fleetd #266: rename SSH agent environment setting

fleetd/fleetd.example.yaml

@@ -676,8 +676,8 @@ guard:
 #            every name here NOT also in `allow` is overlaid with a non-secret sentinel value before
 #            the pane's login shell runs — real protection only for names that shell does not itself
 #            re-export (see the ROUND-2 CORRECTION note above). Under allow-list: reporting only.
-#   sshAuthSock → whether SSH_AUTH_SOCK may pass through under allow-list ("allow") or is omitted
-#            from the member environment ("block", the default). Blocking it only omits the
+#   sshAgentEnv → whether SSH_AUTH_SOCK may pass through under allow-list ("inherit") or is omitted
+#            from the member environment ("omit", the default). Omitting it only omits the
 #            inherited ssh-agent path. It discourages automatic use of the operator's agent.
 #            It does not deny same-user access to that socket. It also does not block SSH keys that
 #            are readable on disk. Git over SSH may still work from inside a member. Keep the block:
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ guard:
 #            confidentiality boundary. A real boundary needs a different OS user or OS-level
 #            confinement, such as a container or VM. That is the open question in fleetd #184.
 #
-#            Still do not set this to "allow" casually. SSH_AUTH_SOCK is a live handle to YOUR
+#            Still do not set this to "inherit" casually. SSH_AUTH_SOCK is a live handle to YOUR
 #            ssh-agent, so a member holding it can sign with EVERY key the agent holds. It sits in
 #            no secret file and looks like no credential, which is why it slipped past three
 #            earlier tickets (gitea #110). Blocking it does not contain a member, but allowing it
@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ guard:
 # are unaffected either way.
 # memberCredentials:
 #   policy: deny-by-default        # or "deny-list", or "allow-list" (CB-633) — see above
-#   sshAuthSock: block             # allow-list only; see the sshAuthSock note above
+#   sshAgentEnv: omit              # allow-list only; see the sshAgentEnv note above
 #   allow:
 #     - AI_GATEWAY_TOKEN     # named in a profile's tokenEnv (local/gx) — a member reaching the
 #                            # gateway is by design, not a leak