLUENCE_USERNAME
|
|
# - CONTEXT7_TOKEN
|
|
# - GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN
|
|
# - GITEA_HOST
|
|
# - GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET
|
|
# - GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN
|
|
# - GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD
|
|
# - GRAFANA_ADMIN_USER
|
|
# - HASS_TOKEN
|
|
# - HW_PASSWORD
|
|
# - HW_USER
|
|
# - LTMS_API_KEY
|
|
# - MEMORY_MCP_TOKEN
|
|
# - METRICS_PUSH_TOKEN
|
|
# - OPENCODE_AUTOMODE_MODEL
|
|
# - TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN
|
|
# - TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID
|
|
# - TS_API_KEY
|
|
# - TS_AUTHKEY
|
|
# - WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN
|
|
|
|
# Spawn-readiness gate (CB-306). The launcher blocks until the worker's herdr status is
|
|
# injectable (IDLE/BLOCKED/DONE) or the timeout elapses. 0 disables the gate.
|
|
# NOTE: keys are camelCase — config is bound by plain Jackson with no naming strategy and
|
|
# unknown keys are ignored, so a snake_case key would be silently dropped (default kept).
|
|
# spawnReadyTimeoutMs: 20000
|
|
# spawnReadyPollMs: 300
|
|
|
|
# Worktree provisioning root (CB-301-ext). Where per-worker git worktrees are checked out so
|
|
# each worker owns an isolated branch instead of sharing the primary's tree. Omit to default
|
|
# to a sibling directory of the repo root.
|
|
# worktreeRoot: /Users/me/src/.bridged-worktrees
|
|
|
|
# Session lifecycle limits (CB-303). All knobs are opt-in; omit or set to null to keep
|
|
# the feature disabled. By default the daemon never reaps, caps, or drains sessions.
|
|
# idleTtlSeconds → reap READY/DONE sessions idle longer than this (never BUSY/SPAWNING)
|
|
# contextCap → force-release a session after this many delegated turns
|
|
# drainTimeoutSeconds → seconds to wait for BUSY sessions on shutdown before forced teardown
|
|
# clearAfterTurn → whether a reusable worker discards its conversation context after every
|
|
# completed delegated turn (default false). Works for claude-code workers
|
|
# only — any other peer kind (e.g. opencode) logs "context reset is
|
|
# unsupported for peer kind …" once and the reset is a no-op.
|
|
# lifecycle:
|
|
# idleTtlSeconds: 300
|
|
# contextCap: 10
|
|
# drainTimeoutSeconds: 5
|
|
# clearAfterTurn: false
|
|
|
|
# Durable reply delivery (CB-307 Stage 2). OMIT this block entirely to keep the default
|
|
# in-memory, soft-state reply inbox (late worker replies are held only until a daemon bounce).
|
|
# Set a broker uri to swap in the AMQP-backed inbox: worker replies with no open send are held
|
|
# on a durable per-target queue (agent.<target>.inbox) and survive a restart — the broker
|
|
# redelivers anything the primary had not yet drained. Production default is LavinMQ; a stock
|
|
# RabbitMQ speaks the same AMQP 0-9-1, so it is a URI-only swap.
|
|
# uri → AMQP connection URI. No trailing slash ⇒ the default vhost "/"; an empty path ("/")
|
|
# is vhost "" and will NOT connect. Encode a named vhost as .../%2Fmyvhost.
|
|
# uriEnv → CB-151: name of a host env var holding the AMQP URI, preferred over `uri` (wins
|
|
# whenever set). The URI carries `user:pass@` inline, so naming a variable keeps the
|
|
# password out of fleetd.yaml — same pattern as auth.tokenEnv/Profile.tokenEnv. A
|
|
# uriEnv that resolves to an unset or blank variable is treated as NOT configured and
|
|
# the daemon falls back to the in-memory inbox, warning loudly.
|
|
# prefetch → CB-527: consumer basicQos, capping how many unacked messages the inbox holds
|
|
# in-heap per owned target (the rest sits on the broker's durable queue instead of
|
|
# growing the JVM heap). Default 32 when omitted.
|
|
# broker:
|
|
# uriEnv: LAVINMQ_URI
|
|
# prefetch: 32
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# Shared cross-host LEADER coordination broker. OMIT this block to leave lead-to-lead messaging
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# off entirely (config-only in this ticket — nothing here wires it into a live LeadMailbox yet).
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# This is a SEPARATE AMQP vhost from `broker:` above: member/worker inboxes always stay on the
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# per-fleet `broker:` vhost, and this vhost carries only leader-to-leader traffic, so two fleets
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# whose members must never see each other can still share one coordination vhost for their leads.
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# uriEnv → name of a host env var holding the coordination AMQP URI, same convention as
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# broker.uriEnv (keeps the credential out of fleetd.yaml). Wins over `uri` when set.
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# selfId → this daemon's own lead coord-id — the name its mailbox is owned under
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# (lead.<selfId>.inbox), e.g. "mac-opus" or "fleet01-lead". Must be globally unique
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# across every daemon sharing this vhost.
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# prefetch → consumer basicQos, capping how many unacked messages the mailbox holds in-heap.
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# Default 32 when omitted.
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# coordinator:
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# uriEnv: LEAD_COORD_URI
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# selfId: mac-opus
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# prefetch: 32
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# Active push-to-primary (CB-307 Stage 3). When a worker reply lands with no open fleet_send,
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# the ReplyPushLoop injects a *drain nudge* (never the payload) into the primary's own herdr
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# pane — status-gated (only when injectable, never mid-turn) and bounded. Ack = drain: the loop
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# stops as soon as the primary's inbox is empty.
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# terminal → pin the primary's herdr terminal id. Omit to learn it from the connection on
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# the first orchestration-side MCP call (the normal case). An off-host or
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# non-herdr primary leaves this unresolved → the loop is a no-op and delivery
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# degrades to pull; the reply is still never lost.
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#
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# REQUIRED (CB-522) if the primary itself runs inside a herdr pane. Caller
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# identity resolves a loopback PID to its herdr pane, and PaneLocator scans
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# EVERY pane — not just bridged-spawned ones — so such a primary is otherwise
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# classified as a WORKER and refused SPAWN/SEND/STOP. That failure is
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# self-locking: the learned terminal is populated by the very orchestration
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# calls being refused, so only this pinned value can break the cycle. Read the
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# id off fleet_whoami (it reports the current terminal even while
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# misclassified) and re-pin whenever the primary moves panes.
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# pushReminders → max nudges before giving up (default 5)
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# pushBackoffMs → delay between nudges in ms (default 15000)
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# primary:
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# terminal: term_65619bd6174568
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# pushReminders: 5
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# pushBackoffMs: 15000
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