#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# CB-596 step 1: measure which credentials a live member actually holds.
#
# The claim under test is that a member's herdr pane starts a LOGIN shell, that shell sources
# ${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh, and so a member inherits every name that file exports — while
# CB-592 blocks exactly one of them (GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN). That is an inference from the code, not a
# measurement, and issue #82 says plainly: do not build a fix on the inference. This is the
# measurement.
#
# WHY THIS IS A SCRIPT AND NOT A COMMAND SOMEONE TYPES
#
# Enumerating credential names inside a member is exactly the action that should need the operator's
# explicit approval, and the command classifier refuses it. That refusal is correct. This script is
# the seam: it is one auditable file the operator can read once, top to bottom, and then run — rather
# than approving an ad-hoc shell pipeline whose behaviour they have to take on trust.
#
# WHAT IT WILL NOT DO
#
#   * It never prints a credential value, and never any prefix or suffix of one. Not one character.
#     Issue #82's criterion 1 asked for a 6-character prefix; this prints a truncated SHA-256 instead.
#     A prefix of a short secret is most of the secret, and it would end up pasted into a ticket. The
#     hash answers every question the prefix was for — is it set, is it the same value as over there,
#     is it the CB-592 sentinel — and answers none of the ones it should not.
#   * It never writes anywhere, never contacts the network, and never touches secrets.sh, which is
#     the operator's file.
#
# HOW TO RUN IT
#
#   1. As the operator, in a member's pane (a spawned worker's terminal):
#        bash scripts/probe-member-credentials.sh
#   2. For the comparison row, in your OWN shell — a lead, not a member:
#        bash scripts/probe-member-credentials.sh --allow-outside-member
#
# The two outputs side by side are the finding: any name whose hash matches between them is a
# credential the member holds in full.
#
set -uo pipefail

# The names ${SHARED_ENV}/tools/secrets.sh exports, recorded on 2026-08-16 (issue #82). Names only —
# this list contains no values and never should. If secrets.sh gains a name, this list goes stale and
# the probe silently stops asking about it; that staleness is itself part of what #82's criterion 4
# has to solve, so it is called out in the summary rather than hidden.
NAMES=(
  AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN BESZEL_ADMIN_EMAIL BESZEL_ADMIN_PASSWORD
  BESZEL_HUB_URL BESZEL_KEY BESZEL_UNIVERSAL_TOKEN
  BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN CF_ACCOUNT_ID CF_API_TOKEN
  CF_USER_TOKEN CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN CONFLUENCE_USERNAME
  CONTEXT7_TOKEN GITEA_HOST GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET
  GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD GRAFANA_ADMIN_USER
  HASS_TOKEN HW_PASSWORD HW_USER
  LTMS_API_KEY MEMORY_MCP_TOKEN METRICS_PUSH_TOKEN
  OPENCODE_AUTOMODE_MODEL TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID
  TS_API_KEY TS_AUTHKEY WORKER_GITEA_TOKEN
  GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN
)

allow_outside=0
for arg in "$@"; do
  case "$arg" in
    --allow-outside-member) allow_outside=1 ;;
    -h|--help) sed -n '2,40p' "$0"; exit 0 ;;
    *) echo "unknown argument: $arg" >&2; exit 2 ;;
  esac
done

if [ "${BRIDGED_MEMBER:-}" != "1" ] && [ "$allow_outside" -eq 0 ]; then
  cat >&2 <<'EOF'
refusing to run: BRIDGED_MEMBER is not 1, so this is not a member's shell.

The finding this probe exists for is what a MEMBER holds. Run it in a spawned worker's pane. If you
meant to take the comparison reading from your own shell, pass --allow-outside-member and the output
will be labelled as such.
EOF
  exit 1
fi

# Prefer sha256sum (Linux), fall back to shasum (macOS). If neither exists, report presence and
# length only — degraded, but never a value.
hasher=""
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  hasher="sha256sum"
elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  hasher="shasum -a 256"
fi

digest() { # value -> first 12 hex chars of its sha256, or "-" when no hasher is available
  [ -z "$hasher" ] && { printf '%s' "-"; return; }
  printf '%s' "$1" | $hasher | cut -c1-12
}

if [ "${BRIDGED_MEMBER:-}" = "1" ]; then
  where="MEMBER (BRIDGED_MEMBER=1)"
else
  where="NOT a member — comparison reading only"
fi

echo "CB-596 credential probe"
echo "reading from : $where"
echo "shell        : ${SHELL:-unknown}"
echo "hash         : ${hasher:-none available — lengths only}"
# Only printed so the two readings can be told apart when they are pasted side by side.
echo "host         : $(hostname 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)"
echo
printf '%-30s %-7s %6s  %s\n' "NAME" "STATE" "LEN" "SHA256-12"
printf '%-30s %-7s %6s  %s\n' "------------------------------" "-------" "------" "------------"

set_count=0
for name in "${NAMES[@]}"; do
  value="${!name:-}"
  if [ -z "$value" ]; then
    printf '%-30s %-7s %6s  %s\n' "$name" "unset" "-" "-"
  else
    set_count=$((set_count + 1))
    printf '%-30s %-7s %6s  %s\n' "$name" "SET" "${#value}" "$(digest "$value")"
  fi
done

echo
echo "$set_count of ${#NAMES[@]} names are set in this shell."
echo
cat <<'EOF'
How to read this:

  * Take the MEMBER reading and the comparison reading, and line them up. A name whose SHA256-12
    matches on both sides is a credential the member holds in full. That is the finding.
  * GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN is the control. CB-592 replaces it with a blocked sentinel, so its hash
    should DIFFER between the two readings. If it matches, CB-592 is not working and that is the
    most urgent thing on this page.
  * AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN matching is expected and correct, not a leak: bridged.yaml names it in
    `tokenEnv:` for the local and gx profiles, so a member reaching the gateway is by design.
  * A name that is set here but is NOT in the list above will not appear at all. The list was
    recorded on 2026-08-16 and does not update itself. Anything added to secrets.sh since then is
    invisible to this probe — which is the same gap issue #82 criterion 4 asks to close properly.
EOF